



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

Princeton University Library
32101 067672715

LIBRARY
OF
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

ORIGINES SACRAE:
OR A
Rational Account of the Grounds
OF THE
CHRISTIAN FAITH,
AS TO THE
T R U T H
AND
Divine Authority
OF THE
S C R I P T U R E S,
And the Matters therein contain'd.

By EDWARD STILLINGFLEET, M. A.

2 Pet. 1. 26. For we have not followed cunningly devised Fables, when we made known to you the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but were eye-witnesses of his Majesty.

Neque religio ulla sine sapientia suscipienda est, nec ulla sine religione probanda sapientia. Lactant. de fals. relig. cap. 1.

C A M B R I D G E,

Printed at the University-Press, for HENRY MORTLOCK,
at the Sign of the *Phoenix* in St. Paul's Church-yard. 1701.

~~XXXXA~~
(RCPPG)

5131

.882

To his most Honor'd FRIEND
And PATRON,
Sr. ROGER BOURGOINE,
Knight and Baronet.

S I R,

IT was the early felicity of *Moses*, when expos'd in an Ark of *Nilotic papyre*, to be adopted into the favor of so great a Personage as the Daughter of *Pharaoh*: Such another Ark is this Vindication of the Writings of that Divine and Excellent Person expos'd to the World in; and the greatest ambition of the Author of it is, to have it receiv'd into your Patronage and Protection. But altho' the Contexture and Frame of this Treatise be far below the excellency and worth of the subject (as you know the Ark in which *Moses* was put, *was of bulrushes daubed with slime and pitch*) yet when You please to cast your eye on the matter contain'd in it, you will not think it beneath your Favor, and unworthy your Protection. For if Truth be the greatest present which GOD could bestow, or Man receive (according to that of *Plutarch*, 'Ως ἐστὲν αὐτῷ *Plutarch. de Isid. & ὁρῶν λαβεῖν μᾶλλον, ἢ χαλεπώτατον Θεῷ σεμνότερον ἀληθείας*) then certainly those Truths deserve our most ready acceptance, which are in themselves of greatest importance, and have the greatest evidence that they come from GOD. And altho' I have had the happiness of so near relation to You, as to know how little You need such discourses which tend to settle the Foundations of Religion, which you have rais'd so happy a Superstructure upon; yet withal I consider what particular kindness the Souls of all good Men bear to such designs, whose end is to assert and vindicate the Truth and Excellency of Religion. For those who are enrich'd themselves with the inestimable Treasure of true Goodness and Piety are far from that envious temper, to think nothing valuable but what they are the sole possessors of; but such are the most satisfy'd themselves, when they see others not only

The Epistle Dedicatory.

admire but enjoy what they have the highest estimation of. Were all who make a shew of Religion in the World really such as they pretend to be, Discourses of this nature would be no more seasonable, than the commendations of a great Beauty to one who is already a passionate admirer of it; but on the contrary we see how common it is for Men first to throw Dirt in the face of Religion, and then persuade themselves it is its natural Complexion; they represent it to themselves in a shape least pleasing to them, and then bring that as a Plea why they give it no better entertainment.

It may justly seem strange, that true Religion, which contains nothing in it but what is truly Noble and Generous, most rational and pleasing to the Spirits of all good Men, should yet suffer so much in its esteem in the World, thro' those strange and uncouth vizards it is represented under. Some accounting the life and practice of it, as it speaks subduing our Wills to the Will of GOD (which is the substance of all Religion) a thing too low and mean for their Rank and Condition in the World; while others pretend a quarrel against the Principles of it, as unsatisfactory to Human Reason. Thus Religion suffers with the Author of it between two Thieves; and it is hard to define which is more injurious to it, that which questions the Principles, or that which despiseth the Practice of it. And nothing certainly will more incline Men to believe that we live in an Age of Prodigies, than that there should be any such in the Christian World, who should account it a piece of Gentility to despise Religion, and a piece of Reason to be *Atheists*. For if there be any such thing in the World as a true height and magnanimity of Spirit, if there be any solid Reason and depth of Judgment, they are not only consistent with, but only attainable by a true generous Spirit of Religion. But if we look at that which the loose and profane World is apt to account the greatest Gallantry, we shall find it made up of such pitiful ingredients, which any skilful and rational Mind will be ashamed to plead for, much less to mention them in competition with true Goodness and unfeign'd Piety. For how easy is it to observe such who would be accounted the most high and gallant Spirits, to quarry on such mean preys, which only tend to satisfy their brutish appetites, or flesh Revenge with the Blood of such who have stood in the way of that airy title, *Honor*! Or else they are so little apprehensive

The Epistle Dedicatory.

prehensive of the inward worth and excellency of Human Nature, that they seem to envy the gallantry of Peacocks, and strive to outvy them in the gayety of their Plumes; such who are, as *Seneca* saith, *ad similitudinem parietum extrinsecus culti*, who imitate the Walls of their Houses in the fairness of the outside, but matter not what rubbish there lies within. The utmost of their ambition is to attain *enervatam felicitatem quam permadescunt animi*, such a felicity as evigorates the Soul by too long steeping, it being the nature of all terrestrial pleasures, that they do *Ἐκτίνειν ἢ ἀνυγεγίνων τὸ φρονεῖν*, by degrees consume Reason, by effeminating and softening the Intellectuals. Must we appeal then to the judgment of *Sardanapalus* concerning the nature of Felicity, or inquire of *Apicius* what Temperance is? or desire that *Sybarite* to define Magnanimity, who fainted to see a Man at hard labor?

Or doth now the conquest of Passions, forgiving Injuries, doing good, Self-denial, Humility, Patience under crosses, which are the real expressions of Piety, speak nothing more noble and generous than a luxurious, malicious, proud, and impatient Spirit? Is there nothing more becoming and agreeable to the Soul of Man, in exemplary Piety, and a Holy well-ordered Conversation, than the lightness and vanity (not to say rudeness and debaucheries) of those whom the World accounts the greatest Gallants? Is there nothing more graceful and pleasing in the sweetness, candor, and ingenuity of a truly Christian temper and disposition, than in the revengeful, implacable Spirit of such whose Honor lives and is fed by the Blood of their Enemies? Is it not more truly honorable and glorious to serve that God who commands the World, than to be a slave to those passions and lusts which put Men upon continual hard service, and torment them for it when they have done it? Were there nothing else to commend Religion to the Minds of Men, besides that tranquillity and calmness of Spirit, that serene and peaceable temper which follow a good Conscience where-ever it dwells, it were enough to make Men welcome that Guest which brings such good entertainment with it. Whereas the amazements, horrors, and anxieties of Mind, which at one time or other haunt such who prostitute their Consciences to a violation of the Laws of God, and the Rules of rectify'd Reason, may be enough to persuade any rational Person, that Impiety is the greatest folly, and Irreligion, madness.

The Epistle Dedicatory.

It cannot be then but matter of great pity to consider that any Persons, whose Birth and education hath rais'd them above the common People of the World, should be so far their own enemies, as to observe the Fashion more than the Rules of Religion, and to study Complements more than Themselves, and read Romances more than the sacred Scriptures, *which alone are able to make them wise unto salvation.*

But SIR, I need not mention these things to You, unless it be to let you see the excellency of your choice, in preferring true Virtue and Piety above the Ceremony and Grandeur of the World. Go on, SIR, to value and measure true Religion, not by the uncertain measures of the World, but by the infallible dictates of GOD himself in his sacred Oracles. Were it not for these, what certain foundation could there be for our Faith to stand on? and who durst venture his Soul, as to its future condition, upon any Authority less than the infallible veracity of GOD himself? What certain directions for practice should we have, what Rule to judg of Opinions by, had not GOD out of his infinite Goodness provided and preserved this authentic Instrument of his Will to the World? What a strange Religion would Christianity seem, should we frame the Model of it from any other thing than the Word of GOD? Without all controversy the disesteem of the Scriptures upon any pretense whatsoever, is the decay of Religion, and thro' many windings and turnings leads Men at last into the very depth of Atheism. Whereas the frequent and serious conversing with the Mind of GOD in his Word is incomparably useful, not only for keeping up in us a true notion of Religion (which is easily mistaken, when Men look upon the face of it in any other glass than that of the Scriptures) but likewise for maintaining a powerful sense of Religion in the Soul of Men, and a due valuation of it, whatever its esteem or entertainment be in the World. For tho' the true genuine Spirit of Christianity (which is known by the purity and peaceableness of it) should grow never so much out of credit with the World, yet none who heartily believe the Scripture to be the Word of GOD, and that the Matters reveal'd therein are infallibly true, will ever have the less estimation of it. It must be confess'd that the credit of Religion hath much suffer'd in the Age we live in thro' the vain pretenses of many to it, who have only acted a part in it for the sake of some private interests of their own. And
it

Books written by the Right Reverend Father in God Edw. Stillingfleet, D. D. late L. Bishop of Worcester, and sold by Henry Mortlock at the Phoenix in St. Paul's Church-yard.

A Rational Account of the Grounds of the Protestant Religion; being a Vindication of the Lord Archbishop of *Canterbury's* Relation of a Conference, &c. from the pretended Answer of T. G. Wherein the true Grounds of Faith are cleared, and the false discovered, and the Church of *England* vindicated from the imputation of Schism; and the most important Controversies between us and those of the Church of *Rome* thoroughly examined. The second Edition, Fol.

Origines Britanica, Or, The Antiquities of the *British* Churches, with a Preface concerning some pretended Antiquities relating to *Britain*, in vindication of the Bishop of *St. Asaph*, Fol.

Origines Sacrae, Or a Rational Account of the Grounds of the Christian Faith, as to the Truth and Divine Authority of the Scriptures, and the matters therein contained, Fol. with large Additions.

Iremicum, A Weapon-salve for the Church's wound, Quarto.

The Unreasonableness of Separation, Or, An Impartial Account of the History, Nature and Pleas of the present Separation from the Communion of the Church of *England*. Second Edition, Quarto.

A Discourse concerning the Unreasonableness of a new Separation on account of the Oath, with an Answer to the History of Passive Obedience, Quarto.

A Letter to Mr. G. giving a true Account of a late Conference at the D. of P's.

A second Letter to Mr. G. in answer to two Letters lately published concerning the Conference at the D. of P's.

A Discourse concerning the Nature and Grounds of the certainty of Faith, in answer to J. S. his Catholic Letters.

The Doctrines and Practices of the Church of *Rome*, timely represented; in answer to a Book intitled, A Papist Mis-represented and Represented, &c. Quarto.

An Answer to some Papers lately printed, concerning the Authority of the Catholic Church in matters of Faith, and the Reformation of the Church of *England*. Quarto.

A Vindication of the Answer to some Papers lately printed, concerning the Authority of the Catholic Church in matters of Faith, and the Reformation of the Church of *England*. Quarto.

The Doctrine of the Trinity and Transubstantiation compared as to Scripture, Reason, and Tradition: In a new Dialogue between a Protestant and a Papist. Part 1st. Quarto.

The Doctrine of the Trinity and Transubstantiation compared, &c. Part 2d. Quarto.

The Council of *Trent* examin'd and disprov'd by Catholic Tradition, in the main Points in Controversy between Us and the Church of *Rome*; with a particular Account of the Times and Occasions of Introducing them. Part I. To which a Preface is prefixed concerning the true sense of the Council of *Trent*, and the Notion of *Transubstantiation*.

A Discourse concerning the Idolatry practis'd in the Church of *Rome*, and the hazard of Salvation in the Communion of it, Octavo.

An Answer to several Treatises occasioned by a Book entituled, A Discourse concerning the Idolatry practis'd in the Church of *Rome*, and the hazard of Salvation in the Communion of it: Part I. Octavo.

A second Discourse in vindication of the Protestant Grounds of Faith, against the pretence of Infallibility in the *Roman* Church, in answer to the Guide in Controversy, by R. H. Professancy without Principles, and Reason and Religion; or the certain Rule of Faith,

by E. W. with a particular Inquiry into the Miracles of the *Roman* Church, Octavo.

An Answer to Mr. Cressy's Epistle apologetical to a Person of Honor, touching his Vindication of Dr. Stillingfleet, Octavo.

A Defence of the Discourse concerning the Idolatry practis'd in the Church of *Rome*, in answer to a Book entituled, Catholics no Idolaters, Octavo.

Several Conferences between a *Roman* Priest, a Phanatick Chaplain, and a Divine of the Church of *England*; being a full Answer to the late Dialogues of T. G. Octavo.

A Discourse concerning Bonds of Resignation of Benefices in point of Law and Conscience, Octavo.

A Discourse concerning the Illegality of the Ecclesiastical Commission, in answer to the Vindication and Defence of it: wherein the true notion of the Legal Supremacy is cleared; and an Account is given of the Nature, Original and Mischief of the Dispensing Power.

The Grand Question concerning the Bishops Right to vote in Parliament in Cases Capital, stated and argued, from the Parliament Rolls and History of former times; with an Inquiry into their Peerage, and Three Estates in Parliament, Octavo.

Two Discourses concerning the Doctrine of *Christ's* Satisfaction; Or, The true Reasons of his Sufferings; wherein the *Socinian* and *Antinomian* Controversies are truly stated and explained: To which is added, a Sermon concerning the Mysteries of the Christian Faith, preached April 17. 1691. With a Preface concerning the true state of the Controversy about *Christ's* Satisfaction. The second Edition, Octavo.

Sermons preached upon several Occasions, in four Volumes, Octavo.

A Discourse in vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity: with an Answer to the late *Socinian* Objections against it, from Scripture, Antiquity and Reason. And a Preface concerning the different Explications of the Trinity, and the tendency of the present *Socinian* Controversy. The second Edition, Octavo.

The Bishop of *Worcester's* Answer to Mr. Lock's Letter concerning some Passages relating to his Essay of Humane Understanding, mention'd in the late Discourse in vindication of the Trinity. With a Postscript to some Reflections made on that Treatise in a late *Socinian* Pamphlet.

An Answer to Mr. Lock's second Letter; wherein his Notion of *Ideas* is proved to be inconsistent with itself, and with the Articles of the Christian Faith, 8vo.

Ecclesiastical Cases relating to the Duties and Rights of the Parochial Clergy, stated and resolv'd according to the Principles of Conscience and Law, Octavo.

The Rule of Faith: Or, An Answer to the Treatise of Mr. J. S. entituled, *Sure-footing*, &c. by John Tillotson, D. D. to which is adjoyned a Reply to Mr. J. S's third Appendix, &c. by Edward Stillingfleet, D. D.

A Letter to a Deist, in Answer to several Objections against the Truth and Authority of the Scriptures, 8vo.

The Effigies of the Right Reverend Father in God, Edward Lord Bishop of *Worcester*, Engraven on a Copper-plate, by Robert White, in Fol. price 1s.

A Catalogue of other Books, sold by Henry Mortlock.

The Antiquities of *Nottinghamshire*, extracted out of Records, Original Evidences, Lieger-Books, and other Manuscripts, and Authentick Authorities; beautified with Maps, Prospects and Pourtraictures; by Rob. Thomson Dr. of Physick, Fol.

Series

A Catalogue of Books Printed and Sold by Henry Mortlock.

Series Chronologica, Olympiadum, Pythiadum, Isthmiadum, Nemeadum, Quibus veteres Graeci Tempora sua metiebantur, per *Gulielmum Lloyd*, A. M. Episcopi *Wigornensis* filium, Fol.

Cambridge Concordance.

Comber on the Common-Prayer.

Cowley's Works.

Prince *Arthur*, by Sir *Richard Blackmore*.

—His Paraphrase on the Book of *Job*, &c.

Dryden's Fables.

—His Works in 2 Vol.

Knowledge and Practice; Or, A plain Discourse of the chief things necessary to be known, believed and practised, in order to Salvation, with a Supplement, and several Additions, by *Samuel Cradock*. A Book necessary to be read in Families. Fol.

The Folly and Unreasonableness of Atheism demonstrated from the advantage and pleasure of a Religious Life: The Faculties of Human Souls: The Structure of Animate Bodies, and the Origin and Frame of the World; in eight Sermons: Preached at the Lecture, founded by the Honorable *Robert Boyle*, Esq; in the first Year, 1692.

Of Revelation, and the *Messias*: A Sermon preached at the Publick Commencement at *Cambridge*, July the 5th. 1696. Both by *Richard Bentsley*, D.D. Chaplain in Ordinary, Library-Keeper to his Majesty, and Master of *Trinity* College in *Cambridge*.

An Historical Examination of the Authority of General Councils, shewing the False Dealing that hath been used in the publishing of them; and the Difference of the *Papists* themselves about their Number. The second Edition corrected, Quarto. By *Rob. Jenkins*, late Fellow of *St. John's* College in *Cambridge*.

The Restoring of Fallen Brethren; containing the Substance of two Sermons on *Gal. VI. 1, 2.* preached at the Performance of Publick Penance, by certain Criminals, on the Lord's Day, usually called *Mid-Lent-Sunday* 1696. in the Parish-Church of *Old Swinford* in *Worcestershire*; by *Simon Ford*, D.D. and Rector there: with a Preface, by the Right Reverend Father in God *Edward* Lord Bishop of *Worcester*.

Some Discourses, Sermons and Remains of the Reverend Mr. *Glanvil*, late Rector of *Bathe*, and Chaplain in Ordinary to his Majesty; collected into one Volume, and published by *Anthony Horneck*, D. D. Preacher at the *Savoy*; with a Sermon preached at his Funeral, by *Joseph Pleydel* Archdeacon of *Chichester*, Quarto.

The Countreyman's Recreation; Or, The Art of Planting, Grafting and Gardening, Quarto.

The Unreasonableness of a Separation from the new Bishops; Or, A Treatise about Ecclesiastical History, shewing that although a Bishop was unjustly deprived, neither he nor the Church ever made a Separation, if the Successor was not an Heretick, Quarto.

The Case of Sees vacant by an Unjust or Uncanonical Deprivation, stated; in Reply to a Treatise entitled, A Vindication of the Deprived Bishops, &c. together with the several other Pamphlets lately published as Answers to the *Baroccian* Treatise; both by *Humphry Hody*, D. D. Fellow of *Wadham* Coll. in *Oxford*, and *Greek Professor*.

The Hopes of a Resurrection asserted, and applied in a Sermon preached *December 4th. 1700.* at the Interment of Mr. *Tho. Wright*; wherein are some occasional Reflections on the Abuse of Funeral Sermons, by *Philip Stubbs* M. A. late Fellow of *Wadham* Coll. *Oxon.* now Rector of *St. Alphage, London*.

A Discourse concerning the Nature of Idolatry; in which a late Author's true and only Notion of Idolatry is considered and confuted, Quarto.

Protestant Certainty, Or, A short Treatise shewing how a Protestant may be well assured of the Articles of his Faith, Quarto.

Veteres Vindicati: In an Expostulatory Letter to Mr. *Sclater* of *Putney*, upon his *Consensus Veterum*, &c.

wherein the absurdity of his Method, and the weakness of his Reasons are shewn; His false Aspersions upon the Church of *England* are wiped off, and her Faith concerning the *Eucharist* proved to be that of the Primitive Church: Together with Animadversions on *Dean Boileau's* French Translation of, and Remarks upon *Bertram*.

An Answer to the Compiler of *Nubes Testium*: Wherein is shewn, That Antiquity (in relation to the Points in Controversy set down by him) did not for the first five hundred years believe, teach and practice as the Church of *Rome* doth at present believe, teach and practice; Together with a Vindication of *Veteres Vindicati*, from the late weak and disingenuous Attempts of the Author of Transubstantiation defended, by the Author of the Answer to Mr. *Sclater* of *Putney*.

A Letter to Father *Lewis Sabran* Jesuit, in answer to his Letter to a Peer of the Church of *England*; wherein the Postscript to the Answer to the *Nubes Testium* is vindicated, and Father *Sabran's* Mistakes farther discovered.

A second Letter to Father *Lewis Sabran* Jesuit, in answer to his Reply.

A Vindication of the Principles of the Author of the Answer to the Compiler of *Nubes Testium*, in answer to a late pretended Letter from a Dissenter to the Divines of the Church of *England*. These five by Dr. *Gee*, Chaplain in Ordinary to his Majesty.

A Dissertation upon the Epistles of *Phalaris*: with an Answer to the Objections of the Honorable *Charles Boyle*, Esq; by *Richard Bentsley*, D. D. Master of *Trinity* Coll. in *Cambridge*, Octavo. To which may be added a Chronological Account of the Life of *Pythagoras* and other Famous Men his Contemporaries; with an Epistle to the Reverend Dr. *Bentley* about *Porphyry's* and *Jamblichus's* Lives of *Pythagoras*; by the Right Reverend Father in God *William L.* Bishop of *Worcester*.

Ten Sermons preached before her Royal Highness the Princess *Anne* of *Denmark*, at the Chappel at *St. James's*; by *Lewis Atterbury*, L. L. D. and one of the Six Preachers to her Royal Highness.

The Happy Ascetick, or the Best Exercise; together with Prayers suitable to each Exercise: To which is added a Letter to a Person of Quality, concerning the Holy Lives of the Primitive Christians, Octavo.

Delight and Judgment represented, in a Discourse concerning the great Day of Judgment, and its power to damp and embitter Sensual Delights, Sports and Recreations, Octavo.

The Exercise of Prayer; Or, A Help to Devotion: containing Prayers and Devotions for several occasions. These three by *Anthony Horneck*, D. D. late Preacher at the *Savoy*.

Several Essays in Political Arithmetick, concerning the multiplication of Mankind and the growth of the City of *London*: Observations on the *Dublin* Bills, or Accounts of the Houses, Hearths, Baptisms and Burials in that City: Concerning the People, Housing, Hospitals, &c. of *London* and *Paris*, proving that *London* has as many People as *Paris, Rome* and *Rouen* put together; with a Discourse concerning the Extent and Value of Lands, People, Buildings, Husbandry, Manufactures, Commerce, Fishery, Artizans, Seamen, Souldiers, Publick Revenues, Interest, Taxes, &c. as the same relates to every Countrey in general, but more particularly to the Territories of his Majesty of *Great Britain, Holland, Zealand* and *France*; by Sir *William Petty*, late Fellow of the Royal Society, Octavo.

The Clerk's Tutor in Chancery, giving true Directions by Authentick Precedents how to draw Affidavits, Interlocutory Orders, Reports before Masters, Bills, Answers, Pleas and Demurrers, with such Processes, Proceedings and other Instruments relating thereto, &c. To which is prefixed an Introduction with some Cases of Note, &c. The Third Edition, with large Additions.

The Epistle Dedicatory.

it is the usual *Logic of Atheists, Crimine ab uno Disce omnes*; if there be any hypocrites, all who make shew of Religion are such; on which account *the Hypocrisy of one Age makes way for the Atheism of the next*. But how unreasonable and unjust that Imputation is, there needs not much to discover, unless it be an argument there are no true Men in the World, because there are so many Apes which imitate them; or that there are no Jewels, because there are so many counterfeits. And blessed be GOD, our Age is not barren of instances of real goodness and unaffected Piety; there being some such generous Spirits as dare love Religion without the dowry of Interest, and manifest their affection to it in the plain dress of the Scriptures, without the paint and set-offs, which are added to it by the several contending parties of the Christian World. Were there more such noble Spirits of Religion in our Age, *Atheism* would want one of the greatest pleas which it now makes against the truth of Religion; for nothing enlarges more the Gulf of *Atheism*, than that *Μεγα χάσμα*, *wide passage* which lies between the Faith and Lives of Men pretending to be Christians. I must needs say there is nothing seems more strange and unaccountable to me, than that the practice of the unquestionable duties of *Christianity* should be put out of countenance, or slighted by any who own, profess, and contend for the Principles of it. Can the profession of that be honorable, whose practice is not? *If the Principles be true, why are they not practis'd? If they be not true, why are they profess'd?*

You see, SIR, to what an unexpected length my desire to vindicate the Honor as well as Truth of Religion, hath drawn out this present Address. But I may sooner hope for your pardon in it, than if I had spent so much paper after the usual manner of Dedications, in representing You to Your self, or the World. SIR, I know You have too much of that I have been commending, to delight in Your own deserv'd Praises, much less in Flatteries, which so benign a subject might easily make one's pen run over in. And therein I might not much have digress'd from my design, since I know few more exemplary for that rare mixture of true Piety, and the highest Civility together, in whom that inestimable Jewel of Religion is plac'd in a most sweet, affable, and obliging temper. But
altho'

The Epistle Dedicatory.

altho' none will be more ready on any occasion with all gratitude to acknowledg the great obligations You have laid upon me; yet I am so far sensible of the common vanity of *Epistles Dedicatory*, that I cannot so heartily comply with them in any thing, as in my hearty prayers to the Almighty for your good and welfare, and in subscribing my self,

S I R,

Your most humble

June 5.
1662.

and affectionate Servant,

ED. STILLINGFLEET.

THE

THE
P R E F A C E
T O T H E
R E A D E R.

IT is neither to satisfy the importunity of Friends, nor to prevent false Copies (which and such like excuses I know are expected in usual Prefaces) that I have adventured abroad this following Treatise: but it is out of a just resentment of the affronts and indignities which have been cast on Religion, by such who account it a matter of judgment to disbelieve the Scriptures, and a piece of wit to dispute themselves out of the possibility of being happy in another World: When yet the more acute and subtile their arguments are, the greater their strength is against themselves; it being impossible there should be so much wit and subtilty in the Souls of Men, were they not of a more excellent Nature than they imagin them to be. And how contradictory is it for such Persons to be ambitious of being cry'd up for Wit and Reason, whose design is to degrade the rational Soul so far below her self, as to make her become like the Beasts that perish! If now the weight and consequence of the subject, and the too great seasonableness of it (if the common fame of the large spread of Atheism among us be true) be not sufficient Apology for the publishing this Book, I am resolv'd rather to undergo thy censure, than be beholding to any other. The intendment therefore of this Preface is only to give a brief account of the scope, design, and method of the following Books, altho' the view of the Contents of the Chapters might sufficiently acquaint thee with it. How far I have been either from transcribing, or a design to excuse out of the hands of their admirers, the several Writings on the behalf of Religion in general, or Christianity in particular (especially Mor- nay, GROTIUS, Amyraldus, &c.) may easily appear by comparing what is contain'd in their Books and this together. Had I not thought something might be said, if not more fully and rationally, yet more suitably to the present temper of this Age, than what is already written by them, thou hadst not been troubled with this Preface, much less with the whole Book. But as the Tempers and Genius's of Ages and Times alter, so do the arms and weapons which Atheists imploy against Religion: the most popular pretenses of the Atheists of our Age, have
b been

The Preface to the Reader.

been the irreconcilableness of the account of Times in Scripture, with that of the learned and ancient Heathen Nations; the inconsistency of the belief of the Scriptures with the Principles of Reason; and the account which may be given of the Origin of things from Principles of Philosophy without the Scriptures: These three therefore I have particularly set my self against, and directed against each of them a several Book. In the first I have manifested that there is no ground of credibility in the account of ancient times given by any Heathen Nations different from the Scriptures, which I have with so much care and diligence inquir'd into, that from thence we may hope to hear no more of Men before Adam to save the Authority of the Scriptures by, which yet was intended only as a design to undermine them; but I have not thought the frivolous pretences of the Author of that Hypothesis worth particular mentioning, supposing it sufficient to give a clear account of things without particular citation of Authors, where it was not of great concernment for understanding the thing it self. In the second Book I have undertaken to give a rational account of the grounds, why we are to believe those several Persons, who in several Ages were employ'd to reveal the Mind of GOD to the World; and with greater particularity than hath yet been us'd, I have insisted on the Persons of Moses, and the Prophets, our Savior and his Apostles, and in every of them manifested the rational evidences on which they were to be believ'd, not only by the Men of their own Age, but by those of succeeding Generations. In the third Book I have insisted on the matters themselves, which are either suppos'd by, or reveal'd in the Scriptures; and have therein not only manifested the certainty of the foundations of all Religion, which lye in the Being of GOD and Immortality of the Soul, but the undoubted truth of those particular accounts concerning the Origin of the Universe, of Evil, and of Nations, which were most liable to the Atheists exceptions, and have therein consider'd all the pretences of Philosophy Ancient or Modern, which have seem'd to contradict any of them; to which (*manifeste loco*) I have added the Evidence of Scripture-History in the remainders of it in Heathen Mythology, and concluded all with a Discourse of the excellency of the Scriptures. Thus having given a brief view of the Design and Method of the whole, I submit it to every free and unprejudic'd judgment. All the favor then I shall request of thee is, to read seriously, and judg impartially; and then I doubt not but thou wilt see as much reason for Religion as I do.

THE

THE CONTENTS.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

The Obscurity and Defect of Ancient History.

I, II, III, IV. *The knowledge of Truth proved to be the most natural perfection of the Rational Soul;* V. *Yet Error often mistaken for Truth: the Accounts of it.* VI. *Want of Diligence in its search;* VII, VIII. *The mixture of Truth and Falshood: Thence comes either rejecting Truth for the Error's sake, or embracing the Error for the Truth's sake;* IX. *The first instanced in Heathen Philosophers,* XIII. *The second in Vulgar Heathen.* X, XI, XII. *Of Philosophical Atheism, and the grounds of it.* XIV. *The History of Antiquity very obscure.* XV. *The Question stated, where the true History of Ancient Times is to be found? In Heathen Histories, or only in Scripture?* XVI. *The want of credibility in Heathen Histories asserted, and proved by the general defect for want of timely Records among Heathen Nations; the reason of it shewed from the first Plantations of the World.* XVII. *The manner of them discovered. The Original of Civil Government.* XVIII. *Of Hieroglyphics.* XIX. *The use of Letters among the Greeks no elder than Cadmus;* XX. *His Time inquired into: no elder than Joshua:* XXI. *The Learning brought into Greece by him.* p. 1

CHAP. II.

Of the Phœnician and Egyptian History.

I. *The particular defect in the History of the most learned Heathen Nations.* II. *First the Phœnicians. Of Sanchoniathon, his Antiquity and Fidelity.* III. *Of Jerom-baal, Baal-Berith.* IV. *The Antiquity of Tyre. Scaliger vindicated against Bochartus.* V. *Abibalus.* VI. *The vanity of Phœnician Theology.* VII. *The imitation of it by the Gnostics.* VIII. *Of the Egyptian History.* IX. *The Antiquity and Authority of Hermes Trismegistus.* X. *Of his Inscriptions on Pillars, transcribed by Manetho.* XI. *His Fabulousness thence discovered. Terra Seriadica.* XII. *Of Seth's Pillars in Josephus, and an account whence they were taken.* p. 17

The CONTENTS.

CHAP. III.

Of the Chaldean History.

- I. *The contest of Antiquity among Heathen Nations, and the ways of deciding it.* II. *Of the Chaldean Astrology, and the foundation of Judicial Astrology.* III. *Of the Zabii, their Founder, who they were; no other than the old Chaldees.* IV. *Of Berosus and his History.* V. *An Account of the fabulous Dynasties of Berosus and Manetho.* VI. *From the Translation of the Scripture-history into Greek in the time of Ptolemee.* VII. *Of that Translation and the time of it.* VIII. *Of Demetrius Phalereus. Scaliger's Arguments answered.* IX. *Manetho writ after the Septuagint, proved against Kircher; his arguments answered. Of Rabbinical Arabic Authors, and their little credit in matter of History.* X. *The time of Berosus inquired into; his writing contemporary with Philadelphus.*

p. 27

CHAP. IV.

The defect of the Grecian History.

- I. *That manifested by three evident arguments of it. (1.) The fabulousness of the Poetical age of Greece. The Antiquity of Poetry.* II. *Of Orpheus and the ancient Poets. Whence the Poetical Fables borrowed.* III. *The advancement of Poetry and Idolatry together in Greece.* IV. *The different censures of Strabo and Eratosthenes concerning the Poetical age of Greece; and the reasons of them.* V. (2.) *The eldest Historians of Greece are of suspected credit. Of Damastes, Aristeus, and others; VI. Of most of their eldest Historians we have nothing left but their Names, of others only the Subjects they treated of, and some Fragments.* VIII. (3.) *Those that are extant either confess their ignorance of eldest times, or plainly discover it. Of the first sort are Thucydides and Plutarch.* IX. *Several evidences of the Grecians ignorance of the true original of Nations.* X. *Of Herodotus and his mistakes.* XI. *The Greeks ignorance in Geography discovered, and thence their insufficiency as to an account of ancient History.*

P. 37

CHAP. V.

The general uncertainty of Heathen Chronology.

- I. *The want of credibility in Heathen history further proved from the uncertainty and confusion in their accounts of ancient times; that discovered by the uncertain form of their years.* II. *An inquiry into the different form of the Egyptian years; the first of thirty Days, III. The second of four Months; of both instances given in the Egyptian history.* IV. *Of the Chaldean accounts, and the first Dynasties mentioned by Berosus, how they may be reduced to probability.* V. *Of the Egyptian Dynasties of Manetho.*

The CONTENTS.

tho. *Reasons of accounting them fabulous, because not attested by any credible authority, and rejected by the best Historians.* VI. *The opinion of Scaliger and Vossius, concerning their being contemporary, propounded, VII. and rejected; with reasons against it.* VIII. *Of the ancient division of Ægypt into Nomi or Provinces, and the number of them, against Vossius and Kircher.*

p. 48

CHAP. VI.

The uncertain Epochas of Heathen Chronology.

- I. *An account of the defect of Chronology in the eldest times. Of the Solar Year among the Egyptians, the original of the Epacts, the antiquity of Intercalation among them. Of the several Canicular Years; the difference between Scaliger and Petavius considered. The certain Epocha's of the Egyptian History no elder than Nabonassar.* II. *Of the Grecian accounts. The fabulousness of the Heroical age of Greece.* III. *Of the ancient Grecian Kingdoms. The beginning of the Olympiads.* IV. *The uncertain origins of the Western Nations. Of the Latin Dynasties. The different Palilia of Rome. The uncertain reckoning Ab Urbe condita.* V. *Of Impostures as to ancient Histories. Of Annius, VI. Inghiramius, and others.* VII. *Of the characters used by Heathen Priests.* VIII. *No sacred characters among the Jews.* IX. *The partiality and inconsistency of heathen Histories with each other. From all which the want of credibility in them as to an account of ancient times is clearly demonstrated.* p. 59

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

The certainty of the Writings of Moses.

In order to the proving the truth of Scripture-history, several Hypotheses laid down. I. The first concerns the reasonableness of preserving the ancient History of the World in some certain Records, from the importance of the things, II. and the inconveniences of mere Tradition or constant Revelation. III. The second concerns the certainty that the Records under Moses's name, were undoubtedly his. The certainty of a matter of fact inquired into in general, and proved as to this particular, IV. by universal consent, V. and settling a Common-wealth upon his Laws. VI, VII. The impossibility of an Imposture as to the Writings of Moses demonstrated. The pleas to the contrary largely answered. p. 71

The CONTENTS.

C H A P. II.

Moses's certain knowledg of what he writ.

- I. *The third Hypothesis concerns the certainty of the matter of Moses's History, that gradually proved: First, Moses's knowledg cleared, by his education, and experience, and certain information. II. His education in the wisdom of Ægypt; what that was. III. The old Ægyptian learning inquired into; IV. the conveniences for it. V. Of the Ægyptian Priests, Moses reckoned among them for his knowledg. VI. The Mathematical, Natural, Divine, and Moral learning of Ægypt. VII. Their Political wisdom most considerable. VIII. The advantage of Moses above the Greek Philosophers, as to wisdom and reason. Moses himself an eye-witness of most of his history: IX. the certain uninterrupted tradition of the other part among the Jews, manifested by rational evidence.*

P. 79

C H A P. III.

Moses's fidelity and integrity proved.

- I. *Moses considered as an Historian, and as a Lawgiver; his fidelity in both proved; clear evidences that he had no intent to deceive in his history, freedom from private interest, impartiality in his relations, plainness and perspicuity of stile. II. As a Law-giver, he came armed with Divine Authority, which being the main thing, is fixed on to be fully proved from his actions and writings. III. The power of Miracles the great evidence of Divine Revelation. Two grand Questions propounded. In what cases Miracles may be expected, and how known to be true. No necessity of a constant power of Miracles in a Church: IV. Two cases alone wherein they may be expected. When any thing comes as a Law from God, and when a Divine Law is to be repealed. The necessity of Miracles in those cases as an evidence of Divine Revelation asserted. V, VI, VII. Objections answered. No use of Miracles when the Doctrine is settled, and owned by Miracles by the first Revelation. No need of Miracles in reformation of a Church.*

P. 90.

C H A P. IV.

The fidelity of the Prophets succeeding Moses.

- I. *An order of Prophets to succeed Moses, by God's own appointment in the Law of Moses. II. The Schools of the Prophets, III. the original and institution of them. IV. The Cities of the Levites. The occasion of their first institution. V. The places of the Schools of the Prophets, and the tendency of the Institution there to a Prophetical Office. VI. Of the Music us'd in the Schools of the Prophets. VII. The Roman Assamenta, and the Greek Hymns in their solemn worship. VIII. The 2 sorts of Prophets among the Jews, Leiger and extraordinary. Ordinary Prophets taken out of the Schools, proved by Amos and Saul.*

p. 100

C H A P.

The CONTENTS.

CHAP. V.

The tryal of the Prophetical Doctrine.

I. Rules of trying Prophets established in the Law of Moses. II. The punishment of pretenders. The several sorts of false Prophets. The case of the Prophet at Bethel discussed. III. The tryal of false Prophets belonging to the great Sanhedrin. IV. The particular rules whereby the Doctrine of Prophets was judg'd. The proper notion of a Prophet, not foretelling future contingencies, but having immediate Divine Revelation. V. Several Principles laid down for clearing the Doctrine of the Prophets. 1. That immediate dictates of Natural light are not to be the measure of Divine Revelation. Several grounds for Divine Revelation from natural Light. VI. 2. Whatever is directly repugnant to the dictates of Nature, cannot be of Divine Revelation. VII. 3. No Divine Revelation doth contradict a Divine positive Law without sufficient evidence of GOD's intention to repeal that Law. VIII. 4. Divine Revelation in the Prophets, was not to be measured by the words of the Law, but by the intention and reason of it. The prophetical office a kind of Chancery to the Law of Moses.

p. 110

CHAP. VI.

The Tryal of Prophetical Predictions and Miracles.

I. The great difficulty of trying the truth of prophetical Predictions, from Jer. 18. 7, 8, &c. Some general Hypotheses premised for the clearing of it. II. The first concerns the grounds why Predictions are accounted an evidence of Divine Revelation. Three Considerations drawn thence. III. The second, the manner of GOD's Revelation of his Will to the Minds of the Prophets. Of the several degrees of Prophecy. IV. The third is, that GOD did not always reveal the internal purposes of his Will unto the true Prophets. V. The grand Question propounded, How it may be known when Predictions express GOD's decrees, and when only the series of causes. For the first several rules laid down. 1. When the Prediction is confirm'd by a present Miracle. 2. When the things foretold exceed the probability of second causes. VI. 3. When confirm'd by GOD's Oath. VII. 4. When the Blessings foretold are purely spiritual. VIII. Three rules for interpreting the Prophecies which respect the state of things under the Gospel. IX. 5. When all circumstances are foretold. 6. When many Prophets in several Ages agree in the same Predictions. X. Predictions do not express GOD's unalterable purposes, when they only contain comminations of judgments, or are Predictions of temporal Blessings. XI. The case of the Ninevites, Hezekiah, and others, opened. XII, XIII. Of repentance in GOD, what it implies. XIV. The Jewish objections about Predictions of temporal Blessings answered. XV. In what cases Miracles were expected from the Prophets: when they were to confirm the truth of their Religion. Instanced in the Prophet at Bethel,

The CONTENTS.

Bethel, Elijah, Elisha and Moses himself; XVI. whose Divine Authority that it was proved by Miracles, is demonstrated against the modern Jews, and their pretenses answered. 118

C H A P. VII.

The eternity of the Law of Moses discussed.

- I. The second case wherein Miracles may be expected, when a Divine positive Law is to be repealed, and another way of worship established instead of it. The possibility in general of a repeal of a Divine Law asserted; the particular case of the Law of Moses disputed against the Jews: II. the matter of that Law proved not to be immutably obligatory; because the Ceremonial Precepts were required not for themselves, but for some further end; that proved from Maimonides his confession: III. the Precepts of the Ceremonial Law frequently dispensed with while the Law was in force. Of the Passover of Hezekiah, and several other instances. IV. It is not inconsistent with the wisdom of God to repeal such an established Law. Abravanel's Argument answered. V. Of the perfection of the Law of Moses, compared with the Gospel. VI. Whether God hath ever declared he would never repeal the Law of Moses. VII. Of adding to the Precepts. VIII. Of the expressions seeming to imply the perpetuity of the Law of Moses. Reasons assigned why those expressions are used, tho' perpetuity be not implied. IX. The Law of Moses not built upon immutable reason, because many particular Precepts were founded upon particular occasions, as the customs of the Zabii; X. many Ceremonial Precepts thence deduced out of Maimonides; XI. and because such a state of things was foretold, with which the observation of the Ceremonial Law would be inconsistent. XII. That largely discovered from the Prophecies of the Old Testament.

137

C H A P. VIII.

General Hypotheses concerning the truth of the Doctrine of CHRIST.

- I. The great prejudice against our Savior among Jews and Heathens, was the meanness of his appearance. The difference of the Miracles at the delivery of the Law and Gospel. II. Some general Hypotheses to clear the subserviency of Miracles to the Doctrine of CHRIST. 1. That where the truth of a Doctrine depends not on Evidence, but Authority, the only way to prove the truth of the Doctrine, is to prove the Testimony of the Revealer to be infallible. Things may be true which depend not on Evidence of the things. What that is, and on what it depends. The uncertainty of Natural Knowledge. III. The Existence of God, the foundation of all certainty. The certainty of matter of Faith proved from the same Principle. Our knowledge of any thing supposeth something incomprehensible. IV. The certainty of Faith as great as that of Knowledge; the grounds of it stronger. The consistency of Rational Evi-

The CONTENTS.

Evidence with Faith. Yet objects of Faith exceed Reason; the absurdities following the contrary opinion. VI. The uncertainty of that which is called Reason. VII. Philosophical Dictates no standard of Reason. Of Transubstantiation and Ubiquity, &c. why rejected as contrary to Reason. The foundation of Faith in matters above Reason. VIII. Which is infallible testimony; that there are ways to know which is infallible, proved. 2. Hypoth. A Divine Testimony the most infallible. The resolution of Faith into God's veracity as its formal object. IX. 3. Hypoth. A Divine Testimony may be known, tho' God speak not immediately. Of Inspiration among the Jews, and Divination among the Heathens. XII. 4. Hypoth. The evidence of a Divine Testimony must be clear and certain. XIII. Of the common motives of Faith, and the obligation to Faith arising from them. The original of Infidelity.

C H A P. IX.

The rational Evidence of the truth of Christian Religion from Miracles.

- I. *The possibility of Miracles appears from God and Providence; the evidence of a Divine Testimony by them. God alone can really alter the course of Nature. The Devil's power of working Miracles consider'd. Of Simon Magus, Apollonius. The cures in the Temple of Æsculapius at Rome, &c. II. God never works Miracles, but for some particular end. The particular reasons of the Miracles of Christ. The repealing the Law of Moses, which had been settled by Miracles. Why Christ check'd the Pharisees for demanding a Sign, when he himself appeals to his Miracles. The power of Christ's Miracles on many who did not thoroughly believe.*
- III. *Christ's Miracles made it evident that he was the Messias, because the Predictions were fulfill'd in him. Why John Baptist wrought no Miracles. IV. Christ's Miracles necessary for the overthrow of the Devil's Kingdom. V. Of the Demoniacs and Lunatics in the Gospel, and in the Primitive Church. The power of the Name of Christ over them largely prov'd by several Testimonies. VI. The evidence thence of a Divine power in Christ. VII. Of counterfeit dispossessions. Of Miracles wrought among Infidels. VIII. Of the future state of the Church. IX. The necessity of the Miracles of Christ, as to the propagation of Christian Religion: that prov'd from the condition of the Publishers, and the success of the Doctrine. The Apostles knew the hazard of their employment, before they enter'd into it. X. The boldness and resolution of the Apostles notwithstanding this, compar'd with heathen Philosophers. XI. No motive could carry the Apostles thro' their Employment but the truth of their Doctrine; XII. not seeking the honor, profit or pleasure of the World. XIII. The Apostles evidence of the truth of their Doctrine lay in being eye-witnesses of our Savior's Miracles and Resurrection. XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII. That attested by themselves; their sufficiency thence for preaching the Gospel. XIX. Of the nature of the Doctrine of the Gospel; contrary of it to Natural Inclination. XX. Strange success of it, notwithstanding*

The CONTENTS.

withstanding it came not with human power: No Christian Emperor, till the Gospel universally preach'd. XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV. The weakness and simplicity of the instruments which preach'd the Gospel. From all which the great Evidence of the power of Miracles is prov'd. P. 159

C H A P. X.

The difference of true Miracles from false.

- I. *The unreasonableness of rejecting the Evidence from Miracles, because of Impostures. That there are certain rules of distinguishing true Miracles from false, and Divine from Diabolical, prov'd from GOD's intention in giving a power of Miracles, and the Providence of GOD in the World. II. The inconvenience of taking away the rational grounds of Faith, and placing it on Self-evidence. Of the Self-evidence of the Scriptures, and the insufficiency of that for resolving the Question about the Authority of the Scriptures. III. Of the pretended Miracles of Impostors and false Christs, as Barchochebas, David el-David and others. IV. The Rules whereby to judge true Miracles from false. 1. True Divine Miracles are wrought to confirm a Divine Testimony. V. No Miracles necessary for the certain conveyance of a Divine Testimony: prov'd from the Evidences that the Scriptures could not be corrupted. VI. 2. No Miracles Divine which contradict Divine Revelation. Of popish Miracles. VII. 3. Divine Miracles leave Divine Effects on those who believe them. Of the Miracles of Simon Magus. VIII. 4. Divine Miracles tend to the overthrow of the Devil's power in the World: the Antipathy of the Doctrine of CHRIST to the Devil's design in the World. IX. 5. The distinction of true Miracles from others, from the circumstances and manner of their operation. The Miracles of CHRIST compar'd with those of the heathen Gods. X. 6. GOD makes it evident to all impartial judgments, that Divine Miracles exceed Created Power. This manifested from the unparallel'd Miracles of Moses and our Savior. From all which the rational evidence of Divine Revelation is manifested, as to the Persons whom GOD employs to teach the World.* P. 224

B O O K III.

C H A P. I.

Of the Being of GOD.

- I. *The Principles of all Religion lie in the Being of GOD and Immortality of the Soul: from them the necessity of a particular Divine Revelation rationally deduced; the method laid down for proving the Divine Authority of the Scriptures. II. Why Moses doth not prove the Being of GOD, but suppose it. III. The notion of a Deity very consonant to Reason. Of the nature of Ideas, and*

The CONTENTS.

and particularly of the Idea of GOD. IV. How we can form an Idea of an infinite Being. V, VI. How far such an Idea argues Existence. VII, VIII. The great unreasonableness of Atheism demonstrated. Of the Hypotheses of the Aristotelian and Epicurean Atheists. IX. The Atheists pretenses examin'd and refuted. X, XI, XII, XIII. Of the nature of the Arguments whereby we prove there is a GOD. Of universal consent and the Evidence of that to prove a Deity and Immortality of Souls. XIV, XV. Of necessity of Existence imply'd in the notion of GOD, and how far that proves the Being of GOD. XVI. The order of the World and usefulness of the parts of it, and especially of Man's Body, an argument of a Deity. XVII. Some higher Principle prov'd to be in the World than Matter and Motion. XVIII. The nature of the Soul, and possibility of its subsisting after death. XIX. Strange appearances in Nature not solvable by the power of Imagination.
p. 242

CHAP. II.

Of the Origin of the Universe.

- I. *The necessity of the belief of the Creation of the World in order to the truth of Religion. Of the several Hypotheses of the Philosophers who contradict Moses: with a particular examination of them. II. The ancient Tradition of the World consonant to Moses; prov'd from the Ionic Philosophy of Thales, and the Italic of Pythagoras. III. The Pythagoric Cabala rather Egyptian than Mosiac. Of the fluid Matter, which was the material Principle of the Universe. IV. Of the Hypothesis of the Eternity of the World asserted by Ocellus Lucanus and Aristotle. V. The weakness of the Foundations on which that Opinion is built. Of the manner of forming Principles of Philosophy. VI. The possibility of Creation prov'd. [No arguing from the present state of the World against its beginning, shew'd from Maimonides.] VII. The Platonists Argument from the Goodness of GOD for the Eternity of the World, answer'd. VIII. Of the Stoical Hypothesis of the Eternity of Matter; whether reconcilable with the Text of Moses. IX. Of the Opinions of Plato and Pythagoras concerning the Præ-existence of Matter to the formation of the World. X. The contradiction of the Eternity of Matter to the Nature and Attributes of GOD. XI, XII, XIII. Of the Atomical Hypothesis of the Origin of the Universe. XIV, XV, XVI, XVII. The World could not be produc'd by a casual concurrence of Atoms, prov'd from the nature and motion of Epicurus's Atoms, and the Phænomena of the Universe, especially the production and nature of Animals. XVIII. Of the Cartesian Hypothesis, that it cannot salve the Origin of the Universe without a Deity giving motion to Matter.*
p. 283

The CONTENTS.

C H A P. III.

Of the Origin of Evil.

I. *Of the Being of Providence.* II. *Epicurus his Arguments against it refuted. The necessity of the belief of Providence in order to Religion.* III. *Providence prov'd from a consideration of the nature of GOD, and the things of the World. Of the Spirit of Nature.* IV. *The great Objections against Providence propounded. The first concerns the Origin of Evil.* V. *GOD cannot be the Author of Sin, if the Scriptures be true. The account which the Scriptures give of the fall of Man, doth not charge GOD with Man's fault. GOD's power to govern Man by Laws, tho' he gives no particular reason of every positive Precept.* VI. *The reason of GOD's creating Man with freedom of Will, largely shew'd from Simplicius; and the true account of the Origin of Evil.* VII. *GOD's permitting the Fall, makes him not the Author of it.* VIII. *The account which the Scriptures give of the Origin of Evil compar'd with that of Heathen Philosophers.* IX. *The antiquity of the opinion of ascribing the Origin of Evil to an evil Principle. Of the judgment of the Persians, Egyptians, and others about it.* X. *Of Manichæism.* XI, XII, XIII, XIV. *The Opinion of the ancient Greek Philosophers; Of Pythagoras, Plato, the Stoics; the Origin of Evil not from the necessity of Matter.* XV, XVI. *The remainders of the History of the Fall among the Heathens.* XVII, XVIII, XIX. *Of the malignity of Dæmons.* XX, XXI, XXII. *Providence vindicated as to the sufferings of the good, and impunity of bad Men. An account of both from Natural Light, manifested by Seneca, Plutarch, and others.* P. 317

C H A P. IV.

Of the Origin of Nations.

I. *All Mankind deriv'd from Adam, if the Scriptures be true.* II. *The contrary supposition an introduction to Atheism.* III. *The truth of the History of the Flood. The possibility of an universal Deluge prov'd.* IV. *The Flood universal as to Mankind, whether universal as to the Earth and Animals; no necessity of asserting either.* V. *Yet supposing the possibility of it demonstrated without creation of new Waters.* VI. *Of the Fountains of the Deep. The proportion which the height of Mountains bears to the Diameter of the Earth. No Mountains much above three miles perpendicular. Of the origin of Fountains. The opinion of Aristotle and others concerning it discuss'd. The true account of them from the vapors arising from the mass of subterraneous waters.* VII. *Of the capacity of the Ark for receiving the Animals, from Buteo and others.* VIII. *The truth of the Deluge from the testimony of Heathen Nations. Of the propagation of Nations from Noah's Posterity.* IX. *Of the beginning of the Assyrian Empire. The multi-*

The CONTENTS.

multiplication of Mankind after the Flood. Of the Chronology of the LXX. Of the time between the Flood and Abraham, and the advantages of it. X. Of the pretense of such Nations, who call'd themselves Aborigines. XI. A Discourse concerning the first Planters of Greece: the common opinion propounded and rejected. The Hellens were not the first Inhabitants of Greece, but the Pelasgi. The large spread of them over the parts of Greece. XII. Of their Language different from the Greeks. XIII. Whence these Pelasgi came; that Phaleg was the Pelasgus of Greece, and the Leader of that Colony, prov'd from Epiphanius. XIV. The Language of the Pelasgi in Greece Oriental: thence an account given of the many Hebrew words in the Greek Language, and the remainders of the Eastern Language in the Islands of Greece, both which not from the Phœnicians, as Bochartus thinks, but from the old Pelasgi. XV. Of the ground of the affinity between the Jews and Lacedæmonians. Of the peopling of America. p. 366

C H A P. V.

Of the Origin of the Heathen Mythology.

- I. *That there were some remainders of the ancient History of the World preserv'd in the several Nations after the dispersion. II. How it came to be corrupted: by decay of Knowledge, increase of Idolatry, confusion of Languages. III. An Inquiry into the cause of that. Difficulties against the common opinion that Languages were confounded at Babel. IV. Those difficulties clear'd. V. Of the fabulousness of Poets. The particular ways whereby the Heathen Mythology arose. Attributing the general History of the World to their own Nation. The corruptions of Hebraisms. Alteration of Names. Ambiguity of Sense in the Oriental Languages. VI. Attributing the Actions of many to one Person, as in Jupiter, Bacchus, &c. VII. The remainders of Scripture-History among the Heathens. The names of GOD, Chaos, formation of Man among the Phœnicians. Of Adam among the Germans, Ægyptians, Cilicians. Adam under Saturn. Cain among the Phœnicians. Tubal-Cain and Jubal under Vulcan and Apollo. Naamah under Minerva. VIII. Noah under Saturn, Janus, Prometheus and Bacchus. IX. Noah's three Sons under Jupiter, Neptune and Pluto. Canaan under Mercury, Nimrod under Bacchus, Magog under Prometheus. Of Abraham and Isaac among the Phœnicians. X. Jacob's Service under Apollo's. ^{The Bani'lim} from Bethel. Joseph under Apis. Moses under Bacchus. Joshua under Hercules. Balaam under the old Silenus. p. 395*

C H A P. VI.

Of the Excellency of the Scriptures.

- I. *Concerning matters of pure Divine Revelation in Scripture: the terms of Salvation only contain'd therein. The ground of the disesteem of the Scripture is tacit Unbelief. II. The Excellency of*

THE CONTENTS.

the Scriptures manifested as to the matters which GOD hath revealed therein. IV. The Excellency of the discoveries of GOD's Nature which are in Scripture. V. Of the Goodness and Love of GOD in CHRIST. The suitableness of those discoveries of GOD to our Natural Notions of a Deity. The necessity of GOD's making known Himself to us, in order to the regulating our Conceptions of Him. VI. The Scriptures give the fullest account of the state of Mens Souls, and the corruptions which are in them. The only way of pleasing GOD discover'd in Scriptures. VII. The Scriptures contain matters of greatest Mysteriousness, and most universal Satisfaction to Mens Minds. VIII. The Excellency of the manner wherein things are reveal'd in Scriptures, in regard of Clearness, Authority, Purity, IX. Uniformity, and Persuasiveness. X. The Excellency of the Scripture as a Rule of Life. The Nature of the Duties of Religion and the Reasonableness of them. The Greatness of the Encouragements to Religion, contain'd in the Scriptures. XI. The great Excellency of the Scriptures, as containing in them the Covenant of Grace, in order to Man's Salvation.

THE

The INDEX of Authors quoted in ORIGINES SACRÆ.

*The Asterisc * notes the New Part.*

A

Bbeville (Claude) *Relation de Maragnan* p. *79
Abravanel 112, 140
Abulcasis in Josh. 102
Acosta *71, *74, *80, *96, 97, *99, *125.
Ælian *39, 44, *50, *54.
Æschylus 15
Alcinous *94
Alex. Aphrodisius *54
Alex. Polyhistor 401
Alstedius 114
Ambrosius *Ep. contr. Symmach.* 211
Ammianus Marcellinus 30, 213, *3, *10
Apollodorus 407
Apollonius 15
Apuleius *62
Aquinas (Thom.) 325
Aristobulus Judæus *apud Euseb. prep. Evang.* 33
Aristophanes 40, 384, 393
Aristoteles 4, *33, *54, 55, *56, 59
 Metaph. 82, 264, 275, 289, *de Caelo* 285, *Poltr.* *53.
 de Meteor. *98. *Phys.* 291, *22. *Hist. An.* *22,
 *23, *27, *34, *de part. Anim.* *25, *38
Arnobius 209, 211, 213, 221, 238, 408
Arrianus *Hist. Alex.* 47
Athenæus *54
S. Augustinus *de Civ. Dei* 51, 234, 63, *de Doctr. Christ.*
 204, *ad Voluf.* *94
Augustinus (Anton.) *Dialogi* 66

B

Bartoli *Hist. Alger.* *75
Baumgarten (Martinus) *30
Bellonius *31
Benzo *77, 78
Benigardus *28
Bennier *213, 115
Benodius *passim*
Bessarion *21, 42, 34
Bochartus 14, 16, 18, 58, 67, 147, 379, 385, 391,
 393, 400, 402, 403, 404, 405, 407, 408, 409, *15
Bodin *Metaph. Hist.* 399
Barrickius *de Hermet. Sep.* *34, 36
Bomhornius 39, 170
Boyle's, *Sceptical Chym.* 288. *Fluidity and Firmness*
 308. *Final Causes* *22. *Origin of Forms* 107. *Ve-*
 neration of Man's Intellect towards God. *218, 122.
 Experiments of the Air *125
Brewerwood 398
Butco *de Arca Noc* 376
Buxtorph. 400

C

Cælius Rhodigin. 82, 355, *52
Cæsalpinus (Andr.) *25
Callimachus 408
Calvin 101, 398
Capelli (Jacobi) *Hist. S. & Exot.* 50, 51, 53
Cartesius 270, 308, 315, *86, 93, 100, 109, 110, 113,
 114, 115, 117, 119, 120, 122, 124
Casaubon (Isaac) *ad Athenæum* 32. *Exercit. ad Baron.*
 35. *in Strab.* 42
Casaubon (Meric) *Original of temp. evils* 374, *de 4.*
 Eing. 397. *Distrib. de L. Heb.* 398
Cassiodorus *de de Nat. Nat.* 60, 313
Chalcidius, *ad Timæum* 287, 297, 299, 344
Cicero *14, *52, *65, *63, 71. *de Nat. Deor.* 8, 23,
 164, 270, 245, 246, 271, 285, 296, 304, 306, 319,
 358, *6, *7, 8, *20, *26, *38, *41, *61. *Tusc. Quæsti.*
 *11, 12, 59. *De Divinat.* 27, 172, *48. *De Legibus*
 271. *De Finibus* 310, 319. *De Fato*
 Ibid.
Clement Alexandrinus 213, 15, 39, 84, 85, 401, *11, 39
Columbus *76, 79
Columella *26
Conon *apud Photium* 15
Conringius *de Hermet.* 61, 81
Couplet *75, 76, 84, 85

D

Van Dalen *47
Dampier's *Voyage* *79
Dellon's *Voyage* *83
Denton's *History of New-York* *81
Diodorus Siculus 25, 28, 40, 50, 52, 60, 61, 67, 77, 82,
 83, 84, 285, 406, 409, *3, *4, *8, *9, *11, *14, *22,
 71, 74
Diogenes Laertius 15, 33, 286, 287, 291, 299, 302,
 313, 319, *16
Dionysii *Pæsi.* 384
Dionysius Halicarnass. 190, 384

E

Elmenhorst *Not. ad Minuc. Felic.* 408
Ent *Apolog. Græc.* *24
Epiphanius 389
Epicharmus *11
Etmullerus *19, 23
Eusebii *Prep. Evang.* 18, 36, 40, 67, 85, 286, 288, 302,
 212, 408, *3, *5, *8, *14, *16, *17, *42, *54. *Chron.* 20,
 33, 34. *Hist. Eccl.* 34, 203, 214, 347

F

Fagius (Paulus) 101
Festus 15
Firmicus (Julius) *de errore Prof. Relig.* 178

G

Galen 24. *De diff. Puls.* 217. *De usu part.* 297
Galileo 13
Gassendus 273. *De logica Epic.* 304. *Phys.* 307, 309,
 374. *Vita Pierski.* 376
Geminus *de Sphæris* 61
Goedart *27, *28
Grotius *de verita Rel. Christ.* 78, 145, 148, 237, 380,
 388, 392. *Annot. in Matt.* 35

H

Du Hamel *de consens. V. & N. Philos.* 110, 111
Harriot's *Hist. of Virginia* *81
Harvey *de generat. Anim.* 305, *18
Heinsius *Dissert. in Hel.* 38. *Exercit. §.* 104. Aristarch.
 356, 408
Herodotus 14, 15, 40, 47, 69, 82, 84, 85, 392, *3, *9,
 *11, *96, *98
Hefychius 384
Hierocles 339, 352, 353
Hierome *de Script. Eccl.* 347
Hobbes 279, *18, *65, *70
Holstenius *de vita Porphyrii* 248
Homeri *Od.* 41, 391, 395. *Iliad.* 63, 384
Hook's *Micrography* *23
Horapollon *Hierogl.* 61
Horatius 40
Hornius *de astæ Mundi* 382
 de orig. Gentium Americ. 395
Hostius *de Arca Noc* 376

I

Iamblichus *62. *de Myst. Egypt.* 23, 24, 355. *de vita*
 Pythag. 84
Iarchi (R. Salomon) 117
Josephus c. Appion. 14, 30, 43, 47, 54, 77, *46
 de bell. jud. 105. *Antiq.* 408
Josephus de Albo 132
Justin's *P.* 33
Justin Martyr *Param.* 40. *Dial. cum Tryph.* 203, 293,
 Apol. 356

K

Kircher 3, *85. *Oedip. Egypt.* 55, 58, 61, 182. *Mash.*
 Hierog. 287

L

Lactantius *de orig. erroris* 50, 211, 213, 215. *De falsa*
 Relig. 164. *De Justitia* 178. *De falsa Sap.* 220.
 De ira Dei *54, 60

The INDEX of Authors.

Lactantius in Statii Thebaid.	14	Quintilian	420
J. de Lact	380, 395, *74, *80, *81		
Lederer	*81	R	
Lerius	*77, 78	Radzivil	*31
Libanius	*210	Raleigh (Sir Walter)	373, 382
Lipfius	82, 266, 299, 400	Ray (John) *21. Of the Creation	23
Lifter	*23, 28	Redi de gen. Insect.	*23, 25
Longinus	78	Regis Phys. *113, *115. Réponse à la Censure	*113,
Lopez	*98	*114, *118, *120	
Loubere	*85	Riolanus	*33
Lower de Corde	*32	Rocheport	*78
Lucian	409, *3	Rohault	*115, 119, 123
Lucretius	*97, *98	Ruficus Eipidius	176
Ludolphi Hist. Æthiop.	*82, *96		
Ludolph Comment.	*98, *99	S	
	M	Salmafius Not. ad Herod. Attic. 16. De An. Clim.	29, 387
Machiavel	282	Sandys	*28
Mactobii Saturn.	50, 81	Scaliger (Julius Cæsar) Exercit.	397, *25, 99
Magillans	*75	Scaliger (Josephus) Nota in Euseb. Chron. 16, 20, 26.	
Maimonides More Nevot.	29, 106, 138, 144, 147,	in Frag. Græc. 19, 404, 407, 408. De emend. Temp,	
284, 292, 316. De Idol. 111, 113. De Fund. Leg.		39, 35, 36, 49, 60, 63, 64. In Can. Ifag. 47, 62. Ep.	
112, 116, 132, 135, 143		ad Casaub. 29. Conject. in Var.	108
Mair (Jacobus)	*74	Schouten	*74
Mayer Prod. Chal. 399. Phil. Sac.	406	Selden de Diu Syria 29, 147. De jure Nat. & Gent. 29,	
Manassch Ben Israël	105, 144, 395	286. De An. civ. Jud.	140
Manilius	281	Seneca	281, 299, 346, 156
Margravius	*81, 82	Servius in Virgil.	196
Martinius	380, *74	Sextus Empiricus	15, *14, *26, *44, *49, *71
Martyr (Petrus)	101	Sherlog Antiq. Heb.	102
Martyr (Petrus Anglerius)	*76	Simplicius in Epict. 319, 327, 358. in Categ. Arift.	*95
Mafius (Andreas) in Jofh.	102	Spinoza	100
Maffacus in Harpocr.	16	Spizzel de Israël American.	395
Mela (Pomponius)	*9, 96	Stephanus Byzant.	42, 384, 404, 405
Mercurus	3	Steuchus (Eugub.) de perenni Phil.	*39
Meursius	15, 288, 400	Stobæus	299, *39, 41, 61, 63, 94
Mey (Johannes)	*27	Strabo 15, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 46, 47, 82, 83, 85, 108,	
Minucius Felix	172, 188, 210, 212	393, *10, *39	
Montanus (Arias)	380, 384	Suetonius	170, 215
More (Henry) *115 Enchirid. Met. *117, 124. Anti-		Suida	41, *54
dote, &c. 313, 316. Myft. Godl.	283	Swærdam	*27
Muretus	302	Sydenham de Hydropæ	*108
	N	Symmach. Ep.	210
Newton (Ifaac) Phil. Nat. Princ. Math.	125		
Nonnus	409	T	
	O	Tacitus (Cornelius)	215, 404
Ocellus Lucanus	291, 292	Tatianus	30
Origenes contra Celsum 9, 35, 148, 152, 177, 178, 179,		Techo (Nicolao) Historia Paraquaria	*82, 99
194, 196, 198, 217, 220, 221, 223, 229, 237, 321,		Du Tertre	*78
356, 418		Tertullian Apol. 171, 188, 189, 205, 212, 224, 215,	
Ovidius	*17, *60	216, 249, 405. Ad Scap. 186. De Praef. adv. Hæref.	
Ouzelius	408	232, 349. Adv. Hermog. 300, 301, 346. Ad Nationes	
	P	187, 210. De Spectac. 391. De Jejuniis	112
Pausanias	15, 40, 386, 409, *11	Theodoret	67
Pearson (John)	*53	Thevenot	*27
Peieri & Harderi exerc. Med.	*19	Thucydides	12
Perfius Sat.	356	Tornielli Annal.	108
Petavius	34, 60, 380, 381	Trigautius	*75, 84
Petit (Petrus)	*49, 110	Tzetzes Schol. in Hef.	40
Philo Biblius in Euseb. Præp. Evang.	18, 22		
Philo Judæus de vita Mosis	104	V	
Philoftratus 15, 386. Vita Apollon.	406	Du Val	*74
Photii Bibl.	39, *22	De la Valle (Pietro)	*31
Pindarus	165	Valerius Maximus	*49
Pineda de reb. Salomon.	105	Varenii Geogr.	375
Pifo Hist. Brasil.	*24, 99	Vargo	15
Plato P. 1. p. 3. in Phæd. 185. Sophist. 290 in Epi-		Vettius Valens apud Scal.	26
nom. 349, *12, *15, *44, *47. Apol.	*51, *59	Vives (Ludovicus)	179, 379
Plinii N. Hist. 16, 37, 85, *8, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 28, 54,		Volkelius	296
59, 60, 62, 96, 98. Ep.	107	Vorstius ad Maim. 117. Not. in Abravanel	140
Plutarchus *12, *14, *28, *41, *44, *46, *50, 52 p. 6.		Voffius (Gerard) *96. De Idol. 8, 15, 30, 52, 56, 61. In	
Sympof. 38. De Herod. 47. De Ifide & Ofir. 60, 83,		Maim. de Idol. 146, 176, 392, 407, 409. De Sectis	
344, *3, 13. De Anima proc. 298, 310. De illis qui		Phil. 286. De Hist. Græc.	20, 24, 37
fero pun. 364. De plac. Phil. 302, 324, 359, *16, 39		Voffius (Ifaacus) de Ætate Mundi 25, 55, 385. Ep. ad	
Porphyr. de vita Pythag. 84. De Abstin. 351, *10, *12		Colv.	380
Proclius in Timæum 14, 24. in Chrestomasthia	108	Urfini Exercit.	21
Proclius in Timæum	178	Ufferi Annales	381, 382
Prudentii Aposth.	28		
Ptolem. Tetrab.	*83, 96, 98, 99	W	
Purchas's Pilgrim		Walton Prolegom. ad Bibl. Polyglott,	382
		Willis de Cerebro	*33
		X	
		Xenophon	*49, 50
			ORIGINES

ORIGINES SACRAE:

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

The Obscurity and Defect of Ancient History.

I. II. III. IV. *The knowledge of Truth proved to be the most natural perfection of the Rational Soul*; V. *Yet Error often mistaken for Truth: the Accounts of it.* VI. *Want of Diligence in its search*; VII. VIII. *The Mixture of Truth and Falshood: Thence comes either rejecting Truth for the Error's sake, or embracing the Error for the Truth's sake*; IX. *The first instanced in Heathen Philosophers*, XIII. *The second in Vulgar Heathen.* X. XI. XII. *Of Philosophical Atheism, and the grounds of it.* XIV. *The History of Antiquity very obscure.* XV. *The Question stated, where the true History of Ancient Times is to be found? in Heathen Histories, or only in Scripture?* XVI. *The want of Credibility in Heathen Histories asserted and proved by the general Defect for want of timely Records among Heathen Nations; the reason of it shewed from the first Plantations of the World.* XVII. *The manner of them discovered. The Original of Civil Government.* XVIII. *Of Hieroglyphics.* XIX. *The use of Letters among the Greeks no elder than Cadmus*; XX. *His Time enquired into: no elder than Joshua*: XIX. *The Learning brought into Greece by him.*

ENQUIRIES after Truth have that peculiar commendation above all other designs, that they come on purpose to gratify the most noble Faculty of our Souls, and do most immediately tend to advance the highest perfection of our Rational Beings. For all our most laudable endeavors after knowledge now, are only the gathering up of some scattered Fragments of what was once an entire Fabric, and the recovery of some precious Jewels which were lost out of sight, and sunk in the shipwrack of Humane Nature. That saying of *Plato*, *That all Knowledge is Remembrance, and all Ignorance Forgetfulness*, is a certain and undoubted truth; if by Forgetfulness be meant the Loss, and by Remembrance the Recovery of those notions and conceptions of things which the Mind of Man once had in its pure and primitive State, wherein the Understanding was the truest Microcosm, in which all the Beings of the inferior World were faithfully represented according to their true, native, and genuine

A

Perfe-

Perfections. G O D created the Soul of Man not only capable of finding out the Truth of things, but furnished him with a sufficient ~~reason~~ or Touchstone to discover Truth from Falshood, by a Light set up in his Understanding, which if he had attended to, he might have secured himself from all Impostures and Deceits. As all other Beings were created in the full possession of the agreeable Perfections of their several Natures, so was Man too; else G O D would have never closed the Work of Creation with those words, *Gen. 1. 31. And God saw all that he had made, and behold it was very good,* that is, endued with all those Perfections which were suitable to their several Beings. Which Man had been most defective in, if his Understanding had not been endow'd with a large stock of Intellectual knowledg, which is the most natural and genuine Perfection belonging to his Rational Being. For Reason being the most raised Faculty of Humane Nature, if that had been defective in its discoveries of Truth, which is its proper object, it would have argued the greatest maim and imperfection in the Being it self. For if it belongs to the perfection of the Sensitive Faculties to discern what is pleasant from what is hurtful, it must needs be the perfection of the Rational to find out the difference of Truth from Falshood. Not as tho' the Soul could then have had, any more than now, an actual notion of all the Beings in the World co-existing at the same time, but that it would have been free from all deceit in its Conceptions of things, which were not caused through inadvertency.

- II. Which will appear from the several aspects Man's Knowledg hath, which are either upwards towards his Maker, or abroad on his Fellow Creatures. If we consider that Contemplation of the Soul which fixes it self on that infinite Being which was the cause of it, and is properly *theoria*; it will be found necessary for the Soul to be created in a clear and distinct knowledg of him, because of Man's immediate obligation to obedience unto him. Which must necessarily suppose the knowledg of Him, whose Will must be his Rule: for if Man were not fully convinced in the first moment after his Creation of the Being of Him, whom he was to obey, his first work and duty would not have been Actual Obedience, but a Search whether there was any supreme, infinite, and eternal being or no; and whereon his Duty to him was founded, and what might be sufficient declaration of his Will and Laws, according to which he must regulate his obedience. The taking off all which doubts and scruples from the Soul of Man, must suppose him fully satisfied upon the first free use of Reason, that there was an Infinite Power and Being which produced him, and on that account had a right to command him in whatsoever he pleased, and that those commands of his were declared to him in so certain a way, that he could not be deceived in the judging of them. The clear knowledg of G O D will further appear most necessary to Man in his first Creation, if we consider that G O D created him for this end and purpose, To enjoy converse, and an humble familiarity with Himself; he had then *ἡμεῖς ὡς θεὸς ὁμιλεῖν κατὰ φύσιν*, in the language of *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Converse with God was as natural to him as his Being was.* For Man, as he came first out of God's Hands, was the Reflection of G O D him-

himself on a dark Cloud, the Iris of the Deity; the similitude was the same, but the substance different: Thence he is said to be created after the Image of God. His knowledg then had been Gen. 1. 26. more intellectual than discursive; not so much imploying his Faculties in the operose deductions of Reason (the pleasant toyl of the Rational Faculties since the Fall) but had immediately imploy'd them about the sublimest objects; not about Quiddities and Formalities, but about Him who was the fountain of his Being, and the center of his Happiness. There was not then so vast a difference between the Angelical and Humane life: the Angels and Men both fed on the same dainties; all the difference was, They were in the ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, the upper room in Heaven, and Man in the summer parlor in Paradise.

If we take a view of Man's knowledg as it respects his fellow III. Creatures, we shall find these were so fully known to him on his first Creation, that he needed not to go to School to the wide World to gather up his conceptions of them. For the right exercise of that Dominion which he was instated in over the Inferior World, doth imply a particular knowledg of the Nature, Being and Properties of those things which he was to make use of, without which he could not have improved them for their peculiar ends. And from this knowledg did proceed the giving the Creatures those proper and peculiar Names which were expressive of their several Natures. For as *Plato* tells us, οὐ πᾶσι θεοῖς ἀποδίδωται ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἑαυτῷ τὸν ἀποδίδωκεν εἰς τὸ τῇ φύσει ὅτιον ἐν ἑαυτῷ. *The Im-* Plato in Cratyl. *position of Names on things belongs not to every one, but only to him that hath a full prospect into their several Natures.* For it is most agreeable to Reason, that Names should carry in them a suitability to the things they express; for Words being for no other end but to express our Conceptions of things, and our Conceptions being but οἰκτις ἑ ἀνομιμαζα πραγμάτων, as the same Philosopher speaks, *The Resemblances and Representations of the things*, it must need follow, that where there was a true knowledg, the Conceptions must agree with the Things; and Words being to express our Conceptions, none are so fit to do it, as those which are expressive of the several Natures of the things they are used to represent. For otherwise all the use of Words is to be a meer Vocabulary to the Understanding, and an Index to Memory, and of no further use in the pursuit of knowledg, than to let us know what Words men are agreed to call things by. But something further seems to be intended in their first Imposition, whence the *Jews* call it הברלה המיני as *Mercer* tells us, *a Separation and Distinction* Mercerus in Gen. 2. 19. *of the several kind of Things:* and *Kircher* thus paraphrases the Words of *Moses*; *And whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the Name thereof: i. e.* saith he, *Fuerunt illis vera & germana Nomina & rerum Naturis propriè accommodata.* But Kircher Oedip. Æ. sypr. Tom. 2. Class. 2. cap. 1. however this be, we have this further evidence of that Hight of knowledg which must be supposed in the first Man, that as he was the First in his Kind, so he was to be the Standard and Measure of all that followed, and therefore could not want any thing of the due perfections of Humane Nature. And as the *Shekel* of the Sanctuary was, if not double to others, (as Men ordinarily mistake) yet of a full and exact weight, because it was to be

the Standard for all other weights (which was the cause of its being kept in the Temple) so if the First Man had not double the proportion and measure of knowledg which his Posterity hath, if it was not running over in regard of Abundance, yet it must be pressed down and shaken together in regard of weight; else he would be a very unfit Standard for us to judge by, concerning the due and suitable Perfections of Humane Nature.

- iv. But we need not have run so far back as the First Man, to evince the knowledg of Truth to be the most natural Perfection of the Soul of Man; for even among the present ruines of Humane Nature, we may find some such noble and generous Spirits, that discern so much beauty in the face of Truth, that to such as should enquire what they find so attractive in it, their answer would be the same with *Aristotle's* in a like case, it was *πολλὸν ἰσχυρότερον, the Question of those who never saw it*. For so pleasing is the enquiry, and so satisfactory the finding of Truth after the search, that the relish of it doth far exceed the greatest Epicurism of *Apicius*, or the most costly entertainments of *Cleopatra*; there being no Gust so exquisite as that of the Mind, nor any Jewels to be compared with Truth. Nor do any persons certainly better deserve the name of Men, than such who allow their Reason a full employment, and think not the Erectness of Man's Stature a sufficient distinction of him from Brutes. Of which those may be accounted only a higher species, who can patiently suffer the imprisonment of their Intellectuals in a dungeon of Ignorance, and know themselves to be Men only by those characters, by which *Alexander* knew himself not to be a God, by their proneness to Intemperance and Sleep. So strange a *Metempsychosis* may there be without any change of Bodies; and *Euphorbus* his Soul might become a Brute, without ever removing its lodging into the Body of an Ass. So much will the Soul degenerate from it self, if not improved; and in a kind of fullness scarce appear to be what it is, because it is not improved to what it may be.

- v. But, you'll say, if this knowledg of Truth be so great, so natural, so valuable a Perfection of Human Nature, whence comes so much of the World to be over-run with Ignorance and Barbarism? whence come so many pretenders to Knowledg, to court a Cloud instead of *Juno*? to pretend a love to Truth, and yet to fall down and worship Error? If there were so great a sympathy between the Soul and Truth, there would be an impatient desire after it, and a most ready embracing and closing with it. We see the Magnet doth not draw the Iron with greater force, than it seems to run with impatience into its closest embraces. If there had been formerly so intimate an acquaintance between the Soul and Truth, as *Socrates* fancied of Friends in the other World, there would be an harmonious closure upon the first appearance, and no divorce to be after made between them?

True, but then we must consider there is an intermediate state between the former acquaintance, and the renewal of it, wherein all those remaining Characters of mutual knowledg are sunk so deep, and lie so hid, that there needs a new fire to be kindled to bring forth those latent Figures, and make them again appear legible. And when once those tokens are produced of the former Friendship,

ship, there are not more impatient longings, nor more close embraces between the touched Needle and the Magnet, than there are between the Understanding and discovered Truth. But then withall, we are to consider that they are but few whose Souls are awakened out of that Lethargy they are fallen into in this degenerate condition: the most are so pleased with their Sleep, that they are loth to disturb their rest; and set a higher price upon a lazy Ignorance, than upon a restless Knowledge. And even of those, whose Souls are as it were between sleeping and waking, what by reason of the remaining confusion of the species in their Brains, what by the present dimness of their Sight, and the hovering uncertain Light they are to judge by, there are few that can put a difference between a meer Phantasm and a real Truth. Of which these rational accounts may be given, *viz.* Why so few pretenders to Knowledge do light on Truth.

First, *Want of an impartial diligence in the search of it.* Truth now must be sought, and that with care and diligence, before we find it; Jewels do not use to lie upon the surface of the Earth: High-ways are seldom paved with Gold; what is most worth our finding, calls for the greatest search. If one that walks the Streets should find some inestimable Jewel, or one that travels the Road meet with a bag of Gold, it would be but a silly design of any to walk the Street, or travel the Road, in hopes to meet with such a purchase to make them rich. If some have happily light on some valuable Truths, when they minded nothing less than them, must this render a Diligence useless in inquiries after such? No: Truth, tho' she be so fair and pleasing as to draw our affections, is yet so modest as to admit of being courted; and, it may be, deny the first suit, to heighten our importunity. And certainly nothing hath oftener forbid the Banns between the Understanding and Truth inquired after, than Partiality and Preoccupation of Judgment, which makes Men enquire more diligently after the Dowry than the Beauty of Truth; its correspondency to their Interests, than its evidence to their Understandings. An useful Error hath often kept the keys of the Mind for free admission, when important Truths, but contrary to mens Preconceptions or Interest, have been forbidden entrance. Prejudice is the wrong byass of the Soul, that effectually keeps it from coming near the mark of Truth; nay, sets it at the greatest distance from it. There are few in the World that look after Truth with their own Eyes, most make use of Spectacles of others making, which makes them so seldom behold proper lineaments in the face of Truth; which the several tinctures from Education, Authority, Custom and Predisposition do exceedingly hinder men from discerning.

Another Reason why there are so few who find Truth, when so many pretend to seek it, is, *That near resemblance which Error often bears to Truth.* It hath been well observ'd, that Error seldom walks abroad the World in her own raiments; she always borrows something of Truth, to make her more acceptable to the World. It hath been always the subtilty of grand Deceivers to graft their greatest Errors on some material Truths, to make them pass more undiscernible to all such who look more at the Root on which they stand, than on the Fruits which they bring forth. It will

VI.
(1.)

VII.
(2.)

hereafter appear how most of the grossest of the Heathen Errors have, as *Plutarch* saith of the *Egyptian* Fables, ἀμυδρὰς ἢ καὶ ἱερὰς τῆς ἀληθείας, *some faint and obscure resemblances of Truth*; nay more than so, as most pernicious weeds are bred in the fattest soils, their most destructive Principles have been founded on some necessary and important Truths. Thus Idolatry doth suppose the Belief of the existence of a Deity; and Superstition the Immortality of the Souls of Men. The Devil could never have built his Chapels, but on the same ground whereon God's Temples stood; which makes me far less wonder than many do, at the meeting with many expressions concerning these Two grand Truths in the Writings of ancient Heathens; knowing how willing the Devil might be to have such Principles still owned in the World, which by his depraving of them, might be the nourishers of Idolatry and Superstition. For the general knowledge of a Divine Nature, supposing men ignorant of the true God, did only lay a foundation to erect his idolatrous Temples upon; and the Belief of the Soul's surviving the Body after death, without knowledge of the true way of attaining Happiness, did make men more eager of embracing those Rites and Ceremonies, which came with a pretense of shewing the way to a blessed Immortality.

viii.

Which may be a most probable reason, why Philosophy and Idolatry did increase so much together as they did; for tho' right Reason fully improved, would have overthrown all those cursed and idolatrous practices among the Heathens; yet Reason only discerning some general Notions without their particular application and improvement, did only dispose the most ordinary sort of people to a more ready entertainment of the most gross Idolatry. For hereby they discerned the necessity of some kind of Worship, but could not find out the right way of it; and therefore they greedily followed that which was commended to them, by such who did withal agree with them in the common Sentiments of Humane Nature: Nay, and those Persons themselves who were the great maintainers of the sublimer Notions concerning God and the Soul of Man, were either the great Instruments of advancing that horrid Superstition among them, as *Orpheus* and *Apollonius*, or very forward compliers with it, as many of the Philosophers were. Altho' withall it cannot be denied to have been a wonderful discovery of Divine Providence, by these general Notions to keep waking the inward Senses of mens Souls, that thereby it might appear when Divine Revelation should be manifested to them, that it brought nothing contrary to the common Principles of Human Nature, but did only rectify the depravations of it, and clearly shew men that way which they had long been ignorantly seeking after. Which was the excellent advantage the Apostle made of the Inscription on the Altar at *Athens* 17.23. to the Unknown God; *Whom, saith he, ye ignorantly serve, him I declare unto you.* And which was the happy use the Primitive learned Christians made of all those Passages concerning the Divine Nature, and the Immortality of the Souls of Men, which they found in the Heathen Writers, thereby to evidence to the World that the main *Postulata* or Suppositions of Christian Religion were granted by their own most admired men: and that
Chri-

Christianity did not rase out, but only build upon those common Foundations, which were entertained by all who had any Name for Reason.

Tho' this, I say, were the happy effect of this building Errors on common Truths to all that had the advantage of Divine Revelation to discern the one from the other; yet as to others who were destitute of it, they were liable to this twofold great inconvenience by it. First, *for the sake of the apparent rottenness of the Superstructures, to question the soundness of the Foundations on which they stood.* And this I doubt not was the case of many considerative Heathens, who observing that monstrous and unreasonable way of Worship obtaining among the Heathen, and not being able by the strength of their own Reason, thro' the want of Divine Revelation, to deduce any certain instituted Worship, they were shrewdly tempted to renounce those Principles, when they could not but abhor the Conclusions drawn from them; for there is nothing more usual than for men who exceedingly detest some absurd Consequence they see may be drawn from a Principle supposed, to reject the Principle it self for the sake of that Consequence; which it may be doth not necessarily follow from it, but thro' the shortness of their own Reason doth appear to them to do so. Thus when the intelligent Heathen did apparently see that from the Principles of the Being of God, and the Immortality of Souls, did flow all those unnatural and inhumane Sacrifices, all those absurd and ridiculous Rites, all those execrable and profane Mysteries; out of a loathing the immoralities and impieties which attended these, they were brought to question the very truth and certainty of those Principles which were capable of being thus abused.

And therefore I am very prone to suspect the Apology usually made for *Protagoras*, *Diagoras*, and such others of them who were accounted Atheists, to be more favourable than true, *viz.* That they only rejected those Heathen Deities, and not the Belief of the Divine Nature. I should think this account of their reputed Atheism rational, were it any ways evident that they did build their Belief of a Divine Nature, upon any other grounds than such as were common to them with those whose worship they so much derided. And therefore when the Heathens accused the Christians of Atheism, I have full and clear evidence that no more could be meant thereby than the rejection of their way of Worship; because I have sufficient assurance from them that they did believe in a Divine Nature, and an instituted Religion most suitable to the most common received Notions of God, which they owned in opposition to all Heathen Worship. Which I find not in the least pretended to by any of the forementioned persons, nor any thing of any different way of Religion asserted, but only a destruction of that in use among them.

And altho' the case of *Anaxagoras Clazomenius*, and the rest of the *Ionic* Philosophers, might seem very different from *Diagoras*, *Theodorus*, and those beforementioned, because altho' they denied the Gods in vulgar repute to be such as they were thought to be (as *Anaxagoras* call'd the Sun *πῦρ* *πῦρ* *πῦρ*, a mere globe of fire, for which he was condemned at *Athens* to banishment, and fined five

Ta-

Voss. de I-
dololat. c. 1.

Talents; yet the Learned *Vossius* puts in this Plea in his behalf, That he was one that asserted the Creation of the World to flow from an eternal Mind :) altho' therefore, I say, the case of the *Ionian* Philosophers may seem far different from the others, because of their asserting the Production of the World (which from *Thales Milesius* was conveyed by *Anaximander* and *Anaximenes* to *Anaxagoras*) yet to one that thoroughly considers what they understood by their Eternal Mind, they may be sooner cleared from the imputation of Atheism, than Irreligion. Which two certainly ought in this case to be distinguished; for it is very possible for men, meeting with such insuperable difficulties about the casual concurrence of Atoms for the production of the World, or the eternal existence of Matter, to assert some Eternal Mind, as the first Cause of these things, which yet they may imbrace only as an Hypothesis in Philosophy to solve the Phænomena of Nature with, but yet not to make this Eternal Mind the object of adoration. And so their asserting a Deity was only on the same account as the Tragedians used to bring in their *Θαῖς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς*, when their Fables were brought to such an issue, and perplexed with so many difficulties, that they saw no way to clear them again, but to make some God come down upon the Stage to solve the difficulties they were engaged in; or, as *Seneca* saith of many great Families, when they had run up their Genealogies so high that they could go no further, they then fetched their Pedigree from the Gods: So when these Philosophers saw such incongruities in asserting an infinite and eternal Series of Matter, they might by this be brought to acknowledg some active Principle which produced the World, tho' they were far enough from giving any religious worship to that Eternal Mind.

XII.

Thus even *Epicurus* and his Followers would not stick to assert the Being of a God, so they might but circumscribe him within the Heavens, and let him have nothing to do with things that were done on Earth. And how uncertain the most dogmatical of them all were, as to their opinions concerning the Being and Nature of their Gods, doth fully appear from the large Discourses of *Tully* upon that subject: where is fully manifested their variety of opinions and mutual repugnancies, their self-contradictions and inconstancy in their own Assertions; which hath made me somewhat inclinable to think that the reason why many of them did to the world own a Deity, was, that they might not be Martyrs for Atheism: Which *Tully* likewise seems to acknowledg, when speaking of the punishment of *Protagoras* for that Speech of his, *De diis neque ut sint, neque ut non sint, habeo dicere: Ex quo*, says he, *equidem existimo tardiores ad hanc sententiam profitendam multos esse factos, quippe cum pœnam ne dubitatio quidem effugere potuisset.* So that for all the verbal asserting of a Deity among them, we have no certain evidence of their firm belief of it, and much less of any worship and service they owed unto it. And tho', it may be, they could not totally excus the Notions of a Deity out of their minds, partly thro' that Natural Sense which is engraven on the Souls of Men; partly, as being unable to solve the difficulties of Nature without a Deity; yet the observing the notorious vanities of Heathen Worship, might make them look upon it as a mere

Cicero de
Nat. Deor.
l. 1. c. 63.

Philo-

Philosophical speculation, and not any thing that had an influence upon the government of mens lives: For, as in Nature, the observing the great mixture of Falshood and Truth, made the *Academics* deny any certain *καθήκον*, or *Rule of judging Truth*; and the *Sceptics* take away all certain Assent: so the same consequence was unavoidable here, upon the same principle. And that made even *Plato* himself so ambiguous and uncertain in his Discourses of a *DEITY*; sometimes making him an eternal Mind, sometimes asserting the whole World, Sun, Moon, Stars, Earth, Souls and all, to be Gods, and even those that were worship'd among the Heathens, as *Tully* tells us out of his *Timæus* and *De Legibus*; which, as *Velleius* the *Epicurean* there speaks, *Et per se sunt falsa & sibi invicem repugnantia*. This is the first inconvenience following the mixture of truth and falshood, *For the sake of the falshood to question the truth it self it was joyned with.*

The other is as great which follows, when truth and falshood are mixed, *For the sake of the Truth to embrace the Falshood.* Which is a Mistake as common as the other, because men are apt to think, that things so vastly different as Truth and Falshood could never blend or be incorporate together; therefore when they are certain they have some truth, they conclude no falshood to be joyned with it. And this I suppose to have been the case of the more credulous and vulgar Heathen, as the other was of the Philosophers; for they, finding Mankind to agree in this, not only that there is a God, but that he must be worship'd, did without scruple make use of the way of worship among them, as knowing there must be some, and they were ignorant of any else. And from hence they grew to be as confident believers of all those Fables and Traditions on which their Idolatry was founded, as of those first Principles and Notions from which the necessity of divine Worship did arise. And being thus habituated to the belief of these things; when Truth it self was divulged among them, they suspected it to be only a corruption of some of their Fables. This *Celsus* the *Epicurean* on all occasions in his Books against the *Christians* did fly to. Thus he saith the building of the Tower of *Babel*, and the confusion of Tongues, was taken from the Fable of the *Aloïdæ* in *Homer's Odyssey*; the story of the Floud, from *Deucalion*; Paradise, from *Alcinöus* his Gardens; the burning of *Sodom* and *Gomorrhah*, from the Story of *Phaëthon*. Which *Origen* well refutes, from the far greater antiquity of those relations among the *Jews*, than any among the *Greeks*: and therefore the corruption of the tradition was in them, and not in the *Jews*. Which must be our only way for finding out which was the original, and which the corruption; by demonstrating the undoubted antiquity of one beyond the other, whereby we must do as *Archimedes* did by the Crown of *Hiero*, find out the exact proportions of Truth and Falshood which lay in those heathen fables.

And this now leads to the third Account, Why truth is so hardly discerned from error, even by those who search after it, which is *The great obscurity of the History of Ancient Times*, which should decide the Controversie. For there being an universal agreement in some common principles, and a frequent resemblance in particular traditions, we must of necessity, for the

B

clear-

XIII.
(2.)Orig. c.
Cels. l. 4.
p. 174, 175.

XIV.

clearing the truth from its corruption, have recourse to ancient History, to see if thereby we can find out where the Original tradition was best preserved, by what means it came to be corrupted, and whereby we may distinguish those corruptions from the Truths to which they are annexed. Which is the design and subject of our future discourse, *viz.* To demonstrate that there was a certain original and general tradition preserved in the world concerning the eldest Ages of the World; that this tradition was gradually corrupted among the Heathens; that notwithstanding this corruption there were sufficient remainders of it to evidence its true original; that the full account of this tradition is alone preserved in those books we call *Scriptures*: That where any other History seems to cross the report contained in them, we have sufficient ground to question their credibility; and that there is sufficient evidence to clear the undoubted certainty of that history which is contained in the Sacred Records of Scripture. Wherein we shall observe the same method, which *Thales* took in taking the hight of the Pyramids, by measuring the length of their shadow; so shall we the hight and antiquity of Truth from the extent of the fabulous Corruptions of it. Which will be a work of so much the greater difficulty, because the truth we pursue after takes cover in so great antiquity, and we must be forced to follow its most flying footsteps thro' the dark and shady paths of ancient history. For tho' History be frequently called the Light of Truth, and the Herald of Times, yet that Light is so faint and dim, especially in Heathen Nations, as not to serve to discover the face of Truth from her counterfeit, Error; and that Herald so little skill'd, as not to be able to tell us which is of the elder House. The reason is; tho' Truth be always of greater Antiquity, yet Error may have the more wrinkled face, by which it often imposeth on such who guess antiquity by deformity, and think nothing so old as that which can give the least account of its own age. This is evidently the case of those who make the pretense of ancient History a plea for Infidelity, and think no argument more plausible to impugn the certainty of Divine Revelation, than the seeming repugnancy of some pretended Histories with the account of ancient time reported in the *Bible*. Which being a pretext so unworthy, and designed for so ill an end, and so frequently made use of, by such who account Infidelity a piece of antiquity as well as of reason, it may be worth our while to shew, That the Scriptures are no more liable to be baffled with Reason, than to be confuted by Antiquity.

xv. In order therefore to the removing of this stumbling-block in our way, I shall first evince, *That there is no certain credibility in any of those ancient histories which seem to contradict the Scriptures*, nor any ground of reason why we should assent to them, when they differ from the *Bible*: and then prove, That all those undoubted characters of a most certain and authentic history are legible in those records contained in Scripture. Whereby we shall not only shew the unreasonableness of infidelity, but the rational evidence which our faith doth stand on as to these things. I shall demonstrate the first of these, *viz.* That there is no ground of assent to any ancient histories which give account of things diffe-

different from the Scriptures, from these arguments; The apparent defect, weakness and insufficiency of them as to the giving an account of elder times; The monstrous confusion, ambiguity and uncertainty of them in the account which they give; The evident partiality of them to themselves, and inconsistency with each other. I begin with the first of these, the defect and insufficiency of them to give such an account of elder times as may amount to certain credibility: which if cleared, will of it self be sufficient to manifest the incompetency of those records, as to the laying any foundation for a firm assent to be given to them. Now this defect and insufficiency of those histories is either more general, which lies in common to them all; or such as may be observed in a particular consideration of the histories of those several Nations, which have pretended highest to antiquity.

The general defect is, *The want of timely records to preserve their histories in.* For it is most evident, that the truest history in the world is liable to various corruptions thro' length of time, if there be no certain way of preserving it entire. And that, thro' the frailty of memory in those who had integrity to preserve it; through the gradual increase of barbarism and ignorance, where there are no ways of instruction; and thro' the subtilty of such, whose interest it may be to corrupt and alter that tradition. If we find such infinite variety and difference in men's accounts, as to the histories of their own times, when they have all possible means to be acquainted with the truth of them; what account can we imagin can be given, where there was no way of preserving to posterity the most authentic relation of former Ages? Especially, it being most evident, that where any certain way of preserving tradition is wanting, a People must soon degenerate into the greatest stupidity and barbarism: because all will be taken up in minding their own petty concerns, and no encouragement at all given to such public spirits, who would mind the credit of the whole Nation. For what was there for such to employ themselves upon, or spend their time in, when they had no other kind of learning among them, but some general traditions conveyed from father to son, which might be learned by such who followed nothing but domestic employments? So that the Sons of *Noah*, after their several dispersions and plantations of several Countries, did gradually degenerate into ignorance and barbarism: For, upon their first settling in any Country, they found it employment sufficient to cultivate the Land, and make habitations to live in, and to provide themselves of necessities for their mutual comfort and subsistence. Besides this, they were often put to removes from one place to another, where they could not conveniently reside; which *Thucydides* speaks much of as to the ancient state of *Greece*: and it was a great while before they came to imbody themselves together in Towns and Cities, and from thence to spread into Provinces, and to settle bounds and extents of their Territories. The first Age after the plantation of a Country being thus spent, the next saw it necessary to fall close to the work of husbandry, not only to get something out of the earth for their subsistence; but when by their diligence they had so far improved the ground, that they had not only enough for them-

XVI.

selves, but to spare to others, they then found out a way for commerce one with another by exchange. This way of traffic made them begin to raise their hopes higher, of enriching themselves; which when some of them had done, they bring the poorer under their power, and reign as Lords over them; these rich, with their dependents, strive to outvie each other; whence came wars and mutual contentions, till they who got the better over their adversaries, took still greater authority into their hands: thence at first every City almost, and adjacent Territory, had a King over it; which by conflicting with each other, at last brought several Cities and Territories under the power of one particular person, who thereby came to reign as sole Monarch over all within his dominions.

xvii.

For altho' there be some reason to think, that the Leaders of several Colonies had at first superiority over all that went with them; yet there being evidence in few Nations of any continued succession of Monarchs from the posterity of *Noah*, and so great evidence of so many petty Royalties almost in every City (as we read of such multitudes of Kings in the small Territory of *Canaan*, when *Josbua* conquered it,) this makes it at least probable to me, that after the death of the first Leader, by reason of their poverty and dispersedness of habitations, they did not incorporate generally into any Civil government under one head, but did rise by degrees in the manner before set down; but yet so, that in the petty divisions some prerogative might be given to him who derived his pedigree the nearest from the first Founder of that plantation; which in all probability is the meaning of *Thucydides*, who tells us, when the riches of *Greece* began to increase, and their Power improved, Tyrannies were erected in most Cities, *αὐτοκρατορίας δὲ ἦσαν ἐν τοῖς πόλεσι πλεονεξίας βασιλείαι, for before that time Kingdoms with honors limited were hereditary*; for so the Scholiast explains it, *πλεονεξίας βασιλείαι διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν τῶν λαμβανόντων καὶ διὰ τὴν γένεσιν*. This then being the state and case of most Nations in the first ages after their plantation, there was no likelihood at all of any great improvement in knowledge among them; nay so far from it, that for the first ages, wherein they conflicted with poverty and necessity, there was a necessary decay among them, of what knowledge had been convey'd to them: because their necessities kept them in continual employment; and after they conquered Them, they began to conquer each other: so that till such time as they were settled in peace under established Common-wealths, there was no leisure nor opportunity for any Arts or Sciences to flourish, without which all certain histories of their own former state must vanish and dwindle into some fabulous stories. And so we find they did in most Nations; which thence are able to give no other account of themselves, but that they sprung out of the earth where they lived; from which opinion the *Athenians* used to wear of old their golden Grasshoppers, as *Thucydides* relates. What account can we then expect of ancient times from such Nations which were so defective in preserving their own Originals?

Thucyd. l.
I. p. 10.
Ed. Port.

xviii.

Now this defectiveness of giving testimony of ancient times by these Nations, will further appear by these two considerations: *First*, What ways there are for communicating knowledge to posterity.

sterity. Secondly, How long it was ere these Nations came to be Masters of any way of certain communicating their conceptions to their Successors. Three general ways there are whereby knowledg may be propagated from one to another; by representative Symbols, by Speech, and by Letters. The first of these was most common in those elder times, for which purpose *Clemens Alexandrinus* produceth the testimony of an ancient Grammarian *Dionysius Thrax* in his Exposition of the symbol of the Wheels: *ισήματα γὰρ αὐτῶν αὐτῶν λέξεσι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῶν συμβόλων ἔτι καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους: That some persons made a representation of their actions to others, not only by speech, but by symbols too.* Which any one who is any ways conversant in the Learning of those ancient times, will find to have been the chief way of propagating it (such as it was) from one to another: as is evident in the Hieroglyphics of the *Egyptians*, and the custom of Symbols from thence derived among the *Grecian* Philosophers, especially the *Pythagoreans*. It was the solemn custom of the *Egyptians* to wrap up all the little knowledg they had, under such mystical representations, which were unavoidably clog'd with two inconveniences very unsuitable to the propagation of knowledg, which were Obscurity and Ambiguity. For it not only cost them a great deal of time to gather up such Symbolical things which might represent their conceptions; but when they had pitched upon them, they were liable to a great variety of Interpretations, as is evident in all those remainders of them, preserved by the industry of some ancient Writers. As in their *καμμοσι*, or *golden Images of their Gods*, they had engraved two Dogs, an Hawk and an Ibis. By the Dogs some understood the two Hemispheres, others the two Tropics; by the Hawk some understood the Sun, others the *Æquinoctial*; by the Ibis, some the Moon, others the Zodiac, as is evident in *Clemens*, who reports it. This way then is a most unfit way to convey any ancient tradition; by being both obscure, ambiguous, and unable to express so much as to give any certain light to future ages of the passages of the precedent.

*Clem.
Alexan.
Strom. l. 5.*

The other ways of conveying knowledg, are either by Speech, or by Letters. The first must be by some vocal Cabala, delivered down from father to son: but Words being of so perishing a nature, and man's Memory so weak and frail in retaining them, it is necessary for a certain communication of knowledg, that some way should be found out more lasting than Words, more firm than Memory, more faithful than Tradition: which could not otherwise be imagined, than that the Author of his own conceptions should himself leave them to the view of all posterity; in order to which, some way must be contrived whereby mens Voices might be seen, and mens Fingers speak. But how to express all kind of sounds, with the several draughts of a pen, and to confine them within the compass of twenty-four letters, is deservedly called by *Galileo*, *admirandarum omnium inventionum humanarum signaculum, the choicest of all humane inventions.* And had we no other evidence of the great obscurity of ancient history, the great difference as to the first inventor of letters, would be a sufficient demonstration of it. For almost every Nation hath had a several Author of them: The *Jews* derive them from *Adam* or *Moses*; the *Egyptians* attribute their invention to *Thoyt* or *Mercury*; the *Grecians* to *Cad-*

XIX.

mus, the *Phœnicians* to *Taautus*, the *Latins* to *Saturn*, others to the *Æthiopians*: and lest the *Pygmies* should be without their enemies, some think they were found out à *gruum volatu*, from the manner of the flying of *Cranes*. Thus it hath happened with most Nations; what was first among themselves; they thought to be the first in the world.

XX.

But by whomsoever they were first invented, we are certain they were but lately in use in that Nation, which hath most vainly arrogated the most to it self in point of Antiquity, and yet had the least reason, I mean, the *Grecians*. Thence the *Ægyptian* Priest *Patenit* truly told *Solon*, the *Greeks* were always children, because they had nothing of the antiquities of former ages. If we may believe *Josephus*, they had no Writings earlier than *Homer*; but herein he is conceived to have served his cause too much, because of the Inscription of *Amphitryo* at *Thebes* in the Temple of *Apollo Ismenius* in the *Ionic* letters, and two others of the same age to be seen in *Herodotus*; and because of the Writings of *Lycus*, *Orpheus*, *Museus*, *Oroebantius Troezenius*, *Thaletas*, *Melesander*, and others. This we are certain of, the *Grecians* had not the use of letters among them 'till the time of *Cadmus* the *Phœnician's* coming into *Greece*, whither he came to plant a Colony of *Phœnicians*, whence arose the story of his pursuit of *Europa*, as *Conon* in *Photius* tells us.

Procl. in
Tim. Plat.

Joseph. c.
App. lib. 1.

Herodot.
lib. 5.
V. Bochar.
Geograph.
Sacr. p. 2.
l. 2. c. 20.

Conon a-
pud Phot.
Bibl. l. 37.

And it is very probable, which learned men have long since observed, that the name *Cadmus* comes from the *Hebrew* קדם *Kedem*, and may relate as an appellative either to his Dignity, as *Junius* in his *Academia* conjectures, or more probably to his Country, the East, which is frequently call'd *Kedem* in Scripture. Some have conjectured further, that his proper name was אג *Og*; upon what reason I know not, unless from hence, that thence by a duplication of the word came the *Greek* 'Αγας, who seems to have been no other than *Cadmus*, as will appear by comparing their stories together. Only one was the name his memory was preserved by at *Athens*, where the *Cadmeans* inhabited, as appears by the *Gephyraei*, who *Herodotus* tells us were *Phœnicians* that came with *Cadmus*; and others fanſie the *Academia* there was originally called *Cadmea*; and the name *Cadmus* was preserved chiefly among the *Bœotians* in memory of the Country whence he came: it being likely to be impos'd by them upon his first landing in the Country; as many learned persons conceive, the name of an *Hebrew* was given to *Abraham* by the *Canaanites*, upon his passing over the river *Euphrates*. On this account then it stands to reason, that the name which was given him as a stranger, should be longest preserved in the place where it was first imposed. Or if we take קדם in the other sense, as it imports Antiquity; so there is still a higher probability of the affinity of the names of *Cadmus* and *Ogyges*; for it is certain, that the *Greeks* had no higher name for a matter of antiquity, than to call it 'Αγας, as the Scholiast on *Hesiod*, *Hesychius*, *Suidas*, *Eustathius* on *Dionysius*, and many others observe. And which yet advanceth the probability higher, *Lucretius* or *Lactantius* the Scholiast on *Statius*, tells us, the other *Greeks* had this from the *Thebanes*; for, saith he, *Thebani res antiquas Ogygias nominabant*. But that which puts it almost beyond meer proba-

Hist. l. 5.

Lactantius
in Senec.
Theb. l. 1.

probability, is, that *Varro*, *Festus*, *Pausanias*, *Apollonius*, *Æschylus*, and others make *Ogyges* the Founder of the *Bæotian Thebes*, which were thence called *Ogygiæ*; and *Strabo* and *Stephanus* further say, that the whole Country of *Bæotia* was called *Ogygia*: now all that mention the Story of *Cadmus*, attribute to him the founding of the *Bæotian Thebes*. And withall it is observable, that in the *Vatican Appendix* of the *Greek Proverbs*, we read *Cadmus* called *Ogyges*; Ὀγύγεια κῆρυξ, ἐπὶ τῶν ὀχλησάντων, ἐπεὶ συνέβη Κἀδμῶν τὸ Ὀγύγιον εἶναι τὴν θυγατέρα καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπέβη. *Meursius* indeed would have it corrected, *Κἀδμῶν τὸ Ὀγύγιον*, as it is read in *Suidas*; but by the favour of so learned a man, it seems more probable that *Suidas* should be corrected by that; he bringing no other evidence of any such person as *Cadmus* a Son of *Ogyges*, but only that reading in *Suidas*; whereas we have discovered many probable grounds to make them both the same. That which I would now infer from hence is, the utter impossibility of the *Greeks* giving us any certain account of ancient times, when a thing so modern in comparison as *Cadmus* his coming into *Greece*, is thought by them a matter of so great antiquity, that when they would describe a thing very ancient, they described it by the name of *Ogyges*, who was the same with *Cadmus*. Now *Cadmus* his coming into *Greece*, is generally, by *Historians*, placed about the time of *Joshua*, whence some (I will not say how happily) have conjectured, that *Cadmus* and his company were some of the *Canaanites* who fled from *Joshua*, as others are supposed to have done into *Africa*, if *Procopius* his Pillar hath strength enough to bear such a conjecture. But there is too great a confusion about the time of *Cadmus* his arrival into *Greece*, to affirm any thing with any great certainty about it.

Yet those who disagree from that former Computation, place it yet lower. *Vossius* makes *Agenor Cadmus's* Father contemporary with the latter end of *Moses*, or the beginning of *Joshua*; and so *Cadmus* his time must fall somewhat after. *Jac. Cappellus* placeth *Cadmus* in the third year of *Othoniel*. The Author of the *Greek Chronicle*, in the *Marmora Arundelliana*, makes his coming to *Greece* to be in the time of *Helen* the son of *Deucalion*; which *Cappellus* fixeth on the 73. of *Moses*, *A. M.* 2995. But *Mr. Selden* conceives it somewhat lower: and so it must be, if we follow *Clemens Alexandrinus*, who places it in the time of *Lyneus* King of the *Argives*, which he saith was ἐνδεκάτῃ ὑστερὶ Μωϋσέως γενεᾷ, in the eleventh Generation after *Moses*, which will fall about the time of *Samuel*: But tho' it should be so late, it would be no wonder it should be reckoned a matter of so great antiquity among the *Grecians*; for the eldest Records they have of any King at *Athens*, begin at the time of *Moses*, whose contemporary *Cecrops* is generally thought to be; for at *Cecrops* his time it is the *Marble Chronicle* begins. Now that the *Grecians* did receive their very Letters from the *Phœnicians* by *Cadmus*, is commonly acknowledged by the most learned of the *Greeks* themselves, as appears by the ingenious confession of *Herodotus*, *Philostratus*, *Critias* in *Athenæus*, *Zenodotus* in *Laertius*, *Timon Philiassus* in *Sextus Empiricus*, and many others: so that it were to no purpose to offer to prove that, which they who arrogate so much to themselves, do so freely acknowledge. Which yet hath been done to very good purpose by

Vatic. App.
Cent. 4.
Prov. 52.
Meursius
de Regno
Att. Lib. 8.
c. 5.

Vossius de
Idol. l. 1.
c. 13.

Strom. l.

Joseph

Scalig. Not.
in Euseb.
Chron. n.
1617.
Bochart
Geogr.
p. 3. l. 1.
cap. 20.

Joseph Scaliger and *Bochartus*, and many others from the form of the Letters, the order and the name of them. It seems probable that at first they might use the form of the *Phœnician* Letters, in which *Herodotus* tells us the three old Inscriptions were extant; and *Diodorus* tells us, that the brass pot which *Cadmus* offered to *Minerva Lindia*, had an inscription on it in the *Phœnician* Letters: but afterwards the form of the Letters came by degrees to be changed, when for their greater expedition in writing they left the old way of writing towards the left hand, for the natural and expedite way of writing towards the right, by which they exchanged the fites of the strokes in several Letters, as it is observed by the fore-cited Learned Authors.

Scalig. ibid.

Plinii
Hist. 7. cap.
57.

Not that the old *Ionic* Letters were nearer the *Phœnician*, and distinct from the modern, as *Jos. Scaliger* in his learned Discourse on the original of the *Greek* Letters conceives; for the *Ionic* Letters were nothing else but the full Alphabet of twenty-four, with the additions of *Palamedes*, and *Simonides Ceus*; as *Pliny* tells us, that all the *Greeks* consented in the use of the *Ionic* Letters: but the old *Attic* Letters came nearer the *Phœnician*, because the *Athenians*, long after the Alphabet was increased to xxiv, continued still in the use of the old 16, which were brought in by *Cadmus*; which must needs much alter the way of writing: for in the old Letters, they writ *THEOS* for *Θεός*, which made *Pliny*, with a great deal of learning and truth, say, that the old *Greek* Letters were the same with the *Roman*. Thence the *Greeks* called their ancient Letters *Ἀρχαῖα γράμματα*, as appears by **Harpocraton* and *Hesychius*; not that they were so much distinct from others, but because they did not admit of the addition of the other eight Letters.

* V. Mansuetum in
Harpocr.
Salmas. in
Consecr.
Templ. p.
30.

XXI.

Plin. Nat.
Hist. l. 5.
c. 29. l. 7.
c. 57.

Clem.
Strom. l. 6.

We see then the very Letters of the *Greeks* were no elder than *Cadmus*; and for any considerable Learning among them, it was not near so old. Some assert indeed that History began from the time of *Cadmus*; but it is by a mistake of Him for a younger *Cadmus*, which was *Cadmus Milesius*, whom *Pliny* makes to be the first Writer in Prose; but That he after attributes to *Pherecydes Syrius*, and History to *Cadmus Milesius*: and therefore I think it far more probable, that it was some writing of this latter *Cadmus*, which was transcribed and epitomized by *Bion Proconesius*, altho' *Clemens Alexandrinus* seems to attribute it to the elder. We see how unable then the *Grecians* were to give an account of elder times, that were guilty of so much infancy and nonage, as to begin to learn their Letters almost in the noon-tide of the World, and yet long after this to the time of the first *Olympiad* all their relations are accounted fabulous. A fair account then we are like to have from them of the first antiquities of the World, who could not speak plain truth, 'till the World was above three thousand years old; for so was it when the *Olympiads* began.

So true is the observation of *Justin Martyr*, ἡδὲν ἔλλατ' ὅτι τῶν Ὀλυμπιάδων ἀρχαῖος ἱστορίας; the *Greeks* had no exact history of themselves before the *Olympiads*; but of that more afterwards.

This is now the first Defect which doth infringe the credibility of these Histories, which is the want of timely and early records to digest their own history in.

CHAP.

C H A P. II.

Of the *Phœnician* and *Ægyptian* History.

- I. *The particular defect in the History of the most learned Hea-then Nations.* II. *First the Phœnicians.* Of Sanchoniathon, *his Antiquity and Fidelity.* III. Of Jerom-baal, Baal-Berith. IV. *The Antiquity of Tyre.* Scaliger *vindicated against* Bochartus. V. Abibalus. VI. *The vanity of Phœnician Theology.* VII. *The imitation of it by the Gnostics.* VIII. *Of the Ægyptian History.* IX. *The Antiquity and Authority of Hermes Trismegistus.* X. *Of his Inscriptions on Pillars, transcribed by Manetho.* XI. *His Fabulousness thence discovered.* Terra Seriadica. XII. *Of Seth's Pillars in Josephus, and an account whence they were taken.*

HAVING already shewed a general defect in the ancient Hea-then Histories, as to an account of ancient times; we now come to a closer, and more particular consideration of the Histories of those several Nations which have born the greatest name in the world for learning and antiquity. There are four Nations chiefly which have pretended the most to antiquity in the learned World, and whose Historians have been thought to deliver any thing contrary to Holy Writ in their account of ancient times, whom on that account we are obliged more particularly to consider; and those are the *Phœnicians*, *Chaldeans*, *Ægyptians*, and *Græcians*; we shall therefore see what evidence of credibility there can be in any of these, as to the matter of antiquity of their Records, or their Histories taken from them. And the credibility of an Historian depending much upon the certainty and authority of the Records he makes use of, we shall both consider of what value and antiquity the pretended Records are, and particularly look into the age of the several Historians. As to the *Græcians*, we have seen already an utter impossibility of having ancient Records among them, because they wanted the means of preserving them, having so lately borrowed their Letters from other Nations. Unless as to their account of times they had been as careful, as the old *Romans* were, to number their years by the several *clavi* or *nails*, which they fixed on the Temple-doors: which yet they were not in any capacity to do, not growing up in an entire body, as the *Roman* Empire did, but lying so much scattered and divided into so many petty Republics, that they minded very little of concernment to the whole Nation. The other three Nations have deservedly a name of far greater antiquity than any the *Græcians* could ever pretend to; who yet were unmeasurably guilty of an impotent affectation of Antiquity; and arrogating to themselves, as growing on their own ground, what was with a great deal of pains and industry gathered but as the gleanings from the fuller harvest of those Nations they resorted to. Which is not

C

only

Philo Bybl.
apud Euseb. Prep.
Evangel. l. i.
c. 8. p. 23.
Ed. R. St.
II.

only true as to the greatest part of their learning, but as to the account likewise they give of ancient times; the chief and most ancient Histories among them being only a corruption of the History of the elder Nations, especially *Phœnicia* and *Egypt*: for of these two *Philo Byblius* the translator of the ancient *Phœnician* Historian *Sanchoniathon* saith, *they were* παλαιότατοι τῶν βαρβάρων, παρ' ὧν καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ περίλαστον ἀνθρώπων, *the most ancient of all the Barbarians, from whom the others derived their Theology*; which he there particularly instanceeth in.

Euseb.
Prep. Ev.
l. 10. c. 8.
p. 285.

We begin therefore with the *Phœnician* History, whose most ancient and famous Historian is *Sanchoniathon*, so much admired and made use of by the shrewdest antagonist ever Christianity met with, the Philosopher *Porphyrius*. But therein was seen the wonderful Providence of God, that out of this *Eater* came forth *Meat*, and out of the *Lion*, *Hony*; that the most considerable testimonies by him produced against our Religion, were of the greatest strength to refute his own. For he being of too great Learning to be satisfied with the vain pretenses of the *Græcians*, he made it his business to search after the most ancient Records, to find out somewhat in them to confront with the antiquity of the Scriptures; but upon his search could find none of greater veneration than the *Phœnician* History, nor any Author contending for age with this *Sanchoniathon*. Yet when he had made the most of his Testimony, he was fain to yield him younger than *Moses*, tho' he supposeth him elder than the *Trojan* Wars. And yet herein was he guilty of a most gross ἀντιρρίσις, not much exceeding the *Græcians* in his skill in Chronology, when he makes *Semiramis* coexistent with the Siege of *Troy*: as is evident in his testimony produced at large by *Eusebius* out of his first *Book against the Christians*; nay, he goes to prove the truth of *Sanchoniathon's* History by the agreement of it with that of *Moses* concerning the *Jews*, both as to their Names and Places, ἰσχυρὴ δὲ ἔστιν ἡ μαρτυρία ἀληθεύειν, ὅτι καὶ εἰς τόπους καὶ εἰς ἑσώματα αὐτῶν ἔστι συμφωνία: whereby he doth evidently assert the greater Truth and Antiquity of *Moses* his History, when he proves the truth of *Sanchoniathon's* from consonancy with that.

III.

Bochart.
Geogr. Sac.
p. 2. l. 2.
c. 17.

Two things more *Porphyry* insists on to manifest his credibility; the one I suppose relates to what he reports concerning the *Jews*, the other concerning the *Phœnicians* themselves. For the first, that he made use of the Records of *Ferom-baal* the Priest of the God *Ieuo*, or rather *Iao*; for the other, that he used all the Records of the several Cities, and the sacred Inscriptions in the Temples. Who that *Ferom-baal* was, is much discussed among Learned men, the finding out of which hath been thought to be the most certain way to determine the age of *Sanchoniathon*. The learned *Bochartus* conceives him to be *Gideon*, who in Scriptures is called *Ferub-baal*, which is of the same sense in the *Phœnician* language, only after their custom changing one *b* into *m*, as in *Ambubajæ*, *Sambuca*, &c. But admitting the conjecture of this learned person concerning *Ferub-baal*, yet I see no necessity of making *Sanchoniathon* and him contemporary; for I no where find any thing mentioned in *Porphyry* implying that, but only that he made use of the Records of *Ferub-baal*, which he might very probably do at a considerable distance of time from him; whether by those ἱστορίαι, we mean the Annals written

written by him, or the Records concerning his actions: either of which might have given *Sanchoniathon* considerable light in the history either of the *Israelites* or *Phœnicians*. And it is so much the more probable, because presently after the death of *Gideon*, the *Israelites* worshipped *Baal-berith*; by which most probably is meant the Idol of *Berith* or *Berytus*, the place where *Sanchoniathon* lived; by which means the *Berytians* might come easily acquainted with all the remarkable passages of *Jerub-baal*. Judg. 8. 33.

But I cannot conceive how *Sanchoniathon* could be contemporary with *Gideon*, (which yet if he were, he falls 182 years short of *Moses*,) especially because the building of *Tyre*, which that Author mentions as an ancient thing (as hath been observed by *Scaliger*) is by our best Chronologers placed about the time of *Gideon*, and about 65 years before the destruction of *Troy*. I know *Bochartus*, to avoid this argument, hath brought some evidence of several places called *Tyrus* in *Phœnicia*, from *Scylax* his *Periplus*; but none that there was any more than one *Tyrus* of any great repute for antiquity. Now this *Tyrus* *Josephus* makes but 240 years elder than *Solomon's* Temple, and *Justin* but one year elder than the destruction of *Troy*. Neither can any account be given why *Sidon* should be so much celebrated by ancient Poets, as *Strabo* tells us, when *Tyre* is not so much as mentioned by *Homer*; if the famous *Tyre* were of so great antiquity and repute as is pretended. It cannot be denied but that there is mention in Scripture of a *Tyre* elder than this we speak of, *Joshua* 19. 29. which some think to be that which was called *Palatyrus*, which *Strabo* makes to be 20 furlongs distant from the great *Tyre*; but *Pliny* includes *Palatyrus* within the circumference of *Tyre*, and so makes the whole circuit of the City to be 19 miles. It is not to me so certain to what place the name of *Palatyrus* refers, whether to any *Tyrus* before the first building of the great *Tyre*, or to the ruins of the great *Tyre* after its destruction by *Nebuchadnezzar*, compared with the new *Tyre*, which was built more inward to the Sea, and was after besieged by *Alexander* the Great. It may seem probable that *Palatyrus* may relate to the ruins of the great *Tyre*, in that it was after included in its circuit, and chiefly because of the prediction in *Ezekiel* 26. 4. *Thou shalt be built no more*; for the *Tyre* erected after, was built not on the Continent, but almost in the Sea. If so, then *Palatyrus* or the old famous *Tyrus* might stand upon a rock upon the brink of the Continent: and so the great argument of *Bochartus* is easily answered, which is, that after it is mentioned in *Sanchoniathon's* History, that *Hypsouranius* dwelt in *Tyre*, upon the falling out between him and his brother *Ufous*, *Ufous* first adventured *εἰς θάλασσαν ὑπερβαῖν*, to go to Sea, which, saith he, evidently manifests that the *Tyre* mentioned by *Sanchoniathon* was not the famous *Insular* *Tyrus*, but some other *Tyre*. This argument, I say, is now easily answered, if the famous *Tyre* before its destruction by *Nebuchadnezzar* did stand upon the Continent; for then it might be the old famous *Tyre* still, notwithstanding what *Sanchoniathon* speaks of the first venturing to Sea after *Tyre* was built. So then I conceive these several ages agreeable to the same *Tyre*; the first was when it was a high strong rock on the sea-side without many inhabitants; so I suppose it was when mentioned by *Joshua*, as the bound of the tribe of *Asher*. The IV. Scalig. Not. in Frag. Græc. p. 40. Joseph. Ant. l. 8. Strabo l. 16. Plin. Hist. Nat. l. 5. c. 19.

second age was, when it was built a great City by the *Sidonians* upon the former place, and grew very populous and famous, which lasted 'till *Nebuchadnezzar's* time; after this, tho' it were never built upon the Continent again, yet a little farther into the sea, a new and goodly City was erected, which was *New Tyre*, and the remains on the continent side *Palatyrus*. Thus far then we have made good *Scaliger's* opinion against *Bochartus*, that the famous *Sanchoniathon* is not so old as he is pretended to be.

v. Which will be further manifest, if that *Abibalus*, to whom *Sanchoniathon* is supposed to dedicate his History, were the father to *Hiram*, contemporary with *Solomon*, as *Jes. Scaliger* supposeth, who was 154 years after the destruction of *Troy*. In the *Tyrian* Dynasties produced by *Scaliger* out of the *Phœnician* Annals, this *Abibalus* is the first who occurs, and is contemporary with *David*: *Sanchoniathon* then is of no great antiquity, if this were the time he lived in. But *Bochartus* well observes, that it is not spoken of *Abibalus* King of *Tyre*, but of *Abibalus* King of *Berytus*, whom we may allow to be somewhat nearer the time of *Moses* than the other *Abibalus*, as the *Phœnician* Annals make it appear, as *Porphry* tells us; but yet we find his antiquity is not so great as to be able to contest with *Moses*, as *Porphry* himself confesseth; altho' we may freely acknowledg him to be far elder than any of the *Greek* Historians; which is all *Vossius* contends for, and sufficiently proves: but we are far from yielding him contemporary with *Semiramis*, as *Porphry* would have him, and yet makes him junior to *Moses*, and to live about the time of the *Trojan* war, which is to reconcile the distance of near 800 years: such miserable confusion was there in the best learned Heathens in their computation of ancient times.

vi. Having thus cleared the Antiquity of *Sanchoniathon* and the *Phœnician* History, we are next to consider the Fidelity of it. This *Sanchoniathon* is highly commended for, both by *Porphry*, and his Translator into *Greek* *Philo Byblius*, who lived in *Adrian's* time; and *Theodoret* thinks his name in the *Phœnician* language signifies *φιλαλῆς*, which *Bochartus* endeavours to fetch from thence, and conceives the name to be given him when he set himself to write his History; and he wisheth, and so do we, that he had been then *vir sui nominis*, and made it appear by his writing that he had been a *Lover of truth*. *Philo* saith he was *ἀνὴρ πολυμάχης καὶ πολυπρόγρητος*, a very learned and inquisitive man; but either he was not so diligent to enquire after, or not so happy to light on any certain Records; or if he did, he was not over-much a *Lover of truth*, in delivering them to the world. How faithful he was in transcribing his History from his Records, we cannot be sufficient judges of, unless we had those books of *Taausus*, and the sacred Inscriptions, and the Records of Cities which he pretends to take his History from, to compare them together. But by what remains of his History, which is only the first Book concerning the *Phœnician* Theology, extant in *Eusebius*, we have little reason to believe his History of the World and eldest times, without further proof than he gives of it, there being so much obscurity and confusion in it, when he makes a *Chaos* to be the first beginning of all things, and the Gods to come after; makes *Αἰτήριον* to be the son of *Chryser* or *Vulcan*,

Scal. Not.
in Euseb.
Chr. p. 12.
Scal. Can.
Isag. l. 2.

Voss. de Hist.
Græc. l. 1.
c. 1.

Vulcan, and again the same *μῦθος*, the man born of earth, to be several generations after *Αἰὼν* and *Πρωτόγονος* who were the first mortal men; and yet from the two brethren *Τυχέτης* and *Αδύχτης* came two Gods, whereof one was called *Ἄγεθς*, and the other *Ἄγεθης*, and this latter was worshipped with as much veneration as any of their Gods.

Yet from these things, as foolish and ridiculous as they are, it is very probable the *Gnostics* and the several subdivisions of them might take the rise of their several *Æones* and *Εὐρύωνες*: for here we find *Αἰὼν* and *Πρωτόγονος* made two of the number of the Gods; but the rest of the names they, according to their several sects, took a liberty of altering according to their several fancies. This is far more probable to me, than that either *Hesiod's* *Θεογονία* should be the ground of them; or the opinion of a late German Divine, who conceives that *Philo Byblius* did in imitation of the *Gnostics*, form this holy story of the *Phœnician* Theology. For altho' I am far from believing what *Kircher* somewhere tells us, that he had once got a sight of *Sanchoniathon's* Original History (it being not the first thing that learned man hath been deceived in,) yet I see no ground of so much peevishness, as because this History pretends so much antiquity, we should therefore presently condemn it as a figment of the Translator of it. For had it been so, the Antagonists of *Porphyrus*, *Methodius*, *Apollinaris*, but especially *Eusebius*, so well versed in antiquities, would have found out so great a cheat. Altho' I must confess they were oft-times deceived with *Pie Fraudes*; but then it was when they made for the Christians, and not against them, as this did. But besides a fabulous confusion of things together, we have some things delivered concerning their Gods, which are both contrary to all natural notions of a Deity, and those very common principles of Humanity, which all acknowledg. As when *Κρόνος* or *Saturn*, suspecting his son *Sadidus*, destroyed him with his own hands, and warred against his father *Uranus*, and after destroyed him likewise, and buried his brother *Atlas* alive in the earth; which being taken, as *Philo Byblius* contends they ought to be, in the literal sense, are such incongruities to all notions of a divine nature, that it is the greatest wonder there should be any that should believe there was any God, and believe these were Gods together.

But altho' there be so many gross fables and inconsistencies in this *Phœnician* Theology, that are so far from meriting belief in themselves, that it were a sufficient forfeiture of reason to say they were credible; yet when we have a greater light in our hands of divine revelation, we may in this dungeon find out many excellent remainders of the ancient tradition, tho' miserably corrupted; as, concerning the Creation, the Original of Idolatry, the Invention of Arts, the Foundation of Cities, the Story of *Abraham*, of which in their due place. That which of all seems the clearest in this Theology, is the open owning the original of Idolatry to have been from the consecration of some eminent persons after their death, who had found out some useful things for the world while they were living: which the subtler *Greeks* would not admit of, viz. that the persons they worship'd were once Men; which made them turn all into Allegories and Mystical senses to blind that Idolatry

latry they were guilty of the better among the ignorant: which makes *Philo Byblius* so very angry with the *Neoteric Græcians*, as he calls them, *ὡς αἱ βιβλικαὶ πόλεις ἐστὶν ἀλλήλῃς τὰς αἰετὶς ἡμῶν μύθους ἐν ἀκαταστάσει καὶ φυσικαῖς διηγήσεσιν* *ap. Euseb. Prep. l. 1. c. 6. p. 23.* *That with a great deal of force and straining they turned all the stories of the Gods into Allegories and Physical discourses.* Which is all the ingenuity that I know is to be found in this *Phœnician* Theology, that therein we find a free acknowledgment of the beginning of the Heathen Idolatry: and therefore *Santhoniathon* was as far from advancing *Porphyry's* Religion, as he was in the least from overthrowing the credibility of Christianity.

viii.

The next we come to then, are the *Egyptians*; a people so unreasonably given to fables, that the wisest action they did, was to conceal their Religion; and the best offices their Gods had, was to hold their fingers in their mouths, to command silence to all that came to worship them. But we design not here any set discourse concerning the vanity of the *Egyptian* Theology, which yet was so monstrously ridiculous, that even those who were overrun with the height of Idolatry themselves, did make it the object of their scorn and laughter. And certainly had we no other demonstration of the greatness of Man's apostasy and degeneracy, the *Egyptian* Theology would be an irrefragable evidence of it: for who could but imagine a strangeness of spirit in those, who could fall down and worship the basest and most contemptible of creatures? Their Temples were the best Hieroglyphics of themselves, fair and goodly structures without, but within some deformed creatures enshrined for veneration. But tho' the *Egyptians* had lost their credit so much as to matter of Religion; yet it may be supposed, that they who were so famed for wisdom and antiquity, should be able to give a full and exact account of themselves thro' the ages of the world. And this they are so far from being defective in, that if you will believe them, they will give you an account of themselves many thousands of years before ever the world was made, but the peculiar vanity of their Chronology will be handled afterwards: That we now enquire into, is, what certain Records they had of their own antiquity, which might call for assent from any unprejudiced mind; whether there be any thing really answering that loud and unparalell'd cry of antiquity among the *Egyptians*, whereby they will make all other Nations in comparison of them, to be but of yesterday, and to know nothing. We question not now their pretence to wisdom and learning, but are the more in hopes to meet with some certain way of satisfaction concerning ancient times, where learning is supposed to have flourished so much, even when *Greece* it self was accounted barbarous.

ix.

The great basis of all the *Egyptian* History depends on the credit of their ancient *Hermes*, whom out of their veneration they called *Trismegistus*, for to him they ascribe the first invention of their Learning, and all excellent Arts; from him they derive their history; their famous historian *Manetho* professing to transcribe his Dynasties from the pillars of *Hermes*. We shall therefore first see of what credit and antiquity *Hermes* himself was, and of what account particularly those pillars were which uphold all the fabric of *Manetho* his Dynasties. For *Hermes* himself the story concerning him

him is so various and uncertain, that some have from thence questioned whether ever there were such a person or no, because of the strangely different account that is given of him. *Cotta* in *Tully*, in order to the establishing his Academical doctrine of withholding Assent, mentions no fewer than five *Mercuries*, of which, two he makes *Egyptian*, one of them the *Hermes* we now speak of, whom the *Egyptians* call *Thoyth*, and was the Author both of their Laws and Letters. The *Egyptians*, as appears by *Diodorus*, make him to be a sacred Scribe to *Osiris*, and to have instructed *Isis*; and when *Osiris* went upon any warlike expedition, he committed the management of affairs to him for his great wisdom. The *Phœnicians* preserve his memory among them too: for *Philo Byblius* saith, That *Sanchoniathon* described his Theology from the books of *Tautus*, whom the *Egyptians* call *Thoyth*, who was the first inventor of Letters, and was a Counsellor to *Saturn*, whose advice he much relied on. What now must we pitch upon in so great uncertainties? How come the *Phœnician* and *Egyptian* Theology to come both from the same person, which are conceived so much to differ from each other? If we make the stories of *Osiris* and *Isis* to be fabulous, and merely allegorical, as *Plutarch* doth, then *Mercury* himself must become an Allegory, and the Father of Letters must be an Hieroglyphic. If we admit the *Egyptian* narrations to be real, and seek to reduce them to truth, and thereby make *Osiris* to be *Mitshraim* the son of *Cham*, who first ruled in *Egypt*, all that we can then affirm of *Hermes* is, That he might be some useful person, who had a great influence both upon the King and State, and did first settle the Nation in a politic way of government, whose memory on that account the *Egyptians* might preserve with the greatest veneration; and when they were once fallen into that idolatry of consecrating the memories of the first contributors to the good of mankind, they thought they had the greatest reason to adore his memory, and so by degrees attributed the invention of all useful things to him. For so it is apparent they did, when *Jamblichus* tells us, The *Egyptians* attributed all their books to *Mercury*, as the Father of them: because he was reputed the father of wit and learning, they made all the off-springs of their brains to bear their father's name. And this hath been the great reason the world hath been so long time imposed upon with varieties of books going under the name of *Hermes Trismegistus*. For he was not the first of his kind, who in the early days of the Christian world obtruded upon the world that *Cento* or confused mixture of the *Christian*, *Platonic*, and *Egyptian* doctrines, which is extant still under the name of *Hermes Trismegistus*; whose vanity and falshood hath been sufficiently detected by learned men. There were long before his time extant several *Mercurial* books, as they were called, which none of the wiser Heathens did ever look on as any other than fables and impostures, as appears by *Porphry's* letter to *Anebo* the *Egyptian* Priest, and *Jamblichus* his answer to it in his book of the *Egyptian* Mysteries.

Cicero de Nat. Deor.

Jamblic. de Myst. l. i.

We have then no certainty at all, notwithstanding the great fame of *Hermes*, of any certain records of ancient times, unless they be contained in those sacred Inscriptions from whence *Manetho* took

x.

took

took his history. It must be acknowledged that the most ancient way of preserving any monuments of learning in those elder times, was by these Inscriptions on Pillars, especially among the *Egyptians*, as is evident from the several testimonies of *Galen*, *Proclus*, *Jamblichus*, and the Author of the book called *Sapientia secundum Egyptios*, adjoyned to *Aristotle*; who all concur in this, that whatever laudable invention they had among them it was inscribed on some Pillars, and those preserved in their Temples, which were instead of Libraries to them. *Manetho* therefore to make his story the more probable, pretends to take all his relations from these sacred Inscriptions; and as *Eusebius* tells us, translated the whole *Egyptian History* into *Greek*, beginning from their Gods, and continuing his History down near the time of *Darius Codomannus*, whom *Alexander* conquered: for in *Eusebius* his *Chronica* mention is made of *Manetho* his History, ending the xvth year of *Artaxerxes Ochus*, which, saith *Vossius*, was in the second year of the 107th Olympiad. This *Manetho Sebennyta* was High Priest of *Heliopolis* in the time of *Ptolemaus Philadelphus*, at whose request he writ his History, which he digested into three Tomes, the first containing the 11 Dynasties of the Gods and Heroes; the second, 8 Dynasties; the third 12; all containing, according to his fabulous computation, the sum of 53535 years. These Dynasties are yet preserved, being first epitomized by *Julius Africanus*, from him transcribed by *Eusebius* in his *Chronica*, from *Eusebius* by *Georgius Syncellus*, out of whom they are produced by *Jos. Scaliger*, and may be seen both in his *Eusebius*, and his *Canones Isagogici*.

KL. Now *Manetho*, as appears by *Eusebius*, voucheth this as the main testimony of his credibility, that he took his History, ἐκ τῶν ἐν τῇ Σακειαδικῇ γῇ κειμένων ὁλῶν, ἱερῶν ἀλφάβητον ἐ ἱερογλυφικῶν χαρακτῶν καὶ μεταφράσας αὐτὰν ἔγραψε ἐν πρώτῳ Ἑρμοῦ, καὶ ἱερογλυφικῶν μὲν τὸ καλεῖσθαι αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ ἀλφάβητον εἰς τὴν ἐλπίδα φεῖν χαρακτῶν ἱερογλυφικῶν, ἐ ληίσθαι αὐτὸν ἐν βίβλῳ καὶ ἐν ἀγαθοδαίμονος ἐν δεύτερῳ Ἑρμοῦ, καὶ ἐν τῷ τῶν, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τῶν ἱερῶν Αἰγυπτίων; from some pillars in the Land of Seriad, in which they were inscribed in the Sacred Dialect by the first Mercury Thoyth, and after the flood were translated out of the sacred dialect into the Greek tongue in Hieroglyphic Characters, and are laid up in books among the Revestries of the Egyptian Temples, by Agathodæmon, the second Mercury, the Father of Tat. Certainly this fabulous Author could not in fewer words have more manifested his own impostures, nor blasted his own credit more than he hath done in these; which it is a wonder so many learned Men have taken so little notice of, which have found frequent occasion to speak of *Manetho* and his Dynasties. This I shall make appear by some great Improbabilities, and other plain Impossibilities which are couched in them. The improbabilities are, first, such Pillars, being in such a place as *Seriad*, and that place no more spoken of either by himself or by any other *Egyptians*, nor any use made of these Inscriptions by any other but himself. As to this *terra Seriadica* where it should be, the very learned and inquisitive *Joseph Scaliger* plainly gives out, and ingenuously professeth his ignorance. For in his Notes on the Fragments of *Manetho* in *Eusebius*; when he comes to that ἐκ τῶν γῇ Σακειαδικῇ, he only saith, *Que nobis ignota querant studiosi*. But *Isaac Vossius*,

Gal. l. 1. c.
Iul. c. 1.
Procl. in
Tim. p. 31.
Jamb. de
Myst. c. 2.
Jamb. l. 1.
Sep. Sec.
Egypt. c. 1.
f. 1.

Vossius de
Hist. Græc.
l. 1. c. 14.

[1.]

Vossius, in his late Discourses *De ætate mundi*, cries *Εἰρηναῖος*, and confidently persuades himself that it is the same with *Seirah*, mentioned *Judges* 3. 16. Indeed were there nothing else to be considered but affinity of names, it might well be the same: but that פסילי, which we render the *stone-quarries*, should signify the Pillars of *Mercury*, is somewhat hard to conceive. The *Seventy* render it, as himself observes, *ἡ γλυπτὴ*, by which they understand *graven Images*: So the word is used 2 *Chron.* 33. 19. *Deut.* 7. 5. *Isai.* 10. 19. The vulgar *Latin* renders it, *ad locum Idolorum*; which were the certain interpretation, if *Chytræus* his conjecture were true, that *Eglon* had lately set up Idols there; but if it be meant of Pillars, I cannot but approve of *Junius* his interpretation, which I conceive bids fairest to be the genuine sense of the place, viz. that these Stones here were the Twelve stones pitched by *Josua* in *Gilgal* after the *Israelites* passed over *Jordan*; and these Stones are said to be by *Gilgal*, *Judges* 3. 19. So that notwithstanding this handsome conjecture, we are as far to seek for the Pillars of *Mercury* as ever we were, and may be so to the world's end. Secondly, the standing of these Pillars during the Flood, which must be supposed certainly to have some singular virtue in them to resist such a torrent of Waters, which overthrew the strongest built Houses, and most compacted Cities. The plain Impossibilities are, first, that *Manetho* should transcribe his Dynasties from the beginning of the History of *Ægypt*, to almost the time of *Alexander*, out of sacred Inscriptions of *Thoyth*, who lived in the beginning of the very first Dynasty according to his own computation. Sure this *Thoyth*, was an excellent Prophet, to write an History for above 50000 years to come, as *Manetho* reckons it. Secondly, it is as well still, that this History after the Flood should be translated into Hieroglyphic Characters. What kind of Translation is that? we had thought Hieroglyphics had been representations of Things, and not of Sounds and Letters, or Words: How could this History have at first been written in any tongue, when it was in Hieroglyphics? Do Hieroglyphics speak in several languages, and are they capable of changing their tongues? But thirdly, it is as good still, that the second *Mercury* or *Agathodæmon* did translate this History so soon after the Flood into *Greek*: Was the *Greek* tongue so much in request so soon after the Flood, that the *Ægyptian* History for the sake of the *Greeks* must be translated into their language? Nay, is it not evident from *Herodotus* and *Diodorus*, that the *Grecians* were not permitted so much as any commerce with the *Ægyptians*, till the time of *Psammetichus*, which fell out in the 26th Dynasty of *Manetho*, and about a Century after the beginning of the *Olympiads*. We see then how credible an Author *Manetho* is, and what truth there is like to be in the account of ancient times given by the *Ægyptian* Historians, when the chief of them so lamentably and ominously stumbles in his very entrance into it.

And yet as fabulous as this account is, which *Manetho* gives of his taking his history from these Pillars before the Flood, I cannot but think that *Josephus*, an Author otherwise of good credit, took his famous story of *Seth's* pillars, concerning Astronomical observations before the flood, from this story of *Manetho*, and there-

D

fore

Scalig. Not.
in gr. Euseb.
p. 408.
If. Voss. de
at. mund.
c. 10.

Josh. 4. 19.
20. 21.

(2.)

(1.)

(2.)

(3.)

Herod. l. 2.
Diod. l. 1,
c. 67.

fore I cannot but look upon them with as jealous an eye as on the other, altho' I know how fond the world hath been upon that most ancient monument, as is pretended, of learning in the world. *Du Bartas* hath writ a whole Poem on these Pillars, and the truth is, they are fitter subjects for Poets than any else, as will appear on these considerations. *First*, how strangely improbable is it, that the posterity of *Seth*, who, as is pretended, did foreknow a destruction of the world to be by a Flood, should busy themselves to write Astronomical observations on Pillars, for the benefit of those who should live after it? Could they think their pillars should have some peculiar exemption above stronger structures, from the violence of the rough and furious waters? If they believed the Flood absolutely universal, for whom did they intend their observations? if not, to what end did they make them, when the persons surviving might communicate their inventions to them? But, *Secondly*, if either one or both these pillars remained, whence comes it to pass that neither the *Chaldeans*, nor any of the eldest pretenders to Astronomy, should neither mention them, nor make any use of them? Nay, *Thirdly*, whence came the study of Astronomy to be so lamentably defective in those ancient times, if they had such certain observations of the heavenly bodies gathered by so much experience of the persons who lived before the Flood? *Fourthly*, How comes *Josephus* himself to neglect this remarkable testimony of the Scripture-history in his books against *Appion*, if he had thought it were such as might be relied on? *Fifthly*, How comes *Josephus* so carelessly not to set down the place in *Syria* where these pillars stood, that inquisitive persons might have satisfy'd themselves with the Sight of the pillar at least, and what kind of characters those observations were preserved in? But now, if we compare this of *Josephus* with *Manetho* his story, we shall find them so exactly resemble each other, that we may judge all those pillars to have been taken out of the same quarry. Two things make it yet more probable: *First*, The name of the place wherein they stood, which *Eustathius* in *Hexaemeron* takes out of *Josephus*, and calls Σηιανδ, the very same place with that in *Manetho*. The other is the common use of the name of *Seth* among the *Egyptians*, as not only appears by *Plutarch de Iside & Osiride*, but by this very place of *Manetho*; where it follows, α βιβλη Σαθουα, a book of his bearing the Title, which *Vettius Valens Antiochenus* tells us is not called Σαθουα, but Σαθ. Now therefore *Josephus*, who frequently useth the testimony of Heathen Writers, and frequently of this *Manetho*, endeavoured to bring this fabulous relation of *Manetho* as near the truth as he could; therefore instead of *Thoyth* he puts *Seth*, and instead of the fabulous history of *Egypt*, the inventions of the Patriarchs, and *Syria* instead of *Seriadica*, a Country too large to find these pillars in.

Vettius Val.
apud Scal.
not. Gr. p.
438.

CHAP.

C H A P. III.

Of the Chaldean History.

- I. *The contest of Antiquity among Heathen Nations, and the ways of deciding it.* II. *Of the Chaldean Astrology, and the foundation of Judicial Astrology.* III. *Of the Zabii, their Founder, who they were; no other than the old Chaldees.* IV. *Of Berofus and his History.* V. *An account of the fabulous Dynasties of Berofus and Manetho;* VI. *From the Translation of the Scripture-history into Greek in the time of Ptolemee.* VII. *Of that Translation and the time of it.* VIII. *Of Deme- trius Phalereus. Scaliger's arguments answered.* IX. *Manetho writ after the Septuagint, proved against Kircher; his arguments answered. Of Rabbinical and Arabic Authors, and thir little credit in matter of History.* X. *The time of Be- rofus enquired into; his Writing contemporary with Phi- ladelphus.*

THE next whom our Enquiry leads us to, are the *Chaldeans*, a Nation of great and undoubted Antiquity, being in probability the first formed into a National Government after the Flood, and therefore the more capable of having these Arts and Sciences flourish among them, which might preserve the memory of eldest times to the view of posterity. And yet even among these who enjoyed all the advantages of ease, quiet, and a flourishing Empire, we find no undoubted or credible Records preserved, but the same vanity as among the *Egyptians*, in arrogating Antiquity to themselves beyond all proportion of reason or satisfaction from their own History, to fill up that vast measure of time with: which makes it most probable, what *Diodorus* observes of them, *That in things pertaining to their Arts, they made use of Lunar years of 30 days; so they had need, when Tully tells us that they boasted of observations of the Stars for 470000 years.* It had been impossible for them to have been so extravagant in their accounts of themselves, had they but preserved the History of their Nation in any certain Records. For want of which, the Tradition of the eldest times varying in the several families after their dispersion, and being gradually corrupted by the policy of their Leaders, and those corruptions readily embraced by the predominancy of self-love in the several Nations, thence arose those vain and eager contests between the *Chaldeans*, *Scythians*, *Egyptians*, and *Æthiopians*, concerning the antiquity of their several Nations: which may be seen in *Diodorus*, and others: by which it most evidently appears that they had no certain history of their own Nations: for none of them insist upon any Records, but only upon several

Diodor. Biblioth. l. 1. Cicero de Divin. l. 1.

probabilities from the nature of their Country, and the Climates they lived under. Neither need *Psammetichus* have been put to that ridiculous way of deciding the controversy by his two Infants bred up without any converse with Men, concluding the language they spake would manifest the great antiquity of the Nation it belonged to: Whereas it is more than probable they had spoken none at all, had they not learned the inarticulate voice of the Goats they had more converse with than Men. The making use of such ways to decide this controversy doth not only argue the great weakness of those times as to natural knowledg; but the absolute defect and insufficiency of them, as to the giving any certain account of the state of ancient times.

- II. Of which the *Chaldeans* had advantages above all other Heathen Nations, not only living in a settled Country, but in or near that very place where the grand Ancestors of the world had their chief abode and residence. Whereby we see how unfaithful a thing Tradition is, and how soon it is corrupted or fails, where it hath no sure records to bottom its self upon. But indeed it is the less wonder that there should be a confusion of Histories, where there had been before of Tongues; and that such whose design and memory God had blasted before, should afterwards forget their own original. But as if the *Chaldeans* had retained something still of their old aspiring mind to reach up to Heaven, the only thing they were eminent for, and which they were careful in preserving of, was some Astronomical observations, which *Tully* tells us they had a great conveniency for, by reason of the plain and even situation of their Country; whereby they might have a larger prospect of the heavenly bodies, than those who lived in mountainous Countries could have. And yet even for this (which they were so famous for, that the name *Chaldeans* passed for *Astrologers* in the *Roman Empire*) we have no great reason to admire their excellency in it, considering how soon their skill in Astronomy dwindled into that which by a great *Catachresis* is called *Judicial Astrology*. The original of which is most evident among Them, as all other Heathen Nations, to have been from the Divinity which they attributed to the Stars; in which yet they were far more rational than those who now admire that Art: For, granting their Hypothesis, that the Stars were Gods, it was but reasonable they should determine contingent effects; but it is far from being so with Them who take away the foundation of all those celestial Houses, and yet attribute the same effects to them, which they did, who believed a Divinity in them. The *Chaldeans*, as *Diodorus* relates, set 30 Stars under the Planets; these they called *Βυλάνιους Θεούς*; others they had as Princes over these, which they called *τῶν Θεῶν Κυβέρας*; the former were as the privy Counsellors, and these the Princes over them, by whom in their courses they supposed the course of the Year to be regulated. See then what a near affinity there was between Astrology and Divinity of the Stars, which makes *Ptolemee* call them *Atheists* who condemned Astrology, because thereby they destroyed the main of their Religion, which was the worshipping the Stars for Gods. But it seems by *Strabo*, that one of the Sects of the *Chaldeans* did so hold to Astronomy still, that they wholly rejected

*Diodor. l. 2.
Biblioth.*

*Ptolem. Te-
trab. l. 1.*

*Strabo Geo-
graph. l. 16.*

jected *Genethliology*: which caused a great division among the *Orchoëni* and *Borsippeni*, two Sects among them, so called from the places of their habitations.

And if we reckon the *Zabii* among the *Chaldeans*, as *Maimonides* seems to do, we have a further evidence of the Planetary Deities so much in request among the *Chaldeans*; for the description he gives of them is to this purpose, *That they had no other Gods but the Stars to whom they made Statues and Images, to the Sun Golden, to the Moon Silver, and so to the rest of the Planets of the Metals dedicated to them. Those Images derived an influence from the Stars to which they were erected, which had thence a faculty of foretelling future things*; which is an exact description of the *Στοιχείων* or *Talismans* so much in request among the Heathens; such as the *Palladium* of *Troy* is supposed by learned men to have been. These *Talismans* are by the *Jews* called *David's bucklers*, and are much of the same nature with the ancient *Teraphim*, both being accurately made according to the positions of the Heavens; only the one were to foretel future things, the other for the driving away some calamity. Concerning these *Zabii*, *Maimonides* tells us, *That the understanding their Rites would give a great deal of light to several passages of Scripture which now lie in obscurity*: but little is supposed to be yet further known of them than what *Scaliger* hath said, That they were the more Eastern *Chaldeans*; which he fetcheth from the signification of the word. Several of their Books are extant, saith *Scaliger*, among the *Arabians*, but none of them are yet discovered to the *European* world. *Salmasius* thinks, these *Zabii* were the *Chaldeans* inhabiting *Mesopotamia*, to which is very consonant what *Maimonides* saith, that *Abraham had his education among them. Saïd Batricides*, cited by Mr. *Selden*, attributes the original of their Religion to the time of *Nahor*, and to *Zaradchath the Persian as the Author of it*; who is conceived to be the same with *Zoroaster*, who in all probability is the same with the *Zertoost* of the *Persees*, a Sect of the ancient *Persians* living now among the *Banyans* in the *Indies*. These give a more full and exact account concerning the original, birth, education, and enthusiasms or revelations of their *Zertoost*, than any we meet with in any *Greek* Historians; three books they tell us of which *Zertoost* received by Revelation, or rather one book, consisting of three several tracts, whereof the first was concerning Judicial Astrology, which they call *Astodeger*; the second concerning *Physic*, or the knowledg of Natural things; the third was called *Zertoest*, from the bringer of it, containing their Religious rites; the first was committed to the *Jesopps* or *Magi*, the second to *Physicians*, the third to the *Darooes* or Church-men, wherein are contained the several precepts of their Law; we have likewise the rites and customs of these *Persees* in their worship of Fire, with many other particular rites of theirs, published some time since by one Mr. *Lord*, who was a long time resident among them at *Surat*; by which we may not only understand much of the Religion of the ancient *Persians*, but if I mistake not, somewhat of the *Zabii* too. My reasons are, because the ancient *Zaradcha* or *Zoroaster* is by *Saïd Batricides* made the Author of the *Zabii*, as we have seen already, who was undoubtedly the founder of the *Persian* worship,

III.

Maimon.
More Nevo
p. 3. c. 29.

V. Scaliger
Ep. ad Casaubon. &
Ep. Gallic.
Selden de
Diis Syris,
l. 1. c. 2.
Salmas. de
An. Clim.
p. 578.

Selden de
jure nat. &
gent. l. 2. c.
7.

Am. Marc. Hist. l. 23. or rather a promoter of it among the *Persians*; for *Ammianus Marcellinus* tells us, that he was instructed in the rites of the *Chaldeans*, which he added to the *Persian* rites. Besides, their agreement in the chief point of Idolatry, the worship of the Sun, and consequently the ~~ⲡⲟⲩⲁⲩⲱⲛ~~ or Symbol of the Sun, the eternal Fire, is evident; which as far as we can learn, was the great and most early Idolatry of the Eastern Countries. And further we find God in *Leviticus* 26. 30. threatning to destroy their ~~ⲡⲟⲩⲁⲩⲱⲛ~~ *their Images of the Sun*, some render it; but most probably by that word is meant the ~~ⲡⲟⲩⲁⲩⲱⲛ~~ *the Hearths* where they kept their perpetual Fire, for those are ~~ⲡⲟⲩⲁⲩⲱⲛ~~ from ~~ⲡⲟⲩⲁⲩⲱⲛ~~, which is used both for the *Sun* and *Fire*.
V. Voss. Idol. l. 2. c. 9. Now hence it appears that this Idolatry was in use among the Nations about *Palestine*; else there had been no need of so severe a threatning against it: and therefore most probably the rites of the *Zabii* (which must help us to explain the reasons of some particular positive precepts in the *Levitical Law* relating to Idolatry) are the same with the rites of the *Chaldeans* and *Persians*, who all agreed in this worship of the Sun and Fire; which may be yet more probable from what *Maimonides* saith of them; *Gens Zabia erat gens quæ implevit totum orbem*; it could not be then any obscure Nation, but such as had the largest spread in the Eastern Countries, which could be no other than the ancient *Chaldeans*, from whom the *Persians* derived their worship. It may not seem altogether improbable that *Balaam* the famous Soothsayer was one of these *Zabii*, especially if according to *Salmasius* his judgment they inhabited *Mesopotamia*; for *Balaam's* Country seems to be there; for it is said, *Num. 22. 5. that he dwelt in Petbor by the river*, i. e. saith the *Chaldee Paraphrast*, *in Peor of Syria by Euphrates*, which in Scripture is called *the river*, *Esa. 8. 7*. But from this great obscurity as to the history of so ancient and so large a people as these *Zabii* are supposed to be, we have a further evidence to our purpose of the defectiveness and insufficiency of the Eastern Histories as to the giving any full account of themselves and their own original.

- iv. We are told indeed by some, that *Nabonassar* did burn and destroy all the ancient Records of the *Chaldeans* which they had diligently preserved among them before, on purpose to raise the greater reputation to himself, and blot out the memory of his usurpation, by burning the Records of all their own ancient Kings. Which is a conceit I suppose hath no other ground than that the famous *Era* so much celebrated by Astronomers and others, did bear the name of *Nabonassar*. Which (if we should be so greedy of all empty conjectures, which tend to our purpose, as to take them for truths) would be a very strong evidence of the falshood and vanity of the *Chaldeans* in their great pretenses to Antiquity. But as the case stands in reference to their History, we find more evidence from Scripture to assert their just antiquity, than ever they are able to produce out of any undoubted Records of their own. Which yet hath been endeavoured by an Author both of some credit and antiquity, the true *Berosus*, not the counterfeit of *Annius*, whose vizard we shall have occasion to pull off afterwards. This *Berosus* was, as *Josephus* and *Tatianus* assure us, *a Priest of Belus, and a Babylonian born, but afterwards flourished in the Isle of*

Joseph. c. App. l. 1. Tatian. c. Græcos.

of Cos, and was the first who brought the Chaldean Astrology in request among the Greeks; in honor to whose name and memory; the Athenians (who were never backward in applauding those who brought them the greatest News, especially if suitable to their former Superstition) erected a Statue for him with a gilded tongue. A good Emblem of his History, which made a fair and specious shew, but was not that within, which it pretended to be: especially where he pretends to give an account of the most ancient times, and reckons up his two Dynasties before the time of Belus: but of them afterwards. It cannot be denied but some Fragments of his history, which have been preserved from ruin by the care and industry of Josephus, Tatianus, Eusebius and others, have been very useful, not only for proving the truth of the history of Scripture to the Heathens; but also for illustrating some passages concerning the Babylonian Empire: as making Nabopolassar the father of Nebuchadonosor, of which Scaliger hath fully spoken in his Notes upon those Fragments.

Scaliger
Append. ad
l. de Emen.
Temp.

v.

Far be it from me to derogate any thing even from prophane Histories, where they do not interfere with the Sacred History of Scripture; and it is certainly the best improvement of these to make them draw water to the Sanctuary, and to serve as smaller Stars to conduct us in our way, when we cannot enjoy the benefit of that greater Light of Sacred History. But that which I impeach these prophane histories of, is only an insufficiency as to that account of ancient times: wherein they are so far from giving light to sacred Records, that the design of setting of them up seems to be for casting a cloud upon them. Which may seem somewhat the more probable in that those monstrous accounts of the Egyptian and Chaldean Dynasties did never publicly appear in the world in the Greek Tongue, 'till the time that our sacred Records were translated into Greek at Alexandria. For 'till that time when this authentic history of the world was drawn forth from its privacy and retirement into the public notice of the world about the time of Ptolemaus Philadelphus, [being as it were lockt up before among the Israelites at Judæa] these vain pretenders to antiquity thought not themselves so much concerned to stand up for the credit of their own Nations. For 'till that time the credulous world, not being acquainted with any certain report of the creation and propagation of the world, was apt to swallow any thing that was given forth by those who were had in so great esteem as the Chaldean and the Egyptian Priests were. Because it was supposed that those persons, who were freed from other avocations; had more leisure to inquire into these things; and because of their mysterious hiding what they had from the vulgar, they were presumed to have a great deal more than they had. But now when the Sun of Righteousness was approaching this Horizon of the world, and in order to that the Sacred Histories like a Day-star was to give the world notice of it, by which the former shadows and mists began to fly away, it concerned all those whose interest lay in the former ignorance of mankind, as much as they could, to raise all their Ignis Fatui, and whatever might tend to obscure that approaching Light, by invalidating the credit of that which came to bespeak its acceptance.

It

VI.

It is very observable, what gradations and steps there were in the world to the appearance of that Grand light, which came down from Heaven to direct us in our way thither; how the world not long before was awakened into a greater inquisitiveness than ever before, how knowledg grew into repute, and what methods divine providence used to give the inquisitive world a taste of truth at present to stay their stomachs, and prepare them for that further discovery of it afterwards. In order to this that Nation of the *Jews* which was an inclosed garden before, was now thrown open, and many of the plants removed and set in foreign Countries, not only in *Babylon* (where even after their return were left three famous Schools of Learning, *Sora*, *Pumbeditha*, and *Neharda*) but in *Egypt* too, where multitudes of them by *Alexander's* favour were settled at *Alexandria*, where they had opportunity to season those two great Fountains, whence the current of knowledg ran into the rest of the world. And now it was not in *Jewry* only that God was known, but He whose name was great in *Israel* did make way for the knowledg of himself among all the Nations of the earth. And that All-wise GOD who directed the *Magi* by a star to Christ, making use of their former skill in Astronomy to take notice of that star which came now on a peculiar errand to them to lead them to their Saviour (the great GOD condescending so far to mankind, as to take advantage of particular inclinations, and to accommodate himself to them; for which purpose it is very observable that he appeared in another way to the Wise-men, than to the poor Shepherds) the same GOD made use of the curiosity and inquisitiveness after knowledg, which was in *Ptolemeus Philadelphus* (which he is so much applauded for by *Athenæus* and others) to bring to light the most advantageous knowledg, which the world ever had before the coming of Christ in the flesh. And that great Library of his erecting at *Alexandria* did never deserve that title 'till it had lodged those sacred Records, and then it did far better than the old one of *Osymanduas*, of which Historians tell us this was the Inscription, *ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ψυχῆς*. *The shop of the Souls Physic*.

V. Casaub.
ad Athē-
næum, l. 5.
c. 9.

VII.

But this being a matter of so much concernment in order to our better understanding the original of these vast accounts of time among the *Chaldeans* and *Egyptians*, and a subject not yet touched by any, we shall a little farther improve the probability of it, by taking a more particular account of the time when the Scriptures were first translated, and the occasion might thereby be given to these *Egyptians* and *Chaldeans* to produce their fabulous account into the view of the world. Whether the Scriptures had been ever before translated into the *Greek* language, (tho' it be asserted by some ancient Writers of the Church,) is very questionable, chiefly upon this account, that a sufficient reason cannot be assigned of undertaking a new translation at *Alexandria* if there had been any extant before. Especially if all those circumstances of that translation be true, which are commonly received and delivered down to us, with almost an unanimous consent of the persons who had greater advantages of knowing the certainty of such things, than we can have at this great distance of time. And therefore certainly every petty conjecture of some modern, tho' learned men, ought

ought not to bear sway against so unanimous a tradition in a matter of fact, which cannot be capable of being proved, but by the testimony of former ages. And it is somewhat strange that the single testimony of one *Hermippus* in *Diogenes Laertius* (whose age and authority is somewhat doubtful) concerning only one Particular referring to *Demetrius Phalereus*, should be thought of force enough among persons of judgment as well as learning, to infringe the credibility of the whole story delivered with so much consent, not only by *Christian*, but *Jewish Writers*; the testimony of one of which (every whit as considerable as *Hermippus*) viz. *Aristobulus Judeus* a *Peripatetical* Philosopher, in an epistle to *Ptolemee Philometor*, doth plainly assert that which was so much questioned, concerning *Demetrius Phalereus*.

*Diog. Laert.
Vit. Demetrii.*

*Apud Euseb.
Præp. Ev.
l. 13.*

But whatever the truth of all the particular circumstances be, which I here enquire not after, nor the authority of that *Aristeus* from whom the story is received, nor whether this Translation was made by *Jews* sent out of *Judea*, or by *Jews* residing at *Alexandria*; it sufficeth for our purpose that this Translation was made before either the *Chaldean* Dynasties of *Berosus*, or the *Egyptian* of *Manetho*, were published to the world. In order to which it is necessary to shew in what time this Translation was effected, and herein that channel of Tradition, which conveys the truth of the thing in one certain course, runs not with so even a stream concerning the exact time of it; all indeed agree that it was about the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*, but in what years of his reign, is very dubious. *Joseph Scaliger* who hath troubled the waters so much concerning the particular circumstances of this Translation, yet fully agrees that it was done in the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*; only he contends with *Africanus* that it should be done in the 132^d Olympiad, which is in the 33^d year of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*; but *Eusebius* and *Jerom* place it in the very beginning of his reign, which I think is far more probable, and that in the time when *Ptolemæus Philadelphus* reigned with his Father *Ptolemæus Lagi*: for so it is most certain he did for two years before his father's death. By which means the great difficulty of *Scaliger* concerning *Demetrius Phalereus* is quite taken off; for *Hermippus* speaks nothing of *Demetrius* his being out of favor with *Philadelphus* during his father's life, but that upon his father's death, he was banished by him, and died in his banishment; so that *Demetrius* might have the oversight of the Library at *Alexandria*, and be the main instrument of promoting this Translation, and yet those things be after true which *Hermippus* speaks; viz. when *Ptolemæus Lagi* or *Soter* was now dead. For it stands not to reason that during his father's life *Philadelphus* should discover his displeasure against *Demetrius*, it being conceived upon the advice given to his father for preferring the sons of *Arsinoë* to the Crown before the son of *Berenice*. Most likely therefore it is that this Translation might be begun by the means of *Demetrius Phalereus* in the time of *Philadelphus* his reigning with his father; but, it may be, not finished till after the death of *Soter*, when *Philadelphus* reigned alone. And by this now we can perfectly reconcile that difference which is among the Fathers concerning the time when this Translation was made. For *Irenæus* attributes it to the

VIII.

*Scaliger
Animad.
ad Num.
Euseb. 1734.*

*V. Scaliger
ib. Theor.
Schol. ad
Idyl. 17.
Just. l. 16.
Euseb. Chron.
Gr.*

E

time

time of *Ptolemæus Lagi*; *Clemens Alexandrinus* questions whether in the time of *Lagi* or *Philadelphus*; the rest of the Chorus carry it for *Philadelphus*; but the words of *Anatolius* in *Eusebius* cast it fully for both; for there speaking of *Aristobulus*, he saith, *He was one of the Seventy who interpreted the Scriptures to Ptolemæus Philadelphus and his father, and dedicated his Commentaries upon the Law to both those Kings. Hæc sane omnem scrupulum eximunt*, saith * *Vossius* upon producing this testimony, *this puts it out of all doubt*; and to the same purpose speaks the learned *Jesuit Petavius* in his Notes on *Epiphanius*.

Euseb. Hist. Eccl. l. 7. c. 26.

* *Vossius de Hist. Græc. lib. 1. c. 12. Petav. ad Epiph. pag. 380.*

IX.

Having thus far cleared the time when the translation of the Scriptures into Greek was made, we shall find our conjecture much strengthened, by comparing this with the age of the forementioned Historians, *Manetho* and *Berosus*. *Manetho* we have already made appear to have lived in the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*, and that, saith *Vossius*, after the death of *Soter*. It is evident from what remains of him in *Eusebius* his *Chronica*, that he not only flourished in the time of *Philadelphus*, but writ his history at the special command of *Philadelphus*, as manifestly appears by the remaining Epistle of *Manetho* to him, still extant in *Eusebius*. This command of *Philadelphus* might very probably be occasioned upon the view of that account, which the holy Scriptures, being then translated into Greek, did give of the World, and the propagation of Mankind; upon which, we cannot imagine but so inquisitive a person as *Philadelphus* would be very earnest to have his curiosity satisfied, as to what the *Ægyptian* Priests (who had boasted so much of antiquity) could produce to confront with the Scriptures. Whereupon the task was undertaken by this *Manetho*, High Priest of *Heliopolis*, whereby those things which the *Ægyptian* Priests had to that time kept secret in their Cloisters, were now divulged and exposed to the judgment of the learned world; but what satisfaction they were able to give inquisitive minds, as to the main *Zurück*, or *matter enquired after*, may partly appear by what hath been said of *Manetho* already, and by what shall be spoken of his Dynasties afterwards.

Euseb. Chro. Gr. p. 6.

But all this will not persuade *Kircher*; for, whatever *Scaliger*, nay, what *Manetho* himself saith to the contrary, He with the confidence and learning of a *Jesuite* affirms, That this *Manetho* is elder than *Alexander* the Great. For these are his words, *Frequens apud priscos historicos Dynastiarum Ægyptiacarum fit mentio, quarum tamen alium Authorem non habemus nisi Manethonem Sebennytam, Sacerdotem Ægyptium, quem ante tempora Alexandri, quicquid dicat Scaliger, in Ægypto floruisse comperio*. Certainly some more than ordinary evidence may be expected after so confident an affirmation; but whatever that person be in other undertakings, he is as unhappy a person in Philology, as any that have pretended so much acquaintance with it. One would think, he that had been twenty years, as he tells us himself, courting the *Ægyptian* Mysteries for compassing his *Oedipus*, should have found some better arguments to prove an assertion of this nature, than meerly the testimony of *Josephus*, the Hebrew book *Juchasin*, and some Arabic Writers, not one of all which do mention the thing they are brought for, *viz. that Manetho was elder than Alexander*. All the business

Oedip. Ægypt. To. 1. Syn. c. 9.

is,

is, they quote him as an ancient Writer; but what then? The Author of the book *Juchasin* was *Abraham Zachuth*, a Jew of *Salamanca*, who writ in the year of our Lord 1505. and this book was first printed at *Constantinople* 1556. Might not this man then well mention *Manetho* as an ancient Writer, if he flourished above 1600 years before him, in the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*? And what if some *Arabic* Writers mention him? Are they of so great antiquity and credit themselves, that it is an evidence *Manetho* lived in *Alexander's* time to be praised by them? It would be well, if *Kircher*, and other learned men, who think the world is grown to so great stupidity, as to believe every thing to be a jewel which is far fetched, would first assert and vindicate the antiquity and fidelity of their *Arabic* Authors, such as *Gelaldinus*, *Abenephi*, and many others, before they expect we should part with our more authentic Records of History for those fabulous relations which they are so full fraught withal. Were it here any part of my present business, it were an easy matter so to lay open the ignorance, falsity, and fabulosity of those *Arabians* whom that Author relies so much upon, that he could not be freed from a design to impose upon the world, who makes use of their testimony in matter of ancient times without a *Caveat*. I know none fit to believe these *Arabic* Writers as to these things, but those who have faith enough to concoct the *Rabbins* in matter of History; of whom *Origen* saith, *Πάντα ὅσα τῶν Ἰουδαίων τῶν πρὸ μωϋσῆος καὶ λέγουσι*. who are, as *Grotius* truly saith, *pejssimi historiae Magistri; nam ex quo patria expulsi sunt, omnis apud illos historia crassis erroribus & fabulis est inquinata, quibus & proinde nihil credendum est, nisi aliunde testes accesserint*. And *Is. Casaubon* passeth this sharp but due censure upon them, *Rabbini, ubi de lingua Hebraica agitur & vocis alicujus proprietate, vel aliquo Talmudico instituto merito à Christianis tribui non parum; ubi vero à verbis venit ad res, aut ad historiam, vel rerum antiquarum veteris populi explicationem, nisi falli & decipi volumus, nihil admodum esse illis fidei habendum. Sexcentis argumentis hoc facile probarem, si id nunc agerem*. And in reference to their ancient Rites as well as History *Joseph Scaliger* hath given this verdict of them, *Manifesta est Judæorum inscitia, qui cum usu veterum rituum etiam eorum cognitionem amiserunt, ut multa quæ ad eorum sacra & historiam pertinent, longe melius nos teneamus quam ipsi*. The same which these very learned persons say of *Rabbinical*, may with as much truth be said of these *Arabic* Writers, in matters of ancient history, which I have here inserted, to shew the reason why I have thought the testimony of either of these two sorts of persons so inconsiderable in the matter of our future discourse; which being historical, and that of the greatest antiquity, little relief is to be expected from either of them in order thereto. But to return to *Kircher*. It is freely granted, that *Josephus*, an Author of credit and age sufficient to give his opinion in this case, doth very frequently cite *Manetho* in his *Egyptian* History; particularly in his learned books against *Appion*; but where he doth give the least intimation of *Manetho* being elder than *Alexander*, I am yet to seek. But *Kircher* will not yet leave the matter so, but undertakes to give an account of the mistake; which is, That there were two *Manetho's* besides, and both *Egyptians*,

Origen. C. Cels. l. 2. Grotius Annot. in Matth. 24. 24. Casaub. Exercit. ad Barom. 16. S. 8.

Scaliger de Emend. Temp. l. 6.

ptians, mentioned by *Suidas*; one a *Mendesian*, who writ of the Preparation of the *Ægyptian* κρόν, a kind of Perfume used by the *Ægyptian* Priests. The other a *Diospolitan*, who writ some Physiologi- cal and Astronomical Treatises, whose works he hears are preserved in the Duke of *Florence* his Library; and this was he (saith he) who lived in the times of *Augustus*, whom many by the equi- vocation of the name have confounded with the ancient Writer of the *Ægyptian* Dynasties. Is it possible so learned a *Jesuite* should discover so little judgment in so few words? For, *first*, who ever asserted the writer of the Dynasties to have lived in the time of *Augustus*? Yet, *secondly*, if that *Manetho* whom *Suidas* there speaks of lived in *Augustus* his time according to *Kircher*, then it must necessarily follow, that the Compiler of the Dynasties did: for it is evident to any one that looks into *Suidas*, that he there speaks of the same *Manetho*, for these are his words: Μανέθης ἐκ Διοσπόλεως ἢ Αἰγύπτου, ἢ Σεβήνιτος, φυσικομαθὴς, &c. Can any thing be more plain than that he here speaks of *Manetho Seben- nyta*, who was the Author of the Dynasties, tho' he might write other things besides, of which *Suidas* there speaks? But *Kir- cher* very wisely, in translating *Suidas* his words, leaves out Σεβήνιτος, which decides the controversy, and makes it clear, that he speaks of the same *Manetho* of whom we have been discoursing. Thus it still appears that this *Manetho* is no elder than the time of *Pto- lemee Philadelphus*, which was the thing to be proved.

- x. Now for *Berosus*, altho' the *Chaldeans* had occasion enough given them before this time, to produce their Antiquities by the *Jews* converse with them in *Babylon*; yet we find this Author the first who durst adventure them abroad, such as they were, in *Greek*. Now that this *Berosus* published his History after the time men- tioned, I thus prove. *Tatianus Assyrius* tells us that he writ the *Chaldaic* History in three Books, and dedicated them to *Antiochus*, τῷ μὲν Σελεύκῳ τρίτῳ, as it is read in the fragment of *Tatianus*, pre- served in *Eusebius*; but it must be acknowledged that in the *Pa- ris* edition of *Tatianus*, as well as the *Basil*, it is thus read, καὶ Ἀλέξανδρῳ γαβριεῖ, Ἀλέξανδρῳ τῷ μὲν αὐτῷ τρίτῳ, here it relates to the *third* from *Alexander*, in the other, to the *third* from *Seleucus*; Now if we reckon the *third* so as to take in the person from whom we reckon for the *first*, according to the reading in *Eusebius*, it falls to be *Antiochus* called οὐκ; according to the other reading it falls to be *Antiochus Soter*; for *Seleucus* succeeded *Alexander* in the Kingdom of *Syria*; *Antiochus Soter*, *Seleucus*; *Antiochus* οὐκ, *Antiochus Soter*. But according to either of these readings, our purpose is sufficiently proved. For *Antiochus Soter* began to reign in *Syria* in the *sixth* year of *Ptol. Philadelphus* in *Ægypt*; *Antio- chus* οὐκ succeeded him in the 22^d year of *Philadelphus*; now the soonest that the history of *Berosus* could come forth, must be in the reign of *Antiochus Soter*, which according to our accounts is some competent time after the translation of the Scripture into *Greek*. But if it were not till the time of *Antiochus* οὐκ, we cannot but imagine that the report of the account of ancient times in the Scriptures was sufficiently divulged before the publishing of this hi- story of *Berosus*; and, it may be, *Berosus* might somewhat sooner than others understand all transactions at *Alexandria*, because the place

*Euseb. pra-
Evang. l.
10. p. 289.
ed. R. Steph.*

*V. Scal. de
Emend.
Temp. l. 5.
p. 392.*

place of his chief residence was where *Ptolemee Philadelphus* was born, which was in the Isle of *Cos*. But *Vossius* goes another way to work, to prove the time of *Berosus*, which is this. He quotes it out of *Pliny* that *Berosus* recorded the history of 480 years, which, saith he, must be reckoned from the *Æra* of *Nabonassar*. Now this began in the second year of the 8th *Olympiad*, from which time if we reckon 480 years, it falls upon the latter end of *Antiochus Soter*; and so his History could not come out before the 22^d of *Ptolemee Philadelphus*, or very little before. Thus we have made it evident, That these two great Historians are younger even than the translation of the Bible into *Greek*, by which it appears probable that they were provoked to publish their fabulous Dynasties to the world. And so much to shew the insufficiency of the *Chaldean* History, as to the account of ancient times: Which we shall conclude with the censure of *Strabo*, a grave and judicious Author, concerning the antiquities of the *Persians*, *Medes*, and *Syrians*; which, saith he, have not obtained any great credit in the world, ἅψ' τὴν ἑὴν συρραφίαν ἀπλοῦτα & φιλομυθία, because of the simplicity and fabulousness of their Historians. From hence we see then that there is no great credibility in those Histories, which are impeached of falshood by the most grave and judicious of Heathen Writers.

Vossius de
Hist. Græc.
li. 1. c. 13.
Plin. hist.
nat. l. 7.
c. 57.

Strab. l. 11.

C H A P. IV.

The defect of the Grecian History.

- I. That manifested by three evident arguments of it. (1.) The fabulousness of the Poetical age of Greece. The Antiquity of Poetry. II. Of Orpheus and the ancient Poets. Whence the Poetical Fables borrowed. III. The advancement of Poetry and Idolatry together in Greece. IV. The different censures of *Strabo* and *Eratoſthenes* concerning the Poetical age of Greece; and the reasons of them. V. (2.) The eldest Historians of Greece are of suspected credit. Of *Damastes*, *Aristeus*, and others; VI. of most of their eldest Historians we have nothing left but their Names, of others only the Subjects they treated of, and some Fragments. VIII. (3.) Those that are extant either confess their ignorance of eldest times, or plainly discover it. Of the first sort are *Thucydides* and *Plutarch*. IX. Several evidences of the Grecians ignorance of the true original of Nations. X. Of *Herodotus* and his mistakes. XI. The Greeks ignorance in Geography discovered, and thence their insufficiency as to an account of ancient History.

DEscend we now to the History of Greece; to see whether the Metropolis of Arts and Learning can afford us any account of ancient times, that may be able to make us in the least question

the account given of them in sacred Scriptures. We have already manifested the defect of *Greece* as to Letters and ancient Records, but yet it may be pretended that her Historians, by the excellency of their wits and searching abroad into other Nations, might find a more certain account of ancient times, than other Nations could obtain. There is no body, who is any thing acquainted with the *Grecian* humor, but will say they were beholding to their Wits for most of their Histories; they being some of the earliest Writers of Romances in the world, if all fabulous narrations may bear that name. But laying aside at present all their Poetic *Mythology*, as it concerns their Gods; (which we may have occasion to enquire into afterwards) we now examin only their credibility, where they pretend to be most historical. Yet how far they are from meriting belief even in these things, will appear to any that shall consider; *first*, That their most ancient Writers were Poetical and apparently fabulous; *secondly*, That their eldest Historians are of suspected credit even amongst themselves; *thirdly*, That their best Historians either discover or confess abundance of ignorance as to the history of ancient times. *First*, That their first Writers were poetical, and apparently fabulous. *Strabo* undertakes to prove that Prose is only an imitation of Poetry, and so Poetry must needs be first written. For, saith he, at first Poetry only was in request; afterwards in imitation of that, Cadmus, Pherecydes, and Hecataeus writ their histories, observing all other laws of Poetry, but only the measures of it; but by degrees Writers began to take greater liberty, and so brought it down from that lofty strain it was then in, to the form now in use: as the Comical strain is nothing else but a depressing the sublimer style of Tragedy. This he proves because ἀδελφὸν did anciently signify the same with ποιεῖν; for Poems were only λόγοι μεμελισμένοι, Lessons fit to be sung among them: thence, saith he, is the original of the *ῥαψῳδία*, &c. for these were those Poems which were sung ἐν ῥαβδῷ, when they held a branch of Laurel in their hands, as *Plutarch* tells us they were wont to sing *Homer's Ilias*; others were sung to the Harp, as *Hesiod's* ἑρμῆα: besides, saith *Strabo*, that Prose is called ὁ πρῶτος λόγος, argues that it is only a bringing down of the higher strain in use before. But however this were in general; as to the *Grecians*, it is evident that Poetry was first in use among them; for in their elder times when they first began to creep out of Barbarism, all the Philosophy and Instruction they had was from their Poets, and all couched in Verse; which *Plutarch* not only confirms, but particularly instanceth in *Orpheus*, *Hesiod*, *Parmenides*, *Xenophanes*, *Empedocles*, and *Thales*; and hence *Horace de arte Poëtica* says of the ancient Poets before *Homer*,

Strabo l. 1.

Plutarch.
Sympos.

Plutarch.
de Pyth.
Orac. p.
403.

—fuit hæc sapientia quondam
Publica privatis secernere, sacra profanis:
Concubitu prohibere vago: dare jura maritis:
Oppida moliri: leges incidere ligno.
Sic honor & nomen divinis vatibus atque
Carminibus venit.

Heinf. Diff.
in Hes.
cap. 6.

From hence, as *Heinfius* observes, the Poets were anciently called Διδασκαλῆς; and the ancient speeches of the Philosophers containing matters

matters of Morality, were called *Ἀσμφα καὶ Ἀδέρφα*, of which many are mentioned in their Lives by *Diogenes Laërtius*; in the same sense were *Carmina* anciently used among the *Latines* for Precepts of Morality, as in that collection of them, which goes under the name of *Cato*, (which some think to be an ancient piece, but with a false inscription, but *Boxhornius* thinks it to be of some Christians doing in the decay of the *Roman Empire*;) *Si Deus est animus, nobis ut Carmina dicunt. Carmina*, saith *Heinsius*, i. e. *dicta Philosophorum*; *causa est, quia dicta illa brevia, quibus sententias suas de Deo deque reliquis includebant, ἀδέρφα dicebant*, i. e. *Carmina*.

When Poetry came first into request among the *Grecians*, is somewhat uncertain; but this is plain and evident, that the intention of it was not merely for instruction, but as *Strabo* expresseth it, *δημιουργεῖν καὶ τραγωδοῦν ὡς πλῆθι, the more gently to draw the people on to idolatry*. For as he saith, *it is impossible to persuade women and the promiscuous multitude to religion by meer dry reason or philosophy*, *ἡ δὲ δὴ ἐστὶν ἀνάγκη διανοημάτων, ὅθεν δ' οὐκ ἀνδρῶν προσηγορίας καὶ πεποιθίας; but for this*, saith he, *there is need of superstition, and this cannot be advanced without some fables and wonders*. For, saith he, *the Thunderbolts, Shields, Tridents, Serpents, Spears attributed to the Gods are meer fables, and so is all the ancient Theology; but the Governors of the Commonwealth made use of these things, the better to awe the silly multitude, and to bring them into better order*. I cannot tell how far this might be their end, since these things were not brought in so much by the several Magistrates, as by the endeavour of particular Men, who thought to raise up their own esteem among the vulgar by such things, and were employed by the great Deceiver of the world as his grand instruments to advance Idolatry in it. For which we are to consider, that altho' there were gross Ignorance, and consequently Superstition enough in *Greece* before the Poetic age of it, yet their superstitious and idolatrous worship was not so licked and brought into form, as about the time of *Orpheus*, from whom the Poetic age commenceth: who was as great an instrument of setting up Idolatry, as *Apollonius* was afterwards of restoring it, being both persons of the highest esteem and veneration among the heathen. Much about the same time did those live in the world who were the first great promoters of Superstition and Poetry, as *Melampus*, *Museus*, *Arion Methymneus*, *Amphion of Thebes*, and *Eumolpus Thrax*, none of whom were very distant from the time of *Orpheus*. Of whom *Clemens Alexandrinus* thus speaks, *περὶ χιμερῶν μουσικῆς λειτουργίας καὶ βίον ἐστὶν καὶ τὴν ἀντιπαραβολήν* — *ὅθεν αὖτε ἡρώδης ἐπὶ τῷ αἰδύλῳ χειρογράφῳ περὶ τούτου*. *These under a pretense of Music and Poetry corrupting the lives of men, did by a kind of artificial Magic first draw them on to the practise of Idolatry*. For the novelty and pleasingness of Music and Poetry did presently insinuate it self into the minds of men, and thereby drew them to a venerable esteem both of the persons and practises of those who were the Authors of them. So *Conon* in *Photius* tells us that *Orpheus* was exceedingly acceptable to the people for his skill in Music, which the *Thracians* and *Macedonians* were much delighted with: From which arose the fable of his drawing trees and wild beasts after him, because

Boxhorn.
Qu. Rom.
c. 14.

Strabo l. 1.
p. 13.

Clem. Al.
Protreptic.
p. 3.

Phot. Bibl.
Cod. 186,
fol. 45.

because his Music had so great an influence upon the civilizing that people, who were almost grown rude thro' Ignorance and Barbarism: and so *Horace* explains it,

*Horat. Ep.
ad Piscon.*

*Sylvestres homines sacer interpretæ Deorum
Cædibus & victu fædo deterruit Orpheus,
Dictus ab hoc lenire Tigres rabidosque Leones.*

*Schol. in
Hesiod.
p. 8.*

Paraphr. 1.

This *Orpheus* by *Mythologists* is usually called the son of *Calliope*, but may with better reason be called the Father of the whole Chorus of Muses, than the Son of one of them; since *Pindar* calls him *Πατρις ἀειδῆς*, and *John Tzetzes* tells us he was called the son of *Calliope*, *ὡς ἡμιθέος ποικίλῃς ἀρετῇς καὶ ἡμῶν τῶν εἰς τὸς θεοὺς, as the inventor of poetical elegancy, and the sacred Hymns which were made to the Gods: (which the old Romans called Assamenta) and Justin Martyr calls him ὁ πολυθέου πρῶτος διδάσκαλος, the first teacher of Polytheism and Idolatry.*

*III.
Paus. E-
liac. 2.
Diod. Bibl.
lib. 1.
Euf. Prep.
l. 10.*

For this *Orpheus* having been in *Egypt*, as *Pausanias*, *Diodorus*, and *Artapanus* in *Eusebius* all confess, he brought from thence most of the Magical rites and superstitious customs in use there, and set them up among the *Grecians*; so *Diodorus* acknowledgeth in the same place; and it is likewise evident by what *Aristophanes* saith in his *Βάτραχοι*.

*Aristoph.
Ran. Act. 4.
sc. 2.*

Ὀρφεὺς αὖ δὲ πλοῦς ὁ καὶ ὑπὸ τῷ ὀνόματι, φέροι τ' ἀπὸ θεῶν.

Orpheus first instructed them in the sacred mysteries, and to abstain from slaughter: which is to be understood of the βαρβαρία, the killing of beasts in sacrifice, which probably was in use among them before, as a remainder of ancient tradition, till Orpheus brought his Egyptian doctrine into request among them. The mysteries of Osiris, saith Diodorus, were transplanted into Greece under the name of Dionysus or Bacchus, and Isis under Ceres or Magna Mater, and the punishment and pleasures after this life from the rites of Sepulture among them; Charon's wafting of Souls, from the lake Acherusia in Egypt, over which they were wont to send the dead bodies. Pausanias tells us, that the Spartans derived the worship of Ceres Chthonia from Orpheus, and the Aegineta the worship of Hecate. Besides which he instituted new rites and mysteries of his own, in which the initiated were called Ὀρφεοπλοῖται: and required a most solemn oath from all of them never to divulge them, which was after observed in all those prophane mysteries which in imitation of these were set up among the Greeks. Strabo thinks the mysteries of Orpheus were in imitation of the old Cotyttian and Bendidian mysteries among the Thracians; but Herodotus with more probability parallels them and the Dionysian with the Egyptian, from which we have already seen that Orpheus derived His; who is conceived by Georgius Cedrenus and Timotheus in Eusebius, to have lived about the time of Gideon the Judge of Israel; but there is too great confusion concerning his age, to define any thing certainly about it. Which ariseth most from the several persons going under this name, of which, besides this, were in all probability

*Paus. Lac.
p. 95.
Corinth.
p. 72.
Vide Cal.
Rhod. Ant.
Lib. l. 15.
p. 9.
Strab. l. 10.*

*Herod. Eu-
rope. p. 134.
Ed. H. St.*

bility two more; the one an Heroic Poet, called by *Suidas*, *Ciconæus*, or *Arcas*, who lived two ages before *Homer*, and he that goes under the name of *Orpheus*, whose Hymns are still extant, but are truly ascribed to *Onomacritus* the *Athenian*, by *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Tatianus Assyrius*, *Suidas*, and others; who flourished in the times of the *Pisistratidæ* at *Athens*. We are like then to have little relief for finding out of truth in the Poetic age of *Greece*, when the main design of the Learning then used was only to insinuate the belief of Fables into the people, and by that to awe them into Idolatry.

If we come lower down to the succeeding Poets, we may find Fables increasing still in the times of *Homer*, *Hesiod*, and the rest, which made *Eratosthenes*, a person of great judgment and learning (whence he was called *alter Plato*, and πάλαιος Πλάτων, and τὸ Βῆτα, because he carried, if not the first, yet the second place in all kind of Literature) condemn the ancient Poetry as *ῥαυδά μυθολογίαν*, a company of old *Wives tales*, which were invented for nothing but to please silly people, and had no real learning or truth at all in them. For this, tho' he be sharply censured by *Strabo*, in his first book, who undertakes to vindicate the Geography of *Homer* from the exceptions of *Eratosthenes*; yet himself cannot but confess that there is a very great mixture of old fables in all their Poets, which is, saith he, partly to delight the people, and partly to awe them. For the minds of men being always desirous of novelties, such things do hugely please the natural humors of weak people; especially if there be something in them that is *ἰαυμάτην ἑ περὶ πῶς*, very strange and wonderful, it increaseth the delight in hearing it; *ἡπὶ ἐν τῷ μνησθῆναι φίλον ἐστιν*, which draws them on to a desire of hearing more of it. And by this means, saith he, are children first brought on to learning, and all ignorant persons are kept in awe; nay, and the more learned themselves (partly for want of reason and judgment, and partly from the remainder of those impressions which these things made upon them when they were children) cannot shake off that former credulity which they had as to these things. By which discourse of *Strabo*, tho' intended wholly by him in vindication of poetic Fables, it is plain and evident what great disservice hath been done to Truth by them, by reason they had no other Records to preserve their ancient History but these fabulous Writers. And therefore supposing a mixture of truth and falsehood together, which *Strabo* contends for; yet what way should be taken to distinguish the true from the false; when they had no other certain Records? And besides, he himself acknowledgeth how hard a matter it is even for wise men to excuse those fabulous narrations out of their minds, which were insinuated into them by all the advantages which prejudice, custom and, education could work upon them. Granting then there may be some truth at the bottom of their fabulous narrations;

ὥς δ' ὅτι τις χρυσὸν ἀνέχοντα ἀργύρεον αἰνέει;

Homer.
Odyss. 3.

which may be gilded over with some pleasant tales, as himself compares it; yet how shall those come to know that it is only gilded, that never saw any pure metal, and did always believe that it was

F

what

what it seemed to be? Had there been any *κατήλων*, or Touch-stone to have differenced between the one and the other, there might have been some way for a separation of them; but there being none such, we must conclude, that the fabulous narrations of Poets instead of making truth more pleasant by their fictions, have so adulterated it, that we cannot find any credibility at all in their narrations of elder times, where the truth of the story hath had no other way of conveyance but thro' their fictions.

- v. But tho' Poets may be allowed their liberty for representing things to the greatest advantage to the palates of their Readers, yet we may justly expect, when men profess to be Historical, they should deliver us nothing but what upon strictest examination may prove undoubted truth. Yet even this were the Greeks far from; for

Strab. l. 1. *Strabo* himself confesseth of their eldest Historians, *καὶ οἱ παλαιὸι ἱστοριογράφοι καὶ τὰ πρόσωπα καὶ τὰ πράγματα μυθώδη*, their first Historians both of persons and things were fabulous. *Diodorus* particularly instanceth in their eldest Historians, as *Cadmus Milesius*, *Hecataeus*, and *Hellanicus*, and condemns them for fabulousness. *Strabo* condemns *Damastes Sigeensis* for vanity and falshood, and wonders at *Eratosthenes* for making

V. Casaub.
in Strab. l. 1.
Voss. de hist.
Græc. l. 4.
c. 5. use of him; yet this man is of great antiquity among them, and his testimony used by Authors of good credit, as *Dionysius Halicarnassensis*, *Plutarch*, and others. Nay, *Pliny* professeth to follow him, and so he doth *Aristeas Proconnesius* in his *Arimaspiæ*, which may render the credit of his History very suspicious; with whom it was a sufficient ground of credibility to any story, That he found it in some Greek Authors. *Strabo* reckons *Damastes* with *Eubemerus Messenius* and *Antiphanes Bergæus*; which latter was so noted a liar, that from him, as *Stephanus* tells us, *βυζαντινὸν* was used as a proverb for to speak never a word of truth. *Aristeas Proconnesius* lived in the time of *Cyrus*, and writ a History of the *Arimaspiæ*, in three Books, who seems to have been the Sir *John Mandevill* of Greece, from his stories of the *Arimaspiæ* with one eye in their foreheads, and their continual fighting the *Gryphens* for gold; yet the story was taken upon trust by *Herodotus*, *Pliny*, and many others; tho' the experience of all who have visited those northern

Stephan. in Byz.

Strab. l. 13.

Climats do sufficiently refute these follies. *Strabo* saith of this *Aristeas*, that he was *ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀσπίδι*, one inferior to none for juggling, which censure was probably occasioned by the common story of him, that he could let his soul out of his body when he pleased and bring it again; yet this Juggler did *Celsus* pitch on to confront with our blessed Saviour, as *Hierocles* did on *Apollonius*: so much have those been to seek for Reason, who have sought to oppose the doctrine of Faith.

- vi. But further, what credit can we give to those Historians who have striven to confute each other, and lay open one anothers falshood to the world. Where was there ever any such dissonancy in the sacred History of Scripture? doth the Writer of one book discover the weakness of another? do not all the parts so exactly agree, that the most probable suspicion could ever fall into the heart of an Infidel, is, that they were all written by the same person, which yet the series of times manifests to have been impossible? But now, if we look into the ancient Greek Historians, we need no other testimony than themselves to take away their credi-

credibility. The Genealogies of *Hesiod* are corrected by *Acusilaus*, *Acusilaus* is condemned by *Hellanicus*, *Hellanicus* accused of falsehood by *Ephorus*, *Ephorus* by *Timæus*, *Timæus* by such who followed him, as *Josephus* fully shews. Where must we then fix our belief? upon all in common? that is the ready way to believe contradictions: for they condemn one another of falsehood. Must we believe one, and reject the rest? but what evidence doth that one give why he should be credited more than the rest? And their eldest Historians are acknowledged to be most fabulous: [which is a most irrefragable argument against the *Grecian* history:] For our only recourse for deciding the controversy among the younger Historians, must be to the elder: and there we are further to seek than ever; for the first ages are confessed to be Poetical, and to have no certainty of truth in them. So that it is impossible to find out any undoubted certainty of ancient times among the *Greek* Historians; which will be yet more evident when we add this, That there are very few extant of those Historians, who did carry the greatest name for Antiquity.

*Joseph. C.
Appion.
l. 1.*

The highest Antiquity of the *Greek* Historians doth not much exceed the time of *Cyrus* and *Cambyses*, as *Vossius* hath fully demonstrated in his learned Book, *De Historicis Græcis*, and therefore I shall spare particular enquiries into their several ages. Only these two things will further clear the insufficiency of the *Greek* History, as to an account of ancient times: *First*, That of many of these old Historians we have nothing left but their mere names, without any certainty of what they treated. Such are *Sisyphus Cous*, *Corimmus*, *Eugeon Samius*, *Deiochus Proconnesius*, *Eudemus Parius*, *Democles Phigaleus*, *Amelesagoras Chalcedonius*, *Xenomedes Chius*, and several others whose names are recorded by several Writers, and listed by *Vossius* among the Historians; but no evidence what subject of history was handled by them. *Secondly*, That of those whose not only memories are preserved, but some evidence of what they writ, we have nothing extant till the time of the *Persian* war. For all that was writ before, is now consumed by time, and swallowed up in that vast and all-devouring Gulph; in which yet their heads still appear above the waters, to tell us what once they informed the world of. It cannot be denied, but if many of those ancient Histories were yet remaining, we might probably have some greater light into some matters of fact in the elder times of *Greece*, which now we are wholly to seek for, unless we think to quench our thirst in the muddy waters of some fabulous Poets. For what is now become of the antiquities of *Ionia* and the city *Miletus* written by *Cadmus Milesius*, supposed to be the first Writer of History? where lie the Genealogie of *Acusilaus Argivus*? where is now extant the *History of the Gods* written by *Pherecydes Syrius*, *Pythagoras* his Master? or the *Chronica* of *Archilochus* who flourished about the 20th *Olympiad*? or those of *Theagenes Rheginus*? Where may we hope to meet with *Pherecydes Leriis* his *Attic Antiquities*, or his *Catalogue of Cities and Nations*? or *Hecateus* his *Description of Asia*, and some suppose of *Libya* and *Europe* too? or the *Originals of Nations and Founders of Cities* written by *Hellanicus*? How may we come by the *Persic*, *Greek* and *Egyptian* History of *Charon Lampscæcus*;

VII.

cenus; the *Lydian* History of *Xanthus Lydius*; the *Samian* Antiquities of *Simmius Rhodius*; the *Corinthian* History of *Eumelus Corinthius*; *Panyasis* his Antiquities of *Greece*; the *Scythian* History of *Anacharsis*; the *Phrygian* of *Diagoras*; the *Chaldaic* and *Persian* of *Democritus*; the *Sicilian* and *Italian* of *Hippys Rheginus*; the *Telchiniac* History of *Teleclides*? All these are now buried with many more in the rubbish of time, and we have nothing but meer skeletons of them left, to tell us, that once such persons were, and thought themselves concerned to give the world some account of their being in it. Whereby may be likewise seen the remarkable providence of GOD, concerning the Sacred history, which tho' of far greater antiquity than any of these, hath survived them all, and is still preserved with us with as much purity and incorruption as a book passing thro' so many hands was capable of. But of that in its due place.

VIII.

But yet if the *Greek* Historians that are yet extant, were of more undoubted credit than those that are lost, we might easily bear with our losing some old stories, if we gained some authentic history by it accomplished in all its parts: but even this we are far from in the *Greek* History; for the Historians themselves do either confess their own ignorance of ancient times, or do most palpably discover it, which was the *third* and last consideration touching the credibility of the *Grecian* History. That most grave and accurate Historian *Thucydides* than whom scarce ever any *Grecian* discovered more an impartial love to the truth in what he writ, doth not only confess, but largely prove the impossibility of an exact account to be given of the times preceding the *Peloponnesian* War, in the entrance into his History: *For*, saith he, *the matter preceding that time cannot now through the length of time be accurately discovered or found out by us*. All that he could find in the ancient state of *Greece* was a deal of confusion, unquiet stations, frequent removals, continual piracies, and no settled form of Commonwealth. What certain account can be then expected of those times, when a most judicious Writer, even of *Athens* its self, acknowledgeth such a *Chaos* in their ancient History? And *Plutarch*, a later Author indeed, but scarce behind any of them, if we believe *Taurus* in *A. Gellius*, for learning and prudence, dares not, we see, venture any further back than the time of *Theseus*; for before that time, as he compares it, as Geographers in their Maps, when they have gone as far as they can, fill up the empty space with some unpassable Mountains, or frozen Seas, or devouring Sands; so those who give an account of elder times, are fain to insert *νεβηλὴ καὶ ἄγνοια*, some wonderful and tragical Stories, which (as he saith) have neither any truth nor certainty in them. Thus we see those who were best able to judge of the *Greek* Antiquities, can find no sure footing to stand on in them; and what basis can we find for our Faith, where they could find so little for their Knowledge? And those who have been more daring and venturous than these persons mentioned, what a labyrinth have they run themselves into? how many confusions and contradictions have they involved themselves in? sometimes writing the passages of other Countries for those of *Greece*, and at other times so confounding times, persons and places, that one might think they had

had only a design upon the understandings of their Readers, to make them play at Blind-mans-buff in searching for the Kings of *Greece*.

But as they are so confused in their own History, so they are as ignorant and fabulous when they dare venture over their own thresholds and look abroad into other Countries; we certainly owe a great part of the lamentable ignorance of the true original of most Nations to the pitiful account the *Greek* Authors have given of them; which have had the fortune to be entertained in the world with so much esteem and veneration, that it hath been thought learning enough to be acquainted with the account which they give of Nations. Which I doubt not hath been the great reason so many fabulous relations, not only of Nations but Persons and several Animals never existing, have met with so much entertainment from the less inquisitive world. The *Greek* Writers, it is evident, took up things upon trust as much as any people in the world did, being a very weak and inconsiderable Nation at first: and afterwards the knowledg they had was generally borrowed from other Nations, which the wise men only suited to the temper of the *Greeks*, and so made it more fabulous than it was before. As it was certainly the great defect of the Natural Philosophy of the *Greeks*, (as it hath been ever since in the world) that they were so ready to form Theories upon some Principles or Hypotheses, which they only received by tradition from others, without fetching their knowledg from the experiments of Nature; and to these they suited all the phænomena of nature; and what was not suitable was rected as monstrous and anomalous: so it was in their History, wherein they had some fabulous Hypotheses they took for granted without enquiring into the truth and certainty of them, and to these they suit whatever light they gained in after-times of the state of foreign Nations, which hath made Truth and Antiquity wrestle so much with the corruption which eat into them thro' the pride and ignorance of the *Greeks*. Hence they have always suited the History of other Nations with the account they give of their own; and where nothing could serve out of their own History to give an account of the Original of other Nations, they (who were never backward at fictions) have made a Founder of them suitable to their own language. The truth is, there is nothing in the world useful or beneficial to mankind, but they have made shift to find the Author of it among themselves. If we enquire after the original of Agriculture, we are told of *Ceres* and *Triptolemus*; if of Pasturage, we are told of an *Arcadian Pan*; if of Wine, we presently hear of a *Liber Pater*: if of Iron instruments, then who but *Vulcan*? if of Music, none like to *Apollo*. If we press them then with the History of other Nations, they are as well provided here: if we enquire an account of *Europe*, *Asia*, or *Libya*; for the first we are told a fine story of *Cadmus's* Sister; for the second of *Prometheus's* Mother of that name, and for the third of a Daughter of *Epaphus*. If we are yet so curious as to know the original of particular Countries; then *Italy* must find its name from a Calf of *Hercules*, because *Ἰταλῶν* in *Greek* will signify some such thing; *Sardinia* and *Africa* must be from *Sardos* and *Afer* two sons of *Hercules*; but yet if these will not serve, *Hercules* shall not want for children to people the world, for we hear

IX.

New Jersey College Library

of *Scythes*, *Galatas*, *Lydus*, some other sons of his, that gave names to *Scythia*, *Lydia*, and *Galatia*; with the same probability that *Media* had its name from *Medea*, and *Spain* and *Lusitania* from *Pan* and *Lusus*, two companions of *Bacchus*. If *Persia* want a founder, they have one *Perseus* an *Argive* ready for it; if *Syria*, *Babylonia*, and *Arabia* want reasons of their names, the prodigal *Greeks* will give *Apollo* three sons, *Syrus*, *Babylon* and *Arabs*, rather than they shall be heretical *Acephalists*. This vanity of theirs was universal, not confined to any place or age, but as any Nation or People came into their knowledg, their Gods were not so decrepit, but they might father one son more upon them, rather than any Nation should be *filia Populi*, and want a father. Only the grave *Athenians* thought scorn to have any Father assigned them; their only ambition was to be accounted *Aborigines & genuini Terræ*, to be the eldest sons of their teeming mother the *Earth*, and to have been born by the same equivocal generation that Mice and Frogs are, from the impregnated slime of the earth. Are we not like to have a wonderful account of ancient times from those who could arrogate to themselves so much knowledg from such slender and thin accounts of the Originals of people which they gave, and would have the world entertain with the greatest veneration upon their naked words? Have we not indeed great reason to hearken to those who did so frequently discover their affection to Fables, and manifest their ignorance when ever they venture upon the history of other Nations?

- x. The truth is, *Herodotus* himself (whom *Tully* calls the *Father of History*, which title he deserves at least in regard of antiquity, being the eldest of the extant *Greek* Historians) hath stood in need of his Compurgators, who yet have not been able to acquit him of fabuloufness, but have sought to make good his credit by recrimination, or by making it appear that *Herodotus* did not fully believe the stories he tells, but took them upon trust himself, and so delivers them to the world. Some impute it to the ingenuity of *Herodotus*, that he calls his books of History by the name of the *Muses*, on purpose to tell his Readers they must not look for meer History in him, but a mixture of such relations, which tho' not true, might yet please and entertain his Readers. Tho' others think they were not so inscribed by himself, but the names were given to them by the *Greeks* from the admiration his History had among them. However this were, this we are certain, that *Herodotus* was not first suspected of falshood in these latter ages of the world, but even among the *Greeks* themselves there have been found some that would undertake to make good that charge against him. For so *Suidas* tells us of one *Ælius Harpocraton*, who writ a book on purpose to discover the falshood of *Herodotus*, *πρὸς τὴν ἀποψεύδειν τὸν Ἡρόδοτον ἱστορίαν*. *Plutarch* his books are well known *Of the spite or malignity of Herodotus*, but the occasion of that is sufficiently known likewise, because *Herodotus* had given no very favourable character of *Plutarch's* Country. *Strabo* likewise seems to accuse *Herodotus* much of nugacity and mixing prodigious fables with his History; but, I confess, observing the grounds on which *Plutarch* insists against *Herodotus*, I am very prone to think that the ground of the great pique in some of the *Greek* Writers against *Herodotus*, was,

was, that he told too many tales out of School, and had discovered too much of the Infancy of Greece, and how much the Grecians borrowed of the *Ægyptian* superstitions: which *Plutarch* Plutarch. de Herod. Mal. p. 857. expressly speaks of, that *Herodotus* was too much led aside, ἡ δὲ Αἰγυπτίων ἀλαζονείαις καὶ μυθολογίαις ἐκ σπουδῆς ἐκ ἀγνοίας ἢ Ἑλληνικῶν ἱερῶν ἀναστρέψαν. Altho' therefore *Herodotus* may not be much to blame in the things which the Grecians most charge him with, yet those who favour him most cannot excuse his palpable mistakes in some things, and ignorance in others. *Josephus* thinks he was deceived by the *Ægyptian* Priests Joseph. c. App. l. 1. Scal. Can. Isagog. l. 3. in things relating to the state of their affairs, of which *Jos. Scaliger* gives many accounts; Either, saith he, the persons who gave him his intelligence were ignorant themselves; or else, like true *Ægyptians*, they were cunning enough, and imposed upon *Herodotus* being a stranger and unacquainted with their artifices; or else he did not understand his Interpreter, or was deceived by him; or lastly, *Herodotus* might have so much of a Grecian in him, as to adulterate the true History with some fables of his own; wherefore he rather adheres to *Manetho* than *Herodotus* as to the *Ægyptian* History: who yet elsewhere (I will not say with what constancy to himself) vouchsafes him this high Elogium, that he is, *Scrinium originum Græcarum & Barbararum, auctor à doctis nunquam deponendus.* Idem ad num. Euf. 1572.

It cannot be denied but a great deal of very useful History may be fetched out of him; yet who can excuse his ignorance, when he not only denies there is an Ocean compassing the Land, but condemns the Geographers for asserting it? Unless this might be any plea for his ignorance in Geography, that he had so many great names besides him guilty of the same: Witness *Aristotle's* suspicion that the *Indies* should be joyned to *Europe* about the Straights, where they feigned *Hercules* his Pillars to be. And the *Theræans* ignorance where any such place as *Libya* was, when the Oracle bid them plant a Colony there. Would it not have been worth one's while to have heard the great noise the Sun used to make every night when he doused his head in the Ocean, as none of the most ignorant *Greeks* imagined? And to have seen the Sun about *Hercules* his Pillars to be a hundred times bigger than he appeared to them, as they commonly fancied. Was not *Alexander*, think we, well tutored in his Cosmography by his Master *Aristotle*, when he writ word to his Mother, he had found out the head of *Nilus* in the East *Indies*? as *Arrian* relates the story. Arrian. Hist. Alex. l. 6. No wonder then his Souldiers should mistake the mountain *Paropamisus* in the *Indies* for *Caucasus* near *Colchis*, when even their learned men thought *Colchis* the utmost boundary of the world on that side, as *Hercules* his Pillars on this. What a lamentable account then were they able to give of the most ancient times, who were so ignorant of the state of the world in their own time, when Learning was in its hight in Greece, and frequent discoveries daily made of the world, by the wars which were made abroad? *Eratosthenes* confesseth the Grecians were ignorant of a great part of *Asia* and the Northern parts of *Europe* before *Alexander's* expedition; and *Strabo* confesseth as much of the Western parts of *Europe* till the *Roman* expeditions thither. *Palus Maotis* and *Colchis*, saith he, were not fully known till the time of *Mithridates*, Strabo l. 1.

XI.

Herod. l. 2.

c. 5.

*Arrian.**Hist. Alex.*

l. 6.

Strabo l. 1.

dates, nor Hyrcania, Bactriana, and Scythia, till the Parthian wars. Eratosthenes mentions some who thought the Arabian Sea to be only a Lake. And it further argues their ignorance in Geography, that the later Geographers always correct the errors of the elder, as Ptolemee doth Marinus, Eratosthenes those before him, Hipparchus Eratosthenes, and Strabo not only both them, but Eudoxus, Ephorus, Dicaearchus, Polybius, Posidonius, and almost all that had writ before him. I insist on these things, not that I would destroy the credibility of any Humane history, where the Authors are guilty of any mistakes (for that were to take away the credit of all Humane History) but to shew how insufficient those Historians are to give us a certain account of the original of Nations, who were so unacquainted with the state of those Nations which they pretend to give an account of. For where there is wanting Divine Revelation (which was not pretended by any Greek Historians; and if it had, had been easily refuted) there must be supposed a full and exact knowledg of all things pertaining to that which they pretend to give an account of; and if they discover apparent defect and insufficiency (which hath been largely manifested as to them, in the precedent discourse) we have ground to deny the credibility of those Histories upon the account of such defect and insufficiency. So much then will abundantly suffice for the making good the first argument against the credibility of Profane Histories, as to the account which they give of Ancient times, different from the Word of God.

C H A P. V.

The general uncertainty of Heathen Chronology.

- I. *The want of credibility in Heathen History further proved from the uncertainty and confusion in their accounts of Ancient times. That discovered by the uncertain form of their Years.*
- II. *An enquiry into the different forms of the Ægyptian Years; the first of thirty Days, III. The second of four Months; of both Instances given in the Ægyptian history. IV. Of the Chaldean accounts, and the first Dynasties mentioned by Berosus, how they may be reduced to probability. V. Of the Ægyptian Dynasties of Manetho. Reasons of accounting them fabulous, because not attested by any credible authority, and rejected by the best Historians. VI. The opinion of Scaliger and Vossius, concerning their being contemporary, propounded, VII. and rejected with reasons against it. VIII. Of the ancient division of Ægypt into Nomi or Provinces, and the number of them, against Vossius and Kircher.]*

THE next thing to manifest how little there is of credibility in the account of ancient times, reported by the histories of heathen Nations, is, the uncertainty, confusion and ambiguity in the

the account they give of those times. If we suppose them not defective as to their records, if yet we find the account given so perplexed, ambiguous and confused, that we can find no certainty of the meaning of it, we have very little reason to entertain it with any certain assent unto it. Now this will be made evident by these things. 1. The uncertainty of their Chronology, whereon their whole account depends. 2. The multitude of Impositions taken from ancient histories. 3. The uncertain meaning of those Characters wherein their ancient histories were preserved. I begin with the great uncertainty of the heathen Chronology, which will be manifested by two things: *First*, the uncertain form of their years: *Secondly*, the want of certainty of their ~~ωδων~~ *μολα*, or certain fixed *Epocha's* from which to derive their account of ancient times. *First*, the uncertain form of their years; this of it self is sufficient to destroy the credibility of their accounts of antiquity, if it be manifested that they had different forms of years in use among them; and it be uncertain to which to refer their accounts they give; for if years be sometimes lunar, sometimes solar, and sometimes but of thirty days, sometimes of four months, sometimes of three hundred and sixty days, sometimes three hundred sixty five, sometimes four times three hundred sixty five in their *tetraeteris*, sometimes eight times in their *octaeteris*, sometimes more, what certainty can we possibly have which of them to fix their accounts to? Especially when they only give them in general, and never tell us which of them they mean, which may make it shrewdly suspicious, that their intent is only to impose on our understandings, and not to deal fairly and truly with us. We shall therefore so much explain the different form of their years, as thereby to shew what uncertainties we are left to by them: Where we meddle not with their Tropical and Astronomical years, but chiefly those which were in civil use among the several Nations we speak to. A year is nothing else but a System of days, and is therefore capable of as great variety, as days are in being joyned together; but usually there were some other lesser Systems of days than those which are called years, out of which the other doth result. Such is the *εβδομήμερον*, or the week, which, as *Joseph Scaliger* saith, was *res omnibus Orientis populis ab ultima usque antiquitate usitata*, a thing in continual use among the Eastern Nations, tho' it be but of late reception into the parts of *Europe*, and no elder than Christianity among them. Among the *Romans* was used an *εβδομήμερον*, which was for the sake of the *Nundina*; returning every ninth day. The *Mexicans*, as *Scaliger* tells us, reckon all by a *τρεισκαιδεκάμερον*, a System of thirteen days. Next to these were their Months; which were either Lunar or Solar. The Lunar were either from the Moon's return to the same point of the Zodiac again, called *μηνιαία*, which was less than twenty eight days; but this was of no use in civil computations; or else from one conjunction of the Moon with the Sun to another, which was called *μηνιαία*; or else from the first phasis of the Moon, the second day after its *coitus*, called *φάσις* and *ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου φάσεως μηνιαία*; some, as the *Grecians*, reckoned their Lunar Months from the *coitus*, as *Scaliger* proves out of *Vitruvius*; others from the *phasis*, as some Eastern Nations did; as the *Jews* began their observation of the New Moons from the first *phasis* or appearance of her after the

*Scaliger
de Emend.
Temp. l. ii*

G

coitus.

coitus. The Solar Months were either natural, such as were defined by the Sun's passage from one sign of the *Zodiac* to another; or civil, whereby the Months were equally divided into 30 days apiece, as in the *Grecian* and *Egyptian* year.

II.

Having thus far seen of what the year consists, we now proceed to shew that the ancient Nations did not observe one constant certain form of year among them, but had several in use, to which their accounts may be referred. And because the *Egyptians* are supposed to have been best skilled as to the form of the year, according to that of *Macrobius*, *Anni certus modus apud solos semper Egyptios fuit*: We shall particularly demonstrate the variety of years in use among them: By which we shall see what great uncertainty there is in their accounts of their Dynasties. For first it is evident that the time of 30 days was among the ancient *Egyptians* accounted a year, for which we have the testimony of *Plutarch* in *Numa*. *Αἰγυπτίους δὲ μνησάμενος ὅτι ἐνιαυτὸς, ἢ 365 ἡμέραι; The Egyptians had at first a year consisting of one month, and after of four*: So *Varro* in *Lactantius* gives an account of the great Age of some men in ancient times, who are supposed to have lived a 1000 years; *Ait enim apud Egyptios pro annis menses haberi, ut non Solis per 12 signa circuitus faciat annum, sed Luna que orbem illum signiferum 30 dierum spacio illustrat.* It is then evident that this year of thirty days was in use among the *Egyptians*; the only scruple is whether it was used in their sacred accounts or no; and that it was, we have a pregnant testimony in *Plutarch* in the fore-cited place; speaking of the *Egyptians* great pretense to antiquity, he gives this account of it; *οὐδὲν ἀμείζωνον ἴσθαι ἐν τῷ βίῳ γινώσκοντες ὑπερβύσσου, ἢ πὶ δὲ τῶν μῆνους εἰς ἴσθαι ἀετλοῦν 24 ἡμέρας. They reckon an infinite number of years in their accounts, because they reckon their months instead of years.*

Macrobius.
Saturn.
l. 1. c. 12.

Lactantius.
de Origin.
l. 2. c. 12.

Diodorus.
lib. 1.

Hist. sacr.
& Exor.
A. M.
1682.

According to this computation, it will be no difficult matter to reduce the vast accounts of the *Egyptian* antiquity to some proportion, and to reconcile their exorbitant Dynasties with sobriety and truth, especially as to the account given of them by *Diodorus Siculus*; for so *Diodorus* gives in their accounts, that the Gods and Hero's reigned in *Egypt* for the space of near 18000 years, and the last of them was *Orus* the son of *Isis*: From the reign of Men in *Egypt* he reckons about 9500 years to the time (if we admit of *Jacob. Cappellus* his correction of *πενταχίλιον* in *Diodorus*) of his entrance into *Egypt*, which was in the 180 *Olympiad*. Now as the aforesaid learned Author observes, *Diodorus* came into *Egypt*, A. M. 3940. V. C. 694. the mortal Men then had reigned in *Egypt* 9500 years, which taking it for these Lunar years of 30 days, makes of *Julian* years 780. the Hero's and Gods 18000 months, that is of *Julian* years 1478; from these two summs together are gathered 2258 years, which being deducted from the year of the world 3940, falls in the year of the world 1682 about which time *Misraim*, who was the great historical *Osiris* of *Egypt* (so called by a light variation of his former name) might be well supposed to be born; for that was in the year of *Noah* 630; and so *Orus* might be born; who was the son of *Osiris*, about the year of the world 1778. Between whose time and *Alexander* the great his Conquest of *Egypt*, the

the *Egyptians* as the same *Diodorus* tells us, reckon little less than 23000 years: Now according to this computation of 30 days for a year, we may reconcile this to truth too; for from 1778 to 3667 of the world, which falls upon the 417 year of *Nabonassar* , there is an interval of 1889 years, which makes of these Lunar years of 30 days, saith *Cappellus* , 22996 and 15 days, which comes very near, if not altogether, up to the *Egyptian* Computation: So when the *Egyptians* , according to *Diodorus* , make no less than 10000 years distance between their *Hercules* and *Hercules Bæotius* , the son of *Alcmena* , it must be understood of these Lunar years; for granting what the *Egyptians* say, that *Hercules Bæotius* lived but one generation before the *Trojan* war, and so his time to fall out about 2783, reckoning now backward from thence, and deducting from that year of the world 10000 months of 30 days, or *Julian* years 831, and 130 days, the time of the *Egyptian Hercules* will fall about the first year of the world, 1962, about which time we may well suppose him to live or die. And according to this computation we are to understand what the *Egyptians* told *Herodotus* , that from their first King or Priest of *Vulcan* , till the time of *Sethos* (in whose time *Sennacherib* attempted the conquest of *Egypt*) there had been passed 341 Generations, and as many Kings and High-Priests, and 11340 years, reckoning three Generations to make up a Century. But now, if we understand this prodigious computation according to this form of years, we may suspect the *Egyptians* of an intention to deceive *Herodotus* and the credulous *Greeks* , but yet not impeach them of direct falshood, it being thus reconcilable to truth. For according to this account 100 years makes 3000 days, and a generation 1000; so many days the Kings or Priests of *Vulcan* may be allowed to reign; so 340 generations of 1000 days apiece, make up 340000 days, to which, if we add the 200 days which *Sethos* had now reigned upon *Sennacherib* 's invasion, we have 340200 days, which makes up of these years of 30 days apiece 11340, which is the number assign'd by *Herodotus* . *Jacobus Cappellus* thinks the *Epoch* from whence these years are to be reckoned, is from *A. M.* 2350, when *Mephres* began to reign in *Egypt* , from whence if we number these 340200 days, or 11340 monthly years, which makes up of *Julian* years 931, and 152 days, the number falls *A. M.* 3282; about which time in probability *Sennacherib* invaded *Egypt* . Thus we see by making use of those Lunar years, that it is possible to reconcile some of the *Egyptian* extravagant accounts to some probability and consistency with truth; but however we ow very little thanks to the *Egyptians* for it, who deliver these things in gross, without telling us which years they mean, and thereby evidence their intent to deceive all who have so little wit as to be deceived by them.

Cappell. Hist. sacr. & Exor. p. 198.

The next kind and form of the *Egyptian* year, was that which consisted of four equal Months, amounting to 120 days; the use of this kind of year among them is attested by *Plutarch* in the fore-cited place, and by *Diodorus* , who gives an account of this kind of year among the *Egyptians* . *Solinus* seems to mention this as the only year in request among the *Egyptians* : and so *S. Augustin* , *perhibentur Ægyptii quondam tam breves annos habuisse ut*

III.

Diod. l. 1. Solin. Polyhist. c. 3.

August. de Civ. Dei, l. 12. c. 10.

ut quaternis mensibus finirentur. This renders then the *Ægyptian* accounts yet more uncertain, and only leaves us to guess with the greatest probability of reason, what form of year was meant by them in their computations. So when *Diodorus* speaks so much in favor of the old *Ægyptian* Kings and Laws, and produceth this from the *Ægyptian* Priests, as the best evidence of the excellent temper of their Government, that they had Kings of their own Nation for the space of 4700 years, till the time of *Cambyfes* his inroad into *Ægypt*, which was in the third year of the 63 *Olympiad*. Now besides the apparent contradiction of these accounts to the other already explained, if we take them in gross, as the *Ægyptians* give them, it is evident this can be no otherwise true, than by taking these accounts in that form of years now mentioned by us. For these 4700 years, taking them for 120 days apiece, make up of *Julian* years 1544, which being deducted from the year of the world 3475, which was the time when *Cambyfes* invaded *Ægypt*, the remainder is *A. M.* 1931, about which time we may fix the death of *Orus*, from whom their proper Kings commenced. And of these years, *Vossius* tells us, we are to understand what they report of the long lives of their ancient Kings, when they attribute to each of them the space of 300 years: as when they attribute a 1000, and more to their eldest Kings, we are to understand them of simple Lunar years of 30 days, by which these *Gigantic* measures of the term of their lives, may without the help of *Procrustes* be cut short according to the proportion of Men's ordinary age in those eldest times. So when *Diodorus* reckons from the death of *Proteus* to his own time *A. M.* 3940, 3400 years, it must be understood of these years of four equal months; for so those 3400 years make up of *Julian* years 1117, which being deducted from 3940, the remainder is 2823, about which year of the world *Proteus* may be supposed to live, which was about the time of the *Judges* in *Israel*.

Diod. l. 1.

*Vossius de
Idolat. l. 1.
c. 28.*

IV. Neither was this only the *Ægyptians* way, but in probability the ancient *Chaldeans* observed the same, which may be a ground likewise of those unmeasurable accounts among them in their first Dynasties, as is evident in the Fragments of *Abydenus* and *Apollodorus* out of *Berosus*, where the times of their first Kings are reckoned not by years, but *Σάεσι*, *Νέεσι*, and *Σύνσι*; now according to them every *Σάεσι* contained 3600 years, *Νέεσι* 600, *Σύνσι* 60. Now who can imagine that *Alorus* and the ten Kings from him to *Xisuthrus* should reign 120 *Sari* as their computation is, which reckoning for every *Saros* 3600 years, makes up 432000 years? A very fair sum for the *Chaldean* Dynasties before the time of *Xisuthrus*, by whom in probability *Noah* was by them understood. There have been only two ways thought on of dealing with these computations; either rejecting them as wholly fabulous, and founded on no evidence or records of History, as we have seen already; only they might retain (being so near the place of the settlement of *Noah* and his posterity after the flood) the memory not only of the flood (of which it is evident they had several remainders preserved in their Traditions) but likewise of the ages of men preceding the flood, wherein they were right, reckoning from *Alorus* the first to *Xisuthrus*, i. e. from *Adam* to *Noah*, ten Generations,

but

but as to the names of those ten persons, and the times they lived in, being wholly ignorant thro' the unfaithfulness of tradition, they took their liberty not only of coining names, but of setting what age to them they pleased themselves. And to this purpose *Scaliger* observes that some of their first Kings are reckoned before the flood, which saith he, is denied by *Georgius Syncellus* without any shew of reason. Thus far then we may admit of the *Chaldean* Dynasties as to some part of the Tradition, but rejecting their names and computations as fabulous. The other way of explaining these Dynasties, is by the several ways of computation among them: For the learned Monks, *Panodorus* and *Anianus*, understand those vast sums, not of years, but days, and so make a *Saros* to contain 120 months of 30 days apiece, which saith *Scaliger*, make ten *Chaldee* years, and a *Nirus* 20 equal months, and a *Sofos* two: according to which computation the 100 *Sari* make but 1200 years. But this computation of theirs is rejected by *Georgius Syncellus*, because he supposeth *Eusebius* so well versed in these things, that he would never have set them down for years, if the *Chaldeans* had not understood them so, and therefore he would not trouble himself in reducing Fables to true History, as he expresseth it, whose words are at large produced by *Scaliger* in the fore-cited place. And it will appear more necessary to reject those *Chaldean* Computations, if we take the sums of their years in the sense which *Salmasius* gives of them in the Preface to his Book, *De annis Climactericis* (from whom *Pyrerius* the Author of the *Præadamites* hath borrowed most of his Arguments as to these things.) According to him then, every Σάρο contained no less than 6000 years, as the *Toman* among the *Persians* contained 10000: but because that learned man hath only given us his *reperi Scriptum*, without any certain foundation for so large an account of those summs, we shall take them in as favourable a sense as we can. In order to which a very learned man of our own hath found a third interpretation of the Σάρο, in the *Chaldee* accounts, from a correction of *Suidas* by the MS. in the *Vatican* Library, according to which he thus reads the words, οἱ ᾧ ρη σάροι ποιῶσι ἐνιαυτὸς βσκβ' καὶ τὴν Χαλδαίων ψῆφοι, εἶπερ ὁ σάρος ποιεῖ μῆνας Σελωιακῶν σκβ', οἷοι γίνονται ἐν ἐνιαυτῷ 6 μῆνες 22: And so the sense, saith he, is clear; Σάρο according to the *Chaldee* account comprehends 222 months, which come to eighteen years and six months; therefore 120 Σάροι make 2220 years, and therefore (he adds) for βσκβ'. I read, leaving out the last β, βσκ'. Now according to this sense of 120 *Sari* to comprehend the sum of 2220 years, it will be no difficult matter to reduce the fragment of *Berosus* concerning the ten Kings before the flood reigning 120 *Sari*, to some degree of probability: As to which I shall only suppose these two things. First, that the ancient *Chaldeans* had preserved among them some Tradition of the number of the chief persons before the flood; for we find them exactly agreeing with the Scriptures as to the number, tho' differing as to the names of them, which may be seen in the Fragments of *Africanus*, preserved in *Eusebius* his *Greek Chronica*. Secondly, that *Berosus* from whom *Apollodorus* and *Alexander Polyhistor* deliver these computations, might, as to the account of the times of those persons, follow the translation of the *Septuagint*. For I have already made it evident that *Berosus* did not publish

*Scal. Not. in
Gr. Euseb.
p. 406.*

*D. Pearson
on the
Creed, p.
115. 1. edit.*

Euseb. p. 5.

his History till after the *Septuagint* was abroad; now according to the computation of the *Septuagint* of the ages before the flood, these 120 *Sari* of the ten Kings will not much disagree from it. For these make 2220 years of these ten persons, and the *Septuagint* in all make 2242; so that if instead of *βσμβ'* in *Suidas*, we only read it *βσμβ'*, we have the exact computation of the *Septuagint* in these 120 *Sari*; but of this let the learned judge.

- v. We now come to the *Egyptian* Dynasties of *Manetho*, as to which I doubt we must be fain to take the same course that *Eusebius* did with the *Chaldaean*, *μὴ συμβάλειν τὴ ψυχή τῇ ἀληθείᾳ*, not to trouble our selves overmuch in seeking to reconcile fables to truth. Great pains is taken by some very learned men to reduce the disorderly Dynasties of *Manetho* to some probable account; but I must confess upon an impartial Examination of them, that I think they have striven, if not to make an *Ethiopian* white, yet an *Egyptian* to speak truth concerning his own Country, which are almost of an equal impossibility. *Joseph Scaliger* who first in this latter age of the world produced them into the light out of *Georgius Syncellus*, hath a more favourable opinion of them, than of the *Egyptian* History of *Herodotus*, *Diodorus* and others, but upon what account I cannot imagine. Is it because four Dynasties, according to his own computation, exceed the Creation of the world according to the true account? for which he is fain to make use of his *Tempus prolepticum* and *Julian* period, which reacheth 764 years beyond the age of the world, and was invented by him from the multiplication of the great *Cycle* into the *Indiction*, i. e. of 532 into 15. Or is it because forsooth *Manetho* hath digested all into better order, and reckoned up the several Dynasties which lay confused in other Authors? but this only shews him a more cunning impostor who saw the former accounts given by others would not serve the turn, and therefore pretends to more exactness and diligence, that he might more easily deceive his Readers. But setting aside those things which have been said already concerning *Manetho*, I have these things which make me reject his Dynasties as fabulous: *First*, the vast difference between *Manetho* his accounts and all others who have written the *Egyptian* History, in the order and names of Dynasties. Where do we ever read of the several Dynasties of the *Thinites*, *Memphites*, *Soites*, *Diospolitans* and many others, but in himself? It is very strange that neither *Herodotus*, nor *Eratosthenes*, nor *Diodorus*, who have all written a succession of the *Egyptian* Kings, should neither by their own industry, nor by all the interest they had in *Egypt*, get any knowledg of these methodically digested Dynasties. Besides, had there been any historical certainty in these Dynasties of *Manetho*, whence comes it to pass that they should be so silently passed over by those who were *Egyptian* Priests themselves, and undertook to write the History of *Egypt*? Such were *Cheremon*, who was an *ἱερογγραφεύς*, a sacred Scribe, and *Ptolemaeus Mendesi* who was an *Egyptian* Priest, as *Eusebius* tells us, and comprehended the History of *Egypt* in three books. Now had this History been so authentical as is pretended, whence come so many and great contradictions between them? insomuch that * *Josephus* saith, *If that which they report were true it were impossible*

* *Joseph. c.*
App. l. i.

possible they should so much differ; but they labour in the invention of lyes, and write neither agreeably to the truth nor to one another. So that it is next to a miracle almost to see how prodigiously fond of these Dynasties Kircher is, and what pains he hath taken to no purpose about them; *scio multos esse*, saith he, *qui hujusmodi Dynastias meras nugas & commenta putant*; very true; but why is not he of the same mind too? he confesseth himself to have been so once; but since he hath conversed more with the Oriental traditions, he hath found them not to be so fabulous as many make them. It seems then the Basis of the *Ægyptian* Dynasties as well before the flood as after, must lie in this Oriental Tradition; a thing, which some, to shew their great skill in those Eastern Languages, are grown very fond of. But as far as I can yet see, they fail to *Ophir*, not for *Gold*, but *Peacocks*; and the next Legend the world hath should be called *Legenda Orientalis*. For can any thing be more irrational, absurd and fabulous, than those *Arabic* Traditions which that Author scrapes as much for, as *Æsop's* Cock did on the dunghil? but there is no jewel to be found among them; Unless we should take those fifteen hard names of men for such which by the *Arabic* Writers are said to have succeeded each other in *Ægypt* before the flood, viz. *Nacraus, Nathras, Mesram, Henoah, Arjak, Hasilim, Husal, Tatrafan, Sarkak, Schaluk, Surith*, (who they say built the Pyramids) *Hugith, Manaus, Aphrus, Malinus, Abn Ama Pharaun*, in whose time they say the flood came. But should we be so little befriended by reason as to grant all this, what advantage will this be to *Manetho*, who speaks not of Kings, but whole Dynasties? so that it still appears these Dynasties are fabulous, not being attested by any credible witnesses. Secondly, All those who profess to follow *Manetho*, differ strangely from one another, as *Josephus, Africanus, Eusebius, George the Sincellus* of the Patriarch *Tarasius*: and *Scaliger*, who hath taken so much pains in digesting of them, yet he is condemned by others since; and *Isaac Vossius* gives a particular caution to his Reader, *In his Dynastiis compingendis nequaquam esse sequendum ordinem & calculum Scaligeri*. What should be the reason of this diversity, but that they thought them not so authentic, but they might cut off, alter and transpose, as they saw occasion? which is most plain and evident in *Eusebius*, who makes no difficulty of cutting off one whole Dynasty, and dividing another into two, only to reconcile the distance between *Thooris*, the *Ægyptian* King, and *Teutamus*, the *Assyrian* Emperor, and the destruction of *Troy*; and therefore leaves out four *Assyrian* Kings, and a whole Dynasty of the *Ægyptians*, to make a *synchronism* between those three.

But yet there hath been something very fairly offered to the world, to clear the truth, if not *Manetho*, in order to his Dynasties, viz. that the subtle *Ægyptian*, to inhance the antiquity of his own Country, did take implicate years for solid, and place those in a succession which were contemporary one with another; This indeed is a very compendious way to advance a great sum of years with a very little charge: Wherein he hath done, saith *Cappellus*, as if a *Spaniard* in the *Indies* should glory of the antiquity of the Dynasties of *Spain*, and should attribute to the Earls of *Barcelona* 337 years, to the Kings of *Arragon* 498, to the Kings of

Kircher.
Oed. Ægypt.
To. 1. Syn.
l. c. 9.

If. Vossius
de anteq.
Mundis
cap. 10.

vi.

Cappell.
Hist. sacr.
& exot. A.
M. 3308.

of Portugal 418, to the Kings of Leon 545, of Castile 800 years, and yet all these Dynasties rise from the year of our Lord 717, when the *Saracens* first entred Spain. There are very few Nations, but will go near to vie antiquity with the *Egyptians*, if they may thus be allowed to reckon successively all those petty Royalties which anciently were in most Nations; as might be particularly instanced in most great Empires, that they gradually rise from the subduing and incorporating of those petty Royalties into which the several Nations were cantonized before. And there seems to be very strong ground of suspicion that some such thing was designed by *Manetho*, from the 32^d Dynasty which is of the *Diospolitan Thebans*; for this Dynasty is said to begin from the tenth year of the 15th Dynasty of the *Phœnician* Pastors in the time of *Saites*: now, which is most observable, he that begins this Dynasty, is of the very same name with him who begins the very first Dynasty of *Manetho*, who is *Menes*, and so likewise his son *Athothis* is the same in both: Which hath made many think, because *Menes* is reckoned first, not only in both these, but in *Diodorus*, *Erato-sthenes* and others, that this *Menes* was he who first began the Kingdom of *Egypt*, after whose time it was divided into several Dynasties. Which makes *Scaliger* say, *Illa vetustissima regna fuerunt instar latrociniorum; ubi vis, non lex aut successio aut suffragia populi reges in solio regni collocabant.* This opinion of the co-existence of these Dynasties is much embraced by *Vossius* both Father and Son, and by the Father made use of to justify *Scaliger* from calumniators, who made as tho' *Scaliger* did in effect overthrow the authority of the Scriptures by mentioning with some applause the Dynasties of *Manetho*.

Scalig. can.
Isag. l. 3.

Ger. Voss.
Idol. l. 1.
c. 28.

Jf. Voss. de
at. mund.
c. 10.

VII.

But to this opinion, how plausible soever it seems, I offer these exceptions. First, As to that *Menes* who is supposed to be the first Founder of the *Ægyptian* Kingdom, after whose death it is supposed that *Egypt* was divided into all these Dynasties; I demand who this *Menes* was; was he the same with him whom the Scripture calls *Misraim*, who was the first Planter of *Egypt*? this is not probable, for in all probability His name must be sought among the Gods, and not the Mortals that reigned. If we suppose him to be any other after him, it will be hard giving an account how he came to have the whole power of *Egypt* in his hands, and soon after him it should be divided. For Kingdoms are oft-times made up of those petty Royalties before; but it will be very hard finding instances of one person's enjoying the whole power, and so many Dynasties to arise after his decease, and to continue coexistent in peace and full power so long as these several Dynasties are supposed to do. Besides, is it not very strange, that no Historian should mention such a former distribution of several Principalities so anciently in *Egypt*? But that which to me utterly overthrows the coexistence of these Dynasties in *Egypt*, is, by comparing with them what we find in Scripture of greatest antiquity concerning the Kingdom of *Egypt*; which I cannot but wonder that none of those learned men should take notice of. When the *Ægyptian* Kingdom was first founded, 'tis not here a place to enquire; but it is evident that, in *Abraham's* time, there was a *Pharaoh*, King of *Egypt* (whom Archbishop

Usher

Usher thinks to have been *Apophis*) not *Abimelech* the first King of *Ægypt*, as *Constantinus Manasses* reports in his Annals (by a ridiculous mistake of the King of *Gerar* for the King of *Ægypt*.) This *Pharaoh* was then certainly King of all the Land of *Ægypt*, which still in Scripture is called the *Land of Misraim* from the first Planter of it: and this was of very great antiquity; and therefore *Funccius* (tho' improbably) thinks this *Pharaoh* to have been *Osiris*, and *Rivet* thinks *Misraim* might have been alive till that time; here then we find no Dynasties coexisting, but one Kingdom under one King. If we descend somewhat lower, to the times of *Jacob* and *Joseph*, the evidence is so undoubted of *Ægypt*'s being an entire Kingdom under one King, that he may have just cause to suspect the eyes either of his body or his mind that distrusts it. For what more evident, than that *Pharaoh* who preferred *Joseph*, was King of all the Land of *Ægypt*? Were not the seven years of famine over all the land of *Ægypt*? Gen. 41. 55. Was not *Joseph* set by *Pharaoh* over all the land of *Ægypt*? Gen. 41. 41, 43, 45. And did not *Joseph* go over all the land of *Ægypt* to gather corn? Gen. 41. 46. Nay did he not buy all the land of *Ægypt* for *Pharaoh*? Gen. 47. 20. Can there possibly be given any fuller evidences of an entire Kingdom, than these are, that *Ægypt* was such then? Afterwards we read of one King after another in *Ægypt* for the space of nigh two hundred years, during the children of *Israel*'s slavery in *Ægypt*; and was not he, think we, King over all *Ægypt*, in whose time the children of *Israel* went out thence? And in all the following History of Scripture, is there not mention made of *Ægypt* still as an entire Kingdom, and of one King over it? Where then is there any place for these contemporary Dynasties in *Ægypt*? No where that I know of, but in the fancies of some learned men.

Indeed there is one place that seems to give some countenance to this opinion; but it is in far later times than the first Dynasties of *Manetho* are suppos'd to be in, which is in *Isai* 19. 2. Where *GOD* saith, *He would set the Ægyptians against the Ægyptians, and they shall fight every one against his brother, city against city, and kingdom against kingdom.* Where it seems that there were several Kingdoms then existent among the *Ægyptians*; but the *Septuagint* very well renders it *νομῶς ἐπὶ νομῶν*. Now *νομῶς* among the *Ægyptians*, as *Epiphanius* and others tell us, notes *τὴν ἐκάστης πόλεως περιουσίαν ἢ ἀίμας*, the precincts of every great City, such as our Counties are, and therefore *Pliny* renders *νομῶς* by *præfecturæ*; these were the several Provinces of *Ægypt*, of which there were thirty six in *Ægypt*, ten in *Thebais*, ten in *Delta*, the other sixteen in the midland parts; so that by kingdom against kingdom, no more is meant than one Province being set against another. *Isaac Vossius* thinks the number of the ancient *Nomi* was twelve, and that over every of these was a peculiar King, and that this number may be gathered from the Dynasties of *Manetho*, setting aside the Dynasties of the *Persians*, *Æthiopians*, and *Phœnicians*: viz. the *Thinites*, *Memphites*, *Elephantines*, *Heracleopolitans*, *Diospolitans*, *Thebans*, the lesser *Diospolitans*, *Xoites*, *Tanites*, *Bubastites*, *Saites*, *Mendesians*, and *Sebennytes*: and so that *Ægypt* was anciently a *Dodecarchy*, as *England* in the *Saxons* time was a *Heptarchy*. But

H

as

*Vid. Boch.
Geogr. p. 1.
l. 4. c. 4.
Kircher
Oedip. Æ-
gypt. To. 1.
Syntag. 1.
c. 4.*

*Idem Synt.
1. 6. 2. p. 7.*

Strab. l. 17.

as it already appears, there could be anciently no such *Dodecarchy* in *Ægypt*; so it is likewise evident that this distribution of *Ægypt* into *Nomi* is a later thing, and by most Writers is attributed to *Sesoosis* or *Sesostris*, whom *Josephus* supposed to be *Sesack* King of *Ægypt*, contemporary with *Rehoboam*. Indeed if we believe *Gelaldinus* the *Arabic* Historian cited by *Kircher*, the most ancient distribution of *Ægypt* was into four parts. *Misraim* held one part to himself, and gave his Son *Copt* another, *Esmun* a third, and *Atrib* a fourth part; which division the same Author affirms to have continued till the time of *Joseph*, who made a new distribution of the whole Land: After him *Sesostris* divided the whole into thirty several *Nomi*; so *Kircher* will needs have it, that of the three several parts of *Ægypt*, each might have for some mystical signification its ten *Nomi*, of which every one had its distinct and peculiar God it worship'd, and a particular Palace in the Labyrinth, and a peculiar *Sanhedrin* or Court of Justice belonging to it. But it evidently appears by that vain-glorious *Oedipus*, that it is a far easier matter to make new Mysteries, than to interpret old ones, which as it might be easily discovered in the main foundations whereon that structure stands, so we have some evidence of it in our first entrance into it, in this part of the *Chorography* of *Ægypt*. For from whence had he this exact division of *Ægypt* into thirty *Nomi*, ten of which belonged to the upper *Ægypt*, or *Thebais*, ten to *Delta*, or the lower *Ægypt*, and the ten remaining to the midland Country? Hath he this from *Ptolemee*, whose Scheme of the several *Nomi* he publisheth? No, *Ptolemee* and *Pliny* by his own confession afterwards add many other to these, as *Omphile*, *Phantarites*, *Tanites*, *Phatnites*, *Neut*, *Heptanomos*, &c. Hath he it from *Strabo*, whose authority he cites for it? No such matter. For *Strabo* saith expressly, that *Thebais* had ten *Nomi*, *Delta* ten, and the midland sixteen; only some are of opinion, saith he, that there were as many *Nomi* as Palaces in the Labyrinth, which were toward thirty; but yet the number is uncertain still. We see by this, how ominous it is for an *Oedipus* to stumble at the threshold, and how easy a matter it is to interpret Mysteries, if we may have the making of them. We see then no evidence at all for these contemporary Dynasties of *Manetho*; which yet if we should grant, would be a further argument of the uncertainty of heathen *Chronology*, when among them implicate years are given out to the world for solid; so that which way soever *Manetho* his Dynasties be taken, they will prove the thing in hand, whether we suppose them at least most part fabulous, or should grant he had taken those in succession to each other, which were coexistent with one another.

CHAP.

C H A P. VI.

The uncertain Epocha's of Heathen Chronology.

- I. *An account of the defect of Chronology in the eldest times. Of the Solar Year among the Egyptians, the original of the Epacts, the antiquity of Intercalation among them. Of the several Canicular Years; the difference between Scaliger and Petavius considered. The certain Epocha's of the Egyptian History no elder than Nabonassar.*
- II. *Of the Grecian accounts. The fabulousness of the Heroical age of Greece.*
- III. *Of the ancient Grecian Kingdoms. The beginning of the Olympiads.*
- IV. *The uncertain Origins of the Western Nations. Of the Latin Dynasties. The different Palilia of Rome. The uncertain reckoning Ab Urbe condita.*
- V. *Of impostures as to ancient Histories. Of Annius, VI. Inghiramius, and others.*
- VII. *Of the characters used by Heathen Priests.*
- VIII. *No sacred characters among the Jews.*
- IX. *The partiality and inconsistency of heathen Histories with each other. From all which the want of credibility in them as to an account of ancient times is clearly demonstrated.*

THE next thing to evidence the uncertainty of the heathen Chronology, is, the want of certain *Parapegmata*, or some fixed periods of time, according to which the account of times must be made. For if there be no certain *Epocha's* by which to reckon the succession of ages, the distanced of intervals, and all intervening accidents, we must of necessity fluctuate in continual uncertainties, and have no sure foundation to bottom any account of ancient times upon. The great reason of this defect, is, the little care which those who lived in the eldest times had to preserve the memory of any ancient tradition among themselves, or to convey it to posterity in such a way as might be least liable to imposture. Of all kinds of Learning, *Chronology* was the most rude in eldest times; and yet that is well called by *Scaliger*, *The life and soul of History*, without which *History* is but a confused lump, a mere *Mola*, an indigested piece of flesh, without life or form. The ancient accounts of the world were merely from year to year, and that with abundance of obscurity, uncertainty and variety: sometimes going by the course of the Moon; and therein they were as mutable as the Moon her self, how to conform the year regularly to her motion: and it was yet greater difficulty to regulate it by the course of the Sun, and to make the accounts of the Sun and Moon meet. There was so much perplexity and confusion about the ordering of a single year, and so long in most Nations before they could bring it into any order, that we are not to expect any fixed periods by which to find out the succession of ages

H 2

among

among them. Among the *Ægyptians* who are supposed most skilful in the account of the year, it was a long time before they found out any certain course of it. It is agreed by most, that when the *Ægyptian* Priests had found out the form of the year by the course of the Sun (which is attributed by *Diodorus* to the *Heliopolitan* Priests) yet the year in common use was only of 360 days, which in any great period of years must needs cause a monstrous confusion, by reason that their Months must of necessity by degrees change their place, so that in the great Canicular year of 730 *Thoyth*, which was the beginning of the Summer *Solstice* in the entrance into that period, would be removed into the midst of Winter, from whence arose that *Ægyptian* fable in *Herodotus*, that in the time of their eldest Kings, the Sun had twice changed his rising and setting; which was only caused by the variation of their Months, and not by any alteration in the course of the Sun. Which defect the *Ægyptian* Priests at last observing, saw a necessity of adding five days to the end of the year w^{ch} thence were called *ἐπιγήμεραι*, which implies they were not anciently in use among them, being afterwards added to make up the course of the year. Which the *Ægyptians* give an account of, as *Plutarch* tells us under this fable: *Mercury being once at dice with the Moon, he got from her 72^d part of the year, which he after added to the 360 days which were anciently the days of the year, which they called ἐπιγήμεραι, and therein celebrated the Festivals of their Gods.* Thence the names of the several *ἐπιγήμεραι* were taken from the Gods; the first was called *Ὀσίρις*, it being celebrated in honor of him; the second, *Ἀνubis*, by which *Scaliger* understands *Anubis*, but *Vossius* more probably the senior *Orus*; the third to *Typho*; the fourth to *Isis*; the fifth to *Nephtha* the wife of *Typho*, and sister to *Isis*. This course of the year *Scaliger* thinks that the *Ægyptians* represented by the Serpent called *Neith*, being described in a round circle biting some part of his tail in his mouth; whereby, saith he, they would have it understood that the form of the year was not perfect without that adjection of five days to the end of the year: For to this day, saith he, the *Coptites* and ancient *Ægyptians* call the end of the year *Neith*. It seems that afterwards they understood likewise the necessity of intercalation of a day every fourth year, for the sake of the redundant quadrant each year above 365 days; which course of four years they called Canicular year, because they observed its defect in that time one whole day from the rising of the Dog-star: and besides that they called *Ἡλιακὸν ἔτος*, and *Ἐπὶ τοῦ Σωθιᾶς*, & *lustrum Sothiacum*, from *Σωθιᾶς* the Dog-star: but *Censorinus* denies any use of intercalation among the *Ægyptians* in their civil year, altho' their Sacred and Hieroglyphical years might admit of it. And upon this ground, I suppose the controversy between those two learned persons, *Scaliger* and *Petavius*, concerning the antiquity of Intercalation among the *Ægyptians* may be reconciled. For on the one side it is apparent, that the ordinary or civil year did want intercalation, by this testimony of *Censorinus*; *Eorum annus civilis solos habet dies 365 sine ullo intercalari; itaque quadriennium apud eos uno circiter die minus est quam naturale quadriennium*; and thence, saith he, it comes to pass, that in 1461 years, which was the great *Heliacal* year, it returns to the same beginning; for then the Dog-star ariseth again

*Diodor. l. 1.
c. 50.*

*Herod. Europ.
Vide Scaliger. de
Emend. Temp.
l. 3. p. 195.*

*Plutarch
de Iside &
Osiride.*

*Voss. de Idol.
l. 1. c. 28.*

*Censorin.
de die Nat.
c. 18.*

*V. Petav.
de doct.
Temp. l. 3.
c. 2.*

again upon the first day of the month *Thoyth*, as it did at the beginning of this great Canicular year; and that this kind of civil year did continue among them in the time of *Censorinus* (which was of the *Dionysian* account 238) appears by this, that he saith in the year wherein he wrote his book the *New-moon* of *Thoyth* was before the seventh day of the Calends of *July*, whereas a hundred years before, it was before the 12 of the Calends of *August*; whence it is evident, that the *Julian* year, whatever some learned men pretend to the contrary, was not in ordinary use among the *Egyptians* in that time; and that *Sosigenes* when he corrected the *Roman* Account, and brought in the form of the *Julian* year, did not take his pattern from the *Egyptian* year, but from the *Grecians* of *Alexandria*, who did make use of the Quadrant added to the 365 years, which the *Egyptians* did not, as appears further by the Golden circle in the monument of *Osmanduas* (which *Diodorus* speaks of out of *Hecateus Milesius*) which was of 365 cubits compass, and divided into so many segments for every day with the observations of the rising and setting of the several Stars, and the effects portended by them. And the reason why this year continued in civil use among the *Egyptians*, is well assigned by *Geminus*, that the *Egyptians* according to a superstitious observation they had, would needs have their Festivals run through every day in the year. But now on the other side, it is as evident that by continual observation the wisest of the *Egyptian* Priests did discern the necessity of intercalation, and that there wanted six hours in every year to make it compleat, which every four years would make the intercalation of a day necessary; so much by *Diodorus* is affirmed of the *Theban* Priests, who were the best Astronomers; and by *Strabo* both of the *Theban* and *Heliopolitan*; and so likewise *Horapollo*, whose work was to interpret the more abstruse learning of the *Egyptian* Priests: *When* (saith he) *the Egyptians would express a year, they name a Quadrant, because from one rising of the star Sothis to another, the fourth part of a day is added, so that the year consists of 365 days*; (and a quadrant must be added, because of the antecedents and consequents) therefore every fourth year they reckon a supernumerary day. How unjustly *Petavius* hath charged *Scaliger* with falshood in reference to this testimony of *Horapollo*, meerly because the citation did not appear in that Chapter mentioned by *Scaliger* in the Book which *Petavius* used, hath been already observed by learned men. Whereupon *Vossius* condemns *Petavius* of strange incogitancy, because in three Editions mentioned by him, *Scaliger's* citation was right: but *Conringius* hath since pleaded in behalf of *Petavius*, that he might make use of the Edition of *Causinus* distinct from the other three; whereby we see how small a matter will beget a feud between learned men, especially where prejudice hath lodged before; as is too evident in *Petavius* his rough dealing on all occasions, with that very deserving person *Joseph Scaliger*. But to return, from hence by degrees the *Egyptians* proceeded to make greater periods of years (as *Eudoxus* carried his *Octaeteris* into *Greece* from the Canicular year of the *Egyptians*) they framed from this a great Canicular year, which had as many years as *Julian* hath days; and lastly, the greatest Canicular year, which comprehended

Kircher
Oed. Ægypt.
To. 3. Class.
7. c. 2.

Diod. l. 1.
c. 49.

Geminus
de sphaera
cap. 6.

Diodor.
l. 1. c. 50.
Strab. l. 17.
Horapollo
Hieroglyph.
l. 1. c. 5.

Voss. de Idol.
l. 1. c. 28.

Conring. de
Hermet.
Med. c. 12.

four of the greater, and consisted of a period of 1461 years. But thus we see, that the great periods of years among them rise gradually, as they grow more skilful in the understanding the nature of the year; and that they had anciently no certain periods to govern themselves by in their computation of ancient times. Nay the *Ægyptians* have not, as appears, any certain *Epocha* to go by, elder than the *Ægyptian* years of *Nabonassar*, and afterwards from the death of *Alexander*, and *Ptolemee Philadelphus*, and *Augustus* his Victory at *Actium*.

II. If from the *Ægyptians* we remove our discourse unto the *Grecians*, we are still plunged into greater uncertainties, it being acknowledged by themselves that they had no certain succession of time before the *Olympiads*. To which purpose the testimony of *Varro* in *Censorinus* is generally taken notice of, distributing time into three parts, reckoning two of them to be unknown and fabulous, and the historical part of time to begin with the first *Olympiad*. Indeed *Scaliger* and some others are loth to reject all that second part of time as fabulous, which was in the interval between *Deucalion's* flood and the *Olympiads*; and therefore they had rather call it Heroical, tho' much corrupted with fables, and to think that it was historical as to persons, but fabulous as to the actions of those persons. But granting this; yet we are wholly to seek for any certain account of the succession of time and persons for want of some certain *Epocha's*, which like the Pole Star should guide us in our passage thro' that vast Ocean of the *Grecian* History. It must be confessed that some of the learned Heathens have taken a great deal of pains this way to find out some certain Periods to fix on in the time before the *Olympiads*; as *Philochorus*, *Apollodorus*, and *Dionysius Halycarnassensis*, and others, who out of their skill in Astronomy sought to bring down some certain intervals between the destruction of *Troy*, and the first *Olympic* games of *Pelops*, restored by *Hercules* and *Atreus*. But granting that their *Epocha's* were fixed and certain, that the destruction of *Troy* was upon the 23 of *Thargelion*, the 11th month of the *Attic* account, and that the *Olympic* game fell out answerably to the ninth of our *July*, and these things were evidently proved from Astronomical observations; yet how vast an account of time is lost quite beyond the siege of *Troy*? And besides that, as to all other accidents in the Intervals between these two *Epocha's* which could not be proved by Celestial observations concurrent with them, they were left at a very great uncertainty still; only they might guess whether they approached nearer to one *Epocha* than the other by the series of Families and their Generations (three of which made a Century of years) whereby they might come to some conjectures, but could not arrive at any certainty at all.

III. But that which is most to our purpose is, that all the History of the original of *Greece*, the foundations of their several Kingdoms, the succession of their first Kings, and all that comes under the name of the History of their ancient times, is clearly given over by their own most skilful Chronologers, as matters out of the reach of any clear evidence. Thence comes such great differences concerning the antiquity of their ancient Kingdoms; the *Argolic* Kingdom by *Dionysius Halycarnass.* is supposed to be the eldest,

*Scalig. not.
in Can Isa-
gog. l. 3.*

eldest, and the *Attic* younger than it by 40 Generations, which according to their computation comes to a 1000 years, which is impossible; and yet the *Arcadians*, who gave themselves out to be elder than the Moon, are supposed to be younger by him than the Grasshoppers of *Athens* by nine Generations; and the *Phthiotica*, under *Deucalion*, younger than *Arcadica* by 42 Generations, which *Scaliger* might well say were impossible and inconsistent. The *Sicyonian* Kingdom is by most supposed to be of greatest antiquity among the *Grecians*, from which *Varro* began his History, as *S. Austin* tells us; and yet as to this, *Pausanias* only reckons the names of some Kings there, without any succession of time among them; and yet as to those names *Africanus* (and *Eusebius* from him) dissent from *Pausanias*; and which is most observable, *Homer* reckons *Adrastus*, who is the 23^d in the account of *Africanus*, to be the first that reigned in *Sicyon*, whose time was after the institution of the *Olympic* Game by *Pelops*: of him thus *Homer*,

*August. de
Civ. Dei,
l. 16. c. 2.*

Καὶ Σικυῶν ὅς' ἄρ' Ἀδράστῃς πρῶτ' ἐμβασιλεύει.

*Homer.
Iliad. 2.*

whereby he expresseth *Adrastus* to be the first King of *Sicyon*; and not as *Scaliger* would interpret it, that *Adrastus* was first King of the *Sicyonians*, before he was of the *Argives*; for in the time of *Adrastus* at *Sicyon*, either *Atreus*, or *Thyestes* was King of the *Argives*: for in the second year of *Phæstus* and *Adrastus* his supposed predecessor in *Sicyon*, *Atreus* restored the *Olympic* Game of *Pelops*, in the 41 year of their reign, and they reigned at *Argi* 65 years: Now that *Phæstus* at *Sicyon* is supposed to reign but eight years; and therefore the reign of *Adrastus* at *Sicyon* fall in with that of *Atreus* and *Thyestes* at *Argi* or *Mycenæ*. Thus we see now, how uncertain the account of times was before the beginning of the *Olympiads* among the *Grecians*, which is fully acknowledged by *Diodorus*, and the very reason given which we here insist on, *Διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ὁρίσθησαν παρεληφθῆναι πρὸ τούτων προσδεδόμενον*, That there was no certainty in the ancient Grecian history, because they had no certain term (which he calls *parapegma*; as others *Epocha*; and *Censorinus*, *Titulus*) from whence to deduce their accounts. But now from the time of the *Olympiads* (i. e. from the first of them after their restoration by *Iphitus*, wherein the names of the Conquerors were engraven in brass Tablets for the purpose) the succession of time is most certain and historical among the *Grecians*; by which account we have from thence a certain way of commensurating the sacred and prophane History. All the difficulty is in what year of sacred History the *Olympiads* began, which *Scaliger* thus finds out. *Censorinus* writes (in the year of *Christ* 238 which was of the *Julian* period 4951.) that, that year was from the first *Olympiad* of *Iphitus* 1014, the first *Olympiad* was of the *Julian* period 3938. which was according to our learned Primate *A. M.* 3228, and the 35 of *Uzziah* King of *Judah*, or the 34, as *Cappellus* thinks: So that from henceforward we have a clear account of times, which we have demonstrated to have been so uncertain before.

*Scaliger
de Emend.
Temp. l. 5.*

If we come to the *Greeks* further into these *European* parts, we shall find as much darkness and obscurity as to ancient times, if

IV.

not

not more, than in those already discours'd of. For the truth is, the account of times before the *Romans* in *Italy*, *Germany*, old *Gallia* or *Britain*, are scarce fit to be discours'd of under any head than that of imposture. Not that I think those Nations had lain in a perpetual sleep, till the *Romans* waked them into some kind of civility but that they had no certain way of conveying down the transactions of their own and former times to the view of posterity. On which account we may justly reject all those pretended successions of Kings here in *Britain* from *Gomer* and *Brute* as fabulous. And it will be the less wonder it shou'd be so in those then accounted barbarous Nations, when even among those who were the Planters of knowledg and civility among others, the account of their ancient times is so dark, confused, and uncertain. As it would sufficiently appear to any that would take the pains to examine the succession of the two first Dynasties among the *Latines*; the first before *Aeneas* his coming into *Italy*; and the second of the *Æneadae* after. And certainly it will be sufficient ground to question the account of times before; if in the third Dynasty, when the succession seems so clear, and so certain an *Epocha* as the building of *Rome*, to deduce their accounts from their Chronology be uncertain, which I shall briefly speak to. For altho' *Porcius Cato* have in *Dionysius* the honour of finding out the first *Palilia* of the City of *Rome* (which was the Feast observed to the honour of the Goddess *Pales* in the time of which, the foundations of *Rome* were laid) yet there appears no great certainty in his undertaking; for therein he was after contradicted by the learned *Roman*, *Varro*. *Dionysius* tells us that *Cato* found by the *Censors* Tables the exact time from the expulsion of the Kings, to the time of the City's being taken by the *Gaules*; from which time to his own, he could not miss of it from the *Fasti Consulares*; so that it cannot be denied but that *Cato* might have a certain account of times from the *Regifugium* to the time he writ his *Origines*. But what certainty *Cato* could have from the first *Palilia* of the City to the expulsion of *Tarquin*, we cannot understand. For the succession of Kings must needs be very uncertain, unless it be demonstrated from some public monuments, or certain records, or some public actions certainly known to have fallen out precisely in such a year of their several Reigns. Now none of these do occur in the *Roman* History, in all that interval from the *Palilia* to the *Regifugium*; so that not only the whole interval, but the time of every particular King's Reign, are very uncertain. And therefore *Varro* being destitute of any demonstration of that time, had recourse to *L. Tarrutius Firmanus*, to see if by his skill in Astronomy he could certainly find out the first *Palilia* of *Rome*: His answer was, that he found that the City was built in the time of an Eclipse of the Sun, which was in the third year of the sixth *Olympiad*; according to which account *Varro* proceeded, and thence arose the difference between the *Palilia Catoniana* and *Varroniana*; the latter falling out in the 23^d of *Iphitus*, the other in the 24th. But if we believe *Joseph Scaliger*, there could not be an Eclipse of the Sun, at the time affirmed by *Tarrutius*: But yet granting an Eclipse of the Sun then, what certainty can we have of the succession of the several Kings afterwards, without

Scaliger de
Emend.
Temp. l. 5.
p. 388.

without which there can be no certain computation *ab Urbe condita*? If then the *Romans*, who had so great advantage of knowing times, and were withal so inquisitive concerning the building of their city (which was a thing of no very remote distance) could attain to no absolute certainty about it, what certainty can we expect as to an account of far ancients times, either from them or others, when they had no Censors Tables, nor *Fasti Consulares* to be guided by? And thus much may serve to shew the great uncertainty of heathen Chronology, as to the giving an account of ancient times.

And yet were it only an uncertainty as to Chronology, we might better bear with it; for the mistake merely in computation of times were not so dangerous (any further than the credibility of the History depends on the computation, as in point of antiquity) if we were but certain that the persons and actions related of them were such as they are reported to be. But that which adds much to the confusion and uncertainty of heathen History, is, the frequency of impostures, which are more hard to be discovered, in that there are no authentic Histories of those times extant, which hath both given occasion to variety of impostures, and much hindered their discovery. For the curiosity of men leading them back into a search after ancient times, it makes them exceeding credulous in embracing whatever pretends to give them any conduct thro' those dark and obscure paths of ancient History. And the world hath never been wanting of such as would be ready to abuse the simple credulity of well-meaning, but less wary men; but those ages have been most *feracious* in the production of such persons, which have pretended to more learning than they had. The pretense of Learning made such persons appear, and the want of it made them not be discovered. Thus it was not only of old among the *Chaldean* and *Egyptian* Priests, and the *Grecian* Poets and Historians, of whom we have spoken already; but even among those who might have learned more truth from the Religion they professed, than to think it stood in need of their lyes. For there can be no greater disparagement offered to truth, than to defend it with any thing but it self, nothing laying truth so open to suspicion, as when falshood comes to be its advocate. And a false testimony discovered, doth more prejudice to a good cause, than it could any ways advantage it, were it not discovered. And therefore their labours have been as serviceable to the world who have discovered Impostures, as those who have directly maintained truth against its open opposers; those being so much more dangerous, in that they appear in the disguise of truth, and therefore are with more difficulty discovered. Such a one was that *Ignis fatuus* that appeared in a kind of twilight in the *Christian* world between the former darkness of Barbarism, and the approaching light of knowledg; I mean *Annius Viterbiensis*, who like *Hannibal* in passing the *Alps*, not finding a way ready to his mind, sets himself to burning the woods, and firing the rocks, and dissolving them with vinegar to make a passage thro' them: So *Annius* being beset in those snowy and gray headed *Alps* of ancient History, and finding no way clear for him according to his fancy, he labours to burn down all certain Records, to eat thro' the

I

credit

credit of undoubted Authors, to make a more free passage for his own History, which he deduceth suitably to Scripture for the concurrent testimony of the eldest Historians. To which purpose, a new *Berosus*, *Manetho*, *Philo*, *Metasthenes* (as he mistook for *Megasthenes*) and *Xenophon* must put on a grave disguise, and walk abroad the world with a mantle of Antiquity about their shoulders, altho' they wear nothing else but airy Phantasms, covered over with the Cowl of the Monk of *Viterbo*. For being himself somewhat more versed in the History of those elder times than generally persons were in the age he lived in, he made that unhappy use of his skill, to play the Mountebank with his Learning; and to abuse the credulity of those who have better stomachs than palates, and sooner swallow down the compositions that are given them, than find out the ingredients of them. Thus *Annius* puts a good face on his New-old Authors, bids them be bold and confident, and they would fare the better. And the truth is, they tell their story so punctually in all circumstances, in those things which had no certain conveyance to posterity, that that were sufficient ground to any intelligent person to question their authority. But lest his Authors should at any time want an Interpreter to make out their full meaning, he sets himself a large Commentary upon them, and certainly he was the fittest person in the world to do it; for, *cujus est condere, ejus est interpretari*; none so fit to explain *Annius*, as *Annius* himself. The whole story of this imposture, how he made the Inscriptions himself, and hid them underground, how they were digged thence and brought to *Annius*; how *Annius* caused them to be sent to the Magistrates, and after-published them in the equipage they are in, is at large related by that learned Bishop * *Antonius Augustinus*, from *Latinus Latinus*.

* Anton.
August.
Dialog. II.
VI.

From a like quarry to this, came out those other famous Inscriptions, walking under the specious title of *Antiquitatum Etruscarum fragmenta*, wherein, besides many palpable incongruities to the customs of those eldest times, discovered partly by *Leo Allatius* in his Discourse concerning them, there are so many particular stories and circumstances related concerning *Noah's* being in *Italy*, and other things so far beyond probability of Reason, that it is a wonder there are yet any persons pretending to Learning, who should build their discourses upon such rotten and sandy foundations as these Inscriptions are. But tho' *Ixion* might, *Jupiter* would never have been deceived with a Cloud instead of *Juno*; so, tho' persons unacquainted with the lineaments of Truth, may be easily imposed on with appearances instead of her: yet such persons who have sagacity enough to discern the air of her countenance from the paint of forgeries, will never suffer themselves to be over-reached by such vain pretenders. But these Impostors are like the Astrologers at *Rome*, ever banished, and yet ever there; and so these are ever exploded by all lovers of truth, yet always find some to applaud and entertain them. Altho' it be more difficult to do so now in the present light of Knowledge, and all advantages for Learning, than it was in those elder times, when the heathen Priests pretended to the Monopoly of Learning among themselves, and made it one of their great designs to keep all others in dependance on themselves, thereby to keep up their veneration the

the better among the people. And therefore all the Records they had of Learning or History, were carefully lockt up, and preserved among the Priests; and least at any time others might get a view of them, they were sure to preserve them in a peculiar Character distinct from that in civil and common use. By which means the heathen Priests had all imaginable opportunities and conveniences for deceiving the silly people, and thereby keeping them in an obsequious ignorance, which is never the Mother of any true Devotion, but of the greatest Superstition.

It is well known of the *Egyptian* Priests; that the sacred Characters of their Temples were seldom made known to any but such as were of their own number and family, (the Priesthood being there hereditary) or such others as by long converse had insinuated themselves into their society, as some of the *Greek Philosophers* and *Historians* had done. And yet we have some reason to think they were not over-free and communicative to some of them, by the slender account they give of several things, which are supposed to be well known among the *Egyptians*. That the *Phœnician* Priests had their peculiar and sacred Characters too, is evident from the words of *Philo Byblius* concerning *Santhoniathon*, if we take *Bochartus* his Exposition of them: He tells us that his History was compared, *ἐκ τῶν τῶν ἀδελφῶν ὑποθέσεων, δαμνέσθαι Ἀμμωνίαν ὑποθέσεων* *Enseb. præf. Evang. l. 1. c. 10.* with the Inscriptions in the Temples written in the *Ammonian* letters, which are known to few: *Litera Ammoneorum* (saith *Bochartus*) *sunt litera Templorum, litera in sacris exceptæ.* For *𐤍𐤏* is the Sun, thence *𐤍𐤏𐤋* the Temple of the Sun, whom the *Phœnicians* worship'd as their principal Deity, under the name of *Beel-samen*, the Lord of Heaven. The same Author tells us out out of *Diogenes Laertius*, of a Book of *Democritus*, *ἐκ τῶν ἐκ Βαβυλωνίων ἱερῶν χαρακτῶν* by which it is evident that the *Babylonian* Priests had their sacred Characters too: And of a Testimony of *Theodoret* of all the *Grecian* Temples, *ἐν τοῖς ἑλληνικοῖς ἱεροῖς ἔστιν ἡμεῖς χαρακτῆρες χαρακτῶν, ὡς ἰσχυρῶς ἀποδείκνυται.* *Quæst. in Gen. 1.* That they had some peculiar Characters which were called sacred. But that learned Author thinks there is no necessity of understanding it peculiarly of the *Grecians*, because the *Greek Fathers* called all Heathens by the name of *Greeks*: but if so, the testimony is the larger, and amounts to an universal testimony of the heathen Temples.

Neither was this only peculiar to them, if we believe some persons of greater Learning than Judgment, who attribute this distinction of sacred and vulgar Characters to the *Jews* as well as others, but without any probability of reason. For these learned men being strongly possessed with the opinion of the modern *Jews* concerning the antiquity of the present *Hebrew* Characters, and finding themselves pressed not only with the testimony of some ancient *Rabbins*, but with the stronger evidence of the ancient *shekels* about *Solomon's* time, inscribed with the *Samaritan* letters, have at last found this Evasion, that the *Samaritan* letters were in vulgar use; but the present Characters were then sacred, and not made common till after the time of the Captivity. But this seems to be a meer shift, found out by some modern *Jews*, and greedily embraced by their followers, because thereby they are in hopes to

VII.

Diod. l. 3.

Enseb. præf. Evang. l. 1. c. 10.

Bochart. Geogr. sac. p. 2. l. 2. c. 17.

Quæst. in Gen. 1.

VIII.

Exod. 13.
16.
Deut. 6. 8.

evade the strength of the contrary arguments, which otherwise they can find no probable solution of. And a meer shift it will appear to be, to any one that considers on how little ground of reason it stands: For none of those reasons which held for such a distinction of Characters among the Heathens, can have any place among the *Jews*. For it was never any part of God's design to have the Law kept from the peoples view. Truth is never so fearful of being seen abroad; it is only falshood that walks under disguises, and must have its hiding-places to retreat to: Nay, God expressly commanded it as a duty of all the *Jews*, to search and study his Law, which they could not do, if it were locked up from them in an unknown Character. Did not God himself promulge it among the people of *Israel* by the ministry of *Moses*? Did he not command it to be *as frontlets between their eyes, and signs upon their hands*: not that *Phylacteries* should be made of the Law to wear, as the *Pharisees* interpreted it, and others from them have mistaken; but that they should have the Law in continual remembrance, as if it were always between their eyes, and ingraven upon their hands. Again, if we suppose the Law to be among the people, but in the vulgar character, I would fain know, what sanctity, majesty, and authority there was in that character more than in the words and matter? and if there were, how comes the vulgar use of it to be no where forbidden? and how durst *Ezra*, as is supposed, after the Captivity, profane so sacred a thing by exposing it to common use? But granting them yet further, that it was lawful, but not useful, to make use of that sacred Character; I demand then, how comes that disuse to continue so punctually till the time of *Ezra*, and that it should never be divulged before? when there was so great reason to make it common, since the square letters are less operose, more expedite and facile, than the *Samaritan*, which is, when time serves, used as a plea for their great antiquity. But yielding yet more, that the sacred Character was only used for the authentic copy of the Law, which was to decide all differences of other copies (which some run to as their last shift) I appeal to any man's reason, whether this be not the most improbable of all? For how could such a copy be the Judge of all others, which could not be read or understood by those who appealed to it? Or was the knowledg and reading of this Character peculiar to the High Priest, and conveyed down as a *Cabala* from one to another? but how many ineongruities would follow hence; in case one High Priest should die before his Son was capable of understanding the Letters, and so that sacred Treasure must needs be lost; or had they it all by inspiration, and understood the sacred Character by *Urim* and *Thummim*? Thus every way, this opinion among the *Jews* is pressed with inconveniences, but it was most suitable to the heathen Priests to maintain a *Meum* and *Tuum* between their own Character and the vulgar. For hereby they prohibited all prying into their mysteries by any, but those who had the same interest with themselves, and therefore were unlikely to discover any thing that might lessen their reputation. Whereas, had there been nothing but truth in their Records, or that truth had been for their interest,

interest, what need had there been of so great reservedness and privacy? but when the discovery of truth would undeceive the world, it was their interest to lock it up, and to give out such things to the vulgar, which might advance themselves and please them; which artifices of theirs give no small ground to question the credibility of their Histories.

Especially if we add what we promised in the last place, to shew the want of credibility in the report of ancient times among them, which was not only defectiveness, and uncertainty, but apparent partiality to themselves, and inconsistency with each other. How evident is it in all these Nations we have spoken to, how much they strive to enhance the reputation of their own Nation, and to that end blend the History of other Nations with their own, to make theirs seem the greater? How much do the *Ægyptians* tell us of the excellency of their ancient Laws and Government? and yet how evident is it, from their own Histories, that no such Laws were observed by their Kings as they speak of? Can we think that such Kings as *Chemmis* and the rest of them, who built those vast structures of the Pyramids, and employed Myriads of men for so many years for the doing of them, would be content to be so dieted by their Laws, as *Hecataeus* and *Diodorus* tell us they were to be? Nay it seems to be very suspicious, that the great enterprizes of their famous *Sesoosis* are merely fabulous; and some think, an attributing to themselves, what was done by the *Assyrian* Emperor in his time. By which we may guess, what to think of the great conquests of *Osiris* and *Isis*, and their subduing almost the whole world to them. And it is most evident how partial the *Ægyptians* are in dissembling their greatest losses; as is clear in the story of the conquest of *Pharao Necho* by *Nebuchadnezzar*, Jer. 46. 12. of which there is not the least mention in *Herodotus* or *Diodorus*. But on the contrary, *Herodotus* tells us this *Necos*, as he calls him, conquered the *Syrians* at *Magdalos*; and the story of *Vaphres* and *Amasis* in him seems to be only a disguise of *Nebuchadnezzar's* conquest; only lest men should think them conquered by a Foreigner, they make *Amasis* to be an *Ægyptian Plebeian*. Again, what a vast number of Cities doth *Diodorus* tell us of, that were in *Ægypt* in their eldest times? no less than 18000, when yet himself confesseth in the time of *Ptolemaeus Lagi*, there were reckoned but somewhat above 3000 Cities, and then *Ægypt* was the most populous that ever it had been. How probable doth this sound, that in those eldest times such vast multitudes of Cities should be erected? But the truth is, it is not unsuitable to their opinion of the production of the first men; which were caused, they say, by the heat of the Sun, and the mud of *Nilus*; and it is certain then they might be the most populous Nation in the world: for there could be no defect as to either efficient or material cause, there being mud enough to produce Myriads, and the Sun hot enough to impregnate it. The partiality of other Nations hath been already discoursed of in our passage; and so likewise hath their mutual repugnancy to, and inconsistency with, each other: Which yet might be more fully manifested from the contradictions in reference to the *Ægyptian* History

IX.

*Herodot. lib. 2.**Diodor. l. i.*

story between *Manetho*, *Herodotus*, *Diodorus*, *Dicæarchus*, *Erastosthenes*, and all who have spoken of it: as to the *Assyrian* Empire between *Herodotus*, *Diodorus*, and *Julius Africanus*: as to the *Persian* Empire between *Herodotus* and *Ctesias*, and those in no inconsiderable things, as is evident in *Photius* his *Excerpta* out of him. Among the *Grecians* we have already discover'd it as to their History and Geography; and if we should enter into their *Theology*, and the History of that, we should find their other differences inconsiderable, if compared with these. Of which we may partly make a conjecture by the incredible spite that is born by the gravest *Greek* Authors, as *Strabo*, *Plutarch*, and others, towards *Euhemerus Siculus*, for offering to deliver the history of *Jupiter*, which he saith, he transcribed from the *Golden Pillar in the Temple of Jupiter Triphyllius in Panchotis*.

But I suppose enough hath been discovered already, to prove that there is no credibility in any of those *Heathen Histories*, which pretend to give an account of ancient times; there being in all of them so much defect and insufficiency, so great uncertainty and confusion, so much partiality and inconsistency with each other. It remains now that I proceed to demonstrate the credibility of that account of ancient times, which is reported in the *Sacred Scriptures*, which will be the second part of our Task.

ORIGINES

ORIGINES SACRÆ:

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

The certainty of the Writings of Moses.

In order to the proving the truth of Scripture-history, several Hypotheses laid down. I. The first concerns the reasonableness of preserving the ancient History of the World in some certain Records, from the importance of the things, II. and the inconveniences of meer Tradition or constant Revelation. III. The second concerns the certainty that the Records under Moses his name, were undoubtedly his. The certainty of a matter of fact enquired into in general, and proved as to this particular IV. by universal Consent, V. and settling a Common-wealth upon his Laws. VI, VII. The impossibility of an Impostor as to the Writings of Moses demonstrated. The pleas to the contrary largely answered.

HA V I N G sufficiently demonstrated the want of credibility in the account of the ancient times, given by those Nations who have made the greatest pretence to Learning and Antiquity in the World, we now proceed to evince the credibility and certainty of that account which is given us in Sacred Scriptures: In order to which I shall premise these following Hypotheses.

First, It stands to the greatest reason, that an account of things so concerning and remarkable, shou'd not be always left to the uncertainty of an oral Tradition; but shou'd be timely entred into certain Records, to be preserv'd to the memory of posterity. For it being of concernment to the World, in order to the Establishment of Belief, as to future things, to be settled in the Belief, that all things past were manag'd by Divine Providence; there must be certain Records of former Ages, or else the mind of Man will be perpetually hovering in the greatest uncertainties: Especially where there is such a mutual dependance and concatenation of one thing with another, as there is in all the Scripture-history. For take away but any one of the main Foundations of the Mosaical History, all the Superstructure will be exceedingly weakned, if it doth not fall quite to the ground. For Man's obligation to Obedience unto God, doth necessarily suppose his Original to be from him; his hearkning to any proposals of favor from God, doth suppose his Apostasy and Fall; God's designing to shew mercy and

L

Hypoth. 1.

and favor to fallen Man, doth suppose that there must be some way whereby the Great Creator must reveal himself as to the Conditions on which fallen Man may expect a recovery; the revealing of these Conditions in such a way whereon a suspicious (because guilty) Creature may firmly rely, doth suppose so certain a recording of them, as may be least liable to any suspicion of imposture or deceit. For altho' nothing else be in it self necessary from God to Man, in order to his Salvation, but the bare revealing in a certain way the Terms on which he must expect it; yet considering the unbounded Nature of Divine Goodness, respecting not only the good of some particular Persons, but of the whole Society of Mankind, it stands to the greatest reason that such a Revelation shou'd be so propounded, as might be with equal certainty convey'd to the community of Mankind. Which cou'd not with any such evidence of credibility be done by private and particular Revelations (which give satisfaction only to the inward Senses of the partakers of them) as by a public recording of the matters of Divine Revelation by such a Person who is enabled to give the World all reasonable satisfaction, that what he did was not of any private design of his own head; but that he was deputed to it by no less than Divine Authority. And therefore it stands to the highest reason, that where Divine Revelation is necessary for the certain requiring of Assent, the matter to be believ'd shou'd have a certain uniform conveyance to Mens minds, rather than that perpetually new Revelations shou'd be requir'd for the making known of those things; which being once recorded, are not liable to so many impostures, as the other way might have been under pretended Revelations. For then Men are not put to a continual Trial of every Person pretending Divine Revelation, as to the evidences which he brings of Divine Authority, but the great matters of concernment being already recorded and attested by all rational evidence as to the truth of the things, their minds therein rest satisfy'd without being under a continual hesitancy, lest the Revelation of one shou'd contradict another.

- II. For supposing that God had left the matters of Divine Revelation unrecorded at all, but left them to be discover'd in every Age by a Spirit of Prophecy, by such a multitude as might be sufficient to inform the World of the truth of the things; we cannot but conceive that an innumerable company of croaking *Enthusiasts* wou'd be continually pretending Commissions from Heaven, by which the minds of Men wou'd be left in continual distraction, because they wou'd have no certain infallible Rules given them, whereby to difference the good and evil Spirit from each other. But now supposing God to inspire some particular Persons, not only to reveal, but to record Divine Truths, then whatever evidences can be brought attesting a Divine Revelation in them, will likewise prove the undoubted certainty and infallibility of those writings, it being impossible that Persons employ'd by a God of truth, shou'd make it their design to impose upon the World, which gives us a rational account, why the wise God did not suffer the History of the World to lie still unrecorded, but made choice of such a Person to record it, who gave abundant evidence to the World that he acted no private design, but was peculiarly employ'd

employ'd by God himself for the doing of it, as will appear afterwards. Besides, we find by our former Discourse, how liable the most certain Tradition is to be corrupted in progress of time, where there are no standing Records, tho' it were at first deliver'd by Persons of undoubted credit. For we have no reason to doubt, but that the Tradition of the old World, the Flood and the consequences of it, with the nature and worship of the true God, were at first spread over the greatest part of the World in its first Plantations; yet we see how soon for want of certain conveyance, all the ancient Tradition was corrupted and abus'd into the greatest Idolatry. Which might be less wonder'd at, had it been only in those parts which were furthest remote from the seat of those grand Transactions; but thus we find it was even among those Families who had the nearest residence to the place of them, and among those Persons who were not far off in a lineal descent from the Persons mainly concern'd in them; as is most evident in the Family out of which *Abraham* came (who was himself the tenth from *Noah*) yet of them it is said, *That they served other Gods.* Josh. 24. 2. How unlikely then was it, that this Tradition shou'd be afterwards preserv'd entire, when the People God had peculiarly chosen to himself, were so mix'd among the *Egyptians*, and so prone to the Idolatries of the Nations round about them, and that even after God had given them a written Law attested with the greatest Miracles? What wou'd they have done then, had they never been brought forth out of *Egypt* by such Signs and Wonders, and had no certain Records left to preserve the memory of former Ages? Thus we see how much it stands to the greatest reason, that so memorable things shou'd be digested into Sacred Records.

Secondly, *We have as great certainty that Moses was the Author* Hypoth. 2. *of the Records going under his name, as we can have of any matter of fact done at so great a distance of time from us.* We are to consider that there are two very distinct Questions to be thought of, concerning a Divine Revelation to any Person at a considerable distance of time from us; and those are what evidences can be given that the matters recorded are of a true Divine Revelation; and what evidence we have of the truth of the matter of fact, that such things were recorded by such Persons. They who do not carefully distinguish between these two Questions, will soon run themselves into an inextricable Labyrinth, when they either seek to understand themselves, or explain to others the grounds on which they believe the Scriptures to be the Word of God. The first step in order to which, must be the proving the undoubted certainty of the matter of fact, or the truth of the History, that such Persons were really existent, and did either do or record the things we speak of: After this succeeds the other, to prove not only the real existence of the things, but that the Persons who recorded the things, were assisted by an Infallible Spirit; then there can be no reason at all to doubt, but those Records are the Word of God. The first of these, is, that which at present we enquire after, the certainty of the matter of fact, that the Records under the name of *Moses* were undoubtedly his. And here it will be most unreasonable for any to seek for further evidence and demonstra-

K

tion

tion of it, than the matter to be prov'd is capable of. But if they shou'd, I suppose we have sufficient reason to demonstrate the folly of such a demand, and that on these accounts.

1. Whoever yet undertook to bring matters of fact into Mathematical demonstrations, or thought he had ground to question the certainty of any thing that was not prov'd in a Mathematical way to him? who wou'd ever undertake that *Archimedes* was kill'd at *Syracuse*, by any of the Demonstrations he was then about? or that *Euclide* was the undoubted Author of the *Geometry* under his name? or do Men question these things for want of such Demonstrations? Yet this is all we at present desire, only the same liberty here which is us'd in any thing of a like nature.

2. I demand of the Person who denies this Moral certainty to be sufficient for an assent, whether he doth question every thing in the World, which he was not present at the doing of himself? If he be peremptorily resolv'd to believe nothing but what he sees, he is fit for nothing but a Voyage to *Anticyra*, or to be soundly purg'd with *Hellebore*, to free him from those cloudy humors that make him suspect the whole World to be an imposture. But we cannot suppose any Man so destitute of Reason, as to question the truth of every matter of fact which he doth not see himself; if he doth then firmly believe any thing, there must be suppos'd sufficient grounds to induce him to such a belief. And then what ground can there be to question the certainty of such things, which have as great evidence as any of those things have, which he most firmly believes? and this is all we desire from him.

3. Do we not see that the most concerning and weighty actions of Mens lives, are built on no other foundation than this Moral certainty? yet Men do not in the least question the truth of the thing they rely upon: As is most evident in all Titles to Estates deriv'd from Ancestors, either by Donation, or Purchase: In all Trading, which go's upon the Moral certainty, that there are such places as the *Indies*, or *France* or *Spain*, &c. In all Journeyings, that there is such a place, as that I am going to, and this is the way thither; for these we have but this Moral certainty; for the contrary to both these are possible, and the affirmatives are indemonstrable. In eating and drinking there is a possibility of being poisoned by every bit of meat, or drop of drink; do we therefore continually doubt, whether we shall be so or no? Chiefly this is seen in all natural affection and piety in Children towards Parents, which undoubtedly suppose the truth of that, which it was impossible they cou'd be witnesses of themselves, their coming out of their Mothers wombs. And doth any one think this sufficient ground to question his Mother, because the contrary is impossible to be demonstrated to him? In short, then, either we must destroy all Historical Faith out of the World, and believe nothing (tho' never so much attested) but what we see our selves, or else we must acknowledg, that a Moral certainty is a sufficient foundation for an undoubted assent, not such a one *cui non potest subesse falsum*, but such a one *cui non subest dubium*, i. e. an Assent undoubted, tho' not infallible. By which we see what little reason the *Atheist* on one side can have to question the truth of the Scriptures, as to the History of it; and what little ground the *Papists* on

on the other side have to make a pretense of the necessity of Infallibility, as to the proposal of such things where Moral certainty is sufficient, that is, to the matter of fact.

Which I now come to prove, as to the subject in hand; viz. IV.
That the Writings of *Moses* are undoubtedly his. Which I prove by a two-fold Argument: 1. *An universal consent of Persons, who were best able to know the truth of the things in question.* 2. *The setting of a Commonwealth upon the Laws deliver'd by Moses.* 1. The universal consent of Persons most capable of judging in the case in hand. I know nothing the most scrupulous and inquisitive mind can possibly desire in order to satisfaction, concerning any matter of fact, beyond an Universal Consent of such Persons who have a greater capacity of knowing the truth of it than we can have: And those are all such Persons who have liv'd nearest those times when the things were done, and have best understood the Affairs of the times, when the things were pretended to be done. Can we possibly conceive, that among the People of the *Jews*, who were so exceedingly prone to transgress the Law of *Moses*, and to fall into Idolatry, but if there had been any the least suspicion of any falsity or imposture in the Writings of *Moses*, the ring-leaders of their revolts wou'd have sufficiently promulg'd it among them, as the most plausible plea to draw them off from the worship of the true God? Can we think that a Nation and Religion so maligned as the *Jewish* were, cou'd have escaped discovery, if there had been any deceit in it, when so many lay in wait continually to expose them to all contumelies imaginable? Nay, among themselves in their frequent Apostasies, and occasions given for such a pretense, how comes this to be never heard of, nor in the least questioned, whether the Law was undoubtedly of *Moses* his writing or no? What an excellent plea wou'd this have been for *Jeroboam's* Calves in *Dan* and *Bethel*: for the *Samaritans* Temple on Mount *Gerizim*, cou'd any the least suspicion have been rais'd among them, concerning the authenticity of the fundamental Records of the *Jewish* Commonwealth? And which is most observable, the *Jews* who were a people strangely suspicious and incredulous, while they were fed and cloathed by Miracles, yet cou'd never find ground to question this. Nay, and *Moses* himself, we plainly see, was hugely envied by many of the *Israelites* even in the Wilderness, as is evident in the conspiracy of *Corah* and his complices, and that on this very ground, That he took too much upon him; how unlikely then is it, that amidst so many enemies he shou'd dare to venture any thing into public Records, which was not most undoubtedly true; or undertake to prescribe a Law to oblige the People to posterity? Or that after his own Age any thing shou'd come out under his name, which wou'd not be presently detected by the Emulators of his glory? What then, is the thing it self incredible? surely not, that *Moses* shou'd write the Records we speak of. Were not they able to understand the truth of it? What? not those, who were in the same Age, and convey'd it down by a certain Tradition to posterity? Or did not the *Israelites* all constantly believe it? What? not they, who wou'd sooner part with their Lives and Fortunes, than admit any variation or alteration as to their Law?

K 2

Well,

v. Well, but if we shou'd suppose the whole *Jewish* Nation partial to themselves, and that out of honor to the memory of so great a Person as *Moses*, they shou'd attribute their ancient Laws and Records to him: Which is all that Infidelity it self can imagine in this case; yet this cannot be with any shadow of Reason pretended. For,

1. Who were those Persons, who did give out this Law to the *Jews* under *Moses* his name? Certainly they, who undertake to contradict that which is receiv'd by common consent, must bring stronger and clearer Evidence, than that on which that consent is grounded; or else their Exceptions deserve to be rejected with the highest indignation. What Proof can be then brought, that not only the *Jewish* Nation, but the whole Christian World hath been so lamentably befooled to believe those things with an undoubted assent, which are only the contrivances of some cunning Men?

2. At what time cou'd these things be contriv'd? Either while the memory of *Moses* and his actions were remaining, or afterwards. First, How cou'd it possibly be, when his memory was remaining? for then all things were so fresh in their memories, that it was impossible a thing of this universal nature cou'd be forged of him. If after, then I demand, whether the People had observ'd the Law of *Moses* before or no? if not, then they must certainly know it at the time of its promulgation to be counterfeit; for had it been from *Moses*, it wou'd have been observ'd before their times; if it was observ'd before, then either continually down from the time of *Moses*, or not? If continually down, then it was of *Moses* his doing, if we suppose him to have had that Authority among the People, which the Objection supposeth; if not, then still the nearer *Moses* his time, the more difficult such a counterfeiting cou'd be; because the Constitutions which *Moses* had left among them, wou'd have remain'd in their memories, whereby they wou'd easily reject all pretenses and counterfeits.

3. How can we conceive the Nation of the *Jews* wou'd have ever embraced such a Law, had it not been of *Moses* his enacting among them in that state of time when he did? For then the People were in fittest capacity to receive a Law, being grown a great People, and therefore necessary to have Laws; newly delivered from bondage, and therefore wanting Laws of their own; and entring into a settled state of Commonwealth, which was the most proper season of giving Laws.

vi. These considerations make it so clear, that it is almost impossible to conceive the Nation of the *Jews* cou'd have their Laws given to them but at the time of their being in the Wilderness, before they were settled in *Canaan*. For suppose we at present, to gratify so far the Objection, that these Laws were brought forth long after the constitution of the Government and the National settlement, under *Moses* his name; how improbable, nay how impossible is it to alter the fundamental Laws of a Nation after long settlement? what confusion of interests doth this bring? what disturbance among all sorts of People, who must be disseis'd of their rights, and brought to such strange unwonted customs, so seemingly against their interests, as many of the Constitutions among the *Jews* were? For can we imagine, that a People always devoted to their own interest,

terest, wou'd after it had been quietly settled in their Land, by Constitutions after the custom of other Nations, presently under a pretense of a copy of Laws found (that were pretended to be given by one in former Ages of great esteem, call'd *Moses*) throw open all their former inclosures, and part with their former Laws, for these of which they have no evidence, but the words of those that told it them? We have a clear instance for this among the *Romans*; altho' there were great evidence given of the undoubted certainty, that the Books found in *Numa's* grave by *Petilius* were his, yet because they were adjudg'd by the Senate to be against the present Laws, they were without further enquiry adjudg'd to be burnt. Was not here the greatest likelihood that might be, that these shou'd have taken place among the *Romans*, for the great veneration for wisdom which *Numa* was in among them, and the great evidence that these were certain remainders of his, wherein he gave a true account of the superstitions in use among them? yet lest the state shou'd be unsettled by it, they were prohibited so much as a public view, when the *Prætor* had sworn they were against the established Laws. Can we then conceive the *Jewish* Nation wou'd have embraced so burdensom and ceremonious a Law as *Moses's* was, had it been brought among them in such a way as the Books of *Numa*, tho' with all imaginable evidence, that it was undoubtedly his, especially when they were engag'd to the observation of some Laws or Customs already, by which their Commonwealth had been establish'd? And withal these Laws of *Moses* seeming so much against the interest and good husbandry of a Nation, as all the neighbour Nations thought, who for that accused them to be an idle and slothful People, as they judg'd by their resting wholly one Day in seven, the great and many solemn Feasts they had, the repairing of all the Males to *Jerusalem* thrice a Year; the Sabbatical Years, Years of *Jubilee*, &c. These things were apparently against the interest of such a Nation, whose great subsistence was upon pasturage and agriculture. So that it is evident these Laws respected not the outward interest of the Nation, and so cou'd not be the contrivance of any Politicians among them, but did immediately aim at the honor of the God whom they serv'd, for whom they were to part even with their civil interests: The doing of which by a People generally taken notice of for a particular love of their own concerns, is an impregnable argument these Laws cou'd not take place among them, had they not been given by *Moses* at the time of their unsettlement, and that their future settlement did depend upon their present observation of them; which is an evidence too that they cou'd be of no less than Divine original: Which was more than I was to prove at present.

Were not these Writings undoubtedly *Moses's*; whence shou'd the neighbour Nations about the *Jews*, notwithstanding the hatred of the *Jewish* Religion, retain so venerable an opinion of the wisdom of *Moses*? The *Egyptians* accounted him one of their *Priests* (which notes the esteem they had of his learning) as appears by the testimonies produced out of *Chærenon* and *Manetho* by *Josephus*. *Diodorus Siculus* speaks of him with great respect among the famous Legislators, and so doth *Strabo*, who speaks

VII.

Joseph. C.
App. l. 1.
Diod. l. 1.
Strabo Geograph. 16.

K 3

in

Longin. de
sublim.

V. Voss. de
Idol. l. 2.
c. 45.

V. Grot. de
Ver. Relig.
Chr. l. 2.

in commendation of the Religion establish'd by him. The testimony of *Longinus* is sufficiently known, that *Moses was no man of any vulgar wit* (ὅτι ἡ τοιοῦτο ἀνὴρ) *Chalcidius* calls him *sapientissimus Moses* (altho' I must not dissemble that *Chalcidius* hath been, I think, undeservedly reckoned among heathen Writers, tho' he comments on *Plato's Timæus*, it being most probable that he was a Christian Platonist, which might more probably make *Vaninus* call him *circumforaneum blateronem*) but tho' we exempt *Chalcidius* out of the number of those Heathens, who have born testimony to the wisdom of *Moses*, yet there are number enough besides him produced by *Justin Martyr*, *Cyril*, and others, whose evidence is clear and full to make us undoubtedly believe, that there cou'd never have been so universal and uninterrupted a Tradition concerning the Writings and Laws of *Moses*, had they not been certainly his, and convey'd down in a continual succession from his time to our present age. Which will be yet more clear, if we consider in the second place, That the National Constitution and settlement of the *Jews*, did depend on the truth of the Laws and Writings of *Moses*. Can we have more undoubted evidence, that there were such Persons as *Solon*, *Lycurgus*, and *Numa*, and that the Laws bearing their names were theirs, than the History of the several Commonwealths of *Athens*, *Sparta*, and *Rome*, who were governed by those Laws? When Writings are not of general concernment, they may be more easily counterfeited; but when they concern the Right, Privileges, and Government of a Nation, there will be enough whose interest will lead them to prevent impostures. It is no easy matter to forge a *Magna Charta*, and to invent Laws; Men's caution and prudence is never so quicksighted as in matters which concern their Estates and Freeholds. The general interest of Men lies contrary to such impostures, and therefore they will prevent their obtaining among them. Now the Laws of *Moses* are incorporated into the very Republic of the *Jews*, and their subsistence and Government depends upon them; their Religion and Laws are so interwoven one with the other, that one cannot be broken off from the other. Their Right to their temporal possessions in the land of *Canaan* depends on their owning the Sovereignty of God who gave them to them; and on the truth of the History recorded by *Moses* concerning the Promises made to the Patriarchs. So that on that account it was impossible those Laws shou'd be counterfeit on which the welfare of a Nation depended; and according to which they were governed ever since they were a Nation. So that I shall now take it to be sufficiently proved, that the Writings under the name of *Moses* were undoubtedly his; for none, who acknowledg the Laws to have been his, can have the face to deny the History, there being so necessary a connexion between them; and the Book of *Genesis* being nothing else but a general and very necessary introduction to that which follows. I deny not but the History of *Moses* might, according to the Tradition of the *Jews*, and the Belief of others, be revised by *Ezra*, or the Men of the great Synagogue after the *Jew's* return from Captivity, as appears by the names of Places, and other passages not suitable to the time of *Moses*; but I utterly deny that the *Pentateuch* was not of *Moses* his penning, or that it

was

was only a Collection out of the Diaries and Annals of the Nation: For throughout the Scripture the very historical passages are attributed to *Moses*, and in all probability the *Samaritan Pentateuch* bears date before the Captivity; by which it still appears that those Books are truly the Books of *Moses*.

CHAP. II.

Moses his certain knowledg of what he writ.

I. *The third Hypothesis concerns the certainty of the matter of Moses his History, that gradually proved: First, Moses his knowledg cleared, by his education, and experience, and certain information. II. His education in the wisdom of Ægypt; what that was. III. The old Ægyptian learning enquired into; IV. the conveniences for it. V. Of the Ægyptian Priests, Moses reckoned among them for his knowledg. VI. The Mathematical, Natural, Divine, and Moral learning of Ægypt. VII. their Political wisdom most considerable. VIII. The advantage of Moses above the Greek Philosophers, as to wisdom and reason. Moses himself an eye-witneß of most of his history: IX. the certain uninterrupted tradition of the other part among the Jews, manifested by rational evidence.*

HAVING thus far cleared our way, we come to the third Hypothesis, which is, *There are as manifest proofs of the undoubted truth and certainty of the History recorded by Moses, as any can be given concerning any thing which we yield the firmest assent unto.* Here it must be considered, that we proceed in a way of rational evidence to prove the truth of the thing in hand, as to which, if in the judgment of impartial Persons the arguments produced be strong enough to convince an unbiassed mind: It is not material, whether every wrangling *Atheist* will sit down contented with them. For usually Persons of that inclination, rather than judgment, are more resolved against light, than inquisitive after it, and rather seek to stop the chinks at which any light might come in, than open the Windows for the free and cheerful entertainment of it. It will certainly be sufficient to make it appear, that no Man can deny the truth of that part of Scripture which we are now speaking of, without offering manifest violence to his own faculties, and making it appear to the World, that he is one wholly forsaken of his own Reason: which will be satisfactorily done, if we can clear these things: *First*, That it was morally impossible *Moses* shou'd be ignorant of the things he undertook to write of, and so be deceiv'd himself. *Secondly*, That it was utterly impossible he shou'd have any design in deceiving others in reporting it. *Thirdly*, That it is certain from all rational evidence, that

L
Hypoth. 3.

that he hath not deceiv'd the World, but that his History is undoubtedly true. *First*, That it was morally impossible *Moses* shou'd be deceiv'd himself, or be ignorant of the things which he writ of. Two things are requisite to prevent a Man's being deceiv'd himself. *First*, That he be a Person of more than ordinary judgment, Wisdom, and Knowledg. *Secondly*, That he have sufficient information concerning the things he undertakes to write of. If either of these two be wanting, it is possible for a Man of integrity to be deceiv'd; for an honest Heart hath not always an *Urim* and *Thummim* upon it; nor is Fidelity always furnish'd with the acutest intellectuals. The simplicity of the Dove is as liable to be deceiv'd its self, as the subtilty of the Serpent is to deceive others; but where the wisdom of the Serpent is, to prevent being deceiv'd, and the Dove's innocency in not deceiving others, there are all the qualifications can be desir'd in any one who undertakes only to tell the truth. *First* then, that *Moses* was a Person of a great Understanding, and sufficiently qualify'd to put a difference between Truth and Falshood, will appear, *First*, from the ingenuity of his Education, *Secondly*, from the ripeness of his Judgment, and greatness of his Experience when he penned these things.

First, We begin with his Education. And here we require at present no further assent to be given to what is reported concerning *Moses* in Scripture, than what we give to *Plutarch's* Lives, or any other relations concerning the actions of Persons who lived in former Ages. Two things then we find recorded in Scripture concerning *Moses* his Education; *That he was brought up in the Court of Ægypt*, and *that he was skilled in all the learning of the Ægyptians*; and these Two will abundantly prove the ingenuity of his Education, *viz.* That he was a Person both conversant in civil Affairs, and acquainted with the abstruser parts of all the *Ægyptian* Wisdom.

Heb. 11.
25.
Act. 7. 22.

II. And I confess there is nothing to me which doth advance so much the repute of the ancient *Ægyptian* Learning, as that the Spirit of God in Scripture shou'd take so much notice of it, as to set forth a Person (otherwise renowned for greater accomplishments) by his skill in this. For if it be below the wisdom of any ordinary Person, to set forth a Person by that which in its self is no matter of commendation; how much less can we imagine it of that infinite wisdom which inspired *Stephen* in that Apology which he makes for himself against the *Libertines*, who charged him with contempt of *Moses* and the Law? And therefore certainly this was some very observable thing, which was brought in as a singular commendation of *Moses*, by that person whose design was to make it appear how high an esteem he had of him. And hence it appears that Learning is not only in its self a great accomplishment of human nature, but that it ought to be looked upon with veneration, even in those who have excellencies of a higher nature to commend them. If a Pearl retains its excellency when it lies upon a dunghil, it can certainly lose nothing of its lustre by being set in a Crown of gold; if Learning be commendable in an *Ægyptian*, it is no less in *Moses*, where it is enamell'd with more noble perfections, than of it self it can reach unto. All the question is, Whether

Whether the ancient Learning of the *Egyptians* was such as might be suppos'd to improve the Reason and Understanding of Men to such an height, as thereby to make them more capable of putting a difference between Truth and Falshood? Whether it were such an overflowing *Nilus* as wou'd enrich the Understandings of all those who were in a capacity to receive its Streams? The truth is, there want not grounds of suspicion, that the old *Egyptian* Learning was not of that elevation which the present distance of our Age makes us apt to think it was. And a learned Man hath in a set Discourse endeavour'd to shew the great defects that there were in it: Neither can it, I think, be deny'd, but according to the reports we have now concerning it, some parts of their Learning were frivolous, others obscure, a great deal Magical, and the rest short of that improvement, which the accession of the parts and industry of after Ages gave unto it. But yet it is again as evident, that some parts of Learning were invented by the *Egyptians* , others much improved, and that the *Greeks* did at first set up with the stock they borrow'd out of *Egypt* , and that Learning chiefly flourish'd there, when there was (I had almost said) an *Egyptian* darkness of Ignorance overspreading the face of *Greece* as well as other Nations.

*Conring. de
Hermes.
Medic. c.
10, 11, 12.*

Which will appear by these considerations, The great antiquity of their repute for Learning, the great advantages they had for promoting it, and the parts of Learning most in use among them. This tho' it may seem a digression here, will yet tend to promote our design, by shewing thereby how qualify'd and accomplish'd *Moses* was to deliver to the World an History of ancient times. If we believe *Macrobius* , there was no people in the World cou'd vye for Learning with the *Egyptians* , who makes *Egypt* in one place, the Mother of all Arts, and in another, the *Egyptians* , *omnium Philosophiæ disciplinarum parentes* , The fathers of all the Philosophic Sciences, he derives elsewhere the original of all Astronomy from them, *quos constat primos omnium cælum metiri, & scrutari ausos* : tho' it be more probable that the Nativity even of Astronomy it self was first calculated by the *Chaldeans* , from whom it was convey'd to the *Egyptians* . He likewise appropriates all divine knowledg to them, where he saith they were *Soli rerum divinarum conscii* , and after calls *Egypt divinarum omnium disciplinarum compotem* . It is sufficiently notorious what great repute the *Egyptian* Learning hath been in, with some in our latter times, in that our Chymists look upon it as the greatest honor to their profession, that they think they can claim kindred of the old *Egyptian* Learning, and derive the pedigree of their Chymistry from the old *Egyptian Hermes* . But that vain pretense is sufficiently refuted by the fore-mentioned learned Man *Conringius* , in his Tract on this subject, *de Hermetica Medicina* . *Franciscus Patricius* professeth himself so great an admirer of the old *Egyptian* Learning, that he thought it wou'd be no bad exchange, if the *Peripatetic* Philosophy were extruded, and the old *Egyptian* received instead of it. But the World is now grown wiser, than to receive his *Hermes Trismegistus* for the Author of the old *Egyptian* Philosophy, the credit of his Author being for ever blasted, and the doctrine contained in the Books under his

III.

*Macrobius.
Saturni l. 1.
cap. 15. in
Somn. Scip.
lib. 1. c. 19.*

Ibid. c. 21.

*Id. Saturn.
l. 1. c. 14.
l. 7. c. 13.*

L

name,

name, manifested to be a mere *Cento*, a confus'd mixture of the *Christian*, *Platonic*, and *Ægyptian* doctrine together. So that we cou'd hardly maintain the justness of the repute of the ancient *Ægyptian* Learning from any thing now extant of it; but yet we see no reason to question it, especially since it is so honorably spoken of in Sacred Writ, and seems in it to have been made the standard and measure of humane Wisdom. For which we have this observable testimony, that when the Wisdom of *Solomon* is spoken of with the greatest advantage and commendation, it is set forth with this character, *that it exceeded the wisdom of all the children of the East Country, and all the wisdom of Ægypt*. Whence it is most natural and easy to argue, That certainly their learning must be accounted the greatest at that time in the World; or else it cou'd not have been inferred, that *Solomon* was wiser than all men, because his wisdom excelled theirs, unless we suppose their wisdom to have been the greatest in that Age of the World, when the wisdom of the *Græcians* (altho' in that time *Homer* is supposed to flourish) was not thought worthy the taking notice of. We see from hence then, as from an irrefragable testimony, that the wisdom of the *Ægyptians* anciently was no trivial *Pedantry*, nor mere superstitious and Magical Rites, but that there was some thing in it solid and substantial, or it had not been worth triumphing over by the wisdom of *Solomon*: It being true of that, what *Lippius* saith of the *Roman* Empire, *Quicquid dignum vinci videbatur, vicit; cetera non tam non potuit quam contempsit*; it was an argument of some great worth, that it was overtopp'd and conquer'd by it.

1. King. 4.
29. 30. 31.

Lippius de
Magnitud.
Rom. l. 1.
c. 3.

IV. Thus we see how just the repute of the ancient *Ægyptian* Learning is from testimony, and we shall find as great reason for it, when we consider the great advantages the *Ægyptians* had for promoting of Learning among them. Two ways Men come to knowledg, either by Tradition from others, or by Observation of their own; what the *Ægyptians* had the first way, will be spoken to afterwards; we now consider the latter of these. All Knowledg arising from Observation, must be either of those Sciences which immediately conduce to the benefit of Men's lives, or such whose end is to improve Men's rational faculties in the knowledg of things. The former necessity will put Men upon the finding out, the latter require *secessum & otia*, freedom from other imployments, a mind addicted to them, and industry in the study of them, and a care to preserve their inventions in them. The study of *Geometry* among the *Ægyptians*, ow'd its original to Necessity; for the river *Nile* being swell'd with the showers falling in *Æthiopia*, and thence annually overflowing the Country of *Ægypt*, and by its violence overturning all the marks they had to distinguish their Lands, made it necessary for them upon every abatement of the flood to survey their Lands, to find out every one his own by the quantity of the ground upon the survey. The necessity of which put them upon a more diligent enquiry into that study, that thereby they might attain to some exactness in that, which was to be of such necessary, constant and perpetual use. Thence we find the invention of *Geometry* particularly attributed by *Herodotus*, *Diodorus*, *Strabo* and others, to the *Ægyptians*. This skill of theirs they

Vid. Arist.
Metaph. 1.
l. c. 1.

Herodot.
lib. 2.
Diodor. l. 1.
Strabol. 17.
Cæd. Rhod.
l. 18. c. 34.

They after improved into a greater benefit, viz. the conveying the water of Nile into those places where it had not overflown to so great a height, as to give them hopes of an ensuing plenty; which they did by the artificial cutting of several Channels for that end, wherein, saith Strabo, the Egyptians Art and Industry out-went Nature it self. By this likewise they observ'd the height of the overflowing of the river, whereby they knew what harvest to expect the following year; which they did by a Well near Memphis (from the use of it call'd Νειλομέτειον) upon the walls of which were the marks of several cubits, which they observe and publish it to all, that they might provide themselves accordingly. We see what grounds there are, even from profit and advantage, to make us believe that the Egyptians were skilled in Geometry, and the knowledg relating thereto.

And for the promoting of all other knowledg, whose end is Contemplation, the very constitution of their Commonwealth did much conduce thereto: For thereby it was provided that there shou'd always be a sufficient number of persons freed from all other Employments, who might devote themselves to a sedulous enquiry into the natures of things. Such were the Egyptian Priests, who by the peculiar nature of the Egyptian superstitions, were freed from that burdensome service of sacrificing beasts, which the Priests of other Nations were continually employ'd about, and so they enjoy'd not only an easy but a very honorable employment; for they were the persons of the greatest honor, esteem, and authority among the Egyptians, of which rank, as far as I can find, all were accounted, who where not Souldiers, Husbandmen, or Artificers. For Strabo mentions no Nobility at all in Egypt distinct from the Priests; for he divides the whole Common-wealth into Souldiers, Husbandmen and Priests. And telling us that the other two were employ'd about matters of War, and the King's revenues in Peace, he adds, οἱ δὲ ἱερεῖς τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ ἦσαν καὶ ἀστρονομίᾳ, ἐμιλῶσι πρὸς βασιλῆας ἦσαν. *The Priests minded the study of Philosophy and Astronomy, and convers'd most with their Kings:* And after, speaking of their Kings being study'd in their Arts, as well as others of the Priests, he adds, μετ' οἷς ὡς πολλοὶ χρόνους ὁ βίβη, *with whom they spent most of their lives.* Agreeable to this, Plutarch tells us, that the Kings themselves were often Priests; and adds out of Hecateus, that the Kings us'd to drink wine by measure, ἱερεῖς ὄντες, *because they were Priests;* for as he saith, the Kings of Egypt were chosen, either out of the rank of Priests or Souldiers, ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, τῶν δὲ ἀφ' ὧν ἱερεῖς γίνονται αἱ τιμῆς καὶ ἡμεῖς ἔχουσιν *those two orders being of the greatest honor, the one for valor, and the other for wisdom;* and if the King were chosen out of the Souldiers, he was presently entred among the Priests, to learn their Mystical Sciences. Diodorus seems to reckon some great persons after the Priests, and distinct from the Souldiery; but if he means by these any other than some of the other two professions, I must say, as Casaubon doth in another case of Diodorus, Sane Strabonis auctoritas multis Siculis apud me praevallet. Diodorus his testimony not to be weighed with Strabo's. From whence we may understand the reason why that Potipherah, whose Daughter Joseph married, is called כהן. which some render the Priest, others the Prince of On; but these two we see are

v.

Strab. l. 17.

Plutarch. de Isid. c. 6.

Diod. l. 1.

Casaub. Not. in Strabo. l. 17.

Gen. 41. 45.

L 2

very

very consistent, their Priests being their great Princes, and *Heliopolis*, or *On*, of which *Potipherah* was Prince or Priest, being the chief Seat and University of the Priests of *Egypt*. Now it is evident from *Clemens Alexandrinus*, that the *Egyptians* did not communicate their Mysteries promiscuously to all, but only to such as were in succession to the Crown, or else to those of the Priests and their Children, who were most apt and fit for them, both by their diet, instruction, and family. For this was unalterably observed among them, that there was a continued succession of a profession in their several families, both of Priests, Soldiers, and Husbandmen, whereby they kept their several orders without any mixture or confusion, which is confess'd both by *Herodotus* and *Diodorus*: So that by this Constitution Learning was among them confin'd to the Priests, which highly advanceth the probability of that Tradition, preserv'd among the *Egyptians* concerning *Moses* (which likewise strongly proves our present design) viz. *Mattetho's* Records, as *Josephus* tells us, that *Moses* was one of the Priests at *Heliopolis*, and that his name among them was *Osarsiphus*, who changing his name, was call'd *Moses*; and in the time of *Amenophis* conducted the leprous people out of *Egypt* (so the *Egyptians* out of their hatred of the *Israelites* call them.) And *Charëmon*, another *Egyptian* Priest in the same Author, calls *Moses* a Scribe, and *Joseph* (by whom probably he means *Joshua*) a sacred Scribe, and saith that the *Egyptian* name of *Moses* was *Tisithen*, and of *Joseph*, *Poteseph*. Now this tradition did in all probability arise from the repute of *Moses* his learning and wisdom; which being among them proper to their Priests, they thence ascrib'd that name to him, altho' probably he might come to the knowledg of all their Mysteries, from the relation he had to *Pharaoh's* daughter.

VI.

Philo Jud.
de vita
Mosis.
Sext. Senen.
l. 2. p. 39.

Iamb. de
vita Pyth.
l. 1. 29.
Porphyr. de
vita Pyth.
p. 182.

Strabo l. 17.

We come now to consider the parts of the *Egyptian* Learning; in which the Scripture tells us *Moses* was skill'd: This by *Philo Judæus* is branched into *Arithmetic*, *Geometry*, *Musick*, and *Hieroglyphical Philosophy*: But *Sixtus Senensis* more comprehensively from *Diodorus*, *Diogenes Laertius*, and others, divides it into four parts, *Mathematical*, *Natural*, *Divine* and *Moral*. Their skill in the *Mathematical* parts of Learning hath been partly shew'd already, and might be more largely from that skill in them, which the *Grecians* gain'd from the *Egyptians*, as both *Iamblichus* and *Porphiry* speak of *Pythagoras*, that he gain'd his skill in *Geometry* chiefly from the *Egyptians*: for these as *Porphiry* saith, of a long time had been very studious of *Geometry*, as the *Phœnicians* of *Arithmetic*, and the *Chaldeans* of *Astronomy*. But *Iamblichus* (and I think deservedly) takes notice of the *difficult access* of the *Egyptian* Priests, especially as to acquaintance with their Mysteries; and so *Strabo* calls them, *μυσταὶ, ἑ δὲ ἀποκρύφτους*, such who concealed their learning under many Symbols, and were not easily drawn to unfold it. And yet we might think the two and twenty years time, which *Pythagoras* is thought to have spent among them, had been enough to have insinuated himself into their utmost acquaintance, and to have drawn from them the knowledg of their greatest Mysteries; but yet we have no great reason to think he did, if we believe the story in *Diogenes Laertius* of his

his sacrificing an *Hecatomb* for the finding out that Demonstration, which is now contain'd in the 47 proposition of the first of *Euclide*. Yet this did not abate the *Græcians* esteem of the *Ægyptians* Mathematical Learning; for in *Plato's* time, *Eudoxus Cnidi* went into *Ægypt* on purpose to acquire it; and *Democritus* his boast, that none of the *Arsepedonaptæ* in *Ægypt* (so their Priests were call'd, as *Clemens Alexandrinus* and *Eusebius* tell us, who relate the story) exceeded him in the Mathematics, proves at least inferred, that they were then in greatest esteem for them. Their great skill in Astronomy is attested by *Diodorus*, *Strabo*, *Herodotus*, and others, and by their finding out the course of the year by the motion of the Sun, which was the invention of the *Heliopolitan* Priests. How much they valued Geography, appears from *Clemens* his description of the ἱεροπολιτανῶν, or *sacred Scribe*, in the solemn procession; for he was requir'd to be skilful in Hieroglyphics, Cosmography, Geography, the motions of the Planets, the Chorography of *Ægypt*, and description of the *Nile*. *Eustathius* in his Notes on *Dionysius*, attributes the invention of Geographical Tables to *Sesostris*, who caused the Lands he had conquered to be described in Tables, and so communicated to the *Ægyptians*, and from them to others. Their skill in Natural Philosophy cou'd not be very great, because of their Magic and Superstition, whereby they were hindred from all experiments in those Natural things, which they attributed a Divinity to; but they seem to have been more exact and curious in Natural History; for any prodigies, or any thing that was anomalous in Nature, they did, saith *Strabo*, φιλοπονημένους ἀναφέρειν εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ γράμματα, with a great deal of curiosity insert in their sacred Records; and *Herodotus* adds, that more things of that nature are observed by them than by any other Nation; which, saith he, they not only diligently preserve, but frequently compare together, and from a similitude of prodigies gather a similitude of events. But that which gain'd the *Ægyptians* the greatest repute abroad, seems to have been their early skill in *Physic*, which is so much spoken of by *Homer*, *Plato*, *Herodotus*, *Plutarch*, *Diogenes Laertius*, and others, that it were impertinent troubling a Reader's patience with the proof of that which is so generally confess'd. A great evidence of the antiquity of this study among them is (if *Manetho* may be so far credited) that *Athotis*, the second King of the first Dynasty of the *Thinites*, was a Physician himself, and writ some Books of *Anatomy*; and the second King of the third Dynasty of the *Memphites*, was, for his skill in *Physic*, honored among them by the name of *Æsculapius*. *Pliny* affirms it to have been the custom of their Kings to cause dead bodies to be dissected, to find out the nature of Diseases; and elsewhere tells us, that the original of *Physic* among them was from the relation of those who by any remedy were cured of any Disease, which for a memorial to posterity were recorded in their Temples. Their Hieroglyphical and Mystical Learning hath made the greatest noise in the world and the least of Substance in it; which whoever will not be convinced of without perusal of *Kircher's Oedipus Ægyptiacus*, will at last find it fully done to his hand by the successless endeavors of that otherwise learned Man. I cannot think any rational Man cou'd think that study worth his

Clem. Al.
Strom. l. 1.
Eus. Prep.
l. 10. c. 2.

Diodor.
l. 1. c. 49.
50.
Strab. l. 17.
Herodot.
l. 2.

Clemens
Strom. l. 6.
p. 631. ed.
Par.

Plin. Nat.
hist. l. 19.
c. 5. l. 29.
c. 1.

pains, which at the highest can amount but to a conjecture; and when it is come to that with a great deal of pains, it is nothing but some ordinary and trivial observation. As in that famous Hieroglyphic of *Diospolis*, so much spoken of by the Ancients, where was a Child to express coming into the World, an old Man for going out of it, an Hawk for God, an *Hippopotamus* for Hatred, and a Crocodile for Impudence; and all to express this venerable *Apophthegm*, *O ye that come into the World, and that go out of it, God hates impudence.* And therefore certainly this kind of Learning deserves the highest form among the *difficiles Nugæ*; and all these Hieroglyphics put together, will make but one good one, and shou'd be for *Labour lost*.

- vii. There is yet one part of Learning more among them, which the *Ægyptians* are esteemed for, which is the Political and Civil part of it, which may better be called Wisdom, than most of the foregoing; two things speak much the wisdom of a Nation, good Laws, and a prudent management of them: their Laws are highly commended by *Strabo* and *Diodorus*; and it is none of the least commendations of them, that *Solon* and *Lycurgus* borrowed so many of their Constitutions from them; and for the prudent management of their Government, as the continuance of their State so long in peace and quietness, is an invincible demonstration of it; so the report given of them in Scripture adds a further testimony to it; for therein the King of *Ægypt* is called
- Isa. 19. 11, the Son of the Wise, as well as the Son of ancient Kings; and
12. his Counsellors are called *wise Counsellors of Pharaoh*, and the *wise Men*; whereby a more than ordinary prudence and policy must be understood. Can we now imagine such a person as *Moses* was, bred up in all the ingenuous Literature of *Ægypt*, conversant among their wisest persons in *Pharaoh's* Court, having thereby all advantages to improve himself, and to understand the utmost of all that they knew, shou'd not be able to pass a judgment between a mere pretence and Imposture, and real and important Truths? Can we think that one who had interest in so great a Court, all advantages of raising himself therein, shou'd willingly forsake all the pleasures and delights at present, all his hopes and advantages, for the future, were he not fully persuaded of the certain and undoubted truth of all those things which are recorded in his Books? Is it possible a Man of ordinary wisdom shou'd venture himself upon so hazardous, unlikely and dangerous employment, as that was *Moses* undertook, which cou'd have no probability of success, but only upon the belief that that God who appeared unto him, was greater than all the Gods of *Ægypt*, and cou'd carry on his Design by his power, maugre all the opposition which the Princes of the world cou'd make against it? And what possible ground can we have to think that such a person, who did verily believe the truth of what God revealed unto him, shou'd dare to write any otherwise than as it was revealed unto him? If there had been any thing repugnant to common Reason in the history of the Creation, the Fall of Man, the universal Deluge, the propagation of the World by the Sons of *Noah*, the History of the *Patriarchs*, had not *Moses* rational faculties as well as we? nay, had he them not far better improved than any of ours are?
and

and was not he then able to judg what was suitable to Reason, and what not? and can we think he wou'd then deliver any thing inconsistent with Reason or undoubted Tradition then, when the Ægyptian Priests might so readily and plainly have triumphed over him, by discovering the falshood of what he wrote? Thus we see that *Moses* was as highly qualify'd as any of the acutest heathen Philosophers cou'd be, for discerning Truth from Falshood; nay, in all probability he far excelled the most renowned of the *Græcian* Philosophers in that very kind of Learning where-with they made so great noise in the World, which was originally Ægyptian, as is evident in the whole series of the *Græcian* Philosophers, who went Age after Age to *Ægypt*, to get some scraps of that Learning there, which *Moses* cou'd not have but full meals of, because of his high place, great interest, and power in *Ægypt*. And must those hungry Philosophers then become the only Masters of our Reason, and their Dictates be receiv'd as the sense and voice of Nature, which they either receiv'd from uncertain Tradition, or else deliver'd in opposition to it, that they might be more taken notice of in the World? Must an *ἀόριστος λόγος* be confronted with, *Thus saith the Lord*? and a few pitiful Symbols vye authority with Divine Commands? and *Ex nihilo nihil fit* be sooner believ'd than, *In the beginning God created the Heavens and the Earth*? What irrefragable evidence of Reason is that so confident a presumption built upon, when it can signify nothing without this *Hypothesis*, That there is nothing but Matter in the World? and let this first be prov'd, and we will never stick to grant the other. I may confidently say, the great gullery of the world hath been, taking philosophical Dictates for the standard of Reason, and unprov'd *Hypotheses* for certain Foundations for our discourse to rely upon. And the seeking to reconcile the Mysteries of our Faith to these, hath been that which hath almost destroy'd it, and turn'd our Religion into a mere philosophical Speculation. But of this elsewhere. We see then that insisting merely on the accomplishment and rational perfections of the persons who speak, we have more reason to yield credit to *Moses* in his History, than to any Philosophers in their speculations.

And that which in the next place speaks *Moses* to be a person of wisdom, and judgment, and ability to find out truth, was his Age and Experience when he deliver'd these things to the World. He vented no crude and indigested conceptions, no sudden and temerarious fancies, the usual issues of teeming and juvenile Wits; he liv'd long enough to have experience to try, and judgment to distinguish a mere outside and varnish, from what was solid and substantial. We cannot then have the least ground of suspicion, that *Moses* was any ways unfit to discern Truth from Falshood, and therefore was capable of judging the one from the other.

But tho' persons be never so highly accomplisht for parts, learning, and experience, yet if they want due information of the certainty of the things they deliver, they may be still deceiv'd themselves; and if they preserve it for posterity, be guilty of deceiving others. Let us now therefore see whether *Moses* had not as great advantages for understanding the truth of his History, as he had judgment

VIII.

ment to discern it. And concerning all those things contained in the four last Books of his, to his own death, it was impossible any shou'd have greater than himself, writing nothing but what he was *pars magna* himself of, what he saw and heard, and did; and can any testimony be desired greater than his whose actions they were, or who was present at the doing of them; and that not in any private way, but in the most public capacity? For altho' private persons may be present at great actions, yet they may be guilty of mis-representing them, for want of understanding all circumstances precedent, and subsequent, or for want of understanding the designs of the chief instruments of action: but when the person himself, who was the chief in all, shall undertake to write an exact History of it, what evidence can be desired more certain than that is, that there cou'd be no defect as to information concerning what was done? The only scruple then that can be made, must be concerning the passages of former times which *Moses* relates. And here I doubt not but to make it appear, that insisting only on all that can be desired in a bare Historian (setting aside Divine Revelation) he had as true and certain information of the History of those former Ages, as any one can have of things at that distance from themselves; and that is, by a certain uninterrupted tradition of them, which will appear more clear and evident in that Nation of which *Moses* was, than in any other Nation in the World: and that on these two accounts: First, *The undoubted lineal descent from Father to Son in the Jewish Nation.* Secondly, *Their interest lying so much in the preserving this Tradition entire.*

- IX. First, *That there was a certain unmixed lineal descent from Father to Son in the Jewish Nation:* the great cause of most of the confusion in the Tradition of other Nations, was the frequent mixing of several Families one with another; now that God might as it were on purpose satisfy the World of the *Israelites* Capacity to preserve the Tradition entire, he prohibited their mixture by Marriages with the people of other Nations and Families. So that in *Moses* his time it was a very easy matter to run up their lineal descent as far as the Flood, nay, up to *Adam*; for *Adam* conversed sometimes with *Lamech*, *Noah's* Father; for *Lamech* was born *A. M.* 874. *Adam* died 930. so that 56 years, according to that computation, were *Adam* and *Lamech* contemporary. Can we then think *Noah* ignorant of the ancient Tradition of the World, when his Father was so long *co-ævous* with *Adam*; and *Mathuselah* his Grand-father, who was born *A. M.* 687. died not till *A. M.* 1656. according to our most learned *Primate* of *Armagh*, *i. e.* was 600 years contemporary with *Noah*. *Sem* his Son was probably living in some part of *Jacob's* time, or *Isaac's* at least; and how easily and uninterruptedly might the general Tradition of the ancient History be continued thence to the time of *Moses*, when the number of Families agreeing in this Tradition was increased, and withal incorporated by a common ligament of Religion? I demand then, where can we suppose any ignorance or cutting off this general Tradition in so continued a succession as here was? Can we imagine that the Grand-children of *Jacob* cou'd be ignorant of their own pedigree, and whence they came into

into *Egypt*? can we think a thing so late and so remarkable as the account of their coming thither, shou'd be forgotten, which was attended with so many memorable circumstances, especially the selling and advancement of *Joseph*, whose memory it was impossible shou'd be obliterated in so short a time? Cou'd *Jacob* be ignorant of the Country whence his Grand-father *Abraham* came? especially when he lived so long in it himself, and married into that branch of the Family that was remaining there, when he had served his Uncle *Laban*? Cou'd *Abraham*, when he was contemporary with *Sem*, be ignorant of the truth of the Flood, when *Sem*, from whom he derived himself, was one of the persons who escaped it in the Ark? Cou'd *Sem* be ignorant of the actions before the Flood, when *Adam*, the first Man, lived so near the time of *Noah*? and, cou'd *Noah* then be ignorant of the Creation and the fall of Man? Thus we see it almost impossible, that any age among them then cou'd be ignorant of the passages of the precedent, which they were so few Generations removed from, that they cou'd with ease derive themselves from the First Man. What then can we say? that any of these had a design of deceiving their posterity, and so corrupted the Tradition? besides, that it cou'd be hardly possible at that time, when there were so many remaining testimonies of former times; what end can we imagin that any parents shou'd have in thus deceiving their Children, or what advantage shou'd come to them by such a deceit? Nay, I shall now manifest in the second place, That the whole interest of their Children lay in preserving this Tradition certain and entire. For their hopes of possessing *Canaan* and title to it, depended upon the promise made unto *Abraham* 400 years before; which wou'd not only keep awake their sense of Divine Providence, but wou'd make them careful during their Bondage to preserve their Genealogies, because all the Right they cou'd plead to their possessions in *Canaan*, was from their being of *Abraham's* Seed. And besides this, on purpose to be a memorial to them of passages between God and *Abraham*, they had in their flesh a badge of Circumcision, which wou'd serve to call to mind those transactions which had been between God and their Fore-fathers. These things then do fully demonstrate, that insisting only on Rational Evidence, the *Israelites* were the most certain conservators of the ancient History of the World; and can we think, that *Moses* who was the Ruler among them, shou'd not fully understand those things which every *Israelite* cou'd scarce be ignorant of, and might correct the mistakes of *Moses* in his History, if he had been guilty of any such? These things I suppose have made the first proposition evident, That it was morally impossible *Moses* shou'd be deceived himself, or be ignorant of the things which he reports to others, both because he had abilities sufficient to discover Truth from Falshood, and sufficient information of the passages of former times.

M

CHAP.

C H A P. III.

Moses his fidelity and proved.

I. *Moses considered as an Historian, and as a Law-giver; his fidelity in both proved; clear evidences that he had no intent to deceive in his History, freedom from private interest, impartiality in his relations, plainness and perspicuity of stile.* II. *As a Law-giver, he came armed with Divine Authority, which being the main thing, is fixed on to be fully proved from his actions and writings.* III. *The power of Miracles the great evidence of Divine Revelation. Two grand Questions propounded. In what cases Miracles may be expected, and how known to be true. No necessity of a constant power of Miracles in a Church:* IV. *Two cases alone wherein they may be expected. When any thing comes as a Law from God, and when a Divine Law is to be repealed. The necessity of Miracles in those cases as an evidence of Divine Revelation asserted.* V. VI. VII. *Objections answered. No use of Miracles when the Doctrine is settled and owned by Miracles by the first Revelation. No need of Miracles in reformation of a Church.*

I. **T**HE second Proposition contains the proof of *Moses* his fidelity, That he was as far from having any intent to deceive others, as he was from being deceived himself. Two ways *Moses* must be considered, as an Historian, and as a Law-giver; the only inducement for him to deceive as an Historian, must be some particular interest which must draw him aside from an impartial delivery of the truth; as a Law-giver, he might deceive, if he pretended Divine Revelation for those Laws which were only the issues of his own Brain, that they might be received with a greater veneration among the people, as *Numa Pompilius* and others did. Now if we prove that *Moses* had no interest to deceive in his History, and had all rational evidence of Divine Revelation in his Laws, we shall abundantly evince the undoubted fidelity of *Moses* in every thing recorded by him. We begin then with his fidelity as an Historian; and it being contrary to the common interest of the World to deceive and be deceived, we have no reason to entertain any suspicions of the veracity of any person where we cannot discern some peculiar interest that might have a stronger byass upon him than the common interest of the World. For it is otherwise in Morals than in Naturals; for in Naturals, we see that every thing will leave its proper interest to preserve the common interest of Nature; but in Morals, there is nothing more common than deserting the common interest of Mankind, to set up a peculiar interest against it: It being the truest description of a Politician, that he is one who makes himself the centre, and the whole World his circum-

circumference; that he regards not how much the whole World is abused, if any advantage doth accrue to himself by it. Where we see it then the design of any person to advance himself or his posterity, or to set up the credit of the Nation whose History he writes, we may have just cause to suspect his partiality, because we then find a sufficient inducement for such a one to leave the common road of Truth, and to fall into the paths of deceit. But we have not the least ground to suspect any such partiality in the History of *Moses*; for nothing is more clear than that he was free from the ambitious design of advancing himself and his posterity, who notwithstanding the great honor he enjoy'd himself, was content to leave his posterity in the meanest sort of attendance upon the Tabernacle. And as little have we ground to think he intended to flatter that Nation, which he so lively describes, that one wou'd think he had rather a design to set forth the frowardness, unbelief, unthankfulness, and disobedience of a Nation towards a gracious God, than any ways to inhanse their reputation in the world, or to ingratiate himself with them by writing this History of them. Nay, and he sets forth so exactly the lesser failings and grosser enormities of all the Ancestors of this Nation, whose acts he records, that any impartial Reader will soon acquit him of a design of flattery, when after he hath recorded those faults, he seeks not to extenuate them, or bring any excuse or pretense to palliate them. So that any observing Reader may easily take notice, that he was carried on by a higher design than the common people of Historians are; and that his drift and scope was to exalt the goodness and favor of God, towards a rebellious and obstinate people. Of which there can be no greater nor more lively demonstration, than the History of all the transactions of the *Jewish* Nation, from their coming forth of *Egypt*, to their utter ruin and desolation. And *Moses* tells them as from God himself, *it was neither for their number, nor their goodness, that God set his love upon them, but he loved them, because he loved them, i. e.* no other account was to be given of his gracious dealing with them, but the freeness of his own bounty, and the exuberancy of his goodness towards them. Nay, have we not cause to admire the ingenuity as well as veracity of this excellent personage, who not only lays so notorious a blot upon the stock of his own Family *Levi*, recorded so punctually the inhumanity and cruelty of him, and *Simeon* in their dealings with the *Sechemites*; but likewise inserts that curse which was left upon their memory for it, by their own Father at his decease! And that he might not leave the least suspicion of partiality behind him, he hath not done as the Statuary did, (who engraved his own name so artificially in the Statue of *Jupiter*, that one shou'd continue as long as the other,) but what the other intended for the praise of his skill, *Moses* hath done for his ingenuity, that he hath so interwoven the History of his own failings and disobedience with those of the Nation, that his spots are like to continue as long as the whole web of his History is like to do. Had it been the least part of his design to have his memory preserved with a superstitious veneration among the *Jews*, how easy had it been for him to have left out any thing that might in the least entrench upon his reputation? but we find him very secure and careless in that

Deut. 7.
7, 8.

Gen. 34.

25.

Gen. 49. 5,
6, 7.

particular; nay, on the other side, very studious and industrious in depressing the honor and deserts of Men, and advancing the power and goodness of God. And all this he doth, not in an affected strain of *Rhetoric*, whose proper work is *impetrare fidem mendacio*, and as *Tully* somewhere confesseth, *To make things seem otherwise than they are*; but that innate simplicity and plainness, and yet withal with that *Imperatoria brevitās*, that Majesty and Authority, that it is thereby evident he sought not to court acceptance, but to demand belief: Nor had any such pitiful design of pleasing his Readers with some affected phrases, but thought that Truth it self had presence enough with it, to command the submission of our Understandings to it.

- II. Especially when all these were delivered by such a one who came sufficiently armed with all motives of credibility and inducements to assent, by that evidence which he gave, that he was no pretender to Divine Revelation, but was really employ'd as a peculiar instrument of State under the God and Ruler of the whole World. Which if it be made clear, then all our further doubts must presently cease, and all impertinent disputes be silenced, when the Supreme Majesty appears empowering any person to dictate to the World the Laws they must be governed by. For if any thing be repugnant to our Rational Faculties, that is, that God shou'd dictate any thing but what is most certainly true, or that the Governor of the World shou'd prescribe any Laws, but such as were most just and reasonable. If we suppose a God, we cannot question veracity to be one of his chiefest Attributes, and that it is impossible the God of truth shou'd employ any, to reveal any thing as from him, but what was undoubtedly true. So that it were an argument of the most gross and unreasonable incredulity, to distrust the certainty of any thing which comes to us with sufficient evidence of Divine Revelation, because thereby we shew our distrust of the veracity of God himself. All that we can desire then, is only reasonable satisfaction concerning the evidence of Divine Revelation in the person whose words we are to credit, and this our gracious God hath been so far from denying Men, that he hath given all Rational Evidence of the truth of it. For it implying no incongruity at all, to any notions of God or our selves, that God shou'd, when it pleases him, single out some instrument to manifest his will to the World; our enquiry then leads us to those things which may be proper Notes and Characters of such a person who is employ'd on so high an Embassy. And those are chiefly these two, If his actions be such as cou'd not flow from the power of mere Natural Causes; and, If the things he reveals be such as cou'd not proceed from any created Understanding. *First* then, for his Actions, these striking most upon our outward Senses, when they are any thing extraordinary, do transmit along with the impressions of them to the Understanding, an high opinion of the person that doth them: whereas the mere height of knowledge, or profoundness of things discovered, can have no such present power and influence upon any, but such as are of more raised and inquisitive minds. And the World is generally more apt to suspect its self deceived with Words, than it can be with Actions; and hence Miracles, or the doing of things above the reach of Nature, hath been always embraced

embraced as the greatest testimony of Divine Authority and Revelation. For which there is this evident Reason, That the course of Nature being settled by Divine Power, and every thing acting there by the force of that Power it receiv'd at first, it seems impossible that any thing shou'd really alter the series of things, without the same Power which at first produced them. This then we take for granted, That where-ever such a Power appears, there is a certain evidence of a Divine Presence going along with such a Person who enjoys it. And this is that which is most evident in the actions of *Moses*, both as to the Miracles he wrought both in *Egypt* and the Wilderness, and his miraculous deliverance of the *Israelites* out of *Egypt*, this latter being as much above the reach of any merely Civil Power, as the other above Natural.

We therefore come to the Rational Evidence of that Divine Authority whereby *Moses* acted, which may be gathered from that Divine Power which appeared in his Actions, which being a matter of so great weight and importance (it being one of the main Bases whereon the Evidence of Divine Revelation, as to us, doth stand) and withal of so great difficulty and obscurity, (caused thro' the preferring some Parties in Religion, above the common interest of it) it will require more care and diligence to search what influence the Power of Miracles hath upon the proving the Divine Commission of those who do them. Whether they are such undoubted Credentials, that where-ever they are produced, we are presently to receive the Persons who bring them, as Extraordinary Embassadors from Heaven, employ'd on some peculiar Message to the Sons of Men? For the full stating of this important Question, two things must be cleared: *First*, In what cases Miracles may be expected as Credentials to confirm an immediate Commission from Heaven? *Secondly*, What Rational Evidences do attend those Miracles, to assure us they are such as they pretend to be?

First, For the causes wherein these Miracles are to be expected as inducements to, or confirmations of our Faith, concerning the Divine Imployment of any persons in the World. And here I lay down this as a certain Foundation, That a power of Miracles is not constantly and perpetually necessary in all those who manage the affairs of Heaven here on Earth, or that act in the name of God in the World. When the Doctrine of Faith is once settled in Sacred Records, and the Divine Revelation of that Doctrine sufficiently attested, by a Power of Miracles in the revealers of it, What imaginable necessity or pretext can there be contrived for a power of Miracles, especially among such as already own the Divine Revelation of the Scriptures? To make then a power of working Miracles to be constantly resident in the Church of God, as one of the necessary Notes and Characters of it, is to put God upon that necessity which common Nature is freed from, *viz.* of multiplying things without sufficient cause to be given for them; and to leave Men's Faith at a stand, when God hath given sufficient testimony for it to rely upon. It is a thing too common and easy to be observed, that some persons out of their eagerness to uphold the interest of their own party, have been fain to establish it upon such grounds, which when they are sufficiently searched

III.

to the bottom, do apparently undermine the common and sure Foundations whereon the Belief of our common Christianity doth mainly stand. It were easy to make a large Discourse on this Subject, whereby we may rip open the wounds that Christianity hath receiv'd, thro' the contentions of the several parties of it; but this imputation cannot with so much reason be fasten'd on any party, as that which is nailed to a pretended Infallible Chair; for which we need no other instance, than this before us. For while the leaders of that party make a Power of Miracles to be a necessary Note of the true Church, they unavoidably run Men upon this dangerous precipice, not to believe any thing as a matter of Faith, where they find not sufficient Miracles to convince them that is the true Church which propounds it to them. Which necessarily follows from their acknowledg'd principles; for it being impossible, according to them, to believe any thing with a Divine Faith, but what is propounded by the Church as an infallible Guide; and it being impossible to know which is this infallible Guide, but by the Notes and Characters of it, and one of those Notes, being a Power of Miracles, I cannot find out my Guide but by this Power; and this Power must be present in the Church, (for nothing of former Ages concerning Faith, as the Miracles of *Christ*, his Resurrection, &c. is to be believ'd, but on the Church's account) and therefore where Men do not find sufficient conviction from present Miracles, to believe the Church to be an infallible Guide, they must throw off all Faith concerning the Gospel; for as good never a whit, as never the better. And therefore it is no wonder *Atheism* shou'd be so thriving a plant in *Italy*; nay under, if not within the walls of *Rome* it self, where inquisitive Persons do daily see the jugglings and impostures of Priests in their pretended Miracles, and from thence are brought to look upon Religion its self as a mere imposture, and to think no *Pope* so infallible, as he that said, *Quantum nobis profuit hac de Christo fabula?* Such horrid consequences do Men drive others, if not bring themselves, to, when they employ their parts and industry rather to uphold a corrupt interest, than to promote the Belief of the acknowledg'd principles of Christian Faith. But as long as we assert no necessity of such a power of Miracles to be the Note of any true Church, nor any such necessity of an infallible Guide, but that the Miracles wrought by *Christ* and his Apostles, were sufficient evidences of a Divine Spirit in them; and that the Scriptures were recorded by them to be an infallible Rule of Faith, here we have more clear reason as to the primary motives and grounds of Faith, and withal the infallible veracity of God in the Scriptures, as the last resolution of Faith. And while we assert such an infallible Rule of Faith, delivered to us by such an unanimous consent from the first delivery of it, and then so fully attested by such uncontrollable Miracles, we cannot in the least understand to what end a power of Miracles shou'd now serve in the Church, especially among those who all believe the Scriptures to be the Word of God. Indeed before the great harvest of Converts in the primitive times were brought in, both of *Jews* and *Gentiles*, and the Church fully settled in receiving the Canon of the Scriptures universally, we find God did continue this power among them; but after the Books of the
New

New Testament were generally embraced as the Rule of Faith among Christians, we find them so far from pretending to any such Power, that they reject the pretenders to it, such as the *Donatists* were, and plead upon the same accounts, as we do now against the necessity of it. We see then no reason in the world for Miracles to be continued where the Doctrine of Faith is settled, as being confirmed by Miracles in the first Preachers of it.

There are only these two cases then, wherein Miracles may justly and with reason be expected. *First*, When any person comes as by an extraordinary commission from God to the World, either to deliver some peculiar message, or to do some more than ordinary service. *Secondly*, When something that hath been before establish'd by Divine Law, is to be repealed, and some other way of worship establish'd instead of it. *First*, When any comes upon an extraordinary message to the World, in the name of, and by commission from God, then it is but reason to require some more than ordinary evidence of such Authority. Because of the main importance of the duty of giving credit to such a person, and the great sin of being guilty of rejecting that Divine Authority which appears in him. And in this case we cannot think that God would require it as a Duty to believe, where he doth not give sufficient arguments for Faith, nor that he will punish persons for such a fault, which an invincible ignorance was the cause of. Indeed God doth not use to necessitate Faith, as to the act of it, but he doth so clearly propound the object of it, with all arguments inducing to it, as may sufficiently justify a Believer's choice in point of reason and prudence, and may leave all Unbelievers without excuse. I cannot see what account a Man can give to himself of his Faith, much less what Apology he can make to others for it, unless he be sufficiently convinced in point of the highest reason, that it was his duty to believe; and in order to that conviction, there must be some clear evidence given, That what is spoken hath the impress of Divine Authority upon it. Now what convictions there can be to any sober mind concerning Divine Authority in any person without such a Power of Miracles going along with him, when he is to deliver some new Doctrine to the World to be believ'd, I confess I cannot understand. For altho' I doubt not but where-ever God doth reveal any thing to any person immediately, he gives demonstrable evidence to the inward senses of the Soul, that it comes from himself; yet this inward sense can be no ground to another person to believe his Doctrine Divine, because no Man can be a competent judge of the actings of another's senses; and it is impossible to another person to distinguish the actings of the Divine Spirit from strong impressions of fancy by the force and energy of them. If it be said, *That we are bound to believe those, who say they are fully satisfy'd of their Divine Commission.* I answer *First*, This will expose us to all delusions imaginable; for if we are bound to believe them because they say so, we are bound to believe all which say so; and none are more confident pretenders to this than the greatest deceivers, as the experience of our Age will sufficiently witness. *Secondly*, Men must necessarily be bound to believe contradictions; for nothing is more ordinary, than for such confident pretenders to a Divine Spirit, to contradict one

iv.

Object.

Answer.

one another, and it may be, the same person in a little time contradict himself: and must we still be bound to believe all they say? If so, no Philosophers wou'd be so much in request, as those *Aristotle* disputes against in his *Metaphysics*, who thought a thing might be, and not be, at the same time. *Thirdly*, The ground of Faith at last will be but a mere human testimony, as far as the person who is to believe is capable of judging of it. For the Question being, Whether the person I am to believe hath Divine Authority for what he saith, What ground can I have to believe that he hath so? Must I take his bare affirmation for it? If so, then a mere humane testimony must be the ground of Divine Faith, and that which is last resolv'd into: If it be said, *That I am to believe the Divine Authority by which he speaks, when he speaks in the name of God*: I answer, The Question will again return, how I shall know he speaks this from Divine Authority? and so there must be a progress *in infinitum*, or founding Divine Faith on a mere humane testimony, If I am to believe Divine Revelation merely on the account of the person's affirmation who pretends to it. For in this case it holds good, *Non apparentis & non existentis eadem est ratio*; if he be divinely inspired, and there be no ground inducing me to believe that he is so, I shall be excused, if I believe him not, if my wilfulness and laziness be not the cause of my unbelief.

- v. If it be said, *That God will satisfy the minds of good Men concerning the truth of Divine Revelation*. I grant it to be wonderfully true; but all the Question is *de modo*, how God will satisfy them? whether merely by Inspiration of his own Spirit in them, assuring them that it is God that speaks in such persons; or by giving them Rational Evidence, convincing them of sufficient grounds to believe it. If we assert the former way, we run into these inconveniences: *First*, We make as immediate a Revelation in all those who believe, as in those who are to reveal Divine Truths to us; for there is a new Revelation of an object immediately to the mind; *viz. That such a person is inspired of God*; and is not after the common way of the Spirit's illumination in Believers, which is by enlightning the faculty, without the proposition of any new object, as it is in the work of Grace: So that according to this opinion, there must be immediate Inspiration as to that act of Faith, whereby we believe any one to have been divinely inspired, and consequently to that whereby we believe the Scriptures to be the Word of God. *Secondly*, Doth not this make the fairest plea for Men's unbelief? For, I demand, Is it the duty of those who want that immediate Illumination to believe or no? If it be not their duty, Unbelief can be no sin to them; if it be a duty, it must be made known to be a duty; and how can that be made known to them to be a duty, when they want the only and necessary means of Instruction in order to it? Will God condemn them for that, which it was impossible they shou'd have, unless God gave it them? And how can they be left inexcusable, who want so much as rational inducements to Faith? for of these I now speak, and not of efficacious persuasions of the Mind, when there are rational arguments for Faith propounded. But, *Lastly*, I suppose the case will be clear'd, when we take notice
what

what course God hath always taken to give all rational satisfaction to the minds of Men, concerning the persons whom he hath imploy'd in either of the foremention'd cases. *First*, for those who have been imploy'd upon some special message and service for God, he hath sent them forth sufficiently provided with manifestations of the Divine Power whereby they acted; as is most clear and evident in the present case of *Moses*, *Exodus* 4. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. where *Moses* puts the case to God, which we are now debating of. Supposing, saith he, that I shou'd go to the *Israelites* and tell them, God had appear'd to me, and sent me to deliver them, and they shou'd say, God had not appear'd unto me; how shou'd I satisfy them? God doth not reject this objection of *Moses* as favouring of unbelief, but presently shews him how he shou'd satisfy them, by causing a Miracle before his face, *turning his rod into a serpent*; and God gives this as the reason of it, *vers. 5. That they may believe that the Lord God of their Fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, hath appeared unto thee.* It seems God himself thought this wou'd be the most pregnant evidence of God's appearing to him, if he wrought Miracles before their faces. Nay, lest they shou'd think one single Miracle was not sufficient, God in the immediate following verses adjoyns two more, which he shou'd do in order to their satisfaction; and further, *vers. 21.* God gave him a charge to do all those wonders before *Pharaoh*, which he had put into his hand: and accordingly we find *Pharaoh* presently demanding a Miracle of *Moses*, *Exodus* 7. 9. which accordingly *Moses* did in his presence, tho' he might suppose *Pharaoh's* demand not to proceed from desire of satisfaction, but from some hopes that for want of it, he might have rendred his credit suspected among the *Israelites*.

Indeed after God had delivered his people, and had settled them in a way of serving him according to the Laws delivered by *Moses*, which he had confirm'd by unquestionable Miracles among them, we find a caution laid in by *Moses* himself, against those which shou'd pretend signs and wonders to draw them off from the Religion establish'd by the Law of *Moses*. And so likewise under the Gospel, after that was establish'd by the unparalell'd Miracles of our Savior and the Apostles, we find frequent cautions against being deceiv'd by those who came with pretences of doing great Miracles. But this is so far from infringing the credibility of such a Testimony which is confirm'd by Miracles, that it yields a strong confirmation to the truth of what I now assert. For the Doctrine is suppos'd to be already establish'd by Miracles, according to which we are to judge of the spirits of such pretenders. Now it stands to the greatest reason, that when a Religion is once establish'd by uncontrolled Miracles, we shou'd not hearken to every whiffling Conjuror that will pretend to do great feats, to draw us off from the truth establish'd. In which case, the surest way to discover the Imposture is, to compare his pretended Miracles with those true and real ones which were done by *Moses* and *Christ*; and the ground of it is, because every person is no competent judge of the truth of a Miracle; for the Devil, by his power and subtilty, may easily deceive all such as will be led by the nose by him, in expectation of some wonders to be done by him. And therefore

N

as

VI.

Deut. 13.
1, 2, 3.

as long as we have no ground to question the certainty of those Miracles which were wrought by *Christ* or *Moses*, I am bound to adhere to the Doctrine establish'd by those Miracles, and to make them my rule of judging all persons who shall pretend to work Miracles: Because, 1. I do not know how far God may give Men over to be deceiv'd by lying wonders, who will not receive the truth in the love of it; *i. e.* those that think not the *Christian Religion* sufficiently confirm'd by the Miracles wrought at the first promulgation of it. God in justice may permit the Devil to go further than otherwise he cou'd, and leave such persons to their own credulity, to believe every imposture and illusion of their senses for true Miracles. 2. That Doctrine which was confirm'd by undoubted Miracles, hath assur'd us of the coming of Lying Wonders, whereby many shou'd be deceiv'd. Now this part of the Doctrine of the Gospel is as certainly true as any of the rest; for it was confirm'd by the same Miracles that the other was; and besides that, the very coming of such Miracles is an evidence of the truth of it, it falling out so exactly according to what was foretold so many hundred years since. Now if this Doctrine be true, then am I certain the intent of these Miracles is to deceive, and that those are deceiv'd who hearken to them; and what reason then have I to believe them? 3. To what end do these Miracles serve? Are they to confirm the truths contain'd in Scripture? But what need they any confirmation now, when we are assur'd by the Miracles wrought by *Christ* and his *Apostles*, that the Doctrine by them preach'd came from God? and so hath been receiv'd upon the credit of those Miracles ever since. Were these truths sufficiently prov'd to be from God before or no? If not, then all former Ages have believ'd without sufficient ground for Faith; if they were, then what ground can there be to confirm us in them now? Certainly God, who never doth any thing but for very great purposes, will never alter the course of Nature, merely for satisfaction of Men's vain curiosities.

VII.

But it may be it will be said, It was something not fully reveal'd in Scripture which is thus confirm'd by Miracles: but where hath the Scripture told us, that any thing not fully reveal'd therein, shou'd be afterwards confirm'd? Was the Scripture an infallible rule of Faith, while this was wanting in it? Did *Christ* and his *Apostles* discharge their places, when they left something unreveal'd to us? Was this a Duty before these Miracles, or no? if it was, what need Miracles to confirm it? if not, *Christ* hath not told us all necessary conditions of Salvation. For whatever is required as a Duty, is such, as the neglect of it runs Men upon damnation. Lastly, Men's Faith will be left at continual uncertainties; for we know not according to this principle, when we have all that is necessary to be believ'd, or do all that is necessary to be practis'd in order to Salvation. For if God may still make new Articles of Faith, or constitute new duties by fresh Miracles, I must go and enquire what Miracles are wrought in every place, to see I miss nothing that may be necessary for me, in order to my happiness in another World.

If Men pretend to deliver any Doctrine contrary to the Scripture; then it is not only necessary that they confirm it by Miracles, but they must manifest the falsity of those Miracles on which

which that Doctrine is believ'd, or else they must use another Miracle to prove that God will set his Seal to confirm both parts of a contradiction to be true. Which being the hardest task of all, had need be prov'd by very sufficient and undoubted Miracles, such as may be able to make us believe those are Miracles, and are not, at the same time, and so the strength of the Argument is utterly destroy'd by the *medium* produc'd to prove it by.

By this Discourse these Two things are clear; *First*, That no pretenses of Miracles are to be hearkn'd to, when the Doctrine we are to believe is already establish'd by them, if those Miracles tend in the least to the derogation of the truth of what was establish'd by those former Miracles. *Secondly*, That when the full Doctrine we are to believe is establish'd by Miracles, there is no necessity at all of new Miracles, for confirmation of any of the truths therein deliver'd. And therefore it is a most unreasonable thing to demand Miracles of those to prove the truth of the Doctrine they deliver, who do first solemnly profess to deliver nothing but what was confirm'd by Miracles in the first delivery of it, and is contain'd in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament; and *secondly* do not pretend to any immediate Commission from Heaven, but do nothing but what in their Consciences they think every true Christian is bound to do; much more all Magistrates and Ministers, who believe the truth of what they profess, which is in their places to reform all Errors and Abuses which are crept into the Doctrine or Practice of *Christianity*, thro' the Corruption of Men or Times. And therefore it is a most unjust and unreasonable demand of the *Papists*, when they require Miracles from our First Reformers, to prove the truth of their Doctrine with. Had they pretended to have come with an immediate Commission from Heaven to have added to the Doctrine of the Gospel, there had been some plea for such a demand; but it was quite otherwise with them: Their only design was, *to whip the buyers and sellers out of the Temple*, to purge the Church from its abuses: And altho' that by *Jerome* was thought to be one of our Savior's greatest Miracles, yet this by us is conceiv'd to be no other than the duty of all Magistrates, Ministers, and private Christians; these by their prayers, Ministers by their Doctrine, and Magistrates by their just Authority.

C H A P. IV.

The fidelity of the Prophets succeeding *Moses*.

- I. *An order of Prophets to succeed Moses, by God's own appointment in the Law of Moses.* II. *The Schools of the Prophets,* III. *the original and institution of them.* IV. *The Cities of the Levites. The occasion of their first institution.* V. *The places of the Schools of the Prophets, and the tendency of the institution there to a prophetic office.* VI. *Of the Music us'd in the School of the Prophets,* VII. *The Roman Assamenta, and the Greek Hymns in their solemn worship.* VIII. *The 2 sorts of Prophets among the Jews, Leiger and extraordinary. Ordinary Prophets taken out of the Schools, prov'd by Amos and Saul.*

I.

BUT altho' now under the Gospel (the Revelation of God's Will being compleated by *Christ* and his Apostles) we have no reason either to expect new Revelations, or new Miracles for confirming the Old; yet under the Law, God training up his People by degrees till the coming of *Christ*, there was a necessity of a new supply of Divine Messengers (call'd *Prophets*) to prepare the People, and make way for the coming of *Christ*. As to whom these two things are considerable.

First, Those Prophets whose work was to inform the People of their duties, or to reprove them for their sins, or to prepare them for the coming of the *Messias* (which were their chief tasks) had no need to confirm the truth of their doctrine or commission from Heaven by the working of Miracles among them. And that on these two accounts.

First, Because God did not consummate the Revelation of his Mind and Will to the *Jews* by the Ministry of *Moses*, but appointed a succession of Prophets to be among them, to make known his Mind unto them. Now, in this case, when the prophetic office was establish'd among them, what necessity was there that every one that came to them upon an Errand from God, shou'd prove his Testimony to be true by Miracles, when in the discharge of his Office he deliver'd nothing dissonant from the Law of *Moses*? It is one argument God intended a succession of Prophets, when he laid down such Rules in his Law for the judging of them, whether they were truly inspir'd or no, *Deut.* 18. 21, 22. And in that same place God doth promise a succession of Prophets, *Deut.* 18. 15, 18. *A Prophet will the Lord God raise up unto thee like unto me; to him shall ye hearken.* Which words, tho' in their full and compleat sense they do relate to *Christ* (who is the great Prophet of the Church) yet who ever attends to the full scope of the words, will easily perceive that the immediate sense of them doth relate to an order of Prophets, which shou'd succeed *Moses* among the *Jews*; between whom and *Moses* there wou'd be a great similitude as to their Birth, Calling, and Doctrine, tho' not a just equality, which is excluded, *Deut.* 34. 10, 11. and the chief reason why it is said there that the other Prophets fell so much short of *Moses* is, in regard of the Signs and Wonders which he wrought, as is there largely express'd. Nor may it seem strange, that by a Prophet shou'd be understood an order or succession

cession of Prophets when it is acknowledg'd by most *Protestants*, that by *ἡ ἀντιχριστος*, the *Antichrist*, is understood a Rank and Succession of several Persons in the same name and function: And that it is to be understood in those words concerning a succession of Prophets, will appear by the occasion of their being brought in; for ver. 14. God prohibits them to hearken after the manner of their Neighbour-nations, to Observers of times and Diviners, and then brings in the following words, ver. 15. as to the reason of that Prohibition, that *God would raise up a Prophet among themselves like unto Moses, and to him should they hearken.* Now let any rational Man judge whether it were so probable an Argument to keep them from hearkning to Diviners of other Nations, that there shou'd be a Prophet arise 2000 years after like unto *Moses*, as that he wou'd raise up a continued succession of Prophets among themselves, to whom they shou'd hearken. Thus *Origen* in his excellent Book against *Celsus*, shews the necessity of the Prophetical Office among the *Jews* from hence; For, saith he, *it being written in their Law that the Gentiles hearkened unto Oracles and Divinations; but God would not suffer it to be so among them, it presently follows, A Prophet will the Lord God raise up in the midst of thee, &c.* Therefore, saith he, *when the Nations round about them had their Oracles, and several ways of Divination, all which were strictly prohibited among the Jews, if the Jews had no way of foreknowing things to come, it had been almost impossible, considering the great curiosity of humane nature, to have kept them from despising the Law of Moses, or apostatizing to the heathen Oracles, or setting up something like them among themselves.* Which Interpretation of his seems to have a great deal of Reason, not only from the Coherence of the words here, but from the *Analogy* of many other Precepts of the Law of *Moses*, which it is most certain have a respect to the customs of the Idolatrous Nations round about them. Another reason why it is most probable, that by this is understood a succession of Prophets, is the charge which follows against false Prophets, and the Rules to discover them, ver. 20, 21, 22. which had not been so pertinent and coherent, if the opposition did not lie between the order of true Prophets among the *Jews*, and the false Prophets, which shou'd rise up in the midst of them. Ad that which yet further justifies this Interpretation, is, that there is no other place in the whole *Pentateuch* which doth expressly speak of a succession of Prophets, if this be not understood of it; and is it any ways probable a matter of so great moment and consequence shou'd be wholly pretermitted? Especially when we find it so exactly perform'd in the succeeding Ages of the Jewish Commonwealth; their immediate Ruler like Dictators at *Rome*, after *Moses's* death, being most rais'd up by immediate incitation and impulse from God, and many of them inspir'd with a Spirit of Prophecy. How shou'd the *Jews* have expected these, or obey'd them when they appear'd, had not God foretold it to them, and provided them for it by the Law of *Moses*.

Neither did these Prophets arise singly among them, like blazing Stars, one in an Age, to portend future Events, but whole Constellations of them sometimes appear'd together; yea, so many smaller Prophets were sometimes united together, as made up a

V. Arabic.
vers. 6.
Calv. in
loc. P. Fa-
ginum, Pet.
Mart. Loc.
Com. Class.
1. cap. 3.
Sect. 12.

Origen. con.
Celsum,
lib. 1.
Deut. 18.
14.

perfect *Galaxy*, when they were entred into Societies, and became Schools of the Prophets; for such we frequently read of in Scripture. The Original and Institution of which may cast a further light into our present design, and shew'd us the little reason the *Jews* cou'd have to expect Miracles from them to confirm their Doctrine, who were brought up in the knowledg of their Law, and were call'd out for their several Societies into the prophetical office by the immediate incitation of God himself. Which being so commonly known among them, there needed no such extraordinary proofs to manifest the Divine Authority by which they were employ'd. Two things then we shall endeavor to clear: *First*, The Original and Institution of these Schools of the Prophets; and *Secondly*, That it was the ordinary course for the Prophets by employments to be taken forth of these Societies wherein they were educated. *First*, for the Original and Institution of these Schools of the Prophets. The first Seminaries, or places of Institution among the *Jews*, were the Cities of the *Levites*, which were dispersed up and down in the several Tribes of *Israel*; God thereby turning that into a Blessing, which was pronounc'd as a curse upon *Levi* by his Father *Jacob*, viz. *that he should be divided in Jacob, and scattered in Israel*. But tho' the fulfilling of that Prophecy might be the primary ground of that scattering, yet it is evident that God aim'd at some further good in it, both in reference to the *Levites* and the *Israelites*. *Lyra* undertakes to assign four reasons of this Distribution of the Cities of the *Levites* among the Tribes. (1.) Because if they had liv'd but in one Tribe, the Worship of God wou'd have seem'd to have been confin'd to that Tribe. (2.) Because they wou'd have been a burden to that Tribe they had their habitations in. (3.) From the equity of being maintain'd by all who serv'd for all. (4.) Because it was their office to teach the People, and therefore it was necessary they shou'd live among them. These Reasons are most of them oppos'd by *Abulensis*, but defended by others. The last is that which most insist on, it being the peculiar office of the *Levites* to teach the People; so 2 Chron. 35. 4. *And said unto the Levites, qui erudiebant omnem Israelem*, as *Vatablus* renders it, *who taught all Israel*; and *Masius* insists on that as the great reason of their dispersion, to be ready to teach the Law among the *Israelites*. But yet all those who are agreed that Teaching the Law was the Duty of the *Levites*, are not yet agreed of the manner of that Teaching; for there being two parts of their Law, the one Ceremonial and Judicial, and the other Moral and Spiritual, the Question is, Whether of these two did belong to, or was perform'd by the *Priests* and *Levites*. There are many who understand all that Office of Teaching, which belong'd to the *Priests* and *Levites* to be merely concerning the Ceremonial Law, i. e. deciding all Cases and Controversy which shou'd arise concerning their Ceremonial Worship, which in *Levit.* 10. 10. is call'd *putting a difference between holy and unholy, and between clean and unclean*. But it seems somewhat strange that God shou'd take so great care about the Shell and Outside of his Worship, and none at all for the Moral and Spiritual part of it, especially when he had set apart a whole Tribe merely for his own service, and freed them from all other employments, that they might have a greater

Gen. 49. 7.

Josh. 21.

Abulensis
in *Josh.* 21.
c. 7. & 8.
V. Sherlog.
Antiq. He-
braic. l. 2.
c. 3. f. 4.
Masius in
Josh. c. 14.

a greater liberty to attend upon the things relating to his service; especially when it is mention'd as the Duty of the *Priests* and *Levites*, to teach all the statutes which the Lord had spoken to them by the hand of Moses, and that they shall teach Jacob thy statutes, and Israel thy law. Which notwithstanding what *Abarbinel* and others say, must certainly comprehend as well the Moral as the Ceremonial part of *Moses* his Law. And the *Priests* lips are said to preserve knowledg: and God saith they should seek the law at his mouth; for he is the messenger of the Lord of Hosts. Do these things import no more than mere deciding the cases of the Ceremonial Law? But whatever God's intention in the institution of the *Levites* was, we find not much in Scripture of what they did for the promoting the Moral and Spiritual part of Divine Worship; but it is no news to hear that Societies instituted for good and pious ends, shou'd degenerate from the first intention of the Founders of them; and thus it is probable it was with the *Levites*, who finding the most of their benefit and advantage to come in by the Ceremonial Cases, might grow more negligent of the Moral part of Divine Service, which brought no secular emolument to them.

Lev. 10.
10.
Deut. 33.
10.

Mal. 2. 7.

And thence we read not of these Schools of the Prophets, which were Societies in order to Spiritual Instruction, till about the time of *Samuel*; and many think him to have been the first Author of them. For it is evident, that about his time the Priesthood was grown to a great degeneracy, and Men thereby estranged from the Worship of God, so that there seem'd almost a necessity then of restoring some Societies, who might have a special eye to the Spiritual part of God's Worship and Service. The occasion of the Institution of them, seems to have been from the resort which the People had to the high places for sacrificing, during the captivity or uncertain abode of the *Ark of God*, after the desolation of *Shiloh*: now the People resorting to these places to perform their Solemnities, it was so order'd, that a company of Prophets shou'd be there resident to bless the sacrifices, and instruct the People. Two of these places with the Societies in them we find mention'd in the time of *Samuel*. The first mention'd 1 Sam. 10. 5, 10. which cannot be *Ramah*, altho' the *Syriac* and *Arabic* Versions so render it. For *Samuel* had his own residence in *Ramah* whither *Saul* went to him, 1 Sam. 9. 18, 19. but in this Chapter we find *Samuel* sending *Saul* on a journey from him beyond *Bethel*, and the plain of *Tabor*, and there tells him he shou'd meet with the company of Prophets upon the hill of God, ver. 5. Some think it was called the Hill of God, because of its height; as the *Cedars of God*, and the Mountains of God for the highest; so *Tirinus* understands it, but *Menochius* far more probably, quia in ea erat cætus & veluti schola prophetarum. The *Chaldee* Paraphrast renders it, ad collem in quo arca Domini. R. *Solomon* makes this Hill to be *Kirjah-jearim*, and therefore call'd the hill of God; because the *Ark* was there in the house of *Abinadab* in the hill. But *Lyra* thinks he hath prov'd, that before this time the *Ark* was remov'd from *Kirjah-jearim* to *Mizpah*; but *Abulensis* more probably conceives it was never remov'd thither, and thinks this hill of God to be no other than *Gibeah* of *Benjamin*, where *Saul* inhabited; and thence the wonder

III.

1 Sam. 3.

1.

1 Sam. 9.

12, 13.

1 Sam. 7.

1.

vid. Jun.

in loc.

wonder was the greater, to see him prophesy among those who had known his former life and education. The other place is *Naioth* in *Ramah*, where was a *high place*, whither the People came to sacrifice; this *Ramah* seems to have been the place of *Samuel's* nativity, call'd *Ramathaim Sophim*, which the *Syriac* version renders *collis specularum* (some who wou'd be ready to improve every thing for their purpose, wou'd think it was so call'd in allusion to the employment of the young Students there. So *Heinsius* conceives *צריה צופים* to be understood, *Numb.* 23. 14, the place of *Watchmen*, from which word faith he, without doubt, the *Greeks* deriv'd their *σφοδ*, who were wont in such high places to observe the course and motions of the Heavens; But to pass by such frivolous conjectures.) It seems a great deal more probable, that this *Ramah* which the *Septuagint* by a light mutation of the initial letters, calls *αριμαθια*, was the same with *Arimathæa*, the Town of *Joseph* mention'd in the Gospel. But the place where the School of the Prophets was, seems to have been, with greatest conveniency, for a place of Education, at some distance from the Town. *Vatablus* conceives it was built in the fields of *Ramah*, and the word *Naioth*, faith *Pet. Martyr*, properly signifies *pastures*, and some remote places *quæ fere sunt studiis aptissima*. The *Chaldee* Paraphrast renders *Naioth* by *בית אורכנא*, a College or School of prophetic Education: Over this College *Samuel* himself was President, as most understand that place, *1 Sam.* 19. 20. And when they saw the company of Prophets prophesying, and *Samuel* standing as appointed over them; *Jonathan* renders it, *Et Samuelem stantem docentem super eos*. To which we may well apply the words of *Philo*, speaking of the Jewish manner of Instruction, *ὅς μὲν ἡγεμὼν ἐφογγυμᾶτο ἐ δὲ μαθηταὶ ἐπὶ αὐτῷ ἐκτρέφεον*. The President going before and teaching, the rest increasing in goodness, and improving in life and manners.

1 Sam. 19.
18, 20.
1 Sam. 1. 1.

Heins. Exercit. Sacra
l. 1. c. 2.

Phil. Jud.
de v. Mos.
l. 3.

IV.

Neither can we think so good and useful an Institution shou'd presently degenerate, or be turn'd into another Channel; and therefore some conceive that the most noted Prophets to the time of *David* were the Presidents of these Colleges; such as besides *Samuel* were *Helcana*, *Gad*, *Nathan*, *Heman*, and *Jeduthun*; and that they selected out the choicest and most hopeful of the young *Levites*, and here educated them, together with the *Nazarites* which came out of other Tribes. And it seems very probable, that in all the most noted high places whither they went to sacrifice, there were such Schools erected after the first Institution of them. Thence we read of such multitudes of the Prophets together, in the time of *Ahab*, *1 Kings* 18. 4. for when *Jezabel* cut off the Prophets of the Lord, *Obadiah* took an hundred, and hid them in caves; certainly their number was very great, when an hundred might be sav'd without missing. The chief places where they resided, seem to have been *Bethel*, *2 Kings* 2. 3. and *Jericho*, which was a large College; for therein we read of *fifty sons of the Prophets standing together out of their number*, *2 Kings* 2. 5, 7, 15. and *Gilgal*, which had been a place of Religion from the first entrance into *Canaan*; there we find the sons of the Prophets sitting before *Elisha*, *2 Kings* 4. 38. It seems most probable that the purity of God's Worship among the ten Tribes after the defection in the time

time of *Jeroboam* was preserv'd by the Prophets in their *several Schools and places of habitation*; which hath sufficient foundation in that place, *2 Kings* 4. 23. where the *Shunamite's* husband asks her *Wherefore she would go to the man of God that day, seeing it was neither new-moon nor Sabbath.* Whereby it is both evident, that the Prophets did undertake the office of instructing the People on their solemn Festivals, and that it was their custom to resort to them for that end. Thus we see what care God took for the instruction of his People, in a time of so general an Apostasy as that of the ten Tribes was, when the Church of God cou'd not be known by that constant Visibilty and outward Glory, which some speak so much of, but was then clouded in obscurity, and shrouded it self under the Mantles of some Prophets which God continued among them, and that not by any lineal succession neither, tho' the *Jews* wou'd fain make the gift of Prophecy to be a kind of *Cabala* too, and convey'd in a constant succession from one Prophet to another. Neither were these Schools of the Prophets only in *Israel*, but in *Judah* likewise was God known, and his Name was great among these Schools there. In *Jerusalem* it self there was a College where *Huldah* the Prophetess liv'd, *2 Kings* 22. 14. some render *Mishna in secunda urbis parte*; for *Jerusalem* was divided into the Upper and Nether part of the City. *Abulensis* and *Lyra* will have it refer to the three Walls of the City in which the three chief parts of it were compriz'd; in the *first*, the Temple and the King's Palace; in the *second*, the Nobles and the Prophets Houses; and in the *third*, the common People. *Josephus* seems to favor the division of the City into three parts; but *Pineda* thinks the *second* part of the City was most inhabited by Artificers, and that the Prophets, and the Wise Men, and such as frequented the Temple most, dwelt in the City of *David* within the first Wall; and therefore he conjectures that the College was upon Mount *Sion*, (and so properly call'd *Sion College*) and he explains that *House*, which *Wisdom is said to have built, and hewn out her seven pillars*, *Prov.* 9. 1. by this College, which he supposeth was built by *Solomon* in Mount *Sion*, and thence ver. 3. *she is said to cry upon the highest places of the City.* Thus much may serve concerning the Original and Institution of these Schools of the Prophets.

V. Manass.
Ben Israel
Concil. in
Exod. 9.
35.

Joseph. de
bell. Jud.
l. 6. c. 6.
Pineda de
reb. Solom.
l. 3. c. 28.

I now come to the *Second* thing promis'd concerning the Schools of the Prophets, which is, *That it was God's ordinary Method to call those persons out of these Schools, whom he did employ in the discharge of the Prophetical Office.* Two things will be necessary for the clearing of this: *First*, What Tendency their Education in those Schools had towards the fitting them for their Prophetical Office. *Secondly*, What Evidence the Scripture gives us that God call'd the Prophets out from these Colleges. The *first* of these is very requisite to be clear'd, because the Prophetical Office depending upon immediate Inspiration, it is hard to conceive what influence any antecedent and preparatory dispositions can have upon receiving the Prophetical Spirit. It is commonly known how much the generality of *Jewish* Writers do insist on the necessity of these qualifications antecedent to a Spirit of Prophecy. 1. An excellent Natural Temper. 2. Good Accomplishments both of

v.

O

Wit

Wit and Fortunes. 3. Separation from the World. 4. Congruity of place (which they make proper to *Judea*). 5. Opportunity of time. 6. And Divine Inspiration. These are so largely discours'd of by many Learned Men from *Jewish* Writers, that it will be both tedious and impertinent to recite much of their Opinions concerning them: who, since they have lost the gift of Prophecy, seem to have lost too that Wisdom and Natural Understanding, which they make one of the most necessary qualifications of a Prophet. It is not easy to imagine what subserviency Riches cou'd have to a Prophetical Spirit, unless the *Jews* be of *Simon Magus* his Opinion, that these gifts of the Holy Ghost may be purchas'd with Money; and if so, they think themselves in as likely a way to bid fair for a Prophetical Spirit, as any People in the World. Or is it that they think it impossible any without them shou'd have that free, cheerful and generous Spirit, which they make so necessary to a Prophetic Spirit, that it is an Axiome of great Authority with them, *Spiritus sanctus non residet super hominem mœstum*: and they think *Elisha* his fit of passion did excus's his Prophetic Spirit from him, which he was fain to retrieve again with a fit of Music. There are only two sorts of those antecedent dispositions which seem to bear any affinity with the Prophetic Spirit: And those are such as tended to the improvement of their Natural Faculties, and such as tended to their advancement in piety, and consequently to the subduing all irregular motions in their Souls: Not that either of these did concur by way of efficiency to the production of a Spirit of Prophecy (which is an opinion *Maimonides* seems very favorable to) but that God might make choice particularly of such persons, to remove all prejudices against them in those they were sent unto. For nothing cou'd possibly dissatisfy them more concerning Divine Inspiration, than if the person who pretended to it were of very weak and shallow intellectuals, or known to be of an irregular conversation. In order therefore to the fuller satisfaction of Men concerning these two qualifications, this Institution of them in the Schools of the Prophets was of great subserviency, because therein their only Employment was to improve in knowledg, and especially in true piety. This latter being the most necessary disposition, since the Apostle hath told us that the

^{2Pct. 1. 21.} Prophets were *Holy men, who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost*. And in order to this, the greatest part we can find of the exercises of those who were educated in these Schools of the Prophets, were Instructions in the Law, and the solemn celebration of the praises of God: Which appears in Scripture to have been their chief employment as Prophets, and by which they are said to prophesy: So at *Gibeah* at the Oratory there, we find a company of

^{1 Sam. 10. 5.} *Prophets coming down from the high place with a Psaltery, a Tabret and Pipe, and a Harp before them, and prophesying.*

V. G. Vor.
in Maim.
fundam.
leg. c. 7.
Sect. 1. Mr.
Smith of
Prophecy,
i. 8.

Maimon.
More Nev.
l. 2. c. 36.

VL

It may seem somewhat strange to consider what relation these Musical Instruments had to the prophesying here mention'd. Are Musical Notes like some Seeds Naturalists speak of, which will help to excite a prophetic Spirit? Or do they tend to elevate the Spirits of Men, and so put them into a greater capacity of *Enthusiasm*? Or is it because Music is so excellent for allaying the tumults of inward passions; and so fitting the Soul for the better enter-

entertainment of the Divine Spirit? Or was all this prophesying here spoken of nothing else but Vocal and Instrumental Music? So some indeed understand it, that it was only the praising God with spiritual Songs and Melody; wherein one as the *Præcentor* began a Hymn, which the rest took from him and carry'd on. I confess it carries the fairest probability with it, that this prophesying with Musical Instruments was at their places and times of sacrifice, an adjunct, if not a part of the solemn service of God: which was manag'd chiefly by the Choir of the Sons of the Prophets which were resident there, and were train'd up in all exercises of piety and devotion. But yet I cannot see any reason to think that all this prophesying was merely singing of Hymns, and playing upon their Musical Instruments to them, as some imagine, because there seems to be implied some immediate impulses of a prophetic Spirit, by what *Samuel* said to *Saul*, that when he came among the Prophets, *the Spirit of the Lord would come upon him, and he should prophesy with them, and he should become another man.* ^{1 Sam. 10. 6.}

What strange impulse and wonderful transformation was this merely for *Saul* to joyn with the Prophets in their praises of God? And this needed not so much admiration as follow'd thereupon this action of *Saul's*, that it shou'd become a Proverb, *Is Saul also among the Prophets?* Certainly *Saul* was a very great hater of all spiritual Music before, if it became a Proverb merely for his being present at, or joyning with this company in singing their Hymns. Therefore others think that those who are said particularly to prophesy at these Music meetings, were some persons as chief among the rest, who having their spirits elevated by the Music, did compose Hymns upon the place by a Divine Energy inwardly moving their Minds. So that there were properly Divine Raptures in some of them, which transported them beyond the ordinary power of Fancy or Imagination, in dictating such Hymns as might be suitable for the design of celebrating the honor of God. ^{1 Sam. 10. 12.}

Neither may it seem strange that such an *Enthusiastic* Spirit shou'd seize on them only at such solemn times, since we read in the New Testament of a like exercise of such gifts in the Church of *Corinth*, *1 Cor. 14. 26.* where we see in coming together every one had a Psalm, a Doctrine, a Tongue, a Revelation, &c. Whereby it appears that they were inspir'd upon the place; *etiam extemporales Hymni sæpe ab afflatu erant*, as *Grotius* there observes; as we see it in frequent instances in Scripture, of *Simeon* and *Anna*, *Moses* and *Miriam*, *Deborah* and *Isaiah*; and in the Christian Church after that Land-flood of Inspired Gifts was much abated in the Church, they kept up a custom much like to these *extemporal* Hymns, as appears evidently by *Tertullian*, *post aquam manualet & lumina ut quisque de Scripturis sanctis vel de proprio ingenio potest, provocatur in medium Deo canere*: After they had ended their Love-Fests, they begun their Hymns, which were either taken from the Scriptures, or of their own composition. Which *Pliny* takes notice of as a great part of the Christian worship, that they did *secum invicem carmen Christo quasi Deo dicere, they joyned in singing hymns to Christ as God.* ^{Tertull. Apol. c. 59. Plin. Ep. 1. 10. Ep. 97.} Nay, we find something very parallel to this preserv'd among the ruins of the Heathen worship; such were the *Assamenta* among the old *Romans*, which were peculiarly sung

sung to the honor of some particular God; thence the *Assamenta*
Janualia, Junonia, Minervia, which were *privata poemata & carmina*
in singulos eos Deos conscripta, as the learned *Joseph Scaliger* ob-
 serves. So likewise the *Greeks* had their solemn Hymns to their
 Gods, some to the propitious Gods, which they call'd *καλῶς ᾄοντες*,
 and the *Latins* properly *Indigitamenta*, and *Carmen calatorium*;
 others they had to their *Vejoves*, or *Lava lumina*, which they
 call'd *ἱερῶς ἀπαγγελμαίους* the *Latins*, *Carmen Avertuncale*; but besides
 these, they had some peculiar to the several Deities, as *ἱερὸν* to
Diana, *παῖον* to *Apollo*, *ἰσταῖον* to *Ceres*, *Dithyrambus* to *Bacchus*,
Adonidia to *Adonis*, as *Proclus* tells us in his *Chrestomathia*. And
 it is withal evident, that the Heathens thought some of their Priests
 inspired while they were performing these solemn Devotions to
 the Gods (which probably was by *Satan*, as many other things in
 Heathen worship taken up in imitation of these inspired Hymns,
 and Music us'd by the Sons of the Prophets) but their Hymns
 were so compos'd, as to be fit rather to transport Men beyond
 the power of their reason, than to compose and sweeten it, which
 was suitable to the fanatic *Enthusiasm*, which was so common among
 them. So *Proclus* tells us that the *Io-Bacche* was *βασανιστῆς καὶ πολὺ*
φρονήματος, full of noise and din; and the *Dithyrambus* was *νακνυμένη* &
πολὺ τὸ ἐδουσιάζει, *ᾧ ᾠρεῖται ἡμετέριον*, a kind of extatic Morice-dance, and
 their Priests were apprehended by them to be under a real *Enthu-*
siasm, at these solemnities. So the *Corybantes* are describ'd rather
 like mad Men than mere *Enthusiasts* by *Strabo*; they were *ἀσθενε-*
ταις ἡνίκ ἐ βακχῶσι, as he describes them, *dancing about with their cym-*
bals and drums, and arms and pipes, (as tho' a *Bedlam* had been
 broke loose among them) yet this was in high esteem among them;
 for, as *Strabo* after saith, *ὅτι τὸ ἐδουσιάζειν ἐστὶν ἡμῶν θεῶν ἔχον δύναμις, ἢ γὰρ μὴ*
ἡμεῖς γινώσκοντες, this *Enthusiasm* seemed to have a Divine touch with
 it, and to come very near to a prophetic spirit.

Strabo l. 10.

But tho' the prophesying with Music among the Sons of the Pro-
 phets, might be by some *Extemporary* Hymns immediately dictated
 by the *Præcentor* of the Chorus; yet we are not to imagine any
 such frantic actions among them as were among the *Curetes* and
Corybantes, it being always the Devil's temper to over-do, when
 he strives to imitate, and instead of solemn and set devotions, to
 carry Men beyond all sense and reason. The Spirit of God did
 never dictate any *Io-Bacche's* or *Dithyrambs* to transport and amuse
 the spirits of Men; but those sweet Airs which might both com-
 pose and elevate the spirits of all that heard them. For in proba-
 bility the spirits of all these Prophets were as Lutes tuned to the
 same height, that when the Spirit of God did strike upon one of
 them, the rest presently answer'd to it, and so made up an entire
 Consort among them. So *Menochius* thinks the Spirit of God not
 only moved the spirit of him who was the *Præcentor*, but the rest
 likewise who joyn'd with him; and they are said to prophesy, saith
Torniellus, *forte quod non quascunque sed Propheticas duntaxat can-*
tiones præcinerent; but from hence we clearly see what the great
 Employment was in these Schools of the Prophets, which, as
 the same Author expresseth, it was *statis horis de rebus divinis dis-*
serere, & divinis laudibus vacare; and thereby we understand what
 reference this Institution had in order to the prophetic Office,

Tornielli
 Manual. ad
 An. M. m.
 2945. Scit.
 14.

because

because the Spirit of God did much appear among them, and all their Exercises tended to piety, and so did remove all prejudices from their persons, when God did send them abroad afterwards.

And so it is evident he frequently did, not to say always, for that were to put too great a restraint upon the boundless Spirit of God: For sometimes, as will appear afterwards, God sent the Prophets upon extraordinary messages, and then furnish'd them with sufficient Evidence of their Divine Commission, without being beholding to the Testimonials of the Schools of the Prophets. But besides these, God had a kind of Leiger-Prophets among his People; such were the most of those whom we read of in Scripture, which were no Pen-men of the sacred Scripture; such in *David's* time we may conceive *Gad* and *Nathan*, and afterwards we read of many other Prophets and Seers among them, to whom the People made their resort: Now these in probability were such as had been train'd up in the prophetic Schools, wherein the Spirit of God did appear, but in a more fixed and settled way than in the extraordinary Prophets, whom God did call out on some more signal occasions, such as *Isaiab* and *Jeremiah* were. We have a clear foundation for such a distinction of Prophets in those words of *Amos* to *Amaziah*, *Amos* 7. 14, 15. *I was no Prophet, neither was I a Prophets son; but I was a herdsman, and a gatherer of sycamore fruits: And the Lord took me as I followed the flock; and the Lord said unto me, Go prophesy to my people Israel.* Some understand the first words, *I was not a Prophet*, that he was not born a Prophet, as *Jeremiah* was, not design'd and set apart to it from his Mother's womb; but I rather think by his not being a Prophet, he means he was none of those resident Prophets in the Colleges or Schools of them, not any of those who had led a prophetic life, and withdrawn themselves from converse with the world; nor was I (saith he) *the son of a Prophet*, i. e. not brought up in Discipleship under those Prophets, and thereby trained up in order to the prophetic function. *Non didici inter discipulos Prophetarum*, as *Pellican* renders it; *nec institutione qua filii Prophetarum quasi ad donum Prophetie à parentibus preparabantur*, saith *Estius*. *Non à puero educatus in Scholis Propheticis*; so *Calvin* and most other modern Interpreters understand it, as well as *Abarbinel* and the Jewish Writers. Whereby it is evident that God's ordinary way for the Prophets, was to take such as had been trained up and educated in order to that end, altho' God did not tie up himself to this method; but sometimes call'd one from the Court, as he did *Isaiab*; sometimes one from the herds, as here he did *Amos*, and bid them *go prophesy to the house of Israel*. There was then a kind of a standing College of Prophets among the *Israelites*, who shined as fixed Stars in the firmament; and there were others who had a most planetary motion, and withal a more lively and resplendent Illumination from the fountain of prophetic Light. And further it seems that the Spirit of Prophecy did not ordinarily seize on any, but such whose Institution was in order to that end, by the great admiration which was caus'd among the People at *Saul's* so sudden prophesying, that it became a Proverb, *Is Saul also among the Prophets?* which had not given the least foundation for an Adage for a strange and unwonted thing, unless the most

VIII.

1 Sam. 10.

12, 19, 24.

common appearances of the Spirit of Prophecy had been among those who were trained up in order to it. Thus I suppose we have fully cleared the first reason why there was no necessity for the ordinary Prophets, whose chief office was instruction of the People, to prove their commission by Miracles, because God had promis'd a succession of Prophets by *Moses*, and these were brought up ordinarily to that end among them; so that all prejudices were sufficiently remov'd from their persons without any such extraordinary power as that of Miracles.

C H A P. V.

The tryal of the Prophetical Doctrine.

I. Rules of trying Prophets established in the Law of Moses. II. The punishment of pretenders. The several sorts of false Prophets. The case of the Prophet at Bethel discussed. III. The tryal of false Prophets belonging to the great Sanhedrim. IV. The particular rules whereby the doctrine of Prophets was judged. The proper notion of a Prophet, not foretelling future contingencies, but having immediate divine Revelation. V. Several Principles laid down for clearing the doctrine of the Prophets. 1. That immediate dictates of natural light are not to be the measure of divine Revelation. Several grounds for divine Revelation from natural light. VI. 2. Whatever is directly repugnant to the dictates of nature, cannot be of divine Revelation. VII. 3. No divine Revelation doth contradict a divine positive Law without sufficient evidence of God's intention to repeal that Law. VIII. 4. Divine Revelation in the Prophets, was not to be measured by the words of the Law, but by the intention and reason of it. The prophetic office a kind of Chancery to the Law of Moses.

THE second Reason why those Prophets whose main office was instruction of the People, or merely foretelling future events, needed not to confirm their Doctrine by Miracles, is, because they had certain rules of tryal by their Law whereby to discern the false Prophets from the true. So that if they were deceiv'd by them, it was their own oscitancy and inadvertency which was the cause of it. God in that Law which was confirm'd by Miracles undoubtedly divine, had establish'd a Court of tryal for prophetic Spirits, and given such certain rules of procedure in it, that no Men needed to be deceiv'd, unless they wou'd themselves. And there was a greater necessity of such a certain way of tryal among them, because it cou'd not otherwise be expected but in a Nation where a prophetic Spirit was so common, there wou'd be very many pretenders to it, who might much endanger the Faith of the

the People, unless there were some certain way to find them out. And the more effectually to deter Men either from counterfeiting a prophetic Spirit, or from hearkening to such as did, GOD appointed a severe punishment for every such pretender, *viz.* upon legal conviction, that he be punished with death. Deut. 18. 20. *But the Prophet which shall presume to speak a word in my name which I have not commanded him to speak, or that, shall speak in the name of other Gods, shall surely die.* The Jews generally understand this of strangling, as they do always in the Law, when the particular manner of death is not expressed. And therein a false Prophet and a Seducer were distinguished each from other, that a mere Seducer was to be stoned to death under sufficient testimony, Deut. 13. 6, 10. But the false Prophet is there said in general only to be put to death, Deut. 13. 1, 5. The main difference between the Seducer and false Prophet was, that the Seducer sought by cunning persuasions and plausible arguments, to draw them off from the worship of the true GOD; but the false Prophet always pretended divine revelation for what he persuaded them to, whether he gave out that he had that Revelation from the true God, or from Idols and false Gods. So that the mere pretence to divine Revelation was that which God wou'd have punished with so great severity.

V. Maimon. de Idol. c. 5. f. 1. & ibi Voffium.

The Jews tell us of three sorts of Prophets who were to be punished with death by Men, and three other sorts who were reserved to divine punishment: Of the first rank were these; 1. He that prophesied that which he had not heard, and for this they instance in *Zedekiah* the son of *Chenaanah*, who made him horns of iron, and said, *Thus saith the Lord*, this was the Lying Prophet. 2. He that speaks that which was revealed not unto him, but to another, and for this they instance in *Hananiah* the son of *Azur*, (but how truly I shall not determine) this was the Plagiary Prophet. 3. He that prophesied in the name of an Idol, as the Prophets of *Balaal* did, this was the Idol Prophet. These three, when once fully convicted, were to be put to death. The other rank of those which were left to GOD's hand consisted of these; 1. He that stifles and smothers his own prophecy, as *Jonas* did, by which it may seem that when the Divine Spirit did overshadow the Understanding of the Prophets, yet it offered no violence to their Faculties, but left them to the free determination of their own Wills in the execution of their Office, but this must be understood of a lower degree of Prophecy; for at some times their Prophecies were *as fire in their bones*, that they were never at any rest till they had discharged their Office. But withal by the example of *Jonas*, we see, that tho' the Spirit of Prophecy, like the Fire on the Altar, cou'd only be kindled from Heaven, yet it might be destroyed when it was not maintained with something to feed upon; or when it met not with suitable entertainment from the Spirits of those it fell upon, it might retreat back again to Heaven, or at least lie hid in the embers, till a new blast from the Spirit of GOD doth *αναζωοποιῇ*, retrieve it into its former heat and activity. Thus it was with *Jonas*. 2. The other was, He that despised the words of a true Prophet; of such GOD, saith, Deut. 18. 19. *And it shall come to pass, that whosoever will not hearken to my words which he shall speak in my name, I will require it of him.*

II.

V. Except. Gem. Sanhedr. c. 10. f. 3.

1 King. 22. 11.

Jer. 28. 11.

Jer. 20. 9.

Maim. de
fundam.
legis, c. 9.
f. 4. V. A.
barbini de
Cereth. a-
pud Bux-
torf. de
Jponf. &
divort. p.
182.
1 King. 13.
2.
Ver. 18.

him. Which *Maimonides* explains by מיתה בירי שמי, death by the hands of God, which he thus distinguisheth from the *Cereth*, that he makes the death *per manus celi*, to be less than the *Cereth*, because this latter continued in the Soul after death, but the other was expiated by death; but generally they interpret it of a sudden death, which falls upon the person. 3. The last is, He who hearkens not to the words of his own Prophecy, of which we have a most remarkable instance in Scripture, concerning the Prophet whom God sent to *Bethel* (whom *Tertullian* calls *Sameas*, the Jews, *Hedue*) whom God destroy'd in an unusual manner for not observing the command which God had given him, not to eat bread nor drink water at *Bethel*, nor turn again by the way he came. Neither was it any excuse to this Prophet, that the old Prophet at *Bethel* told him that an Angel spake unto him by the word of the Lord, that he should turn back. For, 1. Those whom God reveals his will unto, he gives them full assurance of it, in that they have a clear and distinct perception of God upon their own Minds; and so they have no doubt, but it is the Word of the Lord which comes unto them; but this Prophet cou'd have no such certainty of the Divine Revelation which was made to another, especially when it came immediately to contradict that which was so specially enjoin'd him. 2. Where God commands a Prophet to do any thing in the pursuit of his Message, there he can have no ground to question whether God shou'd countermand it or no by another Prophet; because that was in effect to thwart the whole design of his Message. So it was in this action of the Prophet; for God intended his not eating and drinking in *Bethel* to testify how much he loathed and abominated that place since its being polluted with Idolatry. 3. He might have just cause to question the integrity of the old Prophet, both because of his living in *Bethel*, and not openly, according to his office, reproving their Idolatry, and that God shou'd send him out of *Judea* upon that very errand, which wou'd not have seem'd so probable, if there had been true Prophets resident upon the place. 4. The thing he desired him to do, was not an act of that weight and importance, on which God us'd to send his Word to any Prophets, much less by one Prophet to contradict what he had said by another; and therefore *Tertullian* saith of him, *pœnam deserti jejunii luit*, God punish'd him for breaking his fast at *Bethel*; and therefore that Message of this Prophet seem'd to gratify more Man's carnal appetite, than usually the actions of Prophets did, which were most times matters of hardship and uneasiness to the flesh. 5. However all these were, yet he yielded too soon, especially having so much reason on his side as he had; being well assured that God had commanded him, he had reason to see some clear Evidence of a countermand, before he altered his mind: if he had seen any thing upon tryal which might have staggered his faith, he ought to have made his immediate recourse to God by Prayer for the settlement of his mind, and removal of this great temptation. But so easily to hearken to the words of a lying Prophet, which contradicted his own Message, argued either great Unbelief as to his own Commission, or too great Easiness and Inadvertency in being drawn aside by the old Prophet. And therefore God made that old Prophet himself in the midst of his

Tertullian.
de jejuniis,
cap. 16.

his entertainment, as with a *Hand-writing against the wall*, to tell him *he was weighed in the ballance, and found too light*; and therefore his Life shou'd be taken from him. Thus we see how dangerous a thing it was either to counterfeit a Spirit of Prophecy, or to hearken to those who did.

It is the generally received Opinion among the Jewish Doctors, that the cognizance and tryal of false Prophets did peculiarly belong to the great *Sanhedrin*. And that this was one end of its Institution. So *Maimonides* after he has largely discoursed of the punishment of a Seducer, and speaking of that of a false Prophet, he lays this down as a standing Rule among them, *ואידרנן נביא* *השקר אלה בדר של עמי* *No false Prophet was to be judged but in the Court of Seventy one*; which was the number of the great *Sanhedrin*. And there is something looks very like this in the proceedings of the People of *Israel* against the Prophet *Jeremiah*; for the People, the Priests and the Prophets, they laid hold on him; and immediately after we read that the Princes of *Judah* (by whom *Grotius* understands the Senators of the great *Sanhedrin*) they came up from the King's house to the house of the Lord, and sat down in the entry of the new gate of the Lord's house; which probably was the place where the great *Sanhedrin* sat) where after a particular Examination of *Jeremiah*, they acquit him as a person not worthy to die upon a counterfeiting Prophecy, but declare that he spake unto them in the name of the Lord. And in this sense *Grotius* likewise understands what is said of *Zedekiah* concerning *Jeremiah* to the Princes of *Judah* afterwards, *Behold he is in your hand; for the King is not he that can do ought against you*; i. e. saith *Grotius*, *In manibus Synedrui cujus est judicare de Prophetis vero aut falso*. And to this many make those words of our Savior refer, *That it is impossible a Prophet should perish out of Jerusalem*, because the seat of the great *Sanhedrin* was in *Jerusalem*; and so elsewhere our Savior saith, *O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the Prophets, and stonest them which are sent unto thee*: because there it was the true Prophets were destroy'd as tho' they had been false ones, and God's own Messengers punished with the death of Seducers, which was Lapidation. And on this very account many are of opinion that our Savior was condemned by the *Sanhedrin* at *Jerusalem*; which is supposed to have been assembled in the house of *Caiaphas* the High Priest, when *Christ* was carried thither for Examination; which some think to have been at his Lodgings in the Temple, others at his Palace in the City. For we read that the Chief Priests, and the Elders, and all the Council were met together at the High Priest's Palace in order to our Savior's Tryal. The next Morning they were met early together again in order to the further scanning of this business; but they seem not to examine *Christ* concerning a true Spirit of Prophecy, but concerning his being the *Messias*, and calling himself the Son of God; and so they would seem rather to proceed upon the Law against Blasphemy, than that against false Prophets.

But that which was the greatest security of the People against the imposture of false Prophets, was the certain Rules of judging them which were laid down in the Law of *Moses*: which may be

comprehended under these two Heads, such as concern their Doctrine, or such as concern their Predictions. *First*, such as concerned the Prophets Doctrine, which shou'd especially be looked after, because the main office of a Prophet was to be *interpres & internuncius divinæ voluntatis*, to be a *revealer of God's Will to Men*. For the primary Notion of a Prophet doth not lie in foretelling future events, but in declaring and interpreting to the world the Mind of God, which he receives by immediate Revelation from himself. So that the receiving what he makes known by immediate Revelation, is that which formally constitutes a Prophet; but it is wholly extrinsecal and accidental what time his prophecy respects, whether past, present, or to come; but because future contingencies are the furthest out of the reach of humane understanding, therefore the predictions of such have been chiefly looked on as the chief Note and Character of a Prophet, as being apprehended to be the strongest evidence of Divine Revelation. And hence it is in Scripture that the Patriarchs as *Abraham* and others are called Prophets, not because of any prediction uttered by them, but because of the frequency of immediate Divine Revelations among them. And hence likewise those in the New Testament who expounded the Scriptures by immediate Inspiration, are call'd Prophets; and this was the *Ἀποκάλυψις* spoken of by the Apostle, the Exposition of the hidden Mysteries of the Old Testament by an immediate Inspiration. And there is no word in the *Hebrew* for a Prophet, which may not equally respect all differences of time, but every one doth import immediate Inspiration; for *נביא* properly is one *qui revelat abscondita*; *רואה* a *Seer* chiefly respects the clear representation of the intellectual species by the *lumen propheticum* to the understanding, and *חזון* carries an equal indifference to all circumstances of time.

Psal. 105.
15.
Gen. 20. 7.

1 Cor. 14.
26.

Vide Alstedii
Trifol.
proph. p. 53.

V.

Deut. 18.
21.

This being then the chief notion of a Prophet, whatever he declared as the Mind and Will of God, must be searched and examined, to see what consonancy it hath thereto. For the question which *Moses* supposeth, is founded upon clear and evident reason, *And if thou shalt say in thine heart, How shall we know the Word which the Lord hath not spoken?* For it being plain that there may be false Prophets as well as true, we had need of some certain rules to judg of what is delivered for Divine Revelation. For the clearing of which important Question, I lay down these principles.

1. *The immediate dictates of natural light are no sufficient standard to judg of Divine Revelation by.* I mean not in reference to consonancy or repugnancy to natural light, but in reference to the extent and latitude of Divine Revelation, *i. e.* that natural light doth not contain in it whatever may be known of God or of his Will; and that upon these reasons: 1. It implies no repugnancy to any dictate of nature, that God shou'd reveal any thing more of his Mind and Will, than is contained in the light of nature. 2. Nature reacheth, as to matters concerning Religion, no further than the obligation to Duty, but leaves the particular determination of the manner of obedience to divine positive Laws, as is clear in reference to the time, place, and particular duties of worship. 3. Nature owning an universal obligation to the Will of God in whatever

ever

ever he shall command, doth suppose a power in God to command what he pleaseth. 4. Nature is sensible of its own decays; and the imperfection of its own light, and therefore seems rather to require further illumination than to put any bar against it. 5. Man's happiness being a free gift of God's, it stands to the highest reason that he shou'd have the prescribing of the conditions which are in order to it; now these conditions being the results, not of God's nature, but of his arbitrary Will, it is impossible that natural light cou'd ever reach to the full discovery of them. 6. It hath been the general sense of all Nations in the World, that God may reveal more of his Will than Nature can reach unto; which sense discovers it self in two things. 1. Praying to their several Gods for direction. 2. Harkening after pretended Oracles, which the Devil cou'd never have had that advantage of deceiving the World by, had it not been for this general sense of Mankind, that there wanted some particular Revelation from God to make Men happy. So then this may be assumed as a principle, That God may reveal more of his Mind and Will to Mankind, than he hath done by the dictates of mere natural light and reason.

2. *Whatever speaks a direct repugnancy to any of the fundamental dictates of nature, cannot be of Divine Revelation.* For those being founded, not upon any positive or arbitrary Will, but upon those inward impressions which are derived from the Divine Nature its self, it cannot in reason be supposed that God shou'd commission any to enervate his own Fundamental Law; and so by one Will to contradict another. *Placitum Regis* must never stand against the *Placita Coronæ*: Those things which depend upon Fundamental and Established Laws, hold good against any positive sentence or declaration of a Prince's Will; Because he is supposed to have bound up himself by the established Laws; and therefore any thing else which comes from him, contrary to them, is supposed not to be the Will of the Prince, but of the persons persuading him to it. But this now cannot be supposed in God, that he shou'd be any ways drawn to cassate the Obligation of what is imprinted upon the Souls of Men as his own Law. But yet we must distinguish between nulling the general Obligation, and altering the particular nature of any thing which depends upon that general Law; the *first* in any case is impossible, that any Divine Revelation shou'd make it not to be Man's Duty to obey his Maker, or not to be a sin to commit Murder, to lye, or to steal from another; but there may come a particular Revelation from God to alter the respects and nature of such things as do immediately depend upon his own dominion; as the lives of persons and the properties of things are; and thus God did reveal to *Abraham* that he shou'd go and sacrifice his Son, which had been no murder, when done upon God's immediate command, and a sacrifice to himself, and therefore wou'd have been acceptable as a testimony of entire obedience (which God did accept without the act) and so the *Israelites* taking the *Egyptians* Jewels, and dispossessing the *Canaanites*, did depend upon God's immediate disposal of these things to them, which otherwise had been a sin in them, and no doubt was so to any that were unsatisfy'd whether God had immediately commanded it or no. Or from hence to

VI.

P 2

infer

infer any general rule, is no doubt a breach of Divine Commands, and contrary to his Nature and Will.

- VII. 3. *Where God hath established a positive Law; prescribing a form and manner wherein he will be worshipped, it is sufficient evidence of a false Prophet, to go about to null the obligation of that Law; unless there be as great evidences given, that God did intend the establishing a new Law by that Person, as he did at first the institution of the old by the hand of Moses.* This latter clause is inserted, to shew that the succeeding of the Doctrine of *Christ*, into the place of the Law of *Moses*, doth not bear any repugnancy to the Hypothesis laid down, there being greater evidences of God's intending the abolishing the Ceremonial Law by the Gospel of *Christ*, than there were of the establishment of it by *Moses*. But of those afterwards. I now only speak of such as upon the mere pretence of Divine Revelation, shou'd destroy any precept of an established positive Law; and this, as far as we can find, was the great Rule the *Jews* went by; if any thing were spoken by any Prophet, contrary to the Law of *Moses*, or tending to the alteration of the worship of God established thereby, he was accounted a false Prophet. The modern *Jews* to justify themselves in their own Belief, as to the Doctrine of *Christ*, extend this further than the Law doth; for they enlarge it to all the precepts of the Ceremonial Law; whereas God in the Law seems to limit it to the Moral Law, and chiefly insists on the three first precepts of the *Decalogue*; and therefore condemns such a one as spake in the name of the Lord, when he had not commanded them, Deut. 18. 20. and such endeavoured to bring in idolatry, Deut. 13. 1, 2, 3. where tho' the false Prophet shou'd offer to do signs and wonders before them, yet if his intention were to draw them to worship false Gods, they were not to hearken unto him. And therefore *Maimonides*, where he largely disputes about the truth of Prophecies, lays this down as a certain Rule: *Si Prophetæ surrexerit, atque magna miracula aut prodigia fecerit, & adlaboraverit falsitatis convincere prophetiam* *M. N. istum non audimus, quia certò novimus prodigium præstigiis aut incantationibus productum esse*, as *Vorstius* renders him. If a Prophet do never so great Miracles, and seeks to convince *Moses* of falshood, we are not to hearken to him; for we know that they are not done by the power of God, but by the illusion of the Devil. And elsewhere he tells us, that if any pretends to prophecy *בשם עובדי* in the name of Idols, they must not so much as dispute with him, nor answer him, nor desire any Signs or Miracles from him; and if of himself he shews any, we are not to regard or mind them; for, saith he, whoever doth but doubt in his mind concerning them, he breaks that Command, And thou shalt not hearken to the words of that prophet. So that the Doctrine once established, ought to be our most certain Rule, according to which we must judge of all pretenders to Miracles, if their design be to draw Men off from God's Word, we are not to hearken to what they either say or do.

*Maimon.
de fund.
leg. c. 8. f. 7.*

*Idem de
Idololat.
leg. c. 5. f. 9.*

Deut. 13. 3.

- VIII. 4. *The Doctrine of those Prophets who seek not to introduce Idolatry, must not be measured by a strict conformity to the words of Moses his Law, but to the main reason and intention of it.* The great reason of this is, because God did not intend the *Jews* shou'd always

always rest in the *Pædago* of the Ceremonial Law, but sent them Prophets to train them up by degrees, and to fit them for a state of better perfection; and therefore it wou'd be very unreasonable to judge whether they were true Prophets or no, exactly by that which they came gradually to wean them from; which were all one, as to try one whether he were grown a Man or no, by the Swadling-clouts he wore when he was a Child. God tempered the Ceremonial Law much according to the condition and capacity of the persons it was prescribed to, and therefore the Sanctions of it did immediately respect their temporary concerns; but we are not to think the end of that dispensation was to be merely a Covenant for the Land of Promise; but as the Cherubims in the Temple did always look towards the Mercy-seat, so did this whole *economy* look towards the coming of the *Messias*. But it was with the generality of the *Jews*, as it is with ignorant people, who looking up to the Heavens, cannot fancy the Stars to be any bigger than they seem to them; but *Astronomers* by the help of their *Optic-tubes* and *Telescopes*, do easily discern the just magnitude of them; so the *Jews* ordinarily thought there was no more in these Types and Shadows, than was visibly represented to them; but such as had the help of the Divine Spirit (the best *Telescope* to discern the *Day-star* from on high with) cou'd easily look thro' those Prospectives, into the most glorious Mysteries of the Gospel of *Jesus Christ*. These Types being like triangular Prisms, that must be set in a due light and posture, before they can represent that great variety of Spiritual Mysteries which was contained in them. Now the great office of the Prophet was to administer this Light to the people, and to direct them in those excellent pieces of Perspective, wherein by the help of a Prophetic-glass, they might see the Son of God fully represented to their view. Besides this, the prophetic office was a kind of Chancery to the Mosaic Law, wherein the Prophets did interpret the *Pandects* of the Law *ex æquo & bono*, and frequently shewed in what cases God did dispense with the outward letter of it, to exalt the more the inward sense and reason of it. Hence the Prophets seem many times to speak contemptibly of the outward prescribed Ceremonies, when their intent is not to condemn the observation of them, but to tell the people there were greater things which God looked at, than the outward observation of some Ceremonial precepts, and that God wou'd never accept of that by way of commutation for real and internal goodness. Hence the Prophets by their own practice, did frequently shew that the Law of *Moses* did not so indispensibly oblige Men, but that God wou'd accept of those actions which were performed without the regularity required by the Law of *Moses*; and thus he did of sacrificing upon high places, not only before the building of the Temple, but sometimes after, as he accepted of the sacrifice of *Elijah* on Mount *Carmel*, even when high places were forbidden. Which the *Jews* are become so sensible of, that they grant that a true Prophet may sometimes command something to be done in violation of the Law of *Moses*, so he doth not draw people to Idolatry, nor destroy the obligation of *Moses* his Law. But this they restrain to *לפי שעה* something done in case of necessity, and that it shou'd not pass

Psal. 50. 8.
51. 16.
Isa. 1. 11,
13. 66. 3.
Jer. 7. 21,
22, 23.

1 Kings
18. 38.

Vid. *Jarchi*
Deut. 18.
21.
Et *Vorst. ad*
Maim. de
fund. c. o.
f. 5, 6, 7.

into a precedent or a perpetual Law; and therefore their rule is *לפי שעה שימענו לו בבר*. *The prophet was to be hearkened to in every thing he commanded in a case of necessity.* By this it is clear that the Prophets were not to be try'd by the Letter of the Law of *Moses*, but by the end and the reason of it. Thus much I suppose will make it clear what Rules the people had to try the Prophets Doctrine by, without Miracles.

C H A P. VI.

The Tryal of Prophetical Predictions and Miracles.

I. *The great difficulty of trying the truth of prophetical Predictions from Jer. 18. 7, 8, &c. Some general Hypotheses promised for the clearing of it.* II. *The first concerns the grounds why Predictions are accounted an evidence of Divine Revelation. Three Conjectures drawn thence.* III. *The second, the manner of GOD's Revelation of his Will to the Minds of the Prophets. Of the several degrees of Prophecy.* IV. *The third is, that GOD did not always reveal the internal purposes of his Will unto the true Prophets.* V. *The grand Question propounded, How it may be known when Predictions express GOD's decrees, and when only the series of causes. For the first several rules laid down.* 1. *When the Prediction is confirm'd by a present Miracle.* 2. *When the things foretold exceed the probability of second causes.* VI. 3. *When confirm'd by GOD's oath.* VII. 4. *When the Blessings foretold are purely spiritual.* VIII. *Three rules for interpreting the Prophecies which respect the state of things under the Gospel.* IX. *When all circumstances are foretold.* 6. *When many Prophets in several ages agree in the same predictions.* X. *Predictions do not express GOD's unalterable purposes, when they only contain comminations of judgments, or are predictions of temporal Blessings.* XI. *The case of the Ninevites, Hezekiah, and others, opened.* XII, XIII. *Of repentance in GOD, what it implies.* XIV. *The Jewish objections about predictions of temporal Blessings answered.* XV. *In what cases Miracles were expected from the Prophets: when they were to confirm the truth of their Religion. Instanced in the Prophet at Bethel, Elijah, Elisha and Moses himself; XVI. whose divine authority that it was proved by Miracles, is demonstrated against the modern Jews, and their pretences answered.*

I. **T**He next thing which the Rules of Tryal concerned, was the predictions of the Prophets. Concerning which GOD himself hath laid down this General Rule, *Deut. 18. 22. When a Prophet speaketh in the name of the Lord, if the thing follow not, nor come*

come to pass, that is the thing which the Lord hath not spoken, but the Prophet hath spoken it presumptuously; thou shalt not be afraid of him. Grotius understands this place of the Prophet's telling the people he would do some Miracles to confirm his Doctrine; but, if those Miracles were not done as he said, it was an evident demonstration of a false Prophet. It is certain it was so; for then his own mouth told him he was a lying Prophet; but these words seem to refer rather to something future than present, and are therefore generally understood concerning the truth of predictions, which was a matter of very difficult tryal, in regard of the goodness or the justice of God, so frequently interposing between the prediction and the event. That place which makes it so difficult to discern the truth of a prediction by the event, is *Jer. 18. 7, 8, 9, 10.* *At what instant I shall speak concerning a Nation, and concerning a Kingdom, to pluck up, and to pull down, and to destroy it; If that Nation against whom I have pronounced, turn from evil, I will repent of the evil I had thought to do unto them; And at what instant I shall speak concerning a Nation, and concerning a Kingdom, to build and to plant it; if it do evil in my sight, that it obey not my voice, then will I repent of the good wherewith I said I would benefit them.* By which place it seems clear, that even after the predictions of Prophets, God reserved a liberty to himself, either to repent of the evil or the good that was foretold concerning any people; how then can the fidelity of a Prophet be discovered by the event when God may alter the event, and yet the Prophet be a true Prophet? This being a case very intricate and obscure, will call for the more diligence in the unfolding of it: In order to which, we shall first premise some general *Hypotheses*, and then come to the particular resolution of it. The general *Hypotheses* will be concerning the way and method of God's revealing future contingencies to the Prophets, without which it will be impossible to resolve the particular emergent cases concerning predictions.

The prediction of future events is no further an argument of a prophetic Spirit, than as the foreknowledge of those things is supposed to be out of the reach of any created understanding; and therefore God challengeth this to himself in Scripture, as a peculiar prerogative of his own, to declare the things that are to come, and thereby manifests the Idols of the Gentiles to be no Gods, because they could not shew to their worshippers the things to come, Isa. 44. 6, 7. From this *Hypothesis* these three Consequentials follow:

II.
1. *Hypoth.*

1. That the events that are foretold, must be such as do exceed the reach of any created Intellect; for otherwise it could be no evidence of a Spirit of true Prophecy; so that the foretelling of such events as depend upon the series of Natural Causes, or such as tho' they are out of the reach of Human Understanding, yet are not of the Diabolical, or such things as fall out casually true, but by no certain grounds of prediction, can none of them be any argument of a Spirit of Prophecy.

2. That where there were any other evidences, that the Prophet spake by Divine Revelation; there was no reason to wait the fulfilling of every particular prophecy before he was believed as a Prophet. If so, then many of God's chiefest Prophets could not have

have been believed in their own Generations; because their Prophecies did reach so far beyond them, as *Isaiab's* concerning *Cyrus*, the Prophet at *Bethel* concerning *Jofias*: and all the prophecies concerning the Captivity and Deliverance from it, must not have been believed till fulfilled, that is, not believed at all: for when prophecies are accomplished, they are no longer the objects of Faith, but of sense. Where then God gives other evidences of Divine Inspiration, the credit of the Prophet is not suspended upon the minute accomplishment of every event foretold by him. Now it is evident there may be particular Divine Revelation of other things besides future contingencies, so that if a reason may be given, why events once foretold may not come to pass, there can be no reason why the credit of any prophecy shou'd be invalidated on that account; because every event is not exactly correspondent to the prediction. It is most certain that whatever comes under Divine Knowledg, may be divinely revealed; for the manifestation which is caused by any light, may extend it self to all things to which that light is extended: but that light which the Prophet saw by was a Divine Light, and therefore might equally extend it self to all kind of objects; but because future contingencies are the most remote from humane knowledg, therefore the foretelling of these hath been accounted the great evidence of a true Prophet; but yet there may be a knowledg of other things in a lower degree than future contingencies, which may immediately depend upon Divine Revelation; and these are,

1. Such things which cannot be known by any particular Man, but yet are certainly known by other Men; as the present knowledg of things done by persons at a remote distance from them: ^{2 King. 5. 26.} thus *Elisha* knew what *Gehazi* did, when he followed *Naaman*; and thus the knowledg of the thought of another's heart depends upon immediate Divine Revelation, whereas every one may certainly know the thought of his own heart; and therefore to some those things may be matters of sense or evident demonstration, which to another may be a matter of immediate Revelation.

2. Such things as relate not to future contingencies, but are matters of Faith exceeding the reach of humane apprehension; such things as may be known when revealed, but cou'd never have been found out without immediate Revelation; such all the Mysteries of our Religion are, the Mystery of the *Trinity*, *Incarnation*, *Hypostatical Union*, the Death of the Son of God for the pardon of the sins of Mankind. Now the immediate Revelation of either of these two sorts of objects speaks as much a truly Prophetical Spirit, as the prediction of future contingencies. So that this must not be looked on as the just and adequate rule to measure a Spirit of prophecy by; because the ground of judging a prophetical Spirit by that, is common with other things without that, seeing other objects are out of the reach of human Understanding as well as future events, and therefore the discovery of them must immediately flow from Divine Revelation.

3. The Revelation of future events to the Understanding of a Prophet, is never the less immediate, altho' the event may not be correspondent to the prediction. So that if it be manifested that

GOD

GOD immediately reveal such future contingencies to a Prophet, he wou'd be nevertheless a true Prophet whether those predictions took effect or no. For a true Prophet is known by the truth of Divine Revelation to the person of the Prophet, and not by the success of the thing, which, as is laid down in the *Hypothesis*, is no further an evidence of a true Prophet, than as it is an argument *à posteriori* to prove Divine Revelation by. If then the alteration of events after predictions be reconcilable with the truth and faithfulness of GOD, there is no question but it is with the truth of a prophetic Spirit, the formality of which lies in immediate Revelation.

The Prophets cou'd not declare any thing more to the people than was immediately revealed unto themselves. What was presently revealed, so much they knew, and no more, because the Spirit of prophecy came upon them *per modum impressionis transeuntis*, as the Schools speak, and not *per modum habitus*; the *lumen propheticum* was in them, not as *lumen in corpore lucido*, but as *lumen in aëre*; and therefore the Light of Revelation in their Spirits depended upon the immediate irradiations of the Divine Spirit. The Prophets had not always a power to prophesy when they wou'd themselves; and thence it is said, when they prophesy'd, that the Word of the Lord came unto them. And therefore the Schools determine, that a Prophet upon immediate Revelation did not know *omnia prophetabilia* (as they speak in their barbarous language) all things which God might reveal; the reason whereof *Aquinas* thus gives; The ground, saith he, of the connexion of divers objects together is some common tie or principle, which joyns them together; as charity or prudence is in moral vertues; and the right understanding of the principles of a science, is the ground why all things belonging to that science are understood; but now in Divine Revelation, that which connects the objects of Divine Revelation is God himself; now because he cannot be fully apprehended by any human intellect, therefore the understanding of a Prophet cannot comprehend all matters capable of being revealed, but only such as it pleaseth God himself freely to communicate to the Prophet's understanding by immediate Revelation. This is further evident by all those different degrees of illumination and prophecy, which the Jews and other Writers speak so much of, *viz.* of Dreams and Visions, the inspirations of the Holy Spirit, the *Gradus Mosaicus*, the External Voice, &c. Now in every one of these degrees the Prophet cou'd go no further than his present Revelation extended; and therefore *Aquinas* determines, That the Understandings of the Prophets were *instrumenta deficientia respectu principalis agentis*, *i. e.* that in prophetic illumination the Mind of the Prophet was so moved by the Spirit of GOD, as an instrument in the hand of an Artificer, which bears no proportion with the skill of the workman: And therefore the Mind of a Prophet is moved sometimes only to apprehend the thing represented (which they call *Instinctus Divinus*, of which they say a Prophet may have no certainty whether it comes from GOD or no) sometimes it is moved so far as to know certainly that this Revelation is from GOD (this they call *Lumen Propheticum*;) sometimes a Prophet may be moved to speak those things which he fully understands; so it was with

III.
2. Hypoth.

2. 2. q. 171.
Art. 2. 4.

2. 2. q. 173.
Art. 3.

Q

most

most of the true Prophets; but sometimes Men may be moved to speak that which they understand not, as is plain in *Caiaphas*, and probable in *Balaam*. Sometimes a thing was represented to the Fancy of one, without any possibility of understanding the meaning of those imaginary species, as in *Pharaoh's* and *Nebuchadnezzar's* Dreams; and to another may be given the true judgment of those motions of Fancy without the representation of the things to them, as in *Joseph* and *Daniel*. Now in these and many other different impressions of this prophetic Spirit, the Prophets, to whom the things were revealed, cou'd go no further than the degree of the Revelation made to them did extend.

IV.

3. Hypoth.

God did not always reveal to the Prophets the internal counsels and decrees of his own Will, but often only the method and series of his providence in the administration of things in the world. Which is the ground of that threefold distinction of prophecy in the Schools, into *Prophetia predestinationis*, *Prophetia prescientiæ*, and *Prophetia comminationis*; which is taken from the ordinary Gloss upon *Matth. 1.* where they are thus explain'd; *The Prophecy of Predestination* is, when the event depends wholly upon God's Will, without any respect to ours, as the prophecy of the *Incar-nation of Christ*; and the *Prophecy of Prescience* is of such things as depend upon the liberty of Man's Will; and the *Prophecy of Commination* only denotes God's denunciations of heavy judgments against a people. But *Aquinas* doth better reduce the two former to one, and the ground of the difference is to be fetched from the different ways whereby God knows things in the world; which is either as they are in their causes, and so they note the order and series of things in the world, with the mutual respects and dependencies they have upon one another, and this refers to God's administration of things in the world; or else God looks upon them as they are in themselves, or according to his own positive determinations of them; and now in this sense they are unalterable; but in the other they are not; but God may alter those respects of things when he pleaseth. Now tho' these different manners of knowledg can never be conceiv'd separate from one another in the Divine Understanding, yet in the Revelation made to the Mind of a Prophet, they may be disjoyn'd from each other, because God doth not always reveal things in the highest degree to the Prophets; for no free Agent doth always act as far as he can. And therefore prophetic Revelation is sometimes a representation of God's internal Decrees, and then they always take effect; and sometimes only the order of Causes and Effects, and they may admit of an alteration, and the prophecy nevertheless be true, because then it referr'd only to the series of Causes in the world, according to which the Events wou'd follow, if God himself did not interpose. These things being thus premis'd, we come to particular Resolutions, which must arise from the Evidences that may be given when prophetic predictions did express God's internal purpose and decree, and when only the order of the Causes in the world; for in these latter it is apparent that events might not answer predictions, and yet the Prophet be a true Prophet: which is a matter of greater difficulty, viz. to find out the exact differences of these two, till the event hath made it apparent which came

came from God's unalterable purpose, and which not. But tho' it be a subject little spoken to either by *Jewish* or *Christian* Writers, yet we are in hopes there may be some such clear Notes of distinction discovered between them, even *a priori*, which may sufficiently clear God's faithfulness, and the Prophet's truth, tho' the event be not always correspondent to the words of a prediction.

I begin then with the evidences that may be given when predictions do flow from internal purpose and decree.

V.

1. *Every prediction confirm'd by a present Miracle, doth not express merely the order of causes, but the determinations of God's will*, because there can be no sufficient reason given why the order of causes in Nature shou'd be altered to express the dependences of things on each other; for herein a Miracle wou'd rather tend to weaken than strengthen Faith, because the end of the Miracle wou'd be to confirm their Faith as to events following upon their causes; but now the *medium* us'd for that end seems to prove the contrary, viz. That God can alter the series of causes when he pleases himself, by working Miracles, and therein going contrary to the course of Nature; and therefore a Miracle seems to be a very incongruous argument in this, because its self is an evidence that may be, which it comes to prove shall not be. But when Prophets come to declare the internal purposes of the Will of God concerning future contingencies, no argument can be more suitable to demonstrate the truth of what is spoken, than the working of a present Miracle, for this demonstrates to the senses of Men, that however unlikely the event may be to them which is foretold, yet with God all things are possible, and that it is very unlikely God wou'd send such a Messenger to declare a falshood, whom he entrusted with so great a power as that of working Miracles. Thus it was in that remarkable prophecy concerning *Josias* by the Man of God at *Bethel*, 260 years before his Birth, which tho' it were to come to pass so long after, God confirm'd it by a Sign, which was *the renting of the Altar, and the pouring out of the ashes upon it, and the withering of Jeroboam's hand*. We cannot therefore in reason think that God wou'd set so clear a Seal to any Deed which he did intend himself to cancel afterwards.

¹ King. 13.

³.

2. *Predictions express God's inward purpose, when the things foretold do exceed all probabilities of second causes*; in which cause tho' those words of *Tertullian* seem very harsh, *credo quia impossibile*; yet taking that Impossibility as relating to second causes, and the ground of Faith to be some divine prediction, we see what reason there may be for them: For the more unlikely the thing is to be effected by second causes, the greater evidence is it, that the Prophets in foretelling it did not respect the mere order of things in the world, but the unalterable counsels of the will of God, which therefore wou'd certainly have their timely accomplishments. When therefore any Prophets did foretel things above the reach of Natural causes, and those things did not come to pass, it was a certain evidence of a false Prophet, as the contrary was of a true one; for none cou'd know so long before-hand such things as were above all human power, but such to whom God himself, who alone was able to effect them, did reveal and communicate the knowledg of them. And hence we see in Scripture those pre-

Q₂

dictions

Gal. 3. 17. dictions which have seemed the greatest improbabilities with them, have had the most punctual accomplishments, as the *Israelites* returning out of *Egypt* at the end of 430 years; their deliverance by *Cyrus* after the Captivity in *Babylon*, which seemed so improbable a thing, that when God speaks of it, he ushers it in with this preface, *That he frustrateth the tokens of the lyers, and maketh the deviners mad, but confirmeth the word of his servant, and performeth the counsel of his messengers, that saith to Jerusalem, Thou shalt be inhabited, &c.* The more unlikely then the thing was to come to pass, the greater evidence there was in so clear a prophecy of it so long before (above 100 years) and so exact a fulfilling of it afterwards precisely at the expiring of the LXX years from the first Captivity.

Gal. 3. 17.
Isa. 44. 25,
26, 28.

VI. 3. *Predictions concerning future events, which are confirmed by an oath from God himself, do express the immutable determinations of God's will.* For which we have the greatest assurance we can desire from that remarkable expression of the Apostle to the *Hebrews*, Heb. 6. 17, 18. *Wherein God willing more abundantly to shew to the heirs of promise the immutability of his counsel, confirmed it by an oath, that by two immutable things in which it was impossible for God to lye, we might have a strong consolation, &c.* Wherein the Apostle obviates and removes all doubts and misprisions, lest God after the declaring of his Will shou'd alter the event foretold in it, and that he doth, both by shewing that God had made an absolute promise, and withal to prevent all doubts, lest some tacite condition might hinder performance, he tells us that God had annexed his oath to it, which two things were the most undoubted evidences of the immutability of God's counsel. The word *τεῖδιαι* here us'd, doth in Scripture often note the frustrating of Mens hopes and expectations; so it is us'd Heb. 3. 17. *τεῖδιαι ἡ ἐργασία ἡλίας*, we render it the *labour of the Olive shall fail*. So Hos. 9. 2. *καὶ ὁ οἶνος ἐψύσσει αὐτοῦς, and the new Wine shall fail in her*. Thus the meaning here is, that by two immutable things in which it is impossible God shou'd frustrate the expectations of Men, or alter the events of things after he had declared them. For God's oath is an evident demonstration of the immutability of his Will in all predictions to which this is annexed, and doth fully exclude that which the Scripture calls repenting in God, that is, doing otherwise than the words did seem to express, because of some tacite conditions understood in them. So we find *Psal.* 89. 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36. *If they break my statutes, and keep not my commandments, then will I visit their transgression with the rod, and their iniquity with stripes; nevertheless my loving kindness will I not utterly take from him, nor suffer my faithfulness to fail; my covenant will I not break; nor alter the thing that is gone out of my lips. Once have I sworn by my holiness, that I will not lye unto David. His seed shall endure for ever, and his throne as the Sun before me.* Wherein we see what way God takes to assure us of the immutability of his Covenant with his people, by the oath which he adjoyns to his promises; whereby God doth most fully express the unalterable determinations of his own Will, in that he swears by his own Holiness that he wou'd not lye unto *David*, i. e. that he wou'd faithfully perform what he had promis'd to him. And therefore *Tertullian* well faith,

faith, *Beati sumus quorum causa Deus jurat, sed miseri & detestabiles si ne juranti quidem credimus.* It is happy for us believing Creatures, that God stoops so low as to confirm his Covenant with an oath; but it will be sad and miserable for such as dare not venture their Faith upon it, when God hath annex'd his oath unto it. It is thought by Expositors, that there is a peculiar emphasis in those words, *אֲדֹנָי נִשְׁבַּעְתִּי* *Once have I sworn*, thereby noting the irrevocable nature of God's oath, that there is no need of repetition of it as among Men, because when once God swears by himself it is the highest demonstration that no conditions whatever shall alter his declared purpose. And therefore the Council of Toledo well explains the different nature of God's Oath, and his Repentance in Scriptures; *Jurare namque Dei est à se ordinata nullatenus convellere; pœnitere vero eadem ordinata cum voluerit immutare;* God is said to swear when he binds himself absolutely to performance: and to repent, when things fall out contrary to the declaration of God's Will concerning them; for so it must be understood to be only *mutatio sententiæ*, and not *consilii*, that the alteration may be only in the things, and not in the eternal purpose of God. But since it is evident in Scripture, that many predictions do imply some tacite conditions, and many declarations of God's Will do not express his internal purposes, it seem'd necessary in those things which God did declare to be the irrevocable purposes of his Will, there shou'd be some peculiar mark and character set upon them for the confirmation of his people's Faith, and this we find to be the annexing an oath to his promises. Thus it is in that grand Instrument of peace between God and his people, the covenant of Grace, wherein God was pleas'd so far to strengthen the Faith of his people in it, that he ratifies the articles of peace therein contain'd, but especially the Act of Grace, on his own part with an oath, thereby to assure them it was never his purpose to repeal it, nor to fail of performance in it. For we are not to think that an oath lays any greater obligation upon God for performance, than the mere declaration of his Will; it being a part of immutable justice, and consequently necessarily imply'd in the Divine Nature to perform promises when once made; but God's Oath respects us, and not himself, *viz.* that it might be a testimony unto us that God's Will thereby declar'd is his eternal and unchangeable Will, and so the mercies thereby promis'd are sure mercies; such as are *ἀποσπένδοντες*, *without any repentance on God's part.* Concil. Tol. 8. c. 2. Isa. 55. 3.

4. *Predictions made by the Prophets concerning Blessings merely spiritual, do express God's internal purpose, and therefore, must have their certain accomplishment in the time prefix'd by the Prophets.* VII.
The grand reason of this proposition, is, that the bestowing of Blessings merely spiritual, doth immediately flow from the Grace and Favor of God, and depend not upon conditions on our part, as procuring causes of them, and therefore there can be no account given why God shou'd suspend the performance of such promises, which wou'd not more strongly have held why he shou'd not have made any such promises at all. And therefore when we see that notwithstanding the highest demerits, God made such free promises, we can have no reason to think that any other demerits in-

Q₃

terposing

terposing between the promises and performance, shou'd hinder the accomplishment of them: unless it be inserted in the promises themselves, which is contrary to the nature of free promises: Upon this ground all the promises relating to the Gospel state, and to the Covenant of Grace therein contain'd, must have their due accomplishment in the time and manner prefix'd by the Prophets: and therefore the *Jews* are miserably blind when they suppose the reason why the promise of the *Messias* is yet deferr'd after so long expectation of him, is, the sins of their people; for this seems to suppose that God's promise of the *Messias* did depend upon their own righteousness and worthiness above all other people, which if it doth, they are like to be the most miserable and desperate people the world hath: and besides, if God's intuition of sin makes him defer the coming of the *Messias*, his foresight of sin wou'd have hinder'd him from ever promising a *Messias* to come: but this was so far from being a hindrance of God's promise, that the main end of the coming of the *Messias* was to *make reconciliation for iniquity, and to make an end of sin, and to bring in everlasting righteousness*. And we see where-ever the Prophets insist on the Covenant of Grace, the promise contain'd in it is *the blotting out of transgressions, and remembering sins no more*, and that merely on the account of God's free Love and for his own Name's sake: This can be no reason then why predictions concerning spiritual Blessings shou'd not have their exact accomplishment, because there can be no bar against free Love, and the bestowing of such Mercies which do suppose the greatest unworthiness of them, as Gospel Blessings do.

VIII. The great difficulty lies in explaining the prophetical phrases concerning the Gospel state, which seem to intimate a greater advancement and flourishing of peace and holiness therein, than hath as yet been seen in the Christian World; which gives the *Jews* the greater occasion to imagin that the state so much spoken of by the Prophets, is not yet established in the World. But all the difficulty herein ariseth from the want of consideration of the Idiotisms of the prophetical language, especially where it respects the state of things under the Gospel, concerning which, we may observe these following Rules.

1. *The Prophets under the Old Testament, when they speak of things to come to pass in the New, do set them forth by the representation of such things as were then in use among themselves*; thus the spiritual Worship of the Gospel is prophesied of, under the notion of the legal Worship among the *Jews*; the conversion of *Egypt* to the Gospel, is foretold *Isaiah* 19. 19, 21. by the setting up an Altar, and offering sacrifice to the Lord: and the Conversion of the Gentiles in general, by the offering up of incense, *Mal.* 1. 11. and the service of God under the Gospel, is set forth by going up to *Jerusalem*, and keeping the feast of *Tabernacles* there, *Zach.* 14. 16. and the plentiful effusion of the Spirit of God in the miraculous gifts, which attended the preaching of the Gospel, is set forth by the Prophet, *Joel* 2. 28. by prophesying, and dreaming dreams, and seeing visions; not that these things shou'd really be under Gospel times; but that the Prophets meaning might be the better understood by those he spake unto, he sets forth the great measure of gifts

gifts and Gospel light under those things which were accounted as the highest attainments among themselves. So the great measure and degree of holiness which was to be under Gospel times, is set forth by the Prophet *Zachary*, Zach. 14. 20. by the placing of the Motto which was among the *Jews* only upon the *High Priest's forehead*, that this shou'd be so common under the Gospel, that even *the bells of the horses should bear it*, i. e. those things which seem most remote from a spiritual use, shou'd be devoted to it, as the Bells were, which were commonly hang'd upon their war-horses in those mountainous Countries; and in the latter part of that verse, the height and progress of Gospel holiness is describ'd under that phrase, *That the pots in the Lords house should be as bowls before the Altar*, i. e. shou'd be advanc'd from a lower and more ignoble service, to a higher and more spiritual degree of holiness. Now the *Jews* when they observe these and many other prophetic passages relating to the time of the *Messias* to run in the old strain of the Law, they presently conclude that the *Messias* must not innovate any thing concerning their way or worship, but only be some great Prince to give them temporal deliverances, and so expound all these Texts in a literal sense, which were only express'd in such a strain, the better to help the capacities of those they spake them to.

2. *Things absolutely foretold to come to pass in Gospel times in a general manner, are to be understood comparatively in reference to what was before.* For when the measure of their grace or knowledge was so far above what was then among the *Jews*, that there was scarce any proportion between them, the Prophets made use of such expressions to set it forth by, which might raise up the dull apprehension of the *Jews* to conceive the just measure and fulness of it. Thus when the Prophets foretel the grand increase of spiritual knowledge in Gospel times, they do it in this phrase, *They shall not teach every man his neighbour, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord, for all shall know me from the least to the greatest*, Jer. 31. 33. Where it was far from the Prophet's meaning to exclude all use of teaching under the Gospel, (which is contrary to the end of all the Ordinances of the Gospel) but because teaching doth commonly suppose great ignorance, he sets forth the abundance of knowledge which shou'd be then, by the exclusion of that which doth imply it. So when it is said that *they shall all be taught of God*, the meaning is not, that every one that lives in the Gospel state, shou'd be thus effectually taught by the Spirit of God; but that the number of such under the Gospel, shou'd so far exceed those under the Law, that they cou'd hardly apprehend the disproportion between them, unless it had been set forth in so large an expression. Which leads me to the next Rule.

3. *Things foretold as universally or indefinitely to come to pass under the Gospel, are to be understood as to the duty of all, but as the event only of God's chosen people.* Thus when there is so great peace prophesied to be in Gospel times, that then *men should beat their swords into plow-shares, and spears into pruning-hooks; that the Wolf should lie down with the Lamb, and Leopard with the Kid; that Nation should not lift up sword against Nation, nor learn war* any

Isa. 2. 4.
11. 6, 7.

any more; with many others to the same purpose; all these speeches are to be understood of what the nature and design of the Gospel tends to, and what is the duty of all that profess it, and what wou'd effectually be in the Christian world, did all that profess the Christian Doctrine, heartily obey the Dictates of it; and so far as the Gospel doth prevail upon any, it so far cicurates their wild and unruly natures, that of furious Wolves they become innocent Lambs, and of raging Lions, tender Kids; so far from hurting and injuring others, that they dare not entertain any thoughts of ill-will or revenge towards their greatest enemies. And thus we may see, that notwithstanding the seeming repugnancies of the prophecies of the Old Testament concerning the state of the New, with the events which have been observ'd in it, yet that all those predictions which concern'd the bestowing of the spiritual Blessings which concern'd the Gospel state, have had their punctual accomplishment in the sense they were intended.

IX.

4. *Predictions concerning future events where not only the thing its self is foretold, but the several circumstances of persons, time, and place enumerated, are to have their due accomplishment, and consequently express God's inward purposes.* For those promises or comminations which are capable of alteration by some tacite conditions imply'd in them, do most commonly run in general terms; or else are spoken by way of immediate address to the persons concern'd in order to the stirring them up the more to the duty God aims at by those comminations; as when *Jonas* limited the *Ninevites* destruction to forty days. But when prophecies are recorded, not by way of commination but mere prediction, and particular circumstances set down, it stands to reason that such prophecies must have their certain accomplishment; and that *first*, because God by setting down the circumstances wou'd give them greater evidences that the predictions came from himself; as when the Prophet at *Bethel* not only foretold the destruction of the Altar there, but particularly named the Man that shou'd do it. viz. *Josias*. So when God by *Isaiah* call'd *Cyrus* by name, it was doubtless a great confirmation to them, that the deliverance of the *Jews* shou'd be by that person. *Secondly*, because the circumstances are intended for Land-marks to know the certainty of the accomplishment of the prophecy. For when they find the circumstances fall out exactly according to the prediction, they have no ground to question the accomplishment of the prophecy. And hence it was that in the grand prophecy of the coming of the *Messias* all particular circumstances were so long before foretold. The first dawning of his day being to *Adam* after his fall, when the nature he shou'd be born of was foretold, viz. not Angelical but Human, of the seed of the Woman. To *Abraham* it was further revealed of what Nation of Mankind, viz. from his Posterity; to *Jacob* at what time, when the *Scepter should be departed from Judah*; and from what Tribe, viz. his own; to *Isaiah* of what person in that Family, a Virgin; to *Micah* in what place, viz. *Bethlehem*; and to *Daniel* at what precise time, toward the expiring of his seventy weeks; which according to the most probable computation of them did commence from the seventh year of *Artaxerxes Longimanus*, and so the 490 years expired near upon our Saviour's passion. Now certainly

certainly the particular enumeration of all these circumstances spoken of so long before, and falling out so exactly, cou'd not but give the greatest conviction and evidence, that our blessed Savior was that person so much spoken of by the Prophets, in whom all these several lines did meet as in their center.

5. Lastly, *Predictions then express divine purposes when many Prophets in several ages concur in the same predictions*; because it is hardly seen but all those tacite conditions which are suppos'd in general promises or comminations may be alter'd in different ages; but when the conditions alter, and the predictions continue the same, it is a stronger evidence it is some immutable counsel of God which is express'd in those predictions. And in this case one prediction confirms the foregoing, as the *Jews* say of Prophets; *One Prophet that hath the testimony of another Prophet, is suppos'd to be true*; but it must be with this supposition, that the other Prophet was before approv'd to be a true Prophet. Now both these meet in the prophecies concerning our Savior; for to him bear all the Prophets witness, and in their several ages they had several things reveal'd to them concerning him; and the uniformity and perfect harmony of all these several prophecies by persons at so great distance from each other, and being of several interests and employments, and in several places, yet all giving light to each other, and exactly meeting at last in the accomplishment, do give us yet a further and clearer evidence, that all those several beams came from the same Sun, when all those scattered Rays were at last gathered into one Body again at the appearance of the Sun of Righteousness in the World.

Thus have we now cleared when predictions are expressive of God's internal purposes; by observation of which Rules we may easily resolve the other part of the difficulty, when they only express the series and dependencies of things which wou'd have their issue and accomplishment, if God by his immediate hand of Providence did not cut off the entail of effects upon their natural causes. Now as to these prophecies which concern things considered in themselves, and not precisely as they are in the counsel of God, we are to observe these Rules.

1. *Comminations of judgments to come do not in themselves speak the absolute futurity of the event, but do only declare what the persons to whom they are made are to expect, and what shall certainly come to pass, unless God by his mercy interpose between the threatening and the event.* So that comminations do speak only the *debitum pœnæ*, and the necessary obligation to punishment; but therein God doth not bind up himself as he doth in absolute promises; the reason is because comminations confer no right to any, which absolute promises do; and therefore God is not bound to necessary performance of what he threatens. Indeed the guilt; or obligation to punishment is necessary, where the offence hath been committed to which the threatening was annexed; but the execution of that punishment doth still depend upon God's arbitrary Will, and therefore he may suspend or remove it upon serious addresses made to himself in order to it. For since God was pleas'd not to take the present forfeiture of the first grand transgression, but made such a relaxation of that penal Law, that con-

R

dition

dition of pardon were admittable, notwithstanding sentence pass'd upon the malefactors, there is strong ground of presumption in Humane Nature that G O D's forbearance of Mankind notwithstanding sin, doth suppose his readiness to pardon offenders upon their repentance, and therefore that all particular threatnings of judgments to come, do suppose incorrigibleness in those they are pronounc'd against: Upon which the foundation of hope is built, that if timely repentance do intervene, G O D will remove those judgments which are threatned against them.

XI. And this was certainly the case of the *Ninevites* upon *Jonas* his preaching among them. For when the threatning was so peremptory, *Yet forty days, and Nineve shall be destroyed*, all the hope they cou'd have of pardon must be from the general persuasions of Men's Souls of G O D's readiness to remove judgments upon repentance. For otherwise there had been no place for any thing but despair, and not the least encouragement to supplicate the Mercy of G O D, which we see they did in a most solemn manner after they were convinc'd these comminations came from G O D himself by the mouth of his Prophet. Some think that *Jonas* together with the threatning of judgment did intermix exhortations to repentance; but we can find no probability at all for that on these two accounts: First, *Jonas* then wou'd not have been so unwilling to have undertaken this message; for as far as we can see, the harshness of it was the main reason he sought to have avoided it by flying to *Tarshish*. Secondly, *Jonas* wou'd have had no pretence at all for his anger and displeasure at G O D's pardoning *Nineve*; which is most probably conceiv'd to have been, because the *Ninevites* might now suspect him to be no true Prophet, because the event answer'd not his prediction. Now there had been no reason at all for this, if he had mix'd promises together with his threatnings; for then nothing wou'd have fall'n out contrary to his own predictions. And therefore it seems evident that the message *Jonas* was sent with, was only the commination of their speedy ruin, which G O D did on purpose to awaken them the sooner, and with greater earnestness to repentance, when the judgment was denounc'd in so peremptory a manner; altho' it seems *Jonas* had before such apprehensions of the *merciful nature of God*, and his readiness to pardon, that he might suppose G O D's intention by this severe denunciation of judgment, might be only to take occasion upon their repentance, to shew his goodness and bounty to them. But this was no part of his instructions, which he durst not go beyond in his preaching, whatever his private opinion might be; for the Prophets were to utter no more in their preaching or particular messages than was in their commission, and were not to mix their own words with the Word of the Lord.

XII. And by this we may further understand the denunciation of death to *Hezekiah* by the Prophet *Isaiah*, *Set thy house in order, for thou shalt die and not live*. I question not but the Prophet reveal'd to *Hezekiah* as much as G O D had reveal'd to him (for to say as *Molinæus* doth, that the Prophet spake these words of his own head, before he fully understood G O D's mind, is very harsh and incongruous) but G O D might at first discover to *Isaiah* not his internal purpose, but what the nature of the disease wou'd bring him

Molin. Vates, l. 1. c. 26.

him to (unless his own immediate hand of Providence interpos'd) which message he wou'd have *Isaiah* carry to *Hezekiah* for the tryal of his Faith, and exciting him to the more lively acts of Grace, and for a further demonstration of God's goodness to him in prolonging his Life beyond humane probability and the course of Second Causes. Now what repugnancy is there to the truth and faithfulness of God, that God shou'd conceal from his Prophets in their Messages the internal purposes of his Will, and in order to the doing good to Men shou'd only reveal what wou'd certainly have come to pass unless himself had otherwise determin'd it. And thus the repentance which is attributed to God in reference to these denunciations of judgments, is far from importing any real mutation in the internal purposes of God (a rock some have split themselves upon) but it only signifies the outward changing of the Scene towards Men, and acting otherwise than the words of the Prophets did seem to import, and all the alteration is in the outward discovery of his Will, which is certainly far from being any collusion in God: Unless we must suppose God so bound up, that he hath no liberty of using his own methods for bringing Men to repentance, or for tryal of his People's graces, but must in every instance of his Word declare nothing but his own internal purposes, which is contrary to the general method of God's dealing with the World, which is, to govern Men by his own Laws, and thereby to awaken them to duty, and deter from sin by his annex'd threatnings, without revealing any thing of his internal purposes concerning the state and condition of any particular persons at all; which threatnings of his, tho' pronounced with the greatest severity, do not speak God's inward resolutions as to any particular person, but what all must expect if they continue impenitent and incorrigible. For the only conditions imply'd in these threatnings being repentance, it necessarily follows, that where that is wanting, these Hypothetical comminations are absolute predictions of what shall certainly come to pass on all those who are destitute of the condition suppos'd in them.

So that where any comminations are pronounced by any in a prophetic way concerning any person or people, and no alteration happen at all in them, but they continue impenitent and incorrigible, there the not coming of them to pass may be a token of a false Prophet. For in this case the only tacite condition imply'd in these threatening prophecies is suppos'd to be wanting, and so the comminations must be understood as absolute predictions: Now in those comminations in Scripture, which are absolutely express'd, but conditionally understood, we find something interposing, which we may rationally suppose was the very condition understood. As *Abimelech's* restoring of *Sarah* was the ground why the sentence of death after it was denounced, was not executed upon him: So *Ahab's* Humiliation, *Hezekiah's* his earnest Prayer, the *Ninevites* Repentance, all interpos'd between sentence and execution, whereby we may be fully satisfy'd of the reason why these denunciations did not take effect: But where the persons continue the same after threatnings that they were before, there is no reason why the sentence shou'd be suspended, unless we shou'd suppose it to be a mere effect of the patience and long-

XIII.

Gen. 20. 8.

1 King. 21.

19.

R 2

suffering

suffering of God, leading Men to repentance and amendment of life: Which is the ground the *Jews* give, why the not fulfilling of denunciations of judgment was never accounted sufficient to prove a Man a false Prophet; to which purpose these words of *Maimonides* are observable in his *Jesude Thorah*, where he treats particularly on the subject of Prophecies: *If a Prophet foretel sad things, as the death of any one, or famine, or war, or the like; if these things come not to pass, he shall not be accounted a false Prophet; neither let them say, Behold he hath foretold, and it comes not to pass; for our blessed God is slow to anger, and rich in mercy, and repenteth of the evil; and it may be that they repent, and God may spare them, as he did the Ninevites, or defer the punishment, as he did Hezekiah's.* Thus we see that propheticall comminations do not expresse God's internal purposes, and therefore the event may not come to pass, and yet the Prophet be a true Prophet.

*Maim. de
fund. leg.
c. 10. f. 6.*

XIV.

2. *Predictions concerning temporal blessings, do not always absolutely speak the certainty of the event, but what God is ready to do, if they to whom they are made continue faithful to him:* For which we have sufficient ground from that place of *Jeremiah* 18. 9, 10. *At what instant I shall speak concerning a Kingdom, to build and to plant it; if it do evil in my sight, that it obey not my voice, then will I repent of the good wherewith I said I would benefit them.* So *Isaiah* 1. 19, 20. *If ye be willing and obedient, ye shall eat the good of the land; but if ye refuse and rebel, ye shall be devoured with the sword; for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it.* Whereby we see it evident, that all Promises of Temporal Blessings are not to be taken absolutely, but with the condition of obedience. But this the *Jews* can by no means digest, whose Rule is, that all prophecies of good things to come must necessarily come to pass, or he was no true Prophet who spake them: For, saith *Maimonides*, *Whatever good thing God hath promised, altho' it be promised under a condition, he never revokes it; and we never find that God repented him of any good thing promis'd, but in the destruction of the first Temple, when God had promis'd to the righteous, they shou'd not die with the wicked; but he repented him of his words.* But it is very plain to any one that considers the *Jewish* Interpretations of Scripture, that in them they have always an eye to themselves, and will be sure not to understand those Scriptures which seem to thwart their own interest, as is most apparent in the present case; for the grand reason why the *Jews* insist so much on the punctual accomplishment of all Promises of good to be the sign of a true Prophet is, to uphold their own interest in those Temporal Blessings which are prophesied of concerning them in the Old Testament; altho' one wou'd think the want of correspondency in the event in reference to themselves, might make them a little more tender of the honor of those Prophecies which they acknowledg to be divine; and have appear'd to be so in nothing more than the full accomplishment of all those threatnings which are denounced against them for their disobedience, even by the mouth of *Moses* himself, *Deut.* 28. from the 15th to the end. Can any thing be more plain and evident, than that the enjoyment of all the privileges conferr'd upon them, did depend upon the condition of their continuing faithful to God's Covenant? The only place of Scri-
pture

ibid. f. 7, 8.

pture produced by them with any plausibility, is that *Jer. 28. 9. The Prophet which prophesieth of peace, when the word of the Prophet shall come to pass, then shall the Prophet be known that the Lord hath truly sent him.* For reconciling of which place with those already mention'd, we are to understand that here was a particular contest between two Prophets, *Hananiah* and *Jeremiah*; *Jeremiah* he foretold evil to come, tho' unwillingly, *ver. 6. Hananiah* he prophesied peace. Now *Jeremiah*, according to God's peculiar directions and inspiration, appeals to the event to determine whose prophecy was the truest: Now, saith *Jeremiah*, if the prophecy of *Hananiah* concerning peace be fulfill'd, then he is the true Prophet, and I the false. And in this case when two Prophets prophesy contrary things, it stands to reason that God will not reveal any thing by the mouth of his own Prophet which shall not infallibly come to pass, that thereby the truth of his own Prophet may be fully manifested. Besides *Jeremiah* refers not merely to the event foretold, but gives a sudden specimen of his own truth in another prophecy concerning the death of *Hananiah*, which was punctually accomplish'd the same year, *ver. 17.* And which is most considerable to our purpose, both these Prophets considered the same people under the same circumstances, and with the same conditions; and so *Jeremiah*, because of their incorrigibleness, foretels desolation certainly to come; notwithstanding this, *Hananiah* foretels peace and safety, which was contrary directly to God's method of proceeding, and so the falsity of his prophecy wou'd infallibly be discovered by the event. So that notwithstanding this Instance, it appears evident, that predictions of temporal Blessing do suppose conditions, and so have not always the event fulfilled, when the people do not perform their condition of obedience. And thus we have now laid down the Rules whereby the truth of prophecies was to be judg'd; by which it appears what little need the constant Prophets had to appeal to Miracles to manifest the certainty of Divine Revelation in them. So we have finished our first Proposition concerning the manner of trying Divine Revelation in the Prophets God sent among his people.

We now come to the second general Proposition concerning the Prophets. *Those Prophets whom God did imploy upon some extraordinary message for confirming the truth of the Religion established by him, had a power of Miracles conferred upon them in order to that end.* So that we must distinguish the ordinary employment of Prophets, which was either Instruction or Prediction of future events among God's own people, from their peculiar messages when they were sent to give evidence to the truth of that way of Religion which was then settled by God's own appointment. Now the Prophets generally did suppose the truth of their Religion as owned by those they were sent to, and therefore it had been very needless employing a power of Miracles among them to convince them of that which they believed already. For we never read among all the revolts of the people of the *Jews*, that they were lapsed so far as totally to reject the Law of *Moses*, (which had been, to alter the constitution of their Common-wealth) altho' they did enormously offend against the precepts of it, and that in those things wherein the honor of God was mainly concerned, as is most plain

in their frequent and gross Idolatry: Which we are not so to understand as tho' they wholly cast off the worship of the true God, but they superinduced (as the *Samaritans* did) the worship of Heathen Idols with that of the God of *Israel*. But when the revolt grew so great and dangerous that it was ready to swallow up the true worship of God, unless some apparent evidence were given of the falsity of those Heathen mixtures, and further confirmation of the truth of the established Religion, it pleased God sometimes to send his Prophets on this peculiar message to the main instruments of this revolt: as is most conspicuous in that dangerous design of *Jeroboam*, when he out of a politic end set up his two Calves in opposition to the Temple at *Jerusalem*; and therein it was the more dangerous in that in all probability he designed not the alteration of the worship it self, but the establishment of it in *Dan* and *Bethel*. For his interest lay not in drawing of the people from the worship of God, but from his worship at *Jerusalem*, which was contrary to his design of cantonizing the Kingdom, and taking the greatest share to himself. Now that God might confirm his peoples Faith in this dangerous juncture of time, he sends a Prophet to *Bethel*, who by the working of present Miracles there, *viz. the renting the Altar and withering of Jeroboam's hand*, did manifest to them that these Altars were displeasing to God, and that the true place of worship was at *Jerusalem*. So in that famous *Fire-Ordeal* for trying the truth of Religion between God and *Baal* upon Mount *Carmel* by *Elijah*, God was pleas'd in a miraculous way to give the most pregnant testimony to the truth of his own worship, by causing a fire to come down from Heaven and *consume the sacrifice*, by which the Priests of *Baal* were confounded, and the people confirmed in the Belief of the only true God: for presently upon the sight of this Miracle the people fall on their faces and say, *The Lord he is God, the Lord he is God*. Whereby we plainly see what clear evidence is given to the truth of that Religion, which is attested with a power of Miracles. Thus the Widow of *Sarepta* which was in the Countrey of *Zidon*, was brought to believe *Elijah* to be a true Prophet by his raising up her Son to Life. And the Woman said to *Elijah*, *Now by this I know that thou art a Man of God, and that the word of the Lord by thy mouth is truth*. So we see how *Naaman* was convinc'd of the true God by his miraculous cure in *Jordan* by the appointment of *Elisha*, *Behold now I know that there is no God in all the earth, but in Israel*; by which instances it is demonstrable that either the Faith of all these persons was built upon weak and insufficient grounds, or that a power of Miracles is an evident confirmation of the truth of that Religion which is establish'd by them. For this we see was the great end for which God did imploy any of his Prophets to work Miracles, *viz. to be as an evident demonstration of the truth of what was revealed by him*. So that this power of Miracles is not meerly a motive of credibility, or a probable inducement to remove prejudice from the person, as many of our Divines speak, but it doth contain an evident demonstration to Common Sense of the truth of that Religion which is confirm'd by them.

And

And thus we assert it to have been in the case of *Moses*, the truth of whose message was attested both among the *Egyptians*, and the *Israelites* by that power of Miracles which he had. But herein we have the great Patrons of *Moses* our greatest enemies, viz. the present *Jews*; who by reason of their enmity to the Doctrine of *CHRIST*, which was attested by unparalell'd Miracles, are grown very shy of the Argument drawn from thence: Infomuch that their great Dr. *Maimonides* lays down this for a confident Maxim, משה רבנו לא האמין בו ישראל מפני האותות: *The Israelites did not believe in Moses our Master for the sake of the Miracles which he wrought.* Did they not? the more shame for them: and if they did, the more shame for this great Rabbi thus to belye them. But the reason he gives for it is, *Because there may remain some suspicion in ones mind, that all Miracles may be wrought by a power of Magic or Incantation:* Say ye so? what, when *Moses* confounded all the Magicians in *Egypt*, and made themselves who were the most cunning in these things confess it was the finger of God, and at last give out as not able to stand before *Moses*? might one still suspect all this to be done by a Magical power? *Credat Judeus Apella, non ego.* This is much like what another of their Doctors says, whom they call the Divine Philosopher, that *Elisba* his raising the Child to Life, and curing *Naaman's* Leprosy; and *Daniel's* escaping the Lions, and *Jonas* out of the Whale's Belly, might all come to pass by the influence of the Stars, or by *Pythonsism*. Very probable! but it is most true which *G. Vortius* there observes of the *Jews*, *Nil non nugacissimi mortaliū fingunt ne cogantur agnoscere virtute ac digito quasi ipsius Dei Jesum nostrum effecisse miracula sua.* All their design in this is, only to lessen the Miracles of our Blessed Savior, and to derogate all they can from the Belief of them. Hence they tell us, that nothing is so easy to be done as Miracles; the mere recital of the *Tetragrammaton* will work wonders, and that by this *Jeremiah* and our Savior did all their Miracles: It is well yet that he did no more than one of their own Prophets had done before him; but where I wonder do we read that ever the pronouncing of four Letters raised one from the dead, who had lain four days in the grave? or by what power did *Christ* raise himself from the dead; (which was the greatest Miracle of all) cou'd his dead Body pronounce the *Tetragrammaton* to awaken its self with? But *Maimonides* further tells us, that the Miracles which *Moses* wrought among the *Israelites* were merely for necessity, and not to prove the truth of his Divine Commission, for which he instanceth in dividing the Red sea, the raining of Manna, and the destruction of *Corah* and his complices. But setting aside that these two latter were the immediate hand of God, and not Miracles done by *Moses*; yet it is evident that the intent of them was to manifest a Divine Presence among them: and in the tryal of *Corah* *Moses* appeals to God's immediate Providence to manifest whether God had immediately imploy'd him or no. For it is evident by the Text, that the main charge they laid against *Moses*, was ambition and usurpation; *Is it a small thing, say they, that thou hast brought us up out of a Land that floweth with milk and honey, to kill us in the wilderness, except thou make thy self altogether a prince over*

xvi.

Maim. de fund. leg. c. 8. f. 1.

Jos. Albo. l. 1. c. 18.

Numb. 16. 13.

V. 28, 29.

Exod. 19.
9.

over us? Whereby it is evident they thought that *Moses* acted out of a private design, and aimed at his own honor and authority; which was an imputation of the highest nature that cou'd be alledged against him. Now see how *Moses* proceeds to clear himself, (which is sufficient to stop the mouths of these incredulous *Jews*) for he lays the greatest evidence of his Divine Commission upon a present Miracle. And *Moses* said, *Hereby shall ye know that the Lord hath sent me to do all these works; for I have not done them of mine own mind; If these men die the common death of all men, then the Lord hath not sent me, &c.* Can any thing be more plain than that the only intent of this Miracle was to make it appear, that *Moses* took not his office upon him, but was immediately sent and imploy'd by God in what he did. But that which will put an end to this controversy is God's giving *Moses* a power to work Miracles for that very end that the *Israelites* shou'd believe him, *Exodus* 8. 8, 9. And can we think they wou'd have ever left *Egypt* as they did, and followed *Moses* into the wilderness, unless they had been fully convinced he was a deliverer sent from God? It is true (that which the *Jews* speak so much of) the *statio in monte Sina* was a great confirmation both to their own Faith and to *Moses* his, according to what God had told him, *Exod.* 3. 12. but yet it follows not hence they had no firm bottom for their Faith to stand on before (for then they might have been drowned in the Red sea as well as the *Egyptians*) but God knowing their incredulity and readiness to disobey his Law, did at the promulgation of it testify to their eyes and ears his own presence in the midst of them. And this certainly was one of the greatest Miracles of all: and therefore to oppose this to the evidence that is produced by Miracles is only to oppose a power of working Miracles to a power of doing them. So vain and empty then, so false and fallacious, yea so directly contrary to Holy Scripture is that *Axiome* of the *Jews*, *Prophetia veritas non confirmatur miraculis*: for Miracles are sufficient evidences of Divine Revelation in any whom God imployes, to all but such as are resolved not to believe them; and as one well saith, *Pertinacia nullum remedium posuit Deus*; God never works Miracles to convince obstinate *Atheists* and wilful *Infidels*. This now is the first case wherein Miracles are to be expected, which is, when God imployes any upon an extraordinary message, to be as credentials to confirm their Divine Commission.

CHAP.

C H A P. VII.

The eternity of the Law of *Moses* discussed.

- I. *The second case wherein Miracles may be expected, when a Divine positive Law is to be repealed, and another way of worship established instead of it. The possibility in general of a repeal of a Divine Law asserted; the particular case of the Law of Moses disputed against the Jews: II. the matter of that Law proved not to be immutably obligatory; because the ceremonial precepts were required not for themselves, but for some further end; that proved from Maimonides his confession: III. the precepts of the Ceremonial Law frequently dispensed with while the Law was in force. Of the Passover of Hezekiah, and several other instances. IV. It is not inconsistent with the wisdom of GOD to repeal such an established Law. Abravanel's arguments answered. V. Of the perfection of the Law of Moses, compared with the Gospel. VI. Whether GOD hath ever declared he would never repeal the Law of Moses. VII. Of adding to the precepts. VIII. Of the expressions seeming to imply the perpetuity of the Law of Moses. Reasons assigned why those expressions are used, tho' perpetuity be not implied. IX. The Law of Moses not built upon immutable reason, because many particular precepts were founded upon particular occasions, as the customs of the Zabii; X. many ceremonial precepts thence deduced out of Maimonides; XI. and because such a state of things was foretold, with which the observation of the Ceremonial Law would be inconsistent. XII. That largely discovered from the prophecies of the Old Testament.*

I Now come to the second case wherein Miracles may be justly expected, which is, *When something which hath been before established by Divine Law, is to be repealed, and some other way of Worship to be set up instead of it.* Two things are very necessary to be spoken to for the clearing of this Proposition: First, *Whether a Law once established by God himself be capable of a repeal;* Secondly, *What necessity there is of Miracles to manifest God's intention of repealing a former Law.* These Two contain the main foundation of the Dispute between the *Jews* and Us, viz. *Whether the Law of Moses was ever to be laid aside, and whether the Miracles of our Blessed Savior were sufficient evidences of God's intention by him to repeal the former Law established by Moses?* I begin with the first, *Whether a Divine Law in general or the Law of Moses in particular may be abrogated or repealed, after God himself hath made it evident that the promulgation of it was from himself.* This must be confessed the strongest and most plausible plea the present *Jews*

S

have

have for their Infidelity, and therefore the eternity of the Law of *Moses* is made by them one of the fundamental Articles of their present Creed, and is pleaded for with the greatest subtilty by their great *R. Abravanel*, who spends his whole 13th Chapter *de capite fidei* upon it, but with what success, will be seen in our clearing of it. There are but three things can be supposed as the grounds why a Law once promulged by God himself, shou'd not be capable of Repeal; and those are either first, *Because the things themselves commanded in that Law are of such nature, that they are not capable of being dispensed with*: Or secondly, *that it is not consistent with the wisdom of God to repeal a Law once established*: Or thirdly, *that the reason of the Law continuing always the same, it would argue mutability in God to revoke that Law, and establish another instead of it*: If we can therefore demonstrate, *That the matter of the Law of Moses is of a positive and mutable nature, that is suitable to the wisdom of God to alter it, and that sufficient account in reason may be given for the alteration of it*; Then there can be no imaginable necessity that a Law once having God for its Author, must therefore derive from him an eternal and immutable obligation.

II. First then as to the matter of the Law; and here it must be suppos'd, that in the matter of Controversy between us and the *Jews*, the question is not of any of those things which are therefore commanded, because they are intrinsically good, as the precepts of the Natural or Moral Law; but of those things which are therefore only good, because God commands them, *i. e.* things merely positive, whose worth and value ariseth not from the intrinsic weight of the things, but from the external impress of Divine Authority upon them. Now it is no question on either hand whether God may require these things or no; nor whether these things will be acceptable unto God, so long as he requires them; but whether, when once required, the obligation to them can never cease. Such kind of things among the *Jews* we suppose all the Rites and Ceremonies of the Law to be; *viz.* Circumcision, Distinction of Meats and Days, Customs of sacrificing, and such like, and whatever other Laws respected them as a distinct and peculiar Commonwealth. All these we say are such as do not carry an immutable obligation along with them; and that on these accounts.

1. First, *Because these things are not primarily required for themselves, but in order to some further end*. Things that are required upon their own account, carry an indispensable obligation in them to their performance; but where things are commanded not for themselves, but the Legislator doth express some particular grounds of requiring them, there the end and intention of the Legislator is the measure of their obligation. To which purpose *Maimonides* excellently speaks, when he says, *That the particular manner of worship among the Jews, as sacrifices and oblations, were secundum intentionem secundam Dei, God's secondary intention and design; but prayer, invocation, and the like, were nearer God's primary intention*: Now, saith he, *for the first, they are no further acceptable to God, than as all the circumstances of time, place, and persons are observed, which are prescribed by God himself; but the latter are acceptable in any person, time, or place*. And for this cause, saith he, *it is that*

*Maimon.
More Nev.
p. 3. c. 32.*

that we find the Prophets often reprov'g men for their too great sedulity in bringing oblations, and inculcating this to them, that God did not intend these as the principal instances of his worship, and that God did not need any of these things. So 1 Sam. 15. 22. Behold to obey is better than sacrifice, and to hearken, than the fat of rams: Isa. 1. 11. To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? saith the Lord. And especially Jerem. 7. 22, 23. For I spake not to your fathers, nor commanded them in the day that I brought them forth out of the land of Egypt, concerning burnt-offerings; but this thing I commanded them, saying, Obey my voice, and I will be your God, and ye shall be my people. Of which words Maimonides saith, *Scrupulum moverunt omnibus, quos mihi videre aut audire contigit*; For say they, How can it be that God did not command them concerning Sacrifices, when a great part of the Law is about them: But Maimonides well resolves the doubt thus, *That God's primary Intention, and that which he chiefly looked at, was obedience; but God's Intention in sacrifices and oblations, was only to teach them the chief thing, which was obedience.* This then is of the number of those things which are spoken absolutely, but to be understood comparatively; as, *I will have mercy and not sacrifice. My doctrine is not mine, but his that sent me. It is not you that speak, but the Holy Ghost, &c.* So that we see all the goodness which is in these things, is convey'd into them by that which is morally good, which is obedience; and God did never regard the performance of those Laws any further than as it was an expression of obedience, and it was conjoyn'd with those other moral duties which were most agreeable to the Divine Nature. And in this sense many understood that difficult place, Ezek. 20. 25. *And I gavethem חקים לא טובים statutes that were not good*, i. e. say they, comparatively with these things which were simply and in themselves good; to which purpose they give this Rule: *Aliquid negatur inesse alicui, quod alterius comparatione existimatur exiguum.* But I rather think that which the Chaldee Paraphrast suggests, and others explain further, to be the meaning of that place, viz. that by the Precepts that were not good, is meant the cruel and tyrannical impositions of those enemies God for their sins did deliver them over to, which were far from being acceptable to them, which is frequently the sense of Good in Scripture. Thus we see one reason why the Ceremonial Precepts do not in themselves imply an immutable obligation, because they are not commanded for themselves, but in order to a further end.

2. Because God hath frequently dispensed with the Ceremonial Precepts when they were in greatest force, if the end of them cou'd be attained without them. Thus the Precept of Circumcision slept during the Israelites travels in the Wilderness. Thus David ate of the Shew-bread, which is expressly forbidden in the Law; the Jews think to evade this by distinguishing between the Bread of Confession in the Eucharistical Offering, mentioned Leviticus 7. 13. and the proper Shew-bread: Now they say David eat only of the First, and not of the Second; but this is *Glossa Aurelianensis*; which overthrows the Text; for it is expressly said, that the ground why the Priest gave him Holy Bread, was because there was none there but לחם הפנים, the shew-bread, 1 Sam. 21. 6. A like violation

of the Law without reproof, is commonly supposed by the *Jews* to have been in the siege of *Jericho*, viz. in the case of the *Sabbath*. But it is more plain in that *Anamalous Passover* observed by *Hezekiah*, which many of the *Jews* themselves acknowledg was not observed as the *Second Passover*, provided by the Law to be celebrated on the 14th day of the *second month* by those who were debarred of the first for their legal uncleanness; but they suppose it to have been intended for the *Legal Passover*; only because the fourteenth of *Nisan* was passed before the Sanctification of the Temple was finished, lest they shou'd celebrate none at all that year, they tell us that *Hezekiah* with the consent of the Rulers, did make an Intercalation that year of a whole Month, and so *Nisan* was reckoned for the second *Adar*, and *Jiar* for *Nisan*, from whence they say that *Hezekiah* did intercalate *Nisan* in *Nisan*, that is, added another *Nisan* to the first. But where do we read any such thing permitted in the Law as the celebrating the First *Passover* the 14th of the second Month? But granting that it was observed as a second *Passover*, because of the want of Legal Sanctification both in Priests and People; yet we find great irregularities in the observation of it; for it is expressly said, *That a multitude of the people had not cleansed themselves, yet they did eat the Passover otherwise than it was written*. And yet it is said upon *Hezekiah's* prayer, *that the Lord hearkned to Hezekiah, and healed every one*. So that we see God himself did dispense with the strict Ceremonial Precepts of the Law, where Men did look after the main and substantial parts of the worship God required from them. Nay God himself hath expressly declared his own Will to dispense with the Ritual and Ceremonial Law, where it comes to stand in competition with such things as have an internal Goodness in them, when he saith, *He desired mercy and not sacrifice, and the knowledge of God more than burnt-offerings*. Thus we plainly see that the Ceremonial Law, however positive it was, did yield as to its obligation, when any thing that was Moral, stood in competition with it. And so the *Jews* themselves suppose an open violation of the Judicial Law to have been in the hanging up of *Saul's* Sons, a long time together, directly contrary to *Deut. 21. 23.* which they conceive to have been from the 16 of *Nisan* to the 17 of *Marchesvan*, which is as much as from our *March* to *September*, whereas the Law saith expressly that the *body of one that is hanged shall not remain all night upon the tree, but thou shalt in any wise bury him that day*. One of the *Jewish Rabbies*, as *G. Vorstius* tells us, is so troubled at this, *That he wisbeth that place in Samuel expunged out of Scripture, that the Name of God might be sanctified*. But whether this were done ע"פ הכיביר, by the command of the Oracle or no, or whether only by a general Permission, we see it was acceptable unto God; for upon that the *Gibeonites* famine was removed, and God was intreated for the land. Thus we have now proved that there is no immutable and indispensable obligation which ariseth from the things themselves.

IV. Secondly, It is no way inconsistent with the Wisdom of God to repeal such a Law when once established. The main argument of that learned *R. Abravanel*, whereby he wou'd establish the eternity of the Law of *Moses*, is fetched from hence, *That this Law*

was

was the result of the Wisdom of God, who knows the suitableness of things he appoints to the ends he appoints them for; as God hath appointed bread to be the food of Man's body: Now we are not to enquire why God hath appointed bread and no other thing to be the food of Man; no more, saith he, are we to enquire why God hath appointed this Law rather than another for the food of our Souls; but we are to rest contented with the counsels of God, tho' we understand not the reason of them. This is the substance of that Argument, which he more largely deduceth. To which we answer, that his Argument holds good for Obedience to all God's positive Precepts of what kind or nature soever they be, so long as we know their Obligation to continue; but all the question is, whether every positive Precept must always continue to oblige. And thus far his similitude will hold good, that whatever God doth command, we are to look upon it to be as necessary to our Souls, as bread to our Bodies; but hence it follows not that our Souls must be always held to the same positive Precepts, any more than our Bodies to the same kind of food. Nay, as in our Bodies we find some kind of food always necessary, but the kind of it to alter according to age, health, and constitutions; so we say some kind of Divine Revelation is always necessary; but God is graciously pleased to temper it according to the age and growth of his People; so he fed them as with Milk in their Non-age, with a Ritual and Ceremonial Law, and trained them up by degrees under the Nursery of the Prophets, till the Church was grown to age, and then God fed it with the strong Meat, which is contained in God's Revelation of his Will by the Gospel of his Son. And therein was abundantly seen God's *πολυποίκιλος σοφία*, his *variegated Wisdom*, that he made choice of such excellent and proportionable ways to his People's capacity to prepare them gradually for that full and compleat Revelation, which was reserved for the time of the appearance of the true *Messias* in the World. For can any thing be more plain than the gradual progress of Divine Revelation from the beginning of the World? That fair resemblance and portraiture of God himself, and his Will upon his Word (if I may so express it) had its Ground-work laid upon Man's first Apostasy, in the Promise made *Gen. 3. 15.* whereon some further lines were drawn in the times of the Patriarchs, but it had its *σκιαγραφία*, it was shadowed out the most in the Typical and Ceremonial Law, but was never filled up to the life, nor had its perfect *ζωογραφία*, 'till the Son of God himself appeared unto the World. If then it be inconsistent with the Wisdom of God to add any thing to the Law of *Moses*, why not to the Revelation made to *Adam* or the Patriarchs? or especially to the seven Precepts of *Noah*, which they suppose to have been given to all Mankind after the Flood? If it were not repugnant to the Wisdom of God to superadd Rituals and Ceremonials to Morals and Naturals, why shall it be to take down the scaffolds of Ceremonies, when God's Spiritual Temple the Church of God is come to its full height? Is there not more reason that Rituals shou'd give place to Substantials, than that such shou'd be super-induced to Morals?

There are only two things can be pleaded by the *Jews* why it shou'd be more repugnant to the Wisdom of God to add to the Law of *Moses*, than to any former Revelation, which are the

v.

Psál. 19.
16.

greater perfection they suppose to be in this Revelation above others, and that God in the promulgation of it did express that he wou'd never alter it. But both these are manifestly defective and insufficient, in order to the end for which they are produced. For *first*, what evidence is there that the Law of *Moses* contained so great perfection in it, as that it was not capable of having any additions made to it by God himself? We speak not now of the perfection of the Moral Law, which it is granted contained in it the foundation of all positive Precepts; for this we never contend for the abrogation of, but the Ritual Law is that we meddle with; and is it possible any Men shou'd be so little befriended by Reason as to think this to be the utmost pitch of what God cou'd reveal to the World, as to the way of his own Worship? Let any indifferent rational Person take the Precepts of the Gospel, and lay them in the balance with those of the Ceremonial Law, and if he makes any scruple of deciding on which side the over-weight lies, we may have cause to suspect him forsaken of that little Reason which gave him the name of Man. Let but the fifth of *Matthew* be laid against the whole book of *Leviticus*, and then see whether contains the more excellent Precepts and more suitable to the Divine Nature? I speak not this to disparage any thing which had once God for the Author of it, but to let us see how far God was from the necessity of Natural Agents to act to the height of his strength in that discovery of his Will. God is wise as well as righteous in all his ways; as he can command nothing but what is just; so he will command nothing but what is good, nay excellent in its kind. But tho' all the Stars be in the same Firmament, yet *one Star differs from another in glory*; tho' they may be all Pearls, yet some may be more *Orient* than others are; every place of Holy Scripture may have its Crown, but some may have their *Aureole*, a greater excellency, a fuller and larger capacity than the other hath; every parcel of Divine Revelation may have some perfection in its kind, yet there may be some *monstra perfectionis*, in *Scaliger's* expression that may far out-vye the Glory and Excellency of the rest. Can we think the mists and umbrages of the Law cou'd ever cast so glorious a Light as the Sun of Righteousness himself in his Meridian Elevation? As well may we think a dark shady passage more magnificent and glorious than the most princely Palace, a Picture drawn in charcoal more exquisite and curious than the lines of *Apelles*, some imperfect rudiments more exact and accurate than the most elaborate work, as go about to compare the Law of *Moses* with the Gospel of JESUS CHRIST in point of excellency and perfection. Let the *Jews* then boast never so much of their *gradus Mosaicus*, and how much it exceeds the degree of Revelation in other Prophets, we know if his light be compar'd with what the Gospel communicates, *Moses* himself saw but as in a glass darkly, and not in *speculo lucido*, as the *Jews* are wont to speak. We honor *Moses* much, but we have learnt to honor him at whose Transfiguration he was present more; neither can that be thought any disparagement to him, who accounted *the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasures of Ægypt*.

But

But it may be, tho' the Law in its self be not so absolutely perfect, yet God may have declared he will never alter it, and then it is not consistent with Divine Wisdom to repeal it. Very true: God will never alter what he hath said he will not; but where is it that he hath thus bound up himself? Is it in that noted place to this purpose, *Thou shalt not add thereto nor diminish from it?* So indeed *Maimonides* argues; but therein more like a Jew than himself; and yet one of his own Nation therein far more ingenuous than he, gives a most sufficient answer to it, which is *R. Jos. Albo*, whose words are thus produced by *Vorstius* and others; *The Scripture only admonisheth us, that we should not add to nor diminish from God's commands according to our own wills; but what hinders, saith he, but God himself may according to his own Wisdom add or diminish what he pleaseth?* But are they in good earnest when they say God bound up himself by this Speech? whence came then all the Prophetical Revelations among the Jews? did these add nothing to the Law of *Moses*, which was as much the Will of God when revealed by them, as any thing was revealed by *Moses* himself? or will they say that all those things were contained for the substance in the Law of *Moses*, as to what concerned practice? Very true; but not in the Ceremonial, but the Moral Law; and so we shall not stick to grant that the whole duty of Man may be reduced to that. But if adding to the Precepts be the doing of God's Commands in another way than he hath prescribed, and diminishing from them be merely not to do what God hath commanded, as some conceive, then these words are still more remote from the sense affixed on them by the incredulous Jews. For why may not God himself add to his own Laws, or alter the form of them, altho' we are always bound directly to follow God's declared will? May not God enlarge his own Will, and bring his Scholars from the Rudiments of their non-age to the higher knowledg of those who are full grown? or must the World of necessity do that which the old Roman so much abhorred, *senescere in elementis*, wax gray in learning this A, B, C? or was the Ceremonial Law like the China Characters, that the World might spend its Age in conning of them? But it appears that there was no other meaning in that strict prohibition, than that Men shou'd not of their own heads offer to find out new ways of worship as *Jeroboam* did, but that God's Revelation of his own Will in all its different degrees was to be the adequate Rule of the way and parts of his own worship. And I wou'd fain know of the Jews whether their own severe and strict Prohibitions of things not at all forbidden in the Law of God, and that on a religious account, as *סיג לתורה* a boundary to the Law, come not nearer the adding to God's Law, than God's own further declaration of his Will doth? All the dispute then must be, not whether God may add to his own Law, but whether the Gospel be a prohibited addition to the Law of *Moses*; that is, whether it be only the invention of Men, or it be the expresse declaration of the Will of God? As to which controversy, he is no true Christian who dare not readily joyn issue with them, and undertake to prove by all the Arguments by which they believe the Law of *Moses* to have been of Divine Revelation, that the Gospel of *Christ* is a clear Manifestation of the Will of God. But of that afterwards.

From

VI.

Deut. 12.
32.
Maimon.
de fund.
leg. c. 9. f. 1.
Ikkarim l.
3. c. 14.

VII.

From hence it is evident that God hath not by this place tied up himself from any further Manifestation of his Mind beyond the Law of *Moses*; but it may be they may put a greater confidence in those expressions which seem necessarily to imply a perpetual and unalterable obligation in the Law of *Moses*: For, saith the late learned *Rabbi Manasse Ben Israel*, *If by such expressions as those are used in Scripture which seem to import the perpetuity of the Law of Moses, somewhat else should be meant than they seem to express; what did Moses and the Prophets in using them but lay a stumbling-block in the ways of Men, whereas they might have spoken clearly, and told us there should a time come when the Ceremonial Law should oblige no longer?* This being a charge of so high a nature, must not be dismissed without a particular enquiry into the expressions which are the ground and reason of it. The places most insisted on by the *Jews*, are *Deut. 29. 29. Things which are revealed belong to us and to our Children* עַל עַד *for ever*. So *Levit. 23. 14.* the precept of offering the first fruits is there called חֻק עַל עַד *a statute for ever*; and that of the *Passover*, *Exod. 12. 17.* where the same expression is used. From hence they infer that no alteration can happen as to the Ceremonial Law, since God himself hath declared that it shall continue for ever. To this common argument of the *Jews*, it is in general reply'd, That the word in which the main force of the argument lies, doth not carry with it an absolute perpetuity, but it signifies according to the subject it is joyned with. So when it is apply'd to God, it signifies Eternity, not so much from the mere importance of the word, as from the necessary existence of the Divine Nature. Thence *Maimonides* himself can say, *Proinde sciendum est quod Olam non necessario significet aternitatem, nisi ei conjungatur Ed (עַד vel עַד) idque vel post illud ut Olam vaed, vel ante Ad Olam.* Altho' this Rule of his hath no certainty at all in it, as appears from his Collection of it, which is because it is said, *Psal. 10. 16. The Lord he is King Olam vaed, for ever and ever*: but as I said already, that is not from the signification of the word, but the nature of the thing. And it is most plain in Scripture that עַד is so far from implying a necessary perpetuity, that it is apply'd to such things as can have no long duration, as *Exod. 21. 6. and he shall serve him, לעַד*, that is, (as the *Jews* themselves expound it) *to the nex Jubilee, tho' it were near or far off*. So *1 Sam. 1. 22. where Samuel is said to abide before the Lord לעַד* *for ever*, where we find *Maimonides* his *Ad Olam* in a sense very far short of Eternity; this is so plain that the formerly cited *R. Joseph Albo* doth in terms confess it, and produceth a multitude of other places to the same purpose. For which tho' he be sufficiently censured by his Brethren, yet we may see there may be some ingenuity left in a *Jewish Rabbi*, even in the grand dispute concerning the Eternity of the Law of *Moses*.

VIII.

All the difficulty now is to assign some rational accounts why such Precepts which God did not intend shou'd be always obligatory, yet shou'd be enforced upon them in such expressions which may seem at least to imply a Perpetuity. Of which these may be given. First, *That these Precepts to which these expressions are annexed, shou'd not be looked on as mere ambulatory Laws that did only concern them in their travels thro' the Wilderness, and not continue*

*Manass.
Concil. in
Levit. 9. 7.*

*Maimon.
More Nev.
p. 2. c. 28.*

tinue obligatory when they were settled in Canaan. For which purpose we are to observe, That tho' all the Laws were given in one body in the Wilderness, yet the obligation to all of them did not commence at the same time, neither were they to continue for the same duration; these three sorts of Precepts may be observed among them; first, such as concerned them only in their present condition, as that about the Tabernacle, which was then a moveable Temple among them, suitable to their condition; but when they were settled, GOD was to have a settled House too. So that Precept of going without *the camp*, Deut. 32. 12. had an immediate respect to their Peregrination. *Secondly*, Such Precepts as were given them, but they were not bound to perform them 'till their settlement in *Canaan*, as *driving out the Canaanites*, Numb. 33. 52. *building the Temple in the place which God shou'd choose, erecting judicatories in their several Cities, choosing a King, &c.* *Thirdly*, There were such Precepts as concern them where-ever they were, whether in the Wilderness or in *Canaan*; now these are the Precepts which are said to be perpetual. This is the account given of it by *H. Grotius*; but because this may be liable to some Exceptions, I therefore add, *Secondly*, That the reason of those expressions being annexed to the Precepts of the Ceremonial Law, is, *Because they were to continue obligatory 'till such a remarkable period of time came which should alter the state of things among them.* And such a period of time the coming of the *Messias* is by themselves supposed to be, when in their famous computation they make three *Epocha's*, Before the Law, Under the Law, and the Coming of the *Messias*. And it is evident yet by them, that they do still expect a wonderful alteration of the state of things when the *Messias* comes; doth it not therefore stand to reason that עו"ל shou'd be added to such things which were to continue 'till so great alteration as shou'd be on the coming of the *Messias*, especially if the Coming of the *Messias* had been deferred so long as they falsely suppose it to be? But however, granting that a new series of times or *aiw* is to commence from the *Messias*, there is very great reason why that expression shou'd be added to those things which were to continue as long as the *aiw* did, i. e. 'till *Messias* came, which we freely acknowledg. And in this sense is עו"ל often taken for such a duration of things which had some remarkable period to conclude it, as in the case of the *Jubilee*, in the Servant mentioned, and the special employment which God called *Samuel* to, in this case, as to the event, or the end of his life in *Hannah's* designation, when she said he shou'd attend upon the Lord for ever. *Thirdly*, These Precepts are said to endure for ever, which would still have continued obligatory, unless God himself had altered the obligation of them by a new Revelation of his Will. For in this case it is most certain that all positive Precepts coming immediately from God, do carry with them an unalterable obligation, unless the Legislator himself do in as evident a way repeal them as he did once establish them; that is in such Laws which depend merely upon God's Positive and Arbitrary Will. For in this case God allows none to alter any thing concerning his Law; but indispensable obedience is our duty 'till God himself repeal his former Laws. And this we assert to be the case of the Gospel. So that it appears plainly that it im-

T

plies

Grot. de Verit. Rel. Christ. l. 5. f. 7.

plies nothing inconsistent with the Wisdom of God to repeal an established Positive Law, tho' some expressions to prejudiced minds seem to imply a perpetuity in it.

- IX. We come therefore to the third thing which may make a Positive Law unalterable, which is, when the reason of it is immutable; for then, say they, it wou'd argue mutability in God to repeal it. If we can therefore make it evident that the Ceremonial Law was not established on an immutable Reason, and that the Reason on which it was established doth suppose a state of things to come, in which it shou'd expire, then there cannot be the least pretence of mutability in God on the repeal of such a Law. First, *That it was not established upon an immutable Reason*: The immutable Reason of a Law must either be fetched from the nature of the things commanded, or the grounds of the establishing of it; we have already proved that the nature of the Positive Precepts of the Ceremonial Law do not carry in them an intrinsecal goodness. And here the Sophistry of the *Jews* is apparently discovered, that when they are pressed with this, they take sanctuary in the *Decalogue*, or some Spiritual Precepts, which comprehend in them the general foundation of the Law; as *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart*, &c. whereas these are very remote from the matter in controversy, which concerns not what Precepts were moral in their Law, but what were purely ceremonial; which were so far from being founded on an immutable Reason, that the particular occasions of the giving of many of them, is particularly assigned them by their own Writers; especially in the main parts of the Ceremonial Worship of God among them, the reasons of which *Maimonides* saith may be deduced from the Customs of the *Zabaiſts*, the knowledg of whose Opinions and Customs, he tells us, is *porta magna ad reddendas præceptorum causas*, gives much light to the Law of Moses; and particularly of himself, he saith, *Quod multarum legum rationes & causæ mihi innotuerint ex cognitione fidei, rituum & cultus Zabiorum*; that he came to the right understanding of many of the Laws of Moses by his knowledg in the Rites and Customs of these *Zabaiſts*. Granting therefore the *Hypothesis* of this learned *Rabbi*, that the Precepts of the Law had most of them a particular respect to the idolatrous Customs of these People; what will hence follow but only this, that the reason of the Ceremonial Precepts did respect the Customs in use when they were given, and so are not founded upon an immutable Reason? And the more the Precepts are whose Reason is to be fetched from hence, the more plain and evident is the thing we intended by it, viz. *That the Ceremonial Law is not founded upon an unalterable Reason.*

*Maimon.
More Nev.
l. 3. c. 29.*

- X. Now from this one head of the idolatrous Customs of those Nations about them hath that learned Author deduced the Reasons of very many of the most obscure Commands of the Ceremonial Law: As that concerning *rounding the corner of their heads*, which *Herodotus* tells us was the Custom of the *Arabians*, and others of the *Babylonian* Priests; by both which the *Zabii* may be meant, the superstition of the *Zabii* being *Chaldaean*, as I have shewed already, and their Name, as some conceive, from *Saba* the Son of *Chus*, whose posterity were seated in *Arabia*, near to the

*Levit. 19.
27.
Voss. in
Maimon.
de Idololat.
c. 12.*

the Red Sea; and that which confirms this opinion, is, that the *Sabeans* did, as *Philostorgius* saith, *Worship the Sun and Moon*, as the *Zabaiſts* did in *Maimonides*; and withal *Bochartus* makes it evident from *Strabo*, that some of the *Babylonians* called *Gerrhai*, possessed themselves of the Country of the *Sabeans*, whereby this originally *Chaldaic* superstition might spread its self in these parts near the confines of *Judea*, which might be the cause why all those Rites, which were used by these idolatrous People, are so severely forbidden to the *Jews*: God thereby setting up a Wall of Separation between his People and the Nations round about them, by making the Custom of the *Jews* almost *Antipodes* to theirs; as those of *Japan* are to them of *China*. Upon the same ground it is supposed that other Precept was made against wearing a garment of linnen and woollen, because the idolatrous Priests used to go so cloathed, as *Maimonides* tells us out of their Books, and likewise that prohibition of a woman's wearing the armour of a man, and a man's wearing the garments of a woman, is very probably supposed to have had its original from that idolatrous Custom mentioned by the same Author, *Ut vir gestet Vestimentum muliebre coloratum quando stat coram stella Veneris; similiter ut mulier induat loricam & arma bellica quando stat coram stella Martis*; but that Author doth not deny a further Reason to be couched in it for the preservation of public honesty. Many other Precepts are drawn from the same fountain by that same Author, as the sowing of divers seeds in the same ground; the forbidding the eating of the fruit of their trees for the first three years after they came to Canaan; that being the furthest time wherein the trees of their own plantation wou'd begin to bear in that Country. Now it was the Custom of all those idolatrous People, that the first time any tree did bear, part of the fruit was to be burnt up in an offering to the Idol, and the other part eaten in the Idol-Temple; or else they supposed their trees wou'd never prosper: Now in opposition to this, God bids them bring the fruit of the Fourth year to him, and eat of the Fifth themselves, *that it may yield unto you the increase thereof*. So the Idolaters threatned all Parents that their Children wou'd never live, unless they caused them to pass thro' the fire; from which Custom *Maimonides* saith, *Some even in his time would take the children that were new born, and move them up and down over a fire wherein odoriferous smells were cast*. Thence comes that strict Prohibition of giving the children to Moloch, which was by that Custom of passing thro' the fire. To this same Head, the same Author refers that of not eating the member of a living creature, which we render *flesh with the life thereof*; which was forbidden, as he elsewhere tells us, not only for avoiding cruelty, but because the Heathen Nations were wont in their idolatrous Feasts to take a member off from a living creature, and eat it afterwards; and in them likewise he supposeth they used the boiling the flesh and the milk together, which, saith he, besides that it affords a most gross nourishment, savors of their idolatrous practices too; and therefore, saith he, it is observable that twice where this Precept is mentioned, it follows that of the solemn appearance of the males at Jerusalem thrice a year, whereby it seems to be imply'd that this action had relation to some great solemnity. These and several other

Bochari. Phaleg. l. 4. c. 8.

Levit. 19. 19. Maimon. More Nev. l. 3. c. 37. Deut. 22. 5.

V. Selden. de Diis Syris, Synt. 2. cap. 4.

Lev. 19. 19. Lev. 19. 23.

Levit. 19. 24. 25.

Levit. 20. 2. 3. Gen. 9. 4.

Maimon. More Nev. p. 3. c. 48.

Exod. 23. 17. 19. 34. 26.

Precepts of the Law of *Moses* are deduced by that very learned *Rabbi* from idolatrous Customs, as the occasions of them; which seem to have the more reason in them, because that God did in the general so strictly *forbid the Jews to walk after the custom of the Nations about them*. Thence *Origen* takes notice of the *ἡ ἐκείνων τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν ἰδιότητων καὶ αὐτὸς παλιναί;* for which he saith, they *αποβλαπόμενοι, reproached by the Heathens, because their Laws and Polity were so different from the Custom of other Nations*. Thus we see then that many Precepts of the Ceremonial Law, were founded neither on the goodness of the things themselves, nor on any unalterable reason, but were enforced on a peculiar reason on the People of the *Jews* at that time, as they were a People separated from the rest of the world for the worship of the true God. And for the other great offices wherein their Religion did so much consist, *viz.* Sacrifices, Distinction of Meats, Observation of Festivals, Circumcision, and such like: The particular account and reason of them is either so evident in the Law its self, or so fully acknowledg'd by their own Writers, that it is here superfluous to insist on them; especially since so many have done that so largely already (particularly *Grotius*) whose labors I intend not to transcribe.

Levit. 20.
23.
Origen.
contra Cel-
sum, l. 4.

Grot. de re-
vitate Rel.
Christ. l. 5.
XI.

I come therefore to the second thing, which is, *That the Ceremonial Law was so far from being founded on an immutable reason, that while it was in its greatest force such a state of things was plainly foretold, with which the observation of that Law would be inconsistent*. For which we are to consider, that tho' the Law of *Moses* seemed outwardly to respect the temporal advantages of the People embracing it in the Land of *Canaan*; yet there was a Spring of Spiritual Promises whose head was higher than *Jordan* was, that ran down from the Patriarchs, and was more fully opened to some of them, which tho' it seemed to run under ground in the midst of the Ceremonial Observations of the Law; yet it frequently brake forth and opened its self in the midst of them, and by degrees in the Prophetical Age did make its self a larger Channel, 'till in the time of the *Messias* by its force and violence it overthrew those banks which stood in the way of it, and overspread the face of the whole Earth. It is evident by the whole series of the Scripture of the Old Testament, that God's ultimate intention was not to confine the saving Knowledg of his Will only to the *Jews*; for the great Promise to *Abraham* was, *That in his seed all the nations of the earth should be blessed*; And as *Abraham* rejoiced to see that day afar off; so good *Jacob*, when he leaned on his *Jacob's Staff*, took the height of that *Day-Star from on high*, which tho' like some of the fix'd Stars, might not for some time be visible to the inferior World; yet foretold the time when he shou'd descend into a lower Orb, and become conspicuous in our Horizon. And consequently to his appearance in the World, wou'd be the drawing not so much the Eyes as the Hearts of the World to him; for no sooner is it mentioned that *Shiloh comes when the Scepter departs from Judah*; but it immediately follows, *And to him shall the gathering of the people be*. Thus we see before ever the Law of *Moses* came to inclose the People of the *Jews* as *Gods peculiar people*, there was a design on foot, for enlarging the bound of God's Inheritance, and making the uttermost parts of the

Gen. 49.
10.

the earth his Son's possession. Can we then think that the Law which came afterwards, cou'd difannul the Covenant made 430 years before, as the Apostle excellently reasons? Can we believe the Mosaical dispensation was the utmost of what God did intend, when God had before promised that the Blessing of *Abraham* shou'd come upon us *Gentiles* also? To which purpose it is very observable, that *Abraham was justify'd not in circumcision, but in uncircumcision; for he received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the righteousness of faith, being uncircumcised, that he might be the father of all them that believe, though they be not circumcised; that righteousness might be imputed unto them also.* Whereby it is evident that the great Blessings promised to *Abraham*, did not respect him merely as Progenitor of the *Israelites*, but in a higher capacity, as *Father of the faithful*; and that the ground of his acceptance with God did not depend on any Ceremonial Rite, such as Circumcision was, God imputing his Faith for Righteousness before his being circumcised. But because the time was not yet come wherein the grand Mystery of Man's Salvation by the death of the Son of God was to be revealed; therefore when God called the Nation of the *Jews* from their bondage, he made choice of a more obscure way of representing this Mystery to them thro' all the umbrages of the Law: And withal inforced his Precepts with such terrible sanctions of curses to *all that continued not in all that was written in that Law to do it*, to make them the more apprehensive that the ground of their acceptance with God, cou'd not be the performance of the Precepts of that Law, but they ought to breathe after that higher dispensation wherein the way and method of Man's Salvation shou'd be fully revealed when the fulness of time was come. Now therefore God left them under the Tutorage and Pedagogy of the Law, which spake so severely to them, that they might not think this was all God intended in order to the happiness of Men, but that he did reserve some greater thing in store to be enjoy'd by his People when they were come to Age.

So that tho' the Ceremonies of the Law had not a Mouth to speak out *Christ*; yet they had a Hand to point to him; for they were the shadow or dark representation of that which was to be drawn afterwards to the greatest life. And this was understood by all those whose hearts were carried beyond the outward sapless Letter of the Law, to the more inward and spiritual meaning of it, (there being an *εισπερα* and *ἐσπερα* in the Law as well as Philosophy,) these Mysteries were too not so veiled and hidden, but all that were *ἐπίσταται*, fully initiated, might fully understand them; which made that true Spiritual *Cabala*, which was constantly preserved among the *Israelites*, which was more largely commented on by the Prophets of succeeding Ages; whose care it was to unlock this *Cabala*, and to raise up the hearts of the People in a higher expectation of the great things which were to come. Thence we not only read of the solemn Prayer of the Church of the *Jews*, that the knowledg of God might be dispersed over all the Nations of the earth, but we have many Prophecies that when the mountain of the Lord's house shou'd be exalted, all nations should flow unto it: that from the rising of the Sun to the going down thereof, God's name shall be great among the *Gentiles*, and in every place in-

XII.

Psal. 67. 2.

Isaiah. 2. 2.

Mal. 1. 11.

cense should be offered to his name, and a pure offering, for his name shall be great among the Heathen. That the Inscription on the High-Priest's Forehead, *Holiness to the Lord*, shou'd by reason of the large diffusion of a Spirit of Holiness in the days of the Gospel, *be set upon the bells of Horses, that the pots in the Lord's house should be as the bowls before the Altar, i. e.* that when the Levitical Service shou'd be laid aside, and that Holiness, which was that appropriated to the Priests and Instruments of the Temple, shou'd be discerned in those things which seemed most remote from it. That a Priesthood after another order than that of Aaron should be established, viz. after the order of Melchisedec; and that he that was the Priest after this order, should judg among the Heathen, and wound the heads over many Countries; that in the day of his power the People shou'd (not be frightened to obedience with thunder-claps and earth-quakes, as at Mount Sinai) but shou'd come and yield themselves as a free-will offering unto him; and yet their number be as great as the drops of the dew which distil in the morning. That God out of other Nations would take unto himself for Priests and Levites; that the desire of all Nations should speedily come; that the Messenger of the Covenant should come into his Temple; nay, that seventy weeks are determined upon thy people, and upon thy holy City; that then the Vision and Prophecy should be sealed up; that the Sacrifice and Oblation should be caused to cease; that the City and the Sanctuary should be destroyed, and the end thereof shall be with a flood, and unto the end of the War desolations are determined; that after threescore and two weeks Messiah should be cut off, but not for himself; that by him transgression should be finished, and reconciliation for iniquity should be made, and everlasting righteousness should be brought in. And lest all these things shou'd be apprehended to be only a higher advancing of the Levitical Worship, and the way of external Ceremonies, God expressly saith, *That he would make a new Covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah; not according to the Covenant that I made with their Fathers, in the day I took them by the hand to bring them out of the Land of Egypt, which my Covenant they brake, although I was an husband to them, saith the Lord: But this shall be the Covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days, saith the Lord; I will put my Law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts, and will be their God, and they shall be my people.* Can any one that now considers seriously the state of things thus described as it shou'd come to pass, ever imagin that the Levitical Service was ever calculated for this State? Was God's Worship to be confin'd to his Temple at Jerusalem, when all the Nations of the earth shou'd come to serve him? Was the High-Priest to make an Atonement there, when an order of Priesthood different from the *Aaronical* shou'd be set up? Must the Tribe of *Levi* only attend at the Temple, when God shou'd take the Priests and *Levites* out of all Nations that serve him? What wou'd become of the magnificence and glory of the Temple, when both City and Sanctuary shall be destroy'd, and that must be within few prophetic Weeks after the *Messias* is cut off? And must the Covenant God made with the *Israelites* continue for ever, when God expressly saith, he wou'd make a New one; and that not according to the Covenant which he

Zach. 14.
20.

Psal. 110.
4. 5. 6.

Ver. 3.

Isa. 66. 21.

Hag. 2. 7.

Mal. 3. 1.

Dan. 9. 24.
26. 27.

Jer. 31. 31.
32.

he made with them then? It is so evident then, as nothing can well be more, that under the Old Testament, such a state of Religion was describ'd and promis'd, with which the Levitical Worship wou'd be inconsistent; and so that the Ceremonial Law was not at first established upon an immutable Reason, which was the thing to be proved.

C H A P. VIII.

General Hypotheses concerning the truth of the Doctrine of CHRIST.

- I. *The great prejudice against our Savior among Jews and Heathens, was the meanness of his appearance. The difference of the Miracles at the delivery of the Law and Gospel.*
- II. *Some general Hypotheses to clear the subserviency of Miracles to the Doctrine of CHRIST.*
1. *That where the truth of a Doctrine depends not on Evidence, but Authority, the only way to prove the truth of the Doctrine, is to prove the Testimony of the Revealer to be infallible. Things may be true which depend not on Evidence of the things. What that is, and on what it depends. The uncertainty of Natural Knowledge.*
- III. *The Existence of GOD, the foundation of all certainty. The certainty of matter of Faith proved from the same Principle. Our knowledge of any thing supposeth something incomprehensible.*
- IV. *The certainty of Faith as great as that of Knowledge; the grounds of it stronger. The Consistency of Rational Evidence with Faith. Yet objects of Faith exceed Reason; the absurdities following the contrary opinion.*
- VI. *The uncertainty of that which is called Reason.*
- VII. *Philosophical Dictates no standard of Reason. Of Transubstantiation and Ubiquity, &c. why rejected as contrary to Reason. The foundation of Faith in matters above Reason.*
- VIII. *Which is infallible Testimony; that there are ways to know which is infallible, proved.*
2. *Hypoth. A Divine Testimony the most infallible. The resolution of Faith into GOD's veracity as its formal object.*
- IX. 3. *Hypoth. A Divine testimony may be known, tho' GOD speak not immediately. Of Inspiration among the Jews, and Divination among the Heathens.*
- XII. 4. *Hypoth. The Evidence of a Divine Testimony must be clear and certain.*
- XIII. *Of the common motives of Faith, and the obligation to faith arising from them. The original of Infidelity.*

HAVING now cleared that the Law of Moses was capable of a repeal, I come to the second Enquiry, *Whether the Miracles of our Savior did give a sufficient Evidence of his power and Authority*

city to repeal it. I shall not (to prevent too large an excursion) insist on any other Evidences of our Savior's being the promised *Messias*, but keep close to the matter of our present debate, concerning the Evidence which ariseth from such a power of Miracles as our Savior had in order to his establishing that Doctrine which he came to publish to the World. The great stumbling-block in reference to our Blessed Savior among both the *Jews* and learned *Heathens*, was the meanness of his appearance in the World, not coming attended with that state and magnificence, which they thought to be inseparable from so Great a Person. The *Jews* had their senses so possessed with the Thundrings and Lightnings on Mount *Sinai*, that they cou'd not imagin the structure of their Ceremonial Worship cou'd be taken down with less noise and terror than it was erected. And withal collecting all those passages of the Old Testament, which seemed to foretel such glorious things of the days of the *Messias*, (which either refer to his second Coming, or must be understood in a Spiritual sense) they having their Minds oppressed with the sense of their present calamities, apply'd them wholly to an external Greatness, whereby they might be deliver'd from the Tyranny of the *Roman* Power. The *Heathens*, as appears by *Celsus* and others, thought it very strange, that the Son of God shou'd appear in the World with so little Grandeur, and have no greater Train than twelve such obscure Persons as the Apostles were. For, saith *Celsus*, ὁ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐκείνου οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ὁ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. *As the Sun, which enlightens all other things, doth first discover himself, so it was fitting the Son of God should do when he appeared to the World.* And so we say he did to all such whose Minds were not blinded thro' obstinacy and wilful ignorance. For altho' this Son of Righteousness was pleas'd for the better carrying on his design in the World to wrap up himself in a cloud, yet his Glory cou'd not be confin'd within it, but did break thro' that dark veil of his Human Nature, and did discover it self in a most clear and convincing manner. His appearances indeed were not like those upon Mount *Sinai*, because his design was not to amuse Men with the Glory of his Majesty, and to terrify them from Idolatry, (which was a great reason of those dreadful *Phænomena* at the delivery of the Law) but he came to draw all Men to him by the Power and Energy of his Grace, and therefore afforded them all Rational Convictions in order to it. And therefore the quality of our Savior's Miracles was considerable, as well as the greatness of them. The intent of them all was to do good, and thereby to bring the World off from its sin and folly, to the embracing of that holy Doctrine which he came to publish to the World.

Apud
Orig. l. 2.

- II. Now that such a Power of Miracles in our Savior had the greatest subserviency to the giving full and convincing Evidence that he was the Person he declared himself to be, and that his Doctrine was thereby so clearly attested, that it was nothing but obstinacy, which cou'd withhold assent, will appear by these following *Hypotheses* which I lay down in order to the proving it.

1. Hypoth.

Where the truth of a Doctrine depends not on the Evidence of the things themselves, but on the Authority of him that reveals it, there the only way to prove the Doctrine to be true, is to prove the Testimony

testimony of him that revealed it to be infallible. Several things are necessary to be proved for the clearing this Proposition.

1. *That it is not repugnant to Reason, that a Doctrine should be true which depends not upon the Evidence of the thing it self.* By evidence of the thing I understand so clear and distinct a Perception of it, that every one who hath the use of his rational Faculties, cannot but upon the first apprehensions of the Terms yield a certain assent to it; as That the whole is greater than a part; That if we take away equal things from equal, the remainder must be equal. Now we are to observe, that as to all these common Notices of Human Nature which carry such Evidence with them, the certainty of them lies in the Proposition as it is an act of the Mind abstracted from the things themselves; for these do not suppose the Existence of the things; but whether there be any such things in the World or no as Whole or Parts, the Understanding is assured that the Idea of the whole carries more in its representation than that of a part does. This is the great Reason of the certainty and evidence of *Mathematical* truths, not as some imagine, because Men have no interest, or design, in those things, and therefore they never question them, but because they proceed not upon sensible but abstracted matter, which is not liable to so many doubts as the other is: for that a Triangle hath three Angles no Man questions; but whether such sensible parts of Matter make a Triangle, may be very questionable. Now that the truth of Beings, or the certainty of Existence of things cannot be so certain as *Mathematical* Demonstrations, appears from hence: because the manner of conveyance of these things to my Mind cannot be so clear and certain as in purely Intellectual operations, abstracted from existent Matter. For the highest Evidences of the Existence of things must be either the judgment of Sense, or clear and distinct perception of the Mind: now proceeding in a mere Natural way, there can be no infallible certainty in either of these; For the Perception of the Mind in reference to the existence of things being caused so much thro' those *Ideas* or *Phantasms* which are conveyed to the Understanding thro' the impressions of Sense, if these may be demonstrated to be fallacious, I may well question the certainty of that, which I am certain I have been deceived by; supposing then I shou'd question the truth of every thing which is conveyed in an uncertain way to my Mind, I may soon outgo even *Pyrrho* himself in real *Scepticism*. Neither can I conceive how clear and distinct perception of any thing, tho' not coming thro' the senses, doth necessarily infer the existence of the thing; for it only implies a Non-repugnancy of it to our Natural Faculties, and consequently the bare possibility of it. For otherwise it were impossible for us to have a clear perception of any thing any longer than it exists; nay, than we know it to exist; for Existence or Non-existence is all one to the Understanding, while it is not assured of either. And it is withal evident that things imaginary may clearly affect the Mind as well as real, for I may have as real and distinct Perception of a *Phoenix* in my Mind, as of a *Partridge*; doth it therefore follow that the one is really existent as well as the other? and it will be a very hard matter to assign a certain difference between Imagination and pure Intellection in such things, which tho' not actually

U

existent,

existent, yet imply no repugnancy at all to the Faculties of Mens Minds. It is evident then, that there cannot be so great certainty of the existence of things as there may be of *Mathematical* Demonstrations.

- III. And if that Principle be supposed as the foundation of all *Physical* certainty as to the Being of things, *viz.* That there is a God, who being infinitely good, will not suffer the Minds of Men to be deceived in those things which they have a clear and distinct perception of (without which supposition we cannot be assured of the certainty of any operations of the Mind, because we cannot know but we were so made, that we might be then most deceived, when we thought our selves most sure:). If this Principle, I say, be supposed as the foundation of all certain Knowledg, then from it I infer many things which are very much advantageous to our certainty in matters of Faith.

1. *That the foundation of all certainty lies in the necessary existence of a Being absolutely perfect.* So that unless I know that there is a God, I cannot be assured that I know any thing in a certain manner; and if I know there is a God, I must necessarily apprehend him to be absolutely perfect; because the grounds of my Knowledg, that there is a God, are from those absolute perfections, which there are in him; and if I cou'd suppose him not absolutely perfect, I must suppose him not to be God; for that is necessarily imply'd in his Definition. Now then if all certainty doth suppose the existence of a Being so absolutely perfect, I must, before I can know any thing certainly, conclude that there is an infinity of Knowledg, Wisdom, Power and Goodness in this God; for those are things which all who understand them will grant to be perfections; and if they be in God, they must be absolute, *i. e.* infinite. And if they be infinite, it necessarily follows that they must transcend our apprehensions; so that now we have gained this Principle in order to Faith, that we must grant something to be unconceivable before we can come certainly to know any thing. From whence it follows that those who will not believe any thing to be true, because it is above their apprehensions, must deny the foundation of all certainty, which (as we have proved) doth suppose something to be infinite, or above our capacity to comprehend.

- IV. 2. *That we have as great certainty of whatever is revealed to us from God, as we can have of the truth of any thing which we most clearly understand.* For the truth of Knowledg depending on this supposition, That there is a God, whose goodness will not suffer us to be deceiv'd in the things we clearly understand; there is the same foundation for the act of Faith as for that of Knowledg, *viz.* That God will not suffer us to be deceiv'd in matters which himself hath reveal'd to us. Nay, there seems to be greater on these accounts. *First,* That there is not so great danger to be deceiv'd in reference to objects of sense, as there is in reference to objects of Divine Revelation: because objects of sense make a continual impression upon the organs of sense, and as to these things we see the whole World agrees in them so far as they are necessary to life, and withal they bear a greater correspondency to the present state of imperfection which the Soul is now in: but now matters of Divine Revelation are of a more sublime and spiritual nature,

ture, which Mens Minds on that account are more apt to doubt of, than of things obvious to sense; and withal they call the Mind so much off from sense, that on these accounts the proneness to doubt is greater, and therefore the foundation of Certainty from God's not suffering us to be deceiv'd must be stronger. *Secondly*, There is not so great danger in being deceiv'd as to matters of sense or knowledg, as there is in things of Divine Revelation. For we see, granting sense to be deceiv'd, and that we have no certainty at all in natural things, yet affairs of Life are managed still; Men's outward welfare depends not on the judgment of sense; the Merchant hath never the less gold in his Ship, because his sense deceives him in judging that the Earth moves from him, when the Ship moves from it. The Sun doth never the less enlighten the World, tho' our Senses be all of *Epicurus* his Mind, that the Sun is no bigger than he seems to be; but now as to matters of Divine Revelation, they are things of the most unspeakable weight and importance, which depend upon our believing or disbelieving them. And therefore if the Goodness of God be such as it will not suffer us to be deceiv'd in our judgment of material and sensible Beings; how much less in reference to the foundation of our certainty as to things divinely reveal'd? We see then what Rational Evidence there is not only consistent with, but necessarily imply'd in the foundation of Faith, even as great as in any thing which we do most perfectly know; so that the in-evidence, which is so much spoken of as an ingredient of the nature of Faith, must not be understood of the foundation whereon the act of Faith doth stand, but of the condition of the object, which being a matter of Divine Revelation, is a thing not obvious to our Senses. In which sense the Apostle speaks, that Faith is *ἐλπίδος ἡ ἀόρατον, πραγμάτων ἔλεγχος ἢ βλεπομένων*. *The firm expectation of things hoped for, and strong conviction of things which are not seen*: In which words, as *Erasmus* observes, is contain'd only an high *Encomium* of Faith, and no dialectical Definition of it; viz. that Faith soars above things of sense or present enjoyment; yea, tho' the objects of it be never so remote from either, yet where there is sufficient Evidences of Divine Revelation, Faith boggles at no difficulties, but is firmly resolv'd that that God who hath reveal'd these things, can and will bring them to pass in his own time. There is not then any such contrariety between the foundation of Faith and Knowledg, as the Schoolmen have persuaded the World; we see both of them proceed on the same foundation of certainty; all the difference is, Faith fixeth on the veracity of God immediately in reference to a Divine Testimony; Knowledg proceeds upon it, supposing no Divine Revelation as to the things it doth discover.

3. We hence infer, That if the certainty of our Knowledg depends on this Principle, That God will not suffer us to be deceiv'd, then we are bound to believe whatever God doth reveal to us, tho' we may not be able to comprehend the nature of the things revealed. For as to these things, we have the same ground of certainty which we have as to any Natural Causes; for as to them, we now suppose from the former Principles, that setting aside the existence of God, we cou'd have no certainty of them, but that the formal Reason of our certainty is resolv'd into this, That God's

v.

U 2

Goodness

Goodness will not suffer the Understanding to be deceiv'd as to these things: the same I say as to Spiritual Mysteries reveal'd by God; the ground of our certainty lies not in the Evidence of the things, but in the undoubted veracity of God, who hath reveal'd them. All that I can imagin possible to be reply'd to this, is, That God's veracity assures us in Natural Causes that we are not deceiv'd, only where we have a clear and distinct perception of the things, but now in matters above our Reason to comprehend, there can be no clear and distinct Perception. To this I answer,

- *First*, It is evident in the foundation of all certainty of Knowledge, that there may be a clear and distinct Perception of that which we cannot comprehend, *viz.* of a Being absolutely perfect; for if
- we have not a clear and distinct Perception of God, the foundation
- of all certainty is destroy'd, which is the necessary Existence of such a Being; and he that shall say he cannot have a clear Perception of God without comprehending him, doth contradict himself; for if he be a Being infinite, he must be incomprehensible; therefore there may be clear Perception, where the object it self is above our capacity. Now whatever foundation there is in Nature for such a Perception without Comprehension; that and much more is there in such things as are reveal'd by God, tho' above our Apprehension: For the Idea of God upon the Soul of Man cannot be so strong an Evidence of the Existence of a Being above our Apprehension, as the Revelation of matters of Faith is, that we shou'd believe the things so reveal'd, tho' our Understandings lose themselves in striving to reach the natures of them, and the manner of their Existence.

Secondly, That which is the only foundation of a scruple in this case, is a Principle most unreasonable in it self, That we are to embrace nothing for truth, tho' divinely reveal'd, but what our Reason is able to comprehend as to the nature of the thing, and the manner of its existence; on which account the Doctrine of the *Trinity*, *Incarnation*, *Satisfaction*, and consequently the whole Mystery of the Gospel of CHRIST must be rejected as incredible, and that on this bare pretence, because altho' many expressions in Scripture seem to import all these things, yet we are bound to interpret them to another sense, because this is incongruous to our Reason. But altho' *Christianity* be a Religion which comes in the highest way of Credibility to the Minds of Men, altho' we are not bound to believe any thing but what we have sufficient reason to make it appear that it is reveal'd by God; yet that any thing shou'd be questioned whether it be of Divine Revelation, merely because our Reason is to seek, as to the full and adequate conception of it, is a most absurd and unreasonable pretense: And the Assertors of it must run themselves on these unavoidable absurdities.

First, Of believing nothing either in Nature or Religion to be true, but what they can give a full and satisfactory account of, as to every mode and circumstance of it. Therefore let such Persons first try themselves in all the appearances of Nature; and then we may suppose they will not believe that the Sun shines till they have by demonstrative Arguments prov'd the undoubted truth of the *Ptolemaic* or *Copernican Hypothesis*; that they will never give credit to the flux and reflux of the Sea, till they clearly resolve the doubts

doubts which attend the several opinions of it. That there is no such thing as Matter in the World, till they can satisfactorily tell us how the Parts of it are united; nor that there are any Material Beings, till they have resolv'd all the perplexing difficulties about the several Affections of them; and that themselves have not so much as a rational Soul, till they are bound to satisfy us of the manner of the union of the Soul and Body together. And if they can expedite all these, and many more difficulties about the most obvious things (about which it is another thing to frame handson and consistent *Hypotheses*, than to give a certain account of them) then let them be let loose to the matters of Divine Revelation; as to which yet (if they cou'd perform the other) there were no reason for such an undertaking; for that were,

Secondly, To commensurate the Perfections of GOD with the narrow capacity of the human Intellect; which is contrary to the natural Idea of God; and to the manner whereby we take up our conceptions of God: for the Idea of God doth suppose Incomprehensibility to belong to his Nature; and the manner whereby we form our Conceptions of God, is, by taking away all the imperfections we find in our selves, from the Conception we form of a Being absolutely perfect, and by adding Infinity to all the Perfections we find in our own Natures. Now this method of proceeding doth necessarily imply a vast distance and disproportion between a finite and infinite Understanding. And if the Understanding of God be infinite, why may not he discover such things to us, which our shallow Apprehensions cannot reach unto? What ground or evidence of Reason can we have that an infinite Wisdom and Understanding, when it undertakes to discover matters of the highest nature and concernment to the World, shou'd be able to deliver nothing but what comes within the compass of our imperfect and narrow Intellects? And that it shou'd not be sufficient that the matters reveal'd do none of them contradict the prime Results or common Notions of Mankind (which none of them do) but that every particular mode and circumstance, as to the manner of existence in God, or the extent of his omnipotent Power, must pass the scrutiny of our Faculties, before it obtains a *placet* for a Divine Revelation?

Thirdly, It must follow from this Principle, That the Pretenders to it must affirm the Rules or Maxims which they go by in the judgment of things, are the infallible standard of Reason: Else they are as far to seek in the judgment of things as any others are. They must then, to be consistent with their Principle, affirm themselves to be the absolute Masters of Reason: Now Reason consisting of Observations made concerning the natures of all Beings, for so it must be considered, as it is a Rule of judging, (*viz.* as a *System* of infallible Rules collected from the natures of things) they who pretend to it, must demonstrate these general Maxims according to which they judg, to be collected from an universal undoubted History of Nature, which lies yet too dark and obscure for any to pretend to the full Knowledge of, and wou'd be only a demonstration of the highest Arrogance after so many successful endeavors, of the most searching Wits in any society of Persons to usurp it to themselves, especially if such Persons are so far

from searching into the depths of Nature, that they suffer themselves very fairly to be led by the Nose, by the most Dogmatical of all Philosophers; and that in such Principles which the more inquisitive World hath now found to be very short, uncertain and fallacious. And upon severe enquiry we shall find the grand Principles which have been taken by these adorers of Reason, for almost the standard of it, have been some *Theories* which have been taken up merely from observation of the course of Nature by such Persons, who scarce own'd any hand of Providence in the World. Now it cannot otherwise be conceiv'd but that these *Theories* or Principles formed from such a narrow inspection into the natures of things, must make strange work when we come to apply those things to them, which were never look'd at in the forming of them: Whence came those two receiv'd Principles, That nothing can be produc'd out of nothing; That there is no possible return from a privation to a habit, but from those Philosophers who believ'd there was nothing but matter in the World; or if they did assert the Existence of a God, yet supposed him unconcerned in the Government of the World. Whence come our Masters of Reason to tell us, That the Soul cannot subsist after death without the Body? from what Philosophy was this derived? certainly from that which was very loth to acknowledg the immortality of the Soul of Man; and any one who strictly observes the close coherence of the Principles of the *Peripatetic* Philosophy will find very little room left for an eternal Being to interpose it self in the World; and therefore some have shrewdly observ'd that *Aristotle* speaks more favorably of the Being of God in his *Exoterics*, than in his *Acromatics*, which all that know the reason of the Names, will guess at the reason of. I demand then, Must the received Principles of Philosophy, and those short imperfect *Theories*, which were formed more from Tradition than Experience, by the ancient *Greeks*, be taken from the standard of Reason or no? If they must, we may soon forsake not only the sublimer Mysteries of the *Trinity*, *Divinity* of CHRIST, *Resurrection*, &c. but we shall soon shake hands with *Creation*, *Providence*, if not *Immortality* of Souls, and the Being of God himself. If these things be disown'd as the standard of Reason, let us know what will be substituted in the room of them; and what Laws our Faith must be try'd by. Are they only *Mathematical* Demonstrations, or the undoubted common Notions of Human Nature, which whosoever understands assents to them? let any of the forementioned Mysteries be made appear to contradict these, and we will readily yield up our selves captives to Reason: But in the mean time let no jejune unproved *Hypotheses* in Philosophy, be set as Judges over matters of Faith, whose only warrant for that office must be *Stat pro ratione voluntas*. Let the Principles we proceed by, be first manifested to be collected from a most certain and universal inspection into the nature of all Beings, let the manner of process be shewed how they were collected (lest they labour with the common fault of the *Chymists*, of establishing *Hypoetical* Principles from the Experiments of some particular Bodies, which others do as evidently refute) and lastly, let it be made appear, that these Principles, thus collected, will serve indifferently for all Beings, spiritual as well as material, infinite, as well as finite, and

and when this Task is exactly perform'd, we will make room for Reason to sit upon the Bench, and bring the Scripture as the prisoner to its Bar.

Fourthly, According to this Principle, what certainty can we have at all of any thing we are to believe? who hath fixed the bounds of that which Men call Reason? how shall we know that thus far it will come, and no further? If no Banks be rais'd against it to keep it in its due Channel, we may have cause to fear it may in time overthrow not only the *Trinity*, *Incarnation*, *Resurrection of the dead*, but all other Articles of the Creed too. What Prescription can be pleaded by one sort of Men for Reason more than for another? One will not believe this Article of his Faith, because against his Reason; and why not another reject another Article on the same pretense? for whatever the ground of Unbelief be, if it be but baptized by the name of Reason, it must by this Principle pass uncontrouled. If a sullen Philosopher shall tell us, that the Notion of an immaterial substance contradicts his Reason as much as the *Trinity* doth theirs, and that the Universe is nothing else but a System of Bodies; by what Artifice will our Master of Reason purge away all that black Choler, that so clouds his Mind, that he cannot see the Notion of a Spirit thro' it? And such a one will make a hard shift, but he will reconcile his Opinion with Scripture too; and therefore why shou'd he be bound up to Mens Explications of Scripture, when there is no necessity, that he can see, of understanding it in any other way than his own? If another shou'd come and tell us, that we must be all *Anthropomorphites*, and that otherwise the Scripture were not intelligible; shall not this Man put in for Reason too? Nay, *lastly*, if another shall come and speak out, and tell us Religion is but a device of subtle Men, that all things come to pass thro' chance, that the World was made by a fortuitous concurrence of *Atoms*, and that all are fools which are not *Atheists*, and and that it is impossible to apprehend the Being of a God, and therefore by the same Reason that they reject some Mysteries of Religion, he rejects the foundation of all, because an infinite Being is incomprehensible: whither now hath our Reason carried us? while we pretend to reject any thing as divinely revealed, merely on that account, that it is above our Reason? But it may be reply'd, *On what account then do we reject the Doctrine of Transubstantiation, and the ubiquity of the Body of CHRIST, as repugnant to Reason, if we do not make Reason judge in matters of Faith?* I answer, 1. We reject these opinions not only as repugnant to Reason, but as insufficiently proved from Scripture; whereas we here suppose (it not being our present business to prove it) that the several Doctrines of the *Trinity*, *Incarnation*, *Resurrection of Bodies*, &c. are only rejected on that account, that tho' Scripture seems to speak fair for them, yet it is otherwise to be interpreted, because supposed to be repugnant to Reason. 2. Those Doctrines before mentioned are eminently serviceable to promote the great end of the Gospel, and are inlaid in the very foundation of it, as that of the *Trinity*, and *Divinity of CHRIST*; but these we now mention are no ways conduceable to that end, but seem to thwart and overthrow it; and *Transubstantiation* estab-

VII.

sheth a way of Worship contrary to the Gospel. 3. All the foundation of *Transubstantiation* is laid upon ambiguous places of Scripture, which must of necessity have some Tropes and Figures in them; but the Doctrine of the *Trinity* is not only contained in plain Scripture, but is evidenced by visible appearance, as particularly at the Baptism of our Savior. 4. There is far greater ground why we shou'd reject *Transubstantiation* and *Ubiquity*, as inconsistent with Reason, than that they shou'd the *Trinity*, on this account, because the grounds of Reason on which we reject those opinions, are fetched from those essential and inseparable properties of Bodies, which are inconsistent with those opinions; now these are things within the reach of our Understandings (in which case God himself sometimes appeals to Reason) but it is quite another case, when we search into the incomprehensible Nature of God, and pronounce with confidence that such things cannot be in God, because we cannot comprehend them; which gives a sufficient answer to this objection. The substance then of this Discourse is, that whatever Doctrine is sufficiently manifested to be of Divine Revelation, is to be embraced and believed as undoubtedly true, tho' our Reason cannot reach to the full apprehension of all the Modes and Circumstances of it. So that as to these sublime Mysteries our Faith stands upon this twofold bottom. *First*, That the Being, Understanding, and Power of God doth infinitely transcend ours, and therefore he may reveal to us matters above our reach and capacity. *Secondly*, That whatever God doth reveal is undoubtedly true, tho' we may not fully understand it; for this is a most undoubted Principle, That God cannot and will not deceive any in those things which he reveals to Men. Thus our first Supposition is cleared, That it is not repugnant to Reason, that a Doctrine may be true, which depends not on the evidence of the thing it self.

The Second is, *That in matters whose truth depends not on the evidence of the things themselves, infallible testimony is the fullest demonstration of them.* For these things not being of *Mathematical* evidence, there must be some other way found out for demonstrating the truth of them. And in all those things whose truth depends on Testimony, the more creditable the Testimony is, the higher Evidence is given to them; but that Testimony which may deceive, cannot give so pregnant an Evidence as that which cannot; for then all imaginable objections are taken off. This is so clear, that it needs no further Proof; and therefore the Third follows.

That there are certain ways whereby to know that a Testimony delivered is infallible; and that is fully proved by these two Arguments. 1. That it is the duty of all those to whom it is propounded to believe it; now how cou'd that be a duty in them to believe, which they had no ways to know whether it were a Testimony to be believed, or no? 2. Because God will condemn the World for Unbelief: In which the Justice of God's proceeding doth necessarily suppose that there were sufficient Arguments to induce them to believe, which cou'd not be, unless there were some certain way supposed whereby a Testimony may be known to be infallible. These three things now being supposed, *viz.* That a Doctrine may be true which depends not on evidence of Reason; that the greatest demon-

demonstration of the truth of such a Doctrine, is its being delivered by infallible Testimony; and that there are certain waies whereby a Testimony may be known to be infallible: Our first Principle is fully confirmed, which was, *That where the truth of a Doctrine depends not on Evidence of Reason, but on the Authority of him that reveals it, the only way to prove the Doctrine to be true, is to prove the Testimony of him that reveals it to be infallible.*

The next Principle or *Hypothesis* which I lay down, is, *That there can be no greater evidence that a Testimony is infallible, than that it is the Testimony of God himself.* VIII.
2. Hypoth. The truth of this depends upon a common Notion of Human Nature, which is the Veracity of God in whatever way he discovers himself to Men; and therefore the ultimate Resolution of our Faith, as to its formal object, must be alone into the Veracity of God revealing things unto us; for the *Principium certitudinis*, or foundation of all certain assent can be fetched no higher, neither will it stand any lower than the infallible Verity of God himself; and the *Principium patefactionis*, or the ground of discovery of Spiritual truth to our Minds must be resolved into Divine Testimony, or Revelation. These two then not taken asunder, but joyntly, *God, who cannot lye, hath revealed these things*, is the only certain foundation for a Divine Faith to rest it self upon. But now the particular exercise of a Divine Faith lies in a firm assent to such a particular thing as divinely reveal'd; and herein lies not so much the Testimony, as the peculiar energy of the Spirit of God in inclining the Soul to believe peculiar objects of Faith, as of Divine Revelation. But the general ground of Faith, which they call the formal object, or the *ratio propter quam credimus*, is the general infallibility of a Divine Testimony. For in a matter concerning Divine Revelation, there are two great Questions to be resolved: The first is, Why I believe a Divine Testimony with a firm assent? The Answer to that is, Because I am assur'd, that whatever God speaks is true: the other is, Upon what grounds do I believe this to be a Divine Testimony? the resolution of which, as far as I can understand, must be fetch'd from those rational Evidences, whereby a Divine Testimony must be distinguish'd from one merely Human and fallible. For the Spirit of God in its workings upon the Mind, doth not carry it on by a brutish impulse, but draws it by a Spiritual discovery of such strong and persuasive grounds to assent to what is reveal'd, that the Mind doth readily give a firm assent to that which it sees such convincing Reason to believe. Now the strongest Reason to believe, is the manifestation of a Divine Testimony; which the Spirit of God so clearly discovers to a true Believer, that he not only firmly assents to the general foundation of Faith, the Veracity of God; but to the particular object propounded, as a matter of Divine Revelation. But this latter Question is not here the matter of our Discourse; our Proposition only concerns the general foundation of Faith, which appears to be so rational and evident, as no Principle in Nature can be more. For if the Testimony on which I am to rely be only God's, and I be assur'd from Natural Reason, that his Testimony can be no other than infallible, wherein doth the certainty of the foundation of Faith fall short of that in any *Mathematical* demonstration? Upon which account

Fragn.
Citor.

a Divine Testimony hath been regarded with so much veneration among all who have own'd a Deity, altho' they have been unacquainted with any certain way of Divine Revelation. And the reason why any rejected such a Testimony among the *Heathens*, was either, because they believ'd not a *Deity*; or else that the particular Testimonies produced were mere frauds and impostures, and therefore no Divine Testimony, as it was given out to be. But the Principle still remain'd indisputable, that on supposition the Testimony were what it pretended to be, there was the greatest reason to believe it, altho' it came not in such a way of probation, as their Sciences proceeded in. From which Principle arose that speech of *Tully*, which he hath translated out of *Plato's Timæus*; *Ac difficillimum factu à Diis ortis fidem non habere, quanquam nec argumentis nec rationibus certis eorum ratio confirmetur*. By which we see what a presumption there was of Truth, where there was any evidence of a Divine Testimony. And no doubt upon the advantage of this Principle it was the Devil gain'd so great credit to his Oracles; for therein he did the most imitate Divine Revelation. From hence then we see what a firm bottom Faith in the general stands upon, which is nothing short of an infallible Divine Testimony: other things may conduce by way of subserviency for the discovery of this; but nothing else can be a sure foundation for a Divine Faith, but what is a Testimony of God himself.

IX.
3. Hypoth.

A Testimony may be known to be divine and infallible, tho' God himself do not speak in an immediate way. By being known, I do not mean the firm perswasion of a Mind inlightned by the Spirit of God, but that there are sufficient Evidences *ex parte rei*, to convince Men of it, which are not wilfully blind and obstinate, *i. e.* that the ground of unbelief in any cannot be imputed to the defect of sufficient Motives to Faith, but to their own perverseness and prejudice in not discerning them. Now that God may reveal and declare his Mind to the World, not in an immediate way, but by some Instruments he may make use of to that end, is not only evident from the great futableness of such a way to the conditions of the Persons he speaks to, but from the general perswasion of the World concerning the possibility of Inspiration. The *Jews* are so far from denying this, that it is the very foundation of their Religion as well as ours; God discovering the most of his Will to them by the Prophets, or by Persons divinely inspir'd. And this general consent of all other Nations, that there is such a Principle as Divination in the World, doth make it evident, that it carries no repugnancy at all to Natural Light, supposing that there is a God, that he shou'd reveal his Mind by some particular Persons unto the World. For which purpose the testimony of *Tully* in the entrance of his Books *de Divinatione*, is very considerable.

Cicero l. 2.
de Divin.

Vetus opinio est jam usque ab Heroicis ducta temporibus, eaque & populi Romani & omnium gentium firmata consensu, versari quendam inter homines divinationem, quam Græci ^{μαντικὴν} appellant, i. e. præ-sensionem & scientiam rerum futurarum; and soon after adds, gentem quidem nullam video neque tam humanam atque doctam, neque tam immanem atque barbaram, quæ non significari futura, & à quibusdam intelligi, prædicique posse censeat. He makes it appear to be an universal sentiment of all Nations in the World, and instanecth parti-

particularly in the *Assyrians, Egyptians, Cilicians, Pisidians, Pamphylians, Grecians, Romans, Etrurians*, and others. It is true indeed he after mentions some Philosophers who deny'd it; but they were most part the followers of *Epicurus*, who deny'd any *Providence*, and therefore might well take away *Divination*: but if *Xenophanes Colophonius* had any followers who asserted the one, and deny'd the other (as *Tully* seems to intimate that he was alone in that persuasion) yet we may probably suppose the reason of their rejecting it might be the Impostures which went under the name of *Divination* among them; which are excellently discover'd by that Prince of *Roman* Philosophers as well as Orators, in his second Book of *Divination*: But it is apparent by the same Author, that the generality of Philosophers consented with the People in this persuasion, as the Followers of those three great Sects of *Socrates, Pythagoras* and *Aristotle*, were all approvers of it; but of all Persons the *Stoics* were the most zealous contenders for it, especially *Chrysippus, Diogenes Babylonius, Antipater* and *Possidonius*. Some indeed rejected some ways of *Divination*, yet embraced others, as *Dicæarchus* and *Cratippus*, who rejected all but Dreams and Ecstasies; but in the general we find these two Principles went together among them, the existence of a *Deity*, and the certainty of *Divination*; so that from *Divination* they prov'd a *Deity*, and from a *Deity* *Divination*. *Si sunt genera divinandi vera, esse Deos, vicissimque si Dii sint, esse qui divinent*, as *Quintus Cicero* there speaks: and at last thus triumphs in the multitude of his witnesses, *An dum bestię loquantur expectamus, hominum consentiente auctoritate contenti non sumus?* It may not be amiss to produce the chief Argument on which the *Stoics* insisted to prove the necessity of *Divination*, supposing the existence of a *Deity*. *If there be Gods, say they, and they do not reveal to Men things to come; it either is because they do not love them, or because they do not know themselves what shall come to pass, or they think it is of no concernment to Men to know future things, or that it doth not become their Majesty to reveal them, or that they cannot reveal them to Men if they would: but neither is it true that they do not love Men; for the Gods are of a bountiful nature, and friends to Mankind; neither can they be ignorant of future things, because they are appointed and decreed by them; neither is it of no concernment to Men to know future things; for that makes them more cautious if they know them; neither is it repugnant to their Majesty to reveal them, for nothing is more noble than bounty and doing good; and they must needs know these things; therefore they may make them known to others; and if they do make them known, there must be some way whereby to know that they do so; or else they signifie them to no purpose.* If now instead of the knowledg of future contingencies, and the multitude of their Gods, they had insisted on the discovery and revelation by the true God of those ways, which may lead Men to eternal Happiness; that Argument had been strong and convincing, which as it stands is sophistical and fallacious. So that it is very plain, that not only a possibility of *Divination* was acknowledg'd by those who wanted Divine Revelation, but that this *Divination* did not arise from mere Natural Causes, but from an *afflatus Divinus*, and a *concitatio quædam animi*, as they there speak, which imports

Cicero l. 2.
de Nat.
Deorum.

nothing short of Divine Inspiration. Nay the opinion of this was so common among them, that they thought any extraordinary Persons had something of Divine Enthusiasm in them, as *Tully* elsewhere tells us, *Nemo vir magnus sine aliquo afflatu Divino unquam fuit.* Altho' then these Heathens were greatly mistaken as to those things they took for a Divine *Afflatus* and *Divination*, yet we cannot conceive so general a Sense shou'd be imprinted on the minds of Men of such a thing as that was, were it not a thing highly consonant to Principles of Reason, that God shou'd communicate his mind to the World by the inspiration of some Persons. And therefore I conceive that *Cicero* and his Brother *Quintus*, who manage that excellent dispute of *Divination* between them, have divided the Truth between them too. For on the one side *Quintus* evidently proves the possibility of the thing, the consequence of it upon the acknowledgment of a Deity, and the general consent of Mankind in the owning of it; and on the other side *Tully* himself excellently lays open the vanity, folly, and uncertainty, not only of the common waies of *Divination*, but of the Oracles which were in such great esteem among the Heathens. And altho' *Tully* doth so sharply and sarcastically answer the Argument from the common consent of Men; *quasi vero quidquam sit tam valde, quam nihil sapere, vulgare; as though nothing Men did more generally agree in, than in being Fools:* yet as it is evident that the ground of that Scoff was from the several manners of *Divination* then in use, so it cannot be thought to be a general impeachment of Human Nature in a thing so consequent upon the being of a God, which as himself elsewhere proves, is as clear from reason as from that *Testimonium gentium in hac una re non dissidentium*, as the Christian *Cicero*, *Lactantius* speaks, *The consent of Nations, which scarce agree in any thing else, but that there is a God.* That which we now infer from hence is, That God may make known his Mind in a way infallible, tho' not immediate, for in case of Inspiration of mere Men, it is not They so much which speak, as God by them; and in case that God himself shou'd speak thro' the veil of Human Nature, the Testimony must needs be infallible, tho' the appearance of the Divinity be not visible

Lactant.
de fals. relig. cap. 2.

X.
Hyp. 4.

Those evidences whereby a Divine Testimony may be known, must be such as may not leave Mens minds in suspense, but are of their own nature convincing proofs of it. For altho' as to the event some may doubt, and others disbelieve the Testimony so prov'd; yet it is sufficient for our purpose, that in the nature of the things (supposing them to be such as we speak of) they are sufficient for the eviſtion that the Testimony attested by them is divine and infallible. I know it is a great dispute among many, whether those things, which are usually call'd the common Motives of Faith, do of their own nature only induce a probable persuasion of the truth of the Doctrine as probable which they are join'd with, or else are they sufficient for the producing a firm assent to the Doctrine as true? I grant they are not demonstrative so as to inforce assent; for we see the contrary by the experience of all Ages; but that they are not sufficient foundation for an unprejudic'd Mind to establish a firm assent upon, is a thing not easie to be granted; chiefly upon this

this account, that an obligation to believe doth lie upon every one to whom these evidences of a Divine Testimony are sufficiently discover'd. And otherwise of all sins the sin of Unbelief, as to God revealing his mind, were the most excusable and pardonable sin; nay, it wou'd be little less than a part of prudence; because what can it be accounted but temerity and imprudence in any to believe a Doctrine as true, only upon probable inducements? and what can it be but wisdom to with-hold assent upon a mere Verisimilitude? considering what the *Lyrick* Poet hath long since truly told us;

ἢ πᾶσι καὶ βροτῶν φρένα
ὑπὲρ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον
δεδαυδαμένοι ψεύδεσι ποικίλοις
ἔξαπατῶντι μῦθοι.

Pindar O.
lymp. Ode.
1.

That a Falshood may frequently seem truer to common understandings than Truth it self: and as *Menander* speaks, *τὸ πιθανὸν ἔχει καὶ ἀληθίας ἔχει ἐνίστημι μείζων, ἢ πιθανώτερον ὄχλου*, that a mere verisimilitude may have more force on vulgar minds than Truth hath. If therefore there be no evidences given sufficient to carry the minds of Men beyond mere probability, what sin can it be in those to disbelieve who cannot be obliged to believe as true what is only discover'd as probable? I cannot therefore see how an obligation to believe a Divine Testimony is consistent with their opinion, who make the utmost which any outward evidences can extend to, to be only the bare credibility of the Doctrine attested by them. I can very well satisfy my self with the ground and reason why the more subtle Wits of the Church of *Rome* do assert this; for if nothing else can be produced by all motives of Faith but only a probable persuasion of the Truth of Christian Doctrine, then here comes in the fairest pretense for the Infallibility of their Church: for otherwise they tell us we can have no foundation for a Divine Faith; for how can that be a foundation for Divine Faith, which can reach no higher than a Moral Inducement, and beget only a probable persuasion of the credibility of the Doctrine of Christ? But on what account those who disown the Infallibility of the Church of *Rome* in the proposal of matters of Faith, shou'd yet consent with those of it in an *Hypothesis* taken up in probability, merely out of subserviency to that most advantageous piece of the mystery of Iniquity, is not easie to resolve. Unless the overfondness of some upon the Doctrine of the Schools, more than of the Gospel, hath been the occasion of it. For how agreeable can that opinion be to the Gospel, which so evidently puts the most defensive weapons into the hands of Unbelief? For doubtless in the judgment of any rational Person, a mere probable persuasion of the credibility of the Doctrine of Christ, where an assent to it as true is requir'd, can never be look'd on as an act of Faith: for if my assent to the Truth of the thing be according to the strength of the Arguments inducing me to believe, and these Arguments do only prove a probability of Divine Testimony, my assent can be no stronger than to a thing merely probable; which is, that it may be, or not be true; which is not properly assent, but a sus-

pending our judgments till some convincing Argument be produced on either side. And therefore according to this opinion those who saw all the Miracles which Christ did, cou'd not be bound to believe in Christ, but only to have a favorable opinion of his Person and Doctrine, as a thing which tho' not evidenc'd to be true by what he did, yet it was very piously credible; but they must have a care withal of venturing their Belief too far, only on such Moral Inducements as Miracles were, for fear they shou'd go further than the force of the Arguments wou'd carry them. Had not this opinion now, think we, been a very probable way to have converted the World upon the Preaching of Christ and his Apostles; when Christ saith, *though ye believe not me, believe the works, that ye may know and believe that the Father is in me, and I in him?* Nay, saith this opinion, that is more than we are bound to do; tho' we see thy Works we are not bound to believe thy Testimony to be Divine and certainly true: but we will do all we are bound to do; we will entertain a favorable opinion of thy Person and Doctrine, and wait for somewhat else, but we do not well know what, to persuade us to believe. When the Apostles preach the danger of Unbelief, because *the doctrine of the Gospel was confirmed by signs and wonders, and divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost*; what a fair answer doth this opinion put into the mouths of Infidels, that notwithstanding all these Signs and Wonders, they were never bound to believe the Gospel as a certain Truth, and therefore they hope the danger is not so great in neglecting the Salvation promis'd by the Gospel?

XL I cannot conceive that Men otherwise learned and sober, shou'd with so much confidence assert that the rational evidences of a Divine Testimony are insufficient to prove a Doctrine true; unless it be from hence, that they find that notwithstanding the strongest evidences many Persons continue in Unbelief. For say they, *If these Arguments were scientific and demonstrative, (as they speak) of the truth of the Doctrine attested by them, then all persons to whom they are propounded, must certainly believe.* But this is very easily answer'd; for we speak not of internal, but outward Evidence; not of that in the Subject, but of the Object, or more fully of the Reason of the thing, and not the Event in us; for doubtless there may be undoubted Truth and Evidence in many things which some Persons either cannot or will not understand. If *Epicurus* shou'd contend still that the Sun and Stars are no bigger than they seem to be, will it hence follow that there can be no rational Demonstration of the contrary? Nay, if the way of demonstration be offer'd him, and Telescopes put into his hands, yet if he be resolv'd to maintain his credit, and therefore his Opinion, and will not use the Telescopes, or suspect still they are intended only to deceive his sight; what possible way will there be of convincing such a Person, tho' the thing be in its self demonstrable? Now if the strength of Prejudice or maintaining of Credit can prevail so much in matters of Mathematical evidence, to withhold assent; what power may we think a corrupt Interest may have upon the Understanding, as to the Arguments which tend to prove the truth of that Doctrine, which is so repugnant to that carnal Interest which the heart is already devoted to! Our blessed

Savior

Savior hath himself given us so full an account of the original and causes of Unbelief in the persons he convers'd with, that that may yield us a sufficient Answer to this Objection. He tells us the ground of it was not want of light, nay, there was light sufficient to convince any, but that those to whom the light came lov'd darkness rather than it, because their deeds were evil. That they could not believe while they received honor one of another, and sought not the honor which was of God only, i. e. That they were so greedy of Applause from each other, that they wou'd not impartially search into the truth of that Doctrine, which did touch their Sores so to the quick, that they had rather have them fester upon them, than go to the trouble of so sharp a cure. That the reason so few follow'd him was because *the way was narrow and the gate strait which men must go in at*; and therefore no wonder so few of the rich and proud Pharisees cou'd get in at it; they were partly so swell'd with a high opinion of themselves, and partly so loaden with their riches, that they thought it was to no purpose for them to think of going in at so strait a gate, while they were resolv'd to part with neither.

That the final ground of the rejection of any, was not want of evidence to bring them to believe, nor want of readiness in Christ to receive them if they did, but it was *a peevish, wilful, obstinate, malicious spirit that they would not come to Christ*, nor believe his Doctrine (for those import the same) but when the most convincing Miracles were us'd, they wou'd rather attribute them to the Prince of Devils than to the power of God. And tho' our Savior presently by rational and demonstrative Arguments did prove the contrary to their faces; yet we see thereby it was a Resolution not to be convinced, or yield to the Truth, which was the cause why they did not believe. Now from this very instance of our Savior's proceedings with the Pharisees by rational Arguments, I demand, whether these Arguments of our Savior were sufficient foundations for a Divine Assent to that Truth, that our Savior did not his Miracles by any Diabolical but by Divine power, or no? If they were, then it is evident that rational Evidence may be a foundation for Divine Faith, or that some motives to believe may be so strong, as to be sufficient evidence of the Truth and certainty of the Doctrine: If these Arguments were not sufficient proofs of what our Savior spake, then welfare the Pharisees; it seems they said nothing but what might be thus far justify'd, that the contrary to it cou'd not be demonstrated. And if the evidence of our Savior's Miracles were so great, as some suppose, that the Pharisees cou'd not but be convinced that they were Divine; but out of their malice and envy they uttered this Blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, to keep the people from following Christ; then we hence infer two things: *First, How strong an evidence there was in the Miracles of Christ*, when it convinced his most resolute enemies that they were Divine. *Secondly, What power a corrupt Will may have over a convinced Understanding.* For altho' the Will may not hinder the conviction, yet it may soon stifle it, by suggesting those things to the Mind which may divert it from those convictions of Truth; and seek to find out any ways to disgrace it. It wou'd be no difficult task to discover in all those instances

Joh. 3. 19.

Joh. 5. 44.

Mat. 7. 14.

Joh. 5. 40.

Matth. 11.

24

instances wherein the Unbelief of Men is discover'd in the New Testament, that the Persons guilty of it did not proceed like rational Men, or such as desir'd Truth, but were wholly carried away thro' passion, interest, prejudice, disaffection, or some other cause of that nature, which may give us a sufficient account why those persons did not believe, altho' there might be clear and undoubted evidence to persuade them to it. But altho' I assert that these rational evidences are sufficient arguments of the truth of the Doctrine they come to manifest; yet I wou'd not be so understood, that I thereby resolve all Religion into a mere act of Reason and Knowledg, and that no more power is requir'd in the Understanding to believe the Gospel, than to believe a *Mathematical* Demonstration: which is another Objection some lay in the way of this Opinion; but it is not difficult getting over it. For the sufficiency which I attribute to rational Evidence, is not absolute and simple, but *in suo genere*, as an objective Evidence. Notwithstanding this, the whole work of the Spirit of God in its peculiar energy and way of operation upon the Soul, is left intire to it self: But then when the Spirit works as to the planting of a truly Divine Faith, I do not think that it only persuades the Soul of the truth of a Divine Testimony, but withal represents the truths reveal'd by that Testimony, with all that excellency and futableness that there is in them, that by the most agreeable, yet effectual influence of the Spirit upon the Soul, it cheerfully embraceth that Truth which is reveal'd, and cordially yields up its self in obedience to it. This is the Divine Faith which the Scripture acquaints us with, and not such a one as merely believes the truth of a Divine Testimony: and as to the production of this Faith, I acknowledg mere rational Evidence to be insufficient, because they proceed in two very different waies; the one is to satisfy Mens Minds in the truth of the Doctrine, the other is to bring them effectually to adhere unto it. The asserting of the one therefore doth no more tend to destroy the other, than the saying that a Telescope will help us to discover very much of the heavenly Bodies, doth imply that a blind Man may see them, if he makes but use of them. Altho' therefore the natural Man cannot savingly apprehend the things of God; yet there may be so much rational Evidence going along with Divine Revelation, that supposing Reason to be pure, and not corrupted and steep'd in Sense as now it is, it wou'd discover Spiritual Evidence to be the most real and convincing Evidence. Thus far we have prov'd, *That where there is any infallible Testimony, there is sufficient rational Evidence going along with it, to make it appear that it is from God.*

CHAP.

C H A P. IX.

The rational Evidence of the truth of Christian Religion
from Miracles.

I. *The possibility of Miracles appears from GOD and Providence ; the evidence of a Divine Testimony by them. GOD alone can really alter the course of Nature. The Devil's power of working Miracles consider'd. Of Simon Magus, Apollonius. The cures in the Temple of Æsculapius at Rome, &c. II. GOD never works Miracles, but for some particular end. The particular reasons of the Miracles of Christ. The repealing the Law of Moses, which had been settled by Miracles. Why Christ check'd the Pharisees for demanding a Sign, when himself appeals to his Miracles. The power of Christ's Miracles on many who did not thoroughly believe. III. Christ's Miracles made it evident that he was the Messias, because the Predictions were fulfill'd in him. Why John Baptist wrought no Miracles. IV. Christ's Miracles necessary for the overthrow of the Devil's Kingdom. V. Of the Demoniacs and Lunatics in the Gospel, and in the Primitive Church. The power of the Name of Christ over them largely prov'd by several Testimonies. VI. The evidence thence of a Divine Power in Christ. VII. Of counterfeit dispossessions. Of Miracles wrought among Infidels. VIII. Of the future state of the Church. IX. The necessity of the Miracles of Christ, as to the propagation of Christian Religion : that prov'd from the condition of the Publishers, and the success of the Doctrine. The Apostles knew the hazard of their employment, before they entred into it. X. The boldness and resolution of the Apostles notwithstanding this, compar'd with heathen Philosophers. XI. No motive cou'd carry the Apostles thro' their employment, but the truth of their Doctrine ; XII. not seeking the honor, profit or pleasure of the World. XIII. The Apostles evidence of the truth of their Doctrine lay in being eye-witnesses of our Savior's Miracles and Resurrection. XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII. That attested by themselves ; their sufficiency thence for preaching the Gospel. XIX. Of the nature of the Doctrine of the Gospel ; contrariety of it to Natural Inclinations. XX. Strange success of it, notwithstanding it came not with human power : No Christian Emperor, till the Gospel universally preach'd. XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV. The weakness and simplicity of the instruments which preach'd the Gospel. From all which the great Evidence of the power of Miracles is prov'd.*

Y

Of

1. *Hypoth.* **O**F all rational Evidences which tend to confirm the truth of a Divine Testimony, there can be none greater than a power of working Miracles for confirmation that the Testimony which is reveal'd is infallible. The possibility of a power of Miracles cannot be question'd by any who assert a Deity and a Providence; for by the same Power that things were either at first produced, or are still conserv'd (which is equivalent to the other) the course of Nature may be alter'd, and things caus'd which are beyond the power of inferior Causes: For tho' that be an immutable Law of Nature as to Physical Beings, that every thing remains in the course and order wherein it was set at the Creation; yet that only holds till the same power which set it in that order shall otherwise dispose of it. Granting then the possibility of Miracles, the subject of this Hypothesis is: That a power of Miracles is the clearest Evidence of a Divine Testimony, which will appear from these following Considerations.

1. *GOD alone can really alter the course of Nature.* I speak not of such things which are apt only to raise admiration in us, because of our unacquaintedness with the causes of them, or manner of their production, which are thence call'd *Wonders*, much less of mere juggles and impostures, whereby the Eyes of Men are deceiv'd; but I speak of such things as are in themselves either contrary to, or above the course of Nature, *i. e.* that order which is establish'd in the Universe. The Devil no question may, and doth often deceive the World, and may by subtilty and the agility of his nature, perform such things as may amuse the Minds of Men, and sometimes put them to it, to find a difference between them and real Miracles, if they only make their Senses judges of them. And such kind of Wonders, tho' they are but sparingly done, and with a kind of secrecy (as tho' they were consulting with *Catiline* about the burning *Rome*) yet the Devil wou'd have some (especially when Ignorance and Superstition are ascendants) to keep up his interest in the World. Or else, when he is like to be dispossest'd and thrown out of all, he tries his utmost to keep as many to him as may be: Thus when the Spirit of God appear'd in the Miracles of our Savior and his Apostles and the Primitive Church, he then conjur'd up all the infernal Powers to do something parallel, to keep possession of his idolatrous Temples, as long as he cou'd. Thus we find *Simon Magus* dogging the Apostles (as it were) at the heels, that by his Magic he might stagger the People concerning the Miracles wrought by the Apostles: After him *Apollonius* appear'd upon the Stage; but his wonders are such pitiful things, compar'd with those wrought by *Christ* or his Apostles, that it cou'd be nothing but malice in *Hierocles* to mention him in competition with *Christ*. But those things which seem a great deal more considerable than either of these, were, The cure of a blind Man by *Vespasian* in *Egypt*, mention'd by *Tacitus* and *Suetonius*, wherein there was a palpable imitation of our Savior's curing the blind Man in the Gospel; for the Man told *Vespasian*, *Restitutum oculos si inspuisset, That he should receive his sight by his spittle*: So *Spartianus* tells us of a Woman that was cur'd of her blindness by killing the knees of the Emperor *Adrian*; and * *Boxhornius* hath pro-

Sueton.
Vesp. cap. 7.

* *Boxhorn.*
Qu. Rom.
qu. 7.

produced an old Table in the Temple of *Æsculapius* at Rome of several diseased persons that were cured there: *A blind Man in the time of Antoninus was cured by this Oracle; he must come to the Altar, and kneel there; from the right side he must turn to the left, and put five fingers upon the Altar, and then lift up his hands and touch his eyes, and so was cured: Another called Lucius cured of the pain of his side, by mixing the ashes of the Altar with the wine, and applying it to his side; another cured of spitting of blood by the kernel of a pine-apple and honey, used three days; a fourth cured of Blindness by the blood of a white cock and honey used three days upon his eyes.* These are the most considerable of all the pretended Miracles done about that time, when the noise of the Christian Miracles were spread so far and done so frequently, that they challenged the Heathens again and again to bring forth any person possess'd with a Devil; if he did not confess to them that he was a Devil, tho' he made the Heathens believe that he was a God, they were contented to leave their blood in the place.

For thus *Tertullian* speaks in his *Apology* to them: *Edatur hic aliquis sub tribunalibus vestris, quem dæmone agi constet: jussus à quolibet Christiano loqui spiritus ille, tam se Dæmonem confitebitur de vero, quam alibi Deum de falso: æque producat aliquis ex iis qui de Deo pati existimantur, qui aris inhalantes numen de nidore concipiunt, qui ructando curantur, qui anhelando profantur. Ista ipsa Virgo cælestis pluviarum pollicitatrix, iste ipse Æsculapius Medicinarum demonstrator, alias de morituris scordii & denatii & Asclepiadoti subministrator, nisi se Dæmones confessi fuerint, Christiano mentiri non audentes, ibidem illius Christiani procacissimi sanguinem fundite. Quid isto opere manifestius, quid hac probatione fidelius? simplicitas veritatis in medio est; virtus illi sua assistit; nihil suspicari licebit, magia aut aliqua fallacia fieri. Dictis non stetis, si oculi vestri & aures permiserint vobis.* In these very daring words, we see how the Christians appeal'd to their Senses, even with the hazard of their own lives, that they wou'd make even *Æsculapius* himself confess what he was, and by whose power all the cures were wrought upon the Dreamers in his Temples. And for the manner of the Devil's cures, the same Author explains it thus. *Lædunt primo, dehinc remedia præcipiunt ad miraculum nova, sive contraria, post quæ desinunt lædere, & curasse creduntur.* They first possess the Bodies themselves (as Demoniacs were common in those times) and affect it with various distempers, afterwards upon using the strange remedies prescribed by *Æsculapius*, they forsake their station, and the person is cured. And for the cures perform'd by the Emperors, those who consider what various artifices were about that time used to procure an opinion of Divinity in the Emperors, will not much wonder that such reports shou'd be spread of them, or that any persons shou'd feign these distempers to give themselves out to be cured by them. But granting somewhat wonderful in these, what are they, compar'd with those done by *Christians*? and who ever wou'd lay down his life to attest any of them? So that tho' the Devil by his subtilty may easily impose upon Spectators eyes, yet it was impossible for him by any power of his own to alter the course of Nature, or produce any real Miracle. For every true Miracle is a production of something out of nothing

(which cannot be done by less than an omnipotent arm) and that either in the thing it self, or the manner of producing it. In the thing it self, when it is of that nature that it cannot be produced by any Second Causes, as the raising of the dead; in the manner of doing it, when tho' the thing lies within the possibility of Second Causes, yet it is perform'd without the help of any of them, as in the cure of diseases without any use of means, *by a word speaking, the touch of a garment, &c.* Now that all those Miracles which were wrought in confirmation of the Christian Doctrine were such true and proper Miracles, will be discover'd afterwards.

II. 2. *God never alters the course of Nature, but for some very considerable end.* For otherwise when he did it, it wou'd not be taken notice of, nor thought to be an alteration of the order of Nature, but only some rare contingencies which lie hid in the order of Causes, but only break out at some times: of which sort are all those things which the ignorant World is apt to account as Prodigies. Of all which rare contingencies in Nature, I say, as the Roman Orator doth, *Si quod raro fit, id portentum putandum est, sapientem esse portentum est; sæpius enim mulum peperisse arbitror, quam sapientem fuisse.* If all rare contingencies be accounted prodigies, a wise Man is certainly the greatest Prodigy. But these are quite of another nature from true Miracles, which are immediately produced by a Divine Power, and intended for a confirmation of some Divine Testimony. There are now several weighty Reasons, which might make Miracles necessary in the time of our Savior, as an Evidence of his Divine Authority and Power.

Cicero de
Div. l. 2.

Matth. 12.
38. 16. 1.

1. *That he came to take down that way of worship, which had been at first settled by a power of Miracles in Moses.* God wou'd not be so much wanting to the Faith of that People, which had receiv'd their Law by Signs and Wonders from Heaven, but that there shou'd be as strong an Evidence given to them, that the fulness of time was come when that dispensation was to have an end, and to give place to one more perfect, which was to be establish'd instead of it. Upon which account the Jews might rationally enquire after a Sign, where any new Revelation was discover'd, which might null the obligation of any former Law: and when they enquire so much after a Sign, our Savior doth not reject the enquiry as in it self unreasonable, but as made in an unreasonable manner; for they wou'd not be contented with the Miracles which our Savior wrought, which sufficiently manifested a Divine Power; but all that they desired was, *A Sign from Heaven*, i. e. such as were done at the giving of the Law, the Thundring and Lightnings there; or, as the *raining of Manna in the wilderness*: Now our Savior justly checks this demand as importune and impudent, partly as knowing upon what account they asked it, merely to tempt him; and not out of any real desire of satisfaction; and partly because on that abundant Evidence which was given in the Miraculous cures which were wrought by him, which were more sutable to that design of doing good in the World, than all the Thunder-claps on Mount Sinai were: neither were the People in a condition to be fed by Manna as they were in the Wilderness, God graciously suffering the discoveries of his Power to the peculiar advantages of the People which they were made to, and the dispensation they usher'd in.

in. Those terrible Signs at Mount *Sinai* being very futable to the severity and rigor of the Law: and the gracious Miracles of our Savior to the sweetness and grace of the Gospel. And on this account our Savior charged the *Jews* with Hypocrisy, in requiring a *σημειον*, as something above *δυναμις*, a *Prodigy* rather than a *Miracle*; *An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a Sign, and there shall no Sign be given it but that of the Prophet Jonas, i. e.* Matth. 12. 39 this People which are so far from the Faith of *Abraham*, (and therefore are supposititious Children) that no Miracles which I do, will convince them, but they seek only to have their Humors gratify'd more than their Faith confirm'd by some Prodigy from Heaven, shall not by me be thus gratify'd; but having done enough already to persuade them, if they had any heart to believe, instead of a Sign from Heaven, they shall have only one from the Earth, and that not so much intended for the conversion of such wilful Unbelievers, as for the testifying my innocency to the World, viz. his Resurrection from the dead. And so elsewhere when the *Jews* demand a Sign, it was upon the doing of that, which if they had attended to, had been a sufficient Sign to them, viz. *his driving the buyers and sellers out of the Temple*: Which being a thing permitted by the *Sanhedrin* and the *Priests*, how cou'd they think so mean a Person, in appearance, as our Savior was, cou'd ever have effected it, had it not been for a Divine Majesty and Power which appear'd in him? It was not then the expectation of Miracles which our Savior rebuked in the *Jews*, but being unsatisfy'd with the kind and nature of our Savior's Miracles. It was their hypocrisy and unbelief which *Christ* condemn'd, notwithstanding the frequent Miracles which he wrought among them: For we plainly find our Savior very often appealing to his Miracles as the evidences of his Divine Commission: *If I had not done the work among them which no man else did, they had not had sin, i. e.* Joh. 5. 36. 10. 25. Joh. 15. 20. in not believing me. Whereby *Christ* both sets forth the necessity of his working Miracles, in order to the conviction of the World, and the greatness of the Miracles which he wrought: he did those no Man else had done, no not *Moses* and *Elias*, in curing all manner of diseases by the Word of his Mouth, and those Miracles which they had done, he exceeded them in the manner of doing them. *Moses* fed them with bread from Heaven; but *Christ* multiply'd on Earth some few loaves and fishes, to the feeding of many thousands: *Elias* indeed raised one from the dead; but *Christ* raised more, and one after he had been four days in the grave. And upon this very evidence of our Savior's Miracles we find many believing on him. And even of those who were not so far wrought upon as to become followers of *CHRIST*, as the only *Messias*, yet we find them so far persuaded by the power of his Miracles, that they looked upon him as a great Prophet, or one that was sent from *GOD*. So *Nicodemus*, who came first to *CHRIST* more as a rational Equirer than a Believer, yet we see he was persuaded that he was a teacher Joh. 1. 49. 2. 11. come from God, because no man could do the miracles which *Christ* did, unless God were with him. And before him many of the *Jews* at *Jerusalem* believed in his name when they saw the miracles which he did; yet these persons *Christ* would not trust himself with, because Joh. 2. 23. we knew their hearts were not subdued to his Doctrine, tho' their

understandings were convinced by his Miracles. And after this other of the *Jews* that looked not on him as the *Messias*, yet it is

Joh. 7. 31. said they believ'd on him on the account of his Miracles. *And many of the people believed on him, and said, When Christ cometh will he do more Miracles than these which this man hath done?* Altho' herein they were most unreasonable in believing the Evidence, and not the Truth attested by it, in believing Christ to be one sent from God by his Miracles, and yet not believing him to be the *Messias*, which was the thing attested by them. Not that mere Miracles wou'd prove the Person to be the *Messias* who did them, but the Miracles prov'd the Testimony to be Divine; now that which Christ deliver'd to them as a Divine Testimony, was his being the *Messias*, and therefore by the same reason they believed him to be sent from God, they ought to have believed him to be the *Messias*; for one sent from God cou'd never falsifie in the main of his Message, as this was of our Savior's preaching. And hence it is observable our Savior did not shew forth his Divine Power till he entred upon his Office of Preaching; thereby making it appear he intended this as the great evidence of the truth of the Doctrine which he preached to them. And herein the blind man in the Gospel saw more Truth and Reason than the whole Court of *Sanhedrin*, before which in probability he was convened about his Cure by Christ; for when they sought to get something out of him in disparagement of our Savior's person and miracle, he sharply and roundly tells them, when they said they knew God spake to *Moses*, *but for this fellow, we know not from whence he is*; *Why herein*, saith he, *is a marvelous thing; that ye know not from whence he is, and yet he hath opened mine eyes.*

Joh. 9. 29. 30. *If this man were not of God, he could do nothing*; (as tho' he had said) is it not plain that this man is imploy'd by God in the World by the Miracles which he doth? for otherwise God wou'd not so readily assist him in doing such great Works; *for we know that God heareth not sinners: but if any man be a worshipper of God, and doth his will, him he heareth*; i. e. if this man pretended a Commission from Heaven falsly (whereby he wou'd be the greatest of Sinners) can we think God wou'd so miraculously assist him? but we know by our Law, if one comes with a Commission from God, and draw men not to Idolatry, which is meant by a worshipper of God; such a one God is present with, and we are bound to believe him. And for this very miracle, or curing one born blind, was the like ever heard of before? did ever *Moses* or the Prophets do it? Thus we see what strong Rational Evidence there was in this Miracle of Christ in the judgment of this blind man, which he utter'd with so much reason before the Court of *Sanhedrin*, when he knew howlike he was to be excommunicated for it; and yet this very person was as yet ignorant that Christ was the true *Messias*, as appears by the Sequel of the Chapter; but upon Christ's Revelation of himself to him, *he presently believed on him*. How strangely irrational were the *Jews* then in rejecting our Savior, when his Miracles not only exceeded those of *Moses* both in number and quality; but which was more, they saw themselves the Miracles which Christ did, but they received those of *Moses* only upon the credit of their Fathers! And from the strength of the

Ver. 36.
Ver. 38. Evidence

evidence arising from the power of Miracles it is that St. Peter tells the promiscuous Assembly, *Act. 2. 22. That Jesus of Nazareth was a man approved of God among them, by miracles, wonders and signs, which God did by him in the midst of them, as they themselves also knew.* He appeals to their own knowledge, which he would not certainly have done, had it not been in a case beyond all dispute among them. Which was a thing so notorious among them, that we find the *Pharisees* themselves confessing it; *What do we? For this man doth many miracles:* Now then in a Nation whose Religion had been establish'd by Miracles, and the certainty of the truth of it, among those who then profess'd it, did depend so much upon the constant credit which the report of the Miracles done at the settling of their Law had among them; what could be a more rational and convincing way of proceeding, than for our Savior to manifest by a greater Power of Miracles in himself the undoubted credentials of his Commission from Heaven; and that he was the true *Messias*, which was foretold by their own most sacred and authentic Records? Which will appear more.

Because the power of miracles did evidently declare that he was the very person promised. For if the exact correspondency of the event to the Predictions in a Nation owning them as Divine, be an undoubted evidence, that they are exactly fulfill'd; our Savior was most certainly the Person so often spoken of in the Old Testament. For many of the Prophecies of the Old Testament concerning the *Messias*, if they were not fulfill'd in Christ, in the conditions the *Jews* have been in since their dispersion, (which fell out exactly according to the Prediction of Christ) it is impossible they shou'd be fulfill'd at all. So that either the Predictions must lose their Divine Authority, or they must be accomplished in our blessed Savior. For as *Tertullian* sharply says to the *Jews*, *Redde statum Judææ quem Christus inveniat, & alium contendere venire; Let the people of the Jews be in their former condition, and then plead for a Messias to come.* For can any thing be more plain than that the *Messias* was to be born in *Bethlehem* of *Judea*? but where is that now? and how long since the *Jews* enjoy'd any civil Polity there? What is become of the second Temple, in the time of which the Desire of all Nations shou'd come? Is not *Jerusalem* already destroy'd, and the Oblation there long since ceased, which was to come to pass so soon after the *Messias*, and did accordingly? Is not the Scepter yet departed from *Judah*, and the Lawgiver from between his feet, and is not *Shiloh* yet come? What strange unintelligible Weeks were those of *Daniel*, if they were extended to so indefinite; what certain ground cou'd from hence be gather'd of any time wherein their Accomplishment was to be expected? But not to Expatriate on those things which are already so largely prov'd beyond all possibility of contradiction, by the ancient and modern learned Writers against the *Jews*: To insist therefore on our present business; are not the Prophecies concerning the Miracles which the *Messias* shou'd work, exactly fulfill'd in Christ? *Then the eyes of the blind shall be opened, and the ears of the deaf shall be unstopped; then shall the lame man leap as an Hart, and the tongue of the dumb shall sing.* He must be a great stranger in the History of the New Testament that is to seek for an

Joh. 11. 47.

III. Hyp. 2.

Tertull. C. Judæis. c. 13.

Isa. 35. 5. 6.

V. Grot. in an exact fulfilling of this Prophecy. Nay, and the Jewish Mi-
 Joh. 9. 32. *drasch*, upon *Psal.* 146. 8. saith, that when *Messias comes*, he should
 open the eyes of the blind; and the Jews themselves often speak of
 the great Miracles which the *Messias* should do when he appears;
 and therefore out of their own mouths will they be condemned,
 when the Miracles of Christ make it so evident that he was the
 true *Messias*. Hence when *John Baptist* sent his Disciples to Christ
 for them to be fully satisfy'd concerning him; he bids them tell
 him, *the blind receive their sight, and the lame walk, and the lepers*
 Mat. 11. 5. *are cleansed, and the deaf hear, and the dead are raised up, &c.* as
 tho' the mentioning of these Miracles was sufficient to make it
 appear to them who he was whom they came to inquire after.
 And therefore it is observable that *John Baptist* himself, tho' greater
 than the Prophets, nay, *than whom there was not a greater born*
 Mat. 11. 9, of women, by our Savior's own Testimony; yet of him it is said,
 11. *that he wrought no miracle*: of which no account can be given so
 Joh. 10. 41. probable and rational, as that God in his infinite Wisdom was
 pleas'd so to order it, that the Evidence of our Savior's being the
Messias might be made more clear by the Miracles which he wrought,
 that the minds of the People might not be distracted between
John and *Christ*; he therefore reserv'd the glory of Miracles whol-
 ly to the name of *Christ*, that there might be no pretense of Com-
 petition between *John* and *him*.

IV. Another reason of the necessity of Miracles in our Savior by
 Hyp. 3. way of Rational Evidence, is, *the overthrowing the power and*
kingdom of the Devil in the world. For which purpose it is ob-
 servable that the Devil had scarce ever greater power over the Bo-
 dies of Men as well as their Souls, than at that time; thence we
 read of such a multitude of *Demoniacs* in the Gospel. For it
 seems very harsh to interpret those merely of Epileptical and Lu-
 natic Persons, both because the *δαίμονιζόμενοι*, and *σεληνιαζόμενοι*, and *ὡραυνοί*,
 Mat. 4. 24. are mention'd distinctly, and that it appears by the Primitive
 Church afterwards how frequent it was to eject the Devil out of
 possessed persons. Nay, so far am I from thinking that the De-
 moniacs were mere Lunatics, that I rather think with *Vossius* that
 the Lunatics were truly Demoniacs, only they were not constantly
 under the power of the Devil, but as their paroxysms return'd up-
 on them, the Devil loving to Fish in such troubled Waters. And
 thence the same person is called a Lunatic in one place, who is
 called a Demoniac in another; because he did *ruere in principiis lu-*
 Mat. 17. nationum, as the Arabic version expresseth it; or as *Rusticus Elpi-*
 14. dius more fully explains it,
 Luke 9. 39.

Rust. Elpid.
lib. 5.

Repserat in medium rabies horrenda furoris
Demonis afflatu, propria qui peste nocivus
Allidit captas fædo discrimine mentes,
Menstrua deciduos cum Luna recolligit ignes.

Theophylact is of opinion, that the Jews in the time of our Savi-
 or suppos'd, that the Souls of dead men became Demons, and
 Mat. 8. 28. thence we read in Scripture of the Demoniacs among the Tombs:
 but it is far more probable which *Grotius* conceives, that the Jews
 were of opinion, that the Souls of dead men did hover up and
 down

down about their Bodies, and that these were so long under the Devils power, which many of the *Jews* to this day believe and make use of the instance of the *Pythonists* raising *Samuel*; on which account the Devils, to favor an Opinion so advantageous to their Interest, might appear with greater terror and fury about their burying places, as we see they did in those possessed persons. But on whatever account it was, we find it evident that about the time of our Savior's appearance, and some time after, the truly *ἐνεργήματα* were very frequent; whether it were that the Devil by such frequent possessions of persons, and making them to do such strange things, might thereby endeavor to invalidate the evidence of our Savior's Miracles (from whence it is probable the *Pharisees* raised their Calumny, that Christ did Miracles by *Beelzebub*, because they saw so many strange appearances caus'd by possessed persons) or whether it were thro' the Admirable Providence of God, which might give Satan the greater liberty at that time, on purpose to heighten the glory of our Savior in dispossessing of him, and thereby to give the highest Rational Evidence, that his Power was of God, which tended so much to the destruction of the Kingdom of Satan.

And hence the Primitive Christians did so much triumph, and as it were insult over the Devil where-ever they found him, making him to remove his lodgings from possess'd persons, by a Writ of Ejection from the Name of Christ. Thence *Origen* rationally concludes that Christ had his Power given him from above, because at his very Name the Devils forsook the bodies which they had possess'd, *Εἰ γὰρ μὴ θύοιεν ἢν αὐτῷ δαδῆσαι σῶματι, ἐκ αὐτοῦ καὶ δαίμονες τῶν ἐν ὁμοίᾳ αὐτοῦ ἀπαρχαλομένων μόνον εἰσόντες ἀνεχώρουν ἀπὸ πάντων ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πολεμουμένων.* And he elsewhere tells us, that even the meanest sort of Christians without any Ceremony, but merely by their Prayers, did ordinarily eject the Devil out of mens bodies: *ὡς ἐπίπαινον ἢ ἰδιώτην τὸ τοιοῦτον πρᾶττεται, παρασκευῆς ἢ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ χριστοῦ χαλεπῶς τὸ πᾶν δαιμόνων ἐπιπλεῖ καὶ ἀδυνάτους, ἐκ πάντων διόρμονα ὡς τὸ ἡττηθῆναι ὃ εἶχαν ὑπερβῆναι ἀπὸ θυγῆς ἀνθρώπου καὶ σώματος σφῆς πνὸς καὶ δυνατοῦ ἐν ταῖς λογικαῖς ἀπὸ τῆς πίστεως ἀποδείξει.*

Ordinary Christians, saith he, most commonly do this, the Grace of Christ by its word thereby discovering the contemptibleness and infirmity of the Devils, that in order to their Ejection they did not want any learned or experienced Christian. And for this they appeal to the Heathens themselves, as appears not only by the challenge of *Tertullian* already mention'd, but by the Testimony of almost all of them who have writ against the Heathens in vindication of the Christian Religion. Thence *Minutius Felix*, *Hæc omnia sciunt plerique, pars vestrum, ipsos dæmonas de semetipsis confiteri, quoties à nobis tormentis verborum, & orationis incendiis de corporibus exiguntur. Ipse Saturnus & Serapis, & Jupiter, & quicquid dæmonum colitis, victi dolore quod sunt eloquuntur, nec utique in turpitudinem sui nonnullis præsertim vestrum assistentibus, mentiuntur. Ipsi testibus eos esse Dæmonas, de se verum consentibus credite; adjurati enim per Deum verum & solum, inviti, miseri corporibus inhorrescunt; & vel exsiliunt statim, vel evanescent gradatim, prout fides patientis adjuvat, aut gratia curantis aspirat.* Can we now think the Devil shou'd not only forsake his Tyranny over the bodies of men, but let go so advantageous a pillar of his Tyranny over the Consciences of men in Idolatrous worship, as the concealing himself was, had he not been forc'd to

Orig. c.
Cels. l. 3.

Lib. 7.

Minut. Felix. p. 31.
ed. Ouz.

it by a Power far greater than his own? So *Cyprian ad Demetrianum*, appeals to him being the Proconsul of *Africa*, about the same thing (who had written sharply against the Christians) for speaking of the Devils whom they worshipped in their Idols, *O si audire eos velles & videre, quando à nobis adjurantur & torquentur Spiritualibus flagris & verborum tormentis de obsessis corporibus ejiciuntur, quando ejulantes & gementes voce humana, & potestate divina flagella & verbera sentientes, venturum judicium confitentur; veni & cognosce vera esse quæ dicimus:* and a little after, *videbis sub manu nostra stare vinctos, & tremere captivos, quos tu suspicis & veneraris ut Dominos.* Did ever any of the Heathen Magicians (of which there were good store) extort such things from the Devils, as the Christians did, merely by their Prayers, and Invocations of the name of GOD and CHRIST? did they ever make them confess to be what they were, not only in possess'd bodies but in their Temples too? that was beyond the power of their *Ephesian* Letters, or any of their Magical Incantations. Did the Devils ever dread so much the Name of *Socrates* or *Aristides* as they did that of GOD and CHRIST? Of which *Lactantius* thus speaks, *Quo audito tremunt, exclamant, & uri se verberarique testantur, & interrogati qui sint, quando venerint, quando in hominem irrepsent, confitentur sic extorti, & excruciatii virtute divini nominis exulant; propter hæc verbera & minas, sanctos & justos viros semper oderunt.* And even *Apollo* himself at the name of Christ trembled as much as ever the *Pythian* Prophetess did in her greatest furies; so *Prudentius* tells us.

*Prudent.
Apotheos.*

Torquetur Apollo

*Nomine percussus Christi, nec fulmina verbi
Ferre potest; agitant miserum tot verbera lingue,
Quot laudata Dei resonant miracula Christi.*

*Firminus
de errore
prof. relig.*

To these we may add what *Firminus* saith to the same purpose, *Ecce Dæmon est quem colis; cum Dei & Christi ejus nomen audierit, contremiscit, & ut interrogantibus nobis respondeat trepidantia verba, vix se colligit; adhærens homini laceratur, aritur, vapulat, & statim de commissis sceleribus confitetur.* By which Testimonies it appears what power over Satan, when he was in his Kingdom, the Christians by the power of Christ had; not as tho' the bare name of Christ had so great an efficacy in the ejection of Devils, as *Origen* seems to be of opinion (in a discourse about the efficacy of Names, unworthy of so great a Philosopher) but that God might manifest to the World the truth that was contain'd in that Name, he did give a power to such as made use of it, of working Miracles by it. And thence we read in Scripture, that some who were not thoroughly Christians, but yet profess'd the Truth of the Gospel, and that what they did was for the honor of Christ, *had a power of casting out Devils and doing many wonderful things thro' his name.*

*Origen. l. 1.
c. Cels.*

Matt. 7. 22.

VI.

*Mark 16.
17.*

By these and many other Testimonies which might be produced out of the Primitive Church, we find an exact accomplishment of our Savior's promise to his Disciples when he took his leave of them: *And these signs shall follow them that believe, In my*

my name shall they cast out Devils, &c. This power then in the Primitive Church had a twofold Argument in it, both as it was a manifestation of the truth of the Predictions of our Savior, and as it was an Evidence of the Divine Power of *Christ*, when his Name so long after his Ascension had so great a command over all the Infernal Spirits; and that so evidently, that at that time when the *Christians* did as it were tyrannize over *Satan* so in his own territories, yet then the greatest of his *Magicians* had no power to hurt the bodies of the *Christians*, which is a thing *Origen* takes much notice of. For when *Celsus* saith from *Diogenes Ægyptius* that *Magic* cou'd only hurt ignorant and wicked Men, and had no power over *Philosophers*; *Origen* replies, first, that *Philosophy* was no such charm against the power of *Magic*, as appears by *Meragenes* who writ the Story of *Apollonius Tyaneus*, the famous Magician Philosopher, who therein mentions how *Euphrates* and an *Epicurean* (*οἱ αἰγυπτίαι φιλόσοφοι*, no vulgar *Philosophers*) were caught by the *Magic* of *Apollonius*, (and altho' *Philostratus* disown this History of *Meragenes* as fabulous, yet he that thinks *Philostratus* for that, to be of any greater credit, is much deceived, of whom *Lud. Vives* gives this true Character, that he doth *magna Homeri mendacia majoribus mendaciis corrigere*, Mend one hole and make three,) but, saith *Origen*, as to the *Christians*, this is undoubtedly true: *Διαβε- σαίνοντες δὲ αἱρεῖς καὶ τῇ τῶν αἱρετικῶν ἐκείνων καὶ χριστιανισμῶν ἀλλ' τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἔστι νῦν μάχη, καὶ βία, καὶ τὸ ἐκείνων αὐτοῦ τοῦ αἱρετικισμοῦ δι' ὧν αἱ ἐκείνων ἐκείνων καὶ δι- ται ποταμοὶ καὶ ἡμέρας χροῖον, ἐπὶ μαζία ἐπὶ διαμονίᾳ αὐτῶν ἀναβί. This, saith he, we are most certain of, and have found it by experience true, that those who according to the Principles of Christianity do worship God over all, thro' *Jesus*, and do live according to the Gospel, being constant in their solemn Prayers night and day, are not obnoxious to the power of any *Magic* or *Devils* whatsoever. Now then if the Devil who had then so much power over others, had none upon the true followers of *Christ*; and if instead of that they had so great a commanding Power over the Devil even in things which tended most to his disadvantage, not only dislodging him out of Bodies, but out of his idolatrous Temples; what can be more evident, than that this power which was so efficacious for the overthrowing the Kingdom of *Satan*, must needs be far greater than the power of *Satan* is? For it is an undoubted Maxim in Natural Reason, That whatever is put out of its former place by force and violence, is extruded by something stronger than its self; for if the force on either side were equal, there cou'd be no dispossessing of either; if any thing then be cast out of its former possession unwillingly, it is an undeniable proof there was some power greater than his who was dispossessed. Now we cannot conceive, if there be such malignant Spirits, as by many undeniable proofs it is evident there are, that they shou'd willingly quit their possessions to such a Doctrine which tends to the unavoidable ruin of their Interest in the World: if then the power of this Doctrine hath overthrown the Devils Kingdom in the World, where-ever it hath been truly entertain'd, it must necessarily follow, that this power is far above the power of any damned Spirits. Now what folly and madness was it in the *Heathens* to worship those for Gods, which they cou'd not but see, if they wou'd open their eyes, were under so great slavery to*

Lud. Vives
de trad.
disc. l. 5.

Origen.
contr. Cels.
l. 6. p. 302.

a power above them, which cou'd make them confess what was most to their disadvantage in the presence of their great adorers?

VII.

Neither ought the many Counterfeits and Impostures which have been in the World in this kind since the establishment of Christian Religion (among the advancers of particular interests and designs) make us suspect the truth of those things which were done in the first Ages of the Church of *Christ*. For, *first*, it stands to the greatest Reason, that the strongest Arguments for the truth of a Religion ought to be fetched from the Ages of its first appearance in the World; if then the Evidence be undoubted as to those first times, we ought to embrace our Religion as true, whatever the impostures have been among those who have apparently gone aside from that purity and simplicity of the Gospel, which had so great power. Then, *secondly*, if all that hath been done in this kind of ejecting Devils, where Christianity is own'd, be acknowledg'd for impostures; one of these two things must be supposed as the ground of it: either that there was no such thing as a real possession by the Devil, or else there was no such thing as a dispossessing him. If the *first*, then hereby will be seen a confirmation of our former Argument, that where Christianity is own'd, by the power of that, the Devil is more curb'd and restrain'd, than where it is not, or else is much over-run with ignorance and superstition. Of the latter, the Ages of the Christian Church, from the 10th Century to the beginning of the 16th Current, are a clear Evidence; Of the *first*, all those who have been conversant in the places where *Paganism* or gross *Idolatry* do yet reign, will bring in their creditable Testimonies, how tyrannical the power of the Devil is yet among them. If it be not so then, where careful endeavors have been used for retrieving the ancient purity of Christian Doctrine and Worship, we ought to impute it to the power of Him who is stronger than *Satan*, who where-ever he comes to dwell, doth dispossess him of his former habitations. If the *second* then be entertained as the ground of concluding all things as impostures, which are accounted dispossessions of *Satan*, *viz.* that he never is really dispossessed; then it must either be said, that where he is once seized, there is no possibility of ejecting him; which is to say, that the Devil hath an absolute and infinite power; and that there is no power greater than his, which is to own him for God; or else that God suffers him to tyrannize where and how he will, which is contrary to Divine Providence, and the care God takes of the World, and of the good of Mankind; or else, *lastly*, that those Persons who pretend to do it, are not such Persons who are armed so much with the power of *Christ*, nor possessed with such a due Spirit of the Gospel, which hath command over these infernal Spirits. And this in the cases pretended by the great Juglers and Impostors of the Christian World, the *Papish* Priests have been so notorious, that none of their party of any great faith or credit would stand to vouch them. And we have this impregnable Argument against all such Impostures, that the matters which they by such actions would give an Evidence to, being so vastly different from, if not in some things diametrically opposite to the first delivery and design of the Christian Faith, it is inconsistent with the way used for the confirmation of Christian Religion in the first publishing of it, to attest the truth of such things by any real Miracles:

For

For so it would invalidate the great force of the Evidences of the truth of Christianity, if the same Argument shou'd be used for the proving of that which in the judgment of any impartial Person was not delivered, when the truth of the Doctrine of *Christ* was confirmed by so many and uncontroled Miracles. But hereby we see what unconceivable prejudice hath been done to the true primitive Doctrine of the Gospel; and what stumbling-blocks have been laid in the way of considerative Persons, to keep them from embracing the truly Christian Faith, by those who wou'd be thought the infallible Directors of Men in it, by making use of the Broad-seal of Heaven (set only to the truth of the Scriptures) to confirm their unwritten and superstitious ways of worship. For if I once see that which I looked on as an undoubted Evidence of Divine Power, brought to attest any thing directly contrary to Divine Revelation, I must either conclude that God may contradict himself by sealing both parts of a contradiction, which is both blasphemous, and impossible; or that that Society of Men which own such things is not at all tender of the honor of Christian Doctrine, but seeks to set up an interest contrary to it, and matters not what disadvantage is done to the grounds of Religion by such unworthy pretences: and which of these two is more rational and true, let every one's Conscience judge. And therefore it is much the interest of the Christian World to have all such Frauds and Impostures discovered, which do so much disservice to the Christian Faith, and are such secret fomenters of *Atheism* and *Infidelity*. But how far that promise of our Savior, *That they which believe in his Name, shall cast out Devils, and do many Miracles*, may extend even in these last Ages of the World to such generous and Primitive-spirited Christians, who out of a great and deep sense of the truth of Christianity and tenderness to the Souls of Men, shou'd go among *Heathens* and *Infidels* to convert them only to CHRIST (and not to a secular interest, under pretence of an infallible Head) is not here a place fully to enquire. I confess I cannot see any reason why God may not yet for the conviction of *Infidels*, employ such a power of Miracles, altho' there be not such necessity of it, as there was in the first propagation of the Gospel, there being some Evidences of the power of Christianity now, which were not so clear then, (as the overthrowing the kingdom of *Satan* in the World; the prevailing of Christianity, notwithstanding force used against it; the recovery of it from amidst all the corruptions which were mixed with it; the consent of those parties in the common foundations of Christianity, which yet disagree from each other with great bitterness of Spirit,) tho' I say it be not of that necessity now, when the Scriptures are convey'd to us in a certain uninterrupted manner; yet God may please out of his abundant provision for the satisfaction of the Minds of Men, concerning the truth of Christian Doctrine, to employ good Men to do something which may manifest the power of CHRIST to be above the Devil's, whom they worship. And therefore I shou'd far sooner believe the relation of the Miracles of *Xaverius* and his Brethren employ'd in the conversion of *Infidels*, than *Lipsius* his *Virgo Hallensis* and *Asprecollis*, cou'd it but be made evident to me that the design of those Persons had more of *Christianity* than *Popery* in it; that is, that they

Matth. 16.

17.

went more upon a design to bring the Souls of the *Infidels* to Heaven, than to enlarge the Authority and Jurisdiction of the *Roman Church*.

VIII.

Luk. 11.
21, 22.

But what-ever the truth of those Miracles, or the design of those persons were, we have certain and undoubted Evidence of the Truth of those Miracles, whereby Christianity was first propagated, and the Kingdom of Satan over-thrown in the World; Christ thereby making it appear that his Power was greater than the Devil's, *who had possession, because he over-came him, took from him all his armor wherein he trusted, and divided his spoils*; i. e. dispossess'd him of Mens Bodies, and his Idolatrous Temples, silenced his Oracles, nonplust his Magicians, and at last, when Christianity had overcome by suffering, wrested the worldly Power and Empire out of the Devil's hands, and employ'd it against himself. Neither may we think, because since that time the Devil hath got some ground in the world again by the large spread of *Mahometism*, and the general Corruptions in the Christian world, that therefore the other was no argument of Divine Power; because the truth of Christianity is not tied to any particular places; because such a falling away hath been foretold in the Scripture, and therefore the truth of them is prov'd by it; and because God himself hath threatned that those who will not receive the Truth in the love of it, shall be *given up to strong delusions*. Doth not this then instead of abating the strength of the Argument, confirm it more, and that nothing is fallen out in the Christian world, but what was foretold by those whom God employ'd in the converting of it? But we are neither without some fair hopes even from that Divine Revelation which was seal'd by uncontroll'd Evidence, that there may be yet a time to come when Christ will recover his Churches to their pristine Purity and Simplicity; but withall, I think we are not to measure the future Felicity of the Church by outward Splendor and Greatness (which too many so strongly fantasie) but by a recovery of that true Spirit of Christianity which breathed in the first Ages of the Church, what-ever the outward condition of the Church may be: For if worldly greatness, and ease, and riches, were the first Impairers of the purity of Christian Religion, it is hard to conceive how the restoring the Church of Christ to its true Glory, can be by the advancing of that, which gives so great an occasion to Pride and Sensuality, which are so contrary to the design of Christian Religion; unless we suppose Men free from those Corruptions, which continual experience still tells the World the Rulers as well as Members of the Christian Society are subject to. Neither may that be wonder'd at, when such unevenness of parts is now discover'd in the great Luminaries of the World, and the Sun himself is found to have his *Maculae*, as tho' the Sun had a purple Fever, or as Kircher expresseth it, *Ipsè Phæbus, qui rerum omnium in universa nature Theatro aspectabilium longè pulcherrimus omnium opinione est habitus, hoc seculo tandem fumosa facie, ac infecto vultu maculis prodit; diceres eum variolis laborare senescentem*: I speak not this as tho' an outward flourishing condition of the Church were inconsistent with its Purity; for then the way to refine it, were to throw it into the flames of Persecution; but that the advancement of the flourishing

Kircher.
Prophyl.
Agonist. ad
Oedipum,
cap. 2.

flourishing condition of the Church, is not merely by outward Pomp and Grandeur, and that the Purity of the Church is not inconsistent with a state of outward difficulties, which the experience of the Primitive Church gives an irrefragable demonstration of. Thus much may serve to shew the necessity of a Power of Miracles, conjoynd with the Christian Doctrine, to manifest the truth of it by overthrowing the Kingdom of that great *Antichrist* the Devil, who had usurped so much Tyranny over the World.

The last Reason why a Power of Miracles was so necessary for confirming the Truth of the Gospel, is, *because the Gospel was to be propagated over the World without any other rational evidence than was contained in the Miracles wrought for the confirmation of it.* Now the admirable success which this Doctrine found in the World, considering all the Circumstances of it, do make it clear what certainty there was that the Miracles which were wrought were true, and they were certain Evidences that the Doctrine attested by them was from God. Now this will appear from these two things:

1. *That no rational account can be given why the Apostles should undertake to publish such a Doctrine, unless they had been undoubtedly certain that the Doctrine was true, and they had sufficient Evidence to persuade others to believe it.*

2. *That no satisfactory account can be given, considering the nature of the Doctrine of Christ, and the manner of its propagation, why it should meet with so great acceptance in the World, had there not been such convincing Evidence as might fully persuade Men of the truth of it.*

I begin with the first, from the Publishers of this Doctrine in the World. All that I here require by way of a *Postulatum* or Supposition, are only these two things, which no Man right in his wits I suppose will deny: 1. *That Men are so far rational Agents, that they will not set upon any work of moment and difficulty, without sufficient grounds inducing them to it; and so much the greater the work is, the more sure and steadfast had the grounds need to be which they proceed upon.* 2. *That the Apostles or first Publishers of the Christian Doctrine were not men distracted, or bereft of their wits, but acted by principles of common sense, reason and understanding, as other men in the World do:* Which if any one shou'd be so far beside his wits as to question, if he have but patience and understanding enough to read and consider those admirable Writings of theirs which are convey'd to us by as certain uninterrupted a Tradition as any thing in the world hath been, by that time he will see cause to alter his Judgment, and to say that *they are not mad, but speak the words of the greatest Truth and Soberness.* These things supposed, I now proceed to the proving of the thing in hand, which will be done by these three things; First, *That the Apostles could not but know how hazardous an employment the preaching of the Gospel would be to them.* Secondly, *That no motive can be conceived sufficient for them to undertake such an employment, but the infallible Truth of the Doctrine which they preached.* Thirdly, *That the greatest assurance they had themselves of the Truth of their Doctrine, was by being eye-witnesses of the Miracles of Christ.*

First,

First, *That the Apostles could not but understand the hazard of their employment, notwithstanding which they cheerfully undertook it.* That Men armed with no external Power, nor cried up for their Wit and Learning, and carrying a Doctrine with them so contrary to the general Inclinations of the World, having nothing in it to recommend it to Mankind but the Truth of it, shou'd go about to persuade the World to part with the Religion they owned, and was settled by their Laws, and to embrace such a Religion as called them off from all the things they loved in this World, and to prepare themselves by Mortification and Self-denial for another World, is a thing to Human Reason incredible, unless we suppose them acted by a higher Spirit than Mankind is ordinarily acted by. For what is there so desirable in continual Reproaches and Contumelies? what delight is there in Racks and Prisons? what agreeableness in Flames and Martyrdoms to make Men undergo some, nay all of these rather than disown that Doctrine which they came to publish? Yet these did the Apostles cheerfully undergo in order to the Conversion of the World to the truth of that Doctrine which they deliver'd to it. And not only so, but tho' they did foresee them, they were not discouraged from this undertaking by it. I confess, when Men are upon hopes of profit and interest in the World, engaged upon a design which they promise themselves impunity in, having Power on their side, tho' afterwards things shou'd fall out contrary to their expectation, such Persons may die in such a Cause, because they must, and some may carry it out with more resolution, partly thro' an innate fortitude of Spirit, heightned with the advantages of Religion, or an Enthusiastic temper. But it is hard to conceive that such Persons wou'd have undertaken so hazardous an employment, if before-hand they had fore-seen what they must have undergone for it. But now the Apostles did fore-know that Bonds and Imprisonment, nay Death it self must be undergone in a violent manner, for the sake of the Doctrine which they preached; yet notwithstanding all this, they go boldly and with resolution on with their work, and give not over because of any Hardships and Persecutions they met withal. One of the chiefest of them, *St. Peter*, and as forward as any in preaching the Gospel, had the very manner of his death foretold him by Christ himself, before his Ascension; yet soon after we find him preaching Christ in the midst of those who had Crucify'd him, and telling them to their faces the greatness of their sin in it, and appealing to the Miracles which Christ had done among them, and *bidding them repent and believe in him whom they had crucified, if ever they would be saved:*

Joh. 21. 19. And this he did, not only among the People who gave their consent to the Crucifying of Christ; but soon after, being convened together with *John*, before the Court of *Sanhedrin* (probably the very same which not long before had sentenced Christ to death) for a Miracle wrought by them, with what incredible boldness doth he to their faces tell them of their Murdering of Christ; and withall, that there was no other way to salvation but by him whom they had Crucified! *Be it known unto you all* (saith *Peter* to the *Sanhedrin*) *and to all the people of Israel, that by the name of Jesus Christ whom ye have crucified, whom God raised from the dead, even by him doth this man stand here before you whole. Neither is there salvation in any other: for there is none other name under Heaven given among men, whereby we must*

Act. 2. 22, 23, 38.
Act. 3. 13, 14, 15, 19.
Act. 4. 5.
Act. 4. 10, 12.

must be saved. What an heroic freedom of Spirit appears in these words! what magnanimity and courage was there now in that Person, who durst in the face of this Court tell them of their Murther, and that there was no Salvation but by him whom they had Crucified! Well might they wonder at the boldness of the Men, who fear'd not the same Death which they had so lately brought their Lord and Master to.

Neither was this singly the case of *Peter* and *John*, but all the rest of the Apostles undertook their work with the same resolution and preparation of Spirit to undergo the greatest hardship in the World for the sake of the Truths they Preached. And accordingly as far as Ecclesiastical History can ascertain us of it, they did all but *John* (and that to make good the Prediction of Christ) suffer violent deaths by the hands of those who persecuted them merely for their Doctrine. And which is most observable, when Christ design'd them first of all for this work, he told them before-hand of reproaches, persecutions, all manner of hardships, nay of death it self, which they must undergo for his sake. All that he gave them by way of encouragement, was, that they cou'd only *kill the body* and not the *soul*, and therefore that they should fear him only who could destroy both body and soul in Hell; all the support they had, was an expectation in another World, and that animated them to go thro' all the hardships of this. Where do we ever read of any such boldness and courage in the most knowing Philosophers of the Heathens? with what faintness and misgiving of Mind doth *Socrates* speak in his famous discourse suppos'd to be made by him before his death? how uncertainly doth he speak of a State of Immortality? and yet in all probability *Plato* set it forth with all advantages imaginable. Where do we ever find that ever any of the great Friends of *Socrates* who were present at his death, as *Phædo*, *Cebes*, *Crito* and *Simmius*, durst enter the *Areopagus*, and condemn them there for the Murther of *Socrates*, tho' this wou'd be far short of what the Apostles did? Why were they not so charitable as to inform the World better of those grand Truths of the Being of God and Immortality of Souls, if at least they were fully convinced of them themselves? Why did not *Plato* at least speak out, and tell the World the Truth, and not disguise his discourses under feigned Names, the better to avoid Accusation and the Fate of *Socrates*? How doth he mince his excellent matter, and plays as it were at *Bo-peep* with his Readers, sometimes appearing and then pulling in his Horns again? It may not be an improbable conjecture that the death of *Socrates* was the foundation of the Academy: I mean of that cautelous Doctrine of with-holding Assent, and being both *pro* and *con*, sometimes of this side, and sometimes of that: for *Socrates's* death hath made all his Friends very fearful of being too Dogmatical. And *Plato* himself had too much Riches, and withal too much of a Courtier in him to hazard the dear Prison of his Soul, viz. his Body, merely for an *athereal vehicle*. He had rather let his Soul flutter up and down in *Terrestrial Matter*, or the Cage it was pent up in, than hazard too violent an opening of it by the hands of the *Areopagus*. And the great *Roman* Orator, among the rest of *Plato's* Sentiments, had learnt this too; for altho' in his discourses he hath many times sufficiently laid open the folly of the Heathen Worship and Theology, yet he knows not how to bring himself off safe enough with the

x.

Joh. 21.22.

Matt. 10.
17, 18, 21,
22, 23.

*Plato in
Phædo.*

People; and will be sure to be Dogmatical only in this, *That nothing is to be innovated in the Religion of a Commonwealth*, and that the *Customs of our Ancestors are inviolably to be observed*. Which Principles, had they been true as they were safe for the Persons who spake them, the Christian Religion had never gain'd any entertainment in the World; for where-ever it came, it met with this potent Prejudice that it was look'd on as an Innovation, and therefore was shrewdly suspected by the Governors of Common-wealths, and the Preachers of it punished as factious and seditious Persons; which was all the pretext the wise Politicians of the World had for their cruel and inhuman Persecutions of such multitudes of peaceable and innocent Christians. Now when these things were fore-told by the Apostles themselves before their going abroad so plainly, that with the same Faith they did believe the Doctrine they Preached to be true, they must believe that all these things should come to pass, what courage and magnanimity of Spirit was it in them thus to encounter dangers, and as it were court the Flames? Nay and before the time was come that they must die, to seal the Truth of their Doctrine, their whole Life was a continual Peregrination, wherein they were as so many *Jobs* in Pilgrimage, encountered with perils and dangers on every side; of which one of the most painful and successful, *St. Paul*, hath given in such a large Inventory of his perils, that the very reading of them were enough to undo a poor *Epicurean Philosopher*, and at once to spoil him of the two Pillars of his Happiness, the quietness of his Mind and ease of his Body. Thus we see what a hazardous employment that was which the Apostles went upon, and that it was such as they very well understood the difficulty of before they set upon it.

2. Cor. 6.
4, 5, 8, 9.

XL

Secondly, *We cannot find out any rational motive which could carry them through so hazardous an employment, but the full convictions of their minds of the undoubted truth and certainty of the Doctrine which they deliver'd*. We find before that no vulgar motives in the World cou'd carry them upon that design which they went upon; cou'd they be led by Ambition and Vain-glory, who met with such Reproaches where-ever they went; and not only Persecutions of the Tongue, but the sharper ones of the Hands too? We never read of any but the Primitive Christians who were ambitious of being Martyrs, and thought long till they were in the Flames: which made *Arrius Antonius* being Pro-consul of *Asia*, when Christians in multitudes beset his Tribunal and thronged in to be Condemn'd, say to them, *ὦ δειλὸν, οἱ ἡμέτεροι διδόντες, ἀποκρίνεται ἡ βέλτερος ἡμῶν*. O miserable People, had not ye ways enough to end your lives at home, but ye must croud for an execution! This was a higher ambition by far than any of those *mancipia gloriae*, those *Chamäleons* that liv'd on the breath of Applause, the Heathen Philosophers ever reached to, who were, as *Tertallian* expresseth it, *Homines gloriae & eloquentiae solius libidinosi, unsatiabile thirsters after the honor and eloquence of the world*; but the Spirit of a Christian did soar too high to quarry on so mean a Prey. When the more sober Heathens had taken a stricter notice of the Carriages and Lives of the Preachers of the Gospel and all their genuine Followers, they instead of the common and rude name of *Impostures*, gave them a more civil title of *Philosophers*, and looked upon their Doctrine as a sub-

*Tertull. ad
Scapul. c. 5.*

*Idem Apo-
log. c. 47.*

limer kind of Philosophy, *Non utique divinum negotium existimant sed magis Philosophiæ genus*, as *Tertullian* tells us, because the Philosophers pretended so much to Moral Virtues which they saw the Christians so excellent in; but as *Tertullian* there replies, *Nomen hoc Philosophorum Dæmonia non fugat*, *The Devil was never afraid of a Philosopher's beard*, nor were diseases cured by the touch of a Philosophic pallium. There was something more Divine in Christians than in the grave Philosophers; and that not only in reference to their lives, and the Divine Power which was seen in them, but in reference to the truth and certainty of their Doctrine, it being a true Character given of both, by that same excellent Writer in behalf of the Christians of his time: *Veritatem Philosophi quidem affectant, possident autem Christiani*; What the Philosophers desired only, the Christians enjoy, which was Truth: and as he elsewhere more fully speaks, *Mimice Philosophi affectant veritatem, & affectando corrumpunt, ut qui gloriam captant; Christiani eam necessario appetunt, & integri præstant, ut qui saluti suæ curant*. Truth is the Philosopher's Mistress, which by courting he vitiates and corrupts, looking at nothing but his own glory: but Truth is the Christian's Matron, whose directions he observes and follows, because he regards no glory but that to come. And to let them further see what a difference there was between a Christian and a Philosopher, he concludes that Discourse with these words. *Quid adeo simile Philosophus & Christianus? Græciæ Discipulus & cæli? famæ negotiator & vitæ? verborum & factorum operator? rerum ædificator & destructor? amicus & inimicus erroris? veritatis interpolator & integrator? furator ejus & custos?* As much distance (saith he) as there is between Greece and Heaven, between applause and eternal glory, between words and things, between building and destroying, between truth and error, between a plagiarist and corrupter of truth, and a preserver and advancer of it; so much is there between a Philosopher and a Christian. The Heathens might suspect indeed some kind of affinity between the first Preachers of the Gospel and the ancient Sophists of Greece, because of their frequent going from place to place, and pretending a kind of Enthusiasm as they did: but as much difference as there is between a Knight-Errant and Hercules, between a Mountebank and Hippocrates, that and much greater there is between a Greek Sophist and an Apostle. Socrates in Plato's *Euthydemus* hath excellently discover'd the vanity and futility of those Persons under the Persons of *Euthydemus* and *Dionysodorus*, and so likewise in his *Protagoras*; their intent was only like the Retiaries in the Roman Spectacles, to catch their adversaries in a Net, to intangle them with some captious Question or other: but how vastly different from this was the design of the Apostles, who abhor'd those endless Contentions which then were in the heathen World; and came to shew them that Truth which was revealed, with an intent of making them better Men!

We see the Apostles were not carried forth by any mean and vulgar Motives, neither did they drive on any private ends of their own; all that they minded was the promoting of the Doctrine which they preached. Nay they accounted no hazards comparable with the advantage which the World enjoy'd thro' the propagation of the Christian Religion. This shewed a truly noble and gene-

Ibid. c. 46.

Idem ad
Nationes,
l. 1. c. 4.Idem Apol.
c. 46.

XII.

rous Spirit in them, which wou'd not be hinder'd from doing the World good, tho' they found so bad entertainment from it; yea they rejoyced in their greatest sufferings which they underwent in so good a cause; wherein those Primitive Christians who were the genuine followers of the Apostles, did so far imitate them, that, *etiam damnati gratias agunt*, they gave the Judges thanks that they thought them worthy to lose their Lives in a cause which they had reason to triumph in, tho' they died for it. And when any of them were apprehended, they discover'd so little fear of punishment, *Ut unum solummodo quod non ante fuerint pœniteret*, That nothing troubled them so much as that they had been Christians no sooner, as one of their number speaks. And when the Heathens usually scoffed at them, and call'd them *Sarmentitii* and *Semaxii*, because they were burn'd upon the Cross, one of them in the name of the rest answers, *Hic est habitus victoriæ nostræ, hæc palmata vestis, tali curru triumphamus*; The Cross was only their Triumphant-chariot, which carried them sooner to Heaven. Now this courage and resolution of Spirit which was seen in the first Planters of Christianity in the World, made all serious and inquisitive Persons look more narrowly into those things, which made Men flight so much the common bug-bears of Human Nature, sufferings and death. *Quis enim non contemplatione ejus concutitur, ad requirendum quid intus in re sit? quis non ubi requisivit accedit? ubi accessit pati exoptat?* These Sufferings made Men enquire; this Enquiry made them believe; that Belief made them as willing to suffer themselves, as they had seen others do it before them. Thus it appear'd to be true in them, *Exquisitior quæque crudelitas, illecebra magis est sectæ; plures efficimur quoties metimur à vobis; semen est sanguis Christianorum*; The cruelty of their enemies did but increase their number; the harvest of their pretended justice was but the seed-time of Christianity, and no seed was so fruitful as that which was steeped in the Blood of Martyrs. Thence Justin Martyr ingenuously saith of himself, That while he was a Platonic Philosopher, he derided and scoffed at the Christians; but when he consider'd their great courage and constancy in dying for their Profession, he cou'd not think those cou'd possibly be Men wicked and voluptuous, who when offers of Life were made them, wou'd rather choose death than deny CHRIST. By which he found plainly that there was a higher Spirit in Christianity than cou'd be obtain'd by the sublime Notions and Speculations of Plato, and that a poor ignorant Christian wou'd do and suffer more for the sake of CHRIST than any of the Academy in defence of their Master Plato. Now since all Men naturally abhor sufferings, what is it which shou'd so powerfully alter the nature and disposition of Christians above all other Persons, that they alone shou'd seem in that to have forgot Humanity, that not only with patience, but with joy they endur'd torments and abode the flames? What! were they all possessed with a far more than Stoical Apathy, that no sense of pain cou'd work at all upon them? or were they all besotted and infatuated Persons that did not know what it was they underwent? It is true some of the more blind and wilful Heathens derided them as such; but who were the more infatuated, let any sober Person judge: they who flighted and rejected a Doctrine of so great concernment, which

Tertullian.
Apol. c. 46.

Min. Felix.

Tertullian.
Apol. c. 5.

Id. ib.

which came attested with so much resolution and courage in the Professors of it; or they who were so far persuaded of the truth of it, that they wou'd rather die than deny it? *Dicimus & palam dicimus, & vobis torquentibus lacerati & cruenti vociferamur, Deum colimus per Christum.* Tertullian. Apol. c. 21. They were not ashamed to believe in the Blood of CHRIST, even when their own Blood ran down before their Eyes, and confess CHRIST with their Mouths, when their Bodies were upon the rack. Certainly then there were some very powerful and convincing Arguments which buoyed up the Spirits of true Christians in that deluge of Sufferings which they were to swim thro'; it must be a strong and well-grounded Faith which wou'd hold out under so great Tryals, and they cou'd not be to seek for the most persuasive Motives to Faith, who were so ready to give an account to others of the Hope that was in them, and to persuade all other Persons to the embracing of it. With what face and confidence otherwise cou'd they persuade Men to embrace a Doctrine so dangerous as that was, had there not been Motives sufficient to bear up against the weight of Sufferings, and Arguments persuasive to convince them of the undoubted certainty of that Doctrine which they encouraged them to believe?

Now that which appears to have been the main ground of satisfaction to the Primitive Christians as to the truth and certainty of the Doctrine of CHRIST, was this, That the Doctrine of the Gospel was at first delivered to the World by those Persons, who were themselves Eye-witnesses of all the Miracles which our Savior wrought in confirmation of the truth of what he spake. They were such Persons who had been themselves present, not only to hear most of our Savior's admirable discourses when he was in the World, but to see all those glorious things which were done by him, to make it appear that he was immediately sent from GOD. Let us now appeal to our own Faculties, and examine a little what rational Evidence cou'd possibly be desir'd, that the Doctrine of the Gospel was true, which GOD did not afford to the World? What cou'd the Persons who were the Auditors of our Savior desire more as an Evidence that he came from GOD, than his doing such things which were certainly above any created power, either Human or Diabolical, and therefore must needs be Divine? What cou'd other Persons desire more who were not present at the doing of these Miracles, but that the report of them shou'd be convey'd to them in an undoubted manner, by those Persons who were Eye-witnesses of them, and made it appear to the World they were far from any intention of deceiving it? Now this makes the Apostles themselves in their own Writings (tho' they were divinely inspir'd) appeal to the rational Evidence of the truth of the things, in that they were deliver'd by them who were Eye-witnesses of them. There St. Peter speaks thus to the dispersed Jews, *καὶ ὅτι σπουδαίοις ὑμῶν ἐξῆλθεν ἡμεῖς ἀγγελοῦντες ὑμῖν τὴν ἐκείνου ἰσχύος καὶ ἐλπίδος δύναμιν καὶ παρουσίαν, ἵνα ἐπὶ ταῖς ῥησίνου μεγαλειότης.* 2 Pet. 1.16. *For we have not followed cunningly-devised fables, when we made known unto you the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but were eye-witnesses of his Majesty.* The power and coming of CHRIST which the Apostle speaks of, was not as some improbably conceive, either his general coming to Judgment upon the World, or his particular coming upon the

Nation of the *Jews*; but by an *Hendyades*, by his power and coming is meant his powerful appearance in the World, whereby he mightily discover'd himself to be the Son of God. Now this, saith the Apostle, was no *σεσφισμένη μύθος*, not like the *Heathen Mythology* concerning the *παραστάς* and *εμφανιστάς* of their Gods among them (which were so frequently believed among them, that *Dionysius Halicarnassæus* condemns the *Epicureans*, because they did deride *τὰς εμφανίους τῶν θεῶν*, the appearances of their Gods in the World) now, saith the Apostle, assure your selves, this is no such appearance of a God on Earth as that among the *Heathens* was; for, saith he, we our selves who declare these things were *ἐπίσταται*, we fully understood this *μυστήριον*, this great Mystery of godliness, God manifest in the flesh, for we saw his *μεγαλειότητα*, that great Majesty which attended him in all which he spake or did; we saw all those *μεγαλὺν τὸν Θεόν*, the great things of God, which were manifest in him, all those miraculous operations which were wrought by him. Therefore as this was a great confirmation of the Faith of the Apostles themselves that they saw all these things, so we see it was of great concernment to the World in order to their belief that the Gospel was no cunningly devised fable, in that it was delivered by such who were *ἐπίσταται*, Eye-witnesses of what they declared. To the same purpose St. John speaks *ad conciliandam fidem*, to make it appear how true what they delivered was, in the entrance of his Epistle; *That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our Eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled of the word of life, (for the life was manifested, and we have seen it, and bear witness, and shew unto you that eternal life which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us) That which we have seen and heard, declare we unto you.* We see what great force and weight the Apostle lays upon this, that they delivered nothing but what they had seen and heard; as they heard the Doctrine of CHRIST, so they saw the Miracles which he wrought in confirmation of it. St. Luke likewise in the beginning of his Gospel declares that he intended to write nothing but *what he had perfect understanding of from such persons who had been* *αὐτόπιστα*, Eye-witnesses and instruments themselves in part of what was written, for that is meant by *ἐκ τῶν τοῦ λόγου*; and those things which were written, he saith were *πεπληρωσμένα ὡς ἀπὸ πείρας*, things which are abundantly proved to be true; for being Matters of Fact, there could be no stronger proof of them, than by such who were eye-witnesses of what they spake. And this we find the Apostles themselves very cautious about, in the choice of a new Apostle in the room of Judas. Wherefore of these Men which have companied with us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among us, beginning from the Baptism of John, unto that same day that he was taken from us, must one be ordained to be a witness of his Resurrection: For, because CHRIST was mightily declared to be the Son of God by his Resurrection from the dead, (as that which was the great Seal of our Savior's being the Son of God) therefore we find the Apostles so frequently attesting the truth of the Resurrection of CHRIST, and that themselves were eye-witnesses of it. *This Jesus, saith Peter, hath God raised up, whereof we all are witnesses.* And again, *And killed the Prince of life, whom God* *hath*

Dionys.
Halic. l. 2.
pag. 128.

Act. 2. 11.

1 Joh. 1.
1, 2, 3.

Luk. 1. 1,
2, 3.

Act. 1. 21,
22.

Act. 2. 32,
3. 15.

hath raised up from the dead, whereof we are witnesses; and both Peter and John to the Sanhedrin; For we cannot but speak the 4. 20. things which we have seen and heard. And the whole College of Apostles afterwards, And we are his witnesses of these things, and 5. 32. so is also the Holy Ghost, whom God hath given to them that obey him. In which words they give them that twofold rational Evidence which did manifest the undoubted truth of what they spake; for they deliver'd nothing but what themselves were witnesses of, and withal was declar'd to be true by the power of the Holy Ghost in the Miracles which were wrought by and upon Believers. Afterwards we read the sum of the Apostles preaching, and the manner used by them to persuade Men of the truth of it, in the words of Peter to Cornelius and his company, *How God anointed 10. 39, 40. Jesus of Nazareth with the Holy Ghost and with power, who went 41. 42. about doing good, and healing all that were oppressed of the Devil, for God was with him: And we are witnesses of all things which he did both in the land of the Jews and in Hierusalem, whom they slew and hanged on a tree: Him God raised up the third day, and shewed him openly, not to all the people, but unto witnesses chosen before of God, even to us who did eat and drink with him after he rose from the dead. And he commanded us to preach unto the people, that it is he which was ordained of God to be the judge of quick and dead.* By all which we see what care God was pleased to take for the satisfaction of the World in point of rational Evidence, as to the truth of the matters which were discover'd concerning our Savior *Christ*, because he made choice of such Persons to be the Preachers and Writers of these things who were the best able to satisfy the World about them, viz. such as had been eye-witnesses of them.

Now in order to the making it more fully evident what strength there was in this Testimony given by the Apostles to the Miracles of *Christ*, we shall more fully manifest the rational Evidence which attended it in these following Propositions. XIV.

Where the truth of a Doctrine depends upon a matter of fact, the truth of the Doctrine is sufficiently manifested, if the matter of fact be evidently proved in the highest way it is capable of. Prop. I. Thus it is in reference to the Doctrine of *Christ*; for the truth of that is so interwoven with the truth of the story of *Christ*, that if the Relations concerning *Christ* be true, his Doctrine must needs be Divine and Infallible. For if it be undoubtedly true, that there was such a Person as *Christ* born at *Bethlehem*, who did so many Miracles, and at last suffered the death of the Cross, and after he had lain three days in the Grave *rose again* from the dead; what reason imaginable can I have to question, but that the testimony of this Person was certainly Divine, and consequently whatever he preached to the World was most certain and undoubted truth? So that if we have clear Evidence as to the truth of these passages concerning our Savior, we must likewise believe his Doctrine, which came attested with such pregnant Evidences of a Divine Commission which he had from God to the World. No Prince can think he hath any reason to refuse audience to an Embassador, when he finds his Credentials such as he may rely upon, altho' himself doth not see the sealing of them; much less reason have we to question the truth of the Doctrine of the Gospel, if we have sufficient Evidence of

of the truth of the matters of fact concerning *Christ*, in such a way as those things are capable of being proved.

Prop. 2.

The greatest evidence which can be given to a matter of fact, is the attesting of it by those persons who were eye-witnesses of it. This is the foundation whereon the firmest Assent is built, as to any matter of fact; for altho' we conceive we have reason to suspect the Truth of a Story, as long as it is convey'd only in a general way, by an uncertain Fame and Tradition; yet when it comes to be attested by a sufficient number of credible Persons who profess themselves the eye-witnesses of it, it is accounted an unreasonable thing to distrust any longer the Truth of it; especially in these two cases. 1. *When the matter they bear witness to is a thing which they might easily and clearly perceive.* 2. *When many witnesses exactly agree in the same Testimony.*

1. *When the matter itself is of that nature that it may be fully perceived by those who saw it: i. e.* if it be a common Object of Sense. And thus it certainly was as to the Person and Actions of Jesus Christ. For he was of the same nature with Mankind; and they had as great Evidence that they convers'd with Jesus Christ in the Flesh, as we can have that we converse one with another. The Miracles of Christ were real and visible Miracles; they cou'd be no illusions of Senses, nor deceits of their Eyes; the Man who was born blind and cured by our Savior, was known to have been born blind thro' all the Country, and his Cure was after as public as his blindness before, and acknowledged by the greatest Enemies of Christ at the time of its being done. When Christ raised up the dead Man at *Naim*, it was before much People, and such Persons in probability who were many of them present at his Death. But lest there might be any suspicion as to him, that he was not really dead, the case is plain and beyond all dispute in *Lazarus*, who had been to the knowledge of all persons thereabouts dead four days; here cou'd be no deceit at all when the Stone was roll'd away, and *Lazarus* came forth in the presence of them all. And yet further the Death and Passion of our Savior was a plain object of sense done in presence of his greatest Adversaries. The Soldiers themselves were sufficient Witnesses of his being really dead, when they came to break his Bones, and spared him because they saw he was dead already. At his Resurrection the Stone was roll'd away from the Sepulchre and no body found therein, altho' the Sepulchre was guarded by Souldiers, and the Disciples of Christ all so fearful, that they were disperfed up and down in several places. And that it was the same real Body which he rose withal, and no *aëreal vehicle*, appears by *Thomas's* scrupulosity and unbelief, *who would not believe unless he might put his hands into the hole of his side, and see in his hands the print of the nails*; now our Savior condescending so far as to satisfy the incredulity of *St. Thomas*, hath made it thereby evident that the Body which our Savior rose from the Grave with, was the same individual Body which before was crucified and buried in the Sepulchre. And we find all the Apostles together upon our Savior's appearance to them after his Resurrection, so far from being credulous in embracing a Phantasm instead of Christ, that they suspected that it was either a mere Phantasm, or an evil Spirit which appeared among them; upon

Joh. 9. 26.

Luk. 7. 12.

Joh. 11. 39.

Joh. 20.

25. 27.

upon which it is said, *They were terrified and affrighted, and supposed they had seen a spirit.* Which our Savior cou'd not beat them off from, but by appealing to the judgment of their Senses, *Handle me and see; for a spirit hath no flesh and bones as ye see me have,* and afterwards more fully to convince them, *he did eat in the midst of them.* Now the more suspicious and incredulous the Apostles themselves at first were, the greater evidence is it how far they were from any design of abusing the World in what they after preached unto it, and what strong conviction there was in the thing it self, which was able to satisfy such scrupulous and suspicious persons.

2. *When many witnesses concur in the same Testimony.* Nothing can disparage more the Truth of a Testimony, than the counter-witness of such who were present at the same actions; but when all the Witnesses fully agree not only in the substance, but in all material circumstances of the Story, what ground or reason can there be to suspect a Forgery or Design in it; especially when the persons cannot by any Fears or Threatnings be brought to vary from each other in it? Thus it is in our present case, we find no real dissent at all mention'd either as to the Birth, Miracles, Life, Death, or Resurrection of Jesus CHRIST; all the Witnesses attest the same things, tho' writing in different places, and upon different occasions; no alteration in any circumstance of the Story, out of any design of pleasing or gratifying any Persons by it. Most of our Savior's Miracles, not only his Apostles, but the People and his very Enemies were witnesses of, whose Posterity to this day dare not deny the truth of such strange Works which were wrought by him. And for his Resurrection, it wou'd be very strange that five hundred Persons shou'd all agree in the same thing, and that no Torments or Death cou'd bring any of them to deny the truth of it, had there not been the greatest certainty in it.

There can be no reason to suspect such a Testimony which is given by eye-witnesses, but either from questioning their knowledge of the things they spake of, or their fidelity in reporting them. Now there is not the least ground to doubt either of these, in reference to those persons who gave Testimony to the World concerning the Person and Actions of our blessed Savior.

For first, *they were such as were intimately conversant both with the person and actions of Jesus Christ;* whom he had chosen and trained up for that very end, that they might be sufficiently qualify'd to acquaint the World with the truth of things concerning himself after his Resurrection from the Dead. And accordingly they follow'd him up and down wheresoever he went; they were with him in his Solitudes and Retirements, and had thereby occasion to observe all his Actions, and to take notice of the unspotted innocency of his Life. Some of his Disciples were with him in his Transfiguration, others in his Agony and bloody Sweat; they heard the Expressions which came from his mouth; in all which he discover'd a wonderful submission to the Will of God, and a great readiness of Mind to suffer for the good of the World. Now therefore the first thing cannot at all be question'd, their means of knowing the truth of what they spake.

Neither, *secondly,* is there any reason to suspect their fidelity in reporting

Bb11

- reporting what they knew: For, 1. *The truth of this Doctrine wrought so far upon them, that they parted with all their worldly subsistence for the sake of it.* Altho' their Riches were not great, yet their way of subsistence in the World was necessary; they left their Houses, their Wives and Children, and all for Christ, and that not to gain any higher Preferments in this World (which had they done, it wou'd have rendred their design suspicious to the curious and inquisitive World) but they let go at least a quiet and easie life, for one most troublesome and dangerous. So that it is not, how much they parted withal, but how freely they did it, and with what cheerfulness they underwent Disgraces, Persecutions, nay Death itself for the sake of the Gospel. Now can it be imagin'd, that ever Men were so prodigal of their Ease and Lives, as to throw both of them away upon a thing which themselves were not fully assur'd of the Truth of? It had been the highest folly imaginable, to have deceiv'd themselves in a thing of so great moment to them, as the truth of that Doctrine which they preached was; because all their Hopes and Happiness depended upon the truth of that Doctrine which they preached. And as *Tertullian* observes, *Non fas est ulli de sua religione mentiri*; for, saith he, *He that says he worships any thing besides what he doth, he denies what he doth worship, and transfers his worship upon another, and thereby doth not worship that which he thus denies*; Besides what probability is there Men shou'd lie for the sake of that Religion, which tells them that those which do so will not receive the Reward which is promised to those who cordially adhere unto it? Nay, they declar'd themselves to be the most miserable of all persons if their hopes were only in this present life. Can we now think that any who had the common Reason of Men, wou'd part with all the contentments of this World, and expose themselves to continual hazards, and at last undergo death it self for the sake of something which was merely the Fiction of their own Brains? What shou'd make them so Sedulous and Industrious in preaching such things, that they cou'd say necessity was laid upon them, yea, we was unto them if they preached not the Gospel, when yet they saw so many Woes attending them in the Preaching of it, had there not been some more powerful attractive in the beauty and excellency of the Doctrine which they preached, than any cou'd be in the Ease and Tranquillity of this present World? Thus we see the Fidelity of the Apostles manifested in such a way as no other Witnesses were ever yet willing to hazard theirs. And therefore *Origen* deservedly condemns *Celsus* of a ridiculous Impertinency, when he wou'd parallel the Relations of *Herodotus* and *Pindarus* concerning *Aristeus Proconnesius* with those of the Apostles concerning Christ; For, saith he, *Did either of these two venture their lives upon the truth of what they writ concerning him, as the Apostles did to attest the truth of what they preached concerning our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ?*
- XVI. 2. The Fidelity of the Apostles is evident in their manner of reporting the things which they deliver. For if ever there may be any thing gather'd from the manner of Expression, or the *ἡρώδης* concerning the particular Temper and Disposition of the Person from whom it comes, we may certainly read the great Fidelity in the Apostles from the peculiar manner of their expressing themselves to the World. Which they do, 1. *With*

1 Cor. 15.
19.

1 Cor. 9. 16.

Origen.
c. Celsum.
l. 3. p. 127.

1. *With the greatest impartiality*: not declaring only what was glorious and admirable to the World, but what they knew wou'd be accounted foolishness by it. They who had sought only to have been admir'd for the rare Discoveries which they brought to the World, wou'd be sure to conceal any thing which might be accounted ridiculous; but the Apostles fixed themselves most on what was most contemptible in the Eyes of the World, and what they were most mocked and derided for, that they delighted most in the preaching of, which was the Cross of Christ. *Paul* was so much in love with this, which was a stumbling-block to the *Jews*, and foolishness to the *Greeks*, *that he valued the knowledg of nothing else in comparison of the knowledg of Christ, and him crucified.* Nay he elsewhere saith, *God forbid that I should glory save in the Cross of Christ.* What now shou'd be the reason that they shou'd rejoyce in that most which was most despicable to the World, had not they seen far greater truth and excellency in it, than in the most sublime speculations concerning God or the Souls of Men in the School of *Plato*, or any other *Heathen Philosophers*? That all Men shou'd be bound in order to their Salvation, to believe in one who was crucify'd at *Hierusalem*, was a strange Doctrine to the unbelieving World: but if the Apostles had but endeavor'd to have suted their Doctrine to the School of *Plato*, what rare Persons might they have been accounted among the *Heathen Philosophers*! Had they only in general terms discours'd of the Benignity of the Divine Nature, and the Manifestations of Divine Goodness in the World; and that, in order to the bringing of the Souls of Men to a nearer participation of the Divine Nature, the perfect Idea of true Goodness, and the express Image of the Person of God, and the resplendency of his Glory had veil'd himself in Human Nature, and had every where scatter'd such beams of light and Goodness, as warm'd and invigorated the frozen Spirits of Men with higher sentiments of God and themselves, and raised them up above the feculency of this terrestrial Matter to breath in a fresher air, and converse with more noble objects, and by degrees to fit the Souls of Men for those more pure illapses of real Goodness, which might always satisfy the Soul's desires, and yet always keep them up 'till the Soul shou'd be sunning it self to all eternity under the immediate beams of Light and Love: And that after this Incarnate Deity had spread abroad the wings of his Love for a while upon this lower World, 'till by his gentle heat and incubation he had quickned the more pliable World to some degree of a Divine Life, he then retreated himself back again into the superior World, and put off that veil by which he made himself known to those who are here confin'd to the prisons of their Bodies: Thus, I say, had the Apostles minded applause among the admired Philosophers of the *Heathens*, how easy had it been for them to have made some considerable additions to their highest speculations, and have left out any thing which might seem so mean and contemptible as the death of the Son of God! But this they were so far from, that the main thing which they preached to the World, was, the vanity of Human Wisdom without *Christ*, and the necessity of all Mens believing in that *Jesus* who was crucify'd at *Hierusalem*.

1 Cor. 2. 2.
Phil. 8. 3.
Gal. 6. 14.

The Apostles indeed discover very much, infinitely more than ever the most lofty *Platonist* cou'd do, concerning the Goodness and Love of God to Mankind; but that wherein they *manifested* the love of God to the World, was, that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish but have everlasting life. And that herein was the love of God manifested, that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. And that this was the greatest truth and worthy of all acceptation, that Jesus Christ came into the World to save sinners. They never dreamt of any Divine Goodness which shou'd make Men happy without Christ: No, it was their design to persuade the World that all the communications of God's Goodness to the World were wholly in and thro' Jesus Christ; and it is impossible that any shou'd think otherwise, unless *Plato* knew more of the mind of God than our Blessed Savior, and *Plotinus* than St. Paul. Can we think now that the Apostles shou'd hazard the reputation of their own Wits so much as they did to the World, and be accounted babblers, and fools, and mad-men, for preaching the way of Salvation to be only by a Person crucify'd between two thieves at Hierusalem, had they not been convinced not only of the truth but importance of it, and that it concern'd Men as much to believe it, as it did to avoid eternal Misery? Did St. Paul preach ever the less the Words of truth and soberness, because he was told to his face, that his learning had made him mad? But if he was besides himself, it was for Christ; and what wonder was it if the Love of Christ in the Apostle shou'd make him willing to lose his reputation for him, seeing Christ made himself of no reputation, that he might be in a capacity to do us good? We see the Apostles were not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ, because they knew it was the power of God unto salvation; and therefore neither in their preaching nor their Writings wou'd they omit any of those passages concerning our Savior's death, which might be accounted the most dishonorable to his Person. Which is certainly as great an Evidence of their fidelity as can be expected; which makes Origen say, that the Disciples of Christ writ all things *φιλαλίῳ καὶ ἀγνομήῳ*, with a great deal of candor and love of truth. *οὐκ ἐκκαλύπτουσιν τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰρηδικῇ ἱστορίᾳ τὸ δεικνύον ἐν ταῖς αἰσχύναις καὶ ἀλγὺν τῶν χριστιανῶν* Origen not concealing from the World those passages of the Life of Christ, which would be accounted most foolish and ridiculous.

Origen.
contr. Cel-
sum, l. 3.

2. With the greatest plainness and simplicity of speech. Such whose design is to impose upon the Minds of Men with some cunningly-devised fables, love as much ambiguity as ever *Apello* did in his most winding Oracles, of whom it is said,

*Ampage nexa Delphico mas lest Deo
Arcana tegere.*

Servius in
4. Æneid.

Servius tells us, that *Jupiter Ammon* was therefore pictur'd with Rams-horns, because his answers had as many turnings and windings as they had. But the Horns which *Moses* was wont to be pictur'd with, did only note the light and perspicuity (from the ambiguity of *Π*, which notes the sending forth of rays of light like a horn,) and yet *Moses* himself was veil'd in comparison of the openness

openness and plainness of Speech which was in the Apostles. Impostors cast a mist of many dark and cloudy words before them; but when they are once brought into the open light, their vizard falls off, and their deformity appears. Such Persons delight in soaring quite out of the apprehensions of those who follow them, and never think themselves better recompensed for their pains, than when they are most admired and least understood. But never was Christianity more dishonored, than when Men brought it from its native simplicity and plainness, into a company of cloudy and insignificant expressions, which are so far from making Men better understand the truth of it, that it was certainly the Devil's design by such obscure terms to make way for a Mystery to be advanced, (but it was of Iniquity,) and soon after, we see the effect of it in another Oracle set up at Rome instead of Delphos; and all the pretence of it, was the obscurity supposed in Scripture. What! Darkness come by the rising of the Sun! Or is the Sun at last grown so beggarly, that he is fain to borrow light of the Earth? Must the Scripture be beholding to the Church for its clearness, and CHRIST himself not speak intelligibly, unless the Pope be his Interpreter? Did CHRIST reveal to the World the way of Salvation, and yet leave Men to seek which was it, till a Guide never heard of in the Scripture come to direct them in the way to it? What strange witnesses were the Apostles, if they did not speak the truth with plainness? How had Men been to seek as to the truth of Christianity, if the Apostles had not declar'd the Doctrine of the Gospel with all evidence and perspicuity? Whom must we believe in this case, the Apostles or the Roman Oracles? The Apostles they tell us *they speak with all plainness of speech*, and for that end purposely lay aside *all excellency of words and human wisdom*, that Men might not be to seek for their meaning in a matter of so great moment; that *the Gospel was hid to none but such as are lost, and whose eyes are blinded by the God of this World*; that the Doctrine revealed by them is a Light to direct us in our way to Heaven, and a Rule to walk by; and it is a strange property of Light to be obscure, and of a Rule to be crooked. But it is not only evident from the Apostles own affirmations, that they laid aside all affected Obscurity, ambiguous Expressions, and Philosophical Terms, whereby the World might have been to seek for what they were to believe, but it is likewise clear from the very nature of the Doctrine they preached, and the design of their preaching of it. What need Rhetoric in plain Truths? or affected Phrases in giving Evidence? How incongruous wou'd obscure Expressions have been to the design of saving Souls by the foolishness of preaching? For if they had industriously spoken in their preaching, above the capacities of those they spake to, they cou'd never have converted a Soul without a Miracle: for the ordinary way of conversion must be by the Understanding; and how cou'd that work upon the Understanding, which was so much above it? But, saith the Apostle, *We preach not our selves, but Christ Jesus the Lord, and our selves your servants for Jesus sake*. If they had sought themselves or their own Credit and Reputation, there might have been some reason that they shou'd have used the way of the Sophists among the Greeks, and by declamatory Speeches to

2 Cor. 3. 12.

1 Cor. 2. 1.

4

1 Cor. 4.

3. 4.

2 Cor. 4.

5.

have enhanced their esteem among the vulgar. But the *Apostles* disown'd and rejected all these vulgar artifices of mean and low-spirited Men; they laid aside all those enticing words *ἀντρεπτικῶς* *1 Cor. 2. 4.* *of the way of the Heathen Sophists*, and declar'd the Testimony of God with Spiritual Evidence; *they handled not the Word of God deceitfully, but by manifestation of the truth, commended themselves to every Man's conscience in the sight of God:* Now what cou'd be so suitable to such a design, as the greatest plainness and faithfulness in what they spake? We find in the Testimony of the *Apostles*, *ἐδὲ τοῦτο καὶ κἀντιθέμεν καὶ πειθαρχεῖν καὶ παροτρύνει*, as *Origen* speaks, *Nothing that is spurious or counterfeit, nothing savoring of the cunning craftiness of such as lie in wait to deceive; and, saith he, it is impossible to think that Men never bred up in the Sophistry of the Greeks, nor experienced in the Rhetorical insinuations used among them, could ever be able so suddenly to persuade the World to embrace that which had been a figment of their own Brains.* The truth is, the *Apostles* speak like Men very confident of the truth of what they speak, and not like such who were fain to fetch in the help of all their *Topics*, to find out some probable Arguments to make Men believe that which it is probable they did not believe themselves; which was most commonly the case of the great *Orators* among the *Heathens*. We find no Pedantic Flourishes, no flattering Insinuations, no affected Cadencies, no such great care of the rising and falling of Words in the several Sentences; which make up so great a part of that which was accounted *Eloquence* in the *Apostles* time. These things were too mean a prey for the Spirits of the *Apostles* to quarry upon; every thing in them was grave and serious, every Word had its due weight, every Sentence brim-full of Spiritual matter, their whole Discourse most becoming the Majesty and Authority of that Spirit which they spake by. And therein was seen a great part of the infinite Wisdom of God in the choice he made of the Persons who were to propagate the Doctrine of CHRIST in the World; that they were not such who by reason of their great repute and fame in the World, might easily draw whole Multitudes to embrace their Dictates, but (that there might not be the least foundation for an implicit Faith) they were of so mean rank and condition in the World, that in all probability their Names had never been heard of, had not their Doctrine made them Famous. To this purpose *Origen* excellently speaks, *οἷμαι δὲ τὸ Ἰησοῦν αἰετὶ βέλτερόν τι διδάσκαλον τῶν διγυμνῶν καὶ βέλτερον, ὥστε μηδὲν αὐτῷ εἶναι χρεὶν ὑπονοεῖν πρὸς αὐτομάταις λαοῦς αὐτῶν δὲ τοῦ συνήγου διωκτέων ἐμφανίσαι, ὅτι τὸ ἀδελφὸν τὸ σωτηρίαν τῶν γενομένων, ἔχοντι παρὰ τὸ ἀφελὲς, ἐξουσίαν διωκτέων διωκτέων, καὶ μὴ πρὸς αὐτοῦ, ὡς αὐτοὶ δύναμις δουρὶ ἀποβελλόμενοι, καὶ λίαν συνήγου, καὶ μὴ σωτῆρας καὶ πνευματικῶν ἑλεμῶν ἀνταρῆς. I am of opinion, saith he, that Jesus did purposely make use of such Preachers of his Doctrine, that there might be no place for suspicion that they came instructed with the art of Sophistry; but that it be clearly manifest to all that would consider it, that there was nothing of design in those who discovered so much simplicity in their Writings, and that they had a more Divine Power which was more efficacious than the greatest volubility of Expressions, or ornaments of speech, or the artifices which were used in the Grecian compositions.*

3. The *Apostles* delivered their *Doctrine with the greatest openness and freedom of spirit*; they did not give out one thing to the World, and another to their private Disciples; but with great freedom and boldness declared their doctrine in the most public places, and before their greatest enemies. They knew they were looked on as deceivers by the World, but yet they knew themselves to be true, *ὡς ἀληθεῖς, καὶ ἀγαθοί*. This is the usual requital good Men have from the World, that they are looked on as the greatest deceivers of it; if it be so with others, they have much less cause to wonder at it, when even He, who by one Prophet is stiled *the desire of Nations*, is by another said *to be despised and rejected of Men*; and when CHRIST was in the World, he was called *ὁ πειράζων, the deceiver*; no wonder then if his Disciples were accounted such, altho' they manifested their veracity by their open carriage and free speaking to the faces of their greatest adversaries. The *Apostles* neither feared the *Jews* skill in their Law, nor the wisdom and subtilty of the *Greeks*: Saint Paul preacheth CHRIST openly among the *Jews* in their Synagogues, and among the *Athenians* he encounters the *Epicureans* and *Stoics*, and preacheth to them JESUS and the *Resurrection*. If the *Apostles* had any thing of deceivers in them, as to the things they related concerning CHRIST, they wou'd not certainly have spoken with so much confidence concerning CHRIST in the presence of those who had been his murderers; but we see they appeal'd to themselves, as to the Miracles which he had wrought among them, and for his Resurrection they were ready to lay down their Lives in giving Testimony to the truth of it. That his Body was gone, was evident; that the *Apostles* shou'd take it away was impossible, considering what a guard of Souldiers they had set upon it, and how timorous and fearful the *Apostles* were, that they fled upon CHRIST's being apprehended. Now what cou'd it be, cou'd make such fearful Persons afterwards so courageous and resolute as they were, had there not been some more than ordinary power to convince and encourage them?

4. The *Apostles* deliver their *Testimony with the greatest particularity as to all circumstances*. They do not change or alter any of them upon different Examinations before several Persons; they all agree in the greatest constancy to themselves and uniformity with each other. As to matters of Indifferency, we find the *Apostles* very yielding and condescending; but as to any thing which concern'd their Testimony, most constant and resolved. Had the Gospel been some cunningly-contrived fancy, it had been impossible but so many different Persons, in such different places, and under such different conditions, wou'd have varied as to some material circumstance of it: Or else they wou'd have been so wise as to have deliver'd it in general terms, without insisting much upon such particular circumstances, which if they had been false, might have been very easily disprov'd; but with what particular enumeration of circumstances do the *Apostles* preach CHRIST to the World? Peter tells the *Jews* that it was *Jesus of Nazareth whom he preached*; and lest they shou'd think it was not the same Person who rose again, with great boldness and freedom of Spirit he saith unto them, *Therefore let all the house of Israel know assuredly, that God hath made that same Jesus whom ye have crucified,*

2 Cor. 6. 8.

Hag. 2. 7.

Isa. 53. 3.

Matth. 27. 63.

Act. 17. 8.

Act. 2. 22.

2. 36.

both

Act. 5.
31, 32.

both Lord and Christ. Yea, that same individual Person who was convertant in the World, and died upon the Cross, is now become a Prince and Savior, to give repentance to Israel and remission of sins. If there had been any ground of suspicion as to these things, who had been so able to disprove them, or so ready to do it, as those Persons who had crucify'd him? For we cannot conceive but those who had a hand in his death, wou'd endeavor by all possible means to disprove his Resurrection from the dead. For what a case were they like to be in, if those things which the *Apostles* so confidently preached were true? If *Christ had all power now in his hands, and there were salvation in no other Name, but only in his whom they had crucify'd*, they were like to be in a most desperate condition; therefore if any Men can be suppos'd inquisitive after the truth of these circumstances, no doubt these were: And if they cou'd have found the least flaw in their Testimony, the World wou'd soon have ring'd of it; and the *Jews* who were then so much dispersed abroad, would have divulg'd it into all parts, the *Apostles* wou'd have been told of it as they preached CHRIST in the *Synagogues*. And can we in any reason think, but those *Jews* who persecuted *Paul* as he preached in the *Synagogues* of *Asia*; and afterwards impeach'd him so openly in *Jerusalem*, wou'd there enquire into all the circumstances concerning CHRIST, and all the other *Jews* wou'd write to their Friends at *Jerusalem* to be fully inform'd of those strange things which were told them openly in all places in their *Synagogues* by Men of their own Nation and Language, concerning one *Jesus* who was crucify'd and rose again from the dead? Had there been now any so much as plausible pretext that any of these circumstances were not true, can we think but that a People so unmeasurably given to their own ways and Traditions, wou'd in all places have vented any thing that might have tended to the disparagement of CHRIST and his *Apostles*? But we see Malice it self cou'd not find any flaw in the *Apostles* Testimony, for if it had, we shou'd certainly have heard of it; either from the *Jews*, or from the great opposers of *Christianity* among the *Heathens*, who pretended to be curious and inquisitive Persons, such as *Celsus*, *Julian*, *Hierocles* and *Porphry* were. What reason can we have then in the least to suspect such a Testimony, which passed so uncontrouled in that time when it was alone capable of being disprov'd, and Mens Interest and Design wou'd put them so much upon it? The strength of which will appear in the next Proposition, which is,

XVII.
Prop. 4.

No Testimony ought to be taken against a matter of fact thus attested, but from such Persons who had greater knowledge of the things attested, and manifest greater fidelity in reporting them. It is easy to make it appear, that supposing any Persons at that time had contradicted the Testimony of the *Apostles* concerning our Savior, yet there had been no reason in the world to have hearkned to their Testimony in opposition to that of the *Apostles*; and that on these accounts. 1. The *Apostles* witnessed the Affirmative, which is more capable of being attested than any Negative can be. 2. The *Apostles* were more convertant with CHRIST than any other Persons were; because they were chosen for that very end by him to be constantly with him: cou'd any therefore be more capable of knowing the truth

truth of all particulars concerning CHRIST than these were? Had there been any ground of suspicion concerning the design of CHRIST, why cou'd not the *Jews* prevail with *Judas* to discover it as well as to betray his Person? *Judas* had done but a good work, if CHRIST had been such an Impostor as the *Jews* blasphemously said he was: what made *Judas* then so little satisfy'd with his work, that he grew weary of his Life upon it, and threw himself away in the most horrid despair? No Person certainly had been so fit to have been produced as a witness against CHRIST, as *Judas* who had been so long with him, and had heard his Speeches, and observ'd his Miracles; but he had not patience enough to stay after that horrid fact to be a witness against him: nay he was the greatest witness at that time for him, when he who had betray'd him came to the *Sanhedrin* when consulting about his death, and told them *that he had sinned in betraying innocent blood.* Mat. 27. 5. What possible Evidence cou'd have been given more in behalf of our Savior than that was? When a Person so covetous as to betray his Master for *thirty pieces of silver*, was so weary of his bargain, that he comes and throws back the Money, and declares the Person innocent whom he had betray'd? And this Person too was such a one as knew our Savior far better than any of the Witnesses whom afterwards they suborn'd against him, who yet contradicted each other; and at last cou'd produce nothing which in the judgment of the heathen Governor cou'd make him judge CHRIST worthy of death. 3. The *Apostles* were freer from design than any counter-witness at that time cou'd be; we have already prov'd the *Apostles* cou'd not possibly have any other motive to affirm what they did, but full conviction of the truth of what they spake; but now if any among the *Jews* at that time had asserted any thing contrary to the *Apostles*, we have a clear account of it, and what motive might induce them to it; *viz.* the preserving of their Honor and Reputation with the People, the upholding their Traditions, besides their open and declar'd enmity against CHRIST without any sufficient reason at all for it; now who wou'd believe the Testimony of the *Scribes* and *Pharisees* who had so great authority among the People, which they were like to lose, if CHRIST's Doctrine were true, before that of the *Apostles* who parted with all for the sake of CHRIST, and ventur'd themselves wholly upon the truth of our Savior's Doctrine? 4. None ever did so much to attest the *Negative*, as the *Apostles* did to prove their Fidelity as to the *Affirmative*. Had sufficient counter-witness been timely produced, we cannot think the *Apostles* would have run so many continual hazards in preaching the things which related to the Person and Actions of CHRIST. Did ever any lay down their Lives to undeceive the World, if the *Apostles* were guilty of abusing it? 5. The number of such Persons had been inconsiderable in comparison of those who were so fully persuaded of the truth of those things which concern our Savior, who were all ready (as most of them did) to seal the truth of them with their Lives. Whence shou'd so many Men grow so suddenly confident of the truth of such things which were contrary to their former Persuasions, Interest, Education, had they not been deliver'd in such a

Cc

way

XVIII.
Prop. 5.

way, that they were assur'd of the undoubted truth of them? which brings me to the last Proposition, which is,

Matters of fact being first believ'd on the account of eye-witnesses, and receiv'd with an universal and uncontrouled assent by all such persons who have thought themselves concern'd in knowing the truth of them, do yield a sufficient foundation for a firm assent to be built upon. I take it for granted that there is sufficient foundation for a firm assent, where there can be no Reason given to question the Evidence; which that there is not in this present case, will appear from these following considerations.

1. *That the multitudes of those persons who did believe these things, had liberty and opportunity to be satisfy'd of the truth of them before they believ'd them.* Therefore no Reason or Motive can be assign'd, on which they shou'd be induced to believe these things, but the undoubted Evidence of Truth which went along with them. I confess in *Mahometism* a very great number of persons have for some Centuries of years continu'd in the Belief of the Doctrine of *Mahomet*; but then withal there is a sufficient account to be given of that, *viz. the power of the sword* which keeps them in awe, and strictly forbids all the Followers of *Mahomet* to dispute their Religion at all, or compare it with any other. Therefore I can no more wonder at this, than I do to see so great a part of the World under the Tyranny of the great *Turk*: Neither on the other side do I wonder that such a multitude of those professing Christianity shou'd together with it, believe a great number of erroneous Doctrines, and live in the practice of many gross Superstitions, because I consider what a strange prevalency Education hath upon softer Spirits and more easie Intellectuals, and what an awe an Inquisition bears upon timorous and irresolv'd Persons. But now when a great multitude of persons sober and inquisitive, shall contrary to the Principles of their Education, and without fear of any human Force, (which they before-hand see will persecute them) and after diligent enquiry made into the Grounds on which they believe, forsake all their former Persuasions, and resolvedly adhere to the truth of the Doctrine propounded to them, tho' it cost them their lives; if this give us not reason to think this Doctrine true, we must believe Mankind to be the most unhappy creatures in the World; that will with so much resolution part with all Advantages of this Life for the sake of one to come, if that be not undoubtedly certain, and the Doctrine proposing it infallibly true. It is an observable Circumstance in the propagation of Christian Religion, that tho' God made choice at first of persons generally of mean rank and condition in the World to be Preachers of the Gospel, God thereby making it appear that *our faith did not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God*, and therefore chose the weak things of the world to confound the strong; yet soon after the Gospel was preached abroad in the World, we find persons of great place and reputation, of great parts and abilities engaged in the Profession of the Christian Faith. In the History of the *Acts* we read of *Sergius* a Proconsul, of *Dionysius* the *Areopagite* converted to the Faith, and in the following Ages of the Church many persons of great esteem for their excellent

1 Cor. 2. 5.
1 Cor. 1. 27.

excellent Learning and Abilities; such was *Justin Martyr*, one who before he became a Christian, was conversant with all Sects of *Philosophers*, *Stoics*, *Peripatetics*, *Pythagoreans*, and at last was a profess'd *Platonist* till he was converted from *Plato* to *Christ*, and then found that true which he speaks of in his *Dialogue* with *Trypho*, that after all his enquiries into Philosophy, speaking of the Doctrine of *CHRIST* ταύτην μόνον ἐνταυτοῖς φιλοσοφίαν ἀσφαλῆ π' ἐσὶν σύμφορον, *I found this at last to be the only sure and profitable Philosophy*. And when *Trypho* after derides him as a Man of very easie Faith, who wou'd leave the Doctrine of *Plato* for that of *CHRIST*, (for it seems by him the *Jews* then had a more favorable Opinion of the State of *Platonists* than *Christians*) *Justin* is so far from being mov'd with such Reproaches, that he tells him he wou'd undertake to demonstrate to him, ὅτι οὐ κενὸς ἐπιστάμεθα μύθοις, οὐδὲ ἀναποδείκτους λόγους, ἀλλὰ μετὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου καὶ δυνάμεως βρυσσέμεθα, καὶ πεδυνάξομεν χάριτι: *That the Christians did not give credit to empty Fables, and unprovable Assertions, but to such a Doctrine as was full of a Divine Spirit and Power, and flourished with Grace*: The proving of which is the subject of that discourse. At *Alexandria* we meet with a Succession of excellent Persons, all which were not only Embracers themselves, but Defenders of the Christian Faith; for setting aside there *Abilius*, *Iustus*, *Cerdo*, *Eumenes*, *Marcus*, *Celadion*, *Agrippinus*, *Julianus*, *Demetrius*, and others who flourished about the second Century, I shall only fix on those persons, who were famous Enquirers after Truth, and noted for excellency in Heathen Learning; yet these persons after all their enquiries found nothing to fix on but the Christian Faith, and valu'd no other discovery of Truth in comparison with that. Such was *Pantænus*, who as *Eusebius* tells us, was an excellent *Stoic* before he became a Christian, and was after so eminent a one, that in imitation of the Apostles he went into *India* to convert the Inhabitants to the Christian Faith, and at his return was made Rector of the School at *Alexandria*; which as the same Author tells us, was much frequented by such who were ἐν λόγῳ καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ τοῦ ἡνὸς ἀποδείκνυνται, *well skill'd in Human as well as Divine Learning*. How excellent *Pantænus* was in Human Learning, may appear in that *Origen* and *Hierome* both make his example their plea for their studying of it. After him succeeded *Clement Alexandrinus*, *Pantænus*'s Scholar, a person of great depth of learning and exquisitely skill'd in all Heathen Antiquities, as appears by his remaining Writings. The learning of *Origen* is sufficiently known, which was in such great reputation in his own time, that not only Christians but Philosophers flock'd to his Lectures at *Alexandria* as *Eusebius* tells us, wherein he read the *Mathematics*, and other parts of Philosophy as well as the Scriptures; and the same Author informs us that the Philosophers did dedicate their Books to him, and sometimes chose him as Arbitrator between them in matters of Dispute; and *Porphyry* himself in his Books against the Christians vouchsafed a high *Encomium* of *Origen* for his excellent Learning. In *Origen*'s time *Heraclas* a Presbyter of *Alexandria* for five years together frequented the Schools of the Philosophers, and put on the Philosophic pallium, βιβλία τε ἐκείνων καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν οὐ παύεται φιλολόγων, *and was very conversant in the Books of the Grecian Learning*. Besides these we read of *Pierius* and *Acchillas*

Justin. Dialogue. cum Trypho. p. 125. ed. Par.

Euseb. Hist. Eccl. l. 5. c. 10. Ibid. l. 6. c. 20.

Ibid. l. 6. c. 18.

Ibid. l. 6. c. 20.

Nicephor. Hist. Eccl. l. 6. c. 35. *chillas* two Presbyters of *Alexandria*, who were τῇ κατ' ἑκάστην παιδείᾳ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διδοικόμενοι, as *Nicephorus Calistus* speaks, *Persons well skilled in the Grecian Learning and Philosophy*. If from *Alexandria* we go to *Cæsarea*, there we not only meet with a School of learning among the Christians, but with persons very eminent in all kinds of learning; such were the famous *Pamphilus* and *Eusebius* so great an admirer of him, that ever since he is called *Eusebius Pamphili*. At *Antioch* was *Dorotheus* ἀνὴρ παντῶν λόγων καὶ παιδείας ἐλκόμενος, as *Nicephorus* speaks, a person versed in all kind of ingenious Literature. *Anatolius* Bishop of *Laodicea*, one versed in Geometry, *Astronomy*, and all kind of *Philosophy*, as well as the Doctrine of CHRIST. Thus we see how in those early days of the Greek Church what excellent persons many of those were who were zealous Professors of Christianity; and concerning those of the Latin Church, I shall only mention that Speech of St. *Austin* who was himself an instance of the same nature and a Star of the first magnitude among them. *Nonne aspicimus quanto auro & argento & veste suffarcinatus exierit de Ægypto Cyprianus Doctor suavissimus & Martyr beatissimus? quanto Lactantius? quanto Victorinus, Optatus, Hilarius? ut de vivis taceam: quanto innumerabiles Græci? quod prior ipse fidelissimus Dei servus Moses fecerat, de quo scriptum est, quod eruditus fuerit omni sapientia Ægyptiorum.* To whose Catalogue of learned persons, among the Latin Christians *Tertullian*, *Arnobius* and several others may be deservedly added. But as St. *Austin* there well observes, *tho' the Israelites went rich out of Ægypt, yet it was their eating the Passover which saved them from destruction; so tho' these were accomplished with those perfections and riches of the Soul, the ornaments of Learning, yet it was their eating the true Passover which was CHRIST, by their adhering to his Doctrine, was that which wou'd be of more advantage to them, than all their Accomplishments wou'd be.* Now then since in the first Ages of the Christian Church, we find not only innumerable multitudes of Persons of great Integrity and Sobriety in their Lives embracing the Doctrine of CHRIST, but so many Persons that were curious enquirers after the truth of things; we can certainly have no reason to distrust such a Testimony which was receiv'd in so unanimous a manner by persons as able to judge of the truth of things, and as fearful of being deceiv'd in reference to them as any now in the World can be.

- XIX. 2. As this Testimony was receiv'd by persons inquisitive after the Truth of things, so the Doctrine conveyed by it was a matter of the highest moment in the world: and therefore we cannot conceive but persons ordinarily inquisitive about other things wou'd be more than ordinarily so about this, because their eternal welfare and happiness did depend upon it. All Persons that are truly Religious, must at least be allow'd to be persons very inquisitive after the state and condition of their Souls when they shall be dislodged from their Bodies. And if we do but grant this, can we in any reason think that such a multitude of persons in so many Ages shou'd continue venturing their Souls upon a Testimony which they had no assurance of the truth of? And that none of all these persons, tho' Men otherwise Rational and Judicious, shou'd

thou'd be able to discover the Falsity of that Doctrine they went upon, if at least any upon consideration of it can imagine it to be so? It is not reconcilable with the general presumption of Human Nature concerning Divine Providence and the Care God takes of the welfare of Men, to suffer so many persons who sincerely desire to serve God in the way which is most pleasing to him, to go on in such a continual Delusion, and never have it at all discover'd to them. If all Men then who have believ'd the Doctrine of CHRIST to be the only way to Salvation have been deceiv'd, either we must deny altogether a Divine Providence, or say the Devil hath more power to deceive Men than God hath to direct them, which is worse than the former; or else assert that there are no such things at all as either God or Devils, but that all things come to pass by Chance and Fortune: and if so, it is still more inexplicable why such multitudes of rational and serious Men, and the most inquisitive part of the World as to such things shou'd all be so possess'd with the truth and certainty of these things; and the more prophane, wicked and ignorant any persons are, the more prone they are to mock and deride them. If such Men then see more into Truth and Reason than the sober and judicious part of Mankind, let us bid adieu to Humanity and adore the Brutes, since we admire their judgment most who come the nearest to them.

3. *The multitude of these persons thus consenting in this Testimony, could have no other engagements to this consent, but only their firm persuasion of the truth of the Doctrine conveyed by it; because those who unanimously agree in this thing are such persons, whose other designs and interests in this World differ as much as any Men's do. If it had been only a consent of the Jews, there might have been some probable pretence to have suspected a matter of Interest in it; but as to this thing, we find the Jews divided among themselves about it; and the stiffest deniers of the truth of it, do yet inviolably preserve those sacred Records among them, from which the Truth of the Doctrine of CHRIST may be undoubtedly prov'd. Had the Christian Religion been enforced upon the World by the Roman Emperors at the time of its first promulgation, there wou'd have been some suspicion of particular design in it; but it came with no other strength but the evidence of its own Truth; yet it found sudden and strange entertainment among persons of all Nations and Degrees of Men. In a short time it had eaten into the heart of the Roman Empire, and made so large a spread therein, that it made Tertullian say, *Hesterni sumus, & vestra omnia implevimus, urbes, insulas, castella, municipia, conciliabula, castra ipsa, tribus, decurias, palatium, senatum, forum; sola vobis relinquimus Tempia. We have but newly appeared, saith he, and yet we have filled all places with our Company, but only your Temples; and before speaking of the Heathens, Obsessam vociferantur civitatem, in agris, in castellis, in insulis Christianos, omnem sexum, ætatem, conditionem, etiam dignitatem transgredi ad hoc nomen quasi detrimento mærent. All sorts and conditions of Men in all places, were suddenly become Christians. What common tye cou'd there be now to unite all these persons together, if we set aside the undoubted truth and**

*Tertull.
Apol. c. 36.*

Ibid. c. 1.

certainly of the Doctrine of CHRIST which was first preached to them by such who were Eye-witnesses of CHRIST's Actions, and had left sacred Records behind them, containing the substance of the Doctrine of CHRIST, and those admirable Instructions which were their only certain Guides in the way to Heaven?

4. *Because many persons do join in this consent with true Christians, who yet could heartily wish that the Doctrine of Christianity were not true.* Such are all those persons who are sensual in their Lives, and walk not according to the Rules of the Gospel, yet dare not question or deny the Truth of it. Such who could heartily wish there were no future State, nor Judgment to come, that they might indulge themselves in this World without fear of another; yet their Consciences are so far convinced of, and aw'd by the truth of these things, that they raise many perplexities and anxieties in their Minds which they would most willingly be rid of; which they can never thoroughly be, till instead of having the name of Christians, they come to live the Life of Christians, and become experimentally acquainted with the Truth and Power of Religion. And withal we find that the more Men have been acquainted with the practice of Christianity, the greater Evidence they have had of the truth of it, and been more fully and rationally persuaded of it. To such I grant there are such powerful Evidences of the truth of the Doctrine of CHRIST by the effectual workings of the Spirit of God upon their Souls, that all other Arguments, as to their own satisfaction, may fall short of these. As to which, those Verses of the Poet *Dantes*, render'd into *Latin* by *F. S.* are very pertinent and significant; for when he had introduced the *Apostle Peter*, asking him what it was which his Faith was founded on, he answers,

*Deinde exiit ex luce profunda
Quæ illic splendebat pretiosa gemma,
Super quam omnis virtus fundatur.*

i. e. That God was pleas'd by immediate revelation of himself, to discover that Divine Truth to the World where our Faith doth stand as on its sure foundation; but when the *Apostle* goes on to enquire how he knew this at first came from God, his answer to that is,

— *larga pluvia
Spiritus Sancti, quæ est diffusa
Super veteres & super novas membranas,
Est syllogismus ille qui eam mihi conclusit
Adeo acute, ut præ illa demonstratione
Omnis demonstratio alia mihi videatur obtusa.*

i. e. That the Spirit of God doth so fully discover it self both in the Old and new Testament, that all other Arguments are but dull and heavy if compar'd with this. It is true they are so to a truly enlighten'd Conscience which discovers so much Beauty and Glory in the Scriptures, that they ravish the Soul, altho' it be unable to give so full an account of this unto others who want
the

the Eyes to see that Beauty with, which a Heart truly gracious hath. We see ordinarily in the World, that the attraction of Beauty is an unaccountable thing; and one may discern that which ravisheth him, which another looks on as mean and ordinary; and why may it not be much more thus in Divine objects which want Spiritual Eyes to discover them? Therefore I grant that good Men enjoy that satisfaction to their own Consciences, as to the truth of the Doctrine of CHRIST, which others cannot attain to; but yet I say, that such do likewise see the most strong, rational and convincing Evidence which doth induce them to believe; which Evidence is then most convincing, when it is seconded by the peculiar Energy of the Spirit of God upon the Souls of true Believers. But yet we see that the power and force of the truth of these things may be so great, even upon such Minds which are not yet moulded into the fashion of true Goodness, that it may awe with its light and clearness, where it doth not soften and alter by its heat and influence. Now whence can it be that such convictions should stick so fast in the Minds of those who would fain pull out those piercing arrows, but that there is a greater power in them than they are Masters of, and they cannot stand against the force whereby they come upon them; nor find any Salve to cure the wounds which are made within them, but by those weapons which were the causes of them? And therefore when wicked Persons under conflicts of Conscience, cannot ease themselves by direct *Atheism*, or finding reason to cast off such convictions by discerning any invalidity in the Testimony whereon the truth of these things depends, it is a certain Argument that there is abundant truth in that Testimony, when Men would fain persuade themselves to believe the contrary, and yet cannot.

5. The truth of this consent appears, *from the unanimity of it among those Persons who have yet strangely differ'd from each other in many controversies in Religion.* We see thereby this unanimity is no forced or design'd thing, because we see the Persons agreeing in this, do very much disagree from each other in other things. And the same grounds and reasons whereon they disagree as to other things, would have held as to these too, were there not greater evidence of the certainty of these things, than of those they fall out about. It hath not yet become a Question among those who differ so much about the sense of Scripture, whether the Scripture it self be the Word of GOD, altho' the very accounts on which we are to believe it to be so, hath been the subject of no mean Controversies. All the divided parts of the Christian World do yet fully agree in the matters of fact, viz. *That there was such a Person as JESUS CHRIST, and that he did many great Miracles, that he died on the Cross at Jerusalem, and rose again from the dead;* now these contain the great foundations of *Christian Faith*, and therefore the multitude of other Controversies in the World ought to be so far from weakning our Faith, as to the truth of the Doctrine of CHRIST (which Men of weak judgments and *Atheistical* Spirits pretend) that it ought to be a strong confirmation of it, when we see Persons which so peevishly quarrel with each other about some inferior and less weighty parts of Religion, do yet unanimously consent in the principal foundations of *Christian Faith*,

Faith, and such whereon the necessity of Faith and Obedience, as the way to Salvation, doth more immediately depend. And this may be one great Reason why the infinitely wise God may suffer such lamentable Contentions and Divisions to be in the Christian World; that thereby inquisitive Persons may see that if Religion had been a mere Delign of some few politic Persons, the quarrelsome World (where it is not held in by force) wou'd never have consented so long in the owning such common Principles which all the other Controversies are built upon. And altho' it be continually seen that in divided parties, one is apt to run from any thing which is receiv'd by the other, and Men generally think they can never run far enough from them whose Errors they have discover'd, that yet this Principle hath not carried any considerable party of the Christian World (out of their indignation against those great corruptions which have crept into the World under a pretence of Religion) to the disowning the foundation of *Christian Faith*, must be partly imputed to the signal hand of Divine Providence, and partly to those strong Evidences which there are of the truth of that Testimony which conveys to us the foundations of *Christian Faith*. Thus we see now, how great and uncontrouled this consent is, as to the matters of fact deliver'd down from the eye-witnesses of them, concerning the Actions and Miracles of our Blessed Savior, (which are contain'd in the Scriptures as authentic Records of them,) and what a sure foundation there is for a firm assent to the truth of the things from so universal and uninterrupted a Tradition.

xx. Thus far we have now manifested the necessity of the Miracles of CHRIST, in order to the propagation of *Christianity* in the World, from the consideration of the Persons who were to propagate it in the World; the next thing we are to consider, is, the admirable success which the Gospel met with in the World upon its being preached to it: Of which no rational account can be given, unless the Actions and Miracles of our Savior were most undoubtedly true. That the Gospel of CHRIST had very strange and wonderful success upon its first preaching, hath been partly discover'd already, and is withal so plain from the long continuance of it in these *European* parts, that none any ways conversant in the History of former Ages, can have any ground to question it. But that this strange and admirable success of the Doctrine of CHRIST shou'd be an Evidence of the truth of it, and the Miracles wrought in confirmation of it, will appear from these two Considerations. 1. *That the Doctrine it self was so directly contrary to the general inclinations of the World.* 2. *That the propagation of it was so much opposed by all worldly power.*

1. *That the Doctrine it self was so opposite to the general inclinations of the World.* The Doctrine may be consider'd either as to its *credenda*, or matters of Faith, or as to its *agenda*, or matters of Life and Practice; both these were contrary to the inclinations of the World; the former seem'd hard and incredible, the latter harsh and impossible.

1. The Matters of Faith which were to be believ'd by the World, were not such things which we may imagin the vulgar sort of Men wou'd be very forward to run after, nor very greedy to embrace.

1. Be-

1. *Because contrary to the Principles of their Education, and the Religion they were brought up in;* the generality of Mankind is very tenacious of those Principles and Prejudices which are sucked in in the time of Infancy. There are some Religions one would think it were impossible that any rational Men should believe them; but only on this account, because they are bred up under them. It is a very great advantage any Religion hath against another, that it comes to speak first, and thereby insinuates such an apprehension of its self to the Mind, that it is very hard removing it afterwards. The Understanding seems to be of the nature of those things which are *communis juris*, and therefore *primi sunt possidentis*; when an Opinion hath once got possession of the Mind, it usually keeps out whatever comes to disturb it. Now we cannot otherwise conceive but all those Persons who had been bred up under *Paganism* and the most gross Idolatry, must needs have a very potent Prejudice against such a Doctrine which was wholly irreconcilable with that Religion which they had been devoted to. Now the stronger the Prejudice is which is convey'd into Mens Minds by the force of Education, the greater strength and power must there needs be in the Gospel of CHRIST, which did so easily demolish these strong holds, and captivate the Understandings of Men to the obedience of CHRIST. To which purpose *Arnobius* excellently speaks in these words to the Heathens; *Sed non creditis gesta hæc. Sed qui ea conspicati sunt fieri & sub oculis suis viderunt agi, testes optimi certissimique auctores, & crediderunt hæc ipsi, & credenda posteris nobis haud exilibus cum approbationibus tradiderunt. Quinam isti fortasse quæritis? gentes, populi, nationes & incredulum illud genus humanum. Quod nisi aperta res esset, & luce ipsa quemadmodum dicitur clarior, nunquam rebus hujusmodi credulitatis suæ commodarent assensum. An nunquid dicemus illius temporis homines usque adeo fuisse vanos, mendaces, stolidos, brutos, ut quæ nunquam viderant vidisse se fingerent? & quæ facta omnino non erant falsis proderent testimoniis aut puerili assertionem firmarent? Cumque possent vobiscum & unanimiter vivere, & inoffensas ducere conjunctiones, gratuita susciperent odia & execrabili haberentur in nomine? Quod si falsa ut dicitis, historia illa rerum est, unde tam brevi tempore totus mundus ista religione completus est? Aut in unam coire qui potuerunt mentem gentes regionibus diffusæ, ventis cælique convexionibus dimotæ? Asseverationibus illectæ sunt nudis, inductæ in spes cassas, & in pericula capitis immittere se sponte temeraria desperatione voluerunt, cum nihil tale viderent quod eas in hos cultus novitatis suæ possit excitare miraculo. Imo quia hæc omnia ab ipso cernebant geri & ab ejus præconibus qui per orbem totum missi beneficia patris & munera sanandis animis hominibusque portabant, veritatis ipsius vi victæ, & dederunt se Deo, nec in magnis posuere dispendiis membra vobis projicere, & viscera sua lanianda præbere.* The substance of whose Discourse is, that it is impossible to suppose so many Persons of so many Nations to be so far besotted and infatuated, as not only to believe a Religion to be true which was contrary to that they were educated in, but to venture their Lives as well as Estates upon it, had it not been discover'd to them in a most certain and infallible way by such who had been eye-witnesses of the Actions and Miracles of

*Arnobius
contr. gentes
l. i.*

ibid. lib. 2. p. 44. CHRIST and his *Apostles*. And as he elsewhere speaks, *Vel hæc salutem fidem vobis faciant argumenta credendi, quod jam per omnes terras in tam brevi tempore & parvo immensi nominis hujus sacramenta diffusa sunt; quod nulla jam natio est tam barbari moris, & mansuetudinem nesciens, quæ non ejus amore versa molliuerit asperitatem suam, & in placidos sensus assumpta tranquillitate migraverit; quod tam magnis ingeniis præditi Oratores, Grammatici, Rhetores, Consulti juris ac Medici, Philosophia etiam secreta rimantes, magisteria hæc expetunt, spretis quibus paulo ante fidebant, &c.* Will not this persuade the World what firm foundations the Faith of *Christians* stands on, when in so short a time it is spread over all parts of the World? that by it the most inhuman and barbarous Nations are softn'd into more than civility? That Men of the greatest Wits and Parts, *Orators, Grammarians, Rhetoricians, Lawyers, Physicians, Philosophers*, who not? have forsaken their former sentiments, and adhered to the Doctrine of CHRIST. Now, I say, if the power of Education be so strong upon the Minds of Men to persuade them of the truth of the Religion they are bred up under, (which *Atheistically* dispos'd Persons make so much advantage of,) this is so far from weakning the truth of *Christianity*, that it proves a great confirmation of it, because it obtain'd so much upon its first Preaching in the World, notwithstanding the highest prejudices from Education were against it. If then Men be so prone to believe that to be most true, which they have been educated under, it must argue a more than ordinary Evidence and Power in that Religion which unsettles so much the Principles of Education, as to make Men not only question the truth of them, but to renounce them, and embrace a Religion contrary to them.

XXI. Especially when we withal consider what strong holds these Principles of Education were back'd with among the *Heathens*, when the Doctrine of CHRIST was first divulg'd among them, *i. e.* what plausible pretences they had of continuing in the Religion which they were brought up in, and why they shou'd not exchange it for *Christianity*; and those were,

Tertull. ad Nat. l. 1. cap. 10. Symmach. ep. l. 10. ep. 61. Liban. orat. de Templis. 1. *The pretended Antiquity of their Religion above the Christian*; the main thing pleaded against the *Christians* was *divortium ab institutis majorum*, that they thought themselves wiser than their Fore-fathers; and *Symmachus, Lybanus*, and others, plead this most in behalf of *Paganism*; *servanda est tot sæculis fides, & sequendi sunt nobis parentes qui secuti sunt feliciter suos*; their Religion pleaded Prescription against any other, and they were resolv'd to follow the steps of their Ancestors wherein they thought themselves happy and secure. *Cecilius* in *Minutius Felix* first argues much against dogmatizing in Religion, but withal says it most becomes a lover of truth, *Majorum excipere disciplinam, religiones traditas colere, deos quos a parentibus ante imbutus es timere; nec de naminibus ferre sententiam, sed prioribus credere.* So *Arnobius* tells us the main thing objected against the *Christians* was *novellam esse religionem nostram, & ante dies natam propemodum paucos, neque vos potuisse antequam & patriam relinquere, & in barbaros ritus peregrinosque traduci.* And *Cotta* in *Tully* long before laid this down as the main Principle of *Pagan Religion*, *majoribus*

Arnob. contra gentes l. 2. p. 90.
Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 3.

majoribus nostris etiam nulla ratione reddita credere, to believe the Tradition of our Fathers, altho' there be no evidence in reason for it: And after he had discover'd the vanity of the Stoical Arguments about Religion, concludes with this as the only thing he resolv'd his Religion into, *Mihi unum satis erit, majores nostros ita tradidisse, It is enough for me that it comes by tradition from our Fore-fathers.* Lactantius fully sets forth the manner of pleading us'd by the Heathens against the Christians, in point of Antiquity. *Hæ sunt religiones quas sibi à majoribus suis traditas, pertinacissime tueri ac defendere perseverant; nec considerant quales sint, sed ex hoc probatas atque veras esse confidunt, quod eas veteres tradiderunt; tantaque est auctoritas vetustatis, ut inquirere in eam scelus esse dicatur.* The English is, They accounted Tradition infallible, and knew no other way whereby to find the truth of Religion but by its conveyance from their Fore-fathers. How like herein do they speak to those who contend for the corruptions crept into the Christian Church? who make use of the same pretences for them, viz. that they were deliver'd down from the Fathers; *tantaque est auctoritas vetustatis, ut inquirere in eam scelus esse dicatur; who are we who will see further than Antiquity?* But it is no wonder if Antiquity be accompany'd with dimness of sight; and so it was undoubtedly as to the Pagan World; and as to the Christian too, when such a mixture of Heathenism came into it. And the very same Arguments by which the pleaders for Christianity did justify the truth of their Religion, notwithstanding this pretended Antiquity, will with equal force hold for a Reformation of such inveterate abuses, which under a pretence of Antiquity, have crept into the Christian Church. *Nullus pudor est ad meliora transire, saith Ambrose in his Answer to Symmachus, what shame is it to grow better? Quid facies? saith Lactantius, majoresne potius an rationem sequeris? Si rationem mavis, discedere te necesse est ab institutis & auctoritate majorum: quoniam id solum rectum est, quod ratio præscribit. Sin autem pietas majores sequi suadet: fateris igitur & stultos illos esse qui excogitatis contra rationem religionibus servierint; & te ineptum qui id colas quod falsum esse conviceris.* Where Reason and mere Authority of Fore-fathers stand in competition, he is more a Child than a Man that knows not on which side to give his Suffrage. But with the greatest strength, and clearest reason Arnobius speaks in this case. *Itaque cum nobis intenditis aversionem à Religione priorum, causam convenit ut inspiciatis, non factum; nec quid reliquerimus opponere, sed secuti quid simus potissimum contueri.* When you charge us, saith he, that we are revolted from the Religion of our Fore-fathers, you ought not presently to condemn the fact, but to examine the reasons of it; neither ought you so much to look at what we have left, as what it is we have embraced. *Nam si mutare sententiam culpa est ulla vel crimen, & à veteribus institutis in alias res novas voluntatesque migrare, criminatio ista & vos spectat, qui toties vitam consuetudinemque mutastis; qui in mores alios, atque alios ritus priorum condemnatione transistis.* If mere departing from the Religion of our Ancestors be the great fault, all those who own themselves to be Christians, were themselves guilty of it when they revolted from Heathenism. If it be here said that the case is different, because there was suffi-

Lactant. de
orig. Error.
l. 2. c. 6.

Ambros.
ep. c. Sym-
mach.
Lactant. de
orig. Error.
l. 2. c. 6.

Arnobius
contr. gent.
l. 2.

cient reason for it, which there is not as to the corruptions of the *Christian Church*; if so, then all the dispute is taken off from the matter of fact, or the revolt to the causes inducing to it; and if the *Protestant* be not able as to the causes of our Separation from *Rome* to manifest that they were sufficient, let him then be triumph'd over by the *Romanist*, and not before. I assert then, and that with much assurance of Mind, that the Principles of the Reformation are justifiable upon the same grounds of Reason, which the embracing *Christianity* was, when Men of *Heathens* became *Christians*; and that the Arguments made use of by the *Romanists* against our Separation from them, are such as wou'd have justify'd a *Pagan* Philosopher in not embracing *Christianity*. For if it be unlawful for any party of Men, to divide from others in a matter of Religion which pretends Antiquity and Universality, it had been unlawful for a Philosopher to have deserted *Paganism*, as well as for a *Protestant* to depart from *Rome*. For according to the Principles of the *Romanists*, the judgment in the cause of the Separation, and of the truth of Religion lies in that party from which we depart; if we do now but apply this to the old *Roman* Senate or Emperors in the case of *Christian Religion*, and dividing from *Heathen* Worship, we shall quickly see how easy a matter it will be to make *Christianity* it self a Schism, and the Doctrine of CHRIST the greatest Heresy. But as strong as those pretences were then, or have been since, the power of the Doctrine of CHRIST hath been so great, as to conquer them, and thereby to manifest, that it was of God, when such potent Prejudices were not able to withstand it. Of which *Antiquity* is the first.

Minut. in
Octav. p. 6.

2. *The large and universal spread of Pagan Religion*, when *Christianity* came into the World: there was never so great *Catholicism*, as in *Heathen* Worship, when the *Apostles* first appear'd in the *Gentile* World. *Inde adeo per universa imperia, provincias, oppida, videmus singulos sacrorum ritus gentiles habere, & Deos colere municipes*, saith *Cecilius* in *Minutius Felix*. The great charge against the *Christians* was *Novellism*, that they brought in a strange and unheard of Religion. The common Question was, *Where was your Religion before Jesus of Nazareth?* as it has been since, *Where was your Religion before Luther?* and the same answer which serv'd then, will stand unmovable now, *There where no other Religion is, in the Word of God*. For this was the weapon whereby the *Primitive Christians* defended themselves against the assaults of *Paganism*, and the Evidences they brought that the Doctrine preach'd by them, and contain'd in the Scriptures, was originally from God, were the only means of overthrowing *Paganism*, notwithstanding its pretended Universality.

Tertull.
Apol. c. 38.

3. *Settlement by Laws of Heathen Worship*. This was so much pretended and pleaded for, that as far as we can find, by the History of the *Primitive Church*, the pretence on which the *Christians* suffer'd, was Sedition, and opposing the establish'd Laws. The *Christians* were reckon'd *inter illicitas factiones*, as appears by *Tertullian*, among *Unlawful Corporations*; the Politicians and Statesmen were all for preserving the Laws; they troubled not themselves much about any Religion, but only That which was settled by Law they sought to uphold, because the acting contrary to it might

might bring some disturbance to the civil State. There were several Laws which the *Christians* were then brought under, and condemn'd for the breach of. 1. The Law against *Hæterie*, or *Conventicles*, as they were pleas'd frequently to stile the Meeting of *Christians* together; thence the places where the *Christians* assembled for worship, were commonly call'd *Conventicula*; *Ita appellabant loca*, saith *Heraldus*, *ubi congregabantur Christiani oraturi, & verbi divini interpretationem accepturi, ac sacras Synaxes habituri*: but *Elmenhorstius* more shortly; *Conventicula loca sunt ubi Christiani congregati orare consueverunt*. The places where the *Christians* did meet and pray together, were call'd *Conventicles*: in *Basilica Sicinini ubi ritus Christiani est conventiculum*, saith *Ammianus Marcellinus*; *cur immaniter conventicula dirui?* saith *Arnobius*; *qui universum populum cum ipso pariter conventiculo concremavit*, as *Lactantius* likewise speaks. Now the reason of the Name was, because the Heathens judg'd these Assemblies of *Christians* to be illegal Societies. For which we are to understand; that in the time of the *Roman* Emperors, when they grew suspicious of their own safety, they severely prohibited all those *Sodalitia*, or Societies and Colleges, which were very much in use in the *Roman* Commonwealth, in imitation of the *troupe* in the Cities of *Greece*. These were such Societies of Persons, which voluntarily confederated together either for some particular design, or for preserving Love and Friendship among each other, and thence had their frequent Meetings in common together. Now the more numerous these were, and the more closely they confederated, the more jealous Eye the *Roman* Emperors had upon them, because of some Clandestine design, which they suspected might be carried on for disturbance of the public Peace in such suspicious Meetings. Thence came out many particular Edicts of the Emperors against all such kinds of Societies.

Now when the *Christians* began to be somewhat numerous, and had according to the Principles of their Religion frequent Assemblies for Divine worship, and did confederate together by such Symbols, of being washed with water, and eating and drinking together (which was all the Heathens apprehended by their use of Baptism, and the Lord's Supper) the Proconsuls and other Magistrates in their several Provinces bring the *Christians* under these Edicts, and so punish'd them for the breach of the Laws. Which as appears by *Pliny's* Epistle to *Trajan* was the only account on which the wiser Heathens did proceed against the *Christians*; for we see he troubled not himself much about the Truth and Evidence of *Christian* Religion, but such Persons were brought before him; and after he had Interrogated them whether they were *Christians*, or no, several times, if they persisted, he then punish'd them, not so much for their Religion, as for their obstinacy and contempt of Authority. For so much is imply'd in those words of his, *Neque enim dubitabam, qualecunque esset quod faterentur, pervicaciam certe, & inflexibilem obstinationem debere puniri*: That whatever their Religion was, their obstinacy and disobedience deserved punishment. That which the *Christians* now pleaded for themselves, why they shou'd not be reckon'd among the Factions of the People, was that which they gave to *Pliny*, that all their fault

Herald. Observat. in Arnob. l. 4.

Am. Marc. Hist. l. 27. Arnob. l. 4. Lactant. l. 5. c. 11.

Plin. Epist. l. 10. ep. 97.

was, *Quod essent soliti stato die ante lucem convenire, carmenque Christo quasi Deo dicere secum invicem; seque sacramento non in scelus aliquod obstringere, sed ne furta, ne latrocinia, ne adulteria committerent, ne fidem fallerent, ne depositum appellati abnegarent.* That they were wont upon their solemn days to meet together for Divine Worship, and to covenant with each other only for the practice of those things which were as much for the good of Mankind as their own, viz. that they would not wrong and defraud others, as to their Bodies or Estates. And Tertullian approves of the Law against Factions, as *de providentia & modestia publica, ne civitas in partes scinderetur*, as wisely intended to prevent Seditions; but withal pleads, that the Society of Christians cou'd not be reckon'd *inter illicitas factiones*; for, saith he, *hæc coitio Christianorum merito sane illicita, si illicitis par; merito dammanda si quis de ea queritur eotitulo quo de factionibus querela est. In cujus perniciem aliquando convenimus? Hoc sumus congregati quod & dispersi; hoc universi quod & singuli; neminem lædentes, neminem contristantes; quumprobi, quumboni coeunt, quumpii, quumcasti congregantur, non est factio dicenda sed curia.* If, saith he, the Societies of Christians were like others, there might be some reason to condemn them, under the head of Factions: but as long as we meet together for no Man's injury, that whether divided, or assembled, we are still the same, that we grieve and injure no body; when such a company of good Men meet together, it is rather a Council than a Faction.

Tertull.
Apol. c. 38.

Euseb. l. 6.
Eccles. hist.
cap. 19.

Tertull.
Apol. c. 4.

Euseb. Eccl.
hist. l. 7.
c. 11.

Act. 17. 18.
19. 27.

2. Another Law the Christians were brought under, was, That against Innovations in Religion; thence it was laid so much to the charge of the Christians, that they did *ἐν ὁμοίᾳ*, go contrary to the establish'd Law; as Porphyry said of Origen, because he was a Christian, he did *ἑταίριος ἐν τῇ ὁμοίᾳ*; and when he speaks of Ammonius revolting from Christianity to Paganism, *ἐκ τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου πολιτείας μεταβάλλει*, he turn'd to the way of Life, which was agreeable to the establish'd Laws. Now Christianity was every where look'd on as a great Innovation, infomuch that the Christians were accused to be *legum, morum, nature inimici*, as Enemies to Mankind as well as the Laws, because they drew Men off from that way of Religion which Mankind had generally agreed in. Thence *Æmilianus* the Præfect of Egypt, when he bids the Christians return to Paganism, he us'd these Expressions, *ἐπὶ τὸ κοινὸν φέρον ἡμεῖς ἐπιλαβόμεθα δὲ τὸ κοινὸν φέρον*, to return to the common sense of Mankind, and to forget what was so much against it, as he suppos'd Christianity to be. When Paul preached at Athens, his first Accusation was, that he was a Preacher of strange Deities, because he preached to them Jesus and the Resurrection. And Demetrius at Ephesus knew no such potent Argument against Paul, as that his Religion destroyed the worship of Diana, whom all Asia and the world worship. So that the Primitive Christians were then accounted the Antipodes to the whole World, on which account they were so severely dealt with; most Common-wealths observing the counsel of *Mecenas* to Augustus, in Dio, to be sure to have a watchful eye upon all Innovations in Religion, because they tend so much to the disturbance of the Civil State.

3. The Law of Sacrilege. Thence *Lactantius* calls their Laws, *Constitu-*

Constitutione Sacrilegæ. Quin etiam sceleratissimi homicidæ contra pios jura impia condiderunt; nam & constitutiones Sacrilegæ, & disputationes Jurisperitorum leguntur injustæ; and as he tells us, *Domitius Ulpianus* had collected all those *Rescripta nefaria* together, which concern'd the Christians; from hence it was, Christianity by *Pliny*, is called *amentia*, by *Tacitus* *exitiabilis superstitio*, by *Suetonius* *superstitio nova & exitiabilis*; so much did these three great Men agree, in condemning the best Religion in the World for madness, and new, and detestable Superstition; the ground of the great pique was, the enmity declar'd by Christians against the Idolatrous Temples, and Worship of the Heathens.

4. The Law against Treason; for sometimes they proceeded so high, as to accuse the Christians *lese Majestatis*, and thence they are commonly called *publici hostes*, enemies to all civil Government. Which they inferred from hence: 1. *Because they would not sacrifice for the Emperor's safety; Ideo committimus*, saith *Tertullian*, in *Majestatem Imperatorum, quia illos non subjicimus rebus suis; Quia non ludimus de officio salutis eorum, qui eam non putamus in manibus esse plumbatis*. The Accusation for Treason lay in their refusing to supplicate the Idols for the Emperor's welfare. 2. *Because they would not swear by the Emperor's Genius*. Thence *Saturnius* said to the Martyr, *Tantum jura per genium Caesaris nostri*, if he wou'd but swear by the Genius of *Cæsar*, he shou'd be sav'd. Yet tho' they refus'd to swear by the Emperor's Genius, they did not refuse to testify their Allegiance, and to swear by the Emperor's safety. *Sed & juramus*, saith *Tertullian*, *sicut non per genios Caesarum, ita per salutem eorum quæ est augustior omnibus geniis*. 3. *Because they would not worship the Emperors as Gods*; which was then grown a common Custom. *Non enim Deum Imperatorem dicam, vel quia mentiri nescio, vel quia illum deridere non audeo, vel quia nec ipse se Deum volet dici si homo sit*, as the same Author speaks. Nay the Primitive Christians were very scrupulous of calling the Emperor *Dominus*, *hoc enim Dei est cognomen*, because the name LORD was an Attribute of God's, and apply'd as his name to him in Scripture. The reason of this scrupulosity was not, from any question they made of the Sovereignty of Princes, or their obligation to obedience to them, (which they are very free in the acknowledgment of,) but from a jealousy and just suspicion that something of Divine honour might be imply'd in it, when the Adoration of Princes was grown a Custom. Therefore *Tertullian* to prevent mis-understandings, saith, *Dicam plane Imperatorem Dominum, sed more Communi, sed quando non cogor ut Dominum Dei vice dicam*. They refus'd not the name in a common sense, but as it imply'd Divine honour.

5. *Because they would not observe the public Festivals* of the Emperor's in the way that others did, which it seems were observed with abundance of Looseness and Debauchery by all sorts of Persons; and as *Tertullian* smartly says, *Malorum morum licentia pietas erit; & occasio luxuriæ religio deputabitur?* Debauchery is accounted a piece of Loyalty, and Intemperance a part of Religion. Which made the Christians rather hazard the reputation of their

Lactans.
l. 5. c. 11.Tacit. An.
l. 15. Sueton. in Nerone.
Plin. Ep. l. 10. ep. 97.Tertull.
Apol. 27.
c. 35.

Ibid. c. 29.

Herald. in
Tertull.
Apol. cap. 29.Tertull.
Apol. c. 32.

Ibid. c. 33.

Ibid. c. 34.

Ibid. c. 35.

Tertull.
cap. 38.

their Loyalty, than bear a part in so much Rudeness as was then us'd, and thence they abhorred all the solemn spectacles of the Romans; *Nihil est nobis*, saith the same Author, *dictu, visu, auditu, cum insania Circi, cum impudicitia Theatri, cum atrocitate arenae, cum Xysti vanitate*. They had nothing to do either with the madness of the Cirque, or the immodesty of the Theatre, or the cruelty of the Amphitheatre, or the vanity of the public Wrestlings. We see then what a hard Province the Christians had, when so many Laws were laid as Bird-lime in their way to catch them, that it was impossible for them to profess themselves Christians, and not to run into a *præmunire* by their Laws. And therefore it cannot be conceiv'd that many out of affection of Novelty shou'd then declare themselves Christians, when so great hazards were run upon the professing of it. Few soft-spirited Men, and lovers of their own ease, but wou'd have found some fine distinctions and nice evacuations to have reconcil'd themselves to the public Laws by such things which the Primitive Christians so unanimously refus'd, when tending to Prophaneness or Idolatry. And from this discourse we cannot but conclude with the Apostle Paul, *That the weapons* whereby the Apostles and Primitive Christians *encountred the Heathen world, were not fleshly or weak*, but exceeding strong and powerful, in that they obtain'd so great a conquest over the Imaginations and carnal Reasonings of Men (which were their strong holds they secur'd themselves in) as to make them readily to forsake their Heathen worship, and become chearful Servants to CHRIST. Thus we see the power of the Doctrine of CHRIST, which prevail'd over the Principles of Education, tho' back'd with pretended Antiquity, Universality, and Establishment by civil Laws.

2. Cor. 10.
4 5.

xxii.

1 Cor. 2.
14.

But this will further appear if we consider that not only the matters of Faith were contrary to the Principles of Education, but because many of them seem'd incredible to Men's natural Reason; that we cannot think Persons wou'd be over-forward to believe such things. Every one being so ready to take any advantage against a Religion which did so little flatter corrupt Nature either as to its power or capacity; insomuch that those who preached this Doctrine, declar'd openly to the World, that such Persons who wou'd judge of the Christian Doctrine, by such principles which mere natural Reason did proceed upon (such one I suppose it is whom the Apostle calls *λογισμῶν ἀνθρώπων*, one that own'd nothing but natural Reason, whereby to judge of Divine Truths) cou'd not entertain matters of Faith, or of Divine Revelation, because such things wou'd seem but folly to him that own'd no higher principle than Philosophy, or that did not believe any Divine Inspiration; neither can such a one know them, because a Divine Revelation is the only way to come to a thro' understanding of them: and a person who doth not believe such a Divine Revelation, it is impossible he shou'd be a competent judge of the truth of the Doctrine of CHRIST. So that the only ground of receiving the Doctrine of the Gospel is upon a Divine Revelation, that God himself by his Son and his Apostles, hath reveal'd these deep Mysteries to the World, on which account it is we are bound

to

to receive them, altho' they go beyond our reach and comprehension. But we see generally in the Heathen World how few of those did believe the Doctrine of CHRIST in comparison, who were the great admirers of the Philosophy, and way of Learning which was then cry'd up: the reason was, because Christianity not only contain'd far deeper Mysteries than any they were acquainted with, but deliver'd them in such a way of Authority, commanding them to believe the Doctrine they preached on the account of the Divine Authority of the Revealers of it. Such a way of proposal of Doctrines to the World the Philosophy of the *Greeks* was unacquainted with, which on that account they derided, as not being suited to the exact method which their Sciences proceeded in. No doubt had the Apostles come among the *Greeks* *ἐν μακρῇ πομπῇ*, with a great deal of pomp and ostentation, and had fed Mens curiosities with vain and unnecessary Speculations, they might have had as many Followers among the *Greeks* for their sakes, as CHRIST had among the *Jews* for the sake of the Loaves. But the matters of the Gospel being more of inward worth and moment, than of outward pomp and shew, the vain and empty *Greeks* presently find a quarrel with the manner of proposing them, that they came not in a way of clear demonstration, but stood so much upon Faith as soon as they were deliver'd. Thence *Celsus* and *Galen* think they have reason enough to reject the Laws of *Moses* and CHRIST, because *Celsus* calls them *ἰσχυροὶ ἀναισθητικοὶ*, *Galen* Christianity *ἀσθενὴς ἀναισθητικὴ*, that they were such Doctrines which require Faith and Obedience, without giving Mens reason an account of the things commanded. As tho' the Authority of a Legislator sufficiently manifested, were not enough to enforce a Law, unless a sufficient account were given of the thing requir'd to the purblind Reason of every individual Person acted by passions and private interests, as to the Justice and Equity of it. And so the primary obligation on Man's part to Faith and Obedience, must arise not from the evidence of Divine Authority, but of the thing it self which is reveal'd, to the most partial judgment of every one to whom it is propos'd. Which those who know how short the stock of Reason is at the best in Men, and how easily that which is, is fashion'd and moulded according to prejudices and interests already entertain'd, will look upon only as a design to comply with the carnal desires of Men, in that thereby none shall be bound to go any further, than this blind and corrupted Guide shall lead them. Now these being the terms on which the Gospel of CHRIST must have expected entertainment in the *Gentile* World, how impossible had it been ever to have found any success among Men, had there not been sufficient Evidence given by a power of Miracles, that however strange and incredible the Doctrine might seem, yet it was to be believ'd, because there was sufficient means to convince Men that it was of Divine Revelation.

Orig. l. 1.
c. Cels.
Gal. de diff.
puls. lib. 2.
c. 4.

Neither were the matters of Faith only contrary to the inclinations of the World, but so were the precepts of Life, or those things in Christianity which concern'd practice. There are two things which are the main scope and design of Christianity in reference to Mens Lives, and to take them off from their Sins, and

E e

from

xxiii.

from the World; and of all things these are they which Mens hearts are so bewitch'd with. Now the precepts of the Gospel are such which require the greatest *purity of heart and life*, which call upon Men to *deny themselves, and all ungodliness, and wordly lusts, and to live soberly, and righteously, and godly in this present world*; that, *all that name the name of Christ must depart from iniquity*; that, *all true Christians must be cleansed from all filthiness of flesh and spirit, and must perfect holiness in the fear of God*. And the Gospel inforceth these precepts of Holiness with the most terrible Denunciations of the wrath of God on those who disobey them; that, *the Lord Jesus Christ shall be revealed from Heaven with his mighty Angels in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the Gospel of Jesus Christ*. That, *the wrath of God is revealed from Heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness*. That, no persons who live in the habitual practice of any known sin, *shall inherit the Kingdom of God*. That, *no man should deceive them with vain words, for because of these things comes the wrath of God upon the Children of disobedience*; that Men do but vainly flatter themselves when they seek to reconcile unholy Lives with the hopes of future Happiness, for *without holiness no man shall see the Lord*. And then in reference to the things of this present Life which Men busie themselves so much about, the Gospel declares, that *they who love this world, the love of the Father is not in them*; that, *the friendship of this world is enmity with God*; and *whosoever will be a friend of the world is an enemy to God*: That *Christians must not set their affections on Earth, but on the things in Heaven*; That *the conversation of true Christians is in Heaven*. That, we ought not to *lay up our treasure on Earth, but in Heaven*; That, *we must not look at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen*; for *the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal*. Now the whole design of the Doctrine of CHRIST being to persuade Men to lead a Holy and Heavenly Life while they are in this World, and thereby to *be made meet to be partakers of the inheritance with the Saints in light*, can we think so many Men whose hearts were wedded to Sin, and the World, cou'd so suddenly be brought off from both without a Divine Power accompanying that Doctrine which was preached to them? And therefore the Apostle saith, *in Amixutepet n vishlam F xxiu. I am not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ*; i. e. tho' the Gospel of CHRIST be the only true Mystery, yet I do not by it as the Heathens are wont to do with their famous *Ekusinian* Mysteries, which were kept so secret by all the *Myste* and *iduvay*; but saith he, *I know no reason I have to be ashamed of any thing in the Gospel, that I should labour its concealment to advance its veneration*; but the more public the Gospel is, the more it manifests its power; for thro' it God is pleas'd mightily to work, in order to the Salvation both of *Jew and Gentile*. And of all the success of the Gospel, that upon the Hearts and Lives of Men deserves the greatest consideration.

The

The great Efficacy and Power of the Gospel was abundantly seen in that great alteration which it wrought in all those who were the hearty embracers of it. The Philosophers did very frequently and deservedly complain of the great inefficacy of all their Moral Precepts upon the minds of Men, and that by all their Instructions, *politiora non meliora, ingenia fiunt*, Men improv'd more in Knowledg than Godness; but now Christianity not only inforced Duties on Men with greater Power and Authority: For the Scriptures do, as Saint *Austin* speaks, *Non tanquam ex Philosophorum concertationibus strepere, sed tanquam ex oraculis & Dei nubibus intonare*, not make some obstreperous clamors, like those tinkling Cymbals, the Philosophers, but awe the Souls of Men with the Majesty of that God from whom they came. Neither was it only a great and empty sound which was heard in the Preaching of the Gospel; but when God thundered therein, he broke down the stately Cedars and shook the Wilderness, and made the Hinds to calve, (as it is said of Thunder, call'd the *Voice of the Lord* in Scripture,) he humbl'd the Pride of Men, unsetled the Gentile World from its former foundations, and wrought great alterations on all those who hearkened to it. The whole design of the Gospel is couched in those words which Saint *Paul* tells us were spoken to him by CHRIST himself, when he appointed him to be an Apostle, *to open Mens eyes, and to turn them from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God, that they may receive forgiveness of sins; and inheritance among them which were sanctified by faith in Christ*. And the efficacy of this Doctrine in order to these great ends, was abundantly seen in the preaching of that Apostle, who was so instrumental in converting the World to piety and sobriety, as well as to the Doctrine of *Christ*. What strange Persons were the *Corinthians* before they became *Christians*! for when the Apostle had enumerated many of the vilest Persons of the World, he presently adds, *And such were some of you; but ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the spirit of our God*. The more dangerous the distemper is, the more malignant its nature; the more inveterate its continuance, the greater the Efficacy of the remedy which works a cure of it. The power of Grace is the more seen in conversion, the greater the sins have been before it. It is an easy matter in comparison to remove a disease at its first on-set, of what it is to cure it when it becomes Chronical. The power of the Gospel wrought upon all sorts and kinds of Persons, to manifest to the World there was no distemper of Men's Souls so great, but there was a possibility of a Remedy for it; and not only so, but pregnant and visible instances were given of the Power and Efficacy of it. For they themselves shew of us, saith the Apostle, *what manner of entering in we had among you, and how ye turned to God from Idols, to serve the living and true God; and to wait for his Son from Heaven, whom he raised from the dead, even JESUS, which delivered us from the wrath to come*. Now that which manifests the exceeding great power and excellency of the Gospel, was, that it not only turn'd Men from one way of worship to another, which is a matter of no great difficulty, but that it turn'd Men together with that from their Lusts and Sensuality, to a holy and unblameable

August. de Civit. Dei, l. 2. c. 19.

Psal. 29. 5. 8. 9.

Act. 26. 18.

1 Cor. 6. 10. 11.

1 Thess. 1. 9. 10.

E e 2

Life.

Life. For Men being more in love with their Sins, than with their Opinions, it must needs be a greater power which draws Men from the practice of habitual Sins, than that which only makes them change their Opinions, or alter the way of worship they were brought up in. This is that which *Origen* throughout his Books against *Celsus* triumphs in as the most signal Evidence of a Divine power in the Doctrine of CHRIST, that it wrought so great an alteration on all that truly embraced it, that of vicious, debauched, and dissolute, it made them temperate, sober, and religious, in

Origen.

c. Celsus,

l. 2. p. 78,

85. lib. 1.

p. 21.

θεοφύλατος ἀνθρώπων παρεστὶ δὴ καὶ χρίστος τῶν κακῶν, ἐπὶ τῷ κατὰ φύσιν μὲν ἐκφραζόμενος καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀρετῶν βίον. The Doctrine of Christ did convert the most wicked Persons who embraced it, from all their debaucheries, to a life most

suitable to Nature and Reason, and to the practice of all Virtues. Therefore certainly the Gospel cou'd not want that commendation among all ingenuous Moralists, that it was the most excellent instrument in the World to reform the lives of Men, and to promote real goodness in it. When they cou'd not but take notice of so many Persons continually so brought off from their follies and vain conversations, to a life serious, sober, and unblameable; nay and some of the *Christians* were of so much integrity and goodness, that their greatest Enemies were forced to say that their only fault was, that they were *Christians*. *Bonus vir Cajus Sejus, tantum quod Christianus. A very good man, only a Christian.* But one wou'd think this shou'd have made them have a higher opinion of *Christianity*, when it did so suddenly make so many good Men in the World. Especially when this power was so manifest on such Persons who were suppos'd incapable of being reform'd by Philosophy, young, illiterate, and mean-spirited Persons; therefore it may be justly suppos'd that it was not by the strength of their own Reason that this alteration was wrought within them, but by that Divine power which was able to tame the most unruly; to instruct the most ignorant, to raise up the most sordid Persons to such a Generous temper, as to flight the good things of this life, in comparison with those to come. And so remarkable was the difference of life then between those that were *Christians*, and those who were not (as there is still between true *Christians*, and mere Pretenders) that *Origen* dares *Celsus* to compare them in point of Morality with any other Societies in the World. αἱ δὲ τῷ Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ μαθητευσάμεναι ἐκκλησίαι, συνιστάμεναι τοῖς ἄνθρωποις ὡς δὴ φωτὶς εἰσὶν ἐν κόσμῳ. ἢ καὶ οὐκ αἱ ὁμοιοτάται τῇ τῆς χρίστος τῶν δὴ καὶ ἐκκλησίαις, ἐν ἱεροῖς βιβλίοις ἐκείναις, πολλὰν καλότητα πλῆρου τῶν ἐν οὖν δήμῳ ἐκκλησιῶν; For the Churches of GOD, which are discipled to CHRIST, being compar'd with other Societies, shine among them like lights in the world. For who can but confess, that even the worser part of the Christian Churches exceeds the best of the popular Assemblies? For, as he goes on, the Church of GOD which is at Athens, that is *ἡσυχία καὶ εἰρήνη*, very quiet and peaceable, because it seeks to approve it self to GOD; but the popular Assembly at Athens, that is *σαυὰς*, seditious and quarrelsome, and in nothing comparable to the Church of GOD there. So it is, if we compare the Churches of Corinth and Alexandria with the Assemblies of the People there. So that any candid Inquirer after Truth will exceedingly wonder (how such fair Islands shou'd appear nantes in gurgite vasto, in the midst of such a Sea of wickedness as it was in those Cities) how these Churches of GOD shou'd

Orig. contr.

Cels. l. 3.

p. 128.

be

be planted in such rude and profane places. So the same Author goes on to compare the Church's Senate with that of the Cities, the Church's Officers with theirs; and appeals to themselves, that even those among them who were most luke-warm in their Office, did yet far exceed all the City-Magistrates in all manner of Virtues. From whence he rationally concludes, *εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἔτις ἔχει, πῶς οὐκ εὐλογεῖν μὲν νομίζουσιν· ἀλλὰ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ θεοῦ ἐκείνου διδόντος, ὅτι οὐκ ἦ τυχεῖται, θείας ἡδὲ οὐ αὐτῆς;* *If these things be so, how can it but be most rational to adore the Divinity of JESUS, who was able to accomplish such great things?* And that not upon one or two, but upon such great multitudes as were then converted to the *Christian Faith*. We read of one *Phædon*, and one *Polemon* brought from their debaucheries by *Socrates* and *Xenocrates*, but what are these compar'd with those who were turn'd from their Sins to God by the Gospel of CHRIST! *καὶ τοῦτο μὲν εἰς Ἑλλήνων· εἰς ἡς Φαίδων καὶ οὐκ οἶδα εἰ δεύτερον, καὶ εἰς Πολέμων, μετὰ πολλοὺς ἀπὸ αἰσίου καὶ πορνεύου βίης, ἐφιλοσόφησαν· ὧν δὲ τῶν Ἰησοῦ ἐμοῖσι τότε οἱ δίδοντες, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ καὶ πολλαπλάσιος, &c.* *The twelve Apostles were but the first-fruits of that plentiful Harvest of Converts which followed afterwards.* And altho' *Celsus* (like an *Epicurean*) seems to deny the possibility of any such thing as Conversion, because customary sins become a second Nature, that no punishments can reform them; *Yet*, saith *Origen*, *herein he not only contradicts us Christians, but all such as were ἡνικαῖως φιλοσοφήσαντες, who own'd any generous principles of Philosophy, and did not despair of recovering virtue, as a thing feasible by human nature; and gives instances ad hominem, to prove the possibility of the thing from the ancient Heroes, Hercules and Ulysses, from the two Philosophers, Socrates and Musonius, and the two famous Converts to Philosophy, Phædon and Polemon. But yet, saith he, these are not so much to be wondred at, that the eloquence and reason of the Philosophers shou'd prevail on some very few persons, but that the mean and contemptible language of the Apostles shou'd convert such multitudes from intemperance to sobriety, from injustice to fair-dealing, from cowardice to the highest constancy, yea so great as to lay down their lives for the sake of virtue; how can we but admire so Divine a Power as was seen in it? And therefore, saith he, we conclude, ὅτι τῶν θείων λόγων ἀμείψαν κακίαν φύσιν ὥστε ἐν ἑαυτοῖς οὐκ ἀδυνατεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπ' αὐτὸν χαλεπὸν.* *That it is so far from being impossible, that it is not at all difficult for corrupt nature to be chang'd by the Word of God.* *Lactantius* excellently manifests that Philosophy cou'd never do so much good in the World as Christianity did, because that was not suted at all to common capacities, and did require so much skill in the Arts to prepare Men for it, which it is impossible all shou'd be well skill'd in, which yet are as capable of being happy, as any others are. And how inefficacious the Precepts of Philosophy were, appears by the Philosophers themselves, who were far from having command by them over their masterless Passions, and were fain sometimes to confess that Nature was too head-strong to be kept in by such weak Reins as the Precepts of Philosophy were: *But*, saith he, *what great command Divine Precepts have upon the Souls of Men, daily experience shews.* *Da mihi virum qui sit iracundus, maledicus, effrenatus; paucissimis Dei verbis, tam placidum quam ovem reddam. Da cupidum, avarum, tenacem; jam tibi eum liberalem dabo, & pecuniam suam plenius manibus largientem. Da timidum doloris ac mortis; jam cruces, & ignes, taurum contemnet.*

Origen. l. 1. p. 50.

Origen. l. 3. p. 150.

Lactant. de fals. sap. l. 3. c. 25.

Cap. 26.

Da libidinosum, adulterum, ganeonem; jam sobrium, castum, continentem videbis. Da crudelem, & sanguinis appetentem; jam in veram clementiam furor ille mutabitur. Da injustum, insipientem; peccatorem; continuo & æquus, & prudens, & innocens erit. In which words that elegant Writer doth by a Rhetorical Scheme set out the remarkable alteration which was in any who became true *Christians*, that altho' they were passionate, covetous, fearful, lustful, cruel, unjust, vicious, yet upon their being *Christians*, they became mild, liberal, courageous, temperate, merciful, just and unblameable; which never any were brought to by mere Philosophy, which rather teacheth the Art of Concealing vices, than of healing them. But now when *Christianity* was so effectual in the cure of those distempers, which Philosophy gave over as beyond its skill and power, when it cur'd them with so great success, and that not in a *Paracelsian* way, for them to relapse afterwards with greater violence, but it did so thoroughly unsettle the *fomes morbi*, that it shou'd never gather to so great a head again; doth not this argue a power more than Philosophical, and that cou'd be no less than Divine Power which tended so much to reform the World, and to promote true goodness in it?

XXIV. Thus we have consider'd the contrariety of the Doctrine of *Christ* to Mens Natural Inclinations, and yet the strange success it had in the World, which in the last place will appear yet more strange, when we add the almost *continual opposition it met with from worldly power and policy*. Had it been possible for a cunningly-devised fable, or any mere contrivance of Impostors to have prevail'd in the World, when the most potent and subtile Persons bent their whole Wits and Designs for suppressing it? Whatever it were in others, we are sure of some of the *Roman* Emperors, as *Julian* and *Dioclesian*, that it was their Master-design to root out and abolish *Christianity*; and was it only the subtilty of the *Christians* which made these Persons give over their work in despair of accomplishing it? If the *Christians* were such subtile Men, whence came all their Enemies to agree in one common calumny, that they were a company of poor, weak, ignorant, inconsiderable Men? and if they were so, how came it to pass that by their power and wisdom they cou'd never exterminate these Persons; but as they cut them down, they grew up the faster, and multiply'd by their subtraction of them? There was something then certainly peculiar in *Christianity*, from all other Doctrines, that it not only was not advanc'd by any civil power, but it got ground by the Opposition it met with in the World. And therefore it is an observable circumstance, that the first Christian Emperor (who acted as Emperor for *Christianity*) viz. *Constantine* (for otherwise I know what may be said for *Philippus*) did not appear in the World 'till *Christianity* had spread it self over most parts of the habitable World. God thereby letting us see, that tho' the civil Power, when become Christian, might be very useful for protecting *Christianity*, yet that he stood in no need at all of it, as to the Propagation of it abroad in the World. But we see it was quite otherwise in that Religion which had *Mars* its Ascendant, viz. *Mahometism*: For like *Paracelsus* his *Dæmon*, it always sate upon the pummel of the Sword, and made its way in the World merely by force and violence; and as its first constitution had

had much of Blood in it, so by it hath it been fed and nourish'd ever since. But it was quite otherwise with the *Christian* Religion, it never thriv'd better than in the most barren places, nor triumph'd more, than when it suffer'd most; nor spread it self further, than when it encounter'd the greatest Opposition. Because therein was seen the great force and efficacy of the Doctrine of CHRIST, that it bore up Mens Spirits under the greatest miseries of Life, and made them with cheerfulness to undergo the most exquisite torments which the cruelty of Tyrants cou'd invent. The *Stoics* and *Epicureans* Boasts, that their wise Man wou'd be happy in the Bull of *Phalaris*, were but empty and *Thraso-nical* words, which none wou'd venture the truth of by an experiment upon themselves. It was the *Christian* alone, and not the *Epicurean*, that cou'd truly say in the midst of torments, *Suave est & nihil curo*, and might justly alter a little of that common saying of the *Christians*, and say, *Non magna loquimur, sed patimur*, as well as *vivimus*; The *Christians* did not speak great things, but do and suffer them. And this gain'd not only great reputation of integrity to themselves, but much advanc'd the honor of their Religion in the World, when it was so apparently seen, that no force or power was able to withstand it. Will not this at least persuade you that our Religion is true, and from God, saith *Arnobius*? *Quod cum genera pœnarum tanta sint a vobis* Arnob. l. 2. c. gentes. *proposita Religionis hujus sequentibus leges, augeatur res magis, & contra omnes minas atque interdicta formidinum animosus populus obnitatur, & ad credendi studium, prohibitionis ipsius stimulis excitetur?* — *Itane istud non divinum & sacrum est, aut sine Deo, eorum tantas animorum fieri conversiones, ut cum carnifices unci, aliique innumeri cruciatus, quemadmodum diximus, impendeant credituris, veluti quadam dulcedine, atque omnium virtutum amore correpti, cognitæ accipiant rationes, atque mundi omnibus rebus præponant amicitias Christi?* That no fears, penalties, or torments, were able to make a *Christian* alter his profession, but he wou'd rather bid adieu to his Life than to his Savior. This *Origen* likewise frequently takes notice of, when *Celsus* had objected the Novelty of *Christianity*; Origen. l. 1. c. Cels. p. 21. Vid. etiam l. 2. p. 110. *The more wonderful it is (saith Origen) that in so short a time it shou'd so largely spread it self in the World; for if the cure of Mens Bodies be not wrought without Divine Providence, how much less the cure of so many thousands of Souls which have been converted at once to Humanity and Christianity, especially when all the Powers of the World were from the first engaged to hinder the progress of this Doctrine; and yet notwithstanding all this opposition,* οὐκ ἔστι, μὴ πῶς καὶ καλῶς αἰς λόγῳ Θεοῦ καὶ ἡρώδης τῶν ἀνδραγαθῶν ἐχρηστέον, πάσης μὲν ἑλπίδος, ἐπὶ πλείονι δὲ βεβαίως ἐκρήθη, καὶ μετεπέστησε μυρίας ὄσας ψυχὰς ἐπὶ τὴν κατ' αὐτοὺς ἡμετέραν. *The Word of GOD prevail'd, as not being able to be stopt by Men, and became Master over all its enemies, and not only spread it self quite thro' Greece, but thro' a great part of the World besides, and converted an innumerable company of Souls to the true worship and service of GOD. Thus we have now manifested from all the circumstances of the propagation of the Doctrine of CHRIST, what evidence there was of a Divine Power accompanying of it, and how useful the first Miracles were in order to it.*

CHAP.

C H A P. X.

The difference of true Miracles from false.

- I. *The unreasonableness of rejecting the Evidence from Miracles, because of Impostures. That there are certain rules of distinguishing true Miracles from false, and Divine from Diabolical, prov'd from God's intention in giving a power of Miracles, and the Providence of God in the World.* II. *The inconvenience of taking away the rational grounds of Faith, and placing it on self-evidence. Of the self-evidence of the Scriptures, and the insufficiency of that for resolving the question about the Authority of the Scriptures.* III. *Of the pretended Miracles of Impostors and false Christs, as Barchochebas, David el-David and others.* IV. *The Rules whereby to judge true Miracles from false.* 1. *True Divine Miracles are wrought to confirm a Divine Testimony.* V. *No Miracles necessary for the certain conveyance of a Divine Testimony: prov'd from the Evidences that the Scriptures could not be corrupted.* VI. 2. *No Miracles Divine which contradict Divine Revelation. Of Popish Miracles.* VII. 3. *Divine Miracles leave Divine Effects on those who believe them. Of the Miracles of Simon Magus.* VIII. 4. *Divine Miracles tend to the overthrow of the Devil's power in the World: the Antipathy of the Doctrine of Christ to the Devil's design in the World.* IX. 5. *The distinction of true Miracles from others, from the circumstances and manner of their operation. The Miracles of Christ compar'd with those of the Heathen Gods.* X. 6. *God makes it evident to all impartial judgments, that Divine Miracles exceed Created power. This manifested from the unparallel'd Miracles of Moses and our Savior. From all which the rational evidence of Divine Revelation is manifested, as to the Persons whom God employs to teach the World.*

- I. **H**AVING thus far stated the cases wherein Miracles may justly be expected as a rational Evidence of Divine Authority in the Persons whom God employs by way of peculiar message to the World, and in the prosecution of this discourse manifested the Evidences of Divine Authority in *Moses* and the Prophets, and in our Savior and his Apostles; the only remaining question concerning

concerning this subject, is, *How we may certainly distinguish true and real Miracles from such as are only pretended and counterfeit?* For it being as evident that there have been Impostures and Delusions in the World as real Miracles, the minds of Men will be wholly to seek when to rely upon the Evidence of Miracles as an argument of Divine Authority in those persons who do them, unless a way be found out to distinguish them from each other. But if we can make it appear, that, unless Men thro' weakness of Judgment or Incogitancy deceive themselves, they may have certain Evidence of the truth of Miracles, then there can be nothing wanting as to the establishment of their Minds in the truth of that Doctrine which is confirm'd by them. There hath been nothing which hath made Men of better Affections than Understandings, so ready to suspect the strength of the Evidence from Miracles concerning Divine Testimony, as the multitude of Impostures in the World under the name of Miracles, and that the Scripture itself tells us we must not hearken to such as come with lying wonders. But may we not therefore safely rely on such Miracles which we have certain Evidence cou'd not be wrought but by Divine Power, because forsooth the Devil may sometimes abuse the ignorance and credulity of unwary Men? or is it because the Scripture forbids us to believe such as shou'd come with a pretense of Miracles, therefore we cannot rely on the Miracles of CHRIST himself? Which is as much as to say, because the Scripture tells us that we must not believe every Spirit, therefore we must believe none at all, or because we must not entertain any other Doctrine beside the Gospel, therefore we have no reason to believe that. For the ground whereby we are assur'd by the Scriptures, that the Testimony of CHRIST was Divine, and therefore his Doctrine true, is because it was confirm'd by such Miracles as he did; now if that Argument were insufficient which the Scriptures tell us was the great Evidence of CHRIST's being sent from God, we cannot give our selves a sufficient account in point of Evidence, on which we believe the Doctrine of the Gospel to be true and Divine. But the only rational pretense of any scruple in this case must be a suppos'd uncertainty in our Rules of judging concerning the nature of Miracles; for there be no certain *termina*, or notes of difference, whereby to know Divine Miracles from Delusions of Senses and the Impostures of the Devil. I must confess that there is an apparent insufficiency in the Evidence from Miracles; but if there be any certain Rules of proceeding in this case, we are to blame nothing but our Incredulity, if we be not satisfy'd by them. For the full clearing of this, I shall first *make it appear that there may be certain Evidence found out; whereby we may know true Miracles from false, and Divine from Diabolical.* And, Secondly, *Inquire into those things which are the main notes of difference between them.* First, *That there may be certain Evidence whereby to know the truth of Miracles.* I speak not of the difference *ex parte rei* between Miracles, and those called Wonders, as that the one exceeds the power of created Agents, and the other doth not; for this leaves the Inquirer as far to seek for satisfaction as ever; for granting that a Divine Power is seen in one, and not in the other, he must needs be still dissatisfy'd, unless it can

Ff

be

be made evident to him that such things are from Divine Power, and others cannot be. Now the main distinction being placed here in the natures of the things abstractly consider'd, and not as they bear any Evidence to our Understandings, instead of resolving doubts it increaseth more; for, as for instance, in the case of the *Magicians* Rods turning into Serpents, as well as *Moses's*; what satisfaction cou'd this yield to any Spectator, to tell him, that in the one there was a Divine Power, and not in the other, unless it were made appear by some Evidence from the thing, that the one was a mere Imposture, and the other a real Alteration in the thing it self? I take it then for granted, that no general discourses concerning the formal difference of Miracles and Wonders consider'd in themselves, can afford any rational satisfaction to an inquisitive Mind; that which alone is able to give it, must be something which may be discern'd by any judicious and considerative Person. And that God never gives to any a power of Miracles, but he gives some such ground of satisfaction concerning them, will appear upon these two considerations.

1. *From God's intention in giving to any this power of doing Miracles.* We have largely made it manifest that the end of true Miracles is to be a confirmation to the World of the Divine Commission of the Persons who have it, and that the Testimony is Divine which is confirm'd by it. Now if there be no way to know when Miracles are true or false, this power is to no purpose at all; for Men are as much to seek for Satisfaction, as if there had been no such things at all. Therefore if Men are bound to believe a Divine Testimony, and to rely on the Miracles wrought by the Persons bringing it, as an Evidence of it, they must have some assurance that these Miracles cou'd not come from any but a Divine Power.

2. *From the Providence of God in the World;* which if we own, we cannot imagine that God shou'd permit the Devil, whose only design is to ruin Mankind, to abuse the credulity of the World so far, as to have his lying Wonders pass uncontroul'd; which they must do, if nothing can be found out as a certain difference between such things as are only of Diabolical, and such as are of Divine Power. If then it may be discover'd that there is a malignant Spirit which acts in the World and doth produce strange things, either we must impute all strange things to him, which must be to attribute to him an infinite Power, or else that there is a Being infinitely perfect which crosseth this malignant Spirit in his Designs; and if so, we cannot imagine he shou'd suffer him to usurp so much Tyranny over the minds of Men, as to make those things pass in the more sober and inquisitive part of the World for Divine Miracles, which were only Counterfeits and Impostures. If then the Providence of God be so deeply engaged in the discovering the designs of Satan, there must be some means of this discovery, and that means can be suppos'd to be no other in this case, but some rational and satisfactory Evidence, whereby we may know when strange and miraculous things are done by Satan to deceive Men, and when by a Divine Power to confirm a Divine Testimony.

II. But how is it possible, say some, that Miracles shou'd be any ground on which to believe a Testimony Divine, when CHRIST himself hath told us, *That there shall arise false Christs, and*

false

Mat. 24.
24.

false Prophets, and shall shew great signs and wonders; insomuch that if it were possible they should deceive the very elect? and the Apostle tells us *that the coming of Antichrist will be with all power and signs, and lying wonders.* How then can we fix on Miracles as an Evidence of Divine Testimony, when we see they are common to good and bad Men, and may seal indifferently either Truth or Falshood? To this I reply;

I. Men are guilty of doing no small disservice to the Doctrine of CHRIST, when upon such weak and frivolous pretences they give so great an advantage to Infidelity, as to call in question the validity of that which yielded so ample a Testimony to the truth of Christian Religion. For if once the rational grounds on which we believe the Doctrine of CHRIST to be true and Divine, be taken away, and the whole evidence of the Truth of it belaid on things not only derided by Men of Atheistical Spirits, but in themselves such as cannot be discern'd or judg'd of by any but themselves; upon what grounds can we proceed to convince an Unbeliever that the Doctrine which we believe is true? If they tell him, *That as light and fire manifest themselves, so doth the Doctrine of the Scripture* to those who believe it; it will be soon reply'd, that Self-evidence in a matter of Faith can imply nothing but either a firm perswasion of the Mind concerning the thing propounded; or else that there are such clear Evidences in the thing its self, that none who freely use their Reason can deny it. The first can be no Argument to any other person any further than the authority of the person who declares it to have such Self-evidence to him, doth extend it self over the mind of the other; and to ones self it seems a strange way of arguing, *I believe the Scriptures because they are true, and they are true because I believe them;* for Self-evidence implies so much, if by it be meant the perswasion of the Mind, that the thing is true: But if by self-evidence be further meant such clear Evidence in the matter propounded, that all who do consider it, must believe it; I then further inquire whether this Evidence doth lie in the naked proposal of the things to the Understanding; and if so, then every one, who assents to this Proposition, that the whole is greater than the part, must likewise assent to this, that the Scripture is the Word of God; or whether doth the Evidence lie, not in the naked Proposal, but in the efficacy of the Spirit of God, on the minds of those to whom it is propounded. Then, 1. The Self-evidence is taken off from the written Word which was the object, and remov'd to a quite different thing which is the efficient cause. 2. Whether then any Persons who want this efficacious operation of the Spirit of God, are or can be bound to believe the Scriptures to be God's Word? If they are bound, the duty must be propounded in such a way as may be sufficient to convince them that it is their duty; but if all the Evidence of the Truth of the Scripture lie on this Testimony of the Spirit, then such as want this, can have none at all. But if, lastly, by this Self-evidence be meant such an impress of God's authority on the Scriptures, that any who consider them as they ought, cannot but discern; I still further inquire, whether this impress lies in the positive assertions in Scripture that they are from God, and that cannot be unless it be made appear to be im-

possible that any Writing shou'd pretend to be from God when it is not; or else in the written Books of Scripture, and then let it be made appear that any one merely by the evidence of the Writings themselves without any further Arguments can pronounce the *Proverbs* to be the word of God, and not the Book of *Wisdom*; and *Ecclesiastes* to be Divinely inspir'd, and not *Ecclesiasticus*: or else the Self-evidence must be in the excellency of the Matters which are reveal'd in Scripture; but this still falls very short of resolving wholly the question, whether *the Scripture be the Word of God*? For the utmost that this can reach to is, that the things contain'd in Scripture are of so high and excellent a nature, that we cannot conceive that any other shou'd be the Author of them but God himself; all which being granted, I am as far to seek as ever what grounds I have to believe that those particular Writings which we call the Scripture are the Word of God, or that God did immediately imploy such and such Persons to write such and such Books: for I may believe the substance of the Doctrine to be of God, and yet not believe the Books wherein it is contain'd, to be a divine and infallible Testimony; as is evident in the many excellent Devotional Books which are in the World.

But yet further, if the only ground on which we are to believe a Doctrine Divine be the Self-evidencing Light, and power of it, then I suppose there was the same ground of believing a Divine Testimony when the Doctrine was declar'd without Writing, by the first Preachers of it. So that by this method of proceeding, the ground of believing CHRIST to be sent as the *Messias* sent from God, must be wholly and solely resolv'd into this, that there was so much Self-evidence in this proposition utter'd by CHRIST, *I am the light of the World*, that all the *Jews* had been bound to have believ'd him sent from God, (for light manifests its self,) altho' our Savior had never done any one Miracle, to make it appear that he came from God. And we cannot but charge our Savior on this account with being at a very unnecessary expence upon the World in doing so many Miracles, when the bare naked affirmation that he was the *Messias*, had been sufficient to have convinced the whole World. But is it conceivable then upon what account our Savior shou'd lay so much force on the Miracles done by himself in order to the proving his Testimony to be Divine, that he saith himself, *That he had a greater witness than that of John*, (who yet doubtless had Self-evidencing light going along with his Doctrine too,) *for the works which the Father hath given me to finish, the same works that I do, bear witness of me that the Father hath sent me*? Can any thing be more plain, or have greater Self-evidence in it, than that our Savior in these words doth lay the evidence of his Divine Testimony upon the Miracles which he wrought, which on that account he so often appeals to, on this very Reason, *because they bear witness of him; and if they would not believe him on his own Testimony, yet they ought to believe him for his works sake*? Doth all this now amount only to a removing of Prejudices from the Person of CHRIST? which yet according to the tenor of the Objection we are considering of, it is impossible the power of Miracles shou'd do, if these Miracles may be so far done or counterfeited by

Joh. 5. 36.

Joh. 19.

25. 38.

14. 71.

15. 24.

by false CHRISTs, that we can have no certain evidence to distinguish the one from the other.

Which the objection pretends, and was the great thing wherein *Celsus* the *Epicurean* triumph'd so much, that *Christ* should foretell that others should come and do Miracles which they must not hearken to, and thence wou'd infer as from CHRIST's own confession that Miracles have in them οὐδὲ θεῶν, nothing divine but what may be done by wicked Men: καὶ εἰ οὐ χεῖρας δαίμωνος αὐτῶν ἔργον ἔσθ' ἡνὶ, τὰς δὲ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἰσχυρὰς; Is it not a wretched thing, saith he, that from the same works one should be accounted a God, and others Deceivers? Whereby those who wou'd invalidate the Argument from Miracles, may take notice how finely they fall in with one of the most bitter Enemies of Christian Religion, and make use of the same Arguments which he did; and therefore *Origen's* reply to him, will reach them too. For, saith he, our Savior in those words of his doth not bid Men beware in general of such as did Miracles, ἀλλὰ δαίμονες τοὺς ἀναρχομένους ἑαυτοὺς εἶναι τὸ χεῖρας τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ παραμυθίους ἀλλ' αὐτῶν φωνησάντων αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς ἰσχυροὺς τοὺς ἰσχυροὺς μυστήριον but bids them beware of that when Men gave themselves out to be the true Christ the Son of God, and endeavor to draw Christ's Disciples from him, by some mere Appearances instead of Miracles. Therefore CHRIST being evidently made appear to be the Son of GOD, by the powerful and uncontroul'd Miracles which he wrought, what pretence of Reason cou'd there be to hearken to any one who gave themselves out to be CHRISTs, merely from some strange Wonders which they wrought? And from hence, as he further observes, may be justly infer'd contrary to what *Celsus* imagin'd, that there was certainly an evidence of Divine Power in Miracles, when these false CHRISTs gave themselves out to be CHRISTs merely from the supposal that they had this power of doing Miracles. And so it is evident in all the false CHRISTs which have appear'd, they have made this their great pretense that they did many Signs and Wonders; which GOD might justly permit them to do, to punish the great Infidelity of the Jews, who wou'd not believe in CHRIST notwithstanding those frequent and apparent Miracles which he did, which did infinitely transcend those of any such Pretenders. Such among the Jews were *Jonathas*, who after the destruction of *Jerusalem*, as *Josephus* tells us, drew many of the People into the Wilderness of *Cyrene*, σημεῖα καὶ φάσματα δεικνύμενος, promising to shew them many Prodigies and strange Appearances. Not long after in the times of *Adrian* appear'd that famous Blazing-star *Barchohebas*, who not only portended but brought so much mischief upon the Jews; his pretense was that he vomited Flames; and so he did, such as consum'd himself and his Followers: after him many other Impostors arose in *Egypt*, *Cyprus* and *Crete*, who all went upon the same pretence of doing Miracles. In latter times the famous Impostor was *David el-David*, whose story is thus briefly reported by *David Ganz*. *David el-David* pretended to be the true *Messias* and rebelled against the King of Persia, and did many Signs and Prodigies before the Jews and the King of Persia: at last his Head was cut off, and the Jews fined an hundred Talents of Gold; in the Epistle of *Rambam* or *R. Moses Maimon*. It is said, That

III.
Orig. lib. 2.
c. Cels.

Tzemach
David n.
895.

V. ep. Maimonides in not. Vorstii and Tzem. Dav. the King of Persia desired of him a Sign, and he told him that he should cut off his Head and he would rise again; (which he cunningly desir'd to avoid being tormented,) which the King was resolv'd to try, and accordingly executed him; but I suppose his Resurrection and Mahomet's will be both in one day, altho' Maimonides tells us, *some of the Jews are yet such Fools as to expect his Resurrection.* Several other Impostors Maimonides mentions in his Epistle *de Australi Regione.* One who pretended to be the *Messias* because he cur'd himself of the *Leprosy* in a night; several others he mentions in *Spain, France,* and other Parts, and the issue of them all was only a further aggravation of the Miseries and Captivities of the poor *Jews*, who were so credulous in following Impostors, and yet such strange Infidels where there were plain and undoubted Miracles to persuade them to believe in our blessed Savior as the true *Messias.* We freely grant then that many pretended Miracles may be done in the World, to deceive Men with; but doth it hence follow that either there are no true Miracles done in the World, or that there are no certain Rules to distinguish the one from the other? But as *Origen* yet further replies to *Celsus*, as a Wolf doth very much resemble a Dog, yet they are not of the same kind; nor a Turtle-Dove and a Pigeon; so that which is produced by a Divine Power is not of the same nature with that which is produced by *Magic*; but as he argues, *Is it possible that there should be only deceits in the World and Magical operations? and can there be no true Miracles at all wrought? Is Human nature only capable of Impostures, or can none work Miracles but Devils? Where there is a worse, there may be a better; and so from the Impostures and Counterfeits, we may infer that there are true Miracles, wrought by a Divine Power; otherwise it were all one as to say, there are Counterfeits, but no Jewels; or there are Sophisms and Paralogisms, but no legitimate Demonstrations: if then there be such deceits, there are true Miracles too; all the business is* *ἵνα μὴ ἀπορρίψωμεν τοὺς ἐν αἰσθητοῖς καὶ διανοητοῖς ἐκτελέζοντες, strictly and severely to examine the pretenders to them and that from the Life and Manners of those that do them, and from the effects and consequents of them, whether they do good or hurt in the world, whether they correct Mens manners, or bring Men to goodness, holiness, and truth; and on this account we are neither to reject all Miracles, nor embrace all pretenses, but carefully and prudently examine the rational evidences whereby those which are true and Divine, may be known from such as are Counterfeit and Diabolical.*

iv. And this now leads us to the main subject of this Chapter, *viz. What Rules we have to proceed by, in judging Miracles to be true or false; which may be these following.*

1. *True Divine Miracles are wrought in confirmation of some Divine Testimony.* Because we have manifested by all the precedent discourse, that the intention of Miracles is to seal some Divine Revelation. Therefore if God shou'd work Miracles when no Divine Testimony is to be confirm'd, God would set the Broad Seal of Heaven to a Blank. If it be said no, *because it will witness to us now the truth of that Testimony which was deliver'd so many Ages since;* I answer, 1. The truth of that Testimony was sufficiently seal'd at the time of the delivery of it, and is convey-

ed

ed down in a certain way to us. Is it not sufficient that the Charter of a Corporation had the Prince's Broad-Seal in the time of the giving of it, but that every succession of Men in that Corporation must have a new Broad-Seal, or else they ought to question their Patent? What ground can there be for that, when the original Seal and Patent is preserv'd, and is certainly convey'd down from Age to Age? So I say it is as to us, God's Grand Charter of Grace and Mercy to the World thro' JESUS CHRIST, was Seal'd by Divine Miracles, at the delivery of it to the World; the original Patent, *viz.* the Scriptures wherein the Charter is contain'd, is convey'd in a most certain manner to us; to this Patent the Seal is annex'd, and in it are contain'd those undoubted Miracles which were wrought in confirmation of it; so that a new sealing of this Patent is wholly needless, unless we have some cause of suspicion, that the original Patent it self were lost, or the first sealing was not true. If the latter, then Christian Religion is not true, if the Miracles wrought for confirmation of it were false, because the truth of it depends so much on the Verity and Divinity of the Miracles which were then wrought. If the first be suspected, *viz.* the certain conveyance of the Patent, *viz.* the Scriptures, some certain grounds of such a suspicion must be discover'd in a matter of so great moment, especially when the great and many Societies of the Christian World do all consent unanimously in the contrary. Nay it is impossible that any rational Man can conceive that the Patent which we now rely upon, is supposititious or corrupted in any of those things which are of concernment to the Christian World; and that on these accounts.

1. *From the watchfulness of Divine Providence for the good of Mankind.* Can we conceive that there is a God who rules and takes care of the World, and who to manifest his signal Love to Mankind, should not only grant a Patent of Mercy to the World, by his Son CHRIST, and then seal'd it by Divine Miracles, and in order to the certain conveyance of it to the World, caus'd it by Persons imploy'd by himself, to be recorded in a Language fittest for its dispersing up and down the World, (all which I here suppose:) Can we I say conceive that this God shou'd so far have cast off his care of the World and the good of Mankind, which was the original ground of the Grant it self, as to suffer any wicked Men or malignant Spirits to corrupt or alter any of those Terms in it, on which Mens eternal Salvation depends; much less wholly to suppress and destroy it, and to send forth one that is counterfeit and supposititious instead of it, and which shou'd not be discover'd by the Christians of that Age wherein that corrupt Copy was set forth, nor by any of the most learned and inquisitive Christians ever since? They who can give any the least entertainment to so wild, absurd and irrational an Imagination, are so far from Reason, that they are in good disposition to *Atheism*; and next to the suspecting the Scriptures to be corrupted, they may rationally suspect there is no such thing as a God and Providence in the World; or that the World is govern'd by a Spirit most malignant and envious of the good of Mankind. Which is a suspicion only becoming those Heathens (among whom it was very frequent) who worshipped the Devils instead of God.

2. *Because*

De pref-
cript. adv-
hæret. c. 36.

2. *Because of the general dispersion of Copies in the World upon the first publishing of them.* We cannot otherwise conceive, but that Records containing so weighty and important things, wou'd be transcrib'd by all those Churches which believe the truth of the things contain'd in them. We see how far curiosity will carry Men as to the care of transcribing ancient MSS. of old Authors, which contain only some History of things past that are of no great concernment to us: Can we then imagine those who ventur'd Estates and Lives upon the truth of the things reveal'd in Scripture, wou'd not be very careful to preserve the authentic Instrument whereby they are reveal'd in a certain way to the whole World? And besides this, for a long time the Originals themselves of the Apostolical Writings were preserv'd in the Church; which makes *Tertullian* in his time appeal to them. *Age jam qui voles curiositatem melius exercere in negotio salutis tue; percurre Ecclesias Apostolicas, apud quas ipse adhuc cathedræ Apostolorum suis locis præsentur, apud quas ipse authentica eorum literæ recitantur, sonantes vocem, & representantes faciem uniuscujusque.* Now how was it possible that in that time the Scriptures could be corrupted, when in some of the Churches the original Writings of the Apostles were preserv'd in a continual succession of Persons from the Apostles themselves, and from these Originals so many Copies were transcrib'd, as were convey'd almost all the World over, thro' the large spread of the Christian Churches at that time? And therefore it is impossible to conceive that a Copy should be corrupted in one Church, when it wou'd so speedily be discovered by another; especially considering these three circumstances. 1. The innumerable multitude of Copies which wou'd speedily be taken, both considering the moment of the thing, and the easiness of doing it; God, probably for that very end, not loading the World with *Pandects* and *Codes* of his Laws, but contriving the whole Instruments of Man's Salvation in so narrow a compass, that it might be easily preserv'd and transcrib'd by such who were passionate admirers of the Scriptures. 2. The great numbers of learned and inquisitive Men who soon sprung up in the Christian Church; whose great care was to explain and vindicate the sacred Scriptures; can we then think that all these Watchmen should be asleep together when the Evil one came to sow his Tares, which it is most unreasonable to imagine, when in the Writings of all these learned Men, which were very many and voluminous, so much of the Scripture was inserted, that had there been corruptions in the Copies themselves, yet comparing them with those Writings, the corruptions would be soon discover'd? 3. The great veneration which all Christians had of the Scripture, that they placed the hopes of their eternal Happiness, upon the truth of the things contain'd in the Scriptures: Can we then think these would suffer any material Alteration to creep into these Records without their observing and discovering it? Can we now think when all persons are so exceeding careful of their Deeds, and the Records whereon their Estates depend, that the Christians who valu'd not this World in comparison of that to come, should suffer the *Magna Charta* of that to be lost, corrupted, or imbezzelled away? Especially considering what care and industry was us'd by many

many Primitive Christians to compare Copies together, as is evident in *Pantenus*, who brought the *Hebrew* Copy of *Matthew* out of the *Indies* to *Alexandria*, as *Eusebius* tells us: in *Pamphilus* and the Library he created at *Cæsarea*, but especially in *Origen's* admirable *Hexapla*, which were mainly intended for this end.

3. It is impossible to conceive a corruption of the Copy of the Scriptures, because of the great differences which were all along the several ages of the Church, between those who acknowledg'd the Scriptures to be Divine. So that if one party of them had foisted in, or taken out any thing, another party was ready to take notice of it, and wou'd be sure to tell the World of it. And this might be one great reason, why God in his wise Providence might permit such an increase of *Heresies* in the Infancy of the Church, viz. that thereby Christians might be forced to stand upon their guard, and to have a special Eye to the Scriptures, which were always the great Eye-sores of *Heretics*. And from this great wariness of the Church it was that some of the Epistles were so long abroad before they found general entertainment in all the Churches of CHRIST, because in those Epistles which were doubted for some time, there were some passages which seem'd to favor some of the Heresies then abroad; but when upon severe inquiry they are found to be what they pretended, they were receiv'd in all the Christian Churches.

4. Because of the agreement between the Old Testament and the New: the Prophecies of the Old Testament appear with their full accomplishment in the New which we have; so that it is impossible to think the New should be corrupted unless the Old were too, which is most unreasonable to imagin, when the *Jews*, who have been the great Conservators of the Old Testament, have been all along the most inveterate Enemies of the Christians: So that we cannot at all conceive it possible that any material Corruptions or Alterations shou'd creep into the Scriptures, much less that the true Copy shou'd be lost, and a new one forged.

Supposing then that we have the same Authentic Records preserv'd and handed down to us by the care of all Christian Churches, which were written in the first Ages of the Church of CHRIST: what necessity can we imagin that God should work new Miracles to confirm that Doctrine which is convey'd down in a certain uninterrupted way to us, as being seal'd by Miracles undoubtedly Divine in the first Promulgation and Penning of it? And this is the first Reason why the truth of the Scriptures need not now be seal'd by new Miracles. 2. Another may be, because God in the Scripture hath appointed other things to continue in his Church, to be as Seals to his People of the truth of the things contain'd in Scriptures. Such are outwardly, the Sacraments of the Gospel, Baptism, and the Lord's Supper, which are set apart as Seals to confirm the truth of the Covenant on God's part towards us in reference to the great Promises contain'd in it, in reference to pardon of Sin, and the ground of our Acceptance with God by JESUS CHRIST: and inwardly God hath promis'd his Spirit to be as a Witness within them, that by its working and strengthening Grace in the hearts of Believers, it may confirm to

Gg

them

Chrysost.
in 1 Cor. 2.
Hom. 6. p.
266. To. 3.
ed. Eton.

them the truth of the Records of Scripture, when they find the Counter-part of them written in their Hearts by the finger of the Spirit of God. It cannot then be with any reason at all suppos'd, that when a Divine Testimony is already confirm'd by Miracles undoubtedly Divine, that new Miracles shou'd be wrought in the Church to assure us of the truth of it. So *Chrysostom* fully expresseth himself concerning Miracles, speaking of the first Ages of the Christian Church: *ὅτι καὶ τότε χρησίμως ἐχέοντο, καὶ νῦν χρησίμως οὐ γίνονται, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἁγίων γραφῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοῖς οὐρανοῖς τῶν πᾶσι δι' ἀγέρων παρέχοντο.* Miracles were very useful then, and not at all now; for now we manifest the truth of what we speak from the sacred Scriptures, and the Miracles wrought in confirmation of them. Which that excellent Author there fully manifests in a Discourse on this subject, *Why Miracles were necessary in the beginning of the Christian Church, and are not now.* To the same purpose *St. Austin* speaks where he discourseth of the truth of Religion: *Accepimus majores nostros visibilia miracula secutos esse; per quos id actum est ut necessaria non essent posteris;* because the World believed by the Miracles which were wrought at the first preaching of the Gospel, therefore Miracles are no longer necessary. For we cannot conceive how the World shou'd be at first induced to believe without manifest and uncontrouled Miracles. For as *Chrysostom* speaks, *εἰ οὐρανοὶ καὶ γῆ ἐπιστάσαντο, καὶ οὐκ ἔμελλεν τὸ θεῖον φανεῖται.* It was the greatest Miracles of all, if the World shou'd believe without Miracles. Which the Poet *Dantes* hath well express'd in the Twenty-fourth Canto of *Paradise*. For when the *Apostle* is there brought in, asking the Poet upon what account he took the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be the Word of God, his Answer is,

De ver.
Relig. cap.
25.

*Probatio quæ verum hoc mihi recludit,
Sunt opera, quæ secuta sunt, ad quæ Natura
Non candefecit ferrum unquam aut percussit incudem.*

i. e. The evidence of that is the Divine Power of Miracles which was in those who deliver'd those things to the World. And when the *Apostle* catechiseth him further, how he knew those Miracles were such as they pretended to be, viz. that they were true and Divine; his Answer is,

*Si orbis terræ sese convertit ad Christianismum,
Inquiebam ego, sine miraculis: hoc unum
Est tale, ut reliqua non sint ejus centesima pars.*

De Civit.
Dei, l. 22.
cap. 8.

i. e. If the World shou'd be converted to the Christian Faith without Miracles, this wou'd be so great a Miracle, that others were not to be compar'd with it. I conclude this then, with that known saying of *St. Austin*; *Quisquis adhuc prodigia, ut credat, inquireret, magnum est ipse prodigium qui mundo credente non credit:* He that seeks for Miracles still to induce him to Faith, when the World is converted to the Christian Faith, he needs not seek for prodigies abroad; he wants only a looking-glass to discover one. For as he goes on, *Unde temporibus eruditus, et omne quod fieri non potest respicientibus, sine ullis miraculis nimium mirabiliter incredibilia credidit mundus?* Whence

Whence came it to pass that in so learned and wary an Age as that was which the Apostles preach'd in, the World without Miracles shou'd be brought to believe things so strangely incredible as those were which CHRIST and his Apostles preach'd? So that by this it appears that the intention of Miracles was to confirm a Divine Testimony to the World, and to make that appear credible which otherwise wou'd have seem'd incredible; but to what end now, when this Divine Testimony is believ'd in the World, shou'd Miracles be continu'd among those who believe the Doctrine to be Divine, the Miracles wrought for the confirmation of it to have been true, and the Scriptures which contain both, to be the undoubted Word of God? To what purpose then the huge out-cry of Miracles in the Roman Church is, is hard to conceive, unless it be to make it appear how ambitious that Church is of being called by the name of him, whose coming is after the working of Satan, with all power, and signs, and lying wonders, and with all deceivableness of unrighteousness in them that perish, because they receiv'd not the love of the Truth that they might be sav'd. For had they receiv'd the Love of the Truth of the Gospel, they wou'd have believ'd it on the account of those Miracles, and Signs, and Wonders which were wrought for the confirmation of it, by CHRIST and his Apostles; and not have gone about by their Juglings and Impostures instead of bringing Men to believe the Gospel, to make them question the truth of the first Miracles when they see so many Counterfeits; had we not great assurance the Apostles were Men of other Designs and Interests than Popish Priests are, and that there is not now any such necessity of Miracles, as there was then when a Divine Testimony revealing the truth of Christian Religion was confirm'd by them.

2. Those Miracles cannot be Divine, which are done now for the confirmation of any thing contrary to that Divine Testimony, which is confirm'd by uncontrouled Divine Miracles. The case is not the same now, which was before the coming of CHRIST; for then tho' the Law of Moses was confirm'd by Miracles; yet tho' the Doctrine of CHRIST did null the obligation of that Law, the Miracles of CHRIST were to be look'd on as Divine, because God did not intend the Ceremonial Law to be perpetual, and there were many Prophecies which cou'd not have their accomplishment but under a new State: But now under the Gospel, God hath declar'd this to be the last Revelation of his Mind and Will to the World by his Son, that now the Prophecies of the Old Testament are accomplish'd, and the Prophecies of the New respect only the various conditions of the Christian Church, without any the least intimation of any further Revelation of God's Mind and Will to the World: So that now the Scriptures are our adequate Rule of Faith, and that according to which we are to judg all pretenders to Inspiration or Miracles. And according to this Rule we are to proceed in any thing which is propounded to us to believe by any Persons, upon any pretenses whatsoever. Under the Law after the establishment of the Law its self by the Miracles of Moses, the Rule of judging all pretenders to Miracles, was by the worship of the true God. If there arise among you a Prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a sign, or a

VI.

Deut. 13.

1, 2, 3.

Gg 2

wonder,

wonder, and the sign or the wonder come to pass, whereof he spake to thee, saying, Let us go after other Gods (which thou hast not known) and let us serve them; thou shalt not hearken unto the words of that Prophet, or that dreamer of dreams: for the Lord your God proveth you to know whether you love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul. Whereby it is plain, that after the true Doctrine is confirm'd by Divine Miracles, God may give the Devil or false Prophets power to work, if not real Miracles, yet such as Men cannot judge by the things themselves whether they be real or no; and this God may do for the tryal of Mens Faith, whether they will forsake the true Doctrine confirm'd by greater Miracles for the sake of such Doctrines which are contrary thereto, and are confirm'd by false Prophets, by Signs and Wonders. Now in this case our Rule of tryal must not be so much the Wonders consider'd in themselves whether real or no, as the comparing them with the Miracles which were wrought in confirmation of that Doctrine, which is contrary to this, which these Wonders tend to the proving of. Therefore God's People under the Law were to examine the scope and drift of the Miracles; if they were intended to bring them to Idolatry, whatever they were, they were not to hearken to those who did them. So now under the Gospel, as the worship of the true God was then the Standard whereby to judge of Miracles by the Law of Moses, so the worship of the true God thro' JESUS CHRIST, and by the Doctrine reveal'd by him, is the Standard whereby we ought to judge of all pretenders to work Miracles. So that let the Miracles be what they will, if they contradict that Doctrine which CHRIST reveal'd to the World, we are to look upon them as only tryals of our Faith in CHRIST, to see whether we love him with our whole hearts or no. And therefore I think it needless to examine all the particulars of Lippius his Relations of Miracles wrought by his *Diva Virgo Hallensis* and *Asprecollis*; for if I see, that their intention and scope is to set up the worship of Demons, or a middle sort of Deities between God and us, which the Scripture is ignorant of, on that very account I am bound to reject them all. Altho' I think it very possible to find out the difference between true Miracles, and them, in the manner and circumstances of their operation; but this, as it is of more curiosity, so of less necessity; for if the Doctrine of the Scriptures was confirm'd by Miracles infinitely above these, I am bound to adhere to that, and not to believe any other Doctrine, though an Angel from Heaven should preach it, much less, altho' some Popish Priests may boast much of Miracles to confirm a Doctrine opposite to the Gospel: which I know not how far God may in judgment give those Images Power to work, or others Faith to believe, because they wou'd not receive the truth in the love of it: and these are now those

2 Thef. 2.
9.

VII.

3. Where Miracles are true and divine, there the effects which follow them upon the Minds of those who believe them, are true and divine, i. e. the effect of believing of them, is the drawing of men from sin unto God. This the Primitive Christians insisted much

much upon, as an undoubted Evidence that the Miracles of CHRIST were wrought by a Divine power, because the effect which follow'd them, *was the work of conversion of Souls from sin and Idols to God and Christ, and all true piety and virtue.* As the effect of the Miracles of Moses was the drawing a People off from Superstition and Idolatry to the worship of the true God; so the effect which follow'd the Belief of the Miracles of CHRIST in the World was the purging Mens Souls from all sin and wickedness to make them New Creatures, and to live in all exactness and holiness of conversation. And thereby Origen discovers the great difference between the Miracles of CHRIST and Antichrist, that the intent of all Antichrist's Wonders was to bring men *in auctore et aduocato, to the deceivableness of unrighteousness, whereby to destroy them; but the intent of the Miracles of Christ was* *circumducere animas a uicibus et uitiis, not the deceiving but the saving of Souls; ut per et peracta bonis et uirtutibus* *et per uirtutes* *consequatur bonum, ut in salutem, uideretur quod non aduocatus periret; who can with any probability say that reformation of life and daily progress from evil to good should be the effect of mere deceit?* And therefore he saith, Christ told his Disciples, that they shou'd do greater works than he had done; because by their Preaching and Miracles the eyes of blind Souls are opened, and the ears of such as were deaf to all goodness are opened so far as to hearken to the Precepts and Promises of the Gospel: and the feet of those who were lame in their inward man, are so healed as to delight to run in the ways of God's Commandments. Now is it possible that these shou'd be the effects of any evil Spirit? But on the contrary we see the effects of all Impostures, and pretended Miracles wrought by Diabolical power, was to bring men off from God to sin, and to dissolve that strict obligation to duty which was laid upon Men by the Gospel of Christ. Thus it was in that early Ape of the Apostles, Simon Magus, who far out-went Apollonius Tyanicus or any other Heathen in his pretended Miracles, according to the report which is given of him by the Primitive Christians; but we see the intent of his Miracles was to raise an admiration of himself, and to bring men off from all holiness of conversation, by asserting among other damnable Heresies, that God did not at all regard *what Men did, but only what they believed:* wherein the Gnostics were his followers. Now when Miracles are wrought to be Patrons of sin, we may easily know from whom they come.

Lib. 2. cont. Cels.

V. Grot. in 2 Thes. 2. 9. in opusc.

4. *Those Miracles are wrought by a Divine Power, which tend to the overthrow of the Kingdom of Satan in the World.* This is evident from hence, because all such things as are out of Man's power to effect, must either be done by a Power Divine or Diabolical: For as our Savior argues, *Every Kingdom divided against its self is brought to desolation, and every City or House divided against its self cannot stand; and if Satan cast out Satan, he is divided against himself, how shall then his Kingdom stand?* Now Christ by his Miracles did not dispossess Satan out of Mens Bodies, but out of his Temples too, as hath been shewn already. And besides, the Doctrine of CHRIST which was confirm'd by those Miracles, was in every thing directly contrary to the Devil's design in the World. For, 1. The Devil's design was to conceal himself among those who worshipp'd him; the design of the Gospel

VIII.

Matth. 12. 25, 26.

spel was to discover him whom the *Gentiles* worshipped, to be an evil and malignant Spirit, that design'd nothing but their ruin. Now it appears in the whole History of *Gentilism*, the grand Mystery of Satan which the Devil us'd among the *Heathens* was to make himself to be taken and worshipp'd for God, and to make them believe that their *Demons* were very good and benign Spirits; which made the *Platonists* and other Philosophers so much incensed against the Primitive *Christians*, when they declar'd their *Demons* to be nothing else but infernal and wicked Spirits which sought the destruction of Souls.

2. *The Devil's great design was to draw men to the practice of the greatest wickedness under a pretense of Religion*; as is very observable in all the *Heathen* Mysteries, which the more *recondite* and hidden they were, the greater wickedness lay at the bottom of them, and so were to purpose *Mysteries of Iniquity*: But now the design of the Gospel was to promote the greatest purity both of Heart and Life; there being in no other Religion in the World either such incomparable Precepts of Holiness, or such encouraging Promises to the practice of it (from eternal Life hereafter as the Reward, and the assistance of God's Spirit to help Men here) or such prevailing motives to persuade men to it, from the *love of God in Christ to the World*, the *Undertakings of Christ for us* in his Death and Sufferings, the excellent Pattern we have to follow in our Savior's own example: now these things make it plain that the design of *Christ* and the *Devil* are diametrically opposite to each other. 3. The design of the *Devil* is to set God and Mankind at the greatest distance from each other; the design of *Christ* in the Gospel is to bring them nearer together. The *Devil* first tempts to sin, and then for sin; he makes Men presume to sin, and to despair because they have sinned. *Christ* first keeps Men from sin, by his Precepts and Threatnings; and then supposing sin, encourageth them to repent with hopes of pardon procur'd by himself for all truly penitent and believing Sinners. Thus in every things the design of *Christ* and the *Devil* are contrary, which makes it evident that the Miracles wrought in confirmation of the Doctrine of *Christ* cou'd be from no evil Spirit, and therefore must be from a truly Divine Power.

IX.

5. *True and Divine Miracles may be known and distinguished from false and diabolical, from the circumstances, or the manner of their operation.* There were some peculiar Signatures on the Miracles of *Christ* which are not to be found in any wrought by a power less than Divine. Which *Arnobius* well expresseth in these words to the *Heathens*. *Potestis aliquem nobis designare, monstrare ex omnibus illis Magis qui unquam fuere per secula, consimile aliquid Christo millesima ex parte qui fecerit? qui sine ulla vi carminum, sine herbarum aut graminum succis, sine ulla aliqua observatione sollicita sacrorum, libaminum, temporum?—Atqui constitit Christum sine ullis adminiculis rerum, sine ullius ritus observatione, vel lege, omnia illa quæ fecit, nominis sui possibilitate fecisse, & quod proprium, consentaneum, Deo dignum fuerat vero, nihil nocens aut noxium, sed opiferum, sed salutare, sed auxiliariis plenum bonis potestatis munifica liberalitate donasse?* He challengeth the *Heathens* to produce any one of all their *Magicians* who did the
thou-

*Arnob. c.
gentes. l. i.
pag. 25, 26,
&c.*

thousandth part of what our Savior did: who made use of none of their *Magical Rites* and *Observations* in whatever he did; and whatever he did was merely by his own power, and was withal most becoming *God*, and most beneficial to the *World*. And thence he proceeds to answer the *Heathens* about the *Miracles* wrought by their *Gods*, which fell short of those of *CHRIST* in three main particulars, the *Manner* of their working, and the *Number* of them, and the *Quality* of the things done.

1. *The manner of their working*. What they did was with a great deal of pomp and ceremony; what *CHRIST* did was with a word speaking, and sometimes without it by the touch of his Garment: *Non inquirō, non exigo, fāith he, quis Deus, aut quo tempore, cui fuerit auxiliatus, aut quem fractum restituerit sanitati; illud solum audire desidero, an sine ullius adjunctione materiæ, i. e. medicaminis aliqujus ad tactum morbos jusserit ab hominibus evolare, imperaverit, fecerit, & emori valetudinum causam, & debiliū corpora ad suas remeare naturas.* Omitting all other circumstances, name me, fāith he, but which of your *Gods* ever cured, a *Disease* without any adjoyned matter, some prescriptions or other; or which of them ever commanded *Diseases* out of *Bodies* by their mere touch, and quite remov'd the cause of the *Distempers*. *Æsculapius*, he says, cured *Diseases*, but in the way that ordinary *Physicians* do, by prescribing some thing or other, to be done by the *Patients*. *Nulla autem virtus est medicaminibus amovere quæ noceant; beneficia istarum, non sunt curantium potestates.* To cure *Diseases* by *Prescriptions* argues no power at all in the prescriber, but virtue in the *Medicine*.

2. *In the number of the Persons cured*. They were very few which were cured in the *Heathen Temples*; *CHRIST* cured whole multitudes, and that not in the *Revestries* of the *Temples* where fraud and imposture might be easily suspected, but in the presence of the *People* who brought to him all manner of *Persons* sick of all sorts of *Diseases*, which were cured by him; and these so numerous, that the *Evangelist* who records many of *CHRIST*'s *Miracles* which had been omitted by the other, yet tells us at last, the *Miracles* of *CHRIST* were so many, that the whole *World* would not contain them. Joh. 21. 25. But now *Arnobius* tells the *Heathens*, *Quid prodest ostendere unum aut alterum fortasse curatos, cum tot millibus subvenierit nemo, & plena sint omnia miserorum infeliciūque delubra? What matter is it to shew one or two cured, when thousands lie continually perishing for want of cure? yea such as did Æsculapium ipsum precibus fatigare, & invitare miserrimis votis, that cou'd not beg a cure of Æsculapius with all their earnestness and importunity.*

3. *In the quality of the Diseases cured*. The *Cures* among the *Heathens* were some slight things in comparison of those performed by *CHRIST*; the most *Acute*, the most *Chronical*, the most *Malignant* of *Diseases*, cur'd by a *Touch*, a *Word*, a *Thought*. A *Learned Physician* hath undertaken to make it evident from the circumstances of the *History*, and from the received *Principles* among the most *Authentic Physicians*, that the *Diseases* cured by our *Savior*, were all incurable by the *Rules* of *Physic*; if so, the greater the power of our *Savior*, who cured them with so much facility

*Gul. Ader.
de morbis
Evangel.*

facility as he did. And he not only cured all Diseases himself, but gave a power to others, who were not at all versed in matters of Art and Subtilty, that they shou'd do Miracles likewise *sine fucis & adminiculis*, without any fraud or assistance: *quid dicitis O mentes incredulæ, difficiles, duræ! alicuius mortalium Jupiter ille Capitolinus huiusmodi potestatem dedit?* When did ever the great Jupiter Capitolinus give a power of working Miracles to any? I do not say, saith he, of raising the dead, or curing the blind, or healing the lame; *sed ut pustulam, reduriam, populam, aut vocis imperio aut manus contrectatione comprimeret:* but to cure a wart, a pimple, any the most trivial thing, with a word speaking, or the touch of the hand. Upon this Arnobius challengeth the most famous of all the Heathen Magicians, Zoroastres, Armenius, Pamphilus, Apollonius, Damigero, Dardanus, Velus, Julianus, and Babulus, or any other renowned Magician to give power to any one to make the dumb to speak, the deaf to hear, the blind to see, or bring life into a dead Body. Or if this be too hard, with all their Magic Rites and Incantations, but to do that *quod a rusticis Christianis jussionibus factitatum est nudis*, which ordinary Christians do by their mere words: So great a difference was there between the highest that cou'd be done by Magic, and the least that was done by the Name and Power of CHRIST.

X. 6. Where Miracles are truly Divine, God makes it evident to all

impartial judgments that the things done exceed all created power.

For which purpose we are to observe that tho' Impostures and Delusions may go far, the power of Magicians further when God permits them; yet when God works Miracles to confirm a Divine Testimony, he makes it evident that His power doth infinitely exceed them all. This is most conspicuous, in the case of Moses and our Blessed Savior. First Moses, he began to do some Miracles in the

8. 10, 12.

presence of Pharaoh and the Egyptians, turning his Rod into a Serpent; but we do not find Pharaoh at all amaz'd at it, but sends presently for the Magicians to do the same, who did it (whether really or only in appearance, is not material to our purpose,) but

Exod. 7.
19, 22.

Aaron's Rod swallowed up theirs. The next time the waters are turned into blood by Moses. The Magicians they do so too. After

8. 6, 7.

this, Moses brings up Frogs upon the land, so do the Magicians. So that here now is a plain and open contest in the presence of Pharaoh and his People, between Moses and the Magicians, and they try for Victory over each other; so that if Moses do no more than they, they wou'd look upon him but as a Magician; but if Moses do that which by the acknowledgment of these Magicians themselves cou'd be only by Divine Power, then it is demonstrably evident that his power was as far above the power of Magic, as God is above the Devil. Accordingly we find it in the very next Miracle in turning the dust into Cinphes (which we render) lice, the

2. 19.

Magicians are non-plust, and give out, saying in plain terms, This is the finger of God. And what greater acknowledgment can there be of Divine Power than the confession of those who seem'd to contest with it, and to imitate it as much as possible? After this we find not the Magicians offering to contest with Moses, and in the plague of Boils, we particularly read that they could not stand before Moses. Thus we see in the case of Moses how evident it was that

9. 11.

there

there was a Power above all power of *Magic* which did appear in *Moses*. And so likewise in the case of our Blessed Savior; for altho' *Simon Magus*, *Apollonius*, or others might do some small things, or make some great shew and noise by what they did; yet none of them ever came near the doing things of the same kind which our Savior did, curing *the born-blind*, *restoring the dead to life after four days*, and so as to live a considerable time after; or in the manner he did them, with a Word, a Touch, with that frequency and openness before his greatest Enemies as well as Followers, and in such an uncontroll'd manner, that neither *Jews* or *Heathens* ever question'd the truth of them. And after all these, when he was laid in the grave after his *Crucifixion*, exactly according to his own prediction, he rose again the third day, appear'd frequently among his Disciples for forty days together. After which in their presence, he *ascended up to Heaven*, and soon after, made good his promise to them, *by sending his Holy Spirit upon them*, by which they spake with Tongues, wrought Miracles, went up and down preaching the Gospel of CHRIST with great boldness, cheerfulness and constancy, and after undergoing a great deal of hardship in it, they seal'd the truth of all they spake with their Blood, laying down their Lives to give witness to it. Thus abundantly to the satisfaction of the minds of all good Men hath God given the highest Rational Evidence of the truth of the Doctrine which he hath reveal'd to the World. And thus I have finish'd the Second Part of my Task, which concern'd the *Rational Evidence* of the truth of *Divine Revelation* from the Persons who were imploy'd to deliver God's mind to the World: And therein have, I hope, made it evident that both *Moses* and the *Prophets*, our *Savior* and his *Apostles*, did come with sufficient *Rational Evidence* to convince the World that they were Persons immediately sent from God.

ORIGINES SACRAE.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Of the Being of GOD.

- I. *The Principles of all Religion lie in the Being of God and Immortality of the Soul: from them the necessity of a particular Divine Revelation rationally deduced; the method laid down for proving the Divine Authority of the Scriptures.*
- II. *Why Moses doth not prove the Being of God, but suppose it.*
- III. *The notion of a Deity very consonant to Reason. Of the nature of Idea's, and particularly of the Idea of God.*
- IV. *How we can form an Idea of an infinite Being.*
- V, VI. *How far such an Idea argues existence.*
- VII, VIII. *The great unreasonableness of Atheism demonstrated. Of the Hypotheses of the Aristotelian and Epicurean Atheists.*
- IX. *The Atheists pretences examined and refuted.*
- X, XI, XII, XIII. *Of the nature of the Arguments whereby we prove there is a God. Of universal consent and the Evidence of that to prove a Deity and Immortality of Souls.*
- XIV, XV. *Of necessity of Existence imply'd in the notion of God, and how far that proves the Being of God.*
- XVI. *The order of the World and usefulness of the parts of it, and especially of Man's body an argument of a Deity.*
- XVII. *Some higher Principle prov'd to be in the World than Matter and Motion.*
- XVIII. *The nature of the Soul, and possibility of its subsisting after Death.*
- XIX. *Strange appearances in Nature not solvable by the power of Imagination.*

I. **H**AVING in the precedent Book largely given a rational account of the grounds of our Faith, as to the Persons whom God imployes to reveal his Mind to the World; if we can now make it appear that those sacred Records which we embrace as Divinely inspir'd, contain in them nothing unworthy of so great a name, or unbecoming Persons sent from God to deliver; there will be nothing wanting to justify our Religion in point of Reason to be True, and of Revelation to be Divine. For the Scriptures themselves coming to us in the name of God, we are bound to believe them to be such as they pretend to be, unless

unless we have ground to question the general Foundations of all Religion as uncertain, or this particular way of Religion as not suitable to those general foundations. The foundations of all Religion lie in two things; *That there is a God who rules the World,* and that the *Souls of Men are capable of subsisting after Death;* for he that comes unto God, must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that seek him; so that if these things be not suppos'd as most agreeable to Human Reason, we cannot imagin upon what grounds Mankind shou'd embrace any way of Religion at all. For if there be not a God whom I am to serve and obey, and if I have not a Soul of an immortal nature, there can be no sufficient obligation to Religion, nor motive inducing to it: For all obligation to Obedience must suppose the Existence of such a Being which hath power to command me; and by reason of the promiscuous scatterings of good and evil in this Life, the Motives engaging Men to the practice of Religion, must suppose the certainty of a future State. If these things be sure, and the foundations of Religion in general thereby firmly establish'd, it will presently follow as a matter most agreeable to reason, that the God whom we are to serve shou'd himself prescribe the way of his own worship; and if the right of Donation of that happiness which Mens Souls are capable of be alone in himself, that he alone shou'd declare the Terms on which it may be expected: For Man being a Creature endu'd with a free Principle of acting, which he is conscious to himself of, and therefore not being carry'd to his end by necessity of Nature or external Violence, without the concurrence of his own Reason and Choice, we must suppose this Happiness to depend upon the performance of some Conditions on Man's part, whereby he may demonstrate that it is the matter of his free choice, and that he freely quits all other Interests that he might obtain the enjoyment of it. Which Conditions to be perform'd, being Expressions of Man's obedience towards God as his Creator and Governor, and of his gratitude for the Tenders of so great a Happiness which is the free gift of his Maker, we cannot suppose any one to have power to prescribe these Conditions, but he that hath power likewise to deprive the Soul of her Happiness upon non-performance, and that must be God himself. But in order to Man's understanding his Duty, and his obligation to Obedience, it is necessary that these Conditions must not be lock'd up in the Cabinet Council of Heaven, but must be so far declar'd and reveal'd, that he may be fully acquainted with those Terms which his Happiness depends upon; else his neglect of them wou'd be excusable, and his misery unavoidable. Had Man indeed remain'd without offending his Maker, he might still have stood in his favor upon the general terms of Obedience due from the Creature to his Creator, and to all such particular Precepts which shou'd bear the impress of his Maker's will upon them; beside which, the whole Volume of the Creation, without, and his own Reason within wou'd have been sufficient Directors to him in the performance of his duty. But he abusing his liberty, and being thereby guilty of *Apostasy* from God (as is evident by a continu'd propensity to Sin, and the strangeness between God and the Souls of Men) a particular Revelation is now become necessary,

cessary, that Mankind may thereby understand on what terms God will be pleas'd again, and by what means they may be restor'd into his favor. And lastly, it not agreeing with the free and communicative nature of Divine Goodness (which was the first Original of the World's creation) to suffer all Mankind to perish in their own folly, we must suppose this way for Man's recovery to be somewhere prescrib'd, and the Revelation of it to be somewhere extant in the World. So that from the general Principles of the existence of God, and immortality of the Soul, we have deduced by clear and evident Reason the necessity of some particular Divine Revelation, as the Standard and Measure of Religion. And according to these Principles we must examin whatever pretends to be of Divine Revelation; for it must be suitable to that Divine nature from whom it is suppos'd to come, and it must be agreeable to the conditions of the Souls of Men; and therefore that which carries with it the greatest evidence of Divine Revelation, is, a faithful representation of the state of the case between God and the Souls of Men, and a Divine discovery of those ways whereby Mens Souls may be fitted for eternal Happiness. A Divine Revelation then must be faithful and true in all its Narrations; it must be excellent and becoming God in all its Discoveries. And therefore all that can with any reason be desir'd for proof of the Divine Authority of the Scriptures, will lie in these three things. First, *That the foundations of Religion are of undoubted certainty, or that there is a God, and that Mens Souls are Immortal.* Secondly, *That the Scriptures do most faithfully relate the matters of greatest Antiquity therein contain'd* (which do most concern the History of the Breach between God and Man.) Thirdly, *that the Scriptures are the only Authentic Records of those terms on which happiness may be expected in another World.*

- II. I begin with the first of them, which concerns the Existence of God, and Immortality of the Soul; both which seem to be suppos'd as general *Prolepses* in the Writings of *Moses*, and as things so consonant to Human nature, that none to whom his Writings shou'd come cou'd be suppos'd to question them. And therefore he spends no time in the operose proving of either of these, knowing to how little purpose his Writings wou'd be to such who deny'd these first Principles of all Religion. But beside this, there may be these accounts given, why these main foundations of all Religion are no more insisted on in the first Books of the Scripture, which contain the Originals of the World. First, *Because these were in the time of the writing of them, believed with an universal consent of Mankind.* In those more early days of the World, when the Tradition of the first Ages of it was more fresh and intire, it is scarce imaginable that Men shou'd question the Being of a God, when the History of the Flood, and the Propagation of the World after it by the Sons of *Noah*, and the burning of *Sodom* and *Gomorrhah* were so fresh in their memories, as having been done so few Generations before them. And by what remains of any History of other Nations in those elder times Men were so far from *Atheism*, that *Polytheism* and *Idolatry* were the common practice of the World, as is most evident in all Relations of the ancient *Chaldeans*, *Egyptians*, *Phœnicians*, and other Nations,

tions, who all suppos'd these two Principles; as well as those who serv'd the true God. And in all probability, as Men are apt to run from one extreme to another, *Polytheism* was the first occasion of *Atheism*, and *Idolatry* of *Irreligion*. And thence we find the first appearance of *Atheists* to be in the most blind and superstitious Age of *Greece*, when the obscene Poets had so debauch'd the common understandings of the People, as to make them believe such things concerning their Gods, which were so incongruous to Human Nature, that all who had any sense of goodness left, cou'd not but loath and abhor such Deities. And therefore we find all the flouts and jeers of the reputed *Atheists* among them, such as *Dionysius*, *Diagoras*, *Theodorus*, *Euhemerus*, *Messenius* and others, were cast upon their venerable *Deities*, which they so solemnly worshipped, who had been before, as *Euhemerus* plainly told them, poor mortal Men, and those not of the best Reputation neither: and therefore as the *Epicurean* in *Tully* well says, *omnis eorum cultus esset in luctu*, the most sutable Devotion for them had been lamenting their Death. Now when these common *Deities* were so much derided by intelligent Men, and yet the order of the World seem'd to tell them there was really a God, tho' those were none; those who had Philosophical wits, such as *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, set themselves to work to see if they cou'd solve the *Phænomena* of Nature without a *Deity*; and therefore asserted the Origin of the Universe to be only by a fortuitous Concourse of infinite little Particles: but herein they befool'd themselves and their greedy Followers, who were glad to be rid of those Anxieties of mind which the thoughts of a *Deity* and an immortal Soul did cause within them. And altho' *Lucrotius* in a bravado tells us of his Master, *that when Mens minds were sunk under the burden of Religion*,

*Cicero de
Nat. Deor.
l. 1. c. 38.*

*Humana ante oculos fæde cum vita jaceret
In terris oppressa gravi sub religione:
Primum Graius homo mortales tollere contra
Est oculos ausus, primusque obistere contra.*

Lucret. l. 1.

That *Epicurus* was the first true Gyant who durst encounter the Gods, and if we believe him, overthrew them in open field;

*Quare religio pedibus subjecta vicissim
Obteritur, nos exæquat victoria cælo.*

Yet *Cotta* in *Tully* reports the issue of this Battle quite otherwise; for altho' the greatest triumph in this Victory had been only to become like the Beasts that perish; yet if we believe *Cotta*, *Epicurus* was so far from gaining any of his belov'd Ease and Pleasure by his Sentiments, that never was School-boy more afraid of a Rod, nor did any Enemy more dread a Conqueror, than *Epicurus* did the thoughts of a God and Death. *Nec quenquam vidi qui magis ea quæ timenda esse negaret, timeret; mortem dico & Deos.* So hard it is for an *Epicurean* even after he hath prostituted his Conscience, to silence it; but (whatever there be in the Air) there is an Elastical power in Conscience that will bear its self

*Cicero de
Nat. Deor.
l. 1. c. 86.*

Cicero de
Nat. Deor.
l. 1. c. 44.

up notwithstanding the weight that is laid upon it. And yet after all the labors of *Epicurus*, he knew it was to no purpose to endeavor to root out wholly the belief of a Deity out of the World, because of the unanimous consent of the World in it; and therefore he admits of it as a necessary *Prolepsis* or Anticipation of Human Nature, *quod in omnium animis Deorum notionem impressisset ipsa natura, that nature its self had stamp'd an Idea of God upon the minds of Men; cum enim non instituto aliquo, aut more aut lege sit opinio constituta, maneatque ad unum omnium firma consensio, intelligi necesse est Deos esse, quoniam insitas eorum, vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus; de quo autem omnium natura consentit, id verum esse necesse est*, as *Velleius* the *Epicurean* argues. Since the belief of a Deity, neither rises from Custom nor was enacted by Law, yet is unanimously assented to by all Mankind; it necessarily follows that there must be a Deity, because the Idea of it is so natural to us. If it were thus acknowledg'd in the Philosophical Age of *Greece*, when Men bent their wits to unsettle the Belief of such things as tended to Religion; how much more might it be esteem'd a general Principle of Human Nature in those elder times, when not so much as one Dissenter appear'd that we read of among the more ancient Nations? But *Secondly*, it was less needful for *Moses* to insist much on the proof of a Deity in his Writings, when his very employment, and the History he wrote, was the greatest Evidence that there was one. Cou'd any of them question, whether there were a God, or no, who had heard his voice at Mount *Sinai*, and had receiv'd a Law from him, who had been present at so many Miracles which were done by *Moses* in *Egypt* and the Wilderness? What more evident demonstration of God cou'd be desir'd, than those many unparallel'd Miracles, which were wrought among them? And those who wou'd not be convinced by them that there was a God, wou'd certainly be convinced by nothing. *Thirdly*, It was unfutable to the purpose of *Moses* to go about to prove any thing he deliver'd by the mere force of Human Reason, because he writ as a Person employ'd by God; and therefore by the Arguments on which they were to believe his Testimony in whatever he writ, they cou'd not but believe there was a God that employ'd him. And from hence it is that *Moses* with so much Majesty and Authority begins the History of the Creation, with, *In the beginning God created the Heaven and the Earth*. There cou'd be no greater Evidence that there was an infinitely wise, good, and powerful God, than that the Universe was produced out of nothing by him; and what reason cou'd there be to distrust his Testimony who relates it, who manifested not only that there was a God, but that he was employ'd by him, by the Miracles which he wrought? So that all our former discourse concerning the Evidences of Divine Revelation, are a most palpable demonstration of a Deity; for if there be such a power which can alter the course of Nature when he pleases, the Being wherein it is, must needs be infinite; which is the same which we mean by God.

III.

But yet for those whose minds are so coy and squeamish as to any thing of Divine Revelation, we want not sufficient Evidence in

in point of Reason to prove to them the Existence of a Deity. In order to which, I shall clear these following Propositions.

1. *That the true notion of a Deity is most agreeable to the faculties of Mens Souls, and most consonant to Reason and the Light of Nature.*

2. *That those who will not believe that there is a God, do believe other things on far less Reason, and must by their own Principles deny some things which are apparently true.*

3. *That we have a certain Evidence that there is a God, as it is possible for us to have, considering his nature.*

That the true notion of God is most agreeable to the faculties Prop. 1.
of Mens Souls, and most consonant to Reason and the Light of Nature: i. e. that the Idea of God (or that which we conceive in our minds when we think of God) is so far from being any ways repugnant to any Principle of Reason within us, that it is hard to pitch on any other Notion which hath fewer entanglements in it, to a mind so far *Metaphysical* as to abstract from Sense and Prejudice. I grant it very difficult, nay impossible, for those to have any true sett'd notion of a God, who search for an Idea of him in their Fancies, and were never conscious to themselves of any higher faculty in their Souls than mere Imagination. Such may have *imaginem Jovis*, or *galeatæ Minervæ*, as he in *Tully* speaks, some Idea of an Idol in their minds, but none of a true God. For we may as soon come by the sight of colours to understand the nature of Sounds, as by any corporal Phantasms come to have a true Idea of God. And altho' sometimes an Idea be taken for that impression of things which is lodg'd in the Phantasy, yet here we take it in a more general sence, as it contains the representation of any thing in the Mind, as it is commonly said in the Schools that the Divine Intellect doth understand things by their Ideas, which are nothing else but the things themselves as they are objectively represented to the Understanding. So that an Idea in its general sence in which we take it, is nothing else but the objective Being of a thing as it terminates the Understanding, and is the form of the act of Intellection: that which is then immediately represented to the mind in its perception of things, is the Idea or Notion of it. Now such an Idea as this is, may be either true or false. For better understanding of which we must consider that an Idea in the Soul may be consider'd two ways. 1. As it is a mode of Cogitation, or the act of the Soul apprehending an Object; now this way no Idea can be false; for as it is an act of the Mind, every Idea hath its truth: for whether I imagine a Golden Mountain, or another, it matters not here; for the one Idea is as true as the other, considering it merely as an act of the Mind. For the Mind is as really imploy'd about the one as the other; as the Will is about an Object whether it be feasible or no. 2. The Idea may be consider'd in regard of its Objective Reality, or as it represents some outward object; now the truth or falshood of the Idea lies in the Understanding passing judgment concerning the outward Object, as existent, which doth correspond to the Idea which is in the Mind. And the proneness of the Understanding's error in this case ariseth from the different nature of those things which are represented to the Mind; for some of them are general and abstracted things, and do not at all suppose existence, as the nature of Truth, of a Being, of Cogitation; other Ideas depend upon

upon Existence suppos'd, as the Idea of the Sun, which I apprehend in my Mind because I have seen it; but besides these, there are other Ideas in the Mind, which the Understanding forms within its self by its own power, as it is a Principle of Cogitation; such are those which are called *entia rationis*, and have no other Existence at all but only in the Understanding, as *Chimera's*, *Centaures*, &c. Now as to these, we are to observe, that altho' the composition of these things together by the Understanding, be that which makes these Ideas to be only fictitious, yet the Understanding would not be able to compound such things, were they not severally represented to the Mind; as unless we had known what a Horse and a Man had been, our minds cou'd not have conjoyn'd them together in its apprehension. So that in these which are the most fictitious Ideas, we see, that altho' the Idea its self be a mere creature of the Understanding, yet the Mind cou'd not form such an Idea but upon Pre-existent matter, and some objective reality must be suppos'd in order to the intellectual Conception of these Anomalous Entities. By which we see that that strange kind of Omnipotency which some have attributed to Understanding, lies not in a Power of conceiving things wholly impossible, or fancying Ideas of absolute Non-entities, but in a kind of *African* Copulation of such Species of things together, which in Nature seem wholly impossible, (as the Schools speak) or have no congruity at all in the order of the Universe. So that had there never been any such things in the World as *matter* and *motion*, it is very hard to conceive, how the Understanding cou'd have form'd within its self the variety of the Species of such things, which are the results of those two grand Principles of the Universe. But because it is so impossible for minds not very Contemplative and Metaphysical to abstract from matter, thence it is we are apt to imagin such a Power in the Understanding, whereby it may form Ideas of such things which have no objective reality at all. I grant those we call *entia rationis* have no external reality as they are such; but yet I say, the existence of matter in the World, and the corporeal Phantasms of outward Beings, are the foundation of the Soul's conception of those Entities, which have no existence beyond the Human Intellect.

- IV. The great inquiry then is, how far this Plastic Power of the Understanding, may extend its self in its forming an Idea of God. That there is such a one in the minds of Men, is evident to every one that consults his own Faculties, and inquires of them, whether they cannot apprehend a setl'd and consistent Notion of a Being which is absolutely Perfect. For that is all we understand by the Idea of God; not that there is any such connate Idea in the Soul, in the sense which connate Ideas are commonly understood; but that there is a Faculty in the Soul, whereby upon the free use of Reason, it can form within its self a setl'd Notion of such a Being, which is as perfect as it is possible for us to conceive a Being to be. If any difficulty be made concerning the forming such a Notion in ones mind, let the Person who scruples it, only inquire of himself whether he judges all Beings in the World equal; whether a *Mushroom* hath in it all the perfections which Man hath? which I suppose none, who have a Mind within them can question. If then it

be

be granted that Man hath some Perfections in him above inferior Creatures, it will be no matter of difficulty to shew wherein Man exceeds other inferior Beings. For is not Life a greater Perfection than the want of it? Is not Reason and Knowledge, a Perfection above Sense? and so let us proceed to those things, wherein one Man differs from another; for it is evident, that all Men are not of equal Accomplishments; is not then Forecast and Prudence above Incogitancy and Folly? Is not the knowledge of Causes of things better than Stupidity and Ignorance? Is not Beneficence and Liberality more noble than Parsimony and Narrowness of Spirit? Is not true Goodness far above Debauchery and Intemperance? And are not all these far better, when they are joyn'd with such a power as hath no limits or bounds at all? Now then is it not possible for a Man's mind, proceeding in its ordinary way of Intellection, to form a notion of such a Being, which hath Wisdom, Goodness and Power in it, without any limits and bounds at all, or any of those Abatements, which any of these Perfections are found with in Man? For it is unconceivable, that the mind of Man can attribute to its self absolute Perfection, when it cannot but see its own defects in those things it excels other Creatures in; and supposing it had Power, Goodness and Knowledge far above what it hath; yet it cannot but say, that these Perfections wou'd be greater if it were always possess'd of them, and it were impossible that it should ever cease to be, or not have been. So that now joyning infinite Goodness, Wisdom and Power, with Eternity and necessity of Existence, the result is the notion of a Being absolutely perfect. So that now whoever questions the suitability of such a Notion or Idea to the faculties of Mens Souls, must question the truth of his own Faculties, and the method they proceed in, in their clearest Conceptions and Ratiocinations. And the Mind of Man may as well question the truth of any Idea it hath within its self, as of this we now discourse of. Nay, it may be far sooner puzz'd in any of those Ideas, which are transmitted into the Phantasy by the impressions of Corporeal Beings upon the Organs of Sense, than in this more intellectual and abstracted Idea, which depends wholly upon the Mind.

All the difficulty now is, whether this Idea of such an absolutely perfect Being, be any thing else but the Understanding's Plastic power, whereby it can unite all these Perfections together in one Conception; or doth it necessarily imply, that there must be such a Being really existent, or else I cou'd never have form'd such a sett'd Notion of him in my mind? To this I answer, 1. It is as much as I desire at present, that the forming of such an Idea in the Mind, is as suitable and agreeable to our Faculties as the forming the Conception of any other Being in the World. For hereby it is most evident that the notion of a God imports nothing incongruous to Reason, or repugnant to the Faculties of our Souls; but that the Mind will form as sett'd and clear a notion of God, as of any thing which in the judgment of *Epicurus*, his infallible Senses did the most assure him of. So that there can be no shadow of a pretense, why any shou'd reject the Being of a God because of the impossibility to conceive any such Being as God is. If to this it be objected, *that such things are imply'd in this*

v.

I i

Idea,

Idea, which make it unconceivable, in that all the Perfections in this Being are suppos'd to be infinite, and Infinity transcends our capacity of apprehension. To this I answer, 1. That those who deny Infinity in God, must necessarily attribute it to something else, as to infinite Space, infinity of succession of Ages and Persons, if the World were Eternal; and therefore it is most unreasonable to reject any Notion for that, which it is impossible, but if I deny that, I must attribute it to something else, to whose Idea it is far less proper than it is to God's. 2. Lest I shou'd rather seek to avoid the Argument than to satisfy it, I say, that tho' infinite as infinite cannot be comprehended, yet we may clearly and distinctly apprehend a Being to be of that nature, that no limits can be assign'd to it, as to its Power or Presence; which is as much as to understand it to be infinite. The *ratio formalis* of Infinity may not be understood clearly and distinctly, but yet the Being which is infinite may be. Infinity its self cannot be on this account, because however Positive we apprehend it, yet we always apprehend it in a Negative way, because we conceive it by denying all limitations and bounds to it; but the Being which is infinite we apprehend in a Positive Manner, altho' not adequately, because we cannot comprehend all which is in it. As we may clearly and distinctly see the Sea, tho' we cannot discover the bounds of it; so may we clearly and distinctly apprehend some Perfections of God when we fix our Minds on them, altho' we are not able to grasp them altogether in our narrow and confin'd Intellects, because they are infinite. Thus we see that God's Infinity doth not at all abate the clearness and distinctness of the Notion which we have of God; so that tho' the Perfections of God are without bounds or limits, yet it bears no repugnancy at all to Mens natural Faculties, to have a setl'd Idea of a Being infinitely perfect in their Minds.

VI.

To the Question I answer, It seems highly probable and far more consonant to Reason than the contrary, that this Idea of God upon the mind of Man, is no merely fictitious Idea, but that it is really imprinted there by that God whose Idea it is, and therefore doth suppose a reality in the Thing correspondent to that objective reality which is in the Understanding. For altho' I am not so well satisfy'd that the mere objective reality of the Idea of God doth exceed the efficiency of the mind, as that Idea is nakedly consider'd in its self, because of the unlimited power of the Understanding in conception: Yet I say, considering that Idea in all the circumstances of it, it seems highly probable that it is no mere *ens rationis*, or figment of the understanding; and that will appear on these considerations. 1. This Idea is of such a Nature as cou'd not be form'd from the Understanding's consideration of any corporeal Phantasms. Because whatever hath any thing of Matter in it, involves of necessity many imperfections along with it; for every part of Matter is divisible into more parts. Now it is a thing evident to Natural Light, that it is a greater Perfection not to be divisible than to be so. Besides, corporeal Phantasms are so far from helping us in forming this Idea, that they alone hinder us from a distinct Conception of it, while we attend to them; because these bear no proportion at all to such a Being. So that this Idea however must be a pure act of Intellection, and therefore sup-
posing

posing there were no other faculty in Man but Imagination, it would bear the greatest repugnancy to our Conceptions, and it would be according to the Principles of *Epicurus* and some modern Philosophers, a thing wholly impossible to form an Idea of God, unless with *Epicurus* we imagin him to be Corporeal, which is to say, he is no God. Which was the reason that *Tully* said, *Epicurus* did only, *nomine ponere, re tollere Deos*, because such a Notion of God is repugnant to Natural Light. So that if this Idea doth wholly abstract from corporeal Phantasms; it thereby appears that there is a higher faculty in Man's Soul than mere imagination, and it is hardly conceivable whence a faculty which thus extends it to an infinite object, should come, but from an infinite Being: especially if we consider, Secondly, That the Understanding in forming this Idea of God, doth not by distinct acts, first collect one Perfection, and then another, and at last unite these together, but the simplicity and unity of all these Perfections is as necessarily conceiv'd as any of them. Granting then that the Understanding by the observing of several Perfections in the World, might be able to abstract these severally from each Being wherein they were, yet whence should the Idea of the Unity and Inseparability of all these Perfections come? The Mind may, it is true, knit some things together in fictitious Ideas, but then those are so far from unity with each other, that in themselves they speak mutual Repugnancy to one another, which makes them proper *entia rationis*; but these several Perfections are so far from speaking repugnancy to each other, that the Unity and Inseparability of them is as necessary to the forming of this Idea, as any other Perfection whatsoever. So that from hence it appears that the consideration of the Perfections which are in the Creatures, is only an occasion given to the Mind to help it in its Idea of God, and not that the Idea itself depends upon those Perfections as the causes of it: as in the clearest *Mathematical* truths the Manner of demonstration may be necessary to help the Understanding to its clearer assent, tho' the things in themselves be undoubtedly true. For all minds are not equally capable of the same truths; some are of quicker apprehension than others are; now altho' to slower apprehensions a more particular way of demonstrating things be necessary, yet the truths in themselves are equal, tho' they have not equal Evidence to several Persons.

3. It appears that this is no mere fictitious Idea from the uniformity of it in all persons who have freed themselves from the Entanglements of corporeal phantasms. Those we call *entia rationis*, we find by experience in our Minds, that they are form'd *ad placitum*; we may imagin them as many ways as we please; but we see it is quite otherwise in this Idea of God; for in those Attributes or perfections which by the light of Nature we attribute to God, there is an uniform consent in all those who have divested their Minds of corporeal phantasms in their conceptions of God. For while men have agreed that the object of their Idea is a Being absolutely perfect, there hath been no dissent in the Perfections which have been attributed to it; none have question'd but infinite Wisdom, Goodness, and Power, joyn'd with necessity of Existence, have been all imply'd in this Idea. So that it is scarce possible to in-

stance in any one Idea, no not of those which are most obvious to our Senses, wherein there hath been so great an uniformity of Mens conceptions as in this Idea of God. And the most gross corporeal Idea of the most sensible matter hath been more liable to heats and disputes among *Philosophers*, than this Idea of a Being infinite and purely spiritual. Which strongly proves my present Proposition, That this Idea of God is very consonant to Natural light; for it is hardly conceivable that there shou'd be so universal a Consent of minds in this Idea, were it not a Natural result from the free use of our Reason and Faculties. And that which adds further weight to this Argument is, that altho' Infinity be so necessarily imply'd in this Idea of God, yet Men do not attribute all kind of infinite Things to God; for there being conceivable infinite Number, infinite Longitude, as well as infinite power and knowledg, our minds readily attribute the latter to God, and as readily abstract the other from his Nature, which is an Argument this Idea is not fictitious, but argues Reality in the thing correspondent to our conception of it. So much may suffice to clear the first Proposition, *viz. That the notion of a God is very sutable to the Faculties of Mens Souls, and to that light of Nature which they proceed by in forming the conceptions of things.*

VII.
Prop. 2.

Those who deny that there is a God, do assert other things on far less evidence of Reason, and must by their own principles deny some things which are apparently true. One wou'd expect that such Persons who are apt to condemn the whole World of folly in believing the truth of Religion, and wou'd fain be admir'd as Men of a deeper reach, and greater wit and sagacity than others, wou'd, when they have exploded a *Deity*, at least give us some more rational and consistent account of things, than we can give that there is a God. But on the contrary we find the reasons on which they reject a *Deity* so lamentably weak, and so easily retorted upon themselves, and the *Hypotheses* they substitute instead of a *Deity* so precarious, obscure and uncertain, that we need no other Argument to evince the reasonableness of Religion, than from the manifest folly as well as impiety of those who oppose it. Which we shall make evident by these two things: 1. *That while they deny a Deity, they assert other things on far less reason.* 2. *That by those principles on which they deny a Deity, they must deny some things which are apparently true.*

1. *That they assert some things on far less reason than we do that there is a God.* For if there be not an infinitely powerful God who produced the World out of nothing, it must necessarily follow according to the different Principles of the *Aristotelian* and *Episcopurean Atheists*, that either the World was as it is from all eternity, or else that it was at first made by the fortuitous concurrence of Atoms. Now I appeal to the Reason of any Person, who hath the free use of it, Whether either of these two *Hypotheses* urged with the same or greater difficulties, &c. be not far more weakly prov'd than the existence of a *Deity* is, or the production of the World by Him.

1. *They run themselves into the same difficulties which they wou'd avoid in the belief of a Deity; and nothing can be a greater evidence of an entangled Mind than this is: To deny a thing because of some difficulty in it, and instead of it to assert another thing which*

which is chargeable with the very same difficulty in a higher degree. Thus when they reject a *Deity*, because they cannot understand what Infinity means; both these *Hypotheses* are liable to the same intricacy in apprehending the nature of something infinite. For according to the *Epicureans*, there must be an infinite Space, and what greater ease to the Mind is there in conceiving an Idea of that than of an infinite Being? And if the World be eternal, there must have been past an infinite succession of Ages, and is not the Understanding as easily lost in this, as in an eternal Being which created the World? For if the course of Generations in the World had no beginning at all, (which necessarily follows upon the eternity of the World) then an infinite number of successions are already past, and if past, then at an end, and so we find an infinite which hath had an end, which is a consequence becoming one who avoids the belief of a *Deity*, because Infinity is an unconceivable thing. Besides, if the number of Generations hath been infinite; these two Consequences will unavoidably follow, which the reason of any one but an *Atheist* wou'd startle at, that one infinite may be greater than another, and that the part is equal to the whole. For let him fix where he please, in the course of Generations, I demand whether in the Great-grand-father's time the succession of Generations was finite or infinite; if finite, then it had a beginning; and so the World not eternal; if infinite, then I ask, whether there were not a longer succession of Generations in the time of his Great-grand-children, and so there must be a number greater than that which was infinite; for the former succession was infinite, and this hath more Generations in it than that had: but if it be said that they were equal, because both infinite, then the successions of Generations to the Grand-father, being but a part of that which extends to his Grand-children and posterity, the part is equal to the whole. And is not now the notion of an infinite Being enough to stumble an *Atheist's* Reason, when he can so nimbly leap over so apparent contradictions? I insist not on this as an evident Demonstration to prove a *Deity*, which possibly it may not amount to, because it may only demonstrate the impossibility of our Understandings comprehending the nature of Infinity. But however it doth most evidently demonstrate the folly and unreasonableness of the *Atheist*, who rejects the Being of God on the account of his infinity, when his Understanding is more lost in apprehending an infinite succession of Generations which follows from his supposition of the eternity of the World. If then it be impossible, as it is, upon any Principles whatsoever, to avoid the conception of somewhat infinite and eternal, either Matter or Space, or some Being, let any one appeal to his own Reason, whether it be not more agreeable to that, to attribute these Perfections to such a Being, to whose Idea they necessarily belong, than to attribute them to this World, in whose conception they are not at all imply'd; but on the contrary they do far more puzzle our Understandings than when we conceive them to be in God. If somewhat must have a continued duration and be of an unbounded nature, how much more rational is it to conceive Wisdom, Power, and Goodness to be conjoyn'd with Eternity and Infinity, than to bestow these Attributes upon an

empty Space, or upon dull and unactive Matter? It cannot be Reason then, but some more base and unworthy Principle which makes the *Atheist* question the Being of God, because his Perfections are unconceivable, when according to his own Principles the most puzzling Attributes of God return upon him with more force and violence, and that in a more inexplicable manner.

VIII.

2. As the *Atheist* must admit those things himself which he rejects the Being of God for; so he admits them upon far weaker grounds than we do attribute them to God. If any thing may be made evident to Man's natural Reason concerning the existence of a Being so infinite as God is, we doubt not but to make it appear that we have great assurance of the Being of God; but how far must the *Atheist* go, how heartily must he beg before his *Hypothesis* either of the fortuitous Concourse of *Atoms*, or Eternity of the World will be granted to him? For if we stay till he proves either of these by evident and demonstrative Reasons, the World may have an end before he proves his *Atoms* cou'd give it a beginning, and we may find it Eternal, *a parte post*, before he can prove it was so *a parte ante*. For the proof of a Deity we appeal to his own Faculties, Reason and Conscience; we make use of Arguments before his Eyes; we bring the universal Sense of Mankind along with us: But for his Principles, we must wholly alter the present Stage of the World, and crumble the whole Universe into little Particles; we must grind the Sun to Powder, and by a new way of Interment turn the Earth into Dust and Ashes, before we can so much as imagin how the World cou'd be fram'd. And when we have thus far begg'd leave to imagin things to be what they never were, we must then stand by in some infinite Space to behold the friskings and Dancings about of these little Particles of Matter, till by their frequent Rencounters and Justlings one upon another, they at last link themselves together, and run so long in a round till they make Whirl-pools enough for Sun, Moon and Stars, and all the Bodies of the Universe to emerge out of. But what was it which at first set these little Particles of Matter in motion? Whence came so great variety in them to produce such wonderful diversities in Bodies as there are in the World? How came these casual Motions to hit so luckily into such admirable Contrivances as are in the Universe? When I once see a thousand blind Men run the point of a Sword in at a Key-hole without one missing; when I find them all frisking together in a spacious Field, and exactly meeting all at last in the very middle of it; when I once find, as *Tully* speaks, the *Annals* of *Ennius* fairly written in a heap of Sand, and as *Kepler's* Wife told him, a Room full of Herbs moving up and down fall down into the exact order of Sallets, I may then think the *Atomical Hypothesis* probable, and not before. But what Evidence of Reason or Demonstration have we, that the great Bodies of the World did result from such a Motion of these small Particles? *It is possible to be so*, saith *Epicurus*; What if we grant it possible? Can no things in the World be, which it is possible might have been otherwise? What else thinks *Epicurus* of the Generations of things now? They are such certainly as the World now is, and yet he believes it was once otherwise: Must therefore a bare possibility of the contrary make us deny

deny our Reason, silence Conscience, contradict the universal Sense of Mankind by excluding a Deity out of the World? But whence doth it appear possible? Did we ever find any thing of the same nature with the World produced in such a manner by such a concurrence of *Atoms*? Or is it because we find in natural Beings, how much these Particles of Matter serve to solve the *Phænomena* of Nature? But doth it at all follow, because now under Divine Providence which wisely orders the World, and things in it, that these Particles, with their several Affections and Motion, may give us a tolerable account of many Appearances as to Bodies, that therefore the Universe had its Original merely by a Concretion of these, without any Divine Hand to order and direct their Motion? But of this more when we come to the Creation of the World; our design now is only to compare the Notion of a Deity, and of the *Atheist's Hypothesis* in point of Perspicuity and Evidence of Reason: of which let any one who hath Reason judge. Thus we see how the *Atheist* in denying a Deity, must assert something else instead of it, which is press'd with the same, if not greater difficulties, and prov'd by far less Reason.

The Atheist by the same principles on which he denies a God, must deny some things which are apparently true. Which will be evident by our running over the most plausible pretences which he insists upon. IX.
2.

I. Because the Being of God cannot be demonstrated. But how doth the *Atheist* mean it? Is it because God cannot be demonstrated to Sense, that we cannot [*digito monstrari & dicier hic est*] point at him with our Fingers? It is a sign there is little of Reason left, where Sense is made the only Umpire of all kinds of Beings. Must all intellectual Beings be proscrib'd out of the order of Nature, because they cannot pass the scrutiny of Sense? And by the same reason all Colours shall be dash'd out because they cannot be heard; all Noises silenced, because they cannot be seen; for why may not one Sense be set to judge of all objects of Sense with far more Reason, than Sense it self be set as Judge over Intellectual Beings? But yet it is wisely done of the *Atheist* to make Sense his Judge; for if we once appeal to this, he knows our Cause is lost; for as he said of a Physician, when one ask'd him, whether he had any experience of him: No, said he, *Si periculum fecissem, non viverem*; If I had try'd him, I had been dead e'er now; so here, If God were to be try'd by the judgment of Sense, he must cease to be God; for how can an infinite and spiritual Being be discern'd by the judgment of Sense? and if he be not an infinite and spiritual Being, he is not God. But it may be the *Atheist's* meaning is not so gross, but he intends such a *demonstration to reason as That two and two make four, or That the whole is greater than the parts*; with such a demonstration he wou'd sit down contented. But will no less than this serve him? What becomes then of the World's being made by a fortuitous concurrence of *Atoms*? Is this as evident as that two and two make four? And will the Philosophical *Atheist* really believe nothing in Nature, but what is as evident to him in material Beings, as *that the whole is greater than the parts*? By any means let *Atheists* then write Philosophy, that at the last the Clocks in *London* may strike together,

gether, and the Philosophers agree; for I suppose none of them question that. But yet it is possible the *Atheist* may in a good humor abate something of this, and mean by demonstration such a proof as takes away all difficulties. If he means as to the Ground of Assent, we undertake it; if as to the Object apprehended, we reject it as unreasonable, because it is impossible a Being Infinite shou'd be comprehended by us; for if it cou'd, it were no longer Infinite. But let us try this Principle by other things, and how evident is it, that on this account some things must be deny'd which himself will confess to be true? For instance, that *opprobrium Philosophorum*, the divisibility of Quantity, or extended matter into finite or infinite parts; let him take which side he please, and see whether by the force of these Arguments on either side, if he hold to this principle, he must not be forced to deny that there is any such thing as matter in the World: and then we may well have an infinite empty space, when by force of this one Principle, both God and Matter are banish'd quite out of the World. But if the *Atheist* will but come one step lower, and by his demonstration intend nothing else but such a sufficient proof of it as the nature of the thing is capable of, he will not only speak most consonant to Reason, but may be in some hopes of gaining satisfaction. For it is most evident, that all things are not capable of the like way of proof; and that in some cases the possibility of the contrary must be no hindrance to an undoubted assent. What these proofs are, will appear afterwards. I come to the next ground of the *Atheist's* opinion, which is,

2. *The weakness of some Arguments brought to prove a Deity.* But let us grant that some Arguments will not do it, doth it therefore follow that none can do it? What if some have prov'd the Sun to be the Center of the World; and the motion of the Earth, by very weak Arguments, will the *Atheist* therefore question it? What if *Epicurus* hath prov'd his *Atomical Hypothesis* by some silly *Sophisms*, will the *Atheist* therefore rather believe the Creation of the World than it? What if the *Atheist* may make himself sport at some Stories of Apparitions insisted on to prove a Deity, doth it therefore follow there is no God, because some Persons have been over-credulous? What if some having more Zeal than Knowledg, may attribute such things to God's immediate hand, which may be produced by natural Causes, doth it thence follow that God hath no hand in governing the World at all? What if Fears, and Hopes and Persuasions, may depend much on Principles of Education, must Conscience then be resolv'd wholly into these? What if some devout *Melancholist* may embrace the issues of his own Imagination for the impressions of the Divine Spirit, doth it therefore follow, that Religion is nothing but strength of Fancy improv'd by principles of Education? What if some of the numerous proofs of a Deity were cut off, and only those made use of, which are of the greatest force, wou'd the Truth suffer at all by that? I grant, advantage is often taken against a thing more by one weak Argument brought for it, than for it by the strongest Proofs: but I say, it is unreasonable it shou'd be so; and were Men Rational and Ingenuous it wou'd not be so. Many times Arguments may be good in their order, but they are mis-placed;
some

some may prove the thing rational, which may not prove it true; some may shew the Absurdities of the Adversaries, rejecting the thing, which may not be sufficient to prove it; now when Men number and not weigh their Arguments, but give them in the lump to the main question, without fitting them to their several places, they do more disservice to the main of the Battle by the disorder of their Forces, than they can advantage it by the number of them.

3. Another great pretense the *Atheist* hath, is, that Religion is only an invention of Politicians, which they awe People with as they please, and therefore tell them of a God, and another World, as Mothers send young Children to School to keep them in better order, that they may govern them with the greater ease. To this I answer, 1. Religion I grant, hath a great influence upon the well-governing the World, nay so great, that were the *Atheists* opinion true, and the World persuaded of it, it were impossible the World cou'd be well govern'd. For the Government of the World in civil Societies, depends not so much on Force, as the sacred Bonds of Duty and Allegiance, which hold a Nation that owns Religion as true, in far surer Obligations to endeavor the peace and welfare of a Nation than ever Violence can do. For in this case only an opportunity is watch'd for to shake off that which they account a Yoke upon their Necks; whereas when Mens minds are possess'd with a sense of duty and obligation to Obedience out of Conscience, the Reins may be held with greater ease; and yet the People be better manag'd by them, than by such as only gall and irage them. So that I grant true Religion to be the most serviceable Principle for the governing of civil Societies; but withal, I say, 2. It were impossible Religion shou'd be so much made use of for the governing of People, were there not a real propensity and inclination to Religion imprinted on the Minds of Men. For as, did not Men love themselves, and their Children, their Estates and Interests, it were impossible to keep them in Obedience to Laws; but doth it follow, because Magistrates persuade People to Obedience by futing Laws to the general interest of Men, that therefore the Magistrates first made them love themselves and their own concerns? So it is in Religion, the Magistrate may make use of this propensity to Religion in Men for civil ends, but his making use of it doth suppose it and not instill it. For were Religion nothing else in the World but a design only of Politicians, it wou'd be impossible to keep that design from being discover'd at one time or other; and when once it came to be known, it wou'd hurry the whole World into confusion; and the People wou'd make no scruple of all Oaths and Obligations, but every one wou'd seek to do others what mischief he cou'd if he had opportunity, and obey no further than Fear and Force constrain'd him. Therefore no Principle can be so dangerous to a State as *Atheism*, nor any thing more promote its Peace than true Religion; and the more Men are persuaded of the truth of Religion, they will be the better Subjects, and the more useful in civil Societies. As well then may an *Atheist* say there is no such thing as Good Nature in the World, because that is apt to be abus'd, nor any such thing as Love, because that may be cheated, as that Religion

K k

ligion is nothing but a design, because Men may make it stalk to their private ends. Thus we see how the *Atheist* by the force of those Principles on which he denies a God, must be forced to deny other things, which yet by his own confession are apparently true.

X. *Prop. 3.* So I come to the third *Proposition*, which is, *That we have as certain Evidence that there is a God, as we can have, considering his Nature.* When we demand the proof of a thing, our first eye must be to the nature of the thing which we desire may be prov'd, for things equally true, are not capable of equal evidence, nor have like manners of probation. There is no demonstration in *Euclide* will serve to prove that there are such places as the *Indies*: we cannot prove the Earth is round by the judgment of sense; nor that the Soul is immortal by corporeal Phantasms. Every distinct kind of Being hath its peculiar way of probation; and therefore it ought not to be at all wondred at, if the supreme and infinite Being have his peculiar way of demonstrating himself to the minds of Men. If then we have as evident proofs of the Existence of God, as we can have, considering the infinity of his Nature, it is all which in reason we can desire; and of that kind of proofs we have these following. For, 1. *If God hath stamped an universal Character of himself upon the minds of Men.* 2. *If the things in the World are the manifest effects of infinite Wisdom, Goodness and Power.* 3. *If there be such things in the World which are unaccountable without a Deity,* then we may with safety and assurance conclude that there is a God.

1. *That God hath imprinted an universal Character of himself on the minds of Men,* and that may be known by two things,
1. *If it be such as bears the same importance among all Persons.*
2. *If it be such as cannot be mistaken for the Character of any thing else.*

1. I begin with the first, whereby I shall prove this Character to be universal, because the whole World hath consented in it. This Argument we may rely on with the greater security, because it was the only Argument which retain'd the Deity in the ancient School of *Epicurus*; which cou'd he have thought of as easy a way of evading, as he thought he had found out as to the Origin of the Universe, he was no such great Friend to the very name of a God, as to have retain'd it as an Anticipation or Prolepsis of Human Nature. And this Argument from the universal consent of the World, was that which bore the greatest sway among the Philosophers, who went by nothing but Dictates of natural Light, which they cou'd not so clearly discover in any things, as in those which all Mankind did unanimously consent in. Two things I shall make out this by. 1. *That no sufficient account can be given of so universal a consent, unless it be suppos'd to be the voice of Nature.* 2. *That the dissent of any particular Persons is not sufficient to controul so universal an Agreement.*

1. *That no sufficient account of it can be given, but only by asserting it to be a Dictate of Nature.* In so strange a dissent as there hath been in the World concerning most of those things which relate to Mankind in common, as the Models of Government, the Laws they are rul'd by, the particular Rites and Customs

stoms of Worship; we have the greatest reason to judge that those common Principles which were the Foundations on which all these several different Customs were built, were not the effect of any positive Laws, nor the mere force of principles of Education, but something which had a deeper root and foundation in the Principles of Nature it self. A common and universal Effect must flow from some common and universal Cause. So the *Stoic* argues in *Tully*, If there were no God, *non tam stabilis opinio permaneret, nec confirmaretur diuturnitate temporis, nec una cum seculis ætibusque hominum inveterare potuisset.* It is strange to think that Mankind in so many Ages of the World shou'd not grow wise enough to rid it self of so troublesome an Opinion as that was, of the Being of God, had it not been true.

*Cicero de
Nat. Deor.
l. 2.*

We see in all the alterations of the World, other vain Opinions have been detected, refuted and shaken off; if this had been such, how comes it to remain the same in all Ages, and Nations of the World? *Opinionum commenta delet dies, natura judicium confirmat.* It is a great discredit to Time to make it like a River in that sence, that it bears up only lighter things, when matters of greatest weight are sunk to the bottom and past recovery. This may pass for a handsom Allusion, as to the Opinions and Writings of particular Persons, but cannot be understood of such things which are founded on the universal consent of the World, for these common Notions of Human Nature are so suted to the temper of the World, that they pass down the strong current of Time with the same facility that a well built Ship, tho' of good burden, doth furrow the Ocean. So that if we must adhere to the Allegory, it is easily reply'd, that it is not the weight of things which makes them sink, but the unsutableness of their Superficies to that of the water; so we see a small piece of Wood will sink, when a stately Ship is born up; so such things which have not that agreeableness in them to the Dictates of Nature may soon be lost, but such as lie so even upon the superficies of the Soul, will still float above the Water, and never be lost in the swiftest current of Time. Thus we assert this universal consent of Mankind, as to the existence of a Deity, to be a thing so consonant to our Natural reason, that as long as there are Men in the World it will continue.

But now it is hardly conceivable, according to the Principles of *Epicurus*, how Mankind shou'd universally agree in some common Sentiments; much less how it shou'd have such an Anticipation as himself grants of the Being of God. For if the Soul be nothing else but some more active and vigorous Particles of Matter (as *Diogenes Laertius* tells us, that his Opinion was, that the Soul was nothing else but a *System* *ἢ ἀτῶν λευκῶν & πορφυρεῶν, of the most smooth and round Atoms*) if so, it is very hard apprehending how any such things as Anticipations or common Notions can be lodg'd in the Soul; for if our Souls be nothing else but some small Sphærical Corpuscles which move up and down the Body, as the *Epicurean* Philosophy supposeth, then all our Knowledge and Perception must depend on Motion, which Motion must be by the impression of external Objects: which *Lucretius* acknowledgeth and contends for.

XI.

*Laertius
l. 10. in v.
Epic. v.
Gassend.
To. 2d. l. 3.
sect. 3.*

Lucret. l. 4.

*Invenies primis a sensibus esse creatam
Notitiam veri.*

Cicero de
Nat. Deor.
l. 1.

If then our knowledge of Truth comes in by our Senses, and Sensation doth wholly depend upon the impression of outward Objects, what becomes of all common Notions and of the *Prolepsis* of a Deity? unless we suppose the knowledge of a Deity came in by Sense, which *Epicurus* himself denies when he attributes to the Deity not *corpus*, but *quasi corpus*, as *Tully* tells us, and therefore he is not a proper object of Sense. So that it is impossible there shou'd be any such thing as a natural Notion which may be the ground of universal consent among Men, according to the Doctrine of *Epicurus*. And therefore it stands to all reason in the World, that if our Senses be the only competent Judges of Truth, Men shou'd differ about nothing more than such things which cannot be try'd by the judgment of Sense; such as the notion of a God is; (for where shou'd Men be more uncertain in their judgments, than in such things which they have no rule at all to go by in the judging of?) but we are so far from finding it so, that Men are nothing so much agreed about the objects of Sense, as they are about the existence of a Deity; and therefore we see this universal consent of Mankind concerning a God, cannot be salv'd by the Principles of those who deny it; according to which no account at all can be given of any such things as universal or common Notions.

XII

Neither can this universal consent of Mankind be enervated with any greater probability by those *Atheists* who assert the Eternity of the World, and resolve this consent wholly into mere Tradition, such as the Fables of Poets were convey'd in from one to another. For I demand concerning this Tradition, Whether ever it had any beginning or no? If it had no beginning, it cou'd be no Tradition; for that must run up to some Persons from whom it first came; again, if it had no beginning, it was necessary that it shou'd always be, on the same accounts on which they make the World eternal. And if it be necessary, it must be antecedent to any free Act of Man's Will which Tradition supposeth; and so some false Opinion wou'd be found to be as necessary as the World's being eternal, (and by consequence the World's being eternal may be a necessary false Opinion) but if any false Opinion be once granted necessary, it then follows that our Faculties are not true, and that Nature is a necessary cause of some notorious Falsity, which is the highest Impeachment the *Atheist* cou'd have laid upon his only ador'd Nature, which must then have done that, (which *Aristotle* was asham'd to think ever Nature shou'd be guilty of) which is, something in vain; for to what purpose shou'd Man have rational Faculties, if he be under an unavoidable necessity of being deceiv'd? If then it be granted that this Tradition had once a beginning, either it began with Human Nature, or Human Nature did exist long before it: if it began with Mankind, then Mankind had a beginning, and so the World was not eternal; if Mankind did exist before this Tradition, I then inquire in what time, and by what means, came this Tradition first to be embraced, if it doth not suppose the existence of a Deity? Can any Age be mention'd

mention'd in History, wherein this Tradition was not universally receiv'd? and which is most to our purpose, the further we go back in History, the fuller the World was of Deities, if we believe the Heathen Histories; but however no Age can be instanc'd in, wherein this Tradition began first to be believ'd in the World; we can trace the Poetic Fables to their true Original, by the Testimonies of those who believ'd them; we know the particular Authors of them, and what course they took in divulging of them; we find great diversities among themselves in the meaning of them, and many Nations that never heard of them. But all things are quite otherwise in this Tradition; we have none to fix on as the first Authors of it; if the World were eternal, and the belief of a Deity fabulous, we cannot understand by what Artifice a fabulous Tradition cou'd come to be so universally receiv'd in the World, that no Nation of old cou'd be instanced in by the inquisitive Philosophers, but however rude and barbarous it was, yet it own'd a Deity. How cou'd such a Tradition be spread so far, but either by Force or Fraud? It cou'd not be by force, because embraced by an unanimous consent where no force at all hath been us'd, and hath been so rooted in the very Natures of those People who have been most tender of their Liberties, that they have resented no Indignity so highly, as any Affronts they conceiv'd to be offer'd to their Gods. Nay, and where any Persons seem to quit the belief of a Deity, we find what Force and Violence they have us'd to their own Reason and Conscience to bring themselves to *Atheism*, which they cou'd not subdue their Minds to any longer than the Will cou'd command the Understanding; which when it gain'd but a little liberty to examin it self, or view the World, or was alarm'd with Thunder, Earth-quakes or violent Sickness, did bring back again the sense of a Deity with greater force and power than they had endeavor'd to shake it off with. Now had this Tradition come by force into the World, there wou'd have been a secret exultation of Mind to be freed from it, as we see Nature rejoiceth to shake off every thing which is violent, and to settle every thing according to its due order. It is only Fraud then which can be with any Reason imagin'd in this case; and how unreasonable it is to imagin it here, will appear to any one who doth consider how extremely jealous the World is of being imposed upon by the Subtilty of such who are thought to be the greatest Politicians. For the very Opinion of their Subtilty makes them apt to suspect a Design in every thing they speak or do, so that nothing doth more generally hinder the entertaining of any motion so much among vulgar People, as that it comes from a Person reputed very Politic. So that the most politic way of gaining upon the Apprehensions of the Vulgar, is by taking upon one the greatest appearance of Simplicity and Integrity; and this now cou'd not be done by such Politicians which we now speak of, but by accommodating themselves to such things in the People which were so consonant to their Natures, that they cou'd suspect no design at all in the matters propounded to them. And thus I assert it to have been in the present case, in all those Politic Governors who at first brought the World into both Civil and Religious Societies, after they were grown Rude and Barbarous; for as it had

been impossible to have brought them into Civil Societies, unless there had been suppos'd an inclination to Society in them, so it had been equally impossible to have brought them to embrace any particular way of Religion, unless there had been a natural propensity to Religion implanted in them, and founded in the general belief of the existence of a Deity. And therefore we never find any of the ancient Founders of Common-wealths go about to persuade the People that there was a God, but this they suppos'd and made their advantage of it, the better to draw the People on to embrace that way of Worship, which they deliver'd to them, as most suitable to their own design. And this is plainly evident in the vast difference of Designs and Interests which were carry'd on in the Heathen World upon this general apprehension of a Deity. How came the World to be so easily abus'd into Religions of all shapes and fashions, had not there been a natural inclination in Mens Souls to Religion, and an indelible Idea of a Deity on the Minds of Men? Were then this propensity groundless, and this Idea fictitious, it were the greatest slur imaginable, which cou'd be cast upon Nature, that when the Instincts of irrational Agents argue something real in them; only Man the most noble Being of the visible World, must be fatally carry'd to the belief of that which never was. Which yet hath so great a force and awe upon Man, that nothing creates so great Anxieties in his life as this doth, nothing lays him more open to the designs of any who have an intent to abuse him. But yet further, these Politicians who first abus'd the world, in telling them there was a God, did they themselves believe there was a God or no? If they did, then they had no such end as abusing the world into such a belief. If they did not, upon what accounts did they believe there was none, when the People were so ready to believe there was one? Was that as certain a Tradition before that there was no God, as afterwards they made it to be that there was? If so, then all those People whom they persuaded to believe there was a God, did before, all believe there was none; and how can it possibly enter into the Reason of any Man to think, that People who had been brought up in the belief that there was no God at all, nor any State after this Life, shou'd all unanimously quit the Principles of Education which tended so much to their Ease and Pleasure here, to believe there was a God and another Life, and thereby to fill themselves full of Fears and Disquietments, merely because their Rulers told them so? Again, if these Rulers themselves were so wise as not to believe a Deity, can we imagin there ever was such an Age of the World wherein it fell out so happily, that only the Rulers were Wise, and all the Subjects Fools? But it may be, it will be said, *That all who were wise themselves did not believe a Deity, but yet consented to the practice of Religion, because it was so useful for the Government of Mankind;* but can it be thought that all these wise Men, which we must suppose of several Ranks and Degrees, (for Philosophers are not always States-men, nor States-men Philosophers) shou'd so readily concur in such a thing which tended most to the interest of the Prince, and to the abuse of the World? Wou'd none of them be ready to assert the Truth, tho' it were but to make a Party of their own, and discover to the People,

People, that it was only the Ambition and Design of their Govern-
 ners which fought to bring the People to Slavery by the belief of such
 things, which were contrary to the Tradition of their Fore-fathers,
 and wou'd make their Lives, if they believ'd them, continually
 troublesome and unquiet? Or if we cou'd suppose things shou'd
 hit thus in one Nation, what is this to the whole World which the *A-*
theist here supposeth eternal? What, did all the Rulers of the
 World exactly agree in one moment of time; or at least in one
 Age thus to abuse the World? Did the designs of Governors and
 the credulity of all People fall out to be so futable together? But
 on the contrary, we do not find that Governors can have the Judg-
 ments of People so at their command, that they can make them
 to believe what they please; if it were so, we may well say with
 that *Atheistical* Pope, *Hec quam minimo regitur Mundus; What a*
twine thread will Rule the World! But granting these things, (which
 any but an *Atheist* will say are impossible) yet whence shou'd it
 come to pass that the World, which is generally led more by the
 Opinions of their Fore-fathers, than by Reason, shou'd so cancel
 that former Tradition that there was no God, that no remaining
 foot-steps of it can be traced in any History of those times? Or
 did the Governors all consent to abolish all Records of it? Pub-
 lic and Written I grant they might, but not those out of Mens
 Minds and Memories; which wou'd have been for the ease of the
 Minds of their Posterity convey'd in some secret *Cabala* from Fa-
 thers to their Children. It may be it will be said, *so it was, but*
Men durst not profess it for fear of the Laws: but, it is not e-
 vident that the Laws of all the ancient Common-wealths were so
 severe against *Atheism*; and withal how came some of the wisest
 and most philosophical Men of *Greece* and *Rome* to embrace the exi-
 stence of a Deity, as a thing far more consonant to Reason than the
 contrary Opinion, and establish'd their belief on such Evidences
 from Nature it self, that none of their *Antagonists* were able to
 answer them? It was not certainly the fear of Laws which made
 Men rational and inquisitive into the Natures and Causes of things;
 and yet those who were such amidst the great Idolatries of the
 Heathen, and being destitute of Divine Revelation, yet freely and
 firmly assented to the existence of a Deity. Had it been only
 Fraud and Imposture which brought Men to believe a God, whence
 came it to pass that this Fraud was not discover'd by these Philo-
 sophers, who were far better able by their nearness to those eldest
 times, and much converse abroad in other Nations (for some Tra-
 vell'd into *Egypt*, *Chaldea*, *Persia*, *India*, merely to gain Know-
 ledg) to have found out such an Imposture, had it been such,
 than any of our modern *Atheists*? Whence come these now in
 this almost decrepit Age of the World to be the first Smellers out
 of so great a Design? By what Means, what Tokens and Evidence
 came such an Imposture to their knowledg? Because, forsooth,
 the World is still apt to be abus'd by a pretense of Religion; but
 he that doth not see how silly and ridiculous a Sophism that is, ei-
 ther by his own Reason, or by what hath gone before; hath Wit
 and Reason little enough to be an *Atheist*. Some therefore who
 wou'd seem a little wiser than the vulgar sort of *Atheists* (for it
 seems there is a *Vulgus* among them too, I wish it be more for their
 Meanness

Meanness than Multitude) are so far convinced of the unreasonableness of judging that the belief of a Deity came in by Fraud, that finding it so general and universal, they attribute it to as general and universal a Cause, which is the influence of the Stars. So true still is that of the Poet, *Cælum ipsum petimus stultitia*; for by what imaginable influence come the Stars to plant Opinions in Mens Minds so deeply and universally? But yet further, is this Opinion which is thus caus'd by the Stars, true or false? If the Opinion be true, we have what we desire; if false, what malignant Influence is this of the Stars, so powerfully to sway Men to the belief of a Falsity? How far are the Stars then from doing good to Mankind, when they are so influential to deceive the World; but then, by what peculiar Influence come some Men to be freed from this general Imposture? If the Cause be so universal, the Effect must be universal too. But if only the nativity and continuance of some particular Religions may be calculated by the Stars, (as *Cardan* and *Vaninus*, Atheistically suppose) whence then comes the general propensity and inclination to Religion in all Ages and Nations of the World? If it be then caus'd by the Heavens in general, it must be produced necessarily and universally, and so to be an *Atheist*, were impossible; if it be caus'd by the influence of some particular Stars, then when that influence ceaseth, the World wou'd universally relapse into *Atheism*. So that there is no possible way of avoiding this universal consent of Mankind, as an Argument that there is a God, when all the Pretenses of the *Atheist* against it are so weak, ridiculous and impertinent.

XIII.

The only thing then left for him, is, to deny the truth of the thing, viz. that there is such an universal consent; because some Persons have been found in the World who have not agreed with the rest of Mankind in this Opinion. To this I answer, (which was the second Particular for clearing this Argument) that the dissent of these Persons is not sufficient to manifest the consent not to be universal, and to arise from a Dictate of Nature: For I demand of the greatest *Atheist*, whether it be sufficient to say, that it is not natural for Men to have two Legs, because some have been born with one; or that it is not natural for Men to desire Life (which the *Atheist* loves so dearly) because there have been so many who have taken away their own Lives? If it be said that these are Monsters and *Anomalies* in Nature, and therefore not to be reckon'd in the regular Account of things, the same I may with as great reason say of *Atheists*, that they are to be dispung'd out of the *Census* of such who act upon free Principles of Reason; because there may be some peculiar Reasons given of their Dissent from the rest of Mankind in the denial of a Deity. We see by the old Philosophers how far the Affectation of Novelty, and Ambition of being cry'd up for no vulgar Wits, may carry Men to deny such things, which are most common and obvious in the World. Is there any thing more plain and evident to Reason, than that it implies a contradiction for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time? and yet if we believe *Aristotle*, who largely disputes against them, *οτι δὲ τινος οὐδὲν ἐν καθ' ἑαυτὸν φανερὸν ἐστὶν ὅτι αὐτὸ ἐστὶν καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῷ*. There were some who affirm'd that a thing might be and not be at the same time. What so evident in Nature as Motion?

yet

Arist. Metaphys. l. 4. c. 4.

yet the Philosopher is well known who disputed against it, and thought himself subtile in doing so too. What are Men more assur'd of, than that they live, and yet (if it be not too Dogmatical, even in that to believe the *Sceptics*) it was a thing none cou'd be assur'd of? What are our Senses more assur'd of than that the Snow is white, yet all the Philosophers were not of that Opinion? Is this then sufficient Reason on which to deny an universal consent, because some Philosophers oppos'd it, when it is most undoubtedly true, which *Tully* sharply speaks of the ancient Philosophers, *Nihil tam absurdum quod non dixerit aliquis Philosophorum*; *There was no absurdity so great, but it found a Philosopher to vouch it?* But in this case those Philosophers who question'd the existence of a Deity, tho' they were not for number to be compar'd with those who asserted it, yet were not so inexcusable therein as our modern *Atheists*; because they then knew no other way of Religion, but that which was joyn'd with horrible Superstition, and ridiculous Rites of Worship; they were Strangers to any thing of Divine Revelation, or to any real Miracles wrought to confirm it, and to such a way of serving God which is most agreeable to the Divine Nature, most suitable to our Reason, most effectual for advancing true Godliness in the World. And altho' this most excellent Religion, *viz.* the Christian, be subject to many Scandals by reason of the Corruptions which have been mix'd with it by those who have profess'd it, yet the Religion itself is clear and untainted, being with great Integrity preserved in the sacred Records of it. So that now *Atheism* hath far less to plead for its self than it had in the midst of the Ignorance and Superstition of the Heathen Idolatries. But if we shou'd grant the *Atheist* more than he can prove, that the number of such who deny'd a Deity hath been great in all Ages of the World; is it probable they shou'd speak the Sence of Nature, whose Opinion, if it were embraced, wou'd dissolve all Ties and Obligations whatsoever; wou'd let the World loose to the highest Licentiousness, without check or controul, and wou'd in time overturn all Civil Societies? For as *Tully* hath largely shewn, *Take away the Being and Providence of God out of the World, and there follows nothing but Perturbation and Confusion in it, not only all Sanctity, Piety and Devotion is destroy'd, but all Faith, Virtue and Human Societies too*; which are impossible to be upheld without Religion, as not only he, but *Plato*, *Aristotle* and *Plutarch*, have fully demonstrated. Shall such Persons then who hold an Opinion so contrary to all other Dictates of Nature, rather speak the Sence of Nature, than they who have asserted the belief of a Deity, which tends so much to advance Nature, to regulate the World, and to reform the Lives of Men? Certainly if it were not a dictate of Nature that there was a God, it is impossible to conceive the World shou'd be so constant in the belief of him, when the thoughts of him breed so many Anxieties in Mens Minds, and withal, since God is neither obvious to Sense, nor his Nature comprehensible by Human Reason. Which is a stronger Evidence it is a Character of himself which God hath imprinted on the Minds of Men, which makes them so unanimously agree that he is, when they can neither see him, nor yet fully comprehend him.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 3.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1. & de Legib. l. 2.

Vossius Ad-
dend. ad
l. 1. de Idol.
p. 2.

Vid. Aco-
stam, l. 5.
c. 3.
Lips. Mon.
& Exempl.
Politie.

For any whole Nation, which have consented in the denial of a *Deity*, we have no evidence at all; some suspicions it is true there were at first concerning some very barbarous People in *America*, but it is since evident, tho' they are grossly mistaken as to the Nature of God, yet they worship something instead of him, such as the *Toupinamboultis*, *Caribes*, *Patagons*, *Tapuia*, and others; of the last of which *Vossius* from one *Christophorus Arcissewski*, a *Polonian* Gentleman, who was among them, hath given a large account of their Religion, and the manner of their Worshipping of their Gods, both good and bad. And that which among these *Indians* much confirms our present Argument, is, That only those who have been the most barbarous and savage Nations, have been suspected of Irreligion, but the more civiliz'd they have been, the more evident their sense of Religion. The *Peruvians* worship one chief God, whom they call *Virachocha*, and *Pachacamak*, which is as much as *The Creator of Heaven and Earth*. And of the Religion of the *Mexicans*, *Lipsius* and others speak. So that the nearer any have approach'd to Civility and Knowledge, the more ready they have been to own a *DEITY*, and none have had so little sense of it, as they who are almost degenerated to Brutes; and whether of these two now comes nearer to Reason, let any one who hath it judg.

XIV.
2.

Another great Evidence, that God hath imprinted a Character or Idea of himself on the Minds of Men, is, *because such things are contain'd in this Idea of God, which do necessarily imply his existence*. The main force of this Argument lies in this, *That which we do clearly and distinctly perceive to belong to the nature and essence of a thing, may be with truth affirm'd of the thing*; not that it may be affirm'd with truth to belong to the nature of the thing, for that were an empty *Tautology*, but it may be affirm'd with truth of the thing its self; as if I clearly perceive upon exact enquiry; that to be an Animal doth belong to the nature of Man, I may with truth affirm that Man is a living Creature; if I find it demonstrably true that a Triangle hath three Angles equal to two Right ones, then I may truly affirm it of any Triangle: But now we assume, That upon the most exact search and inquiry, I clearly perceive that necessary existence doth immutably belong to the nature of God; therefore, I may with as much truth affirm, that God exists, as that Man is a living Creature; or, a Triangle hath three Angles equal to two Right ones. But because many are so apt to suspect some kind of *Sophism* in this Argument, when it is managed from the Idea in Mens Minds, because that seems to imply only an objective reality in the Mind, and that nothing can be thence inferr'd as to the existence of the thing whose Idea it is, I therefore shall endeavor to manifest more clearly the force of this Argument, by proving severally the suppositions which it stands upon, which are these three: 1. *That clear and distinct perception of the Mind is the greatest Evidence we can have of the truth of any thing*. 2. *That we have this clear perception that necessary existence doth belong to the nature of God*. 3. *That if necessary existence doth belong to God's nature, it unavoidably follows, that he doth exist*. Nothing can be desir'd more plain or full, to demonstrate the force of this Argument, than by proving every one of these.

1. That

1. *That the greatest Evidence we can have of the truth of a thing, is a clear and distinct perception of it in our Minds.* For otherwise the rational Faculties of Man's Soul wou'd be wholly useles, as being not fitted for any end at all, if upon a right use of them, Men were still liable to be deceiv'd. I grant the imperfection of our Minds in this present state is very great, which makes us so obnoxious to error and mistake; but then that imperfection lies in the proneness in Man's Mind to be led by interest and prejudice in the judgment of things; but in such things as are purely speculative and rational, if the Mind cannot be certain it is not deceiv'd in them, it can have no certainty at all of any *Mathematical* Demonstrations. Now we find in our own Minds a clear and convincing Evidence in some things, as soon as they are propounded to our Understandings, as that *a thing cannot be and not be at the same time*; that *a non-entity can have no proper Attributes*; that *while I reason and discourse, I am*; these are so clear, that no Man doth suspect himself deceiv'd at all in them. Besides, if we had no ground of certainty at all in our judging things, to what purpose is there an Idea of true and false in our Minds, if it be impossible to know the one from the other? But I say not, that in all Perceptions of the Mind we have certain Evidence of truth, but only in such as are clear and distinct; that is, when upon the greatest consideration of the nature of a thing, there appears no ground or reason at all to doubt concerning it; and this must suppose the Mind's abstraction wholly from the Senses; for we plainly find that while we attend to them, we may judge our selves very certain and yet be deceiv'd, as those who have an *Ictericism* in their Eyes, may judge with much confidence that they see things as clearly and distinctly as any other doth. Besides, there are many things taken for granted by Men, which have no Evidence of Reason at all in them: Now if Men will judge of the truth of things by such Principles, no wonder if they be deceiv'd. But when we speak of clear and distinct Perception, we suppose the Mind to proceed upon evident Principles of Reason, or to have such Notions of things, which as far we can perceive by the light of Reason, do agree with the natures of the things we apprehend; if in such things then there be no ground of certainty, it is as much as to say, our Faculties are to no purpose, which highly reflects either upon God or Nature. It is a noble Question as any is in *Philosophy*, What is the certain ^{certainty} of the truth of things, or what ground of certainty the Mind hath to proceed upon in its judgment of the truth of such objects as are represented to it? Nothing can render the *Philosophy* of *Epicurus* more justly suspected to any rational and inquisitive Mind, than his making the Senses the only conveyers of the truth of things to the Mind. The Senses I grant do not in themselves deceive any; but if I make the impressions of Sense to be the only rule for the Mind to judge by of the truth of things, I make way for the greatest impostures, and the most erring judgments. For if my Mind affirms every thing to be in its proper nature according to that Idea which the Imagination hath receiv'd from the impressions upon the organs of Sense, it will be impossible for me ever to understand the right natures of things. Because the natures of things may remain the same, when all those things in them which affect

the organs of Sense may be alter'd, and because the various Motion and Configuration of the Particles of Matter may make such an impression upon the Senses, which may cause an Idea in us of that in the things themselves, which yet may be only in the manner of Sensation; as some Philosophers suppose it to be in Heat and Cold. Now if the Mind judgeth of the nature of things according to those Ideas which come from the impressions made upon the organs of Sense, how is it possible it shou'd ever come to a right judgment of the natures of things? So that in reference even to the grossest material Beings, it must be the Perception only of the Mind, which can truly inform us of their proper Nature and Essence. Besides, there are many Ideas of things in the Mind of Man which are capable to have Properties demonstrated of them, which never ow'd their original to our Senses; and were never imported to the Mind at the Keys of the Senses. Such are most *Mathematical* Figures, which have their peculiar Properties and Demonstrations; such are all the mutual respects of things to each other, which may be as certain and evident to the Mind as its self is: now it is plain by this, that all certainty of Knowledge is not convey'd by the Senses; but our truest way of certain understanding the Nature of any thing, is by the clear and distinct Perception of the Mind, which is founded on the truth of our Faculties; and that however we may be deceiv'd when we do not make a right use of our Reason, because of the imperfection of our present state; yet if we say our Minds may be deceiv'd when things are evident and clear to them upon plain Principles of Reason, it is highly to reflect upon that God who gave Men rational Faculties, and made them capable of discerning Truth from Falshood.

2. *That we have clear and distinct Perception that necessity of Existence doth belong to the Nature of God.* For which we are to consider the vast difference which there is in our Notion of the Nature of God, and of the Nature of any other Being. In all other Beings, I grant we may abstract Essence and Existence from each other; now if I can make it appear, that there is evident Reason, *ex parte rei*, why I cannot do it in the Notion of God, then it will be more plain that necessity of Existence doth immutably belong to his Nature. It is manifest to our Reason, that in all other Beings, which we apprehend the Natures of, nothing else can be imply'd in the Natures of them beyond bare possibility of Existence; no, altho' the things which we do apprehend, do really exist; because in forming an Idea of a thing, we abstract from every thing which is not imply'd in the very Nature of the thing: now Existence being contingent and possible, as to any other Being, it cannot be any ingredient of its Idea, because it doth not belong to its Essence; for we may fully apprehend the Nature of the thing, without attributing Existence to it. But now in our Conception of a Being, absolutely perfect, bare possibility or contingency of Existence speaks a direct repugnancy to the Idea of him; for how can we conceive that Being absolutely perfect, which may want that which gives life to all other Perfections, which is *Existence*? The only scruple which Mens Minds are subject to in apprehending the force of this Argument lies in this,

this, *Whether this necessary Existence doth really belong to the Nature of that Being whose Idea it is, or else it be only a Mode of our Conception in apprehending God?* For clearing of this, we must consider by what certain Rules we can know when the composition of things together in the Understanding doth depend upon the mere Operation of the Mind, and when they do belong to the things themselves and their immutable Nature. For which we have no Rule so certain and evident as this is, that in those things which depend merely on the Act of the Mind joyned together, the Understanding cannot only abstract one thing from another, but may really divide them in its Conceptions from each other: but in such things which cannot be divided from each other, but the Essence of the thing is quite alter'd, it is a certain evidence that those things were not conjoyn'd by the mere Act of the Mind, but do immutably belong to the Natures of the things themselves. As for instance, when I conceive a Triangle inscrib'd in a Square, a Man walking, a Horse with wings, it is evident I may understand the Natures of all these things without these Affections of them, because I can fully apprehend the Nature of a Triangle, without imagining a Square, a Man without walking, a Horse without wings; thence it necessarily follows, that the joyning of these things together, was merely an Act of the Mind: But now I cannot conceive a Triangle not to have three Angles equal to two right ones, nor a Man that hath not Rationality belonging to him; for if I divide these Attributes from them, I destroy their Natures; and therefore the joyning of these together is not any mere Act of the Mind; but these are such things as are imply'd in the very notion of them, and therefore immutably belongs to them. So now, when I conceive the notion of a Body, I can imagine all Perfections belonging to it, without conceiving it necessarily to exist; for it may be a Body still, tho' it hath not its Being from it self; but when I conceive a Being absolutely perfect, it is impossible to imagin it shou'd have its Being from any other; and if it be from it self, it must of necessity exist. For tho' the Mind still be apt to doubt, whether Existence in this Idea be only a Mode of Cogitation; yet that doubt may be easily remov'd, if the Mind doth but attend to this, that at least Possibility of Existence doth belong to all those Beings which we have a clear Idea of in our Minds; and the reason why we attribute bare possibility to them, is because we apprehend some Reason in our Minds which keeps us from attributing necessity of Existence to them, as that it is not imply'd in its Nature, or that it doth depend on some other Being, or that it wants infinite Power, &c. Now all these Reasons which make us attribute bare possibility of Existence to any Being, are taken away when we conceive a Being absolutely perfect; for then Existence is imply'd among the number of Perfections; and this Being is independent upon all others, and infinitely powerful; so that nothing can hinder its Existence; and therefore we must conclude that necessity of Existence doth immutably belong to the Nature and Nature of God, and is not any Mode only of our Conception; because if we take away necessity of Existence from God, we lose the notion of a Being absolutely perfect.

Vid. Des
Cartes
Metaphys.
Medit. &
Resp. ad
Object.
D. H. More
Antidote
against
Atheism,
l. 1. ch. 8.
Append.
ch. 5, 6, 7.

The third thing, *That if necessary Existence belongs to the Nature of God, he doth exist*, not only follows as a necessary Conclusion from the other two, as the Premises, but is in it self evident to any one's Reason; for it implies no less than a Contradiction for a Being to exist necessarily, and yet it be questionable, Whether it doth exist or no? Thus much I suppose may suffice here to explain and inforce this Argument; if any are yet unsatisfy'd, I refer them to those judicious Authors, who have made it their peculiar business to manage it, and vindicate it from all objections: which falls in only here as an Evidence that God hath imprinted a Character of himself on the Minds of Men, seeing we have so clear and distinct an Idea of such a Being, from whom, if we take away necessity of Existence, we destroy that Notion which our Minds have of an absolutely perfect Being. This is the first way whereby we can conceive an infinite Being may make himself known to Mankind, by imprinting an indelible Character of himself upon the Soul, which can be attributed to none besides himself without doing manifest violence to our own Faculties, and suspecting our selves deceiv'd in things which are most clear and evident to us.

xv.

I come to the second Evidence which God hath given us of his own Existence, which is the mark, and *impression which he hath left of an infinite Wisdom and Counsel, in the appearances which are in Nature*. There needs no great Criticism to find out the true Author of all the Works of Nature; the Works themselves shew the Author as plainly, as if his effigies were drawn upon them. If the great curiolity and contrivance of any artificial Engine speak the excellency of the Mechanical Wit of the Framers of it; what ridiculous folly will it be to impute that rare Mechanism of the Works of Nature to the blind and fortuitous motion of some Particles of Matter? Suppose a multitude of Letters casually thrown together, shou'd fall so handsomly in order, that we might read in them the Names of *Troja, Juno, Aeneas, Dido, Turnus, Ascanius* or the like; is it possible for any to imagin that ever they shou'd reach the Grandeur, Stile, Matter and Accuracy of the whole Books of the *Aeneids*? So granting, that now Matter being set in motion by a Divine Power, may by its continual agitation, at last produce some of the appearances of Nature; yet what is this to the whole Universe, or the admirable Contrivance of any one part in it? If these things had been the result of mere Matter and Motion, when once the Particles of Matter had been so united and settled together, as to produce any one species of Animals in the World (which it is almost unconceivable they shou'd) yet we cannot think that if there had been but Symmetry of Parts enough for it merely to subsist it self, and propagate more, there cou'd have been any further Attempt made by those *Atoms*, which had been once setl'd in a determinate figure. How came it then to pass that there is not any one species of Animals in the World, but what hath such an Order, Symmetry and Contrivance of parts, which speaks more than mere necessity of Subsistence, and therefore speaks them to be the Effect of a Supreme Governor of the World, and not the Products of mere Matter? Is it possible, that any who is not before-hand resolv'd to exclude a *Deity*, shou'd imagin that

that any Particles of Matter shou'd fall into the exact Form, Order, Motion, and serviceableness to the World which the Heavenly Bodies are in, without Divine Counsel and Wisdom disposing of them? Tully tells us of a Speech of Aristotle to this purpose; *If we cou'd suppose Persons to have liv'd in some caverns of the earth, and to have enjoy'd every thing there of pleasure, and riches, or whatever it is which we think makes Mens Lives happy, and had never been abroad upon the surface of the earth, but had only had some obscure report of an infinite Power and Being; and that afterwards these Persons shou'd by an opening of the caverns wherein they were, come abroad into these parts of the World, and shou'd suddenly behold the Earth, Sea, and the Heavens, and observe the vastness of the Clouds, and violence of Winds, and behold the bigness, beauty and influence of the Sun, and how the Day depended upon his presence, and upon his withdrawing shou'd view the face of the Heavens again (as it were the second course of Nature) the order and ornament of the Stars, the varieties of the light of the Moon, their rising and setting, and their fixed and immoveable courses; they cou'd not hold from believing there was a DEITY, and that these were the effects of his Power.* So vastly different are the free and natural emanations of our Souls, from that which we force and strain out of our selves by distorting and wringing those free Principles of Reason which God hath given us. When a few sorry Experiments and some arbitrary Hypotheses, must make us form other Conceptions of things, than the Majesty, Order and Beauty of them do naturally suggest to us: We see, when once we can but abstract our Minds from those prejudices which continual conversation with the World brings upon us, by that Speech of Aristotle, how readily our Minds will frame an excellent Commentary upon those words of the Royal Psalmist, *The Heavens declare the glory of God, and the Firmament shews his handy-work.* To which purpose likewise those words of the excellent Orator himself in another place, are very observable; *Quid est enim verius quam neminem esse oportere tam stulte arrogantem, ut in se mentem & rationem putet inesse, in cælo mundoque non putet? aut ea quæ vix summa ingenii ratione comprehendat, nulla ratione moveri putat? Quem vero astrorum ordines, quem dierum noctiumque vicissitudines, quem mensium temperatio, quemque ea quæ gignuntur nobis ad fruendum, non gratum esse cogant, hunc hominem omnino numerare qui dicet? What monstrous arrogancy wou'd it be in any Man to think there is a Mind and Reason in himself, and that there is none in the World? Or to think those things are mov'd without Reason and Understanding, which all that he hath is scarce able to comprehend? Neither can he deserve the name of a Man, from whom the observation of the courses of the Stars, the succession and order of Seasons, and the innumerable benefits which he enjoys in the World, doth not extort gratitude towards that Being which order'd all these things. What a low opinion then had those more refin'd and generous Spirits, who went only upon Principles of pure and undistorted Reason, of those mean and ignoble Souls, which were inclin'd to Atheism; especially then, when Religion was so abus'd, that it was true of the wisest of them, what one said of Erasmus, *Magis habuit quid fugeret quam quid sequeretur,**

Cicero de
Nat. Deor.
l. 2. c. 95.

Cicero de
Legibus,
l. 2.

tur, they knew what to avoid, but not what they shou'd embrace: And yet when they saw so much into the Folly and Superstition of Heathen Worship, they saw the greatest reason still to adhere to the belief of a Deity, as may be clearly seen, especially in the second of those excellent Dialogues of *Tully*, *De Natura Deorum*: Where this particular Argument to prove a Deity from the admirable contrivance of the Works of Nature, is manag'd with a great deal of Eloquence and Reason, and by particular enumeration of most considerable parts of the Universe. So unbecoming a late Philosopher was that Reason of his, why he wav'd the Argument from the consideration of the World, to infer a Deity, because the ends of God are unsearchable, as flowing from his Infinite Wisdom. For, what tho' God may conceal some things from Men, which he intends, and are of no concernment for Men to know, must therefore of necessity those ends of his be unsearchable in his works of Creation, which refer so immediately to the advantage of Life, and tend so much to the veneration of the Deity?

xvi.

Nay, the peculiar use and serviceableness of many parts of the Universe, especially of Animals, and chiefly of Man, is so evident, that this hath been the main Argument which hath induced some, otherwise *Atheistical* enough, to acknowledge and adore a Deity. And altho' the *Epicureans* be lamentably puzzled to give any tolerable account of many other appearances in Nature, yet they no where discover so much Weakness and Ignorance, as when they come to discourse *De usu partium*, about the contrivance of the parts of Man's Body. Whose Opinion is thus briefly delivered by *Lucretius*;

Lucret. l. 4.

*Nil ideo quoniam natum'st in corpore ut uti
Possemus; sed quod natum'st id procreat usum.*

i. e. that no parts of Man's body were design'd for that use which they are employ'd for, but the parts by chance fell into that form they are in, and Men by degrees brought them to their present use and serviceableness. An Opinion at first view so strangely unreasonable, that we cannot think *Epicurus* shou'd have ever embraced it, had it not unavoidably follow'd upon his *Hypothesis* of all things in the Universe resulting only from a fortuitous Concourse of Atoms: According to which he suppos'd in Man a different configuration of Parts wou'd happen from the various Agitation and Concretion of those little Particles which at first run together in the fashion of a Man; and because that Man had in him a more florid and vivacious Spirit, made up of the most subtle and movable Atoms, thence Motion came into the several parts suitable to the different Conformation of them. And because those Atoms of which the Soul is compos'd, are capable of Sensation, thence it comes to pass, that it sees in the Eye, hears in the Ear, and smells in the Nostrils. This is the most which is made of the Opinion of *Epicurus* by the late sedulous Vindicator of him, which yet himself calls *intoleranda opinio*; and it will appear to be so, not only as contradicting, what God himself hath deliver'd concerning Man, but what Reason it self will easily suggest

gest from the consideration of the several parts of Man's Body. It must be confess'd there were some Philosophers elder than *Epicurus*, who were much inclin'd to this Opinion, as *Democritus*, *Empedocles*, *Anaxagoras*, and others; yet we find those who more narrowly search'd into the Natures of living Creatures, were thereby brought to acknowledg a Divine Providence, which with a great deal of Wisdom did order the several parts of Animals, and adapted them to their peculiar uses. And altho' *Aristotle* in his Book *de partibus Animalium*, hath said enough to refute the fond Opinion of those Philosophers; yet none hath handled this Argument with more exactness and accuracy, and with a more peculiar reflection on *Epicurus*, than *Galen* hath done in his excellent piece *De usu partium*. Which *Gassendus* thinks *Galen* writ with a kind of *Enthusiasm* upon him (*adeo totum opus videre conscriptum videtur*) and so all those seventeen Books of his on that subject, are a kind of 119th *Psal*m in Philosophy, or a perpetual *Hymn* upon the praise of the great Creator, a just Commentary on those words of the *Psalmist*, *Psal.* 139. 14. *I am fearfully and wonderfully made; marvellous are thy works, and that my Soul knoweth right well.* In the entrance of those Books, *Galen* first shews the great variety of parts which is in several Animals sutable to their several Natures; the Horse because of his Swiftnes and Pride, hath the strongest Hoofs and most curl'd Main; the Lion because of his Fierceness and Courage hath his Strength lying in his Teeth and Paws; the Bull in his Horns; the Boar in his Tusks; the Hart and Hare being timorous Creatures, their parts are made fittest for flight: but Man because he hath a principle of Reason in him, hath no defensive or offensive Weapons in his Body, but he hath Hands to make use of both; which being joyn'd with, and imploy'd by his Reason, far exceed all those advantages which any other Creatures have, being imploy'd not only to defend himself, but to build Houses, make Cloaths, Arms and Nets, what-ever is useful for himself, or hurtful to those Creatures which he hath command over; but because Man was made for Society and civil Converse, therefore his Hands were not only imploy'd to defend himself or hurt other Creatures, but for the mutual benefit and advantage of Mankind; for by these were Laws written, Temples built, all Instruments of Arts fram'd; by them we enjoy the benefit of others Wits, we can discourse with *Plato*, *Aristotle*, *Hippocrates*, and other Ancients, tho' at such a distance from us. Now that the Configuration of Parts is not the cause of the use of them afterwards; as the Lion's paw of his Courage, the Bull's horns of his Fierceness, or the slenderness of the Hart of its Fearfulness; appears by this, because the young Ones of the several kinds of Animals, before their parts are grown up, strive to make the same use of them which the others do. As *Galen* saith, he had often seen a Bull-calf pushing with his Head before any Horns were grown out, and a Colt kicking when his Hoofs were yet tender, and a young Boar defending himself with his Jaws before he had any Tusks, which is an evident Argument that the parts were designed for the use, and not the use to follow the parts. So, saith he, *take three Eggs, one of an Eagle, another of a Duck, and a third of a Serpent, and after they are hatch'd thro' a moderate*

Mm

heat,

Gassend.
Tom. 2.
l. 2. §. 3.

heat, we shall find when they are but newly hatch'd, the two first will be striving to fly before they have Wings, and the third endeavoring to creep away on its Belly; and if you breed them up to greater Perfection, and bring them into the open Air, you will presently see the young Eagle mounting into the Air, the Duck quoddl'g in a Pool, and the Serpent creep under Ground. Afterwards he comes particularly to handle the several parts of Man's Body, and first begins with the Hand, and shews in each part that it were impossible to have fram'd them with greater conveniency for their several uses than they have. The use of the Hand is to take hold of any thing which Man can use; now there being things of such different sizes which Men may use, it had been impossible for the Hand, if it had been one intire thing, and undivided, that it cou'd have held things greater or lesser than its self, but it must have been equal to it. But now as the Fingers are placed and divided, they are equally fit for laying hold of Objects of any size or quantity; for the least things as a Barley Corn, are taken up with the Fore-finger and the Thumb, things somewhat bigger are taken up by the same, but not by the extremities of them as before; things somewhat bigger than these, with the Thumb, Fore-finger and Middle-finger, and so on by degrees, till at last the whole Hand is us'd: so that the division of the Hand into Fingers is necessary. Neither were this enough, but the very position of the Fingers as they are, is necessary too; for they had been useless if they had been all divided in a right line, for the firmest hold is either circular, or at least in two opposite points; but now this is provided for, by the position of the Thumb, which may equally joyn with any of the Fingers in taking hold of any thing. After this, he largely shews the particular necessity of the softness, roundness of the Flesh, and Nails on the tops of the Fingers; and the special usefulness of these; and then comes to the Bones of the Fingers, how necessary they are for firm-hold, and if there had been but one Bone in each Finger, they wou'd have serv'd only for those things which we take up when they are extended; but now seeing they have three several joynts, they are fitted for all kinds of things; for when we bow our Fingers, we use them as tho' they had no Bones at all, and when we stretch them out, as tho' they were all but one intire Bone; and the several inflections of the Joynts serve for all kind of Figures: and then he shews the necessity of the Flesh within the Fingers, and on either side of them, and upon them; and so with wonderful accuracy handles the magnitude, number, figure of the Bones, and nature of the Joynts of the Fingers, and then the Tendons and Muscles belonging to the several Fingers, which after he hath discours'd on thro' his first Book, he concludes it with the manifest inconveniency which wou'd follow in the hand, were not every thing in it in that exact magnitude, position, and figure in which it is. With the same exactness he goes thro' all the parts of the Body, handling in the second Book all that belongs to the Arm, in the third the Legs, in the fourth and fifth the Organs of Nutrition, in the sixth and seventh the Lungs, in the eighth and ninth the Head, in the tenth the peculiar and admirable Fabric of the Eyes, in the eleventh the other parts of the Face, in the twelfth the parts of

of the Back, and so in the thirteenth, in the fourteenth and fifteenth the Genitals, in the sixteenth the Arteries, Veins, and Nerves, and in the last the peculiar Disposition and Figure of all these Parts, and the usefulness of the whole Design: Which is as great as can be in any Work whatsoever, which is for us to take notice of the admirable Wisdom of God in contriving the several parts of the Body of Man: So that, that whole Book contains in it a most full and pregnant demonstration of a Deity, which every Man carries about with him in the Structure of his Body, on which account Men need not go out of themselves to find proof of a Deity, whether they consider their Minds or their Bodies, of which it may be more truly said than *Heraclitus* of old did of his Stove, *Etiam hic Dii sunt*. So that of all Persons, I shou'd most wonder at those whose Employment particularly leads them to the Understanding the parts and nature of Man's Body, if the Proverb be not a great injury to them, since they have fuller insight into this demonstration of a Deity in the Fabric of Man's Body, than many others who converse only with some jejune and sapless Writings. And certainly, whatever is imagin'd to the contrary by Men of weak Understandings, the best way to cure the World of *Atheism*, is true Philosophy, or a search into the Natures of things; which the more deep and profound it is, the more impossible will it be found to explicate all the *Phænomena* of Nature by mere Matter and Motion. It was wisely observ'd of a great Person and Philosopher, that a narrow and slight Inspection into Nature, inclin'd Men of weak Heads to *Atheism*; but a more thorow-insight into the causes of things, made them more evidently see the necessary dependance of things on the great and wise Creator of them. A little knowledg of Philosophy is apt to make Mens heads dizzy, and then in danger of falling into the Gulf of *Atheism*; but a more careful and diligent view of it, brings them into Sobriety and their right Wits again. Such a slight Inspection had the Followers of *Epicurus* into the Nature of things; for when they found how in the present State of the World the various Motion and Configuration of the Particles of Matter wou'd handsomely save many appearances of Nature, they, drunk with the success, reel presently into an Infinite Space, and there imagin they behold Infinite Worlds made of the concretion of Atoms, and ever since their Eyes have been so dusted with these little Atoms, that they cou'd see nothing else in the World but them: Which how gross and unreasonable it is, will appear from our present subject; for who but *Lucretius* or *Epicurus* cou'd ever think that our Nostrils were at first fashion'd as they are merely by the violent impulse of the Air within, which wou'd force it self a passage out? But how came the Air into the Body before it was forced out? Did it break open the Lips, make all that round cavity in the Mouth, for a passage thro' the *aspera Arteria*? But if when it was in, it wou'd come out again, was not the Mouth wide enough to let it go? Or did the first Man shut his Mouth on purpose to find another vent for the Air? If so, how chance the force of the Air did not carry away the *Epiglottis*? Or if it got safely up to the Nose, how came it not to force a passage out about the Eyes rather than to go down so low first? But if we believe these rare Contrivers of Man's

*Aristot. de
part. A-
nim. l. 1.*

Body, all the inward Vessels of the Body were made by the course of Water, as Channels are; but how is it possible, to imagin, that the *Oesophagus* and the Stomach shou'd be so curiously contriv'd by the mere force of Water? and that all the *Intestines* shou'd be made only as Channels, to let it out again when it was once in? but how comes then such a kind of Reciprocation and *Peristaltic* Motion in those Vessels? how comes the several Coats of them to be so firm? if it had been only a forced passage, it wou'd have been direct and thro' the substance of the parts, as we find it to be in all forced passages in the Body of the Earth. Besides, if the Water receiv'd into the Stomach forced the passage thro' the Guts, how comes it not to run in the channel it had made for it self? or did it not like that passage when other things came into it, and therefore found out a more secret one into the Bladder? but if that were made by the Water, how came it to be so full of Membranes, and so subject to dilatation? Thus ridiculous will Men make themselves, rather than shew themselves Men in owning and adoring that infinitely wise and powerful God, who *orders all things in the World, according to the counsel of his Will*. What can be more plain and evident than the peculiar usefulness of the several parts of Man's Body is? What other intent can be imagin'd that Man is form'd with a Mouth, but only for taking in of Nourishment, and for receiving and letting forth of Air? or that an Infant is so ready to open his Mouth, but that there are Breasts and Milk for him to suck in order to his Nourishment? Why shou'd the *Oesophagus* be so hollow and the Stomach so wide, but that one was provided for the better conveyance of the Meat down, and the other for the Fermentation of it? Whence come all the other Vessels to be so conveniently plac'd, were it not for the distribution of Nourishment into the several parts, or for conveying away the Excrements of it? Can any one think that the several Muscles and Tendons shou'd be plac'd in the more solid parts for any other end than for the better Motion of them? or that the Nerves shou'd be deriv'd from the Brain into the several parts of the Body for any other design than to be the instruments of Sense and Motion? or that the continual motion of the Heart shou'd be for any other purpose, than for receiving and distributing of the Blood thro' the Arteries into the parts of the Body? or that the Eye with all its curious Fabric shou'd be only accidentally imploy'd in seeing? These things are so plain, that however the *Epicureans* may more easily lose themselves, and deceive others in explaining the appearances of Nature in some inanimate Beings, yet when they come with their blind concurrence of *Atoms* to give an account of the parts of Animals, they miserably befool themselves, and expose themselves only to contempt and pity. It were easy to multiply examples in this kind, but I shall only mention one thing more, which is, if all the parts of Man's Body have no higher original than the concurrence of *Atoms* in the first Man and Woman, by what were the Umbilical Vessels form'd whereby the Child in the Womb receives its Nourishment? by what *Atoms* was the passage of the *Succus nutritivus* fram'd from the Mother to the Child? how come those Vessels to close up so naturally upon the birth of the Child, and it to seek its Nourishment in quite another way?

Will

Will the Particles of Matter which by their concretion form'd the first pair, save this too? Thus still we see how impossible it is (to go no further than our selves) to give any tolerable account of things without an infinite Power and Being which produc'd all these things, and hath left so plain an inscription of Himself upon the works of Nature, that none but those who shut their Eyes can abstain from seeing it.

I come now to the third Evidence of a *Deity*, which is, *That there are some Beings in the World, which cannot depend upon Matter or Motion, i. e.* that there are some Spiritual and Immaterial Substances or Beings, (for if the thing be acknowledg'd, it is unbecoming a Man to contend about words) the consequence of this for the proving a *Deity*, neither hath been nor I suppose will be deny'd, by such who question an infinite Being; the same Principles leading to the denying and the Proof of both, and immaterial Beings being the strongest proof that there is something above Matter in the World. If there be then such things in the World, which Matter and Motion cannot be the causes of, then there are certainly spiritual and immaterial Beings, and that I shall make appear both as to the Minds of Men, and some extraordinary effects which are produc'd in the World.

XVII.

3.

1. I begin with the nature of the Soul of Man. And herein I must confine my self to those Arguments which directly prove my present purpose, and on that account must quit all those common Arguments to prove the Soul's immortality from the Attributes of God; for all these do suppose the existence of a *Deity* as already evident; neither can I rely with safety on the way which some have taken to prove the immortality of the Soul merely from the *Phænomena* of Sensation, which they endeavor to prove, cannot be perform'd by mere Matter and Motion; for granting all this, yet the utmost that can be prov'd by it is no greater immortality in our Souls than in the Souls of Brutes, and in the sense in which that is admitted, I suppose an *Epicurean* will not deny the Soul of Man to be immortal; as *Demonax* in *Lucian* said, when he was ask'd whether the Soul were immortal or no, *It is* (said he) *but as all things else are*; for those who make the Soul to be nothing but some more subtile and active Particles of matter, do not think that upon death they are annihilated, but that only they are dispers'd and dissipated, or in the *Platonists* Phrase, may *return to the Soul of the World*. These ways I cannot think to be sufficient probations of such a spiritual and immaterial Being in Man, which we now inquire for, much less can I make use of so precarious and infirm an *Hypothesis* as *Præ-existence*, which makes Men apt to suspect the cogency of such Reasons which tend to prove the immortality of the Soul, which are link'd with a supposition, not only inevident either to Sense or Reason, but likewise needless and impertinent. For I know no one Argument which doth directly prove the immateriality of the Soul, that doth in the least infer any necessity of *Præ-existence*, but on the same accounts it will prove the Soul's eternity. Being therefore thus at liberty to inquire into the Nature of the Soul consider'd in her self, our only way must be to find out such peculiar properties in the Soul of Man, which cannot be sav'd on supposition, there were nothing else but Mat-

M m 3

ter

ter and Motion in the World. Supposing then that all Sensation in Man doth arise from corporeal Motion, which is so strongly asserted by the modern Philosophers, and that the highest Conceptions which depend on Sense, can amount no higher than Imagination, which is evident; if it can then be prov'd that there is a Principle of Action in Man, which proceeds in a different way of operation than Sensation doth, and that there are such operations of the Soul which are not Imaginations, it will be then clear that there is a Principle in Man higher than Matter and Motion. Now altho' it be a task sufficiently difficult to explain the manner of Sensation it self in a mere mechanical way, supposing no higher Principle than mere Matter, yet it will appear far more difficult, nay impossible without a spiritual or immaterial Being to save such appearances in Man which transcend the power of Imagination; which will appear by these following Operations of the Mind, which every one who hath it, may find within himself.

1. *Correcting the errors of Imagination.* For if all our Perceptions were nothing else but the Images of corporeal things left in the Brain, the judgment of the Mind must of necessity be according to the impressions, which are made upon the Organs of Sense. But now if our Minds can and do form apprehensions of things quite different from those which are convey'd by Sense, there must be a higher Principle of knowledg in Man than Imagination is. For which the common instance of the just magnitude of the Sun is very plain; If we judg according to the image which is convey'd to the Brain by our Eyes, we can never imagin the Sun to be bigger than he seems to us to be; nay tho' the Sight be advantaged by the help of *Telescopes*, it cannot receive such an Image or Idea of the Sun which answers to its just magnitude, *viz.* that it is 160 times bigger than the Earth. From whence now comes this apprehension of the bigness of the Sun above that proportion which can possibly come in at our Senses? If it be said, *That by the observation of the lessening of objects according to the proportion of distance, the Mind may come to understand how much bigger the Sun may be than he seems;* I grant it, but withal inquire how the Imagination comes to have Proportions and Distances which are mere respects, and can have no corporeal phantasms whereby to be represented to it; so that by this very way of ratiocination it is evident, that there is some principle in Man beyond Imagination. Again, when the Mind by ratiocination hath proceeded thus far, and finds the Sun to be so great, what Idea is there of this magnitude in the Mind? the Mind cannot fix it self on any thing but it must have an Idea of it; from whence comes this Idea? not from corporeal phantasms; for none of them cou'd ever convey the due magnitude of the Sun to the Mind, and therefore the forming of this Idea must be a pure act of Intellection which corrects the errors of Imagination, and is a Principle above it. So in the sight of a stick, when under water, the representation of it by the Sense to Imagination is as crooked; for corporeal Motion carries things to the Eye, without any judgment upon them; the Eye conveys the Imagination to the Brain; and according to the rules of corporeal Perception must presently take every thing for true which is convey'd thither; now from what Principle is it that

that this error of our Senses is corrected? So in many other things wherein our Imaginations are quite puzl'd, and when we go according to them, it is impossible to apprehend things as our Reason tells us they are; thus as to the *Antipodes* our Imaginations are wholly of the Mind of the Ancients, that the *Antipodes* to us must needs be in danger of knocking their heads against the Stars, and if they go upon any thing, it must be their Heads, and that that part of the Heavens which is in the other *Hemisphere* is below us; these are pertinacious errors of Imagination while we adhere to that, and are only corrigible by our Reason, which makes it evident to be otherwise. Besides, there are many things our Reason and Understanding inform us that they may be, and yet our Imaginations can form no Idea of them; let an *Epicurean* Philosopher try the power of his Imagination in his *Inane* or *Infinite empty Space*, and he will soon find, that as strong as his Phancy is, it will soon tire and retreat, as not being able to course thro' so unimaginable a Space. So for Eternal Duration our Reason tells us the thing is possible, but when our Imaginations begin to fardle up some Conceptions of it, they are perferently tying both ends together; which will make a strange Idea of Eternity; the case is the same in the infinite Divisibility of Quantity, which *Epicurus* was somewhat aware of when he deny'd the thing. But how many *Mathematical Problems* are there which will jade our Imaginations presently, and yet our Reason stands still and assures us of the possibility of the things, as in *two lines coming nearer still to each other, and yet never meeting*, and in many other things, which most clearly evince that there is a higher Faculty in Man which exceeds Matter and Motion, when it is able thus to correct the faults and to supply the defects of Imagination.

2. *Reflex acts of the Mind upon it self, argue a higher Principle than Imagination.* That there are such things is evident to any one who hath any use of Cogitation; and if any one doubt of it, his very doubting argues he hath reflex Acts; for he cou'd not doubt whether he had or no, but by Reflection upon himself. Now that reflex Acts shou'd be caus'd thro' Matter and Motion, or thro' mere Imagination is unconceivable. For we see no Matter can act upon it self: indeed one part of extended Matter may act upon another, but not purely upon it self; the extremities of the Fingers can never feel themselves, tho' they can touch each other; neither can Imagination reflect on it self; for that proceeding upon Corporeal Images, must have such a representation from the Senses of what it acts upon; now what image of it self can be convey'd to the Imagination thro' the external Organs of Sense? The Eye may see thro' the motion of the objects of Sight pressing upon it; but how can it see that it sees? so the Imagination receives the images convey'd to the Brain; but what shop hath it to make new ones in of it self, and so be guilty of the greatest Idolatry or worshipping its own Image? But tho' the Imagination cannot thus reflect, yet we find such a Principle within us that is very apt to retire into it self, and recollect things which cou'd never have been conserv'd so long in that shop of shadows, the Imagination. For if Imagination be nothing else but, as a modern *Philosopher defines it, *Conception remaining, and a lit-*

XVIII.

*Hobbes's
Humane
Nature,
ch. 3. sect. 1.

tle

*tle and little decaying from and after the act of Sense, like the Motion of Water after a stone is thrown into it; how is it possible that at so great a distance of Years, as we commonly find, the image of a thing may be retriev'd with as much facility and freshness as to circumstances, as if it were but new done? And that account which he gives of Remembrance is very weak and insufficient, when he tells us, that Remembrance is nothing else but the missing of parts; which every Man expecteth should succeed after they have a conception of the whole. For according to this, it is impossible for the Men to retrieve any object without mutilation of it; and so there cannot possibly be a recollecting of all circumstances, when an object is once pass'd, and the Motion begins to decay. But all this while, we understand nothing by what means this decaying Motion shou'd continue so long as our Memory can fetch things back, or by what means an object when once pass'd, can be recover'd again, if Memory be nothing else but decaying Motion. Such perplexities must needs arise, when Men will undertake to save the inward operations of the Soul by mere Motion; but is it not evident that many times when the Mind is imploy'd about other things, some Phantasms of things long ago past will come and present themselves to the Mind with as much clearness as if new done? whereas if Memory were decaying Motion, the longer past, the more impossible wou'd it be to recover any thing; but, do we not find that many old Men will better remember the circumstances of many things they did in their Childhood, than a year or two before? Besides, we see what quickness and vivacity there is in our Intellectual Faculties above Corporeal Motion, with what facility the Mind turns it self from one object to another, how suddenly it rangeth the whole World, how it trips over Mountains, crosseth the Ocean, mounts to the Skies, and at last quarries upon it self, and all in the twinkling of an intellectual Eye. As quick as the Eye of the Body is, the Mind far exceeds it, and can withdraw the Imagination from attending the Organs of Sense, thus do Men who have their Minds much fix'd, fix their Eyes too; and yet afterwards can scarce tell themselves what they have look'd on all that while. Sometimes the Mind fits and compares Phantasms together, and sports it self in sorting them into several ranks and orders, and making matches between such things which are sure to have no affinity with each other, which are thence called *entia rationis*, or the Creatures of the Mind. And can all these and many other such operations which Men are conscious to themselves of, be nothing else but the Motion of some flegmatic Matter, the Reaction of the Brain, and the mere effects of Imagination?*

3. *The profound speculations of the Mind argue a power far above Imagination and Corporeal Motion.* I wonder how *Epicurus* his Soul, when, if we believe him, it was made up of *Atoms*, cou'd ever imagin an *Infinite Vacuity*? Cou'd mere *Atoms* ever dispute whether they were *Atoms* or no? For I doubt not but *Epicurus* was fain to argue much against himself, before he cou'd persuade himself to so stupendious a piece of folly. Were there nothing in Man but mere Corporeal Motion, whence came the dispute, whether the Soul were Corporeal or no? Can *Atoms* frame *Syllogisms* in *Mood* and *Figure*? and mere Matter argue *pro* and *con*, whether it

it be Matter or something else? What kind of Aereal Particles were their Souls compounded of, who first fancy'd themselves to be immaterial? What strange agitations of Matter were those which first made Men think of an Eternal state? which thoughts have ever since so stuck upon these little Spherical Bodies, that they cou'd never yet disburthen themselves of them? Whence come such amazing fears, such dreadful apprehensions, such sinking thoughts of their future condition in Minds that wou'd fain ease themselves by believing, that death wou'd put a period both to Soul and Body? Whence on the other side come such encouraging hopes, such confident expectations, such comfortable prepossessions of their future state, in the Souls of good Men, when their Bodies are nearest to the grave? *Seneca*, who was somewhat dubious sometimes as to the future condition of the Soul, yet cou'd tell his dear *Lucilius* with what pleasure he cou'd think of it; and cou'd elsewhere say of the Soul, *Et hoc habet argumentum divinitatis suæ quod illum divina delectant, nec ut alienis interest sed ut suis: The Soul had that mark of Divinity in it, that it was most pleas'd with Divine Speculations, and convers'd with them as with matters which nearly concern'd it.* And when it hath once view'd the dimensions of the Heavens, *contemnit domicilii prioris angustias*, it was ashamed of the Cottage it dwelt in; nay, were it not for these Speculations, *non fuerat operæ pretium nasci*, it had not been worth while for the Soul to have been in the Body; and as he goes on, *detrahe hoc inestimabile bonum, non est vita tanti ut sudem, ut æstuem.* Cou'd there be now so great an *Epicurism* in Contemplation, were the Soul of Man of *Epicurus* his mould, a mere complexion of *Atoms*? wou'd dull and heavy Matter ever have delighted to have search'd so much into the causes of things, to have gone over the World in its Speculations, and found more sweetness in Knowledg, than the little *Epicure*, the Bee, tastes in his choicest Flowers? *Epicurus* his own Philosophy is a demonstration against himself; if his Soul had not been of a purer Nature than he fancy'd, when his Brain had been well heated at his Study, those more vivid and spirituous Particles, like the spirits of Wine, had been in danger of evaporation, and leaving the more lumpish matter to complete his work. Of all Persons, I most admire that Philosophers, who make so much use of their Understandings, shou'd so ungratefully requite them, and serve them like old Horses, when they have made them do all the service they cou'd, turn them into the high-ways, and let them die in a ditch. But yet all Philosophers have not been so unthankful, some have understood the worth of their Souls, and asserted it, if they have not us'd too high, i. e. *Platonical* expressions of it, making it a Particle, not of Matter, but of the Divine Nature it self, a little Deity in a Cottage, that stays here a-while, and returns to that upper Region from whence it came. As *Manilius* speaks,

*Senec. pref.
ad Quæst.
Natur.*

*An dubium est habitare Deum sub pectore nostro,
In cælumque redire animas, cæloque venire?*

Manil. l. 4.

And while the Soul is here in its Cage, it is continually fluttering up and down, and delighteth to look out now at this part, and

N n

then

then at another, to take a view by degrees of the whole Universe, as the same Poet goes on,

*Quid mirum noscere mundum
Si possunt homines, quibus est & mundus in ipsis:
Exemplumque Dei quisque est in imagine parva?*

The Soul hath nothing more delightful to it than Knowledg, and no Knowledg so pleasing and satisfactory as of him whose Image and Superfcription it bears, who makes Himself most known to such as enquire after him;

*Seque ipsum inculcat & offert
Ut bene cognosci possit.*

I conclude this with that of *Seneca*, in that excellent Preface to his *Natural Questions*, *O quam contempta res est homo nisi supra humana se erexerit! What a pitiful thing is Man, were it not that his Soul was apt to soar above these earthly things?* And by this Aptness to soar so high above these Terrene Objects, and to converse with so much freedom with spiritual Beings, as well as abstracted Notions, we may certainly infer that our Rational Souls are of a far more noble and refin'd Nature, than that more feculent Principle of Imagination, which always converses in *face Romuli*, and can go no further than our Senses carry it. And thus I have made good the first proof, that there is something above Matter and Motion in the World, which is from that immaterial Being which is in Man.

- XIX. 2. The next Evidence which we have of a Being above Matter and Motion, is, from *the extraordinary effects which have been in Nature*. I speak not now merely of such things which by their Natures and Effects are manifested to proceed from some Beings which bear ill-will to Mankind, multitudes of which are related by Men philosophical and inquisitive, with such enumerations of circumstances, and particular Evidences, that they are not mere impostures, that one may on the same grounds question any Matter of fact which himself did not see, as such relations which are deliver'd by Persons without interest or design, and such as were able to judge of the truth of circumstances; such are both ancient and modern Philosophers, Physicians, States-men, and others. Neither shall I insist on such Prodigies, which oft-times presage revolutions in States, if we believe *Machiavel* himself, who in a whole Chapter designedly proves it; and professeth himself utterly to seek for the causes of them, unless they may be attributed to some Spirits and Intelligences in the Air, which give the World notice of such things to come. But those things which I suppose have the most clear and undoubted Evidence of true and undoubted Miracles (the Matters of fact being affirm'd by Eye-witnesses, who seal'd the truth of them with their Lives) are those recorded in the Holy Scriptures; which there are only two ways to evade, either by questioning the truth of the things, which I suppose in the precedent Book we have prov'd with as much rational Evidence as any thing of that nature is capable of, or else that the things therein recorded

*Machiav.
disput. l. 1.
c. 56.*

recorded might be salv'd without a *Deity*. For which only two ways have been excogitated by *Atheistical* Spirits, either attributing them to the power and influence of the Stars, the foundations of which fond and absurd Opinion have been taken away by those many Writers, who have rationally confuted the whole Art of *Judicial Astrology*, or else that they are done by mere power of Imagination, which is the way of *Avicenna* and some other *Arabic* Writers, which is so wild an effect of the power of Imagination, that nothing doth so much demonstrate the irregular Motions of it, as such an Opinion doth; and is sufficiently derided and refuted by *Pomponatius* himself. Now then, it being an acknowledged Principle in Nature, *That every thing continues in the course it is in, till something more powerful put it out*, if then such things have been in the World, which have been real alterations of the course of Nature, as the *Sun's standing still in the time of Joshua*, then there must be something above Matter and Motion, and consequently that there is a *GOD*.

Vid. D. H. More's Mystery of Godliness. l. 7. c. 14. 15. 16. 17.

C H A P. II.

Of the Origin of the Universe.

- I. *The necessity of the belief of the Creation of the World in order to the truth of Religion. Of the several Hypotheses of the Philosophers who contradict Moses: with a particular examination of them.*
- II. *The ancient Tradition of the World consonant to Moses; prov'd from the Ionic Philosophy of Thales, and the Italic of Pythagoras.*
- III. *The Pythagoric Cabala rather Ægyptian than Mosaic. Of the fluid Matter, which was the material Principle of the Universe.*
- IV. *Of the Hypothesis of the Eternity of the World asserted by Ocellus Lucanus and Aristotle.*
- V. *The weakness of the Foundations on which that Opinion is built. Of the manner of forming principles of Philosophy.*
- VI. *The possibility of Creation prov'd. [No arguing from the present state of the World against its beginning, shew'd from Maimonides.]*
- VII. *The Platonists arguments from the goodness of God for the Eternity of the World, answer'd.*
- VIII. *Of the Stoical Hypothesis of the Eternity of Matter; whether reconcilable with the Text of Moses.*
- IX. *Of the Opinions of Plato and Pythagoras concerning the præ-existence of Matter to the formation of the World.*
- X. *The contradiction of the Eternity of Matter to the Nature and Attributes of God.*
- XI, XII, XIII. *Of the Atomical Hypothesis of the Origin of the Universe.*
- XIV, XV, XVI, XVII. *The World cou'd not be produced by a casual*

N n 2

con-

concourse of Atoms prov'd from the nature and motion of Epicurus's Atoms, and the Phenomena of the Universe, especially the production and nature of Animals. XVIII. Of the Cartesian Hypothesis, that it cannot save the Origin of the Universe without a Deity giving motion to Matter.

1. **T**HE Foundations of Religion being thus establish'd in the Being of God, and the Immortality of the Soul, we now come to erect our Superstructure upon them, by asserting the undoubted truth and certainty of that account of the World which is given us in the Writings of *Moses*. Which beginning with the World it self, leads us to a particular consideration of the Origin of the Universe, the right understanding of which hath great influence upon our belief of all that follows in the word of God. For altho' we shou'd assert with *Epicurus* the Being of a Deity, if yet with him we add that the World was made by a casual concourse of Atoms, all that part of Religion which lies in obedience to the Will of God is unavoidably destroy'd. All that is left, is only a kind of Veneration of a Being more excellent than our own, which reacheth not to the government of Mens Lives, and so will have no force at all upon the generality of the World, who are only allur'd by Hopes or aw'd by Fears, to that which of their choice they would be glad to be freed from. Besides, What expressions of Gratitude can be left to God for his Goodness, if he interpose not in the Affairs of the World? What dependance can there be on Divine Goodness, if it be not at all manifested in the World? What apprehensions can we have of God's Infinite Wisdom and Power, if neither of them are discernable in the Being of the World? And as the Opinion of *Epicurus* destroys Religion, so doth that of *Aristotle* which attributes Eternity to the Universe, and a necessary Emanation of it from the first cause, as Light comes from the Sun; for if so, as *Maimonides* well observes, *the whole Religion of Moses is overthrown, all his Miracles are but Impositions, all the Hopes which are grounded on the Promises of God, are vain and fruitless*. For if the World did of necessity exist, then God is no free Agent; and if so, then all Instituted Religion is to no purpose; nor can there be any expectation of Reward, or fear of Punishment from him who hath nothing else to do in the World; but to set the great Wheel of the Heavens going. So much is it our concernment to inquire into the true Original of the World; and on what Evidence of Reason those Opinions are built, which are so contrary to that account given of it in the very entrance of the Books of *Moses*. Wherein we read the true Origin of the World to have been by a Production of it by the Omnipotent Will and Word of God. This being then the plain Assertion of *Moses*, we come to compare it, in point of Reason, with all those several Hypotheses which are repugnant to it, which have been embrac'd in several Ages by the Philosophers of greatest esteem in the World. Which may be reduc'd to these four: 1. *Such as suppose the World to have existed as it is from all Eternity.* 2. *Such as attribute the Formation of the World as it is to God: but withal assert the præ-existence and eternity*

*Maimon.
more Ne-
buch. p. 2.
c. 25.*

ty of Matter. 3. Such as deny any eternity to the World, but assert the Origin of it to have been by a casual concurrence of Atoms. 4. Such as endeavor to explain the Origin of the Universe and all appearances of Nature, merely by the Mechanical Laws of the motions of Matter.

I begin with those who assert the eternity of the World as it is, among whom *Aristotle* hath born the greatest name; who seems to have arrogated this Opinion to himself; for when he inquires into the judgment of Philosophers, who had writ before him, he says of them, *ἡρώτων ἑκάς ἐν ἀναρχίας εἶναι φασιν*, all the Philosophers asserted that the World was made, tho' some one way, some another. And were this true which *Aristotle* saith, it wou'd be the strongest Prejudice against his Opinion; for if the World had been eternal, how shou'd it come to pass, that the eldest Philosophers shou'd so readily and unanimously embrace that Opinion which asserted the Production of the World? Was it not a strong presumption of the novity of the Universe, that all Nations to whom the Philosophers resorted had Memorials left among them of the first Origin of things? And from hence it is observable, that when the humor of philosophizing began to take the *Greeks* (about the XL Olympiad, when we may suppose *Thales* to flourish) the beginning of the World was no matter of dispute, but, taking that for granted, the inquiry was, out of what material Principle the Universe was form'd; of which *Thales* thus delivers his Opinion in *Tully*; *aquam dixit esse initium rerum, Deum autem eam mentem quæ ex aqua cuncta fingeret*; wherein he plainly distinguisheth the efficient from the material Cause of the World. The prime efficient was God, the material principle, Water. It is a matter of some inquiry, whether the first principles of Philosophy among the *Greeks* were not rather some Traditional things conveyed to them from others, than any certain Theories which they had form'd from their own Experiments and Observations. The former is to me far the more probable on many accounts, but chiefly on this, that the first principles of the two Founders of the chief Sects of Philosophers, viz. the *Ionic* and *Italic* (for all the other were but the various issues of these two) did come so near to that which we have the greatest Reason to believe to have been the most certain account of the Origin of the World. For this Opinion of *Thales* seems to have been part of that Universal Tradition which was continu'd in the World concerning the first principles of things: for I do not see any reason to aver with so much confidence, as some do, that those Philosophers who spake any thing consonantly to *Moses*, must presently converse with the *Jews*, transcribe their Opinions out of the Scriptures, or have them convey'd to them in some secret Cabala of the Creation, as it is affirm'd of *Pythagoras* and *Plato*, and may with no less reason of *Thales*. But this I suppose may be made evident to any considerative Person, that those Philosophers of *Greece*, who convers'd most abroad in the World, did speak far more agreeably to the true account of things, than such who only endeavor'd by their own wits to improve or correct those Principles which were deliver'd by the other Philosophers. Which I impute not so much to their converse with the *Mosaic* Writings, as to that Universal Tra-

II.

*Aristot. de
cælo, l. 1.
c. 10.*

*Cicero de
Nat. Deor.
l. 1. c. 25.*

dition of the first Ages of the World, which was prefer'd far better among the *Phœnicians*, *Egyptians*, *Chaldeans*, and others, than among the *Greeks*. For which we have this evident Reason, that *Greece* was far more barbarous and rude in its elder times, than those other Nations were, which had means of preserving some Monuments and general Reports of the first Ages of the World, when the *Græcians* wanted them. And therefore we find that *Greece* from its beginning shin'd with a borrow'd Light; and saw not by an extramission of Rays of Knowledg from its self, but by an intromission of those representations of things which were receiv'd from other Nations. Those who form'd *Greece* first into civil Societies, and lick'd it into the shape of well order'd Common-wealths, were such who had been Traders for knowledg into foreign Parts. To which purpose *Diodorus Siculus* informs us that *Lycurgus* and *Solon*, as well as the Poets, *Orpheus*, *Musæus*, *Melampus* and *Homer*, and the Philosophers, afterwards *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, and others, had gain'd most of their Knowledg and Wisdom out of *Egypt*; nay, he saith in general, ὅτι τὰ πλεῖστα διδασκαλῶν ἐπὶ συνίᾳ καὶ παιδείᾳ, περιήλθον εἰς Αἴγυπτον ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων, ἥτις καὶ ἐστὶν ἡ κοινή περὶ πάντων τῶν παιδῶν μελέτη. All those who were renown'd among the *Greeks* for Wisdom and Learning, did in ancient time resort to *Egypt*, to be acquainted with their Laws and Knowledg. On this account therefore we are not to seek for the ancient and genuine Tradition of the World from the native and home-bred *Greeks*, such as *Aristotle* and *Epicurus*, but from those who took the pains themselves to search into those Records which were preserv'd among the elder and more knowing Nations: And altho' the Nations they resorted to, sought to advance their own Reputation in the Histories of their Ancient Times, of which we have already given a large account, yet they were more faithful in the account they gave of the Origin of the whole Universe. For it appears from *Diogenes Laertius*, that the *Egyptians* did constantly believe, That the World had a beginning, and was corruptible; that it was a Spherical, and the Stars were of the nature of Fire; that the Soul was of an Immortal nature, and did pass up and down the World. Which *Laertius* cites from *Hecateus* and *Aristagoras*. So that we need not make *Pythagoras* acquainted with such a Cabala of the Creation, which in all probability neither the *Jews* nor he ever dreamt of; we find a fair account may be given of most of the Opinions of *Pythagoras*, and whence he deriv'd them, without forcing the words of *Moses* into such a sense, which the plainness and perspicuity of the Writings of *Moses*, argue them not capable to admit of. But I will not deny from those concurrent Testimonies of *Hermippus* and *Aristobulus*, besides *Origen*, *Porphyrus*, *Clemens Alexandrinus*, and others, that *Pythagoras* might have had an opportunity of conversing with the *Jews*, (which it is most probable was in *Chaldea*, after the Captivity, at which time *Pythagoras* was there among them) but that *Pythagoras* shou'd converse with the Successors of *Elisha* on Mount *Carmel*, as *Vossius* thinks; or that *Moschus* the *Sidonian* Philosopher, in *Iamblichus*, shou'd be *Moses*, as others fanſie; or that pre-existence of Souls shou'd be part of the *Mosaic Cabala*; or that the *Pythagoric numbers*, as they are explain'd by *Nichomachus*

Diodorus,
l. i. v. Eu-
seb. Prep.
Evangel.
l. 10.

Diog. La-
ert. proem.
l. 7.

V. Selden.
de jure
Nat. &
Gen. apud
Ebraeos.
l. 1. c. 2.

Voss. de
Seſſis Phi-
loſoph. c. 6.
ſect. 5.

Gera-

Gerasenus in *Photius*, should be adequate to the Creation Cabalistically understood, are Fancies too extravagant and *Pythagorean*, to be easily embraced. If *Pythagoras* was Circumcis'd, it was more for love of the *Egyptians* than the *Jews*, among whom he spent twenty two years; if præ-existence of Souls be a rational *Hypothesis*, we may thank the *Egyptians* for it, and not *Moses*; if numbers be so expressive of the work of Creation, we are beholding to the Arithmetical Hieroglyphics of *Egypt* for them. But altho' *Pythagoras* might not be acquainted with such a philosophic *Cabala* of the Creation, which none of the *Jews*, as far as we can find, understood, till one more vers'd in *Plato* and *Pythagoras* than in the Learning of his own Nation, viz. *Philo* of *Alexandria*, began first to exercise his wit on the Text of *Moses*, with *Platonic* Notions; yet I shall easily grant that *Pythagoras*, by means of his great Industry and Converse with the learned Nations, might attain to far greater knowledg of many mysterious things in Natural Philosophy, and as to the Origin of the Universe, than any of the home-bred Philosophers of *Greece*, or it may be, than any one of the Nations he resorted to, because he had the advantage of comparing the several accounts of them together, and extracting out that which he judg'd the best of them. And hence *Plutarch* tells us, that the first Principles of the World, according to *Pythagoras*, were these two, the one was τὸ πᾶντι καὶ αἰδιδόν (ὅσα ἐστὶν νῦν ὁ θεός) an active and forming Principle, and that was God, whom he call'd Mind, (as *Anaxagoras* likewise did) the other τὸ παθητικόν τε καὶ αἰδιδόν (ὅσα ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρατός κόσμος) passive and material, which is, the visible World.

V. Mathem.
Hierogl.
Kircheri.
Tom. 3. Oc.
dip. Æ.
87p.

Plutarch.
de Plat.
philos. l. 1.
cap. 3.

And thus we see these two renowned Founders of the *Ionic* and *Italic* Societies of Philosophers, both giving their concurrent Testimony with *Moses* as to the true Origin of the World, and not at all differing from each other; for thus *Thales* speaks in *Dionigenes Laertius*, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ὄντων, θεός ἀγέννητος ὃ καὶ καλεῖται κόσμος, πρῶτος δὲ θεός, God is the eldest Being, because unbegotten; the World the most beautiful, because it is God's workmanship. To which those expressions of *Plato*, in his *Timæus*, come very near (whose Philosophy was for substance the same with the *Pythagorean*) when he had before ascrib'd the Production of the World to the goodness of God, which goodness of his did incline him to make all other things like himself. θεὸς ἔτι μὲν ἔτι ἐν τῷ αἰετῷ ὄντων αἰὲν ὡς τὸ καλὸν. For the most excellent Being cannot but produce the most excellent Effects. And as to the material Principle out of which the World was made, there appears no great difference between the ὕδωρ of *Thales*, and the ὕλη of *Plato* and *Pythagoras*; for *Plato*, when he tells us what a kind of thing the material Principle was, he describes it thus, σὺν νότῳ καὶ ἀτακτοῦ καὶ ἀνέμῳ καὶ ἀπλημελὲς καὶ ἀτακτὸς, which as *Chalcidius* renders it, is motu importuno fluctuans neque unquam quiescens, it was a visible corporeal thing (πᾶν ὅσον ἢ ὁρατόν) which was never at rest, but in continual disorderly Motion and Agitation: which is a full Explanation, I suppose, of what *Thales* meant by his Water, which is the same with that ὕδωρ or mixture of Mud and Water together which others speak of as the Principle of the Universe; as *Orpheus*, in *Athenagoras*, and the Scholiast on *Apollonius* cited by *Grotius* and others. Which we have the more reason to believe, because the

III.

Diog. Laer.
V. Thales.

Plato in
Tim. p.
1047. ed.
Ficini.

Chalcid.
Tim. p. 25.
ed. Meurs.

Grot. An.
not. in l. 1.
de Ver.
Christ. Rel.

Suc-

Successors of *Thales*, *Anaximander* and *Anaxagoras*, express themselves to that purpose. *Anaximander* call'd the Sea, ^{ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος} *the remainder of the primitive moisture*: and *Anaxagoras* says, before the Νῦς, or God, set things in their order, ^{πάντα ἄνωμα καὶ ὁμοῦ παρυσμένα} *all things were at first confus'd together*: which must needs make that which *Chalcidius* tells us *Numenius* attributes to *Pythagoras*, which his Translator calls *Sylvam fluidam*, or *fluid Matter*. Which is the same likewise with the *Phœnicians* ^{μῶν}, which as appears by *Eusebius*, some call ^{ἰλύω}, others ^{ἐλαττόδου μίξιν} *Mud or Slime*, others, the *putrefaction of watery Mixtures*, which they say was, ^{ἀπορροὴ καὶ κίση ἐκ τοῦ ὕδατος} *the Seed-plot of the Creation and the Generation of things*. Thus we see how *Thales* with the *Phœnicians* from whom he was deriv'd, as *Laertius* tells us and *Pythagoras*, with the *Egyptians* and others, concur with *Moses*, not only in the production of the World, but in the manner of 'it, wherein is express'd a fluid Matter which was the material Principle out of which the World was form'd, when we are told that *The Earth was without form and void, and the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the Waters*, i. e. that all at first was but fluid Matter; for *P. Fagius*, from *R. Kimchi*, renders ^{מְנוּחָה} by ^{מְנוּחָה} which fluid Matter was agitated and mov'd by the Divine Spirit, or the *vis plastica mundi*, so *Chrysostom* calls it ^{ἐκτατική δύναμις} and so *Drusius* and *P. Fagius* explain ^{מְנוּחָה} by Motion or Agitation. And herein we have likewise the consent of those forenamed excellent Philosophers, who attribute the Origin of particular things in the World to this Agitation or Motion of the fluid Matter. For *Chalcidius* speaking not only of *Thales*, *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, but of *Anaximenes*, *Heraclitus*, and others, says thus of them, *omnes igitur hi--in motu positam rerum originem censuerunt: they all agreed in this, that the Origin of things was to be ascrib'd to the motion of the parts of Matter*. So the *Phœnicians* call'd this Motion of the Particles of Matter ^{ἀπὸ τοῦ σκοτεινοῦ καὶ ἀνέμου} *a dark and blustering Wind*. And how futable this Explication of the Origin of things from the motion of fluid Matter is to the History of Nature, appears by those many Experiments by which mixt Bodies are shew'd to spring from no other material Principle than the Particles of fluid Matter. Of which you may read a Discourse of that ingenious and learned Gentleman Mr. *Boyle* in his *Sceptical Chymist*. Only thus much may here suffice to have made it appear, that all those Philosophers, who were most inquisitive after the ancient and genuine Tradition of the World concerning the first beginning of things, did not only concur with *Moses* in the main thing, that its beginning was from God, but in the particular Circumstances of it, as to the fluid Matter and motion thereof. Concerning which I may yet add, if it be material, the Testimony of *Homer* in *Plutarch*.

Homer.
Iliad. ζ.

Ὠκεανὸς, ὅσπερ γένεσις πάντεσσι τέτυκται.

Odys. ι.
Chalcid.
p. 178.
V. Menes.
in *Chal.*
p. 37.

And in *Chalcidius*: *Inque eadem sententia Homerus esse invenitur, cum Oceanum & Thetis dicat parentes esse genitura; cumque jusjurandum Deorum constituat aquam, quam quidem ipse appellat Stygem, antiquitati tribuens reverentiam, & jurejurando nihil constitu-*

ens

ens reverentius. To which purpose likewise *Aristotle* speaks in his *Metaphysics*, that the reason why *Styx* was made the Oath of the Gods, was because Water was suppos'd to be the material Principle of things, which he saith was *δοχμία τις αὐτῇ καὶ παλαιὰ ὡς τὸ φύσει δέξαι.* *a most ancient Tradition concerning the Origin of the Universe.* And tells us before, that some were of opinion, *τὸς παμπλαιῶς, καὶ πολὺ ὡς τὸ νῦν θύσεως καὶ πρώτους θεολογῶντες.* *that the most ancient and remote Persons and first Writers of Theology held this Opinion of Water being the first material Principle of things.*

*Aristot.
Metaphys.
l. 1. c. 3.*

Having thus made it appear what a consent there was between the ancient Tradition of the World, and the Writings of *Moses* concerning the Origin of the World; I now come to consider upon what pretence of Reason this Tradition came to be contradicted, and the Eternity of the World asserted. For which we are to consider, that the difference of the former Philosophers of the *Ionian* Sect, after the time of *Thales*, as to the material Principle of the World, one substituting Air, another Fire instead of Water, rendred the Tradition it self suspected among other Philosophers, especially when the humor of innovating in Philosophy was got among them, and they thought they did nothing unless they contradicted their Masters; thence came that multiplicity of Sects presently among them, and that Philosophy which at first went much on the original Tradition of the World, was turn'd into Disputes and Altercations, which help'd as much to the finding out of Truth, as the fighting of two Cocks on a Dung-hill doth to the finding out the Jewel that lies there. For which, scraping and searching into the Natures of things had been far more proper, than contentions and wranglings with each other; but by means of this litigious humor, Philosophy from being a Design, grew to be a mere Art, and he was accounted the best Philosopher, not that search'd further into the Bowels of Nature, but that dress'd and trick'd up the Notions he had in the best posture of defence against all who came to oppose him. From hence those Opinions were most plausible, not which were most true, but which were most defensible, and which like *Des-Cartes* his second Element, had all the Angles cut off, on which their Adversaries might have an advantage of justling upon them, and then their Opinions were accounted most pure when they were so Sphærical, as to pass up and down without interruption. From such a degeneracy of Philosophy as this we have now mention'd, arose the Opinion of the Eternity of the World; for the certain Tradition of the World being now lost in a crowd of Philosophers, whose main aim was to set up for themselves, and not to Trade with the Common-bank, so that there cou'd be no certain and convictive Evidence given to a shuffling Philosopher that things were ever otherwise than they are; they found it most defensible to assert that the World never had a beginning, nor wou'd have an end, but always did, and wou'd continue in the state they were in. This Opinion, tho' *Aristotle* seems to make all before him to be of another mind, yet was hatch'd, as far as we can find, at first, under *Pythagoras* his Successors by *Ocellus Lucanus*, as appears by his Book still extant, *καὶ τὸ πάντες φύσει.* *of the nature of the Universe;* to whom *Aristotle* hath not been a little beholding, as *Ludov. Nogarola* hath in part manifest-

O o

ed

ed in his Notes on *Ocellus*, altho' *Aristotle* had not the Ingenuity of *Pliny*, *agnoscere per quos profecerit*. From *Aristotle* this Opinion together with his Name, spread it self much farther, and became the Opinion most in vogue among the Heathen Philosophers, especially after the rise of Christianity; for then not only the *Peripatetics*, but the modern *Platonists*, *Plotinus*, *Apuleius*, *Taurus*, *Iamblichus*, *Alcinous*, *Proclus*, and others, were all engaged in the defence of the Eternity of the World, thinking thereby the better to overthrow Christianity. Hence came the hot and eager Contests between *Proclus*, *Simplicius*, and *Philoponus*, who undertook to answer *Proclus* his eighteen Arguments for the Eternity of the World, and to charge *Aristotle* with self-contradiction in reference to it. But nothing were they more troubl'd about, than to reconcile the *Timæus* of *Plato* with the Eternity of the World, which they made to be a mere *Hypothesis*, and a kind of *Diagramme* to salve Providence withal; altho' the plain words of *Plato* not only there, but elsewhere do expresse, as far as we can judg by his way of writing, his real Judgment to have been for the production of the World by God. For which purpose we have this observable Testimony in his *Sophista*, where he divides all manner of Productions of things into *Divine* and *Human*, and opposes the Opinion that conceiv'd all things to be produc'd by an Eternal Power, to the Opinion of the vulgar, which saith he, was τὸ πᾶσι αὐτῷ θεῷ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι αἴτιος ἀλλοδαπῆς καὶ ἀνὰ ἀλογίας φύσεως, that all things were produc'd by a blind force of Nature, without any Reason or Counsel, to which he opposeth the other Opinion, that they are made ὡς λόγῳ καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ θεῷ καὶ θεῷ συνεσθῆναι, by a Divine Power with Infinite Reason and Wisdom; and when *Theætetus* expresseth himself in an Academical way as to either of these Opinions, the *Hospes Eleatensis*, who there acts the part of the Philosopher, tells him, if he thought he were inclinable to the other Opinion, οὐκ ἂν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ πειθῇ ἀνταγωνιστὴς ἐπαυρομένη πρὸς ἡμετέραν. He wou'd undertake to make him confess the contrary by the Evidence of Reason which he wou'd bring. And we shall see what great reason there is for this Opinion, when we consider what weak and infirm foundations the contrary is built upon. For all the Arguments which either *Ocellus*, or *Aristotle*, or the modern *Platonists* make use of, are built on these following Suppositions which are all false. 1. That it is unconceivable that things shou'd ever have been in any other state than they are. 2. That there is no other way of Production but by Generation. 3. That God is no free Agent, but produced the World by necessity of Nature.

- v. 1. That it is unconceivable that things shou'd ever have been any otherwise than they are. The reason of which supposition was this, That the general Conclusions of Reason, which they proceed upon in *Philosophy*, were taken up from the Observation of things as they are at present in the World. Which is evident from the ground of *Aristotle's* condemning the Opinion of *Empedocles*, who asserted the Production of the World, and yet the Incorruptibility of it. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ἀδύνατον εἶναι φθίνειν τὸ ἀδύνατον, which he accounts impossible, and gives this as his Reason, μὴδὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ἁπλοῦς αἰετὸς καὶ ἀφθαρτός. For, saith he, nothing else can be rationally asserted, but what we find to be in all things or at least in most; now

Plato. *Sophista*, p. 185.
Ed. Fic.

*Arist. de
caelo*, l. i.
cap. 10.

because there cou'd nothing be found in the World which was produc'd (*i. e.* by Generation) and yet was incorruptible, therefore he concludes it impossible it shou'd be so with the Universe. By which we evidently see what the grand Principles of Reason among the Philosophers were: *viz.* such Observations as they had made from the present course of Nature in the order of the Universe. From hence arose that strong presumption among them, which hath been so taken for granted, that it hath been look'd on as common Notion of Human Nature, *viz.* *Ex nihilo nihil fit*, which was the main Argument us'd by them to prove the Eternity of the World: and by others to prove the *Præ-existence of Matter*. So Ocellus argues against both the Dissolution and Production of the World from this Principle; *If the World be dissolv'd*, saith he, *it must either be* *ἢ εἰς τὸ ὄν, ἢ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν*, *either into that which is, or into that which is not*: It cannot be dissolv'd into that which is, because then the Universe cannot be destroy'd; for that which is, is either the Universe, or a part of it: neither can it be dissolv'd into that which it is not, *ἀμύχανον γὰρ τὸ ὄν ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, ἢ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀναλυθῆναι*. For it is impossible that a thing shou'd be made out of that is not, or be dissolv'd into nothing. And Aristotle somewhere tells us, that it is a Principle which all the Writers of Natural Philosophy are agreed in, (*ὡς δὲ πάντες ὁμολογουμένως τὸ δεῖν ἅπαντες εἰ ὡς τὸ φύσει*) which is *ἐκ μὴ ὄντος ἵνα τίς ἀδύνατον*, that is impossible for any thing to come out of nothing. But now when we observe upon what grounds this Principle was took up by these Philosophers, we have no reason to admit of it as an universal standard of Nature. For we find these Naturalists, who thus asserted this Principle, that when they go about to prove it, it is only from the course of Generations in the World, or from the works of Art, both which suppose Matter *Præ-existent*, and from these short collections they form this universal Maxim. And from hence when they discours'd of the manner whereby God did produce the World, their Imaginations ran presently upon that which the Epicurean in Tully inquires after, *Quæ molitio? quæ ferramenta? qui vectes? quæ machinæ? qui ministri tanti operis fuerunt?* they apprehend God only as an Artificer that contrives the World first into a Platform, and then useth instruments to erect it, and consequently still suppose the Matter ready for him to work upon. So true is that of Balbus in Tully, when he comes to discourse of the Nature of God; *In quo nihil est difficilius quam a consuetudine oculorum aciem mentis abducere*; nothing is more difficult than to abstract our Minds from the observations of this visible World when we seek to apprehend the Nature of the Deity. Thus we see upon what general grounds the Philosophers proceeded, and from what they took them, and how insufficient any collections from the present order of the Universe are to determine any thing concerning its Production by. For supposing a Production of the World, several things must of necessity be suppos'd in it, different from what the present order of the World is; and it is an unreasonable thing to argue from a thing when it is in its greatest perfection, to what must always have been in the same thing; for by this means we must condemn many things for falsities which are apparently true, and believe many others to be true which are apparently false. For which Maimonides useth an ex-

Vid. Laert. in vit. Democriti.

Ocellus Lucanus p. 16. ed. Comm.

Aristot. Physic. l. 4.

Cicero de Nat. l. 1.

Ibid. l. 2.

ἐπὶ τὸ μείον, καὶ τὴν δὲ τοῦ βελτίονος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον τὸ δὲ συμπέρας μὲν τοῦ μετὰ τοῦ βελτίονος ἀφ' οὗ
 μαζέται φθορὰ καὶ ἀφ' οὗτος. *Every thing that comes into Being, and is sub-*
ject to dissolution, hath two observable mutations in it; the one is,
whereby it grows from less to greater, and from worse to better, and
this is called Generation, and the height of this Mutation, Perfe-
ction; the other begins from better to worse, and from bigger to less;
and the conclusion of this is Corruption, and Dissolution. But now,
saith he, if the World had a beginning, there wou'd be such a mu-
tation in it, and it wou'd have grown by degrees greater, till it had
come to its perfection, and from thence it wou'd sensibly decay till it
came to dissolution; but no body hath ever observ'd such a mutation
in the World, neither is there any appearance of it; ἀλλ' αἰὲ καὶ αὐτὸ
καὶ ὡσαύτως ἀπλῶς καὶ ἴσον ὅμοιον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ but the World is semper idem, it
varies not nor alters any thing from it self. For which he particu-
larly instanceth in the Courses, Symmetries, Figures, Positions,
Intervals, Proportions of Motion which are in the World, which
things all are capable of such a Mutation, yet we see no such thing
in the Universe, from whence he infers that the Universe was al-
ways and will be as it is. Upon the same Principle doth Aristotle
dispute for the Eternity of the World from the Nature of his ma-
teria prima; because if the First Matter were generated, it must
be generated of other Matter, and so in infinitum; and so argues
from the Nature of the Heavens, that they are not capable of Ge-
neration and Corruption as other Bodies are. All which Argu-
ments signify no more than this, that the World was not generated
as Plants or Animals are; and whoever right in his Wits asserted
that it was? But do any of these Arguments prove it impossible
that God having infinite Power, shou'd produce the Universe
after another way, than any of those things are produc'd in, which
we observe in the World? For we assert an Infinite and Eternal
Being, which was the Efficient Cause of the World, who by his
Omnipotent Power produc'd it out of nothing, and continues it
in its Being; which is well express'd by the Author of the Refu-
tation of Aristotle in Justin Martyr's Works. We assert, saith he,
one God who is eternal himself, that hath nothing else co-equal
with himself, neither by way of subjection or opposition, whose
power is so great that nothing can hinder it, by which power he
produc'd the World, ἀρχὴν ἔχοντες τὸ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ πᾶς ἀσπαρῆν, τὴν
αἰώνιον ἡλικίαν; which hath no other cause, either of its beginning, or of
its being, or continuance, but only his Will. Who fully answers
in a Philosophical manner, the particular Allegations out of Ari-
stotle, concerning the Eternity of the World: his design being, as
he saith, to shew μὴ κατὰ τὴν δαυδαυλικὴν ἐπιστήμην, καὶ ἢ ἐπαγγέλλονται Ἕλληνες ὡς Θεοῦ
τε καὶ κτίστον τὰς λόγους ποιῶν, ὅτι ποικιλοῦς, ἀλλ' εἰκασμῶ τὸ δοκοῦν διαλογισμῶς. That the
Greek Philosophers in their discourses concerning God and the Crea-
tion, were very far from being as good as their word to observe the
laws of Demonstration, but instead of them proceeded only upon Opi-
nions and Conjectures. And to this particular of the Possibility of
another way of Production, besides that of Generation, he proves
it from Aristotle's own Opinion, from the equal necessity of the ex-
istence of Matter, as of God. For, saith he, if God can pro-
duce any thing out of Matter, which is as necessarily existent as him-
self, he may produce something out of nothing. For the same repug-

Aristor.
 dogmat.
 overf. p. III.

Just. Mar.
 ep. p. 113.

nancy that there is in that which is absolutely nothing to be produc'd, the same must there be in that which is necessarily existent. How then can God produce something out of Matter which necessarily exists, and not be able to produce something out of nothing? For if Matter have its original from it self, how can it be subject to the power of another? And besides, if we acknowledg God to have his Being from himself, and on that account attribute infinite Power to him, by the same reason we must attribute it to Matter. But whatever hath infinite Power in it self, hath a Power upon something beyond it self; but if God and Matter have it both, they can never have Power upon each other, or without themselves. Which is a far greater Absurdity than the mere asserting a Power to produce something out of nothing, which is imply'd in the very Notion of infinite Power; for if it be confin'd to any Matter, the Power is not infinite, because we cannot but conceive the bounds of it; for it extends no farther than Matter doth. So that a Power of Creation is imply'd in the very Notion of a *Deity*; and therefore it is a mere *Sophism* to argue because the World cou'd not be generated, therefore it cou'd not be produc'd, unless any other way of Production but by Generation, be prov'd impossible.

- VII. A third false *Hypothesis* they proceeded on was this, *That the*
 3. *Being of the World was no effect of God's Will, but of the necessity of Nature.* For altho' the Philosophers we now speak of, did assert a *Deity*, which in some sense might be call'd the cause of the World, yet they withal asserted that the World was co-equal with God himself, and so tho' there might be some priority in order of Causes between them, yet there was none in order of time, or duration, as we see the Light, tho' it flows from the Sun, yet the Sun is never without Light. This *Aristotle* proves from the necessity of Motion and Time: For, saith he, *whatever is mov'd, must be mov'd by something else, and consequently there must be a running in infinitum*; but this runs on a false Supposition of the necessity of a continual *Physical* Motion in things, which we deny, since God by his infinite Power may give Motion to that which had it not before; and so all that can be prov'd, is the necessity of some first Cause, which we assert, but no necessity at all of his continual Acting, since he may cause Motion when he please. And for time continually existing, it denotes nothing real in it self existing, but only our manner of Conception, of the Duration of things, as it is conceiv'd to belong to Motion; and so can argue nothing as to the real existence of things from all eternity. But the latter *Platonists* look upon these as insufficient ways of Probation, and therefore argue from those Attributes of God, which they conceive most necessary and agreeable to God's Nature; and by which the World was produc'd if at all: so that by the same Arguments whereby we prove that the World was made by God, they prove it to have been from all eternity. It was well and truly said in *Plato*, in his *Timæus*, *That the goodness of God was the cause of the production of the World*; from which Speech the more modern *Platonists* gather a necessity of the World's eternity, for from hence they infer, that since God was always good, he must always have an object to exercise his Goodness upon; as the *Sun* disperseth his light as soon as he is himself. True, were God of the

the Nature of the Sun, it wou'd be so with him; or were the Sun of the Nature of God, it wou'd not be so with it. But there is this vast difference between them, that tho' God be essentially and necessarily good, yet the communications of his Goodness are the effects of his Will, and not merely of his Nature; For, were not the acts of Beneficence and Goodness in God the free acts of his Will, Man must be made as happy as he was capable of being, not only upon his first existence in the World, but as long as it shou'd continue, by mere necessity of Nature, without any intervention of the will or actions of Men. And so there cou'd be no such difference as that of good and bad Men in the World; For, if the lettings forth of God's Goodness to the World be so necessary, all Men must become necessarily good, if God's Goodness be so great as to be able to make Men so; which I suppose will not be question'd. By this then when we see that the communications of God's Goodness to the World are free, and depend upon the eternal Counsels of his Will, which is a depth too great for us to approach, or look into; by what necessity then, if God be a free Agent, and of infinite Wisdom, as well as Goodness, must we either assert the Eternity of the World, or fear to deprive God of his essential Goodness? Whereas to make the communications of God's Goodness *ad extra* necessary, and therefore to make the World from Eternity, that he might have an object to exercise his Goodness on, is, to take as much off from the infinite Perfection and Self-sufficiency of the Divine Nature, as it wou'd seem to flatter his Goodness. For God cannot be himself without his Goodness; and if his Goodness cannot be without some Creature to shew or display it upon, God cannot be perfect nor happy, without his Creatures, because these are necessary issues of his Goodness; and consequently we make the Being of the Creatures necessary to his being God. Which is the highest derogation from the absolute Perfection of the Divine Nature. We assert then so much Goodness in God, as none can be imagin'd greater; we assert, that it was from the communication of this Divine Goodness which gave Being to the World; but withal we acknowledg God to be an Agent infinitely wise and free, who dispenseth this Goodness of his in such a way and manner as is best pleasing to himself, tho' ever agreeable to his Nature. As God is infinitely good in himself, so whatever he doth is futable to this Nature of his; but the particular determinations of the Acts of God's Beneficence belong to the Will of God, as he is a most free and independent Agent; so that Goodness as it imports the necessary rectitude of the Divine Nature, implies a Perfection inseparable from the true Idea of God; but as it is taken for the expressions of Divine Bounty to somewhat without, as the object of it, it is not imply'd in our conception of God, as to his Nature, but belongs to the free determinations of his Will. We cannot then, neither ought we to determine any thing concerning the particular ways of God's Bounty towards the whole Universe, or any part of it, any farther than God himself hath declar'd it to us. Now we see the World exists, we have cause to adore that Goodness of God, which not only gave a Being to the Universe, but continually upholds it, and plentifully provides for the Creatures

Cicero de
Nat. Deor.
l. 2.

tures which he hath made in it. Which the *Heathen* was so sensible of, that the *Stoic* in *Tully* taking notice of the abundant provision which is made in the World, not only for Man's necessity, but for delight and ornament, cries out, *Ut interdum Pronæa nostra Epicurea esse videatur: God's Providence doth abundantly exceed Man's necessity.* We see then from this Discourse, how unsafe and unsatisfactory (that I may not say bold and presumptuous) those Arguments are, which are drawn from a general Consideration of the Divine Nature and Goodness, without regard had to the determinations of his Will, as to the existence of things in the World. It cannot certainly then be an Argument of any great force with any candid Inquirers after Truth and Reason, which hath been lately pleaded in the behalf that *Pythagorean Hypothesis* of the *Præ-existence* of Souls, viz. *That if it be good for Men's Souls to be at all, the sooner they are, the better; but we are most certain that the Wisdom and Goodness of God will do that which is best; and therefore if they can enjoy themselves before they come into these terrestrial Bodies (it being better for them to enjoy themselves than not) they must be before they come into these Bodies.* Wherefore the *Præ-existence* of Souls is a necessary result of the Wisdom and Goodness of God, who can no more fail to do that which is best, than he can to understand it. I now seriously inquire of such who love Reason above *Plato* and *Pythagoras*, whether if the Eternity of the World were put into the Argument instead of the *Præ-existence* of Souls, this Argument wou'd not hold as strongly for that, as it doth for *Præ-existence*; and if I am bound to believe *Præ-existence* on this ground, I be not likewise bound to believe at least the Souls of Men eternal, if not the Universe. But how reconcilable the Eternity of the World is to the *Pythagoric Cabala* of the Creation, I am yet to understand. But if this Argument doth not at all infer the Eternity of the World, as we have shew'd it doth not, much less doth it *Præ-existence* of Souls.

VIII.

We have thus far consider'd the first *Hypothesis*, which is repugnant to *Moses*, concerning the origin of the Universe, which is that which asserts the *Eternity of the World as it is*; we come now to the second, which attributes the Formation of the World as it is, to GOD, as the efficient Cause; but attributes Eternity to the Matter out of which the World was fram'd. I am not ignorant that some who wou'd be taken for the Masters of Reason, are so far from conceiving this *Hypothesis* to be repugnant to the Text of *Moses*, that they conceive it to be the genuine sense of it, viz. That there was a *præ-existent Matter*, out of which God form'd the World. But I wou'd willingly understand how *Moses* wou'd have express'd that Matter it self was created, supposing it had been his intention to have spoken it; for altho' the word כֶּרֶם may not of it self imply necessarily the Production of things out of nothing, i. e. out of no *præ-existent Matter*; yet it is acknowledg'd by all, that no word us'd by the *Jews* is more proper to that than כֶּרֶם is; and *P. Fagius* cites it from *R. Nachmani*, That the Hebrew Language hath no other word to signify such a Production out of nothing but כֶּרֶם. It is therefore a very weak manner of arguing, That because כֶּרֶם is sometimes us'd for
no

Volkelius
de vera rel.
l. 2. c. 4.

no more than *ἡ ύλη*, therefore the World was created out of *Præ-existent* Matter; all that can rationally be inferr'd, is, that from the mere force and importance of that word the contrary cannot be collectèd: but if other places of Scripture compar'd, and the evidence of Reason, do make it clear that there could be no *Præ-existent* Matter which was uncreated, then it will necessarily follow that Creation must be taken in its proper Sense. And in this Sense it is evident, that not only *Jews* and *Christians*, but even the *Heathens* themselves understood *Moses*, as is plain by *Galen*, Galen. de usu part. l. 11. where he compares the Opinion of *Moses*, with that of *Epicurus*, and ingenuously confesseth that of *Moses*, which attributed the Production of things to God, to be far more rational and probable than that of *Epicurus*, which assign'd the origin of Things to a mere casual concourse of *Atoms*: but withal adds, that he must dissent from both; and sides with *Moses* as to the origin of such things as depend on Generation, but asserts the *Præ-existence* of Matter, and withal, that *God's power could not extend it self beyond the capacity of the Matter which it wrought upon. Atque id est*, saith he, *in quo ratio nostra ac Platonis, tum aliorum qui apud Græcos de rerum natura recte conscripserunt, a Mose dissidet.* How true these words are, will appear afterwards. *Chalcidius* in his Commentaries on *Plato's Timæus*, where he speaks of the Origin of *ύλη*, which in him is still translated *Sylva*, and inquires into the different Opinions of all Philosophers about it, takes it for granted, that according to *Moses*, this *ύλη* had its Production from God. *Hebræi Sylvam generatam esse consentiunt; quorum sapientissimus Moyses non humana facundia, sed Divina, ut ferunt, inspiratione vegetatus, in eo libro, qui de genitura mundi censetur, ab exordio sic est profatus, juxta interpretationem LXX. prudentium; Initio Deus fecit cælum & terram. Terra autem erat invisibilis & incompta. Ut vero ait Aquila; Caput rerum condidit Deus cælum & terram; terra porro inanis erat & nihil; velut Symmachus; Ab exordio condidit Deus cælum & terram. Terra porro fuit otiosum quid, confusumque & inordinatum. Sed Origenes asseverat ita sibi ab Hebræis esse persuasum, quod in aliquantum sit a vera proprietate derivata interpretatio. Fuisse enim in exemplari, Terra autem stupida quadam erat admiratione. Omnia tamen hæc in unum aiunt concurrere, ut & generata, sic ea quæ subjecta est universo corpori, sylva, sermonesque ipsos sic interpretantur.* Where we find by the testimony of *Chalcidius* an universal consent as to the Production of the Universal Corporeal Matter by God; for that is all which is understood by his term of *Generata est*, But this same Author afterwards tells us, that by *Heavens* and *Earth* in the first verse of *Genesis*, we are not to understand the visible *Heavens* and *Earth*: For, saith he, *the Heavens, which are called the Firmament, were created after, and on the third day, when the Waters were separated, the dry Land appeared, which was called Earth. Qui tumultuario contenti sunt intellectu, cælum hoc quod videmus, & terram qua subvehimur, dici putant; porro qui altius indagant, negant hoc cælum ab initio factum, sed secundo die.* And therefore by the *Heavens* he understands *Incorpoream Naturam*, and by *Earth*, *ύλη* or the *Primogenial Matter*.

Pp

And

And this, saith he, appears by the following words, *The Earth was invisible and without form*; i. e. this Corporeal Matter, before it was brought into order by the Power and Wisdom of God, remain'd a rude and indigested Lump; and that which is so, might well be call'd invisible and without form. And therefore it is call'd *inanis* and *nihil*, because of its capacity of receiving all forms, and having none of its own. *Symmachus* calls it *otiosa & indigesta*; the former, because of its inability to produce any thing of its self: the latter, because it wanted a Divine Power to bring it into due order. The stupidity and admiration which *Origen* attributes to it, he conceives to relate to the Majesty of God, who was the Orderer and Contriver of it, *siquidem Opificis & Auctoris sui Majestate capta stupuerit*. Thus we see that according to *Moses*, the first Matter of the World was produced by God, which is largely manifested by *Origen* against the *Marcionists*, a fragment of which is extant in his *Philocalia*; and by *Tertullian* against *Hermogenes*, and others, who from the Opinion of the præ-existence of Matter, are call'd *Materiarii*.

Origen.
Philoc. c.
24. Tertull.
ad Hermog.
per tot.

IX.

Having thus clear'd the Sense of *Moses*, it is far more difficult to find out the true Opinions of the ancient Philosophers concerning the production or eternity of Corporeal Matter, there having been so great Dissentions, not only about the thing it self, but about the Opinions of some about it. For it is plain by *Plutarch* his *Φυσιολογία*, as well as the Discourses of the later *Platonists*, how eager some have been to interpret *Plato's Timæus* in favor of the Eternity, at least of Matter, if not of the World. But altho' *Plato* doth assert therein a præ-existence of rude Matter, before the formation of the World, yet I see no reason why he should be otherwise understood than in the same sense that we believe a *Chaos*, to have gone before the bringing the World into the order it is now in. And in that sense may those places in *Plutarch* be interpreted, *ὅτι ὅταν ἦ μὴ ὄντος ἡ γένεσις, ἀλλ' ὅταν τῷ μὴ παλαιοῦ καὶ λευκοῦ ἀκατάστατον* and so likewise those following words, *ὅτι ὅταν ἦν αἰὼν καὶ ἀσχηματιστός, ἔτι φυσικῶς καὶ ἀσχηματιστός* for the meaning may be no more than that *Plato* conceiv'd that all the productions of the kinds of things, which are in the World, was out of a præ-existent Hyle, the one Spiritual and Intelligible, out of which he suppos'd Souls to be form'd, the other Sensible and Corporeal, out of which other Beings which were more gross and material, were produced. So *Chalcidius* tells us that both *Pythagoras* and *Plato* look'd upon *constitutionem Sylvæ* to be *opus providentiæ*: which I suppose relates not only to the bringing of Matter into form, but to the production of Matter it self. But after this he takes a great deal of pains to search out the true meaning of *Plato* concerning the Origin of Hyle, and mentions the great Dissentions among the *Platonists* about it, and the obscurity of the *Timæus* in it. To him therefore I refer the Reader: Who likewise brings in *Numenius* largely discoursing concerning the Opinion of *Pythagoras* about it, who condemns all those, as not understanding *Pythagoras*, who attribute to him the production of the indeterminate Hyle: These are his words, *Numenius ex Pythagoræ Magisterio Stoicorum hoc de initiis dogma refellens, Pythagoræ dogmate, cui concinere dicit dogma Platonicum, ait Pythagoram, Deum quidem singularitatis nominasse* (no-
mine

Plutarch.
de Anima
procreat. o
Tim.

Chalcid. in
Tim. p. 377.

pag. 401.

pag. 393.

mine appellasse) *sylvam vero duitatis. Quam duitatem indeterminatam quidem, minime genitam, limitatam vero, generatam esse dicere. Hoc est, antequam exornaretur quidem, formamque & ordinem nancisceretur, sine ortu & generatione; exornatam vero atque illustratam, a Digestore Deo esse generatam. Atque ita quia generationis sit fortuna posterior, inornatum illud minime generatum, æquævum Deo, a quo est ordinatum, intelligi debeat. Sed nonnullos Pythagoreos, vim sententiæ non recte affecutos, putasse, dici etiam illam indeterminatam & immensam duitatem, ab una singularitate institutam, recedente a natura sua singularitate, & in duitatis habitum migrante. But however these Pythagoreans might be deceiv'd, who thought the Unity it self became the Deity; yet it is evident by Numenius, that he look'd on the undetermin'd and confus'd matter to have been co-æval with God himself, and not produced by him. And if Numenius be as much to be credited in this as when he calls Plato, Moses Atticus, then the Creation of Universal Matter can be no part of Pythagoras his philosophic Cabala. But whatever were the Opinions of Plato and Pythagoras, concerning the first Origin of Matter, we are certain that the Stoics generally asserted the improdution of Matter, and make that to be as necessary a passive Principle for the Being of the World, as God is the active and efficient Cause. So Diogenes Laertius reports of the Stoical Principles concerning the Origin of the Universe: *ἄνεσι δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀρχαὶ αἰῶν ἢ ἑλάν διό· τὸ παῖον καὶ τὸ πάχον· τὸ μὲν ἔστι πάχον αἰῶν τῆς ἀπείρου οὐσίας τῆς ὕλης· τὸ δὲ παῖον, ὃ ἐκ αὐτῆς λόγον ἔχει.* They make two principles of the Universe, one active, and the other passive; the passive, an Essence without quality, called Hyle or confus'd Matter; the active, the Reason which acts on the other, which is God. These two Principles Seneca calls *Causa & materia; esse vero debet, faith he, aliquid unde fiat; deinde, a quo fiat; hoc causa est, illud materia.* Altho' Seneca seems to make a Query of it elsewhere, *quantum Deus possit? materiam ipse sibi formet, an data utatur?* But Zeno is express in Stobæus, *ὁ αἰῶν αἰῶν τῆς ἡμετέρας οὐρανῶν ἀρχὴν ὕλην, μέτρον δὲ πῶτος αἰῶνος, ἔστι πᾶσι γινώσκῃς ἔστι ἀνάγκη.* The first Essence of all is Matter, which is eternal, and not capable of accession or diminution. To the same purpose Chalcidius speaks, *Stoici ortum sylvæ rejiciunt, quin potius ipsam & Deum, duo totius rei sumunt initia; Deum, ut opificem; Sylvam, ut quæ operationi subjiciatur. Una quidem essentia præditos facientem, & quod sit ac patitur, id corpus esse; diversa vero virtute; quia faciat, Deum; quia fiat, Sylvam esse.**

Laert. V.
Zeno.

V. Lipsium
in Physiol.
Sto. l. i. c. 4.

Senec. Epist.
65.

Idem Praefat. ad Nat.
Quæst.
Stob. Eclog.
Physic.

Chalcid. in
Tim. p. 388.

x.

Having now found out the certain Assertors among the Heathen Philosophers of the eternity and improdution of Matter as the passive Principle of things, we come to examin the reason of this Hypothesis, and whether there were foundation enough for this matter to subsist upon to all Eternity? It might be sufficient prejudice against this Opinion, that it was built on the same infirm Conclusions which that of the Eternity of the whole World was, viz. that Maxim which Lipsius attributes to Democritus, but was embraced by all those Philosophers who deny'd production of Matter, *μὴδὲ οὐ τὸ μὴ οὐτὶ· γινώσκει· μὴδὲ οὐ τὸ μὴ εἶναι οὐ γινώσκει, that nothing cou'd be produced out of nothing, nor cou'd return into nothing;* which as we have already said, was only taken up from the established order of the Universe, and the manner of production of material

Beings. But this is not all we have to charge this *Hypothesis* with; for,

1. It is repugnant to the natural Notion of a Deity, which must imply in it an Omnipotent Power; For otherwise we degrade him to the imbecillity of finite Creatures, if he cannot produce any thing which doth not imply a contradiction: but what contradiction is there in this, that God shou'd give a Being to that which had none before? For that is all we understand by Creation, *viz.* the producing of something out of nothing, or which had nothing out of which it was produc'd. Now what repugnancy is there to any free Principle of Reason, that a Power infinite shou'd raise an Insect into Being without any passive Principle out of which it was caus'd; and if an Infinite Power can do that, it may as well produce the World out of nothing, else the Power wou'd not be Infinite; for it wou'd have its bounds set, that thus far it cou'd go and no further. Now if such a Power in God implies no contradiction in it self, I say, the asserting the necessary existence of Matter implies a contradiction to this Power. For 1. a Power to produce something out of nothing wou'd be to no purpose, if a passive Principle or præ-existent Matter be necessary to the production of any thing; and so that Being which hath a power to produce something out of nothing, hath only a power to produce something out of something, which is a plain contradiction. 2. If God hath a power to produce something out of nothing, either this power doth extend to the production of this Matter, or not; if it doth, then it depends on him; if not, his power is not Infinite, and so the same power is Infinite and not Infinite; which is another contradiction. So that it is plainly repugnant to the Notion of a God, to assert the necessary and eternal existence of Matter.

2. If Matter be unproduced, then necessary Existence must belong to it as well as to God; and if necessary Existence belongs to Matter, Infinite Power must belong to it too; for whatever necessarily exists is Self-originated; whatever is Self-originated, cou'd not by any Cause whatsoever be hinder'd from Being, what cannot by any Cause be hinder'd from Being, hath Infinite Power; what hath Infinite Power, may produce any thing, and is God, and so Matter cannot be a mere passive Principle, but must be an active, and must be God himself, or else there must be more Gods than one. To an Argument something of this nature *Hermogenes* in *Tertullian* replies, that Matter wou'd not lose the Name or Nature of Matter, because of its Co-eternity with God; neither cou'd it be God merely on that account, unless it had other things that were agreeable to the Nature of God as well as that. But I have already shew'd that necessary Existence implies other Perfections going along with it: which is likewise thus prov'd by *Tertullian* in answer to *Hermogenes*; The reason of the Imperfections which are to be seen in any Creatures, is from hence, that they derive their Beings from a higher Cause, who creates them in what order he pleases; but that which hath its original from it self, must on that account want those Imperfections which other Creatures in the World have; and therefore if necessary Existence be of the Nature of Matter, all other Perfections must belong to it too: and so there

*Tertull.
advers.
Hermog.
c. 4.*

there can be no superiority and inferiority between God and Matter, because on both sides there will be necessary Existence. *De- vinitas gradum non habet, utpote unica:* and so the eternal existence of Matter, is repugnant to the Unity of God. Tertul. c. 7.

3. It is repugnant to the Independency of God: for it makes God subject to Matter, and not Matter to God. For if God cannot produce any thing without præ-existent Matter, the Matter is necessary to his Action, and so God must depend on that which he can do nothing without; and so God's using Matter, is as *Tertullian* speaks, *ex necessitate mediocritatis sue*, to help him in the production of things. *Nemo non subicitur ei cuius eget ut possit uti*, as he goes on. Thus Matter at last is crept above the Deity, that God can do nothing without its aid and concurrence; and so as *Tertullian* sharply says, *God is beholding to Matter for every Being known to the World; grande beneficium Deo contulit ut haberet hodie per quam Deus cognosceretur, & omnipotens vocaretur, nisi quod jam non omnipotens, si non & hoc potens ex nihilo omnia proferre.* Thus we see how irreconcilable this Hypothesis is with these Attributes of God. Ibid. l. 2.

4. It is repugnant to the Immensity of God. For either God did exist separate from this Eternal Matter, or was conjoyn'd with it: if conjoyn'd with it, then both made but one Being, as *Maximus*, or *Origen* argues; if separate from it, then there must be something between them, and so there will be three real improduced things. If it be answer'd that they are neither conjoyn'd nor separate, but God is in Matter as in his proper place, as the *Stoics* asserted, it is easily reply'd, that either then he is in a part of Matter, or the whole Matter; if in a part only, he cannot be immense; if in the whole as his adequate place, how could he then ever frame the World? For either he must then recede from that part in which he was, and contract himself into a narrower compass, that he might fashion that part of the World which he was about, or else he might likewise frame part of himself with that part of the World which he was then framing of, which consequence is unavoidable on the *Stoical Hypothesis* of God's being Corporeal and confin'd to the World as his proper place. And so much for this second Hypothesis concerning the Origin of the Universe, which supposeth the eternity of Matter as co-existing with God. Orig. Phil. loc. c. 24.

I come now to that which makes most noise in the World, which is the *Atomical* or *Epicurean Hypothesis*; but will appear to be as irrational as either of the foregoing, as far as it concerns the giving an account of the Origin of the Universe. For otherwise supposing a Deity which produc'd the World and put it into the order it is now in, and supremely governs all things in the World, that many of the *Phænomena* of the Universe, are far more intelligibly explain'd by Matter and Motion than by substantial Forms, and real Qualities, few free and unprejudic'd Minds do now scruple. But because these little Particles of Matter may give a tolerable account of many appearances of Nature, that therefore there shou'd be nothing else but Matter and Motion in the World, and that the Origin of the Universe shou'd be from no wiser Principle than the casual concurrence of these *Atoms*, is one of the Evi-

xi.

dences of the proneness of Mens minds to be intoxicated with those Opinions they are once in love with. When they are not content to allow an *Hypothesis* its due place and subserviency to God, and Providence, but think these *Atoms* have no force at all in them unless they can extrude a Deity quite out of the World. For it is most evident that it was not so much the truth as the serviceableness of this *Hypothesis*, which hath given it entertainment among Men of *Atheistical* Spirits. *Epicurus* himself in his Epistle to *Pythocles* urgeth that as a considerable circumstance in his Opinion that he brought no God down upon the Stage to put things in order, καὶ ἡ οὐκ ὄντων θεῶν ἀπὸ τῆς συντάξεως ἀπονοστήσει, which his Paraphrast *Lucretius* hath thus rendred.

Diog.
Laert. l. 10.
Lucret. de
Nat. l. 5.

*Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam
Naturam rerum.*

If this Opinion then be true, the History of the Creation quite falls to the ground; on which account we are oblig'd more particularly to consider the reason of it. The *Hypothesis* then of *Epicurus* is, that before the World was brought into that Form and Order it is now in, there was an infinite empty Space, in which were an innumerable company of solid Particles or *Atoms* of different sizes and shapes, which by their weight were in continual motion, and that by the various occurrences of these, all the Bodies of the Universe were fram'd into that order they now are in. Which is fully express'd by *Dionysius* in *Eusebius*, and very agreeably to the Sence of *Epicurus* in his Epistles to *Herodotus* and *Pythocles*, and to what *Plutarch* reports of the Sence of *Epicurus*, tho' he names him not (if at least that Book be his, which *Muretus* denies) the words of *Dionysius* are these concerning the *Epicureans*, οἱ μὲν δὲ αἰτέρου ἀσυστάτου ἀφ' ἧς πάντα καὶ συντάσσεται κόσμος. ἀπὸ τῶν αἰνέειν, καὶ π χρεῖν κινεῖν. μέγιστον ἀπειράτου ἀσυντάκτου, πῶς δὲ φασὶ τὰς αἰτέρας εἰς ἔντα εἶναι καὶ τὰς μετὰ φερεσθῆναι, αὐθαίμακας πὲρ συμπιέσεως καὶ ἀλάλτης, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἄβυστον καὶ ἀσυντάκτον εἶναι τὸ πᾶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰτέρων, καὶ ἔτι πάντας κόσμους, καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν, πολλοὺς διαίετας ἀπείρους ἀσυστάτους. So that according to this Opinion, all the account we have of the Origin of the World, is from this general Rendezvouz of *Atoms* in this infinite Space, in which after many encounters and facings about, they fell into their several Troops, and made up that order'd Battalia which now the World is the Scheme of. It was not imprudently done of *Epicurus* to make the Worlds infinite, as well as his Space and *Atoms*; for by the same reason that his *Atoms* wou'd make one World, they might make a thousand; and who wou'd spare for Worlds, when he might make them so easily? *Lucretius* gives us in so exact an account of the several courses the *Atoms* took up in disposing themselves into Bodies, as tho' he had been Muster-Master General at the Rendezvouz; for thus he speaks of his *Atoms*.

Euseb.
Prep. E-
vang. l. 14.
c. 22. p.
421. R. St.
Plutarch.
de Placitis
Phil. l. 1.
c. 4.
Mures.
Annot. in
Senec. de
provid.

Lucret. l. 1.

*Quæ quia multa modis multis mutata per omne
Ex Infinito vexantur percita plagis,
Omne genus motus & cætus experiundo,
Tandem deveniunt in taleis disposituras,
Qualibus hæc rerum consistit summa creata.*

And

And more particularly afterwards;

*Sed quia multa modis multis primordia rerum
Ex Infinito jam tempore percita plagis,
Ponderibusque suis consuerunt concita ferri,
Omnimodisque coire, atque omnia pertentare,
Quæcunque inter se possunt congressa creare;
Ut non sit mirum, si in taleis disposituras
Deciderunt quoque, & in taleis venere meatus,
Qualibus hæc rerum genitur nunc summa novando.*

Lucret. l. 5.

Thus we see the substance of the *Epicurean Hypothesis*, that there was an infinite number of Atoms, which by their frequent occurrences did at last meet with those of the same nature with them, and these being conjoyn'd together made up those Bodies which we see; so that all the account we are able to give according to this *Hypothesis* of all the *Phænomena* of the Universe, is from the fortuitous concurrence of the Atoms in the first forming of the World, and the different contexture of them in Bodies. And this was deliver'd by the ancient *Epicureans* not with any Doubt or Hesitation, but with the greatest Confidence imaginable. So *Tully* observes of *Velleius* the *Epicurean*, beginning his Discourse, *fidenter sane ut solent isti, nihil tam verens quam ne dubitare de aliqua re videretur; tanquam modo ex Deorum concilio, & ex Epicuri intermundiis descendisset*: Confidence was the peculiar Genius of that Sect, which we shall see in them to be accompany'd with very little reason.

For those two things which make any principles in Philosophy to be rejected, this Atomical *Hypothesis* is unavoidably charg'd with; and those are, *If the principles be taken up without sufficient ground in reason for them; and if they cannot give any sufficient account of the Phænomena of the World.* I shall therefore make it appear, *That this Hypothesis, as to the Origin of the Universe, is first, merely precarious, and built on no sufficient grounds of Reason. Secondly, That it cannot give any satisfactory account of the Origin of things.*

1. That it is a precarious *Hypothesis*, and hath no evidence of Reason on which it shou'd be taken up; and that will be prov'd by two things. 1. *It is such an Hypothesis as the Epicureans themselves cou'd have no certainty of according to their own principles.* 2. *That the main principles of the Hypothesis its self are repugnant to those Catholic Laws of Nature which are observ'd in the Universe.*

1. *The Epicureans according to their own principles cou'd have no certainty of the truth of this Hypothesis.* And that, 1. *Because they cou'd have no certain Evidence of its Truth.* 2. *Because their way of proving it was insufficient.*

1. *That they cou'd have no certain evidence of the truth of it, I prove from those Criteria, which Epicurus lays down as the only certain Rules of judging the truth of things by; and those were Sense, Anticipation and Passion.* Let Sense be never so infallible a Rule of Judgment, yet it is impossible there shou'd be any Evidence

XII.

dence to Sense of the truth of this *Hypothesis*; and let him extend his *ἡ ἀπορία*, as long as he please, which was his great help for correcting the Errors of Sense, *viz.* as it was in the *Roman* Court when the Case was not clear, *ampliandum est*; So *Epicurus* wou'd have the Object represented every way it cou'd be before he pass his Judgment; yet this prudent Caution wou'd do him no good for this *Hypothesis*, unless he were so wise as to stay till this World were crumbl'd into Atoms again, that by that he might judg of the Origin of it. There is but one way left to find out the truth of things inevident to Sense, (as by *Epicurus's* own confession all these Atoms are, which are now the component Particles of Bodies; much more those which by their fortuitous concurrence gave Being to the World) and that is, if something evident to Sense doth apparently prove it, which is his way of proving a Vacuity in Nature and Motion; but tho' that be easily answer'd by Principles different from those of *Epicurus*, and more rational; yet that very way of probation fails him in this present *Hypothesis*. For what is there evident to Sense which proves a fortuitous concurrence of Atoms for the production of things? nay if we grant him that the composition of Bodies is nothing else but the Contexture of these insensible Particles, yet this is far from being an evidence to Sense, that these Particles without any wise and directing Providence shou'd make up such Bodies as we see in the world. And here when we speak of the evidence of Sense, we may well ask, as the *Stoic* in *Tully* doth, whether ever *Epicurus* found a Poem made by the casual throwing of Letters together; and if a concurrence of Atoms did produce the world, *cur porticum, cur templum, cur domum, cur urbem non potest? Why did it never produce a cloyster, a temple, a house, a city*, which are far easier things than the world? I know *Epicurus* will soon reply, *That things are otherwise in the World now than when it was produc'd*; I grant it, and from thence prove, that because no such thing ever happens in the world now, as a merely casual concurrence of Atoms to produce any things, *Epicurus* could have no Evidence from Sense at all to find out the truth of his *Hypothesis* by. And as little relief can he find from his second *Criterion*, *viz.* *Anticipation*; for by his own acknowledgment, all Anticipation depends on the Senses, and Men have it only one of these four ways, 1. By Incurfion, as the Species of a Man is preserv'd by the sight of him. 2. By Proportion, as we can enlarge or contract that Species of a Man either into a Gygant or Pigmy. 3. By Similitude, as we may fanfie the image of a City by resemblance to one which we have seen. 4. By Composition, whereby we may joyn different Images together, as of a Horse and a Man to make a Centaur. Now tho' it be very questionable how some of these ways belong to a *Criterion* of Truth, yet none of them reach our case; for there can be no Incurfion of insensible Particles as such upon our Senses; we may indeed by proportion imagin the parvitude of them: but what is this to the proving the truth of the *Hypothesis*? Similitude can do no good, unless *Epicurus* had ever seen a world made so; the only relief must be from composition, and that will prove the Origin of the world by Atoms to be as true as that there are Centaurs in the world, which we verily believe. These are the only *Criteria* which *Epicurus*

Cicero de
Nat. Deor.
l. 2.

V. Gassend.
de Logica
Epicuri.
Op. To. 1.
c. 7. Can. 7.

curus wou'd judg of the truth of natural things by (for the third, Passion relates wholly to things Moral and not Physical) and now let any one judg, whether the *Hypothesis* of the Origin of the Universe by Atoms can ever be prov'd true, either by the judgment of Senſe, or by Anticipation.

The way they had to prove this *Hypothesis* was insufficient; and that was by proving that the Bodies of the World are compounded of ſuch inſenſible Particles; now, granting the thing, I deny the conſequence; for what tho' the compoſition of Bodies be from the contexture of Atoms, doth it therefore follow, that theſe Particles did caſually produce theſe Bodies? Nay doth it at all follow, that becauſe Bodies upon their reſolution do fall into inſenſible Particles of different ſize, figure and motion, therefore theſe Particles muſt be præ-exiſtent to all Bodies in the world? For it is plain, that there is now an Univerſal lump of Matter out of which theſe inſenſible Particles ariſe, and whither they return on the diſſolution of Bodies; and all theſe various Corpufcles may be of the ſame uniform ſubſtance only with the alteration of ſize, ſhape and motion; but what then? Doth this prove, that becauſe particular Bodies do now emerge out of the various configuration and motion of inſenſible Particles of that Matter which exiſts in the world, that therefore this whole Matter was produc'd by the caſual occuſions of theſe Atoms? It will aſk more time and pains than is uſually taken by the Philoſophers either ancient or modern, to prove that thoſe things whatſoever they are, whether Elements or Particles out of which Bodies are ſuppos'd to be compounded, do exiſt ſeparately from ſuch compounded Bodies, and antecedently to them. We find no *Ariſtotelian* Elements pure in the world, nor any Particles of Matter deſtitute of ſuch a ſize, figure and motion as doth make ſome Body or other. From whence then can we infer either the exiſtence of *Ariſtotle's materia prima*, without quiddity, quantity, or quality, or the *Epicurean* Atoms without ſuch a contexture as makes up ſome Bodies in the world? Our profound Naturaliſt Dr. *Harvey*, after his moſt accurate ſearch into the Natures and Generation of things, delivers this as his Experience and Judgment concerning the commonly reputed Elements or Principles of Bodies. For ſpeaking of the different Opinions of *Empedocles*, and *Hippocrates*, and *Democritus*, and *Epicurus*, concerning the compoſition of Bodies, he adds, *Ego vero neque in animalium productione, nec omnino in ulla corporum ſimilarium generatione, (ſive ea partium animalium, ſive plantarum, lapidum, mineralium, &c. fuerit) vel congregationem ejuſmodi, vel miſcibilia diverſa in generationis opere unienda præ-exiſtere, obſervare unquam potui.* And after explaining the way which he conceiv'd moſt rational and conſonant to Experience in the Generation of things, he concludes his diſcourſe with theſe words; *Idemque in omni generatione fieri crediderim; adeo ut corpora ſimilaria miſta, elementa ſua tempore priora non habeant, ſed illa potius elementis ſuis prius exiſtant (nempe Empedoclis atque Ariſtotelis igne, aqua, aere, terra, vel Chymicorum ſale, ſulphure, & Mercurio, aut Democriti atomis) utpote natura quoque ipſis perfectiora. Sunt, inquam, miſta, & compoſita, etiam tempore priora elementis quibuſlibet ſic dictis, in qua illa corrumpuntur & deſinunt; diſſolvuntur ſcilicet,*

XIII.
2.

*Harvey.
de Generat.
Anim.*

Qq

scilicet, in ista ratione potius quam re ipsa & actu. Elementa itaque quæ dicuntur, non sunt priora istis rebus quæ generantur aut oriuntur; sed posteriora potius, & reliquæ magis quam principia. Neque Aristoteles ipsemet aut alius quispiam unquam demonstravit, elementa in rerum natura separatim existere, aut principia esse corporum similium. If then none of these things which Bodies are resolv'd into, and are suppos'd to be compounded of, either have been or can be prov'd to exist separate from and antecedent to those Bodies which they compound, what then becomes of all our company of Atoms which are suppos'd by their concurrence in an infinite Space to be the Origin of the world? I know not where to find them, unless dancing with the School-men's *Chimera's* in a *vacuum*, or in a Space as empty as the infinite one, viz. some *Epicurean's* Brains. Neither therein will they be much unlike their great Master *Epicurus*, if we believe the character which the *Stoic* in *Tully* gives of him, who saith he was *homo sine arte, sine literis, insultans in omnes, sine acumine ullo, sine auctoritate, sine lepore.* But allowing the *Stoic* some of that Passion, (which he disclaim'd so much) in these words; yet we may rather believe what *Tully* himself elsewhere speaks of *Epicurus's* Sentiments, that they were none of them handsom or becoming a Man. *At ille quid sentit?* saith he of *Epicurus*; and soon replies, *sentit autem nihil unquam elegans, nihil decorum;* and in another place speaking of his Morals, he saith, *nihil generosum sapit atque magnificum, there was nothing Noble and Generous in him.* Which Censure of *Epicurus*, all the pains that *P. Gassendus* hath taken in the Vindication of the Life and Opinions of *Epicurus*, hath not been able to wipe off. For altho' we shou'd yield what that learned Man so much contends for, that all the Calumnies which were cast on *Epicurus* arise from the antipathy between *Zeno* and the following *Stoics*, and the School of *Epicurus*; yet all this will not make *Epicurus* to have been comparable with some other Philosophers for parts and judgment, whose Principles have somewhat more generous and venerable in them, than the Morals of *Epicurus* had, taking them in their more refin'd sense.

Cicero de
Nat. Deor.
l. 2.

Idem de
Divinat.
l. 1.
Idem de
Finibus,
l. 1.

XIV.

But it is not the Morality of *Epicurus* which we now inquire after; our business is to see how well he acquits himself in rendring an account of the Origin of the Universe without a Deity. And so we come to consider the *Hypothesis* it self, whether it be rational or no, or consistent with the Catholic Laws of Nature which appear in the world. Two things I shall here inquire into, which are the main Principles of *Epicurus*, viz. the motion of these Atoms in the infinite Space, and the manner of the concretion of Bodies by the concurrence of these Atoms.

1. I begin with their motion; which *Epicurus* attributes to his Atoms without any hesitation, and yet never undertakes to give an account of the Origin of that Motion; which argues his whole *Hypothesis* to be extremely precarious. The thing then, (which he must assume as his main Principle, without which all his other do nothing) is, That Motion doth inseparably belong to the least Atom or insensible Particle; for without this there cannot be imagin'd any concurrence of Atoms at all, much less any such texture of Bodies out of them. But for one to say that Atoms move, because

because it is their nature to move, and give no other account of it, is so precarious, that it will never give the least satisfaction to an inquisitive Mind. And it will be the least of all pardonable in the exploders of substantial Forms and occult Qualities, when the Origin of the whole World is resolv'd into an occult Quality which gives motion to Atoms. And herein the *Atomists* out-do the most credulous *Peripatetics*, seeing they lay the prime Foundation of the World and of their own Philosophy together in a thing they can give no rational account of at all, which is, the motion of Atoms in an infinite Vacuity. If it be reply'd, which is all *Epicurus* hath to say, *That the motion of Atoms depends upon their gravity*; the question returns upon him with the same violence, how comes this gravity to belong to these Atoms in such an empty Space, where there can be no impulsion from other Bodies, no attraction from any magnetic Particles which are suppos'd to be the causes of the descent of heavy Bodies? Nay, *Epicurus* himself takes away any center of that motion of Atoms; and yet attributes a necessary descent to his Atoms by virtue of their gravity; and if a Philosopher may beg such things as these are, so repugnant to the *Phænomena* of Nature, without assigning any other Reason for them, but that it is their Nature, let us never venture Philosophizing more, but sit down in that contented piece of Ignorance which attributes the Causes of every thing unto specific Forms and occult Qualities. For this is so shameful a piece of Beggery, that *P. Gassendus* doth more than once disclaim it, and in his discourse of Motion doth prove an impossibility of motion in an infinite empty Space. Might not *Epicurus* then have sav'd his Credit better by sitting down with the Opinions of his Fore-fathers, than thus to go a begging for such *Hypotheses*, which none, who are not resolv'd to be ignorant, will be ready to grant him?

Gassendus
Phys. f. 1.
l. 3. c. 7.
De appa-
rent. mag-
nitud. Solis
humilis &
sublimis,
ep. 4. f. 3.
De motu
Phys. f. 1.
l. 5. c. 2.
V. ep. de
motu im-
presso a mo-
iore trans-
lato. To. 3.
op.
xv.

But yet this is not all, but according to this fundamental Principle of *Epicurus*, viz. That there is a principle of motion in every insensible particle of Matter, he plainly overthrows another Principle of his, which is, the solidity and different magnitude of these Atoms. These Particles are suppos'd so solid, that *Dionysius* in *Eusebius* tells us the account given why they are call'd *ἀσμίμω* was, *ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀσμύου σπέρματος*, because of their indissoluble firmness; and the different sizes of these Atoms is so necessary a Principle, that from thence they undertake to resolve many *Phænomena* of the Universe: let us now see how consistent these things are with the inseparable property of Motion belonging to Atoms: For if there be Particles of such different sizes, then it is plain that there are some Particles which may not only be conceiv'd to be bigger than others, but are really so; and so there must be more parts of Matter imagin'd in this bigger Particle than in another less; and if there be more parts, these parts may be conceiv'd separate from each other, that this Particle may be equal to the other; now then, I demand, if Motion doth inseparably belong to the least Particle of Matter, how comes one to be bigger than the other? For herein we see that every Particle is not in distinct motion; for there cannot but be more imaginable Particles in an Atom of a bigger size than in a less; and if so, there must be some union of those imaginable Particles in that bigger Atom; and how cou'd such an

Euseb. prep
Evang. l.
14. c. 22.

union be without rest, and what rest cou'd there be if motion doth inseparably belong to every particle of Matter? And so it must be in all those Atoms which are suppos'd to have Angles and Hooks, in order to their better catching hold of each other, for the composition of Bodies; how come these Hooks and Angles to be annex'd to this Atom? For an Atom may be without them, whence comes this union, if such a principle of motion be in each Particle? If it be answer'd, *That Motion did belong to all these Particles, but by degrees the lesser Particles hitting together made up these angled and hooked Particles*; I soon reply, that the difficulty returns more strongly; for if these angled and hooked Particles be suppos'd necessary to the contexture and union of Bodies; how came those least imaginable Particles ever to unite without such Hooks and Angles? And so the Question will return *in infinitum*. If then the solidity and indivisibility of these angled Atoms, doth depend on the union and rest of those lesser imaginable particles joyn'd together, then it is evident that Motion is no inseparable property of all these Particles, but some are capable of union, in order to the making of such Hooks and Angles, which are necessary for the contexture of Bodies; and where there is union and solidity, there is rest, which is at least accompany'd with it, if it be not one of the great Causes of it. And without which the *Atomists*, of all other Philosophers, will be least able to give an account of firmness in Bodies, when they make Bodies to consist of an aggregation of Particles, by which it will be very hard finding a sufficient account of the difference between fluid and firm Bodies, unless it be from the quicker motion and agitation of the particles of fluid Bodies, and the rest of the small and contiguous parts that make up the firm Body, according to that Catholic Law of Nature, whereby things continue in the state they are in till some stronger force puts them out of it. The only thing which the *Epicurean Atomists* have left to give any account of the solidity of Particles of such different sizes, is, the want of Vacuity; for say they, *The ground of divisibility of Bodies is the interspersion of a disseminated Vacuum; now where there is no Vacuity, tho' the particles be of different size, yet they may be solid and indivisible*. But this is taken off by the instance produced against other persons by that Ingenious and Honorable Person Mr. Boyle in his *Physiological Essays*, which is to this purpose, *Suppose two of these presum'd indivisible particles, both smooth and of a cubical figure, should happen to lie upon one another, and a third should chance to be fitly placed upon the upper of the two; what should hinder but that this Aggregate may by the violent knock of some other Corpuscles be broken in the midst of the whole Concretion, and consequently in the middlemost Body?* For suppose them as solid as may be, yet since Corpuscles as hard as they, can be made very violently to knock against them, why may not those grate or break the middlemost Corpuscle, or any of the others? And if there be a possibility of breaking off these cubical particles in the middle, then mere want of Vacuity is no sufficient account of their being indivisible. By this we see how far the *Atomists* are from giving any rational account of the Origin of the motion of the Atoms themselves without a Deity.

V. Descartes,
1^{re}, princip.
p. 2. art.
54, 55, 56.

History of
Fluid. and
Firm. p.
202.

2. Sup-

2. Supposing this Motion to be granted them, yet they cannot give any satisfactory account of the manner of concretion of Bodies by the casual occursions of these Atoms moving in an infinite empty space. Which appears from those gross and extravagant suppositions of *Epicurus*, in order to the making these Atoms of his to hit together that they make up any Bodies by their Contexture.

1. He supposeth as it were two Regions, a Superior and Inferior in an infinite empty Space, which hath no center at all in it, nor any Body, from which to measure those respects of above and below, as appears by his Epistle to *Herodotus*, wherein he saith, *These terms of above and downwards, must be conceiv'd without any bounds or limits at all. So that tho' we conceive something superior, we must imagin nothing supreme, and so on the contrary.* Whereby it is evident, as *Gassendus* confesseth, that *Epicurus* thought the surface of the Earth to be a plain, and this plain to be continued up in a level superficies to the Heavens, and so to all that immense space of the Universe. So that all those heavy Bodies which should fall downwards in any parts of the widest distance on the Earth, as in *Europe, Asia, and Africa*, would never meet (if they continued their Motion) in the center of the Earth, but would continue their Motion still in a parallel line; and so he imagin'd that which is said to be above as to us, was really the upper part of the World, and so the descent of his Atoms, must necessarily be downwards towards the Earth, according to the weight of them. And was not this a worthy *Mathematical* Supposition, for one who would undertake to give an Account of the Origin of the Universe without a *Deity*?

This Motion of descent by reason of the gravity of Atoms would not serve his turn; for if the Atoms mov'd downwards thus in a parallel line, how was it possible for them ever to meet for the contextures of Bodies? Now for this purpose he invented a Motion of declination; for finding the Motion *ad lineam*, or *ad perpendicularum* as some call it, could not possibly produce those varieties of Bodies which are in the Universe, he suppos'd therefore the Descent not to be in a perpendicular right line, but to decline a little, that so several Particles in their descent might make some occursions one upon another. And this *Epicurus* added to *Democritus*; but therein, as *Tully* observes, was very unhappy, that where he adds to *Democritus*, *ea quæ corrigere vult, mihi quidem depravare videatur*; that he marr'd what *Democritus* had said, by mending of it. The reason of which Motion of Declination is thus given by *Lucretius*;

*Quod nisi declinare solerent, omnia deorsum
Imbris uti guttæ caderent per Inane profundum;
Nec foret offensus natus, neque plaga creata
Principiis, ita nil unquam natura creasset.*

Lucret. l. 2.

It was obvious to object, That, according to the Principles of *Epicurus*, there could have been no concurrence at all of Atoms in an infinite space, on the two grounds he went on, which were the Natural Descent of Atoms, and the *æqui-velocity* of the Motion of all Atoms of what size soever, which he likewise asserted (altho' one

would think, if Gravity were the cause of Motion, then the more Gravity, the swifter the Motion would be) from hence, I say, it were not easy to conceive how the *Atoms* should embrace each other in a parallel line, if they fell down, as *Lucretius* expresseth it, *like drops of rain*; and therefore they saw a necessity to make their Motion decline a little, that so they might jostle and hit one upon another. But this oblique Motion of the *Atoms*, tho' it be the only refuge left to save the origin of things by a concurrence of *Atoms*, is yet as precarious and without reason as any other Supposition of theirs whatsoever. *Tully* chargeth this Motion of Declination with two great faults, *Futility*, and *Inefficacy*, *quæ cum res tota ficta sit pueriliter, tum ne efficit quidem quod vult*. It is a childish Fancy, and to no purpose: For, *first*, It is asserted without any reason at all given for it, which is unworthy a *Philosopher*; neither is to any purpose; for if all *Atoms*, saith he, decline in their Motion, then none of them will stick together; if some decline, and others do not, this is as precarious as any thing can be imagin'd, to assign a diversity of Motion in indivisible Particles, which yet have all the same velocity of Motion; and, as *Tully* saith, *Hoc erit quasi provincias Atomis dare, quæ recte, quæ oblique ferantur*; as tho' *Epicurus* were the General at this *Rendezvous* of *Atoms*, who stands ready to appoint every one his Task and Motion. This *Plutarch* tells us was the great charge against *Epicurus*, *ὡς ἀνάλως ἐπεμύνην τὴν κίνησιν ἐν τῷ πᾶσι*, because he introduced such a Motion of Declination out of nothing, upon no pretense of reason. And *Turnebus* tells us that the ground why they desir'd so small a Declination, was, because they were conscious to themselves, that it was founded upon no ground of Reason; *Et Epicurei sibi conscii culpæ, timide eam ponebant, & minimam sibi postulabant*. To which purpose *Turnebus* cites those Verses of *Lucretius*,

Lucret. l. 2.

*Quare etiam atque etiam paulum inclinare necesse est
Corpora, nec plusquam minimum, ne fingere motus
Obliquos videamur, & id res vera refutet.
Nam hoc in promptu manifestumque esse videmus,
Pondera quantum in se est, non posse obliqua meare
E' supero cum præcipitant, quod cernere possis.
Sed nihil omnino recta regione viai
Declinare quis est qui possit cernere sese?*

*Cicero de
Fato.*

But this Argument of *Lucretius* will hold, if at all, further than this little Declination (for it is no more they desire than as little as may be imagin'd, *quo nihil possit fieri minus*, as *Tully* expresseth it) but if they may decline a little, why not a great deal more? nay, it is impossible to conceive, but a little oblique Motion at first will in an infinite Space grow to be very oblique; for there is nothing to hinder the Motion which way it bends: now if there be never so little Motion of Declination, the *Atom* will be inclin'd that way; and what then should hinder, but that the obliquity in a Motion thro' a great Space should at last come to be very great; there being no center at all to guide the Motion towards, and the gravity not hindring this little Declination? Therefore *Tully* asks that Question, *Cur declinet uno minimo, non declinet duobus aut tribus*? Why only it declines one minim, and not two or three? For, saith

saith he, it is no impulsion from any other Atom which makes it decline that one minim; neither is there any impediment in the Space to hinder it from declining more; so that, as he well saith, *optare hoc quidem est, non disputare*, this is to beg Hypotheses, and not to prove them, which is the thing we have prov'd Epicurus to do. Which was the first thing premis'd, viz. that this Hypothesis of Epicurus was very precarious, and is built on no foundation of Reason.

2. It is unsatisfactory and insufficient, as well as precarious; for should we grant his two main Principles, Atoms, and his Infinite empty Space; yet we deny that ever his Atoms with all their occurrences would ever produce those things which are in the Universe. To run thro' the noted *Phænomena* of the Universe, and to shew how insufficient an account the Epicureans are able to give of them, from a fortuitous concurrence of Atoms, is a task too large to be here undertaken. There are only three things which I shall rather suggest than insist upon, to see what miserable shifts the Epicureans are driven to for the salving of them, and shall then leave it with the Reader to judge, what unmeasurable confidence it is in any to reject the Creation of the World for the sake of the Epicurean Hypothesis; and whether it be not the height of credulity, as well as infidelity, to believe the World ever to have been made by a fortuitous concurrence of Atoms. XVII.

1. The great variety of appearances in Nature, which are attributed to Particles of the same Nature, only with the alteration of Size, Shape and Motion. That some things in the world, should have no other reason given of them, may not only be tolerable, but rational, as in the objects and operations on the organs of Sense, those affections which are mistaken for real qualities, &c. But that all those effects which are seen in Nature, should have no other cause but the different Configuration and Motion of Atoms, is the height of Folly as well as impiety. To imagin that the Particles of Matter, as they are in Men, should be capable of Sensation, Memory, Intellection, Volition, &c. merely because of a different Shape, Size and Motion from what they have in a piece of wood, is a riddle that requires a new Configuration of Atoms in us to make us understand. May it not be hoped, that at least one time or other by this casual concurrence of Atoms, the Particles may light to be of such a Nature in Stones, as to make them fly; in Plants, to make them all sensitive; and in Beasts, to make them reason and discourse? What may hinder such a Configuration or Motion of Particles, if all these effects are to be imputed to no higher Principles? We see in other Bodies what different appearances are caus'd by a sudden alteration of the Particles of the Matter of which they are compounded; why may it not fall out so in the things mentioned? Neither can this be unreasonable to demand. 1. Because the Motion of these Particles of Matter is casual still according to them, and who knows what chance may do? for the Seminal Principles themselves are, I suppose, according to them of the same uniform Matter with the rest of the world, and so are liable to different Motion and Configuration. 2. Because all Particles of Matter are suppos'd to be in continual Motion, because of that disseminated Vacuity which is presum'd

sum'd to be in the world, and because a *Coacervate Vacuity* is not only asserted as possible, but as probably existent: I assume only then (that which is insisted on as probable) *viz.* that that Space which lies between our *Atmosphere* and the *Stars*, is empty of any other thing, but only the rays of the *Stars* which pass thro' it; I then supposing it a *Vacuity*, whether would not the Particles of those Bodies which lie contiguous to that Space presently dislodge from the Bodies wherein they are, and begin a new *Rendezvous* of *Atoms* there? for all *Atoms* are suppos'd to be in perpetual Motion; and the cause assign'd, why in solid Bodies they do not fly away, is because of the repercussion of other *Atoms*, that when they once begin to stir, they receive such knocks as make them quiet in their places. Now this cannot hold in the Bodies contiguous to this Space; for both those Bodies are more fluid, and so there is no such knocking of Particles to keep them at rest; but which is more, those which are contiguous have nothing at all to hinder them from Motion, and so those Particles will necessarily remove into that empty Space where there is no impediment of their Motion, and so the next *Atoms* to those must remove, because that Space wherein the other were is made empty by their removal; and so the next, and so on, till not only the Air, but the whole mass of the Earth will on supposition of such a *Vacuity* be dissolv'd into its first Particles, which will all mutiny in the several Bodies wherein they are, and never rest till they come to that empty Space, where they may again *Rendezvous* together. So dangerous is the news of Liberty, or of an empty Space to these *Democratical* Particles of the Universe. Neither can I see how a disseminated *Vacuity* can salve the difficulty; for those Particles of the most solid Bodies, being in continual Motion, and the ground of their union being repercussion, it thence follows that towards that part where the disseminated *vacuum* is, the Particles meeting with no such strokes may fairly take their leaves of the Bodies they are in, and so one succeed in the place of another, till the Configuration of the whole be alter'd, and consequently different appearances and effects may be caus'd in the same Bodies, tho' it results from seminal Principles. So that according to the *Atomical* Principles, no Rational account can be given of those Effects which are seen in Nature. This *Dionysius* in *Eusebius* urgeth against the *Atomists*, that from the same Principles without evident reason given for it, they make of the same uniform Matter some things conspicuous to Sense, others not, some short-liv'd, others extremely long-liv'd. *τίνα δὲ πρέσβει μάλιστα ἔσσι καὶ τὴν αὐτῆς ἀπασιγῶν ἔσσις, καὶ τὴν αὐτῆς ἀφθάρτου φύσεως, πάλιν τὴν μεταβολῶν, ὡς φασί, καὶ τὴν χρηματικῶν, ἐν ᾧ ἔσσι καὶ ἀκίνητος καὶ αἰώνιος. ὡς αὐτοὶ φησὶν ἂν, πύμαλα, ἢ μετακρίνωμεν καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἕνα ἀποφασίζουσιν, φανερὰ πὶ καὶ ἀφανῆ;* *What ground can there be assign'd of so vast a difference between things if they all be of the same nature, and differ only in size and shape?* saith that excellent Person, who there with a great deal of Eloquence lays open the folly of the *Atomical* Philosophy, *Θαυμάσιον γὰρ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀποφασίζουσιν ὅτι αἰώνιος καὶ ἀκίνητος ὁ κόσμος, καὶ μετακρίνωμεν καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἕνα ἀποφασίζουσιν ὅτι αἰώνιος καὶ ἀκίνητος ὁ κόσμος.* *It is a rare Democracy of Atoms*, saith he, *where the friendly Atoms meet and embrace each other, and from thence forward live in the closest society together.*

*Euseb.
Præp. Ev.
l. 15. c. 24.*

2. Not only the variety, but the *exact order and beauty of the World*, is a thing unaccountable by the *Atomical Hypothesis*. Were the whole World still a *Hesiod's Chaos* (from the consideration of which *Diogenes Laertius* tells us *Epicurus* began to philosophize) we might probably believe an Agitation of Particles (supposing matter created) might settle it in such a confus'd manner; but that there should be nothing else but a blind *impetus* of *Atoms* to produce those vast and most regular Motions of the heavenly Bodies, to order the passage of the *Sun* for so great conveniency of Nature, and for the alternate succession of the Seasons of the Year, which should cut such Channels for the *Ocean*, and keep that vast Body of the Water (whose surface is higher than the Earth) from overflowing it, which should furnish the Earth with such seminal and prolific Principles, as to provide food and nourishment for those Animals which live upon it, and furnish out every thing necessary for the comfort and delight of Man's Life; to believe, I say, that all these things came only from a blind and fortuitous concurrence of *Atoms*, is the most prodigious piece of credulity and folly, that Human Nature is subject to. But this part which concerns the order and beauty of the parts of the Universe, and the Argument thence, that it could be no blind fortuitous Principle, but an infinitely wise God, hath been so fully and judiciously handled by a Learned Person already, that I shall rather choose to refer the Reader to his Discourse, than insist any more upon it.

Laert. l. 10.

D.H. More
Antidote
against
Atheism,
part 2.

3. *The Production of Mankind* is a thing which the *Atomists* are most shamefully puzzl'd with, as well as the Formation of the internal parts of Man's Body, of which I have already spoken in the precedent Chapter. It would pity one to see what lamentable shifts the *Atomists* are put to, to find out a way for the Production of Mankind, viz. *That our teeming mother the Earth, at last cast forth some kind of bags like wombs upon the surface of the Earth, and these by degrees breaking, at last came out Children, which were nourish'd by a kind of juice of the Earth like Milk, by which they were brought up till they came to be Men.* Oh what will not *Atheists* believe rather than a *DEITY* and *Providence*! But lest we should seem to wrong the *Atomists*, hear what *Censorinus* saith of *Epicurus*; *Is enim crededit limo calefactos uteros nescio quos radicibus terræ coherentes, primum increvisse, & infantibus, ex se editis ingenitum lactis humorem, natura ministrante præbuisse; quos ita educatos & adultos, genus humanum propagasse.* But because *Lucretius* may be thought to speak more impartially in the case, how rarely doth he describe it?

Censor. de
die Nat.
c. 2.

Crescebant uteri terræ radicibus apti,
Quos ubi tempore maturo patefecerit ætas
Infantum, fugiens humorem, aurasque petissens,
Convertebat ibi natura foramina terræ,
Et succum venis cogebat fundere apertis
Consimilem lactis; sicut nunc fœmina quæque
Quum peperit dulci repletur lacte, quod omnis
Impetus in mammas convertitur ille alimenti:
Terra cibum pueris, vestem vapor, herba cubile
Præbebat, multa & molli lanugine abundans.

Rr

Had

Had *Lucretius* been only a Poet, this might have pass'd for a handsomely describ'd Fable: but to deliver it for a piece of Philosophy, makes it the greater Mythology: that Man's Body was form'd out of the Earth we believe, because we have reason so to do; but that the Earth should cast forth such *folliculi*, as he expresseth it, and then Men should be brought up in such a way as he describes, deserves a place among the most incredible and Poetic Fables. But if Poets must be credited, how much more like a Man did he speak, who told us,

*Natus homo est; sive hunc divino semine fecit
Ille opifex rerum, Mundi melioris origo,
Sive recens tellus, seductaque nuper ab alto
Æthere, cognati retinebat semina cæli;
Quam satus Iapeto mistam fluvialibus undis,
Fœxit in effigiem moderantum cuncta Deorum.*

Thus have we consider'd the *Epicurean Hypothesis*, both as to the Principles on which it stands, and the suitability of it to the *Phænomena* of the Universe; and I suppose now there cannot be the least shadow of Reason found from the *Atomical Philosophy* to make us at all question that Account of the Origin of the Universe, which ascribes it not to the fortuitous concurrence of *Atoms*, but to the infinite wisdom of a DEITY. I conclude then this Discourse of the *Epicurean Hypothesis* with the words of *Antomedon* in the *Greek Epigram*.

*Antholog.
L. 1. c. 15.*

Ταῦτ' εἰδὼς ὅφρος ἴδῃ, μάτην δ' Ἐπίκρου ἐάσῃ
Πρὸς τὸ κενὸν ζητεῖν, καὶ τίνας αἱ μονάδες.

*Learn to be wise; let Epicurus chase
To find his Atoms, and his empty Space.*

xviii.

I come now to the last *Hypothesis* mention'd, which undertakes to give an account of the Origin of the Universe, from the mere *Mechanical Laws of Motion and Matter*. Which is the *Hypothesis* of the late Famous French Philosopher Mr. *Des-Cartes*. For altho' there be as much Reason as Charity to believe, that he never intended his *Hypothesis* as a foundation of *Atheism*, having made it so much his business to assert the Existence of a DEITY, and Immateriality of the Soul: yet because it is apt to be abus'd to that end by Persons *Atheistically* dispos'd, because of his ascribing so much to the power of Matter; we shall therefore so far consider it, as it undertakes to give an Account of the Origin of the Universe without a DEITY. His *Hypothesis* therefore is briefly this. He takes it for granted, that all the Matter of the World was at first of one Uniform Nature, divisible into innumerable parts, and divided into many, which were all in Motion: from hence he supposeth, 1. *That all the Matter of which the Universe is composed, was at first divided into equal particles of an indifferent size, and that they had all such a Motion as is now found in*

*Cartesii
Princip.
p. 3. Art.
46, &c.*

the

the World. 2. That all those particles were not at first Spherical, because many such little Globes joyn'd together will not fill up a continued Space, but that of whatever figure they were at first, they would by continual Motion become Spherical, because they would have various circular Motions; for seeing that at first they were mov'd with so great force that one particle would be disjoyn'd from the other, the same force continuing would serve to cut off all angles which are suppos'd in them, by their frequent occurrences against each other; and so when the angles were cut off, they would become Spherical. 3. He supposeth that no Space is left empty, but when those round particles being joyn'd, leave some intervals between them, there are some more subtile particles of Matter, which are ready to fill up those void Spaces, which arise from those angles which were cut off from the other particles to make them Spherical; which fragments of particles are so little, and acquire thereby such a celerity of Motion, that by the force of that, they will be divided into innumerable little fragments, and so will fill up all those Spaces which other particles could not enter in at. 4. That those particles which fill up the intervals between the Spherical ones, have not all of them the same celerity of Motion, because some of them are more undivided than others are, which fill'd up the space between three globular particles when their angles were cut off, and therefore those particles must necessarily have very angular figures, which are unfit for Motion, and thence it comes to pass that such particles easily stick together, and transfer the greatest part of their Motion upon those other particles which are less, and therefore have a swifter motion; and because these particles are to pass thro' such triangular spaces which lie in the midst of three globular particles touching each other, therefore he supposeth them as to their breadth and depth to be of a triangular figure; but because these particles are somewhat long, and the globular particles thro' which they pass with so swift motion have their rotation about the poles of the Heavens, thence he supposes that those triangular particles come to be wreathed. Now from these things being thus suppos'd, Des-Cartes hath ingenuously and consonantly to his Principles undertaken to give an Account of the most noted *Phænomena* of the World, and those three sorts of particles mention'd, he makes to be his three Elements. The first is that subtile Matter which was suppos'd to arise from the cutting off the angles of the greater particles; and of this he tells us the *Sun* and *Fix'd Stars* consist, as those particles of that subtile Matter being in continual motion have made those several *vortices* or *Æthereal Whirlpools*. The second Element consists of the Spherical particles themselves, which make up the *Heavens*; out of the third Element, which are those *Wreathed particles*, he gives an Account of the Formation of the *Earth*, and *Planets*, and *Comets*; and from all of them, by the help of those common Affections of Matter, Size, Figure, Motion, &c. he undertakes to give an Account of the *Phænomena* of the World. How far his Principles do conduce to the giving Mens Minds satisfaction, as to the particular *Phænomena* of *Nature*, is not here our business to inquire, but only how far these Principles can give an Account of the Origin of the Universe without a *DEITY*? And that it

Rr 2

cannot

Dr. More
Antidote
 b. 2. ch. 1.
 Immorta-
 lity of the
 Soul, b. 1. c.
 11. f. 3. &c.
 Ep. 3. ad
 Cartes.
 p. 88.

Cartes.
 resp. ad ep.
 3. H. Mori.
 p. 104

Maimon.
 More Nev.
 l. 2. c. 30.
 Gassendi
 Physic. f. 1.
 l. 7. c. 6.
 Eccl. 8. 17.

cannot give a satisfactory account how the World was fram'd without a *Deity*, appears by the two grand Suppositions on which all his Elements depend, both which cannot be from any other Principle but God. Those are, 1. *The Existence of Matter in the World*, which we have already prov'd cannot be independent on God, and necessarily existent; and therefore supposing that Matter existent and put into Motion, would grind it self into those several particles by him suppos'd, yet this cannot give an Account of the Origin of the Universe without a *Deity*. 2. *The motion of the particles of Matter supposeth a Deity*, for Matter is no self-moving Principle, as hath been fully demonstrated in several places by that judicious Philosopher Dr. H. More, who plainly manifests that if Motion did necessarily belong to Matter, it were impossible there should be *Sun*, or *Stars*, or *Earth*, or *Man* in the World; for the Matter being uniform, it must have equal Motion in all its particles, if Motion doth belong to it. For Motion being suppos'd to be natural and essential to Matter, must be alike every where in it, and therefore every particle must be suppos'd in motion to its utmost capacity, and so every particle is alike and mov'd alike: and therefore there being no prevalency at all in any one particle above another in Bigness or Motion, it is manifest that this *Universal Matter*, to whom Motion is so essential and natural, will be ineffectual for the producing of any variety of appearances in Nature; for nothing could be caus'd by this thin and subtile Matter, but what would be wholly imperceptible to any of our Senses: and what a strange kind of visible World would this be? From hence then it appears that there must be an infinitely powerful and wise God, who must both put Matter into Motion, and regulate the Motion of it, in order to the producing all those varieties which appear in the World. And this necessity of the Motion of Matter by a power given it from God is freely acknowledg'd by Mr. *Des-Cartes* himself in these words; *Considero materiam sibi libere permissam, & nullum aliunde impulsam suscipientem, ut plane quiescentem; illa autem impellitur a Deo, tantundem motus sive translationis in ea conservante quantum ab initio posuit*. So that this great improver and discoverer of the Mechanical power of Matter, doth freely confess the necessity not only of God's giving Motion in order to the Origin of the Universe, but of his conserving Motion in it for the upholding it: So that we need not fear from this *Hypothesis* the excluding of a *Deity* from being the prime efficient cause of the World. All the Question then is concerning the particular manner, which was us'd by God as the efficient cause in giving Being to the World. As to which I shall only in general suggest what *Maimonides* says of it. *Omnia simul creata erant, & postea successive ab invicem separata*; altho' I am somewhat inclinable to that of *Gassendus*, *Majus est mundus opus, quam ut assequi mens humana illius molitionem possit*: To which I think may be well apply'd that Speech of *Solomon*; *Then I beheld all the work of God, that a man cannot find out the work that is done under the Sun: because tho' a man labor to seek it out, yea further, tho' a wise man think to know it, yet shall he not be able to find it*.

CHAP.

C H A P. III.

Of the Origin of Evil.

I. *Of the Being of Providence.* II. *Epicurus his Arguments against it refuted. The necessity of the belief of Providence in order to Religion.* III. *Providence prov'd from a consideration of the nature of GOD, and the things of the World. Of the Spirit of Nature.* IV. *The great objections against Providence propounded. The first concerns the Origin of Evil.* V. *GOD cannot be the Author of Sin, if the Scriptures be true. The account which the Scriptures give of the fall of Man, doth not charge GOD with Man's fault. GOD's power to govern Man by Laws, tho' he gives no particular reason of every positive Precept.* VI. *The reason of GOD's creating Man with freedom of Will, largely shew'd from Simplicius; and the true account of the Origin of Evil.* VII. *GOD's permitting the Fall, makes him not the Author of it.* VIII. *The account which the Scriptures give of the Origin of Evil compar'd with that of Heathen Philosophers.* IX. *The antiquity of the opinion of ascribing the Origin of Evil to an evil Principle. Of the judgment of the Persians, Egyptians, and others about it.* X. *Of Manicheism.* XI, XII, XIII, XIV. *The opinion of the ancient Greek Philosophers; of Pythagoras, Plato, the Stoics; the Origin of Evil not from the necessity of Matter.* XV, XVI. *The remainders of the History of the Fall among the Heathens.* XVII, XVIII, XIX. *Of the malignity of Dæmons.* XX, XXI, XXII. *Providence vindicated as to the sufferings of the good, and impunity of bad Men. An account of both from Natural Light, manifested by Seneca, Plutarch, and others.*

IT being now manifested not only that there is a GOD, but that the World had its Being from Him; it thence follows by an easy and rational Deduction, that there is a particular Hand of Divine Providence, which upholds the World in its Being, and wisely disposeth all Events in it. For it is a most irrational and absurd Opinion to assert a *Deity*, and deny *Providence*: and in nothing did *Epicurus* more discover the weakness and puerility of his judgment than in this. Indeed, if *Epicurus* had no other design in asserting a *Deity*, than (as many ancient Philosophers imagin'd) to avoid the imputation of direct *Atheism*; and yet to take away all foundations of Religion; he must needs be said to serve his *Hypothesis* well, tho' he did assert the Being of an *Excellent Nature*, which he call'd GOD; while yet he made Him sit as it were with his Elbows folded up in the Heavens; and taking no cognizance of Human actions. For he well knew, that if the belief of Di-

L

vine Providence were once rooted out of Mens Minds, the thoughts of an *Excellent Being* above the Heavens, would have no more awe or power upon the Hearts and Lives of Men, than the telling Men that there are Jewels of inestimable value in the *Indies*, makes them more ready to pay Taxes to their Princes. For that Philosopher could not be ignorant, that it is not Worth but Power, nor Speculation but Interest that rules the World. The poor Tenant more regards his petty Landlord, than the greatest Prince in the World that hath nothing to do with him: and he thinks he hath great reason for it; for he neither fears punishment, nor hopes for reward from him; whereas his Landlord may dispossess him of all he hath upon displeasure, and may advantage him the most if he gains his favor: Supposing then that there were such an *Excellent Being* in the World which was compleatly happy in Himself, and thought it an impairing of his happiness to trouble Himself with an inspection of the World; Religion might then be indeed deriv'd *à relegendò*, but not *à religando*; there might be some pleasure in contemplating his Nature, but there could be no obligation to Obedience. So that *Epicurus* was the first founder of a kind of *Philosophical Antinomianism*, placing all Religion in a Veneration of *the Deity*, purely for its own Excellency, without any such mercenary Eye (as those who serve God for their own ends, as they say, are apt to have) to reward and punishment. And I much doubt that Good-woman whom the Story goes of, who in an *Enthusiastic* posture ran up and down the Streets with Emblems in her Hands, *Fire* in the one, as she said, to burn up *Heaven*, and *Water* in the other, to quench *Hell*, that Men might serve God purely for Himself, would, if she had compass'd her design, soon have brought *Profelytes* enough to *Epicurus*, and by burning *Heaven* would have burnt up the Cords of *Religion*, and in quenching *Hell* would have extinguish'd the Awe and Fear of a *Deity* in the World. Inded the incomparable Excellency and Perfection which is in the *Divine Nature*, to Spirits advanc'd to a Noble and Generous height in Religion, makes them exceedingly value their Choice; while they disregard whatever rivals with God for it; but were it not for those Magnetical hooks of Obedience and Eternal Interest, there are few would be drawn to a due Consideration of, much less a Delight in so Amiable and Excellent a Nature. And it is impossible to conceive, why God in the Revelation of his Will should ever so much as mention a future punishment, or promise an eternal Reward, were not the Consideration of these things the Sinews of *Religion*.

- II. Which they whose design was to undermine the very Foundations on which all Religion was built, understood far better, than those weak pretended Advancers of Religion, who while in such a way they pretend to advance it, do only blow it up. For if Men ought not to have an Eye and respect to their own future condition, nor serve God on the account of his power to make our Souls miserable or happy, much less ought Men to serve God with any regard to his Providence, since the matters which Providence is employ'd about in this World, are of infinitely less moment, than those which concern our future State. And if we have no Eye on Divine Providence in the exercise of Religion, we shall scarce be able

able to understand for what end God should take so much care of Mankind, and manifest so much of his goodness to them, were it not to quicken them in their search after him, and excite them to the more cheerful Obedience to him. And when once we question to what end God troubles himself with the World, we are come next door to *Epicurus*, and may in few steps more delight in the Flowers of his Garden. For this was his strongest plea against Providence, that it was beneath the Majesty and Excellency of the Divine Nature to stoop so low, and trouble himself so far, as to regard what was done on Earth. This being one of his *Ratæ Sententiæ*, or undoubted Maxims, *Τὸ πανάγειον καὶ ἀθάνατον ἔστι αὐτὸ ἀσθενὲς* *Diog. La.*
ἢ, ἔστι ἀσθενὲς καὶ θνητὸν. *The blessed and immortal Being, neither hath any* *art. l. 10.*
employment himself, nor troubles himself with others. Which as *Maximus Tyrius* well observes, is rather a description of a *Sardanapalus*, than a Deity; nay, of a worse than a *Sardanapalus*; for he in the midst of all his softness and effeminacy wou'd yet entertain some Counsels for the safety and good of his Empire; but *Epicurus* his Deity is of so tender a nature, that the least thought of Business wou'd quite spoil his Happiness. This Opinion of *Epicurus* made the more raised-spirited Moralists so far condemn the unworthy Apprehensions which he entertain'd of the Divine Nature, that they degraded him from the very title of a Philosopher in it, and rank'd him beneath the most fabulous Poets, who had writ such unworthy things of their Gods, as is evident by the Censures which *Tully*, *Plutarch*, and others, pass upon him for this very Opinion. And they tell him that some of their own Men were of a more noble and excellent Spirit than *Epicurus* his Deity, who abhor'd Softness and Idleness, and made it their greatest delight to do good to their Countries. But *Epicurus* must needs make his God of his own humor (the usual flattery which Men bear to themselves, to think that most excellent which they delight in most) as *Xenophanes* was wont to say, that if his Horse, were to describe a God, it would be with a curl'd Main, a broad Chest, &c. and in every thing like himself. Had *Epicurus* himself so little of an *Athenian* in him, as not to make it some part of his delight to understand the Affairs of the World? Or at least, did he take no pleasure in the walks of his famous Garden, nor to order his Trees, and set his Flowers, and contrive every thing for his own delight? Wou'd *Epicurus* then count this a part of his Happiness? And is it inconsistent with the Happiness of the Deity to take notice of the World and order all things in it for his own Glory? Must so excellent a Nature as God's was, by his own acknowledgment, be presently tired with Business, when the more excellent any Nature is, the more active and vigorous it is, the more able to comprehend and dispatch matters of moment with the least disturbance to it self? Is it a pleasure to a Nurse to fill the Child with her Milk? Doth the Sun rejoice to help the World with his constant Light? And doth a Fountain murmur till it be deliver'd of its Streams which may refresh the Ground? And is it no delight to the Divine Nature to behold the effects of his Goodness upon the World? We see here then the foundation on which *Epicurus* went, *viz.* that his God must be like himself, or there must be none; and truly he might more suitably to his Principles question

Max. Tyr.
Dissert. 29.

Cicero de
Finib. l. 1.
De Nat.
Deor. l. 2.
Plutarch.
advers. Co-
lor.

question his Existence, than supposing his Existence deny, his Providence on such miserable accounts as these are, which yet are the chief which either *Epicurus* or *Lucretius* cou'd bring against it, from the consideration of the Divine Nature.

- iii. The which to any one who considers it, doth necessarily infer a peculiar Eye and Hand of Providence in the World. For can we imagin that a Being of Infinite Knowledg shou'd be ignorant of what is done in the World? And of Infinite Power, shou'd stand by and leave things to Chance and Fortune? Which were at first contriv'd and brought into Being by the contrivance of his Wisdom, and exercise of his Power. And where the foundation of Existence lies wholly and solely in the power of an Infinite Being producing, the ground of continuance of that Existence must lie in the same power conserving. When Men indeed effect any thing, the work may continue, whatever become of him that did it; but the reason of that is, because what Man doth, is out of Matter already existent, and his work is only setting Materials together; but now what God effects, he absolutely gives a Being to, and therefore its duration depends on his conservation. What is once in its Being, I grant, will continue till some greater force than it self put it out of Being; but withal I add, that God's withdrawing his Conservation is so great a force, as must needs put that Being which had its Existence from his Power, out of the condition it was in by it. The light of the Sun continues in the Air, and as long as the Sun communicates it, nothing can extinguish the Light, but what will put out the Sun: but cou'd we suppose the Sun to withdraw his Beams, what becomes of the Light then? This is the case of all Beings, which come from an Infinite Power; their subsistence depends on a continual Emanation of the same Power which gave them Being: and when once this is withdrawn, all those Beings which were produced by this power must needs relapse into nothing. Besides, what dependence is there upon each other in the moments of duration of any created Being? The mode of Existence in a Creature is but contingent and possible, and nothing is imply'd in the notion of an existent Creature, beyond mere possibility of Existence: what is it then which gives actual Existence to it? That cannot be it self, for it wou'd be necessarily existent: if another then gives Existence, this Existence must wholly depend upon him who gave it: for nothing can continue Existence to it self, but what may give it to it self, (for it gives it for the moment it continues it) and what gives Existence to it self, must necessarily exist, which is repugnant to the very notion of a created Being: So that either we must deny a possibility of Non-existence, or Annihilation in a Creature, which follows upon necessity of Existence; or else we must assert that the duration or continuance of a Creature in its Being doth immediately depend on Divine Providence and Conservation; which is with as much reason as frequency said to be a continu'd Creation. But yet further: was an Infinite Wisdom and Power necessary to put things into that order they are in? And is not the same necessary for the governing of them? I cannot see any reason to think that the Power of Matter when set in motion, shou'd either bring things into that exquisite order and dependance which the parts of the

the World have upon each other: much less that by the mere force of that first motion all things shou'd continue in the state they are in. Perpetual Motion is yet one of the *desiderata* of the World: the most exquisite *Mechanism* cannot put an Engine beyond the necessity of being look'd after: can we then think this dull, unactive Matter, merely by the force of its first motion shou'd be able still to produce the effects which are seen in the World, and to keep it from tumbling, at least by degrees, into its pristine *Chaos*? It was an Infinite Power, I grant, which gave that first motion; but that it gave power to continue that motion till the Conflagration of the World, remains yet to be prov'd. Some therefore finding that in the present state of the World, Matter will not serve for all the noted and common *Phænomena* of the World, have call'd in the help of a Spirit of Nature, which may serve instead of a Man-midwife to Matter, to help her in her production of things. Or, as tho' God had a plurality of Worlds to look after, they have taken care to substitute him a Vicar in this, which is the Spirit of Nature. But we had rather believe God himself to be perpetually resident in the World, and that the power which gives Life, and Being, and Motion to every thing in the World, is nothing else but his own Providence; especially since we have learnt from himself, that it is *in him we live and move and have our being*. Acts 17. 28.

Thus then we see a necessity of asserting Divine Providence IV. whether we consider the Divine Nature, or the *Phænomena* of the World; but yet the case is not so clear but there are two grand Objections behind, which have been the continual exercise of the Wits of inquisitive Men almost in all Ages of the World. The one concerns the first origin of Evil; the other concerns the dispensations of Providence, whence it comes to pass that good Men fare so hard in the World, when the bad triumph and flourish: if these two can be clear'd with any satisfaction to Reason, it will be the highest Vindication of Divine Providence, and a great evidence of the Divinity of the Scriptures, which give us such clear light and direction in these profound Speculations, which the dim Reason of Man was so much to seek in.

I begin with the origin of Evil; for, if there be a hand of Providence which orders all things in the World, how comes Evil then into it, without God's being the Author of it? Which is a speculation of as great depth as necessity, it highly concerning us to entertain the highest apprehensions of God's Holiness, and how far he is from being the Author of Sin; and it is likewise a matter of some difficulty so to explain the origin of Evil, as to make it appear that God is not the Author of it. I easily then assent to what *Origen* saith on this subject, when *Celsus* upon some mistaken places of Scripture, had charg'd the Scripture with laying the origin of Evil upon God; Orig. c. Cels. l. 4. p. 207. *εἰς τὸ ἄλλο πρὸς τὸ ὅτι ἀνθρώποις ἐξιστάται λόγος, διδόντες ἐν τῇ φύσει ἡμῶν, ὅτι τούτοις ἐστὶ κακῶν τευχρὴν αἰτία.* *If any thing which calls for our inquiry be of difficult investigation, that which concerns the origin of Evils is such a thing;* and as *Simplicius* well begins his discourse on this subject; Simplic. in Epist. c. 34. *ὅτι τὸ ὑποκείμενον τῷ κακῶν ὁ λόγος μὴ καλῶς διορθῶνται ἐστὶν ὅτι τὸ ἡμῶν ἀσθενείας αἴτιον γένοιτο, καὶ τὸ ὅτι ἡμῶν ἀσθενείας τὰς ἀρχαὶς διδόντες, καὶ πολλαὶ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀπειρίας αἰτίαι τὰς μὴ καλῶς ἀπολογεῖσθαι αὐτῶν.* *The dispute*

Sf

pute

pute concerning the nature and origin of Evil, not being well stated, is the cause of great Impiety towards God, and perverts the principles of good Life, and involves them in innumerable perplexities who are not able to give a rational account of it. So much then is it our great concernment to fix on sure grounds in the resolution of this important question; in which I intend not to lanch out into the depth and intricacies of it, as it relates to any internal purposes of God's Will, (which is beyond our present scope) but I shall only take that account of it which the Scripture plainly gives in relating the fall of the first Man. For the clearing of which I shall proceed in this method:

1. *That if the Scriptures be true, God cannot be the Author of Sin.*
2. *That the account which the Scripture gives of the origin of Evil, doth not charge it upon God.*
3. *That no account given by Philosophers of the origin of Evil, is so clear and rational as this is.*
4. *That the most material circumstances of this account are attested by the Heathens themselves.*

1. *That if the Scriptures be true, God cannot be the Author of Sin.* For if the Scriptures be true, we are bound without Hesitation to yield our assent to them in their plain and direct affirmations; and there can be no ground of suspending assent, as to any thing which pretends to be a Divine Truth, but the want of certain Evidence, whether it be of Divine Revelation or no. No doubt it would be one of the most effectual ways to put an end to the numerous controversies of the Christian World (especially to those bold disputes concerning the method and order of God's Decrees) if the plain and undoubted assertions of Scripture were made the Rule and Standard, whereby we ought to judg of such things as are more obscure and ambiguous. And cou'd Men but rest contented with those things which concern their eternal Happiness, and the means in order to it (which on that account are written with all imaginable perspicuity in Scripture) and the moment of all other Controversies be judg'd by their reference to these, there wou'd be fewer Controversies and more Christians in the World. Now there are two grand Principles which concern Mens eternal Condition, of which we have the greatest certainty from Scripture, and on which we may with safety rely, without perplexing our Minds about those more nice and subtile Speculations (which it may be are incapable of all full and particular resolution) and those are, *That the ruin and destruction of Man is wholly from himself;* and, *That his salvation is from God alone.* If then Man's ruin and misery be from himself; which the Scripture doth so much inculcate on all occasions; then without controversy that which is the cause of all the misery of Human Nature, is wholly from himself too, which is, Sin. So that if the main scope and design of the Scripture be true, God cannot be the Author of that, by which (without the intervention of the Mercy of God) Man's misery unavoidably falls upon him. For with what Authority and Majesty doth God in the Scripture forbid all manner of Sin? with what earnestness and importunity doth he wooe the Sinner to forsake his sin? With what loathing and detestation

testation doth he mention Sin? With what justice and severity doth he punish Sin? With what wrath and indignation doth he threaten Contumacious Sinners? And is it possible, (after all this and much more, recorded in the Scriptures, to express the Holiness of God's Nature, his hatred of Sin, and his appointing a day of Judgment for the solemn punishment of Sinners) to imagin that the Scriptures do in the least ascribe the Origin of Evil to God, or make him the Author of Sin? *Shall not the Judge of all the world do right?* will a God of infinite Justice, Purity, and Holiness, punish the Sinner for that which himself was the cause of? Far be such unworthy thoughts from our Apprehensions of a *Deity*, much more of that God whom we believe to have declar'd his Mind so much to the contrary, that we cannot believe that and the Scriptures to be true together.

Taking it then for granted in the general, that God cannot be the Author of Sin, we come to inquire, *Whether the account which the Scripture gives of the Origin of Evil, doth any way charge it upon God?* There are only two ways, according to the History of the fall of Man recorded in Scripture, whereby Men may have any ground to question whether God were the cause of Man's fall; either *first*, by the giving him that positive Law, which was the occasion of his fall; or *secondly*, by leaving him to the liberty of his own Will. *First*, The giving of that positive Law cannot be the least ground of laying Man's fault on God; because, 1. It was most futable to the nature of a rational Creature to be govern'd by Laws, or declarations of the Will of his Maker: for considering Man as a free Agent, there can be no way imagin'd so consonant to the nature of Man as this was, because thereby he might declare his obedience to God to be the matter of his free choice. For where there is a capacity of Reward and Punishment, and acting in the consideration of them, there must be a declaration of the Will of the Law-giver, according to which Man may expect either his Reward or Punishment. If it were futable to God's nature to promise Life to Man upon Obedience, it was not unfutable to it to expect Obedience to every declaration of his Will; considering the absolute Sovereignty and Dominion which God had over Man as being his Creature, and the indispensable Obligation which was in the nature of Man to obey whatever his Maker did command him. So that God had full and absolute Right to require from Man, what he did as to the Law which he gave him to obey; and in the general we cannot conceive, how there shou'd be a Testimony of Man's Obedience towards his Creator, without some declaration of his Creator's Will. *Secondly*, God had full Power and Authority, not only to govern Man by Laws, but to determin Man's general obligation to Obedience to that particular positive Precept by the breach of which Man fell. If God's power over Man was universal and unlimited, what reason can there be to imagin it shou'd not extend to such a positive Law? Was it, because the matter of this Law seem'd too low for God to command his Creature? But whatever the matter of the Law was, Obedience to God was the great end of it, which Man had restify'd as much in that Instance of it as in any other whatsoever; and in the violation of it were imply'd the highest aggravations of

Sf 2

Disobe-

Disobedience; for God's Power and Authority were as much contemned, his Goodness slighted, his Truth and Faithfulness question'd, his Name dishonor'd, his Majesty affronted in the breach of that, as of any other Law whatsoever it had been. If the Law were easie to be observ'd, the greater was the Sin of Disobedience; if the weight of the matter was not so great in it self, yet God's Authority added the greatest weight to it; and the ground of Obedience is not to be fetch'd from the nature of the thing required, but from the Authority of the Legislator. Or was it then because God conceal'd from Man his Counsel in giving of that positive Precept? Hath not then a Legislator power to require any thing, but what he satisfies every one of his reason in commanding it? If so, what becomes of Obedience and Subjection? It will be impossible to make any probative Precepts on this account; and the Legislator must be charg'd with the Disobedience of his Subjects, where he doth not give a particular account of every thing which he requires: which as it concerns Human Laws (who have not that absolute Power and Authority which God hath) is contrary to all Laws of Policy and the general Sense of the World. This *Plutarch* gives a good account of, when he discourseth so rationally of the Sobriety which Men ought to use in their inquiries into the grounds and reasons of God's Actions; For, saith he, *Physicians will give prescriptions without giving the Patient a particular reason of every circumstance in them:* αὐτὸ δὲ αἱ ἀρχαὶ τοῖς νόμοις ἀποδοῦναι τὸ νόμον ἀπλῶς ἔχοντα καὶ μάλιστα φανερόν, αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐκείνου γὰρ τὴν ἀσυνεπείαν. *Neither have Human Laws always apparent reason for them, nay some of them, are to appearance ridiculous; for which he instanceth in that Law of the Lacedæmonian Ephori,* μὴ κείρεται μὲν τὸ κεφάλαιον, to which no other reason was annex'd but this, καὶ πάλιν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτῶν καὶ μὴ χαλκῶν δὲ οὐδὲν: *They commanded every Magistrate at the entrance of his Office to shave himself, and gave this reason for it, that they might learn to obey Laws themselves.* He further instanceth, in the Roman Custom of Manumission, their Laws about Testaments, Solon's Law against Neutrality in Seditions, and concludes thence, καὶ ὅλας περὶ αὐτῶν τὰς ἐκείνου νόμους ἀποδοῦναι, μάλιστα δὲ λόγῳ ἔχει τὸ νόμον, μάλιστα τὸ αὐτῶν νόμους ἀποδοῦναι τὴν ἀσυνεπείαν. *Any one would easily find many Absurdities in Laws, who doth not consider the intention of the Legislator, or the ground of what he requires.* τί δὲ θαυμάσιον, saith he, αἱ δὲ ἀρχαὶ τοῖς νόμοις ἀποδοῦναι τὸ νόμον ἀπλῶς ἔχοντα καὶ μάλιστα φανερόν, αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐκείνου γὰρ τὴν ἀσυνεπείαν. *What wonder is it, if we are so puzzled to give an account of the Actions of Men, that we shoud be to seek as to those of the Deity?* This cannot be then any ground on the account of mere reason, to lay the charge of Man's Disobedience upon God, because he requir'd from him the observance of that positive command of not eating of the forbidden Fruit.

*Plutarch.
de his qui
seco puni-
untur a
numine.*

VL

The only thing then left, is, whether God be not liable to this charge as he left Man to the liberty of his Will: And that may be grounded on two things; either that God did not create Man in such a condition, in which it had been impossible for him to have sinned; or that knowing his temptation he did not give him power to resist it. If neither of these will lay any imputation of the Origin of Evil upon God, then God will appear to be wholly free from it. First, concerning Man's being created a free Agent, if the

the determination of the Schools be good, that possibility of Sinning is imply'd in the very notion of a Creature; and consequently that impeccability is repugnant to the nature of a created Being; then we see a necessary reason, why Man was created in a state of Liberty: but endeavoring to shew that the grounds of our Religion are not repugnant to natural Reason, I shall rather make use of the Testimony of such who profess'd to be Followers of nothing else but Reason and Philosophy. Among whom I shall make choice of *Simplicius* both for the Reason he produceth, and because he is farthest from any suspicion of partiality, by reason of his known opposition to the *Mosaic* History of the Creation. He then in his *Commentaries* on *Epictetus* professedly disputes this very subject of the Origin of Evil, and after having rejected that fond Opinion of two Principles, one of Good, and the other of Evil, undertakes to give an account whence Evil came into the World; which because it tends so much to the illustrating our present subject, I shall give an account of. God, saith he, *who is the fountain and principle of all Good, not only produced things which were in themselves good, nor only those things which were of a middle nature, but the extremes too, which were such things which were apt to be perverted from that which is according to nature, to that which we call Evil. And that after those Bodies which were (as he supposeth) incorruptible, others were produced which are subject to Mutation and Corruption; and so after those Souls which were immutably fixed in Good, others were produced which were liable to be perverted from it; that so the riches of God's goodness might be display'd in making to exist all Beings which are capable of it; and that the Universe might be perfect in having all sorts of Beings in it. Now, he supposeth that all those Beings which are above this sublunary World are such as are immutably good, and that the lowest sort of Beings which are liable to be perverted to Evil, are such which are here below. Therefore, saith he, the Soul being of a more noble and immutable Nature, while it is by it self, doth not partake of Evil; but it being of a nature apt to be joyned with these Terrestrial Bodies (by the Providence of the Author of the Universe, who produced such souls, that so both extremes might be joyned by the Bonds of vital Union) thereby it becomes sensible of those Evils and Pains which the Body is subject to; but these things are not properly Evils but rather Good, considering our Terrestrial Bodies as parts of the Universe which is upheld by the changes and vicissitudes which are in this lower World: Which he largely discourses on to shew that those particular alterations which are in Bodies, do conduce rather to the perfection and beauty of the Universe, than are any real Evils in it. But now, saith he, for the Origin of those things which are properly Evils, viz. Moral Evils, which are τὰ ἐν ἀνθρωπίνῃ ψυχῇ πλεονεκτήματα, the lapses and errors of the Human soul, we are to consider, that there are souls of a more excellent nature than ours are, which are immutably good; and the souls of Brutes are of a lower kind than ours are, and yet are middle between the rational and vegetative, having something in them parallel both to the Appetites and Evils which are in Men, which will therefore be understood by an account of the other. Ἡ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ, μίσην ἐκπαύσσει ἢ πρὸς αὐτὴν ῥησὺν ψυχῶν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῇ ἐν ψυχῇ οὐσίᾳ ἀρετῆς, ἢ ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ νῦν μὲν ἔστιν, καὶ ἔτι αὖτις κατὰ ἀλλ' τὴν αἰῶνα*

Vid. Thom. 1 p. q. 63. art. 1. E-stium in sensens. l. 2. dist. 7. sect. 9.

Simplic. Com. in Epict. c. 34. p. 175.

Ibid. p. 180. ed. Salmas.

τὸ πνεῦμα συζώνειαν ἔχει ἀλόγου ζωῆς, καὶ σύνδοξον ζῶντος χειρὸς τὸ πνεῦμα ἐστὶν καὶ τὸ κατὰ, ἀλλὰ ἡ αὐτοῦ φύσις ἁπλοῦς, καὶ ἡ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου, καὶ ἡ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου, καὶ ἡ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου. *The Soul of Man is nexus utriusque mundi, in the middle between those more excellent Beings which perpetually remain above, with which it partakes in the sublimity of its Nature and Understanding, and those inferior Terrestrial Beings with which it communicates thro' the vital Union which it hath with the Body, and by reason of that freedom and indifferency which it hath, it sometimes is assimilated to the one, sometimes to the other of these extremes. So that while it approacheth to the nature of the superior Beings, it keeps it self free from Evil; but because of its freedom it may sometimes sink down into these lower things, and so he calls the cause of all evil, in the Soul τὴν αὐθιγὰν καὶ τὴν ἐκείνου, its voluntary descent into this lower World, and immersing it self in the feculency of Terrestrial Matter. καὶ φησὶν δὲ ἀμφόβουλον ἔλασθαι, οὐκ ἀναγκασμένην καὶ οὐκ ἀντιπρὸς, ἀλλὰ ὡς ἂν ἐκείνη, οὐκ ὡς ἂν ἐκείνη, οὐκ ὡς ἂν ἐκείνη. For tho' the Soul be of a kind of Amphibious Nature, yet it is not forced either upwards or downwards, but acts either way according to its internal liberty. But saith he, while the rational soul keeps that power which it hath in its hands over the Body, and makes use of it only as an instrument for its own good, so long it keeps pure and free from any stain of evil; but when it once forgets the similitude it hath with the more excellent Being, and throws away the Scepter of its power, and drowns it self in the Body and Brutish Affections (preferring the pleasure of Sense above that of Reason) when it so far degenerates below the principles of Reason, that instead of commanding the Brutish Faculties it becomes a slave to them, then it conceives and brings forth evil; but this it doth not thro' any coercion or necessity, but thro' the abuse of that power and liberty which it hath: For the choice is a proper action of the Soul it self: which he proves from hence, because God, and the Laws, and all good Men, do not measure the good and evil of Actions so much by the event, as by the will and intention of the Person; and that Punishment and Reward have chiefly a respect to those. And therefore Men are pardoned for what they do out of constraint and force, and the fault is ascribed, οὐ τὸ ἀκούειν ἀλλὰ βιάσθαι, not to him that did it, but to him that forced him to the doing of it. And so from hence he concludes, that because of the freedom of the will of Man, nothing else can be said to be the Author of Evil properly, but the Soul of Man; and concludes that discourse with this excellent Speech, Ἐπειδὴ οὖν τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ κακοῦ, λαμβάνει τὸ φῶς τῆς βούλητος, ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς κακίας ἀναίτιος, διότι τὸ κακὸν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐνεργεῖ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου, ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ κακὸν ἐνεργεῖ, οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ κακὸν ἐνεργεῖ, οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ κακὸν ἐνεργεῖ. Having thus found out the true origin of Evil, let us cry out with a loud voice, that God is not the Author of Sin, because the Soul freely doth that which is evil, and not God; for if the Soul were forced to do what it doth, one might justly lay the blame on God, who permits such a force to be offered it, neither could it be properly evil which the Soul was constrained to; but since it acted freely, out of choice, the Soul must alone be accounted the Author and Cause of Evil. Thus we see that God cannot with any shadow of Reason be accounted the Author of Evil, because he gave the Soul of Man a principle of internal freedom, when the very freedom of acting which the Soul had, put it into a capacity of standing as well as falling.* And

And certainly, he can never be said to be the cause of the breaking of a Person, who gave him a stock to set up with, and suppos'd him able to manage it when he gave it him. Indeed had not Man had this freedom of Will, he could not have fallen; but then neither had he been a rational Agent, which supposing no corruption, doth speak freedom of Action. So that while we inquire after the origin of Evil we have no other cause to assign it to, but Man's abuse of that free power of acting which he had: but if we will be so curious as to inquire further, why God did create Man with a freedom of Will, and not rather fix his Soul immutably on Good; if the order of Beings be no satisfactory Reason for it, we can give no other than that why he made Man, or the World at all, which was the good pleasure of his Will.

But secondly, *supposing God's giving Man this freedom of Will, doth not entitle him to be the Author of Evil; doth not his leaving Man to this liberty of his in the Temptation, make him the cause of Sin?* I answer no, and that on these accounts.

1. *Because Man stood then upon such terms, that he could not fall but by his own free and voluntary act; he had a power to stand, in that there was no principle of corruption at all in his Faculties, but he had a pure and undefil'd Soul which could not be polluted without its own consent: Now it had been repugnant to the terms on which Man stood (which were the trial of his Obedience to his Creator) had he been irresistibly determin'd any way.* *Simplicius* puts this question after the former discourse, *Whether God may be called the Author of sin, because he permits the soul to use her liberty? But, saith he, he that says God should not have permitted this use of its freedom to the soul, must say one of these two things, either that the soul being of such a nature as is indifferent to Good or Evil, it should have been wholly kept from the choosing Evil, or else that it should have been made of such a nature that it should not have had a power of choosing Evil. The first is irrational and absurd; for what freedom and liberty had that been, where there was no choice? And what choice could there have been where the Mind was necessitated only to one part? For the second we are to consider, saith he, that no Evil is in it self desirable, or to be chosen; but withal, if this power of determining it self either way must be taken away, it must be either as something not good, or as some great evil; and whoever saith so, doth not consider, how many things in the World there are, which are accounted good and desirable things, yet are no ways comparable with this freedom of Will. For it excells all sublunary Beings; and there is none would rather desire to be a Brute or Plant than Man; if God then shew'd his goodness in giving to inferior Beings such Perfections which are far below this, is it any ways incongruous to God's Nature and Goodness to give Man the freedom of his Actions, and a self-determining power, tho' he permitted him the free use of it? Besides, as that Author reasons, had God to prevent Man's sin taken away the liberty of his Will, he had likewise destroyed the foundation of all Virtue, and the very nature of Man; for Virtue would not have been such, had there been no possibility of acting contrary; and Man's Nature would have been Divine, because impeccable. Therefore, saith he, tho' we attribute this self-determining Power to God as the Author of it, which was so necessary in the order of the Universe, we have no reason to attribute the*

Origin

VII.
*Simplic. in
Epicet. p.
186, 187.*

Origin of that Evil to God, which comes by the abuse of that Liberty. For, as he further adds, God doth not at all cause that Aversion from Good, which is in the Soul when it sins, but only gave such a power to the Soul, whereby it might turn it self to Evil, out of which God might afterwards produce so much Good, which could not otherwise have been without it. So consonantly to the Scripture doth that Philosopher speak on this subject.

2. *God cannot be said to be the Author of Sin, tho' he did not prevent the fall of Man, because he did not withdraw before his fall any Grace or Assistance, which was necessary for his standing.* Had there been indeed a necessity of supernatural Grace to be communicated to Man for every moment, to continue him in his Innocency, and had God before Man's fall withdrawn such Assistance from him, without which it were impossible for him to have stood, it would be very difficult freeing God from being the cause of the fall of Man. But we are not put to such difficulties for acquitting God from being the Author of Sin; for there appears no necessity at all for asserting any Distinction of sufficient and efficacious Grace in Man before his fall; that the one should belong only to a Radical power of standing, the other to every Act of good which Adam did: For if God made Man upright, he certainly gave him such a power as might be brought into act without the necessity of any supervenient Act of Grace, to elicit that Habitual power into particular Actions. If the other were sufficient, it was sufficient for its end; and how could it be sufficient for its end, if notwithstanding that, there were no possibility of standing, unless efficacious help were superadded to it? God would not certainly require any thing from the Creature in his Integrity, but what he had a power to obey; and if there were necessary further Grace to bring the Power into Act, the subtracting of this Grace, must be by way of punishment to Man, which it is hard to conceive for what it should be, before Man had sinned, or else God must subtract this Grace on purpose that Man might fall, which would necessarily follow on this Supposition, in which case Man would be necessitated to fall, *Veluti cum subductis columnis domus necessario corruit*, as one expresseth it, *As a house must needs fall, when the pillars on which it stood are taken away from it.* But now if God withdrew not any effectual Grace from Man, whereby he must necessarily fall, then tho' God permit Man to use his Liberty, yet he cannot be said to be any ways the Author of Evil, because Man had still a *posse si vellet*, a power of standing, if he had made right use of his Liberty, and God never took from Man his *Adjutorium quo potuit stare, & sine quo non potuit*, as Divines call it, Man enjoying still his Power, tho' by the abuse of his Liberty he fell into sin; so that granting God to leave Man to the use of his Liberty, yet we see God cannot in the least be charg'd with being the Author of Sin, or the Origin of Evil, by the History of the Fall of Man in Scripture: which was the thing to be clear'd.

VIII.

We come now in the third place to compare that account given of the Origin of Evil in Scripture, with that which was embrac'd by Heathen Philosophers, in point of Reason and Evidence. There was no one inquiry whatsoever in which those who had nothing but Natural Light to guide them, were more to seek for Satisfaction

tion in, than this concerning the Origin of Evil. They saw by continual Experience how great a torrent of both sorts of Evils, of Sin and Punishment, did overflow the World; but they were like the *Egyptians*, who had sufficient evidence of the overflowing their Banks by the River *Nile*, but could not find out the Spring or the Head of it. The reason was, as Corruption increas'd in the World, so the means of Instruction and Knowledge decay'd; and so as the *Phænomena* grew greater, the reason of them was less understood; the knowledge of the History of the first Ages of the World, thro' which they could alone come to the full understanding of the true cause of Evil, insensibly decaying in the several Nations: Infomuch that those who are not at all acquainted with that History of the World which was preserv'd in Sacred Records among the *Jews*, had nothing but their own uncertain conjectures to go by, and some kind of obscure Traditions which were preserv'd among them, which while they sought to rectify by their Interpretations, they made them more obscure and false than they found them. They were certain of nothing, but that Mankind was in a low and degenerate condition, and subject to continual Miseries and Calamities; they who cry'd up the most the *αὐτεξέλιξις*, or the Self-determining power of the Soul, could not certainly but strangely wonder, that a Principle indifferent to be carry'd either way, should be so almost fatally inclin'd to the worst of them. It was very strange that since Reason ought to have the command of Passions by their own acknowledgment, the Brutish part of the Soul should so master and enslave the Rational, and the Beast should still cast the Rider in Man, the sensitive Appetite should throw off the power of the *τὸ ἡγεμονικόν*, of that Faculty of the Soul which was design'd for the Government of all the rest. The Philosophers could not be ignorant what slaves they were themselves to this *Terrestrial Hyle*, how easily their most mettlesome Souls were mir'd in the dirt, how deep they were sunk into corporeal Pleasures, that it was past the power of their Reason to help them out. Nay, when the Soul begins to be fledg'd again, after her *πτεροποιΐα*, or moulting, at her entrance into the Body, which *Plato* speaks of, and strives to raise her self above this lower World, she then feels the weight of such plummets hanging at her feet, that they bring her down again to her former fluttering up and down in her Cage of Earth. So *Hierocles* complains, that when Reason begins to carry the Soul to the perception of the most noble objects, the Soul with a generous flight would soar above this World, *ὅταν μὴ ὡς παθητικὴς ἐλευθερὸς ὥσπερ παρὰ μολύβδου, ἀποφύγῃ ὡς κακίαν*.
Were it not born down to that which is evil by the force of Passions, which hang like leads upon the Soul's feet. What a strange unaccountable thing must this needs be to those who beheld the constancy of the effect, but were to seek for the cause of it? It could not but be clear to them that the *αὐτεξέλιξις* they were wont to extoll so high, was (in the state Man was now in) but a more noble Name for slavery; when themselves could not but confess the *πρωτὴ*, or inclination in the Soul, was so strong to the evil; and could that be an even ballance, where there was so much down-weight in one of the scales? unless they made, as some of them did, the voluntary Inclinations of the Soul to evil, an evidence of her Li-

*Hieroc. in
 aurea cat-
 mina. p. 17.*

T t

berty

berty in this most degenerate condition, as tho' it were any Argument that the Prisoner was the freer, because he delighted himself in the noise of his shackles. Neither was this Disorder alone at home in the Soul, where there was still a *Xantippe* scolding with *Socrates*, *Passion* striving with *Reason*; but when they look'd abroad in the World, they could not but observe some strange Irregularities in the converse among Men. What debaucheries, contentions, rapines, fightings and destroying each other, and that with the greatest cruelty, and that frequently among Country-men, Friends, nay Relations and Kindred! and could this Hostility between those of the same Nature, and under the most sacred bonds of Union, be the result of Nature, when even Beasts of prey are not such to those of their own kind? Besides all this, when they summed up the Life of Man together, and took an account of the weaknesses and follies of Childhood, the heats and extravagancies of Youth, the passions, disquietments and disappointments of Men in their strength and height of business, the inquietude, aches and infirmities of old Age, besides the miseries which thro' every one of these all Men are subject to, and few escape, into how small a sum will the solid Pleasure and Contentment of the Life of Man be reduc'd? Nay, if we take those things in the World which Men please themselves the most in enjoyment of, and consider but with what care they are got, with what fear they are kept, and with what certainty they must be lost; and how much the possession of any thing fails of the expectation of it, and how near Men are upon the top of *Tenariff*, to fall into the depth of the Sea, how often they are precipitated from the height of Prosperity, into the depth of Adversity; we shall find yet much less that by the greatest *Chymistry* can be extracted of real satisfaction out of these things. Whence then should it come that Mens Souls should so delight to feed on these Husks, and to embrace these Clouds and Shadows, instead of that real Good which is the true object of the Soul's desire? They could easily see there was no pure, unmix'd Good in the World, but there was a Contemperation of both together, according to that of *Euripides*:

Οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο χεῖς ἐσθλὰ ἔκ κακὰ,
'Αλλ' ἔστι τις σύγκρησις.

Plat. in
Phad.

There is a kind of continual mixture of good and evil in the World; which Socrates observ'd upon the rubbing of his thigh where the fetters made it itch, ὡς αἴσθηται, ὃ αἰσθάνεται, ὅτι καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεται καὶ τὸ καλὸν αἰσθάνεται καὶ τὸ κακόν αἰσθάνεται; What a strange thing is that which Men are wont to call Pleasure? how near a kin is it to that which seems so contrary to it, Pain?

Now the observing the strange and sudden vicissitudes of these things, and what near neighbours Pain and Pleasure were to each other, (so that there is frequently a passage out of one into the other) did yet more entangle them to give a clear account of the Origin of both these. Those who believe there was a God, who produc'd the World and order'd all things in it, did easily attribute whatever was good in the World to the Fountain of all Goodness;

and wisest of the Heathen. Now these two Principles some (saith he) call *Two opposite Gods*, whereof the one is the cause of *Good*, and the other of *Evil*; him they call *εὖς*, this *δαιμόνιον*. By this one would imagin that this very ancient Tradition was nothing else but the true account of the Origin of Evil a little disguis'd. For the Scripture making the *Devil* the first Author of *Evil* himself, and the first solicitor and tempter of Man to it; who when God directed him straight forward, pull'd Man back, and put him quite out of his way, by which means all the Miseries of the World came into it: For while Man kept close to his Maker, his Integrity and Obedience were to him what the *vasa umbilicalia* are to the child in the Womb; by them he receiv'd whatever tended to his subsistence and comfort: but Sin cut those Vessels asunder, and prov'd the *Midwife* of Misery, bringing Man forth into a World of sorrow and sufferings: Now, I say, the Scripture taking such especial notice of one, as the chief of *Devils*, thro' whose means Evil came into the World, this gave occasion to the Heathens, when length of time had made the Original Tradition more obscure, to make these two, *God* and the *Demon*, as two *Anti-gods*, and so to be the causes, the one of all *Good*, and the other of all *Evil*. Which at last came to that (which was the *Devil's* great design in thus corrupting the Tradition) that both these *Anti-gods* should have solemn worship by Sacrifices; the one by way of Impetration, for bestowing of Good; the other by way of Deprecation, for averting of Evil. Such *Plutarch* there tells us were the *Oromasdes* and *Arimanius* of *Zoroastres* which were worshipped by the *Persians*, the one for doing good, and the other for avoiding evil; the one they resembled to Light (or Fire) the other to Darkness and Ignorance; what Animals were good and useful they ascribed to *Oromasdes*, and all venomous and noxious ones to *Arimanius*, whom *Plutarch* elsewhere calls *τὸ πονηρὸν δαιμόνιον Περσῶν*, *The evil Demon of the Persians*. The same *Diogenes Laertius* relates of the *Magi*, the Philosophers of *Persia*, that they made two distinct Principles, *Ἀγαθὸν δαίμονα καὶ κακόν*, a good and bad *Demon*; for which he quotes *Dion*, *Aristotle*, *Hermippus*, *Eudoxus*, and others. The same *Plutarch* makes to be the Opinion of the ancient *Greeks*, who attribute the good to *Jupiter Olympius*, the bad to *Hades*; the *Chaldeans*, saith he, make the *Planets* their Gods, of which two they suppose the cause of Good; two more of only a malignant Influence; and other three to be indifferent to either. The same he affirms of the *Egyptians*, that whatever 'was evil and irregular, they ascrib'd to *Typho*; what was good, comely and useful, they attributed to *Isis* and *Osiris*; to *Isis* as the passive, *Osiris* as the active Principle.

*Plut. in Alex.
Diog. Laertius in Proœm.*

- x. Thus we see how large a spread this Opinion of the Origin of Evil had in the *Gentile* World; neither did it expire with *Heathenism*; But *Manes* retain'd so much of the Religion of his Country, being a *Persian*, that he made a strange medley of the *Persian* and *Christian* Doctrine together. For that was his famous Opinion, of which *St. Austin* tells us; *Iste duo principia inter se diversa atque adversa, eademque aterna, & co-æterna, hoc est, semper fuisse, composuit; duasque naturas atque substantias, boni, scilicet, & mali, sequens alios antiquos hæreticos, opinatus est.* *St. Austin*

August. de Hæres. c. 40.

Austin thinks that *Manes* had his Opinion concerning two Principles from the ancient Heretics, by whom I suppose he means the *Marcionists* and *Valentinians*; but it seems more probable that *Manes* had his Doctrine immediately from his Countreymen, tho' it be generally thought that *Scythianus* and *Buddas* were his Masters in it. But from whomsoever it came, the Opinion was merely *Heathen*, and not more contrary to Scripture than it is to Reason; the former I meddle not with, that Opinion being now extinct in the *Christian* World; I only briefly consider the Unreasonableness of it; to shew what a far better account of the *Origin of Evil* the Scriptures give us, than was discover'd by the *Heathen* Philosophers. For on both sides that Opinion is repugnant to the Notion of a *Deity*, so that while they would make two such *Gods*, they make none at all. For how can the Principle of Good be God, if he hath not Infinite Power, as well as Goodness? and how can he have Infinite Power, if he hath not the management of things in the World? and how can he have the management of things, if they be liable to Evil, which the other *God*, which is the Principle of Evil, may lay upon it; from which, according to this supposition, the Principle of Good cannot rescue it? So that they who hold this Opinion cannot, as *Simplicius* tells us, Give GOD το ἡμῶν τὴν ἁλὴν δυνάμειν, the half of that Infinite Power which belongs to him; for neither can he keep the good Creatures which he makes from the power of the evil *Dæmon*, and therefore if he loves them, must be in continual fears of the Power of the contrary Principle; neither can he free them from the evil which the other lays upon them; for then GOD's Power would be far greater than the evil *Dæmon*, and so he could be no *Anti-god*. And on the other side the Notion or Idea of an Infinite evil Being, is in it self an inconsistent Idea; for it is an Infinite Non-entity, if we suppose his very Being to lie in being evil, which is only a privation of Goodness; and besides if he be infinitely evil, he must be infinitely contrary to the good Principle; and how can he be infinitely contrary which enjoys several of the same Perfections, which the other hath, which are Infinity of Essence, and Necessity of Existence? Now if this Principle of Evil be absolutely contrary to the other, it must be contrary in all his Perfections; for whatever is a Perfection, belongs to that which is good; and now if it be contrary in every Perfection, Infinity of Essence, and Necessity of Existence, being two, it must be as contrary as is imaginable to them, by which this evil Principle must be infinitely defective in Being and Existence, and so it will be an Infinite Non-entity which yet exists, which is the height of contradiction. Again, if there be such a contrary Principle, which is the cause of all Evil, then all Evil falls out unavoidably, and by the power of this Infinitely evil Principle, by which means not only all Religion, but all Virtue and Goodness will be taken out of the World, if this evil Principle be infinite; and if not infinite, no *Anti-god*: and not only so, but all difference of Good and Evil will be taken away (and then what need making two such contrary Principles to give an account of the Origin of Evil?) for when once Evil becomes thus necessary, it loseth its Nature as a Moral Evil; for a Moral Evil implies in it a voluntary breach of some known Law; but how can that breach be voluntary, which

was caus'd by an Infinite Power in the most proper way of Efficiency? And thus if all freedom of Will be destroy'd (as it is necessarily by this Supposition) then no Government of the World by Laws can be suppos'd, and consequently no Reward or Punishment, which suppose liberty of Action, and by this means all Religion, Law, and Providence are banish'd out of the World, and so this evil *Dæmon* will get all into his own hands, and instead of two contrary Principles, there will be but one *Ininitely evil Dæmon*. Which that there is not, appears by this, that notwithstanding all the Evil in the World, there is so much Good left in it, of which there would be none, if this evil *Dæmon* had Infinite Power. By this we see there cannot be a Principle infinitely evil, for while they go about to make two such contrary Principles infinite, they make neither of them so, and so while they make two *Gods*, they take away any at all. So that this Opinion of the *Origin of Evil*, is manifestly absurd, irrational, and contradictory.

- XI. But all the *Heathen* Philosophers were not so gross as to imagin two such *Anti-gods* with infinitely active Power, but yet those who would not in terms assert it, might be driven to it by the consequence of their Opinion concerning the *Origin of Evil*, which did suppose a necessity of it in Nature, as flowing from that passive Principle out of which the World was produc'd. Hence it was that *Heraclitus*, as *Plutarch* tells us, attributed the Origin of all things to *Discord* and *Antipathy*, and was wont to say, that when *Homer* wish'd

*Plutarch.
de Isid. &
Osiride.*

Ἐκ τε θεῶν ἔειν ἔκτ' ἀνθρώπων ἀπολέαζ.

That all contention were banish'd out of the World, that he did secretly curse the Origin of things, and wish'd the ruin of the World. So *Empedocles* call'd the active Principle which did good, Harmony and Friendship, but the other

Νεῖκε ἐλόμμενον ἐ δῆεν αἱματόεσσαν.

by which he makes it to be a quarrellsome, pernicious, and bloody Principle. The same *Plutarch* tells us of these two renowned Philosophers, *Pythagoras* and *Plato*. Thence he tells us the *Pythagoreans* call'd the Principle of Good, τὸ ἑν, πεπερασμένον, τὸ μένον, τὸ εὐδαιμόνιον, τὸ πλεονέκον, τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ λαμπρόν. *Unity, finite, quiescent, straight, uneven number, square, right and splendid*; the Principle of Evil, they call'd τὸ πῶν δαδόν, τὸ ἀπειρον, τὸ περιεργον, τὸ καμπύλον, τὸ ἄρλον, τὸ ἀπερμήκον, τὸ ἀνισον, τὸ ἀειπλεον, τὸ σκοτεινόν. *The Binary, Infinite, moving, crooked, even, long of one side, unequal, left, obscure*. The Opinion of *Plato*, he tells us, is very obscure, it being his purpose to conceal it; but he saith in his old Age in his Book *de Legibus*, ἡ δὲ αἰτιολογία, ἡ δὲ συμβολικὴ, without any ifs or ands, he asserts the World to be mov'd by more than one Principle, by two at the least, τὴν μὲν ἀγαθὴν αἰτῶν, τὴν δὲ κακὴν αἰτῶν, καὶ τὴν ἀγαθὴν δημιουργόν. *The one of a good and benign Nature, the other contrary to it both in its Nature and Operations*. *Numenius* in * *Chalcidius* thus delivers the Opinions of *Pythagoras* and

* *Chalcid.
in Tim.
p. 394*

and *Plato de originibus*, as he speaks; *Igitur Pythagoras quoque, inquit Numenius, fluidam & sine qualitate sylvam esse censet; nec tamen ut Stoici naturæ mediæ, interque malorum, bonorumque viciniam, sed plane noxiam; Deum quippe esse (ut etiam Platoni videtur) initium & causam bonorum, sylvam malorum*: So that according to *Numenius*, both *Plato* and *Pythagoras* attributed the Origin of Evil to the Malignity of Matter, and so they make Evils to be necessarily consequent upon the Being of Things. For thus he delivers expressly the Opinion of *Pythagoras*; *qui ait, Existente providentia, mala quoque necessaria substituisse, propterea quod sylva sit, & eadem sit malitia prædita: Platonemque idem Numenius laudat, quod duas mundi animas autumet; Unam beneficentissimam; malignam alteram, sc. Sylvam. Igitur juxta Platonem mundo bona sua Dei, tanquam patris liberalitate collata sunt; mala vero, matris sylvæ vitio coheserunt*. But *Plutarch* will by no means admit, that *Plato* attributes the Origin of Evil merely to Matter, but he makes the Principle of Evil to be something distinct from Matter, which he calls τῆς ἀτακτοῦ καὶ ἀόριστον, αὐτοκίνητον δὲ καὶ κινητικὸν ἀρχὴν, *A confused infinite, self-moving, stirring Principle*; which (saith he) he elsewhere calls *Necessity*, and in his *de Legibus*, plainly, ψυχὴν ἀτακτοῦ καὶ καυσιμίου, *a disorderly and malignant Soul*, which cannot be understood of mere Matter, when he makes his *Hyle* ἀμορφὸν καὶ ἀχρηματιστὸν & πάσης ποιότητος καὶ δυναμικῆς οὐσίας ἴσην, *Without form or figure, and destitute of all qualities and power of operation*: and it is impossible (saith he) that that which is of it self such an inert principle as Matter is, should by *Plato* be suppos'd to be the cause and principle of Evil, which he elsewhere calls ἀνάγκη ποτὶ θεῷ δὲ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀφαιρετὴς ἑσθαι, *Necessity which often resisted God, and cast off his reins*. So that according to *Plutarch*, *Plato* acquits both *God* and *Hyle* from being the Origin of Evil, τὴν γὰρ ἰδὴν ἀμορφὴν ἀπάσης ἀμαρτανίας, καὶ ἐπὶ θεῷ τὴν οὐκ ἔχουσαν αἰτίαν ἀπολείπει πᾶσι, and therefore attributes it to that malignant Spirit which moves the Matter, and is the cause of all the disorderly Motions in the World. But what this Spirit should be, neither he or any one else could ever understand: what darkness and ignorance then was there among the wisest of Philosophers concerning the Origin of Evil, when they were so confus'd and obscure in the account which they gave of it, that their greatest admirers could not understand them!

Plutarch. de Anima procreat. 2 Tim.

But tho' *Plato* seem'd so ambiguous in his judgment of the Origin of Evil, whether he should attribute it to the *Hyle*, or some malignant Spirit in it, the *Stoics* were dogmatical, and plainly imputed the cause of Evil to the perversity of Matter. So *Chalcidius* tells us, that the *Stoics* made Matter not to be evil in it self as *Pythagoras*, but that it was indifferent to either; *perrogati igitur unde mala? perversitatem seminarium malorum causati sunt*: they made the perversity of Matter the Origin of Evil; but as he well observes, *nec expediunt adhuc unde ipsa perversitas, cum juxta ipsos duo sint initia rerum, Deus & sylva. Deus summum & præcellens bonum; sylva, ut censent, nec bonum nec malum*. They give no rational account whence this perversity of Matter should arise, when according to the *Stoics*, there are but two Principles of Things, *God* and *Matter*, whereof the one is perfectly good, the other neither good nor evil. But this perversity they tell us is something necessarily

XII.

Chalcid. in Tim. p. 395.

confe-

consequent upon the Generation of Things. *Ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν κόσμῳ ἔργα ἀκατασκευάστα, ἀκατασκευάστα τὰ κακά, ἃ ἰσχυρὰ τὰ κακά, these are affections, (viz. the Disorders in the World) which follow the Generation of things, as rust comes upon brass, and filth upon the body, as the counterfeit Trismegistus speaks; so Maximus Tyrius saith that Evils in the World are ἡ τῆς φύσεως ἀκατασκευασία not any works of art, but the affections of Matter. Non potest artifex mutare materiam, saith Seneca, when he is giving an account Why God suffers Evils in the World: and elsewhere gives this account why Evils came into the World, non quia cessat ars, sed quia id in quo exercetur inobsequens arti est. So that the Origin of Evil by this account of it lies wholly upon the perversity of Matter, which it seems was incapable of being put into better order by that God who produc'd the World out of that Matter. which the Stoics suppos'd to be eternal. And the truth is, the avoiding the attributing the cause of Evil to God, seems to have been the great Reason, why they rather chose to make it matter necessary and co-existent with God, and this was the only plausible pretence which Hermogenes had for following the Platonists and Stoics in this Opinion, that he might set God far enough off from being the Author of Sin; but I cannot see what advantage comes at all by this Hypothesis, but it is chargeable with as many difficulties as any other. For, 1. It either destroys God's Omnipotency, or else makes him the approver of Evil; so that if he be not Author, he must be Assentator mali, as Tertullian speaks against Hermogenes, because he suffer'd Evil to be in Matter; for, as he argues, Aut enim potuit emendare sed noluit; aut voluit quidem, verum non potuit infirmus Deus: si potuit & noluit, malus & ipse, quia malo favit; & sic jam habetur ejus licet non instituerit: quia tamen si nolisset illud esse, non esset; ipse jam fecit esse, quod noluit non esse: quo quid est turpius? si voluit esse quod ipse noluit fecisse, adversum semetipsum egit, cum & voluit esse quod noluit fecisse, & noluit fecisse quod voluit esse. So that little advantage is gain'd for the clearing the true Origin of Evil by this Opinion; for either God could have taken away Evil out of Matter but would not, or else would but could not; this last destroys God's Omnipotency, the former his Goodness; for by that means Evil is in the World by his consent and approbation; for if God would not remove it when he might, the Being of it will come from him; when if he would have hindered it, it would not have been, and so God by not rooting out of Evil, will be found an Assentor of it, Male si per voluntatem: turpiter si per necessitatem, aut famulus erit mali Deus, aut amicus: if God's Will were the cause why Sin was, it reflects on his Goodness, if God's Power could not hinder it, it destroys his Omnipotency. So that by this Opinion God must either be a slave or a friend to Evil. 2. This Principle overturns the foundations of Religion, and all transactions between God and Mens Souls in order to their welfare, because it makes Evil to be necessarily existent in the World, which appears from hence, in that Evil doth result from the Being of Matter, and so it must necessarily be as Matter is suppos'd to be; for whatever results from the Being of a thing, must be co-existent with it; and so what flows from what doth necessarily exist, must have the same Mode of Existence which the Being it self*

Maxim.
Tyr. Serm.
25.
Seneca de
Provid.
c. 5.
Idem pref.
ad natur.
quæst.

1.
Tertull. ad-
vers. Her-
mogen.
c. 10.

2.

self hath; as is evident in all the Attributes of God, which have the same immutability with his Nature: now then, if Evil did exist from Eternity together with Matter, it must necessarily exist as Matter doth, and so evil will be invincible and unavoidable in the World; which if once granted, renders Religion useless, makes God's Commands unrighteous, and destroys the foundation of God's Proceedings in the day of Judgment. 3. *This Opinion makes God not to be the Author of Good*, while it denies him to be the Author of Evil. For either there was nothing else but Evil in this eternal Matter, or there was a mixture of Good and Evil; if nothing else but Evil which did necessarily exist, it were as impossible for God to produce Good out of it, as to annihilate the necessarily existent Matter. If there were a mixture of Good and Evil, they were both there either necessarily or contingently; how could either of them be contingently in that which is suppos'd to be necessarily existent, and no free Agent? If they be both there necessarily, 1. It is hard conceiving how two such contrary things as Good and Evil, should necessarily be in the same uniform Matter. 2. Then God is no more the Author of Good than of Evil in the World; for he is said not to be Author of Evil because it comes from Matter; and so it appears Good doth too, and so God according to this Opinion, is no more the Author of Good, than he is of Evil. But if it be said *that Good is not in Matter, but God produc'd that out of nothing*: Then I reply, 1. If God did produce Good out of nothing, why did he not produce Matter out of nothing too? If he were so powerful as to do the one, there could be no defect of power as to the other. What insufficiency is there in God's Nature for producing all things out of nothing, if he can produce any thing out of nothing? 2. If God did produce Good out of Evil, why could he not have remov'd all Evil out of Matter? For Good could not but be produc'd by the removing of some Evil which was before that Good, and so God might have remov'd all Evil out of Matter. And so by not doing it when he might, this opinion gives not the least Satisfaction in point of Reason for acquitting God from being the Author of Sin, nor for clearing the true origin of Evil.

3.

XIII.

Thus we have now compar'd the account given of it in Scripture, with that given by the Heathen Philosophers, and find it in every thing more clear, rational and satisfactory than theirs is. Which doubtless is the reason, why the more modern Philosophers, such as *Hierocles, Porphyry, Simplicius* and others, tho' otherwise great opposers of Christianity, did yet in this side with the Scriptures and attribute the original of Evil not to Matter but to the Will of Man. And whoever is seriously conversant with the writings of those Philosophers, who were *ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησίας* of the sacred succession out of the School of *Ammonius* at *Alexandria*, such as *Plotinus, Porphyrius, Iamblichus* and *Hierocles*, will find them write in a higher strain concerning many weighty and important Truths, as of the degeneracy of Mens Souls from God, and the way of the Souls returning to Him, than the most sublime of the ancient Philosophers had done. Which Speculations of theirs no doubt arose not so much from the School of *Plato*, and *Pythagoras*, as of that great restorer of Philosophy *Ammonius* of *Alexandria*; whose Scholars *Herennius, Origen* and *Plotinus* were. Who liv-

Enseb. Eccl. hist. l. 6. c. 19. Hierom. de Script. Eccl.

U u

Holsten. de
vit. &
Script. Por-
phyri. c. 6.

ing and dying a Christian, as *Eusebius* and *Hierom* assure us, whatever *Porphyrius* suggests to the contrary, did communicate to his Scholars the sublimer Mysteries of Divine Revelation; together with the Speculations of the ancient Philosophers: which *Holstenius* conceives he did with an adjuration of secrecy, which he tells us *Porphyrius* himself acknowledgeth, that those three Scholars of *Ammonius*, *Herennius*, *Origen* and *Plotinus*, were under an obligation to each other not to reveal and discover, tho' it were after violated by them. It is an easie matter to conceive what an excellent improvement might be made of the ancient *Platonic* Philosophy by the advantage of the Scriptures, by one who was so well vers'd in both of them as *Ammonius* is suppos'd to have been; and how agreeable and becoming would that Philosophy seem which had only its rise from *Plato*, but its height and improvement from those rich and truly Divine Truths which were inlaid with them? The want of observing this, viz. whence it was that those excellent discourses in the latter *Platonists* had their true Original, hath given occasion to several mistakes among learned Men: as first the over-valuing of the *Platonic* Philosophy, as tho' in many of the discourses and notions of it, it seem'd to some (who were more in love with Philosophy than the Scriptures) to out-go what is discover'd therein concerning the same things. A most groundless and unworthy Censure! when it is more than probable (and might be largely manifested, were it here a fit opportunity) that whatever is truly generous and noble in the sublimest discourses of the *Platonists*, had not only its primitive rise, but its accession and improvement from the Scriptures wherein it is still contain'd in its native lustre and beauty, without those paintings and impure mixtures which the sublimest Truths are corrupted with in the *Platonic* Writings. The reason of which is, tho' these Philosophers grew suddenly rich thro' the spoils they had taken out of the Scriptures, yet they were loth to be known, from whence they had them, and would seem to have had that out of their own Gardens which was only transplanted from the Sacred Writings. Therefore we find them not mentioning the Scriptures and the Christian Doctrine without some contempt of its meanness and simplicity; and whatever improvement they had gain'd by them, they would have it less taken notice of by professing their opposition to the Christians, as is notorious in those great Philosophers, *Porphyrius*, *Iamblichus*, *Hierocles*, *Simplicius* and others. It being their design to take so much and no more out of the Christian Doctrine as they could well suit with their *Platonic* Notions, by which means they so disguis'd the Faces of the Truths they stole, that it were hard for the right owners of them to know them again. Which was the grand Artifice of their great Master *Plato*, who doubtless by means of his abode and acquaintance in *Egypt* about the time when the *Jews* began to flock thither, had more certain knowledge of many Truths of grand importance, concerning the Deity, the nature of the Soul, the origin of the World, than many other *Greek* Philosophers had; but yet therein lay his great fault, that he wrapt up and disguis'd his Notions in such a fabulous and ambiguous manner, that partly he might be less known from whence he had them, and that they might find better entertainment among the

G. 1713,

Greeks, than they were ever like to do in their plain and native dress. Which *Plato* himself seems somewhere to intimate, when he saith, that what the *Greeks* receiv'd from the *Barbarians*, *καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ἑαυτῶν ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἑτεροῦν*, they put it in a better fashion, i. e. they disguise it, alter and change it as they please, and put it into a *Greek* habit, that it might never be suspected to have been a *Foreigner*. Thence *Tertullian* speaks with a great deal of truth and freedom of such Philosophers who did *ingenii sitim de prophetarum fonte irrigare* (as he expresseth it) that quench'd their thirst after Knowledge with the Waters of *Jordan* (tho' they did not, like *Naaman*, cure the Leprosie of the Head by washing in them) for as *Tertullian* saith, they came only *ex negotio curiositatis*, more to please the itch of their curiosity than to cure it. Plato in Epinom.

And wherein they seem'd most to agree with the Scriptures, their difference was beyond their agreement. *Siquidem vera quæque & consonantia Prophetis aut aliunde commendant aut aliorum subornant, cum maxima injuria veritatis, quam efficiunt aut adjuvari falsis aut patrocinari. Whatever the Philosophers speak agreeable to the Scriptures, either they do not own whence they had it, or turn it quite another way, whereby they have done the truth a great deal of injury, by mixing it with their corruptions of it, and making that little Truth a plea for the rest of their Errors.* Neither was this only among the ancient Philosophers, but the primitive Christians began to discern the underhand workings of such, who sought to blend Philosophy and Christianity together; for *Tertullian* himself takes great notice of such, who did *Veritatis dogmata ad Philosophicas sententias adulterare*, suborn Christianity to maintain Philosophy; which makes him cry out, *Viderint qui Stoicum, & Platonicum, & Dialecticum Christianismum protulerunt*; by which we see what tampering there was betimes rather to bring Christianity down to Philosophy, than to make Philosophy truckle under the truth and simplicity of the Scriptures. Whether *Ammonius* himself, and some others of the School of *Alexandria*, might be guilty in this kind, is not here a place to inquire, tho' it be too evident in the Writings of some, that they rather seek to accommodate the Scriptures to the Sentiments of the School of *Plato*, than to reform that by the Scriptures; but I say, however it were with those who were Christians, yet those who were not, but only Philosophers, made their great advantage by it. For when they found what was reconcilable with the Doctrine of *Plato* in the Scriptures, done already to their hands, by the endeavors chiefly of *Ammonius* and *Origen*, they greedily embrace those improvements of their Philosophy, which would tend so much to the credit of it, and as contemptuously reject what they found irreconcilable with the Dictates of their Philosophy. Now what an unreasonable thing is it, when whatever was noble and excellent in the Heathen Philosophy was derivative from the Scriptures, as the sacred Fountain of it, that the meeting with such things should in the least redound to the prejudice of the Scriptures, from whence it was originally deriv'd? When on the other side it should be a great confirmation to our Faith, as to the Scriptures, that they who were profess'd Philosophers and Admirers only of Reason, did so readily embrace some of those grand Truths which are contain'd in the Word of God. Tertul. de Anima, c. 2.

U u 2

For

XIV.

For which we need no other instance, than that before us, concerning the origin of Evil, the making out of which will tend to the clearing the last thing mention'd concerning it, which was, *That the most material things in it are attested by the Heathens themselves.* And this Honey which is gain'd out of the Lion's mouth, must needs taste sweeter than any other doth. For it is a weak and groundless mistake on the other side, which is the second (which ariseth from meeting things consonant to the Scriptures in the Writings of Philosophers) presently to conclude from such things, that they were Christians (as it is said some have lately done in the behalf of *Hierocles.*) For their being such clear accounts given in Scripture of the grand difficulties and perplexities which the minds of Men were troubl'd with, when these came to the knowledg of such who were of Philosophic and inquisitive Heads, we cannot but think they would meet with acceptance among them, especially if they might be made consistent with their former Speculations: thus it was in our present case concerning the origin of Evil, we have already beheld the lamentable perplexities the ancient Philosophers were in about it, what *Meanders* they were lost in for want of a Clue to guide them thro' them; now it pleas'd God, after the coming of CHRIST in the flesh, to declare to the World the only way for the recovery of Souls and their eternal Salvation, the news of which being spread so far that it soon got among the Philosophers, could not but make them more inquisitive concerning the state and condition of their Souls; and when they had search'd what the Philosophers had formerly discover'd of it, their curiosity would presently prompt them to see what account of things concerning the Souls of Men was deliver'd by the Preachers of this new Doctrine. By this they could not but presently understand that they declar'd all Mens Souls to be in a most degenerate and low condition, by being so continually under the power of the most unreasonable and unruly passions, that they were estranged from God, and prone to fix on things very unsutable to their nature, as to all which, their own inward sense and experience could not but tell them that these things were notoriously true; and therefore they inquire further how these things came to be so; which they receive a full account of in Scripture, that Man's Soul was at first created pure and holy, and in perfect friendship with God, that God dealt bountifully and favorably with Man; only expected Obedience to his Laws; that Man being a free Agent, did abuse his Liberty, and disobey'd his Maker; and thence came the true *tragedy*, the feathers of the Soul, whereby it soared up to Heaven, moulted away, and the Soul sunk below it self, into a degenerate and apostate Condition, out of which it is impossible to be recover'd without some extraordinary expression of Divine Favor. Now what is there in all this account, but what is hugely sutable to principles of Reason, and to the general experience of the World, as to those things which were capable of being try'd by it? And those Philosophers who were any thing ingenious, and Lovers of Truth, could not but confess the truth of those things which we are now speaking of, *viz. That Mens Souls are in a very degenerate condition; That the most rational account of it is, that Man by the act of his own will brought himself into*

into it; and that in order to the happiness of Mens Souls, there was a necessity of recovery out of this condition.

As to the degeneracy of the Souls of Men; this was the common complaint of those Philosophers, who minded the government of themselves, and the practice of Virtue, especially of the *Platonists* and *Stoics*. *Seneca* in all his Moral Discourses, especially in his Epistles, may speak sufficiently in behalf of the *Stoics*, how much they lamented the degeneracy of the World. And the *Platonists* all complain of the slavery of the Soul in the Body, and that it is here by way of punishment, for something which was done before; and which makes me somewhat inclinable to think, that *Plato* knew more of the lapse of Mankind, than he would openly discover, and for that end disguis'd it after his usual manner in that *Hypothesis* of præ-existence, which taking it Cabalistically (for I rather think the Opinion of præ-existence is so to be taken, than the history of the Fall of Man) may import only this, That Mens souls might be justly suppos'd to be created happy, but by reason of the Apostasy of Man's soul from God, all Souls come now into their Bodies as into a kind of Prison, they being enslav'd to the brutish part within them, there having been such a true *παραπτώσις*, the soul being now depriv'd of her chiefest perfections in this her low and degenerate condition. And it seems far more rational to me to interpret those Persons Opinions to a Cabalistical, or an Allegorical Sense, who are known to have writ designedly in a way obscure and ambiguous, than to force those Mens expressions to *Cabala's*, who profess to write a plain History, and that with the greatest simplicity and perspicuity. But it cannot but seem very strange that an *Hypothesis* capable of being reconcil'd to the plain literal sense of the Scriptures (deliver'd by a person who useth great artifice and cunning to disguise his Opinions, and such a person withal, who (by such persons themselves who make use of this Opinion to that end) is suppos'd to have been very conversant with the Writings of *Moses*) should be taken in its literal sense, as it really imports præ-existence of each particular Soul in the grossest manner; and this should be made to be a part of the Philosophic Cabala of the Writings of such a Person, who useth not the least Artifice to disguise his Sense, nor gives us any where the least intimation that he left behind him such plaited Pictures in his History of the beginning of the World, that if you look straight forward, you may see a literal Cabala, on the one side a Philosophical, and on the other a Moral. But now if we remove the Cabala from *Moses* to *Plato*, we may find no incongruity or repugnancy at all either as to *Plato's* way of writing, or the consonancy of the Opinion so interpreted to the plain genuine sense of *Moses*, if by *Plato's* opinion of the præ-existence and descent of Souls, be understood by the former, the happy state of the Soul of Man in conjunction with God; and by the latter, the low and degenerate condition which the Soul is in, after Apostasy from him. Which the latter *Platonists* are so large and eloquent in expressing. *Porphyrus*, where he speaks of some things he counsels Men to do, hath these words, But if we cannot do them, let us at least do that which was so much lamented of old, *Τὸ ἡλιωμένον αὐτῶν τὸ πάλαιον*, which is, *αὐτῶν τῶν ἐν ἡλίου ἐκείνῳ γενέσθαι*.

xv.

i.

Porphyr. de Abstin.
l. 3. f. 2.

Hieroc. in
Pythag.
Carm.
p. 261.

ἐπὶ τὸ ἦναι καὶ ἀκέραιον, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι ἀβλαβὲς σὺν οὐδυνάμεναι. *Let us at the least join with our Fore-fathers in lamenting this, that we are compounded of such disagreeing and contrary principles, that we are not able to preserve divine, pure and unspotted Innocency.* And Hierocles fully expresseth his sense of the Degeneracy of Mankind in these words; οἱ δὲ πλείους κακοὶ καὶ τὸ ἀσθενεῖας ἡλίου καὶ φρενοβλαβείας ὑπὸ τῷ εἰς γῆν νεύσας θνῆσθαι, ὡς καὶ πῶς περὶ ἑαυτὸ τὸ κακὸν ἔχουσιν, διὰ τὸ βουληθῆναι φυγεῖν ἀπὸ Θεοῦ, καὶ ἀπομεινῆσαι αὐτοῦ, τὸ πῶς ἐμυλίας, ἢ εὐτύχουν ἐν αὐτῇ καθαρᾷ ἀλγήσει. τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ Θεοῦ χωρισμὸν βλάπτει πᾶς φρένας ἢ αἶσιν γῆν νεύσας ἀλλοῖ. *The most of Men in the World are bad, and under the command of their passions, and grown impotent thro' their propensity to Earth; which great evil they have brought upon themselves, by their wilful Apostasy from God, and withdrawing themselves from that Society with him which they once enjoy'd in pure light: which departure of of Mens Souls from God, which is so hurtful to the minds of Men, is evident by their strong inclination to the things of this World.* The same Author mentions, with much approbation, that Speech of *Heracitus*, speaking of those Souls which are ἀπταῖς εἰς κακίαν, which I cannot better render than *undeclinably good*, he saith, ὅτι ζῶμεν τὸ ἐκείνου θάνατον, πνέομεν δὲ τὸ ἐκείνου βίον. *We live their death, and die their life:* καί ποτε τὸ καὶ ἐπιπίπτει τὸ εὐδαίμονος χάριτος ὁ ἀνθρώπος. *For Man is now fallen down from that blessed Region, and as Empedocles the Pythagorean speaks,*

Φυγὰς θεοῦ καὶ ἀλήτης
Νείκε' μαινομένοισιν πῖνον.

Hieroc. in
Pythag.
p. 254.

Which words cannot be better rendred, than in the words the Scripture useth concerning *Cain*, and he went from the presence of the Lord, and was a fugitive in the earth, and under continual perplexities. For the Soul of Man having left τὸ λαμβάνειν εὐδαιμονίαν (it is Hierocles's own expression) *the pleasant meadow of truth* (a fit description of Paradise) τῇ ἐκείνῃ τὸ περιεργασίας εἰς γῆν ἐρχεται σῶμα δίκαιον αἰῶνος ἀμυλίας, thro' the violence of her moulting, or depulmation, she comes into this earthly Body, deprived of that blessed Life, which she before enjoy'd. Which he tells us is very consonant to Plato's sense of the καθῶς, or descent of Souls, that when by reason of their impotency of fixing wholly on God they suffer συντυχίαν καὶ περιεργασίαν, *some great loss, and a depravation of former perfections*, (which I suppose is meant by the περιεργασίας, the Souls impotency of flying up above this earthly World) then they lapse into these Terrestrial and Mortal Bodies. So Hierocles concludes with this excellent and divine Speech, ὡς αὖτε ὅτι ἡ θύκη φύγη, καὶ ἡ περιεργασίας τὸ κορυφίζονται ἡμᾶς αὐτοὶ τὰ αἶμα εἰς τὸ θεῖον ἡγεῖται πᾶσι, οἷς τὰ κακὰ συνέχεται. ὡς αὖτε ὅτι θνητὴς αἰσθητικῆς ἀποβολῆς, καὶ ἡ τὸ ἀρετῆς, οἷον πτερῶν πᾶσι τρυφεροὺς αὐτοὺς τὸ καλὸν καθαρὸν ἵσταν, εἰς τὴν θείαν εὐδαιμονίαν ἡμᾶς ἀνάξει. *As therefore by apostasy from God, and the moulting of those feathers of our Souls, whereby we may be rais'd up above this World, we have fallen into this place of Mortals which is compassed about with Evils: so by casting off carnal affections, and by the growth of Virtues like new feathers to the soul, we shall ascend to the place of pure and perfect good, and to the enjoyment of a Divine Life.* So much more becoming Christians do these excellent Philosophers speak of the degeneracy of Mens Souls, and the

of the Will of Man, which we have already shew'd to be the Doctrine of the Scriptures.

3.

August. de
Civ. Dei,
l. 10. c. 32.

As to the necessity of the Soul's recovery from this condition, in order to her felicity, we have these Philosophers expressing their consent with the Scriptures, *Porphyrus*, as *St. Augustine* tells us in the end of his first Book, *De regressu animæ*, doth acknowledge the necessity of a way of recovering Souls, which should be universal. *Cum autem dicit Porphyrius, Nondum receptam unam quandam sectam, quæ universalem viam animæ contineat liberandæ, — nondumque in suam notitiam eandem viam, historici cognitione perlatam, proculdubio confitetur esse aliquam, sed nondum in suam venisse notitiam.* But the necessity of the purgation of the Soul in order for the Felicity, is so largely and fully discours'd of by all the *Platonists* and *Pythagoreans*, that it will be needless to insist upon it. Thus far then we find the account given of the origin of Evil in Scripture to be embrac'd by the sublimest of the Heathen Philosophers, as most rational and satisfactory; which was the thing to be prov'd.

XVII.

Neither do we find only the main of this account acknowledged as rational, but we may trace some not obscure foot-steps of the truth of particular Circumstances which concern the fall of Man, among the Heathens: such as the *Devil's envying of Man's happiness, his disguising himself under the form of a Serpent; and Man's being thrown out of Paradise upon his fall.*

D. Casaub.
Original
of temporal
Evils.

I. *The Devil's envying the happiness of Man.* It hath been truly observ'd by a learned Man, that the original of that very ancient Opinion among the Heathens, *de invidia Demonis*, had its rise from the History of the fall of Man, which he hath made out so fully, that I shall the less need to prove it. And that there was an undoubted Tradition of some malignant Spirits, which envied the welfare of Mankind, appears by that ample Testimony of *Plutarch*, in his *Dio*, mention'd by the same Author; οὐκ ἴδμεν, μὴ ἢ παλαιῶν ἢ ἀποκόλων ἀναγκασιῶν ἀποδοχὰς λόγον, οἱ τὰ πάντα δαιμόνια καὶ βασάντας, ἀποφθονοῦντα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διδοῦσιν ἔτι καὶ πρὸς τὴν εὐτυχίαν, πονηρὰς ἔφ' ὅσους ἐπ' αὐτῇ, στίοντα καὶ σφύλλοντα τὴν δόξαν οἱ μὴ ἀλγύνοντες ἀπάντες, οὐ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀνέροισι, βελτίονος εὐχόμενοι μάλιστα μετὰ τὴν πλάττην τέχνην. *Plutarch* was much troubl'd to give an account of the Apparitions which *Brutus* and *Dia*, who were learned and philosophical Men, were haunted withal; and doubts he can give no just account of it, unless he embrac'd that very ancient Tradition (which yet seem'd absurd and incredible,) viz. *That there are certain wicked and malignant Demons, which envy good Men, and withstand their Enterprizes, by raising Fears and Troubles to them, that so they might hinder them in their pursuit of Virtue; lest, if they continue steadfast and unmoveable in Good, they should be at last partakers of greater Felicity than they enjoy.* There being so ancient a Tradition of such ὁλοκαὶ δαιμόνιος, (as the learned Man mention'd hath more fully shew'd in his Notes on this place of *Plutarch*,) gives a great confirmation to the truth of what the Scripture reports concerning the Devil's being so great an Instrument in procuring the fall of Man. To him therefore I refer the inquisitive Reader, and shall not add to the Testimonies of him cited, that of *Xenocrates* in *Plutarch*, *de Iside & Osiride*, where he saith that the calamities of Life and Misfortunes Men meet with, do not agree with

Plutarch.
de Isid. &
Osir. p. 361.

with, do not agree with that veneration which we have for the Deity and good Spirits, 'Αλλ' εἶνα φότες ἐν τῇ ἀέρι μιν μέλας ῥῆ καὶ ἰχθυεῖς, δὲ σέβας δὲ καὶ σφοδρότητα, αἱ χαίρουσι τοῖς τοῖς. But that there are in the Air some great and potent Beings; which are of a surly and malignant nature, and rejoyce to do Men all the mischief they can. Iamblichus, in his answer to Porphyrius concerning the Egyptian Mysteries, undertakes to give an account of these evil Spirits or Demons, and that from them the origin of Evil in the World is; for thus he speaks (as he is translated by Ficinus) *Si verum est quod de Idolis dicebamus, improbisque Demonibus, hinc sane exoritur multiplex origo malorum. Simulant enim Deorum presentiam, Demonumque bonorum, ideoque cultorem suum jubent esse justum, ut ipsi videantur boni, sicut & Dii; quoniam vero natura sunt mali, rogati mala inferre, libenter inferunt, atque nobis ad injusta conducunt. Hi sunt omnino qui & in oraculis mentiuntur & fallunt, & turpia consulunt atque peragunt.* By which we see he acknowledgeth some Spirits whose natures are wicked, and help Men to do evil; and that these very Spirits may sometimes command that which is good, lest they should be suspected to be what they are, of a wicked and malignant Nature, which only design the ruin of Men. By which we have a good account of whatever was commendable deliver'd by the Heathen Oracles, which yet might come from the Devil still; by this confession of Iamblichus himself.

Iamblich.
de myster.
p. 105.

For the Devil's appearing under the form of a Serpent, It is very probably conjectur'd, that from hence it was that the Prince of those who contended with Saturn; was by that Ænigmatical writer Pherecydes Gyrius call'd 'Οφιοῖς. Celsus who had so little skill in Antiquity as to think that the History of Moses was as to many passages of it taken out of Heathen Fables, insists on this very story of Ophioneus as the ground-work of that relation in Genesis concerning the Fall. But Origen well answers him, 'Εγὼ ὅτι, αἱ ἐγκυκλίαι ἡμῶν οἷς σφαλιρῶς ἀσβεβήτως, καὶ ἀσπασίαν ἀσβεβήτως ἡμῶν αἰνιγματίζονται, αὐτῶς σαφῶς σφάλλονται; μὴ καὶ ἀσβεβήτως ἐπὶ τοῖς παλαιῇ ἡ μόνον Ἡρακλείτου καὶ Φερεκύδου δόξασι, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ὁμήρου, Μωϋσέως γράμματα εἰσάγοντα τὸ ἀπὸ παντοῦ τοῦτο καὶ ἀσπασίαν τὸ εὐσεβεῖν λόγον. See therefore if this rare Antiquary who chargeth us with Impiety in corrupting and altering the Heathen Fables; be not himself more justly chargeable with the same fault, not understanding the far greater Antiquity of the Writings of Moses, than either of Heraclitus, or Pherecydes, or Homer himself, which reports the story of that evil one which fell from Heaven. ὁ δὲ ὅφης (πῶς) ἐν τῷ Φερεκύδῃ γένοιτο 'Οφιοῖς) αἰτίας ἡρώδης τοῦ ἐκκλησιαστικοῦ τοῦ ἡίου ὁρθόδοξου τὸ ἀνθρώπου τοῦτο πῶς αἰνίσσεται, ἰππεδολογία ἡρώδης καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀπατάς τοῦ ἡρώδους γένεσθαι οἷς συνδεδουλευμένον λέγεται καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς

XVIII.
2.

Orig. c. Celi.
sum. l. 6.

For the Serpent (from which Ophioneus in Pherecydes deriv'd his name) which was the cause why Man was cast forth of Paradise, doth intimate some such thing, while under a pretence of Divinity, and of a better condition, he first deceiv'd the Woman, and by her means the Man. Celsus Rodiginus calls this Ophioneus *Dæmuncum Serpentem, qui antesignanus fuerit agminis a Divinae mentis placito deficientis.* This Pherecydes, as appears by Eusebius, had much converse with the Phœnicians; where he purposely speaks concerning this Ophioneus. Now the Phœnicians, as Eusebius likewise tells us, worshipp'd their God under the form of a Serpent; which probably might be occasion'd by the Devil's ambition and

Cal. Rhodig.
Antiq.
lib. l. 2. c. 7.
Euseb. de
Prep. E-
vang. l. 1.
c. 10.

Xx

tyranny

tyranny over Men, that would be worshipped among them in that very Form wherein he had done so much mischief to the World. It was very early in the World, when the *Phœnicians* and *Egyptians* did begin to adore their Gods under the form of Serpents, for the beginning of it is attributed to *Taautus* by *Eusebius*, τῶν μὲν ἐν τῷ Δελφῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτὸς ἐξείησεν ὁ Ταυταύς, καὶ μετ' αὐτὸν αὖθις Φοίνικες τε καὶ Ἀγυπῖοι. Neither was this only among the *Phœnicians* and *Egyptians*, but where-ever the Devil reign'd, the Serpent was had in some peculiar veneration: thence *Justin Martyr* saith, ὡς παρ' ἡμετέροις καὶ ἡμῶν θεῶν ὅφιν σύμβολον μύστα καὶ μυστήριον ἀναγράφεται. *The Serpent was the Symbol of Adoration among them*; and was the proper *Indicium*, or note of a Consecrated Place, as is evident by that of *Persius*.

Pers. Satyr.
1.

Pinge duos angues: pueri, sacer est locus.

Heinsf. Aristarch. p. 18. ed. 1627.

Thence the Scholiast on *Aristophanes* on that place in *Plutus*, ἐξήρατο ἂν δύο δράκοντες ἐκ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ, observes καὶ οὕτως πᾶσι τοῖς ἡρώεσσιν ἀνέστησαν παρασημεῖα, so that where-ever any God or Hero was to be worshipped, there were Serpents painted to denote so much. So *Orus Appollo* saith of the *Egyptians*, οὐδ' αὖτε ὁ ἐστὶν ἐκκλησίᾳ βασιλικῶν χρυσῶν ἀεὶ ἐκτετακτοῖς τοῖς θεοῖς, they were wont to put the form of a golden Basilisk to their Gods. *Heinsius* conceives that the first worship of *Appollo* at *Delphi* was under the form of a Serpent, whither *Nonnus* tells us that *Cadmus* the *Phœnician* went upon his first coming into *Boætia*, and from hence he derives the name *Pytho* from the Hebrew שֶׁפֶן which signifies a Serpent. *Ut non dubitandum sit*, saith he, quin *Pythius Appollo*, hoc est, *Spurcus ille spiritus*, quem *Hebræi Ob & Abaddon*, *Hellenistæ ad verbum Ἀπολλώνια*, cæteri Ἀπάδων sub hac forma qua miseriam humano generi invexit, primo cultus sit in *Græcia*. And which is further observable, the Devil was always ambitious to have the World think that the knowledg of Good and Evil was to come by the Serpent still; thence the famous Oracle of *Appollo* here at *Delphi*; thence came the use of Serpents so much in Divination, thence שֶׁפֶן signifies to divine, from שֶׁפֶן a Serpent; and so among the *Greeks* οἰωνίζω, is taken in the same sense, from οἰωνός a Serpent. So that excellent Glossographer *Hesychius*; οἰωνός, ὅφιν ἀπεικῶς λέγουσιν ἐς τοὺς μαντικὰς τοὺς ὄφεις ἔχει ὡς καὶ οἰωνοὺς ἔλεγον. The Serpent was reckoned among the *pedestria auspicia* by the *Romans*; and *Homer* tells in that solemn Divination concerning the *Greeks* success at *Troy* there appears,

Iliad. β'.

δράκων ἐπὶ νῶτα δάφου.

Which, saith *Heinsius*, is an exact description of the *Nachas*; whom they would have so call'd from the marks on his back, which they accurately observ'd in Divination. Thus we see how careful the Devil was to advance his honor in the World under that form, wherein he had deceiv'd Mankind into so much folly and misery.

3.
Orig. c. Cel.
l. 4. p. 189.

We meet with some remainders of Man's being cast out of *Paradise*, upon his Fall among the *Heathens*. *Origen* thinks that *Plato* by

by his converse with the *Jews* in *Ægypt*, did understand the History of the Fall of Man, which he after his way enigmatically describes in his *Symposiacs*. Where he brings in *Porus the God of plenty feasting with the rest of the Gods; after supper Penia comes a begging to the door; Porus being drunk with Nectar, goes into Jupiter's garden, and there falls asleep; Penia observing it, steals to him, and by this deceit conceiv'd by him.* In this Fable of *Plato*, *Origen* takes notice what a near resemblance the garden of *Jupiter* hath to *Paradise*, *Penia* to the *Serpent* which circumvented *Adam*, and *Porus* to *Man*, who was deceiv'd by the *Serpent*. Which he conceives more probable because of *Plato's* custom, *ὅτι μετὰ λαϊκῶν φανερὰ διγίμωτο κρύβει μὲν ἀλλὰ τὰς πολλὰς αἰτίας ὅς μιν οὕτως εἰρήσεν*, to wrap up those excellent things he knew under some Fables, because of the vulgar; for which he after speaks of his custom in altering and disguising what he had from the *Jews*, lest he should too much displease the Fabulous *Greeks*, if he should adhere too close to the *Jews*, who were so infamous among them. Some have thought the story of *Paradise* was preserv'd among the *Heathens* in the Fable of the Gardens of *Adonis* which comes near that of *Eden*; but what footsteps may be gather'd of the truth of Scripture-history in the *Heathen* Mythology, will appear afterwards. Thus much here then may serve to have manifested the account which the Scripture gives of the Origin of Evil by the Fall of Man to be in it self rational, and attested by the consent of such Persons who cannot be suspected of any partiality to the Scriptures.

We come now to consider the other grand Difficulty which concerns the Origin of Evil, and the truth of Divine Providence together. Which is, that if Sin be the cause of Misery, and there be a God which Governs the World, *Whence comes it to pass, that the worst of Men do so frequently escape sufferings, and the best do commonly undergo them?* This hath been in all Ages of the World where Men have been philosophical and inquisitive, one of the great Inquiries which the Minds of Men have been perplex'd about. The true and full Resolution of which Question, depends much upon those Grounds and Principles which are discover'd to us by Divine Revelation in the Scriptures, concerning the grounds of God's patience towards wicked Men, the nature and end of sufferings which good Men are exercis'd with. And certainly this should very much commend the Scriptures to all sober and inquisitive Persons, that they contain in them the most clear and certain grounds of satisfaction to the Minds of Men, in such things wherein they are otherwise so irresolv'd. But of that afterwards: Our present business is to give an account of this difficulty from Natural Reason, which will be most satisfactorily done by the producing those grounds from which they have resolv'd this Question, *Cur malis bene, & bonis male*, who either have not had, or at least own'd any thing of Divine Revelation. I begin with that which doth concern the prosperity and impunity of wicked Men, which Men have with more confidence insisted on on this account, because all Men could not but understand a general reason of sufferings, by reason there were none whose consciences could wholly acquit them of evil actions; but why Persons notoriously wicked should live in impunity, when others

xx.

Xx 2

suffer,

Simplic.
Comment.
in Epictet.
c. 38.
p. 223.

suffer, that they were unable to give an account of. And this was the common pretense of *Atheism*, and *Simplicius* tells us, *συμβαίνει δὲ*

τίνας εἶναι τὸ ἀναποδείξιόν ποτείν, καὶ τίς τὸ ἔργον ποτὶ μὴ ἀγαθὸν διενεργεῖν, ποτὶ δὲ κακὸν οὐ
ἰσχυρῶς ἀποδείξαι, εὐτυχεῖν δὲ ἔχουσι ἀσολύτως, καὶ χρεῖαν δίδωσι τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ λόγον.

Τολμῶ κατεπεῖν μήποτ' ἔκ εἰσὶν Θεοί,
Κακοὶ γὰρ εὐτυχῶντες ἐπιπλήττωσί με.

It comes to pass, that such who have no grounded belief of a Deity, when they observe the miseries of good Men, and the tranquillity and felicity of bad Men, they regard not the common notions they have of a Deity, and are ready to cry out with the Tragædian,

*Shall I not dare to say there are no Gods,
When those do prosper who have injur'd me?*

And it is observable, that the most of those who have taken occasion amongst the *Heathens* to question Providence, have done it upon some remarkable injury which they have conceiv'd to be done to themselves, and so we have ground to think that it was more Passion and Interest, than any clear Reason which was the inducement to it. So *Diagoras* resolves to set up for an *Atheist*, because the perjur'd Person was not struck down in the place.

And *Jason* in *Seneca*, when he sees *Medea* fly away after killing his Children, cries out,

Testare nullos esse quæ veheris Deos.

*Thou tell'st the World there are no Gods that way
Where thou dost fly.*

And so *Claudian*, who largely reasons the case on both sides, for Providence and against it, at last tells us what it was which was the main cause of his doubts, *viz.* the long impunity of *Rufinus*.

*Abstulit hunc tandem Rufini pœna tumultum
Absolvitque Deos.*

*Rufinus's death doth clear the Gods, and set
My Mind at ease.*

*Cicero l. 3.
de Nat.
Deor.*

But because some carry it higher, as *Cotta* in *Tully*, who reasons the most (as became a States-man) in reference to such Persons who had been useful or hurtful to the Common-wealths, we may suppose there might be somewhat more of Reason than Interest in such Argumentations; and yet even in those Discourses we may still find that the main original of this quarrel against Providence was an over-high esteem of themselves, that they thought they deserv'd better from the Gods, than to receive such injuries, or undergo such calamities. Therefore *Cotta* cries out on Providence, because such Persons who were useful to the *Roman* Commonwealth, were destroy'd, when the enemies to it escap'd, as tho' Providence had been only a *Tutelar Deity* of *Rome*, and had nothing to do else-where.

where. Thence he cries out, If there be Providence, why were the two *Scipio's* destroy'd in *Spain* by the *Carthaginians*? Why was *Maximus* killed by *Hannibal*? Why were the *Romans* with *Paulus* ruined at *Canna*? Why did *Regulus* undergo so much cruelty by the *Carthaginians*? Why did not *Africanus* die in his own bed? Nay, saith he, to come nearer home, why is my Uncle *Rutilius* in banishment? Why was my friend *Drusus* killed in his own house? On the other side, why did *Marius* die in peace, and the most cruel *Cinna* enjoy so long tranquillity? with many other instances of both sorts. But this is it which I take notice of these for, because we hereby see how common it is for Men to question Providence, more out of passion and Interest, than out of any solid grounds of Reason.

Let us therefore appeal from persons who were particularly engaged by some private interest in those passages, from whence they would infer that there was no Providence, to such who stood by unconcern'd, and made use of the free dictates of their Reason in these cases. And such persons when they come to reason the case like Philosophers, and Men out of passion, have given satisfactory and rational accounts why God in his wise Providence may sometimes suffer the worst of Men to go on in impunity, when good Men may go thro' the troubles of this World. As,

1. *God forbears wicked Men, to propound the example of his goodness to their imitation, to teach them not to revenge their injuries too greedily on each other.* This *Plutarch*, in that admirable Discourse of his on this subject, insists on as his first reason, why God doth not presently punish wicked Men. For, saith he out of *Plato*, God hath set forth himself in the midst of the World for our imitation; and true Virtue is nothing else but an imitation of the Divine Nature. And therefore God, saith *Plato*, gave Man the use of sight, that by the sight of the heavenly Bodies, and the exact motions which are in them, Men should learn *τὸ εὐχρηστὸν καὶ πειθαρχεῖν*, that which was comely and orderly, and hate all disorderly and irregular motions; For as he excellently speaks, *ὅτι γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ πλεῖστον ἀνθρώπων δόξα λαβεῖν θεοὺς πύργους ἢ τὸ μιμεῖσθαι, καὶ διὰ τὸ τὸ εὖ οὐκ εἶναι καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἰς ἀρετὴν καλίστατον.* There is no greater benefit Man can receive from God, than to attain true Virtue by the imitation and pursuit of those perfections which are in him. And thence, saith *Plutarch*, God forbears to punish wicked Men presently, not lest if he should punish them he might do that he would repent of afterwards, *ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ τὸ ἀεὶ εἰς πρηνείας θηλειῶδες καὶ λαβροὺς ἀφαιεῖν*, but that he might take away the fury and violence of Men in revenging their injuries on each other, that they should not do it in wrath and anger, with as much eagerness as they satisfy their hunger and thirst, whereby they do, *ἐπαισθῆναι ὅτι λαλοῦντες, leap upon them who have injur'd them*, with as much fury as a wild beast upon his prey; but Men should learn to imitate *τὸν θεοῦ πραότητος καὶ μετριοῦ*, God's gentleness and patience, whereby he gives the offender time to consider with himself what he hath done, before he doth severely punish him. As *Plato* when his Boy had angered him, stood still a while without striking him, *καὶ θυμὸν παύειν*, as he said, punishing himself first for his anger, before he would chastise the Boy for his fault; and *Archytas* when he saw how negligent his workmen had been, and began to be very angry with them, told them, *ἐννοεῖν*

XXI

Plutarch.
de his qui
fero puni-
untur à
numine, p.
55a. ed. Fr.

ὅτι ὀργίζομαι ὑμῖν. *It is well for you that I am angry with you.* Now saith *Plutarch*, if the consideration of this forbearance in Men should tend to moderate Mens heat and violence, how much more should the consideration of the lenity and patience of God, do it! καὶ ὅτι ἡμεῖς ἱκανῶς πόρρω ἀφ' αὐτοῦ τῆς περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς μεγαλοπρεπείας, *and to account gentleness and forbearance to be an imitation of Divine perfections.* Now what can be more rational and agreeable to our Apprehensions of a Divine Nature than this is, that he should shew his Goodness to all, and by his forbearance of so many, teach the World more meekness and gentleness towards each other? For if offences rise by the quality of the person against whom they are committed, no injuries can be so great in one Man to another, as those affronts are which Men put upon God by their continual provocations of Him: and if God then be of so infinite patience to forbear such who have offended him, what justice and reason is there, but that Men should express more lenity and patience towards each other? So *Hierocles* excellently speaks, μιμεῖται καὶ εἰς τοῦ φιλικῆς μέτρος τὸ Θεοῦ, ὃς μὴ οὐδὲν ἀνθρώπων, τὸ δὲ φιλασθεντίας ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ γὰρ ἀποτίωται. *A good Man imitates God in the measures of friendship, who hates no Man, and extends his loving kindness to all Mankind.* Of which *Seneca* likewise somewhere speaks: *Ne Deos quidem immortales ab hac tam effusa benignitate sacrilegi negligentesque eorum deterrent; utuntur natura sua, & cuncta, interque illa ipsos munerum suorum malos interpretes, juvant.* *The Divine Benignity extends it self to all, even to such as affront and dishonor them, and abuse the gifts they bestow upon them.* And since there is so much truth and reason in that of *Plato*, ἄλλο δὲ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἀπομιμεῖσθαι Θεοῦ. *It is the height of goodness to be like to God*; we see what excellent reason there is for that Command of our Savior, *Love your enemies, and do good, and lend, hoping for nothing again; and your reward shall be great, and ye shall be the children of the Highest; for he is kind unto the unthankful, and to the evil. Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father is merciful.*

Luk. 6.
35, 36.

2. *God forbears presently to punish wicked Men, to give them time to become better.* This the same excellent Moralist gives as another account of God's patience, that thereby he gives them χρόνον αὐτοῖς ἐπιστρέψαι, *a space to repent in*, as the Scripture call it. For Men, saith *Plutarch*, in their punishments look at nothing further than mere satisfying their revenge and malice, and that makes them pursue those that have offended them with so much rage and eagerness; but God, saith he, aims at the cure of those who are not utterly incurable, to such he gives, μετὰ χρόνον χρόνον, *a time to reform in.* Here he brings in the examples of such who were bad at first, and came afterwards to be chang'd from what they were, for which he instances in *Cecrops*, who was thence call'd Διφύης, because from a cruel severe Prince, he became gentle and mild; and so *Gelon* and *Hieron* of *Sicily*, and *Pisistratus* the Son of *Hippocrates*, who, from being Usurpers, became excellent Princes. If *Miltiades*, saith he, had been cut off while he acted the part of a Tyrant, and *Cimon* in his Incest, or *Themistocles* in his Debaucheries, what had become of *Marathon*, *Eurymedon*, *Dianium*, by which the *Athenians* got so great Glory and Liberty? and as he well observes, οὐδὲν γὰρ αἱ μεγάλα φρονεῖς μικρῶν ἐπιτρέπον, *Great Spirits do nothing mean*; οὐδὲ ἀργὸν δὲ ἐξέτασθαι τὸ σφοδρὸν, εἰ καὶ αὐτοῖς καὶ δραστήριοι, ἀλλ' εἰς τέλος ἀσφίγγονται, πρὸς οὗς τὸ μέγεθος καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν. *That*

Plutarch.
p. 551.
Rev. 2. 21.

That sharp and active Spirit that is in them can never lie at rest by reason of its vigor, but they are toss'd up and down, as it were in a tempest, till they come to a settled compos'd life. But as the multitude of weeds argues the richness and softness of the ground, tho' for the sake of those weeds one not skill'd in Husbandry would not account such ground worth looking after; so, saith he, ὡς περὶ πολλὰ καὶ φάρμακα ἀνέχεσθαι τοὺς αἰ μετὰ τὴν φύσιν. Great Spirits usually bring forth no commendable fruits at first; which we considering the danger and hurtfulness of, are presently for cutting them down: but one that more wisely considers the generous nature which may lie under this ill fruit, waits time and leisure, till Reason and Age begin to master these head-strong passions. And therefore according to the prudent Law of the Egyptians, The Woman with Child must be repriev'd till the time of her delivery.

3. *God spares some wicked Men from punishment to make them instruments of his justice in punishing others. Ἐπίοις δὲ ἀμείλι καὶ ἡλιεστέῃς ἐτίθειν ποινήν, ἀπὸ δημοσίων, ἀπὸ χρημάτων τὸ δαμνέειν, as Plutarch goes on, God spares some from punishment, that by them he might punish others. Which he supposeth to be the case of all Tyrants; and thereby Cotta's difficulty concerning Marius, Cinna, Sylla, and those other cruel and tyrannical persons, who usurp'd Authority among them, is clearly taken off: For Divine Providence might let those Trees grow from whence he intended to take his Rods to scourge others withal. God makes the same use of Tyrants (saith Plutarch) to Common-wealths, that Physicians do of the Gall of a Hyæna and other hurtful Creatures; which may be good for curing some dangerous Diseases; so may the tyrannical severity and sharpness of such persons be continued ἢ τὸ νοσοῦν ἀποκαταλέγει καὶ καθύγει, till the diseases of the political Body be cur'd by these sharp Medicines. Such a one was Phalaris to the Agrigentines, and Marius to the Romans: and the Oracle told the Sicyonians in express terms, μαστιγώμεν διὰ τὴν πόλιν. The City wanted some severe discipline. Thence Totilas, when he found what strange success he had in his enterprizes, call'd himself Flagellum Dei, and thought God rais'd him up on purpose to be a Scourge for the sins of the World. And no doubt those strange passages of the Roman Common-wealth (which made Cato at least dispute Providence, and say, Res divinas multum habere caliginis, when he saw Pompey successful as long as he serv'd his Ambition, but presently overthrown when he stood for the Common-wealth) these things, I say, had a higher end than they look'd at, which was to make both Pompey and Cæsar the Instruments of Divine Justice to punish the Romans for their Lusts, Ambition and Cruelty, which were never greater than in that Age. Now then, if God must justly punish Offenders, why may he not spare some to make them his Instruments in the punishing of others, especially since after he hath us'd his Rods, he may cast them into the fire too? as was evident in the instance of Cæsar, who, after all his slaughters and triumphs, was murdered in the Senate, and that by some who had been as active as any for him. And herein Divine Justice, both as to the punishment of the persons, and the means of it, hath been very remarkable in multitude of Instances, which every one's reading may afford him.*

4. There-

4. Therefore, another account why God may spare wicked Men a while, is, *That Divine Providence might more remarkably be observ'd in the manner of their punishment afterwards.* Plutarch tells us of *Callippus*, who was stabb'd by his Enemies with the same Dagger with which he had kill'd *Dion* under a pretence of friendship. And when *Mitius* the *Argive* was kill'd in a tumult, afterwards, upon the day of a solemn Shew, a brass Statue in the Market place fell upon his Murtherer, and kill'd him there. But most remarkable is the Story of *Belfus* recorded by the same Author, who having kill'd his Father, and a long time conceal'd it, goes one night to Supper to some Friends, and while he was there, thrusts up his Spear into a Swallow's Nest, and pulls it down, and kills the young ones; his Friends asking him the reason of so strange an action: οὐ γὰρ (ἴφν) μὲν πάλαι καὶ μαρτυροῦσιν αὐτῷ ψόδις, ἢ καὶ βοῶσιν, ὡς ἀπεκτόνῃ τὴν πατέρα; *Do not your hear, saith he, how they falsely accuse me, and cry out, that I have killed my Father?* Which being by the persons present carry'd to the King, and the truth of it found out, he was executed for it. Such strange ways doth Providence sometimes use to shew how vigilant it is, even when we think it sleeps the most.

5. *Tho' God spares the persons of wicked Men, he doth not defer their punishment,* when the thoughts of their evil actions is the greatest torment to them; *Maxima peccati pœna est, peccasse,* as *Seneca* speaks. Sin bears its own punishment along with it. Wickedness is δεινὴ ὡς βίη δημιουργοῦ οἰκτεῖν, *the most exquisite contriver of misery,* which fills the Minds of those who commit it with continual consternations, anxieties and perplexities of Mind. But as that often and deservedly cited Author on this subject, *Plutarch* tell us, most Men are in this like Children, who when they behold Malefactors in the Theatres in their Cloth of Gold, and Purple Robes, with their Crowns on their Heads dancing about, they admire them, and imagin them to be most happy Men, till they see them lash'd and beaten, and fire come out from their brave Apparel; so saith he, as long as Men see others in their Pomp and Grandeur, they think them very far from punishment, till they behold their execution; which saith he, is not so much the entrance of their punishment, as the perfection of it. So that the longer the time of their Lives is, the longer is the time of their punishment here; οἱ δὲ γηράσκουσιν ἐκολάσθην, ἀλλ' ἐγήρασαν ἐκλαζόμενοι. *They are not punished when they grow old, but are grown old in punishments.* Cannot we say a person is punished while he is in Prison and hath his fetters upon him, till his execution comes? nor that one that hath drunk Poison, is a dying while he walks about till the cold comes to his Heart, and kills him? *If we deny,* saith he, *that all the inquietudes, horrors and anxieties of Mind which wicked Men have, are no part of their punishment, we may as well say that a Fish which hath swallow'd the hook is not taken, because he is not fry'd, or cut in pieces.* So it is with every wicked Man, he hath swallow'd the hook when he hath committed an evil action (τὸ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ὡς ποτὶ δέλεαρ αἰὲς ἐξεδίδου) and this Conscience within him, as he expresth it,

Θύνος βολαῖς πέλας ὡς διασφραῖ.

Which

Which in the Prophet's expression is, *The wicked are like a troubled sea, which casts forth nothing but mire and dirt.* As *Apollo-dorus* dreamt, that he was flea'd and boyl'd by the *Scythians*, and that his Heart spake to him out of the Cauldron, *Ἐγὼ οὐ ἕσταυ αἰτία, I am the cause of all this.* God deals by wicked Men, as *Caligula* was wont to say of those he commanded to be executed, *Ferit ut sentiant se mori*, he so punishes them, as to make them sensible of their punishments. And as *Tacitus* speaks of cruel and wicked persons, *quorum mentes si recludantur, possint aspici laniatus & ictus; quando ut corpora verberibus, ita sævitia, libidine, malis consultis animus dilaceretur.* Wickedness is the only Fury which continually haunts and lashes those who delight in it, and leaves still behind it *αἰσχρὰ καὶ φοβερά παῖσι, loathsome and terrible perturbations*, secret gripings of Conscience and self-condemning thoughts for their folly and wickedness; like *Lysimachus*, who for extreme thirst offer'd his Kingdom to the *Getæ* to quench it, which when he had done, *φειδὲ ἑμῆς κακίας, ὅς δ' ἡδυνῶ ἔγω βασιλείαν, ἐξέρημαι βασιλείας πλινυαύτης. What a wretch was I (saith he) to lose such a Kingdom for so short a pleasure!* And tho' wicked Men be not sensible of the loss of a far more glorious Kingdom than this of *Lysimachus*, viz. *that of Heaven*, yet they cannot but be sensible how much they have lost that Kingdom which every good Man hath in the tranquillity of his Spirit, and the command of his passions.

6. *The time that God spares wicked Men, is not so long as we think for.* It is all one, as *Plutarch* saith, as if we should complain, that the Malefactor was punished in the evening, and not in the morning; God's forbearance is but for a very little time, compar'd with his own duration. We measure God by the short hour-glass of our time, when we are so ready to confine him to our measures. The time seems long to us, but it is as nothing in it self: *ἐπὶ τοῖς πέντε πᾶσι ἀνθρώπων βίου ἀλγεσιν, τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν. The whole life of Man compared with eternity is nothing.* Besides, all this time God suffers wicked Men to live here, he hath them under safe custody; he doth but let them take the air within the Prison-wall, or it may be they may play and sport themselves there, but there is no possibility of escaping out of the hands of Divine Justice.

7. *God forbears wicked Men here, because the time is to come wherein God intends to punish them.* This is the highest vindication of Divine Providence, as to the present impunity of wicked Men in the world, because this is not the proper season for the open Execution of Justice. There are but few in comparison whom Justice causeth to be executed in the Prison, of what are reserv'd for the General Assizes; God reserves them for a fair and open Trial, for the greater vindication of his honor, and manifestation of his Justice to the World. And altho' God's Judgments even in this World be sometimes so remarkable, that we cannot but see a hand of Providence in them, yet they are but few whom God doth so remarkably punish here, to make us more firmly believe a day of Judgment to come. Which tho' it be most clearly and fully reveal'd in Scripture, yet the *Heathens* themselves from mere Reason have had such a persuasion of it, that they have given this as another great reason, why God did forbear to punish wicked Men here, because he did reserve them for future punishment.

Y y

For,

For, as the same Moralift speaks in the same Discourse concerning the Soul, *Ἀγωνίζεται ὅ ὡς αἰὲρ ἀθάνατος καὶ τὸ βίον, ὅταν δὲ ἀγωνίζηται τότε πολεῖται τὸ πάθος.* *This present life is the place of, the Soul's combat, which when it hath finish'd, it then receives according to its performance of it.* And as he before speaks, *Εἰς ἡν λόγῳ ἡ ψὴς τοῦ ἀθανάτου ἀφ' ἧς ἀφαιρούμεθα τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ψυχῆς βέλαιον, καὶ ἡμετέροις οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπολαύειν, ἀπολαύειν ἡμετέροις.* *The same reason which confirms Providence, doth likewise confirm the Immortality of the Soul; and if one be taken away, the other follows.* *Ὅταν δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ κατὰ τὴν πολλοῦ, μᾶλλον εἰσὶν ἐν τῇ μακροχρονίᾳ τῇ ἡμετέροις.* *And if the Soul doth subsist after death, it stands to the greatest reason, that it should there receive either reward or punishment.* Thus we see how far Natural Light, and Moral Reason will carry Men in the vindicating of Divine Providence, as to the present impunity of wicked Men.

XXII.

The other part which concerns the sufferings of good Men, is not of so great difficulty, because there are none so good as not to have a mixture of evil in them, and as they have a mixture of evil, so they have but a mixture of punishment; none lying under so great miseries here, but withal they have some share in the comforts of this Life. And therefore it is less wonder, that this part of Divine Providence which concerns the sufferings of Men, hath not wanted some among the Heathen Moralists, who have made it their design to vindicate it; which setting aside what *Simplicius* on *Epietetus*, and many others have done, is fully performed by *Seneca* in his Tract on this subject, *Cur bonis male sit, cum sit Providentia* (as *Muretus* restores the title of that Book) wherein these following accounts are given of it.

Senec. de Provid. c. 1.

1. *God brings them up as his Children under sharp discipline for their future benefit.* A good Man in *Seneca's* language is, *Discipulus Dei, amulatorque, & vera progenies*: which in the language of the Scripture is, *one taught of God, and a follower of God, and one born of him.* Now, saith he, *Parens ille magnificus, virtutum non lenis exactor, sicut severi patres, durius educat.* *God, who is the great Father of good Men, keeps them under discipline while under age, and by hardship fits them for the practice of Virtue.* Thence he bids us take notice of the different indulgence of Fathers and Mothers to their Children; the Father he hastens them to School, suffers them not to be idle on their play-days, makes them toil, and sometimes cry; the Mother she is all for holding them in her lap, keeping them out of the Sun, and from catching cold, would not willingly have them either cry or take pains. *Patrium habet Deus adversus bonos animum, & illos fortius amat.* *God bears the indulgence of a Father towards his Children, and loves them with greater severity.*

2. *Good Men receive benefit by their sufferings; Quicquid evenit in suum colorem trahit,* saith *Seneca* of a good Man, which in the language of the Apostle is, *Every thing works together for his good.* *The sea loseth nothing, saith he, of its saltness by the rivers running into it, neither doth a good Man by the current of his sufferings.* And of all benefits which he receives, that of the exercise and trial of his Virtue and Patience is most discernible. *Marcet sine adversario virtus*; as soon as *Carthage* was destroy'd, *Rome* fell to Luxury: *True Wrestlers desire to have some to try their strength upon them;*

Cui

Cui non industrio otium plena est? An active spirit hates idleness and cowardise; For, *etiamsi ceciderit, de genu pugnât, tho' his legs be cut off, he will fight on his knees.*

3. *It redounds to God's honor, when good Men bear up under sufferings.* *Ecce par Deo dignum, virtus fortis cum mala fortuna compositus.* It is a spectacle God delights to see, a good Man combat with calamities. God doth in *Seneca's* phrase *quosdam fastidio transire*, passeth them by in a slight; *An old wrestler scorns to contend with a Coward*, one who is *vinci paratus*, ready to yield up presently. *Calamitates sub jugum mittere proprium magni viri est*, It argues a noble spirit to be able to subdue miseries.

4. *It tends to the trial and increase of their strength.* *Seneca* highly extols that speech of the Philosopher *Demetrius*, *Nihil infelicius eo cui nihil unquam evenit adversi; non licuit enim illi se experiri.* He is the most unhappy Man who never knew what misery meant; for he could never know what he was able to bear. And, as he saith, to pass one's Life away *sine morsu animi*, without any trouble, it is *ignorare rerum naturæ alteram partem*, not to know what is upon the reverse of Nature. *Idem licet fecerint qui integri revertuntur ex acie, magis spectatur qui saucius redit.* Tho' he that comes home sound, might fight as well as he that is wounded; yet the wounded person hath the more pity, and is most cry'd up for his valor. The Pilot is seen in a Tempest, a Souldier in the Battel, and a good Man in Sufferings. God doth by such as Masters do by Scholars, *qui plus laboris ab his exigunt, quibus certior spes est*; who set the best Wits the hardest tasks.

5. *God exerciseth good Men with sufferings, to discover the indifferency of those things which Men value so much in the World, when he denies them to good Men.* Blindness would be hateful, if none were blind but such whose Eyes were put out; and therefore *Appius*, and *Metellus* were blind. Riches are no good things, therefore the worst as well as the best have them. *Nullo modo magis potest Deus concupita traducere, quam si illa ad turpissimos defert, ab optimis abigit.* God could not traduce or defame those things more which Men desire so much, than by taking them away from the best of Men, and giving them to the worst.

6. *That they might be examples to others of patience and constancy:* For, as *Seneca* concludes, *Nati sunt in exemplar*, they are born to be patterns to others. If to these things we add what the Word of God discovers concerning the nature, grounds, and ends of afflictions, and that Glory which shall be reveal'd, in comparison with which exceeding weight of Glory, these light and momentary afflictions are not at all to be valu'd; then we have a clear and full vindication of Divine Providence, as to the sufferings of good Men, as well as to the impunity of such as are wicked. But however, from hence we see how far the mere light of Reason hath carried Men in resolving these difficulties concerning God's Providence in the World, and what a rational account may be given of them, supposing evil of punishment to arise from sin, and that there is a God in the World, who is ready to punish the wicked, and to reward the good: Which was the thing to be shew'd.

C H A P. IV.

Of the Origin of Nations.

- I. *All Mankind deriv'd from Adam, if the Scriptures be true.*
- II. *The contrary supposition an introduction to Atheism.* III. *The truth of the History of the Flood. The possibility of an universal Deluge prov'd.* IV. *The Flood universal as to Mankind, whether universal as to the Earth and Animals; no necessity of asserting either.* V. *Yet supposing the possibility of it demonstrated without creation of new Waters.* VI. *Of the Fountains of the Deep. The proportion which the height of Mountains bears to the Diameter of the Earth. No Mountains much above three Mile perpendicular. Of the origin of Fountains. The opinion of Aristotle and others concerning it discuss'd. The true account of them from the vapors arising from the mass of subterraneous Waters.* VII. *Of the capacity of the Ark for receiving the Animals, from Butco and others.* VIII. *The truth of the Deluge from the Testimony of Heathen Nations. Of the propagation of Nations from Noah's Posterity.* IX. *Of the beginning of the Assyrian Empire. The multiplication of Mankind after the Flood. Of the Chronology of the LXX. Of the time between the Flood and Abraham, and the advantages of it.* X. *Of the pretense of such Nations, who call'd themselves Aborigines.* XI. *A discourse concerning the first Planters of Greece: the common opinion propounded and rejected. The Hellens were not the first Inhabitants of Greece, but the Pelasgi. The large spread of them over the parts of Greece.* XII. *Of their language different from the Greeks.* XIII. *Whence these Pelasgi came; that Phaleg was the Pelasgus of Greece, and the Leader of that Colony, prov'd from Epiphanius.* XIV. *The language of the Pelasgi in Greece Oriental: thence an account given of the many Hebrew words in the Greek language, and the remainders of the Eastern languages in the Islands of Greece, both which not from the Phoenicians, as Bochartus thinks, but from the old Pelasgi.* XV. *Of the ground of the affinity between the Jews and Lacedæmonians. Of the Peopling of America.*

T H E

THE next thing we proceed to give a rational account of, in the History of the first Ages of the World contain'd in Scripture, is the peopling the World from *Adam*. Which is of great consequence for us to understand, not only for the satisfaction of our curiosity as to the true Origin of Nations, but also in order to our believing the truth of the Scriptures, and the universal effects of the fall of Man. Neither of which can be sufficiently clear'd without this. For as it is hard to conceive how the effects of Man's fall should extend to all Mankind, unless all Mankind were propagated from *Adam*; so it is unconceivable how the account of things given in Scripture should be true, if there were persons existent in the World long before *Adam* was. Since the Scripture doth so plainly affirm, *That God hath made of one blood all Nations of Men, for to dwell on the face of the Earth*; some Greek Copies read it $\epsilon\kappa\ \epsilon\nu\ \alpha\iota\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$, leaving out $\alpha\iota\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$ which the vulgar Latin follows: the *Arabic* Version to explain both, reads it *ex homine*, or as *de Dieu* renders it *ex Adamo uno*, there being but the difference of one letter in the Eastern languages between $\alpha\iota\mu$ and $\alpha\delta$, the one denoting Blood, and the other Man. But if we take it as our more ordinary Copies read it $\epsilon\kappa\ \epsilon\nu\ \alpha\iota\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$, yet thereby it is plain, that the meaning is not, that all Mankind was made of the same uniform Matter, as the Author of the *Præ-Adamites* weakly imagin'd (for by that reason, not only Mankind, but the whole World might be said to be $\epsilon\kappa\ \epsilon\nu\ \alpha\iota\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$, of the same blood, since all things in the World were at first form'd out of the same Matter) but $\alpha\iota\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$ is taken there in the sense in which it occurs in the best Greek Authors for the stock out of which Men come: So *Homer*,

$\text{Εἰ ἐτερόν γ' ἔμους ἐστὶ καὶ αἷματ' ἡμετέρου.}$

*Hom. O.
dyff. II.*

Thence those who are near Relations, are call'd in *Sophocles*, $\alpha\iota\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$; thence the name of Confanguinity for nearness of Relation; and *Virgil* useth *sanguis* in the same sense,

Trojanò a sanguine duci.

So that the Apostle's meaning is, that however Men now are so dispers'd in their habitations, and differ so much in Language and Customs from each other, yet they were all originally of the same stock, and did derive their succession from that first Man whom God created. Neither can it be conceiv'd on what account *Adam* in the Scripture is call'd the first Man, and that *he was made a living soul, and of the earth, earthy*; unless it were to denote that he was absolutely the first of his kind, and so was to be the standard and measure of all that follows. And when our Savior would reduce all things to the beginning, he instanceth in those words which were pronounc'd after *Eve* was form'd. *But from the beginning of the creation God made them Male and Female; for this cause shall a Man leave Father and Mother, and cleave unto his Wife.* Now nothing can be more plain and easie than from hence to argue thus; those of whom these words were spoken,

*1 Cor. 15.
45, 47.*

*Mark 10.
6, 7.*

Y y 3

were

Gen. 2. 23, 24. were the first Male and Female which were made in the beginning of the Creation; but it is evident these words were spoken of *Adam* and *Eve*: *And Adam said, this is now bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh: therefore shall a Man leave his Father and his Mother, and shall cleave unto his Wife.* If the Scriptures then of the *New Testament* be true, it is most plain and evident that all Mankind is descended from *Adam*; and no less conspicuous is it from the History of the Creation as deliver'd by *Moses*.

- II. For how necessary had it been for *Moses*, when he was giving an account of the origin of things, to have discover'd by whom the World was first planted, if there had been any such Plantation before *Adam*; but to say that all the design of *Moses* was only to give an account of the Origin and History of the *Jewish Nation*, and that *Adam* was only the first of that stock, is manifestly ridiculous, it being so clear, that not only from *Adam* and *Noah*, but from *Sem*, *Abraham*, and *Isaac* came other Nations besides that of *Jews*. And by the same reason that it is said, that *Moses* only speaks of the origin of the *Jewish Nation* in the History of *Adam*, it may as well be said that *Moses* speaks only of the making of *Canaan*, and that part of the Heavens which are over it, when he describes the Creation of the World in the six days work. For why may not the Earth in the second verse of *Genesis* be as well understood of the Land of *Judæa*, and the Light and production of Animals and Vegetables refer only to that, as to understand it so in reference to the Flood, and in many other passages relating to those eldest times? But the Author of that *Hypothesis* answers, *That the first Chapter of Genesis may relate to the true origin of the World and the first Peopling of it, but in the second Moses begins to give an account of the first Man and Woman of the Jewish Nation.* Very probable! but if this be not a putting asunder those which God hath joyn'd together, nothing is. For doth not *Moses* plainly at first give an account of the Formation of things in the first six days, and of his Rest on the seventh? But how could he be said to have rested then from the works of Creation, if after this follow'd the Formation of *Adam* and *Eve* in the second Chapter? Besides if the forming of Man mention'd, *Gen. 2. 7.* be distinct from that mention'd, *Gen. 1. 27.* then by all parity of Reason, חולדות השמים והארץ the *Generations of Heaven and Earth* mention'd, *Gen. 2. 4.* must be distinct from the *Creation of the Heaven and Earth* mention'd, *Gen. 1. 1.* And so if there were another Creation of Heaven and Earth belonging to the *Jews* in *Gen. 2.* we may likewise believe that there was a new Creation of Man and Woman in that Chapter distinct from that mention'd in the former. Again-further, if there had been any such Persons in the World before *Adam*, no doubt *Adam* himself was ignorant of them; or else it had been a false and ridiculous account which he gives of the name of his Wife חוה because she was אמכלתי the *Mother of all living*. Not of all living things, for that had been a more proper description of a *Ceres*, or *Magna Mater*, or *Diana multimammia*, of our Grand-mother the Earth, but certainly it extends to all of the kind, that all living Creatures that are of Human Nature came from her. So the *Chaldee Paraphrast* understands it, she was call'd *Hava*, because she was אמכל בני אנוש the

the Mother of all the sons of Men. And so the *Arabic* Version, *quia ipsa fuit mater omnis viventis rationalis.* To which purpose our Learned *Selden* cites the version of the *Mauritanian Jews*, and the *Persic* of *Tawafius*. Selden. de
jure natur.
& gens. l. i
c. 5. p. 65

But whatever the Credit or Authority of these Versions be, this is most certain, that *Adam* had no reason at all to have given this name to his Wife, as being *the Mother of all living*, if there had been any of Mankind existing in the World from other Mothers, which had been long before *Eve* was form'd. So that we find it plain and clear, that if the report given of things in Scripture be true, the *Hypothesis* of *Præ-Adamites* is undoubtedly false. And certainly who ever seriously considers the frequent Reflections on the Authority of the Scriptures which were cast by the Author of that Fiction, and his endeavoring on all occasions to derogate from the Miracles recorded in it, may easily suspect the design of that Author was not to gain any credit to his Opinion from those Arguments from Scripture, which he makes shew of (which are pitifully weak and ridiculous) but having by the help of such Arguments made his Opinion more plausible, his hope was that his Opinion would in time undermine the Scriptures themselves; when he had made it appear that the account given in the Scriptures of the plantation of the World was unsatisfactory, since there were Men before *Adam*, which the Scriptures to please the *Jewish* Nation take no notice of. So that after he had attempted to prostitute the Scriptures to his Opinion, his next work had been to have turn'd them out of doors, as not of credit to be rely'd on by any, when they were so common to every Opinion. But how impious, absurd and rude that attempt was upon the sacred and inviolable Authority of the Scriptures, hath been so fully discover'd by his very many not unlearned Adversaries, that it might seem needless so much as to have taken notice of so weakly grounded, and infirmly prov'd an Opinion, had it not thus far lain in my way in order to the clearing the true origin of Nations according to the Scriptures. The main foundations of which fabulous Opinion lying chiefly in the pretended Antiquities of the *Chaldeans*, *Egyptians*, and others, have been fully taken away in our first Book, where our whole design was to manifest the want of credibility in those accounts of ancient times, which are deliver'd by Heathen Nations in opposition to the Scriptures. There is nothing at all in Scripture from the Creation of *Adam* to the Flood which seems to give any countenance to that Fignent, but only what may be easily resolv'd from the consideration of the great conciseness of the *Mosaic* History, in reporting that long interval of time which was between the fall of *Adam*, and the Flood; by means of which conciseness such things are reported as speedily done, because immediately succeeding in the story, which asked a very considerable time before they could be effected; and besides all things which were done before the Flood, being all quite obliterated by it, and all the numerous Posterity of *Adam* being then destroy'd (only *Noah* and his Family excepted) to what purpose had it been any further to have reported the passages before the Flood, otherwise than thereby to let us understand the certainty of the succession of Persons from *Adam*, and such Actions in those

those times which might be remarkable discoveries of God's Providence and Man's Wickedness in it; which being most apparent at first in *Cain* and his Posterity, did by degrees so spread it self over the face of the then inhabited World, that the just God was thereby provok'd to send a Deluge among them to sweep away the present Inhabitants, to make room for another Generation to succeed them.

III. This therefore we now come to consider, *viz. The History of the Flood*, and the certainty of the propagation of the World from the Posterity of *Noah* after the Flood. I begin with the History of the Flood it self, as to which two things will be sufficient to demonstrate the truth of it. 1. *If there be nothing in it repugnant to Reason.* 2. *If we have sufficient evidence of the truth of it, from such who yet have not believ'd the Scriptures.* There are only two things which seem questionable to Reason concerning the Flood; the first, is, *concerning the possibility of the Flood it self*; the other is, *concerning the capacity of the Ark for preserving all kinds of Animals.* The only ground of questioning the possibility of such a Flood, as that is related in Scripture, hath been from hence, that some have suppos'd it impossible, that all the Water which is contain'd in the Air, supposing it to fall down, should raise the surface of Water upon the Earth a foot and a half in height; so that either new Waters must be created to overflow the Earth, or else there must be suppos'd a Rarefaction of the Water contain'd in the Sea and all Rivers, so that it must take up at least fifteen times the space that now it doth; but then, they say, if the Water had been thus rarefy'd, could neither have destroy'd Man nor Beast, neither could *Noah's Ark* have been born up by it any more than by liquid Air. To this therefore I answer.

First, I cannot see any urgent necessity from the Scripture to assert, that the Flood did spread it self over all the surface of the Earth. That all Mankind (those in the Ark excepted) were destroy'd by it, is most certain according to the Scriptures. When the occasion of the Flood is thus express'd, *And God saw that the wickedness of Man was great upon Earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his Heart was only evil continually. And the Lord said, I will destroy Man whom I have created from the face of the Earth.* It could not be then any particular Deluge of so small a Country as *Paleskine*, which is here express'd, as some have ridiculously imagin'd; for we find an universal corruption in the Earth mention'd as the cause; an universal threatening upon all Men for this cause; and afterwards an universal destruction express'd, as the effect of this Flood. *And all flesh died that moved upon the Earth, and every Man. And every living substance was destroyed which was upon the face of the ground, both Man and Cattle, and the creeping things, and the Fowl of the Heaven, and they were destroyed from the Earth, and Noah only remained alive, and they that were with him in the Ark.* So then it is evident that the Flood was universal as to Mankind; but from thence follows no necessity at all of asserting the universality of it as to the Globe of the Earth, unless it be sufficiently prov'd that the whole Earth was Peopled before the Flood: which I despair of ever seeing prov'd. And what Reason can there be to extend the Flood beyond the occasion

Gen. 6. 5.
7.

Gen. 7. 21.

v. 23.

cation of it, which was the corruption of Mankind? And it seems very strange that in so short an interval in comparison, as that was from *Adam* to the Flood according to the ordinary computation, viz. 1656 years, and not much above two thousand, according to the largest, the World should then be fully Peopled, when in so much longer a space of time since the Flood to this day, the Earth is capable of receiving far more Inhabitants, than now it hath. The only probability then left for asserting the universality of the Flood, as to the Globe of the Earth, is from the Destruction of all living Creatures together with Man; now tho' Men might not have spread themselves over the whole surface of the Earth, yet Beasts and creeping Things might which were all destroy'd with the Flood: For it is said, *That all flesh died that moved upon the Earth, both of fowl and of cattle, and of beast, and of every creeping thing, that creepeth upon the Earth, and every Man.* To what end should there be not only a note of universality added, but such a particular enumeration of the several kinds of Beasts, creeping Things, and Fowls, if they were not all destroy'd? To this I answer. I grant as far as the Flood extended all these were destroy'd; but I see no reason to extend the destruction of these beyond that compass and space of Earth where Men inhabited: Because the punishment upon the Beasts was occasion'd by, and could not but be concomitant with the destruction of Mankind, but (the occasion of the Deluge being the Sin of Man, who was punish'd in the Beasts, that were destroy'd for his sake, as well as in himself) where the occasion was not, as where there were Animals, and no Men, there seems no necessity of extending the Flood thither. But to what end then, it will be replied, *Did God command Noah with so much care to take of all kind of Beasts, and Birds, and creeping Things into the Ark with him, if all these living Creatures were not destroyed by the Flood?* I answer, because all those things were destroy'd where ever the Flood was; suppose then the whole Continent of *Asia* was Peopled before the Flood, which is as much as we may in reason suppose, I say, all the living Creatures in that Continent were all destroy'd; or if we may suppose it to have extended over our whole Continent of the anciently known World; what reason would there be that in the opposite part of the Globe, viz. *America*, which we suppose to be unpeopled then, all the living Creatures should there be destroy'd, because Men had sinned in this? And would there not on this supposition have been a sufficient reason to preserve living Creatures in the Ark for future propagation, when all other living Creatures extant had been in such remote places as would not have been accessible by them in many Generations, and those Beasts growing wild for want of Inhabitants, would not have prov'd presently serviceable for the use of Men after the Flood? Which was certainly the main thing look'd at in the preservation of them in the Ark, that Men might have all of them ready for their use after the Flood, which could not have been, had not the several kinds been preserv'd in the Ark, altho' we suppose them not destroy'd in all parts of the World.

All this proceeds on supposition that Animals were propagated much further in the World than Men were, before the Flood.

IV.

Zz

Which

Which I confess seems very probable to me on this account; ~~be~~ cause the production of Animals is parallel in *Genesis* with that of Fishes, and both of them different from Man; For God saith, *Gen. 1. 20, 21. Let the waters bring forth every moving Creature that hath life, viz. Fish, and Fowl;* and accordingly it is said, *that the waters brought forth abundantly every living Creature after their kind, and every Fowl after his kind.* Accordingly in the production of Beasts, we read, *Let the Earth bring forth the living Creature after his kind, Cattle, and creeping thing, and Beast of the Earth after his kind, and it was so:* But in the production of Man, it is said, *Let us make Man in our own likeness.* From hence I observe this difference between the production of Animals, and of Man, that in the one God gave a prolific Power to the Earth and Waters for production of the several living Creatures which came from them; so that the seminal principles of them were contain'd in the Matter out of which they were produc'd; ~~which was~~ otherwise in Man, who was made by a peculiar Hand of the great Creator himself, who thence is said to have *formed Man of the dust of the ground.* Now therefore altho' there were but one Male and Female of Mankind at first, which had a special formation by God himself; yet there is no reason we should conceive it to be so as to the Production of other living Creatures, whether Fish, or Fowl, or Beasts; but the prolific Virtue being by God's power given to that material principle out of which they were form'd, it may very well be suppos'd that many of the same kind were at first produc'd. For it seems very strange to imagin that in the whole Ocean there should be only two of a kind produc'd, but Fish and Fowl both arising from the Water, we may have just reason to think, that the Waters being separated before this prolific Virtue was communicated to the whole mass of Waters, might in the several parts of the Globe of the Earth, bring forth both Fish and Fowl after their kinds. The same I say of the production of Animals in the sixth days work, which are rank'd into three sorts, Cattle, creeping Things, and Beasts of the Earth after their kinds; now God saying, *Let the Earth bring forth her living Creatures,* (and that after the Waters had divided some parts of the Earth from other, so that there could be no passage for the Cattle, creeping Things, and Beasts out of one part into another, without the help of Man,) it seems very probable that at least those parts of the Earth which were thus divided from each other, did bring forth these several living Creatures after their kinds; which did after propagate in those parts without being brought thither by the help of Man. If now this supposition be embrac'd, by it we presently clear our selves of many difficulties concerning the propagation of Animals in the World, and their conversation in the ~~Ark~~, which many have been so much to seek for satisfaction in. As how the unknown kind of Serpents in *Brasil*, the flow-belly'd Creature of the *Indies*, and all those strange species of Animals seen in the *West-Indies* should either come into the *Ark of Noah*, or be convey'd out of it into those Countries which ~~are~~ divided from that Continent where the Flood was by so vast an Ocean on the one side, and at least so large a tract of Land on the other (supposing any passage out of one Continent into another, which yet hath not been discover'd.) Besides, some kind of Animals cannot live

live out of that particular Clime wherein they are; and there are many sorts of Animals discover'd in *America*, and the adjoining Island, which have left no remainders of themselves in these parts of the World. And it seems very strange that these should propagate into those remote parts of the World from the place of the Flood, and leave none at all of their number behind them in those parts from whence they were propagated. These things at least make that Opinion very probable which extends the production of Animals beyond that of Mankind in the old World, and that the Flood tho' it destroy'd all Mankind, and every living Creature within that compass wherein Mankind inhabited, yet might not extend it self to those parts, and the Animals therein, in which Men had never inhabited. And by this means we need not make so many Miracles as some are fain to do about the Flood; and all those difficulties concerning the propagation of Animals do of themselves vanish and fall to the ground. This is the first way of resolving the difficulty concerning the possibility of the Flood, by asserting it not to have been over the whole Globe of the Earth, but only over those parts where Mankind Inhabited.

Secondly, Suppose the Flood to have been over the whole Globe of the Earth, yet there might have been Water enough to have over-whelm'd it to the height mention'd in Scripture. For which we are to consider that many causes concurr'd to the making of this Deluge; *first*, the Air was condens'd into Clouds, and those fell down with continu'd force and violence, not breaking into drops, but all in a body (which Sir *Walter Rawleigh* parallels with the spouts of the *West-Indies*) which are thence call'd the Cata-racts or Flood-gates of Heaven, God loosening (as he expresseth it) the power retentive which was in the Clouds, and so the Waters must needs fall in abundance, according to the expression of *Job*, *Behold he withholdeth the waters, and they dry up, also he sendeth them out, and they overturn the Earth.* Now I say, altho' these Waters falling down with so much fury and violence, as well as in so great abundance might quickly destroy all living Creatures; yet this was not all; for God who held in the Ocean within its bounds, whereby he saith to it, *Thus far it shall go, and no further*, might then give it commission to execute his Justice upon the sinful World: and to all this, we have another cause of the Deluge, which was, *That the Fountains of the great Deep were broken up.* By which *Vatablus*, most probably understands, *Immensam illam & profundam aquarum copiam quæ est subter terram*, that vast body of Water which lies in the bowels of the Earth; now when all these Fountains were broken up, and the Waters within the Earth rush out with violence and impetuosity upon it, it must needs cause an Inundation so great as that is mention'd in the Scripture. For as that judicious Historian Sir *W. Rawleigh* observes, Let us consider that the Earth had above 21000 Miles compass, the Diameter of the Earth according to that Circle 7000 Miles, and then from the Superficies to the Center 3500 Miles; take then the highest Mountain of the World, *Caucasus*, *Taurus*, *Teneriff*, or any other, and I do not find, saith he, that the highest exceeds thirty Miles in height: It is not then impossible, answering Reason with Reason, that all those Waters mixed within the Earth,

v.

Sir Walter
Raw-
leigh's Hi-
story.

Job. 12. 15.

Gen. 7. 11.

Sir Walter
Rawleigh
Ibid.

Gassend.
Tom. 2. op.
Phys. f. 3.
l. 1.

Plut. in Æ-
milian.
Plin. l. 2.
c. 65.

Voss. in
Pomp. Me-
lam, l. 5.
c. 2. p. 115.
c. c.

3500 Miles deep, should be able to cover the space of 30 Miles in height, which 30 Miles upright being found in the depths of the Earth 116 times; for the Fountains of the great Deep were broken, and the Waters drawn out of the bowels of the Earth. But then withal, saith he, if we consider the proportion which the Earth bears to the Air about it, we may easily understand the possibility of the Flood, without any new creation of Waters; for supposing so much Air to be condens'd, and so turn'd into Water which doth encompass the Earth, it will not seem strange to Men of Judgment, yea but of ordinary Understanding, that the Earth (God so pleasing) was cover'd over with Waters, without any new Creation. But this will yet appear more probable, if the height of the highest Mountains doth bear no greater proportion to the Diameter of the Earth, than of the 1670 part to the whole, supposing the Diameter of the Earth to be 8355 Miles, as P. Gassendus computes both. And it is more than probable, that Men have exceedingly mistaken, as to the height of Mountains, which comes so short of what Sir Walter Rawleigh allows to them, that the highest Mountain in the World will not be found to be five direct Miles in height, taking the altitude of them from the Plain they stand upon. Olympus whose height is so extoll'd by the Poets and ancient Greeks, that it is said to exceed the Clouds; yet Plutarch tells us that Xenagoras measur'd it, and found it not to exceed a Mile and half perpendicular and about 70 Paces. Much about the same height Pliny saith that Dicæarchus found the Mountain Pelion to be. The Mount Athos is suppos'd of extraordinary height, because it casts its shadow into the Isle of Lemnos, which according to Pliny was 87 Miles, yet Gassendus allows it but two Miles in height; but Isaac Vossius in a learned discourse concerning the height of Mountains in his Notes on Pomponius Mela, doth not allow above 10 or 11 Furlongs at most to the height of Mount Athos. Caucasus by Ricciolus is said to be 51 Miles in height: Gassendus allowing it to be higher than Athos or Olympus, yet conceives it not above three or four Miles at most; but yet Vossius will not yield it above two Miles perpendicular, for which he gives this very good reason; Polybius affirms, there is no Mountain in Greece which may not be ascended in a days time, and makes the highest Mountain there not to exceed 10 Furlongs; which, saith Vossius, it is scarce possible for any one to reach unless he be a Mountainer born, any other will scarce be able to ascend above six Furlongs perpendicular; for in the ascent of a Mountain every Pace doth reach but to an hand breadth perpendicular; but if we do allow eight Furlongs to a days ascent, yet thereby it will appear that the highest Mountains in the World are not above twenty four Furlongs in height, since they may be ascended in three days time: and it is affirm'd of the top of Mount Caucasus, that it may be ascended in less than the compass of three days, and therefore cannot be much above two Miles in height. Which may be the easier believ'd of any other Mountain, when that which is reputed the highest of the World, viz the Pike of Teneriff, which the Inhabitants call Pica de Terraria, may be ascended in that compass of time, viz. three days: for in the Months of July and August (which are the only Months in which Men can ascend it, because

cause all other times of the year Snow lies upon it, altho' neither in the Isle of *Teneriff* nor any other of the *Canary-Islands* there be Snow ever seen) the Inhabitants then ascend to the top of it in three days time, which top of it is not Pyramidal but plain, from whence they gather some Sulphurous Stones, which are carry'd in great Quantities into *Spain*. So that according to the proportion of eight Furlongs to a days journey, this *Pike of Teneriff* will not exceed the height of a *German Mile* perpendicular, as *Varenius* confesseth, than which he thinks likewise, that no Mountain in the World is higher. For what *Pliny* speaks of the *Alps* being fifty Miles in height, must be understood not perpendicular, but in regard of the obliquity of the ascent of it; so that he might account so much from the foot of the *Alps* to the top of them, and yet the *Alps* in a perpendicular line not come near the height of a *German Mile*. If then the highest Mountains do not exceed much above three Miles in height, (for the *Spaniards* themselves affirm, that those lofty Mountians of *Peru*, in comparision of which, they say, the *Alps* are but like Cottages, may be ascended in four days compass,) we see from hence then far greater probability, how the waters in the time of the general Flood might overtop the highest Mountains.

Especially if it be made evident that there is so great an Abyss of subterraneous Waters, that the breaking open of the Fountains of it may so much increase the Inundation arising from the Clouds, and from the breaking in of the Ocean upon the main Land. And that there is such a mass of Waters in the body of the Earth, is evident from the origin of Fountains; for the opinion of *Aristotle* imputing them to the condensation of Air in the Caverns of the Earth, and that of other Philosophers ascribing them to the fall of Rain-water receiv'd into such Cisterns in the Earth which are capable of receiving it, are both equally unsatisfactory, unless we suppose a mass of Waters in the Bowels of the Earth, which may be as the common stock to supply those Fountains with. For it is very hard conceiving, how mere Air should be so far condens'd, as to cause not only such a number of Fountains, but so great a quantity of Water as runs into the Sea by those Rivers which come from them, (as the River *Volga* is suppos'd to empty so much Water in a years time into the *Caspian* Sea, as might suffice to cover the whole Earth,) by which likewise it is most evident that there must be some subterranean passages into the Sea, or else of necessity, by that abundance of Water which continually runs into it from the Rivers, it would overflow and drown the World. And from this multitude of Waters which comes from Fountains, it is likewise evident, that the origin of Fountains cannot be merely from such Water which falls from the Clouds, which would never suffice to maintain so full and uninterrupted a stream as many Fountains have: Especially if that be true which some assert, that Rain-water doth never moisten the Earth above ten foot deep, for of far greater profundity many Fountains are. And besides, the Rain-water runs most upon the surface of the Earth, and so doth rather swell the Rivers, which thereby run with greater force in their passage to the Ocean, and doth not lodg it self presently in the Earth, especially if it descends in a greater quantity, which alone is able to fill such Cisterns suppos'd to be in the Earth, especially in Mountains,

tains, which may keep a stream continually running. Altho' therefore we may acknowledg that the fall of Rain may much conduce to the over-flowing and continuance of Fountains, as is evident by the greater force of Springs after continu'd Rains, and by the decay of many of them in hot and dry weather, (which yet I had rather impute to the Sun's exhaling by his continu'd heat those moist Vapors in the Earth, which should continually supply the Springs, than merely to the want of Rain,) and by the great Rivers from such Fountains which came from the tops of Mountains; where the ground is suppos'd to be of so hard and consistent a substance, as Stone or Chalk, or something of like nature, which might help to the conservation of water there, from whence it after ran in streams to the Ocean, (which was the great argument of the famous *Peirescius* for his Opinion,) altho' I say, these things may argue thus far, that Rain-water doth much conduce to the preservation of Springs, yet it cannot give a sufficient account of the origin of them: Which with the greatest reason and probability is imputed to those subterraneous Waters which pass up and down thro' the Bowels of the Earth. Some have fancy'd the Earth to be as one great Animal, whose subterraneous passages were like Veins in the Body, which receiv'd Water out of the Sea, as the Veins do Blood out of the Liver; and that there are some kind of Vapors in the Earth which supply the place of vital Spirits, which are diffus'd up and down the Body thro' the Arteries. And that as in an Animal, there are some parts which upon the least prick do send forth Blood, and others are more callous where the incision must be deeper before any Blood appears; so it is in the Earth: when it is open'd in a right Vein we find presently a Spring of Water; but if we chance to hit on a wrong place, we go deep and may find none; not that Water is wanting, but we have not hit on the Veins thro' which it runs. And thence the Blood with equal freedom and velocity ascends into the Head as it runs into the Legs, because it is equally dispers'd into all the parts from the Center of it; so in the body of the Earth it is as natural for the Water to ascend into the tops of Mountains, as it is to fall down into the Center of the Earth. And that it is no more wonder to see Springs issue out of Mountains, than it is to see a Man bleed in the Veins of his Fore-head when he is let Blood there. So in all places of the Earth the parts of it are not dispos'd for apertion; for some of them are so hard and compact, that there seems to be no passage thro' them, (which is the most probable reason, why there is no Rain neither in those places, because there is no such exudation of those moist vapors thro' the surface of the Earth, which may yield Matter for Rain, as is commonly of the sandy places of *Africa*;) but usually Mountainous Countries have more large, and as it were Temple-veins thro' which the moist vapors have a free and open passage, and thence there are not only more frequent Springs there; but Clouds and Rain too. Now if this account of the origin of Springs in the Earth be as rational as it is ingenious and handsome, (and there is not much can be said against it, but only that then all Fountains should be salt as the Water is from whence they come,) then we easily understand how the Earth might be overflow'd in the universal Deluge.

*V. Gassend.
vir. Peires-
kii. l. 3.
p. 292.*

luge; for then the Fountains of the Deep were broken up, or there was an universal opening of the Veins of the Earth, whereby all the Water contain'd in them would presently run upon the surface of the Earth, and must needs according to its proportion advance it self to a considerable height. But because the salving the difference of the Water in Springs from what it is in the Sea is so considerable a *Phænomenon* in our present case, I therefore rather take this following as the most rational account of the origin of Fountains, *viz.* That there are great Cavities in the Earth, which are capable of receiving a considerable quantity of Water, which continually runs into them from the Sea, (which as it continually receives fresh supplies from the Rivers which empty themselves into it, so it dispatcheth away a like quantity thro' those spongy parts of the Earth under the Ocean, which are most apt to suck in and convey away the surplufage of Water,) so that by this means the Sea never swells by the Water convey'd into it by the Rivers, there being as continual a circulation in the body of the Earth of the Water which passeth out of the Ocean into the subterraneous Caverns, and from thence to the Mountains, and thence into the Sea again; as there is a circulation of Blood in Man's Body from the Heart by the Arteries into the exterior parts, and returning back again by the Veins into the Heart. According to which we may imagin such a place in the Heart of the Earth like *Plato's Baratrum*,

Τῆλε μάλ' ἤχι βάθισον ὑπὸ χθονός ἐστι βέρεθρον.

As *Plato* in his *Phædrus* describes it out of *Homer*, a long and deep subterraneous Cavity. *εἰς δ' τὸν τὸ χάσμα συρρίναι πᾶντος τοῦ ποταμοῦ, ὃ οὐ τότε πάλιν πᾶντος ἀγρίσει.* Into which Cavity all the Rivers at last flow, and from which they again disperse themselves abroad. Now this Cavity of the Earth thus fill'd with Water, supplies the place of the Heart in the body of the Earth, from which all those several *Aqueducts* which are in the Earth have their continual supply; but that which makes those passages of Water which we call Springs and Fountains properly, I suppose, is thus generated; from those Cavities fill'd with Water in the Earth by reason of the hot steams which are in the body of the Earth, there are continually rising some Vapors or little Particles of Water, which are disjoyn'd from each other by the heat, by reason of which they attain a greater celerity of motion, and so pass thro' the inner pores of the Earth till they come near the superficies of it. Which when they have approach'd to, they are beat back again by the cold, which environs the surface of the Earth, or at least are so arrested by the cold and condens'd by it, that they lose the form of Vapors, and become perfect Water again. Which Water being now more gross, than while it was a mere Vapor, cannot descend again thro' the same pores thro' which it ascended before, because these are not now capable of receiving it: And therefore it seeks out some wider passages near the surface of the Earth, by which means it moves in an oblique manner, and is ready to embrace any other Vapors which are arrested in the same manner; now when these are grown to a considerable body in the surface of a Mountain, or a Plain, and

and find a vent fit for them, there appears a proper Fountain, whose streams are still maintain'd by the same condensation of Vapors, which when they are once come abroad, are in continual motion, whereby Rivers are made, which are still finding a passage thro' the declivity of the surface of the Earth, whereby they may return to the Ocean again. Now according to this account, that grand *Phenomenon* of the freshness of Fountain-water, when the Water of the Sea is salt, whence it originally comes, is sufficiently resolv'd. For mere transcolation may by degrees take away that which the *Chymists* call the fixed Salt; and for the Volatile Salt of it (which being a more spiritous thing, is not removable by Distillation, and so neither can it be by transcolation,) yet such an evaporation as that mention'd, may serve to do it, because it is evident that fresh Water will fall from the Clouds which hath risen from those Vapors which have come out of the Sea; and besides these Vapors or small Particles of Water in their passage thro' the Earth (especially when they come near the surface of it) do incorporate with other sweet Vapors, as those which come from Rain and others, by which means they insensibly lose their former acidity and sharpness. But those Fountains which do retain their former saltness, as there are many such in the World, may very probably be suppos'd not to have come from those Vapors condens'd, but to be a kind of breaking of a Vein in which the Salt Water was convey'd up and down the body of the Earth. Now then, considering that mass of Waters and multitude of Vapors arising thence which are in the Earth, how easie is it for us to understand what the breaking open the Fountains of the Deep means in Scripture, and how by that means together with the falling down of the Cataracts of the Clouds, and the letting loose of the Ocean, the whole Earth might be overspread with an universal Deluge? The possibility of which was the thing to be shew'd.

vii.

The next thing we come to concerning the Flood, is, the capacity of the Ark for receiving the several Animals which were to propagate the Word afterwards. Concerning which, two things are necessary to be understood, what the measure of the Ark was, and what the number of Animals contain'd in it. The measure of the Ark must be determin'd by the proportion of the cubit, which there is no reason at all to suppose either with *Origen* and others to have been the Geometrical cubit, which contains six ordinary cubits or nine feet, both because we find no mention at all of any such cubit in Scripture, and because the Fabric of the Ark would have been of too vast a proportion. Neither yet is it probable, what Sir *W. Rawleigh* supposeth, that this cubit must be of a proportion as much exceeding ours, as the stature of a Giant doth ours, both because there is no certain evidence, either from Scripture or Reason, that the proportion of Men then did generally exceed what is now; and besides, this tends not in the least to make the thing more plain. For according to that proportion, we must then have imagin'd Beasts to have been as well as Men, for the Horse must have been proportionably as great to have been serviceable to Men of that stature, and so the Animals would have taken up as much more room in the Ark as the cubit is suppos'd to be bigger. I suppose then that *Moses* speaks of the cubit most in

in use in his own time (for he writ so that they for whose use he writ, might be easily able to understand him,) now this cubit by the consent of Writers contain'd a foot and a half in length; according to which proportion, supposing the Ark by *Moses's* description to have 300 cubits in length, 50 in breadth, and 30 in height, the whole capacity of the Ark, according to the computation of *Buteo* comes to 450000 solid cubits. For the length of 300 cubits being multiply'd into the breadth of 50 cubits, and the product by the height of 30 cubits, makes the whole Concavity 450000. Which *Matheus Hostus* reducing to the German measure, makes the longitude of the Ark to be 31 perches, 4 cubits, 5 fingers; the latitude 5 perches, 2 cubits and 11 fingers; the altitude 3 perches 1 cubit, 9 fingers; allowing to every perch 15 Roman feet. So that if we take a perch to contain 10 Hebrew cubits, which exceeds the former 11 fingers, the whole capacity of the Ark will be 450 cubical perches. And as he saith, *Hujusmodi sane ædificii amplitudo capacissima est, & quamlibet magno animantium numero haud dubie sufficere potuit*, the Ark of so large a capacity might easily contain the several kinds of Animals in it. Which will be easily understood, if according to our former supposition, only the Animals of the inhabited part of the World were preserv'd in the Ark; but admitting that all kinds of Animals were there, there would be room enough for them, and for Provision for them. For which Sir *W. Rawleigh* gives a prudent caution, that Men ought not to take Animals of a mixt Nature, as *Mules* and *Hyæna's*, nor such as differ in size and shape from each other, as the *Cat* of *Europe*, and *Ounce* of *India*, into the several species of Animals. Sir *W. Rawleigh* following *Buteo* reckons 89, or lest any be omitted, a 100 several kinds of Beasts, and undertakes to demonstrate from a triple proportion of all Beasts to the *Ox*, *Wolf*, and *Sheep*, that there was sufficient capacity for them in the Ark. *Hostus* allows a 150 several kinds of Animals, yet questions not the capacity of the Ark. But these things are so particularly made out by those learned Authors, especially by *Buteo*, that I shall rather refer the Reader for further satisfaction to the Authors themselves, than take the pains to transcribe them.

Gen. 6. 15.

Buteo de arca Noe. p. 93.

Hostus de fabrica Arca Noe. lib. 66.

I come now therefore to the evidence of the truth and certainty of this universal Deluge, of which we have most clear and concurring Testimonies of most ancient Nations of the World. For which purpose *Grotius* and others have at large produc'd the Testimony of *Berosus* the *Chaldean* out of *Josephus*, concerning the Flood and the Ark in which *Noah* was preserv'd, of *Abidenus* out of *Cyril* and *Eusebius* concerning *Xisuthrus*, or *Noah's* sending out of the Birds to see if the Flood were asswag'd, and of *Alexander Polyhistor* concerning the preservation of Animals in the Ark, of *Plutarch* concerning the sending out of the Dove, of *Lucian de Dea Syria* concerning the whole story, and so of *Molon* and *Nicolaus Damascenus*. Besides it is manifested by others, how among the *Chaldeans* the memory of *Noah* was preserv'd under the Fable of *Oannes*, which had part of a Fish, and part of a Man, as is evident from the fragments of *Apollodorus*, *Abydenus*, and *Alexander Polyhistor*, preserv'd in *Eusebius's* Greek Chronica; among the *Chineses* under the name of *Puoncuus*, who by them is

VIII.

V. Grot. Annot. in l. 1. de Verit. relig. Christi. Voss. Isagog. Chron. differt. 4. c. 2. & 3. Bochar. Geogr. sacr. l. 1. c. 4. August. de Civit. Dei. l. 18. c. 12. & ibid. Lud. Viv. Euseb. Chr. p. 5. ed. 2. Scaliger.

Aaa

faid

Is. Voss. e-
pist. ad Col-
vium, p.
409.
Martin.
hist. Sinic.
l. 1. p. 12.
Joh. de
Laet. de
orig. gent.
American.
l. 1. p. 115.

Gro. Annos
ad l. 1. de
Verit.
Ari. Mon-
tan. Pha-
leg.
Junius in
Gen. 10.
Bochart.
Geogr. sacr.
p. 1.

said to have escap'd alone with his Family out of the universal Deluge, saith *Isaac Vossius*, who supposeth *Pu* or *Pi* to be only a prefix to the name, and so that *Puoncuus*, is the same with *Πονκ*. *Martinius* tells us, *de diluvio multa est apud Sinicos Scriptores mentio*, that the ancient Writers of the *Sinic* History speak much of the Flood. *Johannes de Laet* tells out of *Lescharbotus* how constant the Tradition of the Flood is among the *Indians*, both in *New-France*, *Peru*, and other parts. This being therefore so fully attested by the evident and apparent consent of so many Writers and Historians, which did not own the Authority of the Scriptures, I shall suppose this sufficiently prov'd, and proceed to the main thing which concerns the Origin of Nations, which is, *the certainty of the propagation of Mankind from the posterity of Noah*. Of which there this is strong and convincing evidence, that in all that account which the Scripture gives of the propagation of Nations from the Sons of *Noah*, there is some remainder in the History of that Nation to justify the reason of the imposition of the name from the names of the Nations themselves, which have preserv'd the original name of their Founder in their own, as the *Medes* from *Madai*; the *Thracians* from *Thiras*; the *Ionians* from *Javan*; the *Sidonians* from *Sidon*; the *Philistins* from *Polesthim*; the *Arceans*, *Aradians*, *Elymaans*, *Assyrians*, *Lydians*, from *Arki*, *Arad*, *Elam*, *Assur* and *Lud*, and many others produc'd by *Grotius*, *Montanus*, *Junius*, and especially *Bochartus*, who with admirable Industry and Learning hath clear'd all this part of sacred History, which concerns the reason of the imposition of the names of the People which were propagated from the posterity of *Noah*, and given a full and satisfactory account of the several places where the posterity of *Noah* seated themselves after the Deluge. Instead of that therefore, I shall consider the pretences which can be brought against it, which are chiefly these three. 1. That the *Chaldean* Empire seems to have greater Antiquity than can be attributed to it by the History of *Moses*. 2. That the most learned Heathen Nations pretend to be self-originated, and that they came not from any other Country. 3. That no certain account is given from whence *America* should be Peopled.

IX.

1. The History of the *Assyrian* Empire seems inconsistent with the propagation of the World from the Sons of *Noah*; for the Reign of *Ninus* and *Semiramis* is plac'd by many *Chronologers* within the first Century after the Flood, which seems a manifest inconsistency with the propagation of Mankind from the Sons of *Noah*; for it seems utterly impossible that the foundations of so great an Empire should be laid in so small a compass of time by the Posterity of three Persons; and besides, *Ninus* and *Semiramis* were not the first who began the *Assyrian* Empire; for *Belus* not only reign'd fifty five years before *Ninus*, but according to the *Chaldean* Antiquities from *Evechous*, who they say first reign'd among them, are reckon'd 495 years. But admit that the Beginning of the *Assyrian* Empire be plac'd so low as *Petavius* and other *Chronologers* would have it, viz. in the year after the Flood, 153, yet the difficulty is only somewhat abated, but not remov'd; for it seems yet unconceivable that from three Persons in 150 years, such multitudes should spring, as to make so large an Empire as that

Petav. de
doct. temp.
l. 9. c. 14.
Tom. 2.

of

of *Ninus*, and that within an hundred years after the Flood there should be such vast multitudes for the building the Tower of *Babel* and dispersion up and down the World, so that according to the *Hebrew* computation in the compass of 300 years, viz. about *Abraham's* time, the World was so fully peopl'd, that we read of several Kings encountring one another, by which it is evident the World had been peopl'd some time before, or else there could not have been such potent Kings as some of them were at that time. This being the grand Difficulty, to it I answer these things.

1. There is no such certainty of the beginning of the *Assyrian* Empire, as for the sake of that, to question the truth of the Propagation of the World by the Sons of *Noah*. I have already largely manifested the want of credibility in the Chronology of the ancient *Chaldeans*, and that we have no certain grounds to rely upon in reference to it. Especially as to these seven first *Babylonian* Kings, which are cited out of *Africanus*, by *Eusebius*, and *Georgius Syncellus*, viz. *Evechous*, *Chomasbolus*, *Porus*, *Nechubes*, *Abius*, *Oniballus*, *Chinzirus*, who are said to reign 225 years two months; and alike fabulous, I suppose, is the other *Dynasty* of six *Arabian* Kings, whose Empire is said to have stood 215 years to the time of *Belus*, who expell'd the *Arabians*, and took the power to himself: And it is much more agreeable to Reason to reject these two *Dynasties*, which had no record of them left in any History of the *Assyrian* Empire, but only in *Berosus*, whose authority in this case hath been discuss'd already; than to follow our late Excellent Primate of *Armagh*, who punctually sets down the Reign of the Kings of these two *Dynasties*, but cuts off at least eight Ages in the time of the *Assyrian* Empire from *Ninus* to *Sardanapalus*, which times he confines to 496 years, and placeth *Ninus* in the 2737 year of the World, according to the *Hebrew* Computation, and so to live in the time of the *Judges*, and be contemporary with *Deborah*: Which he buidls only on a place in *Herodotus*, which relates not to the time between *Ninias* and *Sardanapalus*, but to the time of the defection of the *Medes* from the *Assyrian* Empire, as *Isaac Vossius* hath already shew'd. We cannot then find any certainty in the beginning of the *Assyrian* Empire, which may give us cause to question the Propagation of the World from the Posterity of *Noah*.

*Usser. Ann.
vet. Test. A.
M. 2737.*

*Castigat.
adv. Horn.
c. 10.
Gen. 9. 1.*

2. We have reason to think that there was a more than ordinary multiplication of the World from the Sons of *Noah* after the Flood. For as God had before punish'd the World by destroying Mankind in it by an extraordinary manner; so after the Flood, he doth in a particular manner blest *Noah* and his Sons, and said unto them, *Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth*, which may well be thought to have then had an extraordinary effect. Several ways have been attempted by Learned Men to make appear, to what a vast number the Posterity of *Noah* would increase in the space of two or three hundred years after the Flood. *Peta-*

*Petar. de
doct. temp.
l. 9. c. 14.*

vius supposeth that the Posterity of *Noah* might beget Children at seventeen, and that each of *Noah's* Sons might have eight Children in the eighth year after the Flood, and that every one of these eight might beget eight more; by this means in only one Family, as of *Japhet* in the year after the Flood 238, he makes a *Dia-*

Aaa 2

gram

Uff. Chron. sacr. c. 5. gram consisting of almost an innumerable company of Men. *Johannes Temporalis*, as our most Learned *Primate* tells us, takes this way, that all of the Posterity of *Noah*, when they attain'd twenty years of Age, had every year twins, on which supposition by *Arithmetical* progression he undertakes to make it appear, that in the 102 year after the Flood, there would be of Males and Females 1554420; but taking away the one half, because of the groundless supposition of twins, yet then in that time there would be 388605 Males besides Females. Others suppose that each of the Sons of *Noah* had ten Sons, and by that proportion, in few Generations it would amount to many thousands within a Century. Others insist on the parallel between the multiplication of the Children of *Israel* in *Egypt*; that if from 72 Men in the space of 215 years there are procreated 600000, how many will be born of three Men in the space of an hundred years? some have said above 23000, but with what success in their *Arithmetic*, I shall not determin. But whether all or any of these ways be sufficient, and satisfactory, we have yet cause to believe that there was a more than ordinary multiplication in the Posterity of *Noah* after the Flood.

Horn. def. dissert. de anat. mundi, c. 26.

3. If we embrace the account of those Copies, which the *Septuagint* follow'd in their Version, all this difficulty is then ceas'd. For that account doth very much enlarge the times, and makes almost a thousand years between the Flood and *Abraham*, by which means there will be sufficient space given for the propagation of Mankind, the building the Tower of *Babel*, the dispersion of Nations, the founding the *Assyrian* Empire, the plantation of *Egypt*, *China*, and other places, all which seem to have been in that time, and to concur with that computation, as well as *Josephus* doth, and the whole Primitive Church before *Hierom*, which certainly ought in no case to be disregarded.

The whole controversy concerning this part of the Chronology of the World comes at last to this, Whether it be more probable that the *Jews* who lived under the second Temple (who then were the Trustees to whom were committed the Oracles of God) whom the *LXX.* follow'd in their Version, had the true reading, or the *Talmudic Jews* after their dispersion and banishment from their Countrey, when they were discarded by God himself from being his People, when he broke up house among them at the destruction of *Jerusalem* and the Temple. But if the Reader desire further satisfaction concerning this difference of this Chronology of the *LXX.* from that of the present *Hebrew* Copies, he may consult the learned dissertation of the late learned Bishop of *Chester* upon the *LXX.* and the later Discourses of *Isaac Vossius* on this subject. Setting aside then the controversy between the present *Hebrew* Copies and the *LXX.* in point of integrity and incorruption, which I meddle not with, I cannot but subscribe to the judgment of our judicious Historian, **Sir W. Raleigh*. That if we look over all, and do not hastily satisfy our Understanding with the first things offer'd, and thereby being satiated do slothfully and drowsily sit down, we shall find it more agreeable rather to follow the reckoning of the *LXX.* who according to some Editions make it above 1072 years between the Flood and *Abraham's* Birth, than to take away any part of those 352 years given. For if we advisedly

Walton Proleg. ad Bibl. Polyg. c. 9. ff. 58, 63. &c. Isaac Vossius de LXX. Interpr. & anat. Mundi.
**Sir W. Raleigh Hist. p. 1. b. 2. c. 1. sect. 7.*

visedly consider the state and countenance of the World, such as it was in Abraham's time, yea before Abraham was born, we shall find that it were very ill done of us by following opinion without the guide of Reason, to pare the time over deeply between Abraham and the Flood; because in cutting them too near the quick, the reputation of the whole story might perchance bleed thereby, were not the testimony of the Scriptures supream, so as no objection can approach it; And that we did not follow withal this precept of St. Austin, that wheresoever any one place in the Scriptures may be conceiv'd disagreeing to the whole, the same is by ignorance of mis-interpretation understood. For in Abraham's time all the then known parts of the World were peopled: all Regions and Countries had their Kings. Egypt had many magnificent Cities, and so had Palæstine and all bordering Countries; yea all that part of the World besides as far as India: and those not built with sticks, but of hewn stones, and defended with Walls and Rampiers, which magnificence needed a Parent of more antiquity than those other Men have suppos'd. And therefore where the Scriptures are plainest and best agreeing with Reason and Nature, to what end should we labor to beget doubts and scruples, or draw all things into wonders and marvels? giving also strength thereby to common cavillers, and to those Mens apish brains, who only bend their Wits to find impossibilities and monsters in the Story of the World and Mankind. Thus far that excellent Historian, whose words deserve consideration. Thus much for the first Objection.

The second is, *From the great pretense of several Nations that they were self-originated, or came not from any other place.* This was the pretense of the Egyptians, Græcians, ancient Inhabitants of Italy, and others. But how little reason we have to give credit to these pretenses, will appear on these accounts. 1. The Impossibility in Nature that Mankind should be produc'd in such a way as they imagin'd, which we have manifested already in our Discourse of the Origin of the Universe. 2. That the Nations which pretended this, were never able to give sufficient Evidence of it to any other Nation which demanded it; which is manifest by their want of any certain Records of their ancient times, which is fully prov'd in our Discourse in the first Book of the want of credibility in the Heathen History. 3. The only probable Reason which induc'd these Nations to make themselves *Aborigines*, was, because they suppos'd themselves to be the first Inhabitants of the Countries they liv'd in: which altho' I may allow to the Egyptians, and some other ancient Nations, yet I cannot do it to the Hellenes or Greeks, who most vainly and arrogantly pretend to it. Which because it may give more light into the greatest Antiquities of Greece, and some other Nations than hath been yet discover'd or taken notice of, and because it may further tend to clear the truth of the Scriptures, as to the Origin of Nations, I shall more particularly inquire into the first Plantation of Greece. That it was first inhabited by some of Noah's Posterity, is out of question with all those who prefer the most ancient and undoubted Records of Scripture before the fabulous Impositions of Mens Brains. But by whose immediate Posterity the Country of Greece was first inhabited, is not yet so clear as it hath been generally

x.

2.

presum'd to be, by most who had rather follow the dictates of others, than spend time in such inquiries themselves: Which yet certainly are so far from being unworthy Mens labor and industry, that nothing tends more clearly to advance the truth of Scripture-history, than the reconciling the Antiquities of the elder Nations to what we find deliver'd of the Plantation of the World from the Posterity of *Noah*. As to this particular therefore of the first Plantation of *Greece*, I shall first propound the opinion generally embraced among Learned Men, and then shew how far it is defective, and what other more true account may be given of it. It is evident from *Moses*, Gen. 10. 5. that the Posterity of *Japhet* took possession of the Isles of the *Gentiles*, i. e. according to the *Hebrew* Idiom, not only such as are properly so call'd, but all those Countries which lay much upon the Sea, being at any distance from *Palestine*, especially such as lay between the *Ocean* and *Mediterranean* Sea; and so both *Greece* and *Italy* come under the name of the *Isles of the Gentiles*. Among the Sons of *Japhet* none is conceiv'd so probable to have first peopled *Greece*, as he whose name was preserv'd among the Inhabitants of *Greece* with very little alteration. And so as the *Medes* from *Madai*, the *Assyrians* from *Assur*, the *Thracians* from *Thiras*, by the like Analogy the *Ionians* from *Javan*. From which it is observable, that altho' among the *Greeks* themselves, the *Ionians* were but as one division of that People which inhabited *Greece*, yet other Nations comprehended all under the name of *Ionians*. For which we have sufficient evidence

Hesych. v. *Ἰωνίαι*. *Ἰωνίαι* λέγουσι. saith *Hesychius*; and more to this purpose the Schol. in *Aristoph.* *Ἰωνίαι* τῆς Ἑλλάδος Ἰόνες οἱ βάρβαροι καλεῖται. For *Ἰών* with the Insertion of the *Eolic Digamma* (which is always done when two Vowels meet) is *Ἰάπων* i. e. *Javones*; and *Stephanus Byzantinus* tells us, that from *Ἰών* comes *Ἰών*, and so *Homer*.

Hom. II. v.

Ἐνθα δὲ Βοιωτοὶ ἔ' Ἰάονες ἐλκεχτιῶνες.

And *Dionysius Periegetes* reckons up *Ἰών* as one of the Rivers of *Arcadia*,

Dionys. v. 416.

Ἐνθα μέλας ὄρε Κεῖθρις ἵνα ῥέει ὕργ' Ἰάων.

And which much confirms this opinion, the *Hebrew* word for *Javan* before the points added by the *Masorites*, viz. יָוָן bears a perfect Analogy with the *Greek* Ἰών, and יָוָן in Scripture is taken for *Greece*; and so *Dan.* 8. 21. *Alexander* is call'd יָוָן מֶלֶךְ, which the LXX render βασιλεὺς ἰωνίων; and *Joel* 3. 6. Thou have sold my Sons, בְּנֵי הַיּוֹנִי the Sons of *Javan*, i. e. to the *Greeks*, as it is generally understood. But as *Javan* cannot be suppos'd to have come into these parts without his Family, so it is generally presum'd that there are no obscure foot-steps left of *Javan's* eldest Son, *Elisha's* seating himself in *Greece*. For from him *Josephus* derives the name *Αἰωλῆς*, with whom the *Jerusalem* Paraphrast concurs. *Montanus* from thence derives the name *Elis*, from whence he supposeth the *Greeks* are call'd *Ἑλλῆνες*. *Bochartus* finds the clearest remainders

Ar. Mont. *Phaleg.* p. 24.

mainders of *Elis* in *Elis*, the same with *Peloponnesus*, one part of which by *Homer* is call'd *Alisium*; thence *Ezek.* 27. 7. we read of the *purple and scarlet from the Isles of Elis*, which makes it most probable to be that part of *Greece* which lay upon the *Ionian* Sea, where the best Purple next to the *Tyrian* was found, as the Learned *Bochartus* hath demonstrated from several Authors. This is now the substance of the generally-receiv'd account concerning the plantation of *Greece* from the Posterity of *Noah*. Which if it be taken as to that People which did at length possess *Greece*, I see no reason to disapprove it; but if it be extended to the first plantation of *Greece*, I see as little to embrace it. That we may therefore judg more freely of the first Inhabitants of *Greece*, it is requisite we take an account of it from those who profess themselves most vers'd in their own Antiquities, who may in a matter of this nature, which is attested by the common consent of the most learned Antiquaries of *Greece*, be the more credited, in that what they thus deliver, may be suppos'd to come from an ancient and undoubted Tradition.

Bochart.
Phaleg. l. 3.
cap. 10.

It is evident therefore, from the judgment of the most learned and judicious, even of the *Greeks* themselves, that *Greece* was first inhabited by a People by them call'd *Barbarous*, i. e. a People different from them in Language and Manners. So *Ephorus*, whom *Polybius* commends as the best Writer of the *Greek Antiquities*, saith that *Greece* was inhabited by a barbarous People before the *Hellens* came into it. And *Hecataeus Milesius* cited by *Strabo* concerning *Peloponnesus*, ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ Ἑλλάδιον ἀνέστη βάρβαροι, which *Strabo* himself not only believes of *Peloponnesus*, but of all *Greece*, that it was καὶ πάλαι βάρβαρον τὸ πάλαιον, *anciently a Plantation of Barbarians*; the same is affirm'd by *Aristotle* writing of the Common-wealth of the *Tegeates* concerning *Arcadia*, that before its being possess'd by the *Arcadians*, it was inhabited by a barbarous People, who because they were expuls'd their Country before Moon-rising, the *Arcadians* call'd themselves αὐτοστῆλαι. Whether that be the ground of that vain-glorious boast (of which many reasons are given by learned Men) I here dispute not; it is sufficient that we find the *Grecians* were not the first who peopled any of these several places; which is likewise attested by *Herodotus*, *Thucydides*, and others, whose testimonies we shall afterwards produce. It being then evident that the *Grecians* were not the first who inhabited that Country after from them called *Greece*, it follows to be inquir'd what this barbarous People was, and from whence they came. *Strabo* hath given us in a large Catalogue of the names of many of them, as the *Dryopes*, *Caucones*, *Leleges*, besides the *Aones*, *Tembices*, *Hyantes*, and many others; but these seem not to have been that ancient People, but rather some latter Castlings of the *Carians*, who, as *Thucydides* tells us, did very often make inroads upon the quarters of *Greece*. That People which had the largest spread, and greatest Antiquity, was the *Pelasgi*: thence *Peloponnesus* was anciently called πελασγία. *Stephanus Byzantius* Πελοποννήσου τῆς ἐπωνυμίας, Ἄπια, Πελασγία and Ἀργεῖ; and *Apollodorus* saith, that the *Peloponnesians* were anciently called *Pelasgi*; and *Euripides*,

XI.

Strabo l. 7.
V. Scholiast.
in Apollon.
l. 4. v. 262.

Πελα-

Πελασγώτας ὀνομασμένους τὸ πρὶν
Δαναῶς.

And elsewhere,

Πρῶτον Πελασγοὶ, Δαναῖδαι τὸ δεύτερον.

Strabo l. 9. These *Pelasgi* were not only in *Peloponnesus*, but in *Attica* too, as appears by *Strabo*, where he saith the Nation of the *Pelasgi* did inhabit, and by the *Athenians* (that is after their mixture) they were called *παραγοὶ Storks*, ἀπὸ τῆς πάλιν, for their frequent removals from place to place: And *Pausanias* mentions their being under the *Acronoli* at *Athens*: that they were in *Thessaly*, is evident from *Hesychius*. Πελασγοὶ οἱ θρῳακοὶ ἐν Ἰωνίᾳ καὶ βαρβάρων, ἐν γὰρ ἀπὸ Πελασγῶν ὁδὸς Ἀρκάδος ἀνέβη καὶ πάλιν ἀνέβη: *Arcadia* seems to have the first or chief place of their residence, for the *Arcadians* who were accounted *παραίτιες* ἢ καὶ *ἰαλῶν*, do vindicate the Founder of this Nation, whom they call *Pelafgus*, to themselves, and say he was an *αὐτόχθων* among them, that is, the first who came into that Country; for all those, whose Original they knew not, they called *Terræ filios*, and *Genuinos terræ*. *Pausanias* rightly conjectures that he was the first Man among them, not as tho' he was alone, but because the Chief Ruler and Commander among them, and that brought them into the Country; but tho' they might fix themselves about *Arcadia*, it is evident they spread further; for *Menecrates Eleates* in his Book of the Founders of Cities, affirms that all the Sea-coasts of *Greece* called *Ionica*, beginning from *Mycæ*, were first inhabited by the *Pelasgi*; nay we find them yet much higher in *Epirus*, who were, as *Strabo* tells us, the first Founders of that famous Oracle of *Dodona*; for so *Ephorus* in him saith it was *Πελασγῶν ἱδρυμένη*, and that these were τῶν πρῶτῶν τῶν ἐν Ἰαλῶν ἀνιστάμενων ἀρχαίων: thence the Poet,

Ζεὺς ἄνα Δωδωναῖς Πελασγικέ.

And *Hesiod*,

Δωδώνῳ φυγόντε Πελασγῶν ἔδρανον ἦεν.

Strabo further makes it evident, that they were a barbarous People which liv'd about *Dodona*, from the description *Homer* gives of them,

ἀμφὶ δὲ Σελλοὶ
Σοὶ ναῖουσ' ὑποφῆται, δυνήϊο ποδὲς χαμαιδύναι.

Philostr. in Imag. Which *Philostratus* best interprets, when he saith they were *αὐτοχθόνες* καὶ *ἰσχυροὶ* ἐν ἡλικίᾳ καὶ ἐν πνεύματι, *such that thought the Gods were best pleased with their simplicity and severity of life*, and therein far different from the *Grecian* humor. *Suidas* in *Thessalicis* (cited likewise by *Strabo*) saith that the Temple of *Dodona* was remov'd from

from *Scotusa* in *Pelasgia* to *Theffaly*, which is confirm'd by *Herodotus* in *Euterpe*, where he largely speaks of the *Temple* and *Oracle* at *Dodona*. These *Pelasgi* confin'd not themselves to *Greece* neither, but were dispers'd into the neighbor *Islands*, as *Chios*, *Crete*, *Lesbos*, *Lemnos*, *Imbro*, *Samos*, as will appear afterwards; and at last came into *Italy*, as is well known, and are thought to be the same with the *Tyrrhenians*, and by some conceiv'd to be the first *Founders* of *Rome*. We see what a large spread the *Pelasgi* had over *Greece*, which was divided after the *Hellens* began to appear, into τὸ πηλοποννησίον and τὸ ἑλλάδικον, as *Herodotus* witnesseth; and so these two appear to be a very different People from one another, and not the same under different names, as is commonly thought.

Which sufficiently appears from their Language, which was quite XII.
different from one another. So *Herodotus* Ἦσαν οἱ Πελασγοὶ βάρβαρον γλῶσσαν ἔχοντες, they us'd a barbarous Language: i. e. a Language not understood by the *Hellens*; who at first had their chief residence in *Theffaly*, from whence by degrees they came forwards into *Greece*, as *Thucydides* shews. For altho' the name of *Hellens* at last spread it self over all the People of *Greece*, yet it was at first peculiar to that part of *Theffaly* called *Pthiotis*, and thence *Homer* calls them properly *Hellens* which followed *Achilles* from thence; and it appears by *Homer* that there was a City there called Ἐλλάς, which as *Stephanus de Urbibus* tells us was there built by Ἐλλας, altho' he will not have him to be *Hellen* the Son of *Deucalion*, but the Son *Pthius*, wherein he is mistaken; For *Thucydides* plainly shews, that it was from *Hellen* the Son of *Deucalion*, that the name Ἕλληνες came, and this *Hellen* liv'd in *Pthiotis*. But altho' they were first in *Pthiotis*, yet they daily increasing in numbers and power, by degrees they got all *Theffaly* into their hands, of which one part was called Πηλοποννησίους; afterwards under *Dorus* the Son of *Hellen* they conquer'd *Hestiaëtis*, that part of *Theffaly* which lies under the Mountains *Ossa* and *Olympus*; from thence they were beaten back by the *Cadmeans* into *Pindus*, where the *Greeks* were first called Μακεδόνες, as *Herodotus* tells us; from hence they went into *Dryopis*, and thence into *Peloponnesus*, and there had the name *Dorians*; but before their coming hither, they had first secured themselves of the *Hellens* lying between *Theffaly* and *Peloponnesus*, and there they dispossess the *Pelasgi* in all the *Attic* Region; who were now forc'd to submit or to fly; they who submitted, as most of them did, were incorporated into the *Greeks*, and became one People with them, and so by degrees lost that former Language which was peculiar to themselves and wholly distinct from the *Greek* Tongue. That the *Hellens* did thus gradually come into *Peloponnesus*, is evident from the names of People and Places common to *Theffaly* and *Peloponnesus*; which came from hence, that tho' the *Greeks* left the Cities behind them, yet they carried most of the names along with them. Thus the *Achai*, *Ionians*, and *Æolians*, and *Dorians* in *Peloponnesus* came from those of the same names in *Theffaly*; and so likewise the names of these following Regions and Cities were common to both, as *Ellopiea*, *Estiæa*, *Eretria*, and *Oropos*, *Graia*, *Larissa*, *Psophis*, *Iton*, *Oechalia*, and very many others. *Salmasius* seems to be of opinion, that the *Pelasgi* never us'd any Language distinct from the *Hellens*; but besides that it is directly

Salmas. de
Helien. p.
315.

Bbb

con-

contrary to the testimony of *Herodotus*, the Arguments he produceth for it are very weak. The first is because the *Pelasgi* that went into *Italy*, did use the *Greek* Tongue, from their calling *Agylla Cære*, from *ἄγυς*, a word pronounc'd from one on the Walls; and because the *Arcades* us'd only the *Greek* Language in the *Æolian* Dialect, which *Evander* carried with him into *Italy*, and from which most of the old *Roman* Language was deriv'd. But doth not *Herodotus* expressly say, that after the mixture between the *Greeks* and *Pelasgi* these by degrees lost their own proper Language and made use of the common *Greek* Tongue? Yet afterwards too it is evident from *Herodotus* in some places, as at *Crotone*, they did use a Language different from the *Greek*. His other Argument is, That the names of the eldest persons mention'd were originally *Greek*; but this is expressly deny'd by *Strabo*, who makes the contrary one of his strongest Arguments, that the *Barbarians* did anciently inhabit *Greece*; and instanceth in *Cecrops*, *Codrus*, *Æolus*, *Cothus*, *Drymas*, *Crimanus*. Thus we have abundantly prov'd against the common opinion, that *Greece* was not first peopl'd by the *Hellens*, or the Posterity of *Elisa*, altho' these did afterwards come to the full possession of *Greece*.

XIII.

It remains that we shew whence these *Pelasgi* came, and of whose Posterity they were, and what the Language was which was us'd by them. He that gave the name to this People according to the *Grecian* Fables, was one *Pelasgus*, which none will wonder at among them, whose constant custom it was, (partly by reason of their Ignorance of the true account of their Names, and partly by their Pride that they might not seem ignorant of any thing) when they meet with any Names of People, to find out some Person near it who was the Founder of them. Thus *Attica* from *Actæus*, it being anciently called *Ἀττική*, and *Cranæ* from *Cranæus*, *Ægialea* from *Ægialeus*, *Mauritania* from *Maurus*, *Scythia* from one *Scythes*, *Galatæa* from *Galates*, and thus in multitudes of other Names. But from the Name *Pelasgi* we may probably find out the true Founder of the People, allowing that variation which is usually caus'd thro' the *Greeks* melting the harsher words of the *Eastern* Languages into a sound fit for their more delicate palates, as is evident in the comparing the Names of the Prophets in *Hebrew*, with what they are in the *Greek* Version. Thus the *Pelasgi* may with great probability be deriv'd from *פֶּלֶג*, *Phaleg*; for which we have the concurrent testimony of two Learned Persons, *Grotius* and *Salmasius*, who are contented to mention it, without bringing much evidence of Reason for it. What they only touch at, we shall endeavour to make out more at large; which we shall do by removing the great presumptions against it, and laying down the probabilities for it. The great presumptions lying against it are, for that the Isles of the Nations fell to the Posterity of *Japheth*, and that *Phaleg* liv'd with *Eber* in *Chaldea*. For the first, it must be acknowledg'd that the greatest part of the Countries lying upon the *Ocean* and *Mediterranean*, were in the time when *Moses* wrote so inhabited; not that the Habitations of the Sons of *Noah* had their bounds and limits set them either by God or *Noah*, but that the posterity of *Japheth* did chiefly address themselves to those parts which lay towards *Europe*; but yet not so, as to exclude any

*Grot. not.
in lib. 1. de
jure bel.
c. c. 3.
Sed. de
Hellen.*

of the Posterity of *Sem*, if their necessities for further room made it necessary for them to seek for Habitations further abroad. For we can have no reason to think, that because the chief of *Sem*'s Posterity did live together, therefore none of them went further off, which necessity would put them upon because of their great increase; for we read of *Phaleg* and others, that besides those in direct Line to *Abraham*, (whose Genealogy it was *Moses* his great design to recount) they begat many other Sons and Daughters, which would make it necessary for them, to seek their Habitations further abroad. And that *Phaleg* and *Ragau* did so, we have the expresse testimony of *Epiphanius*, Gen. 11. 19. 21.
*Φαλὲν καὶ Ραγαὺ οἵτινες ἐπὶ τὸ Ἰβέρωπι καὶ
 καὶ Ἰουδαίᾳ καὶ τῇ Σκυθίᾳ μέγιστον καὶ εἰς αὐτῶν ἔθνησι ἀποσπένθησαν. ἀπὸ τῶν δὲ Θέρας ἡλικίας καὶ
 ἐπὶ τῇ Ἰβέρῳ καὶ οἱ Θέρας γέννηται. That from the age of Therah and thence
 forward Phaleg and Ragau diverted towards the clime of Europe,
 to part of Scythia, and were joyn'd with those Nations from which
 the Thracians arose. Several things make this not so improbable
 as some have imagin'd it to be; for first, it is the constant acknow-
 ledgment of all sober Inquirers into the Original of the *Greeks*,
 that *Greece* was first peopled from *Scythia*; and indeed almost all
 the Nations in *Europe* have come out of that Country: besides
 there is evidence of it, even in the Grecian Fables; for *Prometheus*
 (from whom the *Greeks* deriv'd themselves) is fancy'd by them to
 lie bound in Mount *Caucasus*, which must be suppos'd to be the
 Country from whence he came. Again, it is evident already that
 the *Hellens* came not into *Greece* before it was peopled by the *Pe-
 lasgi*, and that these had different Language and Customs from one
 another; now then in all probability, altho' the Posterity of *Elisa*
 might come first down from *Scythia* into those parts, and seat
 themselves in *Macedonia* and *Theffaly*, where they had in probabi-
 lity more than room enough at first, and a Country to their desire:
 they might be willing to permit the Posterity of *Phaleg* to pass on
 further; for in those first Plantations we cannot otherwise concei-
 ve, but that the last comers must be the furthest goers; unless
 they had strength enough to drive the former Inhabitants out of
 their Seats whereof they were already possess'd, as the *Scythians*
 did afterwards, and so the *Hellens*; So then the Posterity of *Pha-
 leg* being forced to quit their own Country because of the multi-
 tude of Inhabitants, must be suppos'd to take that course, where
 in probability they might find an empty Seat fit for them to dwell
 in; thence they come towards *Europe*; for they saw how the Po-
 sterity of *Sem* did spread it self Eastwards already, and *Cham*
 Southwards, and coming to part of that vast Country of *Scythia*,
 which was both already taken up, and not so convenient an Habi-
 tation for them, they draw downwards towards *Thracia*, and there
 the Posterity of *Thiras*, from whom the *Thracians* came, had already
 possessed themselves; passing further into *Theffaly*, they find that
 already planted by some of the Posterity of *Elisa*, but as yet but
 scant and thin of Inhabitants; therefore they disperse themselves
 up and down through some part of *Epirus*, most part of *Ellas*,
 and some pass into *Peloponnesus*, where they fix themselves chiefly
 upon *Arcadia*, and thence spread up and down by degrees towards
 the Sea-side; for we cannot but think that the Maritime parts were
 the last peopled, partly for fear of another Deluge, partly for want*

*Epiph. de
 Scythis l.
 ep. ad
 Acu. &
 Paulum.*

of conveniency of Navigation, most of their travels being by Land; and partly when Navigation grew more in use for fear of Pirates, who drove a great Trade upon the Coasts of Greece in elder times, as is most evident from *Thucydides* in the beginning of his History. Thus we have a reasonable account given of the *Pelasgi* their first coming into Greece, and how by degrees the *Hellens* came to possess their Country, and what a fair pretence the *Arcadians* had to boast of the greatest Antiquity, their Country being probably first peopled by the *Pelasgi* of any part of the whole *Chersonese*, and the Seat of the Leader of the whole Company whom they call *Pelagus*, and the Scriptures *Phaleg*.

XIV.

Having thus far clear'd the Antiquities of Greece as to the first Planters of it, whom we have evidenc'd to have been the *Pelasgi*, and these deriv'd from *Pelag*, it will be no great difficulty to resolve what Language they brought along with them, which must be suppos'd to be the same with that us'd in the Family from whence *Peleg* or *Phaleg* came, as to the substance of it, altho' it might admit as great variation of Dialect from it as the *Chaldee* or *Syriac* doth. But this I will not only suppose, but offer these probabilities for the proof of it; the first is, the agreement of the ancient Greek Language with the *Hebrew* in many of its primitive words; and here we have a most rational and probable account given of it; which is, the *Greeks* mixing with the *Pelasgi*, and both coming to be one People, they must needs retain many of the old words us'd by the *Pelasgi* in their Greek Language, which are evidently of an Eastern extraction, the ground of which cannot with such probability be fetch'd from *Cadmus* and the *Phœnicians*, because it is not so easy admission of a foreign Language after the perfection of their own, unless by long tract of time, or great numbers over-running the former People, neither of which can be so truly affirm'd of *Cadmus* and his company, for they were soon driven out of Greece, he himself ending his days in *Illyricum*, neither was their spread so large as that of the *Pelasgi*, who were before possessors of the Country; and it is continually seen how impossible it is for any Conquerors, as the *Greeks* were, to bring their own Language so into a place, where some of the former People are suffered to live, and not to retain many of their old words among them, and so make the Language mix of both, as it is in all Nations conquer'd by the *Romans*; the *Roman* not being purely spoken by any, but corrupted with a mixture of the former Language in use among them. The second Argument is from the different Pronunciation and Dialects in use in the Greek Language; of which no account so likely can be given, as the mixture with different Languages. This is most evident in the *Doric* Dialect; for the *Dorians* inhabiting probably where most of the *Pelasgi* had been, their Pronunciation and Dialect is the nearest to the Eastern of any of the *Greeks*. In the *Doric* Dialect the *πλαττερειν* or broad pronunciation, is a great part of: So he in *Theocritus* upbraids the *Dorians*, they speak every thing very broad; which answers to the pronunciation of the Eastern Languages, besides, the *Dorians* lights much in adding *a* to the end of words, which is the custom of Eastern Tongues, especially the *Syriac* and *Chaldee*.

much widen the Pronunciation. The third Argument is from the remainders of the Eastern Tongues in those places, especially where the *Pelasgi* had been. The *Pelasgi* are much taken notice of for their frequent removes and travelling from one place to another; which I suppose was chiefly after the *Hellens* had conquer'd the Country where they dwelt, then they were forc'd to go seek better Habitations abroad; thence *Strabo* calls the Nations of the *Pelasgi* *πολύπλοον* ἢ *ἄλλοι* τὸ *ἔθνος* ἀπὸς *ἰππωνασίας*: and elsewhere that they were *πολλὰ καὶ τὸ* *Εὐρώπης* τὸ *παιαὶν* *παιωνώμηναι*, they went up and down to a great part of *Europe*; but we may suppose them to have made their first and chief resort to the neighbor Islands to *Greece*; where we shall see what evidence they left of their Language there. The first Island we meet with them in, is *Crete*; so *Strabo* speaking of them, *Καὶ ἥ δ' ἡ Κρήτης ἀποικίη γηγέναισι, αἷς φησὶν Ὀμήρου*; that a Colony of them liv'd in *Crete*, for which he voucheth *Homer's* Authority:

Ἄλλη δ' ἄλλων γλῶσσαι μεμιγμένη, ἐν μὲν Ἀχαιοί,
Ἐν δ' Ἑτεόκεντες μεγαλήτορες, ἐν δ' Κυδῶνες,
Δωριεὲς τὲ τετραῖκες, δῖοι τε Πελασγοί.

Hom. Odyss.
τ. 175.

It is evident then that the *Pelasgi* were in *Crete*. Now most of the *Cretan* words are of an Eastern extraction, if we believe the Learned *Bochartus*, who hath promis'd a Discourse on that subject; besides *Crete* we find the *Pelasgi* in *Chios*, ἢ *Χίος* δὲ οἰκιστὴς ἰαυτῶν *Πελασγῶν* φασὶ τὰς αἰ *Θητῆρας*, saith *Strabo*, the Inhabitants of *Chios* say that the *Pelasgi* of *Thessaly* were their first Inhabitants; and here the fore-named Learned Person hath deriv'd the Name *Chios*, the Mountain *Pelinaus*, and the Wine *Arvisium*, all from the Eastern Languages. The next we find them in, is *Lesbos*, ἢ *τὴν* *Λέσβον* *Πελασγῶν οἰκιστὰς*, *Strabo* l. 1. which from them was called *Pelagias*, saith *Strabo*, whose Name is likewise fetched out of the East. By *Bochartus* further we find them in *Lemnos* and *Imbros*: so *Anticlidus* in *Strabo*, αὐτὸς φησὶ *Πελασγῶν* ἢ *Δίμνον* ἢ *Ἰμβρὸν* καὶ *Ἰόνιον*; concerning whose Names, see *Bochartus* 82. I know that Learned Author makes the *Phœnicians* the Authors of all these Names, from no other ground generally, but because they are of an Eastern derivation; but according to what we have laid down, we may yield to the thing it self, and upon clearer grounds; for of some of these Islands he ingenuously confesseth he can find no evidence of the *Phœnicians* being in them. *Phœnices in his Insulis habitasse nusquam legimus*: but we find it very plain, that in those very Islands the *Pelasgi* inhabited; and whether account then be more probable, let the Reader judge. One thing more I shall insist on, which is the Original of the *Samo-thracian Mysteries*: That these were as to their Names from the Eastern Languages, is now acknowledg'd by all Learned Men, the *Cabiri* being so evidently deriv'd from *כביר*, which signifies *strength* and *power*, i. e. the *Dii potes*, so *Cabiri* is explain'd by *Varro* and *Tertullian*, and the particular Names of the several *Cabiri* mention'd by the Scholiast on *Apollonius*, *Ἀξίμενος*, *Ἀξίμενος*, *Ἀξίμενος* and *Κάδμω* are very handsomely explain'd by that Learned and Excellent *Bochartus* from the Eastern Languages; only he will needs have them deriv'd from the *Phœnicians*, whereas *Herodotus* expressly tells us that they

Bochart. de
Phœn. Col.
l. 1. c. 15.

Strabo l. 1.
c. 9.

Bochart.
Geogr. p. 2.
l. 1. c. 12.

Phœn. l. 1.
c. 9.

Tertull. de
spe. c. 8.

Bochart.
ibid. l. 1.
c. 12.

Herod. l. 2. were from the *Pelasgi*, whose words are these; ὅτι δὲ πάλιν Καθεύσαν ὄρηα μεμνημένων πάλιν Σαμοθρίτικας ἐπιπλέουσιν λαβόντες τὸν Πηλασγῶν. And again, τὸν δὲ Σαμοθρίτικον αἶσαν ἀπὸ τῶν Πηλασγῶν ἔχει πάλιν παρ' Ἀθηναίων σύνομις ἐχέουσα, καὶ τὸν δὲ Σαμοθρίτικον τὰ ὄρηα ἀπὸ τῶν Πηλασγῶν. We see evidently by this, that the *Samothracians* deriv'd their Mysteries from the *Pelasgi*; and without all question they had their names from thence, whence they deriv'd their Mysteries: And to this purpose it is further observable, that as the old *Hetrurians* were certainly a Colony of the *Pelasgi*, upon their removal out of *Greece*; so *Vossius* observes that the old *Hetruscan* language (*fere a Syris habet cuncta sacrorum nomina*) hath almost all the sacred Appellations from the Eastern tongues. For which purpose it is further observable, which *Grotius* takes notice of, that the *jus pontificum Romanorum* was taken a great part from the *Hetrusci*, and the *Hetrurians* had it *ab Hebræis* out of the Eastern parts.

Vossius de
Idol. l. 2.
c. 57.
Grot. An-
not. in Mat.
12. 1.

XV. By all which I cannot conceive but this opinion, notwithstanding its novelty, is advanc'd to as high a degree of probability, as any that stands on the like foundations; and not only so, but it is an excellent clue to direct us to the Labyrinth of Antiquities, and gives us a fair account whence the *Eastern Tongues* came to be so much us'd among both the ancient *Greeks* and *Hetrurians*. One thing more this will help us to understand far better than any *salvo* hath been yet us'd for it; which is the affinity spoken of by *Axius* King of *Lacedæmon* in his Letters to *Onias*, between the *Jews* and *Lacedæmonians*: ὡς ἐστὶν ἐν γράμματι πρὸς τὸν Σπαρτιάτην ὁ Ἰουδαῖος ὁ ὀνόματι ἀδελφός, ὅτι εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν γένος Ἀβραάμ· which is explain'd by *Josephus* thus: ἐστὶν ὁμογενεῖς γένος πρὸς αὐτὸν ὡς ἐστὶν ἐν γένει Ἰουδαῖος καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιος ὁ καλεῖται Ἀβραάμ. They had found in a boook that the *Jews* and *Lacedæmonians* were of the same stock, from their mutual relation to *Abraham*. *Vossius* thinks the original of this was from those of the posterity of *Anak*, who came into *Greece*, and Peopled *Sparta*, and would seem to have been of the posterity of *Abraham*; or that they were partly of the Posterity of *Abraham* by *Agar* or *Ceturah*, and partly of the *Canaanites*, driven out by *Joshua*: But how unlikely a thing is it (suppose *Sparta* Peopled by the *Canaanites*, which yet is not evident) that they should give out themselves to be of that stock which they had been expell'd their Country by? And for the true posterity of *Abraham* coming thither, as we have no ground for it but the bare assertion, so we have this strong evidence against it, that all that came from *Abraham* were Circumcis'd, as the *Ishmaelites*, *Hagarans*, &c. which we never read of among the *Lacedæmonians*. *H. Grotius* differs not much from the opinion of *Vossius* concerning the ground of this kindred between the *Jews* and *Spartans*: For in his Notes on that place in the *Maccabees*, where it is spoken of, he gives this account of it. The *Dorians*, of whom the *Spartans* were a part, came from the *Pelasgi*; the language of the *Pelasgi* was different from that of the *Greeks*, as appears by *Herodotus* in his *Clio*: ἦσαν οἱ Πηλασγοὶ βαρβαροὶ γλῶσσαν ἄντικα. Now the *Pelasgi* (saith he) are ἡδὲ διασπέρσι, a scatter'd Nation; thence he supposeth the *Pelasgi* or banish'd People, to have come from the *Arabia* and *Syria*, in which the posterity of *Abraham* and *Ceturah* had plac'd themselves. But 1. it is uncertain whether the posterity of *Abraham* by *Ceturah* were plac'd so near *Canaan* or no. I

know

know *Junius* endeavors to find the seat of all the Sons of *Ceturah* in *Arabia*; but *Mercer* gives several not improbable reasons why he conceives them plac'd not in the East of *Canaan*, but in the Eastern parts of the World. 2. We have no evidence at all of any remove of these Sons of *Abraham* by *Ceturah* out of the parts of *Arabia*, supposing them plac'd there; nor any reason why they should be banish'd thence. 3. That which was the badge of *Abraham's* posterity, was never that we read of in use among the *Spartans*, which was Circumcision. Indeed in much later Ages than this we speak of, we read of a People among the *Thracians* who were circumcis'd, whom the *Greeks* themselves judg'd to be *Jews*. So *Aristophanes* brings the *Odomantes* in. τίς τ' Ὀδομαντῶν τὸ πρὸς Διονύσιον ἀνδρῶν (saith the Scholiast) i. e. ἀνέκταν, ἱεραίων δὲ ἐκ ἀπὸ πλάτος οἱ Θούριες τὰ αἰδῶν καὶ ἀποσεσυρμένα εἶχον αὐτοί. Whereby it is plain that Circumcision was in use among the *Thracians*; for these *Odomantes* were (saith the Scholiast) a People of *Thrace*. φανὶ δὲ αὐτοὶ Ἰουδαίους εἶναι. It seems it was a Tradition among them that they were *Jews*. If so, it seems most probable that they were some of the ten Tribes, who were plac'd about *Colchis*, and the adjacent places: For *Herodotus* in *Euterpe* saith, that the *Syrians* that liv'd about the Rivers *Thermoodon* and *Parthenius*, learn'd Circumcision from the *Colchi*, of whom he saith, Μῆνοι πάντων Κόλχοι καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι καὶ Αἰθίοπες ἀπὸ τῶν Κόλχων τὸ αἰδῶν. Only the *Colchi*, and *Egyptians*, and *Ethiopians* had originally the custom of Circumcision. Or else the *Odomantes* might be some of the dispers'd *Jews* in *Armenia*, where *Strabo* mentions a Region call'd *Odomantis*, and so they retain'd the name of the place from whence they came, after their removal into *Thrace*. But whatever these *Odomantes* were, they were far enough from the *Spartans*, who never were thus suspected of *Judaism*, nor laugh'd at for Circumcision. So that this opinion of *Grotius* on that account seems not very probable. *Bochartus*, who hath been so happy in many other Conjectures, yet here gives out, unless it may depend upon the Testimony of *Claudius Iolus* in *Stephanus Bizantius*, who fabulously derives the *Jews* from one *Judeus Sparton*, who went from *Thebes* along with *Bacchus* into the Wars; which *Sparton* they might confound with another *Sparton*, the Son of *Phonoreus*, the Founder of *Sparta*; which yet is rejected as a Fable by *Pausanias* in *Laconicis*. Surely the *Lacedæmonians* were very ambitious of Kindred with the *Jews*, that would claim it upon such grounds as these, especially at such a time when the People of the *Jews* were under distress, and their Kindred might be like to cost them so dear; and if they had never such a mind to have claim'd Kindred with the *Jews*, they would certainly have done it upon a more plausible Testimony than the Fable of one *Claudius Iolus*, that had neither Sense nor Reason in it; and yet supposing his Fable true, it had been nothing to the purpose, without the linking another Fable to it, which was so gross, that even the *Greeks* themselves were asham'd of it, who were always the most daring Forgers of Fables in the World. But let us see further what the Divine (as some have lov'd to call him) *Jos. Scaliger* saith to it: All that he saith, is only a wonder or two at it: *Quid magis mirum quam Lacedæmonios ab Abraham prognatos esse*, &c. and a refutation of an absurd opinion, that *Oebalus* the

Aristoph.
Acharnen.
Act. 1. sc. 4.

Strabo l. 11.

Bochart. de
Phœn. Col.
l. 1. c. 22.

Scalig. Ca-
non. Isag.
p. 332.

the Father of *Tyndareus*, and Grandfather of *Castor*, *Pollux*, and *Helena*, was the same with *Ebal*, mention'd *Gen. 10. 28.* which there can be no reason for, since *Ebal* was the Son of *Joktan*, and so of another Race from *Abraham*; and *Joktan's* Sons were plac'd Eastward, but chiefly *Oebalus* was within an hundred years before the destruction of *Troy*; but *Phaleg* Uncle to *Ebal*, died 664 years before *Oebalus* in *A. M. 1993.* Thus far then we cannot ~~find any~~ plausible account of this claim of Kindred: but tho' it be an endless task to make good all the claims of Kindred in the World, especially to Persons of Power and Authority, yet there being no visible interest or design which the *Spartans* could have in such a claim, especially at that time with a Nation generally hated and maligned by Heathen Idolaters, we cannot suppose but there must be some at least plausible ground for such a persuasion among them. What if we should conjecture that the *Spartans* might find in the Greek Version of the *Pentateuch*, which was much spread abroad at that time among the Sons of *Ishmael*, one whose name makes the nearest approach to their *Cadmus*, from whom they suppose themselves deriv'd; for the youngest of *Ishmael's* Sons was call'd *Kedemah*, *Gen. 25. 15.* which the *Syriac* renders *Kedem*, the very name of *Cadmus* in the Eastern Tongues. But this being a light conjecture, I pass it by, and return to the subject of our discourse, which gives a plausible account of the ground of this Kindred. We have already shew'd that the *Pelasgi* were the first who Peopled *Greece*, (*καὶ τῇ Ἐλλάδι πᾶσι ἐπαύλατο*, is *Strabo's* expression of that Nation, that it spread over all *Greece*,) and withal it appears that the chief Seat of the *Pelasgi* was in *Arcadia*, to which next adjoyns *Laconia*; and therefore in all probability was Peopled by them; and besides, the *Dorians* sprang from the *Pelasgi*, and the *Spartans* were a part of the *Dorians*, as appears already out of *Grotius*; so that what Kindred the *Pelasgi* had, was ~~come~~ down to the *Spartans*; and we have manifested that these *P* from *Phaleg*, and the Scripture tells us that *Phaleg* was the son of *Eber*, from whom *Abraham* came in a direct and lineal succession; thus the *Jews* coming from *Abraham* and the *Spartans* by the *Pelasgi* from *Phaleg*, they both came out of the same stock: For so *Josephus* expresseth it, not that the *Lacedæmonians* came from *Abraham*, but that the *Jews* and they were both *ἔκ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀπογόνου*, out of the same stock, and both had relation to *Abraham*; the *Jews* as coming in a direct line, the *Spartans* as deriving from *Phaleg*, from whom *Abraham* came. And thus much may now suffice to clear the first Plantation of *Greece*, and to shew how consonant it is to sacred Scripture, which I have taken the more pains in, because of the serviceableness of this discourse to that end, and to shew what use may be made of this kind of Learning, for vindicating the honor of the Sacred Scriptures.

The only thing remaining as to the origin of Nations, is the Peopling of that vast Continent of *America*, which I cannot think we have yet sufficient information, either concerning the ~~passage~~ *passage* thither, especially East and North, or concerning any Records the *Indians* have among themselves absolutely to determin any thing in it. It seems most probable that the several parts of it were ~~Peopled~~ *Peopled* several times, and from several parts, especially North and East; but to go about absolutely to determin from what Nation, in what

Gen. 11. 17.
28.

Age, by what means they were first Peopled, were a piece of as great confidence as ignorance, till we have more certain discoveries of it. I chuse therefore rather to refer the Reader to the bandyings of this Controversy in the many Writers about it, than to undertake any thing as to the decision of it. Only in the general it appears from the remaining Tradition of the Flood, and many Rites and Customs us'd among them, that they had the same original with us, and that there can be no Argument brought against it from themselves, since some Authors tell us, that the eldest Accounts and Memoirs they have, do not exceed 800 years backward; and therefore their Testimony can be of no validity in a matter of so great Antiquity, as the origin of Nations is.

V. Gros.
Job. de
Laet. Horn.
de Orig.
Gent. A-
merican.
V. Manesse
Ben. Israel.
Spec. Israel.
Et Spizzel.
de Israel.
American.

CHAP. V.

Of the Origin of the Heathen Mythology.

- I. That there were some remainders of the ancient History of the World preserv'd in the several Nations after the dispersion.
- II. How it came to be corrupted: by decay of Knowledge, increase of Idolatry, confusion of Languages.
- III. An inquiry into the cause of that. Difficulties against the common opinion that languages were confounded at Babel.
- IV. Those difficulties clear'd.
- V. Of the fabulousness of Poets. The particular ways whereby the Heathen Mythology arose. Attributing the general History of the World to their own Nation. The corruption of Hebraisms. Alteration of names. Ambiguity of sense in the Oriental languages.
- VI. Attributing the actions of many to one person, as in Jupiter, Bacchus, &c.
- VII. The remainders of Scripture-history among the Heathens. The names of God, Chaos, formation of Man among the Phoenicians. Of Adam among the Germans, Egyptians, Cilicians. Adam under Saturn. Cain among the Phoenicians. Tubal-Cain and Jubal under Vulcan and Apollo. Naamah under Minerva.
- VIII. Noah under Saturn, Janus, Prometheus and Bacchus.
- IX. Noah's three Sons under Jupiter, Neptune and Pluto. Canaan under Mercury, Nimrod under Bacchus, Magog under Prometheus. Of Abraham and Isaac among the Phoenicians.
- X. Jacob's service under Apollo's. The Βαιτύλια from Bethel. Joseph under Apis. Moses under Bacchus. Joshua under Hercules. Balaam under the old Silenus.

Ccc

THE

I. **T**HE main particulars contain'd in the Scriptures concerning the History of ancient Times being thus far clear'd, there remains only that Evidence which there is of the truth of the Historical part of those eldest times, in those foot-steps of it which are contain'd in the Heathen Mythology. For we cannot conceive, that since we have manifested that all Mankind did come from the Posterity of *Noah*, that all those passages which concern'd the History of the World, should be presently obliterated and extinguish'd among them, but some kind of Tradition would be preserv'd, altho' by degrees it would be so much alter'd for want of certain Records to preserve it in, that it would be a hard matter to discover its original, without an exact comparing it with the true History it self from whence it was first taken. For it far'd with this Tradition of the first Ages of the World, as with a Person who hath a long time travell'd in Foreign Parts, who by the variety of Climes and Countries may be so far alter'd from what he was, that his own Relations may not know him upon his return, but only by some certain marks which he hath in his Body, by which they are assur'd, that however his Complexion and Visage may be alter'd, yet the Person is the same still. Thus it was in this original Tradition of the World; thro' its continual passing from one Age to another, and the various humors, tempers, and designs of Men, it receiv'd strange disguises and alterations as to its outward favor and complexion; but yet there are some such certain marks remaining on it, by which we find out its true original. Two things then will be the main subject of our inquiry here. 1. *By what means the original Tradition came to be alter'd and corrupted.* 2. *By what marks we may discern its true original,* or what Evidences we have of the remainders of Scripture-history in the Heathen Mythology.

II. 1. Concerning the means whereby the Tradition by degrees came to be corrupted. There may be some more general, and others more particular. The general causes of it were;

Book I. c. 1.
sect. 16.

1. The gradual decay of Knowledge and increase of Barbarism in the World; occasion'd by the want of certain Records to preserve the ancient History of the World in: Which we at large discours'd of in our entrance on this subject. Now in the decay of Knowledge, there must needs follow a sudden and strange alteration of the memory of former times, which hath then nothing to preserve it, but the most uncertain report of Fame, which alters and disguiseth things according to the humors, and inclinations, and judgments of those whose hands it passeth thro'.

2. The gradual increase of Idolatry in the World: which began soon after the dispersion of Nations, and in whose Age, we cannot at so great a distance and in so great obscurity precisely determine; but as soon as Idolatry came in, all the ancient Tradition was made subservient in order to that end; and those Persons whose memories were preserv'd in several Nations, by degrees came to be worshipped under diversities of names; and such things were annexed to the former Traditions as would tend most to advance the greatest Superstition in the World.

3. The

3. The Confusion of Languages at *Babel*, was one great reason of corrupting the ancient Tradition of the World. For in so great variety (as suddenly happen'd) of Languages in the World, it cannot be conceiv'd but such things which might be preserv'd in some uniform manner, had all Nations us'd the same language, would thro' the diversity of Idioms and Properties of several Tongues be strangely alter'd and disguis'd, as will appear afterwards. This alteration of Languages in the World upon the confusion of Tongues at *Babel*, brought as great a confusion into the original Tradition, as it did among those who were the Designers of that work.

And because this subject of the original and cause of this diversity of Languages among Men, doth both tend to explain the present subject, and to clear the truth of Scripture-history, I shall a little further inquire into it. Chiefly on this account, because it is pretended that such a confusion is needless which is deliver'd in Scripture, for the producing such diversities of Languages, which would arise thro' mere length of time, and the varieties of Climes and Customs in the World. But if we only speak concerning the sense of *Moses* about it, the inquiry is of greater difficulty than at first view it seems to be. For it is pretended that *Moses* nowhere speaks of a diversity of Languages, as we understand it, but only of a confusion of their Speech who were at *Babel*, which might well be, altho' they all us'd the same Language, that is, there might be a confusion rais'd in their Minds, that they could not understand one another; their notions of things being disturb'd, so that tho' they heard one word, they had different apprehensions of it: some thinking it signify'd one thing and some another: as *Julius Scaliger* tells us that the *Jews* he had convers'd with, did not understand by it a multiplication of Tongues; but only by that confusion their former notions of things by the same words were alter'd. As if one call'd for אבן a Stone, one by that word understands Lime, another Water, another Sand, &c. this must needs produce a strange confusion among them, and enough to make them desist from their work. But supposing no such division of Languages there, yet after their dispersion, which might be caus'd by the former confusion, by the different Laws, Rites, and Customs, Commerce, and Trading, and tract of Time, there would have risen a division of their several Tongues. But if there were such a division of Tongues miraculously caus'd there (that as it is commonly said, all those who were of the same language, went together in their several companies) whence comes it to pass, that in their dispersion we read of several Families dispersed, which used the same language after their dispersion, as all the Sons of *Canaan* mentioned, *Gen.* 10. 15, 16, 17, 18. used the *Canaanitish* Tongue: in *Greece*, *Javan* and *Elisa* had the same language. In *Egypt*, *Misraim* and *Pathrusim*; in *Arabia* the Sons of *Joktan* and *Chus*; in *Chaldea* *Aram* and *Uz* the Inhabitants of *Syria*, *Mash* of *Mesopotamia*, *Nimrod* of *Babylon*, *Assur* of *Assyria*: whence comes it to pass if their several Tongues were the cause of their dispersion, that these several Heads of Families should use the same Tongue? Another reason against the common opinion, is this, which seems to have a great deal of force in it. If Tongues were divided at

III.

V. Mer. Casaub. de 4 linguis p. 3. &c.

Scal. Exercit. in Cor. dan. 259. fol. 1.

Ccc 2

Babel

Babel as it is imagin'd; whence was it, that the nearer any Nation lay to those who had the primitive language the *Hebrew*, they did participate more of that Tongue than those who were more remote, as is plain in the *Chaldeans*, *Canaanites*, *Greeks*, and others? Whereas if their language were divided at *Babel*, they would have retain'd their own languages as well as others. This very argument prevail'd so far with the learned *Is. Casaubon*, as appears by his *Adversaria* on this subject (publish'd by the learned Doctor's Son) as to make him leave the common opinion, and to conclude the several Tongues to be only some variations from the *Hebrew*, but yet so as many new words were invented too. Hence he observes that the *Asiatic Greeks* came nearer to the *Hebrew* than the *European*. And if this opinion hold true, it is the best foundation for deriving other languages from the *Hebrew*: a thing attempted by the same learned Person, as you may see in the Book fore-cited, and endeavor'd by *Guichardus*, *Avenarius* and others. Thus we see there is no agreement in Mens minds concerning the division of Tongues at *Babel*.

IV.

But having set down this Opinion with its Reasons, I shall not so leave the receiv'd Opinion, but shall first see what may be said for that, and leave the judgment concerning the probability of either to the understanding Reader. And it seems to be grounded on these Reasons. 1. That had it been left to Mens own choice, there cannot be a sufficient reason assign'd of languages in the World. For there being one language originally in the World, whereby Men did represent their conceptions to one another, we cannot imagin that Men should of themselves introduce so great an alteration, as whereby to take off that necessary society and converse with each other, which even Nature itself did put Men upon. Hence *Calvin* and others conclude *quidam digii loco habenda est linguarum diversitas*; because there having been that freedom of converse among Men, it is not to be supposed they should of themselves cut it off to their mutual disadvantage. But to this it is said, *That the long tract of time and diversity of Customs might alter the language*. I grant it much, but not wholly; and they would only therein differ in their languages wherein their Customs differ'd: so that there would remain still such an agreement as whereby they might understand each other, which it will be hard to find in many of the eldest languages. As for the length of time, tho' that doth alter much in reference to Words and Phrases, in which that of *Horace* holds true, *Multa renascentur quæ jam cecidere, &c.* yet it will be more difficult to find where mere length of time hath brought a whole language out of use, and another in the room of it. But that which I think deserves well to be consider'd, is this, that the greatest alteration of languages in the World hath risen from Colonies of Nations that us'd another language; and so by the mixture of either the language might be much alter'd: as the *Hebrew*, *Chaldees* in *Babylon*: the *Spanish*, *Italian* and others by the *Moors*, as *Breerwood* shews, our own by the *Normans* and others. And that were there not a diversity of languages suppos'd, this intermixture of People would bring no considerable alteration along with it, no more than a Colony from *New-England* would alter our language.

Casaub.
Distrib. de
L. Heb.
p. 17, 18.

P. 47.

Calvin.
Annot. in
Gen. 11. 1.
2.

Breerwood
Inquiries
c. 5, 6.

language here. And as for another cause assign'd of the change of languages, the difference of Climates, which *Bodin* gives as the reason why the *Northern* People use Consonants and Aspirates so much, especially the *Saxons*, and those that live by the *Baltic* Sea who pronounce thus, *Per theum ferum pibimus penum finum*. And so *R. D. Kimchi* observes of the *Ephraimites*, *Judg.* 12. 6. that it was the Air that was the cause of their lisping, and calling it *Sibboleth*, as he there observes the Men of *Sarphath*, that is, the *French*, that they could not pronounce *Schin*, but pronounc'd it like *Thau Raphe*. But by these examples we see that this would cause only an alteration as to some Letters and Syllables, and rather as to the pronunciation, than any variety of the language. So that we see that, setting aside the confusion of languages at *Babel*, there can be no reason sufficient assign'd for the variety of languages in the World. 2. Tho' it be granted, that a confusion in their Minds without distinct languages were enough to make them desist from their work, yet the Context in that place, *Gen.* 11. doth infer a diversity of tongues, as will appear from the antecedents and consequents; as from the first verse, where it is not conceivable why it should be there taken notice of as such a remarkable circumstance, that then they had but one language before they set upon this work, if there was not a diversity of tongues caused by the work they went about; but especially *ver.* 6. where God takes such notice of this very thing, that they had but one language, wherein they were so confident to carry on their work; therefore, *ver.* 7. when he would destroy their work by confounding their language, it must be by multiplying that language into many more; for it must be taken in opposition to what is said in the other verse. And what is there added, *their not understanding one anothers speech*, seems to refer not to their inward conceptions, as tho' they did not understand one anothers Minds, but to the outward expressions, as שִׁבְחָה doth apparently relate to them: further in *ver.* 8. this is set down as the cause of their dispersion, which had the tongue been the same afterwards as it was before, could have been no reason for it. Again some argue from the name *Babel* given to the place, from בָּבֶל, which signifies to *confound* and mingle things of several kinds together. So us'd *Judg.* 19. 21. *Ezra* 30. 24. *Job* 6. 5. &c. thence the name בָּבֶל for בִּלְבֵל the middle ^ל left out, as in *Golgotha* for *Golgoltha*, *Kigaltha* for *Kilkaltha*, and others of a like nature. Besides, there seems to be somewhat in what is said, *that the families were divided according to their tongues*, *Gen.* 10. 5, 20, 31. which doth at least imply a diversity of tongues among them, the cause of which must be assigned by them who will not allow of the confusion and division of languages at *Babel*. Further, this seems most agreeable to God's end in making of them thus leave off their work, that there might be not only a present judgment upon them, but that which might remain to Posterity as a note of the folly of their Ancestors. Those who recede from the common opinion lest they should give advantage to Infidels by attributing that to a Miracle, which might be done without, seem to be more wary than wise in it. For besides that it is certain that Miracles may be in those things which might be effected otherwise by natural causes, when they are produced

Bochart.
Geog. l. 1.
c. 15.
Buxt. diatr.
sect. 54.
Ibid. sect.
68.

Lipf. cent.
3. ep. 44.
Busbeq. ep.
24.

Mayer.
Philol. sacr.
p. 2. c. 6.

without the help of those Causes, and in a space of time impossible to nature; and that it hath not been as yet prov'd how such diversity of tongues as is in the World would have been effected without such a Miracle; it must be granted by them that there was a Miracle in it; and what greater difficulty there should be in the variety of languages, than in the signification of the same words, I understand not. But I see no necessity of asserting that every one of the Families had a distinct language; and the common opinion of 70 or 72. as the Gr. Families and as many languages, is now taken for a groundless fancy by learned Men: as is easily prov'd from the dividing Father and Children, whose Families could not certainly be without them: and some suppos'd to be unborn then, as *Joktan's* 13 Children; especially if we say, as many do, that the confusion was at the birth of *Phaleg*, and *Joktan* was his younger Brother, as the *Jews* generally do. To the last objection it may be reply'd, that the agreement of languages in some radical words doth not infer the derivation of the one from the other, as is plain in the *Persian* and *German*, in which learned Men have observ'd so many words alike. And so by *Busbequius* of the Inhabitants about *Tauric Chersonese*; and so in most of our modern tongues there may be some words alike without any such dependence or derivation. Again, tho' it be granted that the languages of them who were at *Babel* were confounded, yet it is not necessary we should say that all *Noah's* posterity were there. It is thought by some that they were chiefly *Cham* and his company; if so, then *Sem* and his Posterity might retain the language they had before, only with some variations. But this is very uncertain, unless we take it for *Heber* and *Phaleg*, from whose vicinity other bordering Nations might make use of many of their primitive words: and for the *Greeks*, it will be granted that many of their words, especially the old *Bæotic*, had affinity with the *Hebrew*; but it was from the *Pelasgi* at first, and *Cadmus* the *Phœnician* afterwards: the old *Canaanitish* language, being if not the pure *Hebrew*, yet a dialect of that tongue, as is prov'd by many learned Men. But however these things be, it is not necessary to say that all Mother tongues so call'd, were then existent at that confusion; but the present curse did divide their languages who were there, and that all division of languages since, is to be look'd upon as the effect of that curse.

It being thus manifested what a strange confusion of languages was caus'd in the World, we may thereby easily understand how the ancient Tradition came to be corrupted and alter'd in the World.

Another reason of the alteration of the ancient Traditions, was the fabulousness of the Poets: for these made it their design to disguise all their ancient Stories under Fables, in which they were so lost, that they could never recover them afterwards. For the elder Poets of *Greece* being Men of greater learning than generally the People were of, and being conversant in *Egypt* and other parts, did bring in new reports of the ancient times which they receiv'd from the Nations they went to; and by mixing their own Traditions and others together, and by futing what was remaining of the ancient Tradition to these, they must needs make a strange confusion of things together, and leave them much more obscure

and fabulous than they found them. And herein all their cunning and subtilty lay in putting a new face on whatever they borrow'd from other Nations, and making them appear among themselves in a *Greek Habit*, that the former owners of those Traditions could scarce challenge them as theirs under so strange a *Metamorphosis*. For those things which were most plain and historical in the Fountains whence they deriv'd them, they did so *περιποιεῖν*, as *Clemens Alexandrinus* speaks, (or as *Origen*, *ὁ μεταποιεῖν τὰ ἀληθινὰ*) wrapt them up under so great *Mythology*, that the original Truths can hardly be discerned, because of that multitude of prodigious Fables, with which they have inlaid them. But as great as their Artifice was in the doing this, we may yet discern apparently many of those particular courses which were taken by them to disguise and alter the primitive Tradition.

*Clemens
Strom. 6. c.
Orig. contr.
Cels. l. 4*

1. Attributing what was done by the great Ancestors of Mankind to some Persons of their own Nations. Thus the *Thessalians* make *Deucalion* to be the Person who escap'd the Flood, and from whom the World was peopled after it. And whoever compares the Relation of the Flood of *Deucalion* in *Apollodorus* with that in the Scripture, might easily render *Apollodorus* his *Greek* in the Language of the Scriptures, only changing *Greece* into the whole Earth, and *Deucalion* into *Noah*, *Parnassus* into *Ara-rat*, and *Jupiter* into *Jehovah*. On the same account the *Athenians* attribute the Flood to *Ogyges*, not that the Flood of *Ogyges* and *Deucalion* were particular and distinct Deluges, which many have taken a great deal of needless pains to place in their several Ages: But as *Deucalion* was of the eldest memory in *Thessaly*, so was *Ogyges* at *Athens*, and so the Flood as being a matter of remotest Antiquity, was on the same account in both places attributed to both these. Because as Mankind was suppos'd to begin again after the Flood; so they had among them no memory extant of any elder than these two, from whom on that account they suppos'd Mankind deriv'd. And on the same reason it may be suppos'd that the *Assyrians* attribute the Flood to *Xisuthrus*, whom they suppos'd to be a King of *Assyria*; but the circumstances of the Story as deliver'd by *Alexander Polyhistor*, and *Abaydenus*, are such as make it clear to be only a remainder of the universal Flood which happened in the time of *Noah*. So the *Thessalians* make *Prometheus* to be the *Protoplast*; the *Peloponnesians* *Phoroneus*, as *Clemens Alexandrinus* tells us, whom *Phoronides* the Poet calls *πατρις ἡ ἀνθρώπων*, *The Father of Mankind*. This may be now the first way of corrupting the ancient Tradition, by supposing all that was convey'd by it to have been acted among themselves; which may be imputed partly to their Ignorance of the state of their ancient times, and partly to their Pride, lest they should seem to be behind others in matters of Antiquity.

*Apollod.
biblioth. l.
1. p. 19.*

*Apud Cyr.
c. Julian.
lib. 21.*

*Clemens
Strom. l. 1.*

2. Another fountain of *Heathen Mythology*, was the taking the *Idiom* of the Oriental Languages in a proper Sense. For whether we suppose the ancient Traditions were convey'd to them in the ancient *Hebrew* by the *Pelasgi*, or were deliver'd to them by the *Phœnicians*, or were fetch'd out of the Scriptures themselves (as some suppose, tho' improbably, of *Homer* and some ancient Poets) yet all these several ways agreeing in this, That the Traditions were
Oriental,

- Oriental, we thereby understand how much of their *Mythology* came by taking the *Hebrew* in a proper and literal sense without attending to the *Idiom* of the Tongue. From hence *Bochartus* hath ingeniously fetch'd many Heathen Fables. Thus when *Noah* is said to be אִישׁ הָאֲרֻמָּה *Gen.* 9. 20. which in the *Idiom* of the *Hebrew* only signifies a *husbandman*, they took it in a proper sense for *Σάτυρ* and thence *Saturn* who was the same with *Noah* (as will appear afterwards) is made by *Mythologists* the husband of *Rhea*, which was the same with the *Earth*. So the Gyants making war against Heaven, was only a Poetical adumbration of the design at the building of *Babel*, whose top in the Scripture is said to reach כְּשֹׁמַיִם, which in the *Hebrew* signifies only a *great height*; but to aggrandize the Story, was taken in the literal Interpretation, that they attempted *Heaven*. So when they are said to fight against the Gods, *Bochartus* thinks it might be taken from that phrase of *Nimrod*, that he was a *mighty hunter*, לִפְנֵי יְהוָה *before the Lord* we render it, but it sometimes signifies *against the Lord*. So what
- Ap. Enseb. Prep. Ev. l. 9.* *Abydenus* saith the Gyants, that they were ὅσοι ἐξῆλθον ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, *those that came out of the earth*, is suppos'd to be taken from that phrase, *Gen.* 10. 11. מִן הָאֲרֶזַץ יָצָא, *ex terra ipsa exiit*. But far more likely and probable is that which Learned Men are generally agreed in concerning *Bacchus* his being born of *Jupiter's Thigh*, which is only an Expression of that *Hebraism* יָצָא יֶרֶכוֹ, wherein *coming out of the thigh* is a phrase for ordinary Procreation.
- Gen.* 46. 26. 3. A third way observable, is, the alteration of the Names in the ancient Tradition, and putting Names of like importance to them in their own Language. Thus *Jupiter* who was the same with *Cham*, was called *Ζεύς* as *θεός*, from *חָמַם* *fervere, incallescere*. *Ἡρόδοτος* saith *Herodotus*; him whom the *Greeks* call *Ζεύς*, the *Egyptians* call *Cham*. So *Japheth*, whose memory was preserv'd under *Neptune*, to whose portion the Islands in the Sea fell, was called by the *Greeks* *Ποσειδών*, which comes (saith *Bochartus*) from the *Punic* *פִּשְׁיָן*, which signifies *large and broad*, which is the very importance of the *Hebrew* *יָסַח*, thence in allusion to the Name, it is said, *Gen.* 9. 27. אֱלֹהִים לִיפְתָּה יִסַּח *God shall enlarge Japhet*. Thence the *Epithets* of *Neptune* are *Εὐρυπύριος*, *Εὐρύπυρος*, all equally alluding to the Name *Japhet*. So *Δαίμων*, in the *Greek* is of the same importance with the *Heb.* *דֶּם*, *Demon*, from *שָׂרַף* *to destroy*. Thence we read, *Deut.* 32. 17. *they sacrificed לַשֵּׁרִים*, *to Devils*. *Canaan* in the *Hebrew* signifies a Merchant; thence *Mercury*, under whom the memory of *Canaan* the Son of *Cham* was preserv'd is deriv'd, by many from *מָכַר*, *to sell*. *Ceres* which was the Inventress of *Agriculture*, from *עֵרָשׁ* which imports *Bread-corn*. These and many others are produc'd by *Vossius*, *Heinsius*, *Bochartus* and other Learned Men, which I insist not on, because my design is only *digitos ad fontes intendere*, and to make these handsom and probable conjectures, argumentative to our purpose, and to bind up those loose and scattering observations into some order and method, in which they have not yet appear'd, nor been improv'd to that end which I make use of them for.
4. When the Oriental phrases were ambiguous and equivocal, they omitted that sense which was plain and obvious, and took that which was more strange and fabulous. From hence the Learned
- Bochartus*

Bochartus hath fetch'd the Fable of the *Golden Fleece*, which was nothing else but robbing the Treasury of the King of *Colchis*; but it was disguis'd under the name of the *Golden Fleece*, because the *Syriac* word *נוא*, signifies both a *Fleece* and a *Treasury*. So the *Bulls* and *Dragons* that kept it, were nothing but the *Walls* and *Brazen-gates*; for *שור*, signifies both a *Bull* and a *Wall*, and *נשר* *Brass*, and a *Dragon*. And so the Fable of the *Brass-Bull* in the Mountain of *Tabyrus* which foretold Calamities, arose from the Equivocation of the *Phœnician* or *Hebrew* words *אורף מנחש*, which signify either *Doctor*, *Augur*, or *bos ex ære*, a foreteller of events or a *Brazen-Bull*. From the like Ambiguity of the word *אליס* arose the Fable of *Jupiter* stealing *Europa* in the form of a *Bull*, because the word either signifies a *Ship* in which he convey'd her away, or a *Bull*; or it may be the Ship had *שמיניס* *bovis*, as the Ship *St. Paul* sailed in had *Castor* and *Pollux*, it being usual to call their Ships by the names of the Signs they carry'd. From the like Equivocation in the *Phœnician* Language doth *Bochartus* fetch many other Heathen Fables, in his Excellent Piece *De Phœnicum Coloniis*, as particularly that of *Arethusa* coming from *Alpheus*, which was from *אליפ* a *Ship*, because it was not far from an Excellent *Haven*. And so he makes the *Chimæra* to be no more than a mere *ens rationis*; for he takes the *Chimæra* which *Bellerophon* conquered, to be only the People of *Solymi* under the three Generals, *Aryus*, *Trosibis*, and *Arsalus*; *ארי* that signifies a *Lion*; *Trosibis* was *ראש הויא* the head of a *Serpent*: *Arsalus* was *אור ויל* a young *Kid*, and so the *Chimæra* consisted of the form of a *Lion*, a *Goat*, and a *Serpent*. Thus we see how easy a matter it was to advance the *Heathen Mythology* from the Equivocation of the Oriental Languages, in which their Traditions were convey'd to them.

Bochart.
Canaan. l.
1. cap. 28.

Ibid. l.
c. 6.

But yet a more prolific Principle of *Mythology* was by attributing the Actions of several Persons to one who was the first or the chief of them. Thus it was in the Stories of *Jupiter*, *Neptune*, *Mars*, *Mercury*, *Minerva*, *Juno*, *Bacchus* and *Hercules*, which were a collection of the Actions done by a multitude of Persons, which were all attributed to one Person. So *Vossius* tells us before the time of the *Trojan Wars*, most of their Kings, who were renowned and powerful, were called *Joves*. Now when the Actions of all these were attributed to one *Jupiter* of *Creet*, they must needs swell his Story up with abundance of Fables. *Vossius* hath taken a great deal of pains to digest in an Historical manner the Stories of the several *Jupiters*, whereof he reckons two *Argives*, a third the Father of *Hercules*, a fourth a King of *Phrygia*, and two more of *Creet*; to one of which, without any Distinction, the Actions of all the rest were ascribed, and who was worshipped under the name of *Jupiter*. And so besides the ancient *Neptune*, who was the same with *Japhet*, they sometimes understood any Insular Prince, or one that had great power at Sea; but besides these, there were two Famous *Neptunes* among the *Greeks*, the one of *Athens*, the other the Builder of the Walls of *Troy*: Now the Stories of all these being mixed together, must needs make a strange confusion. So for *Mars*, besides that ancient one they had by the Oriental Tradition, they had a *Spartan*, *Thracian*, and *Arcadian Mars*. What abundance of *Mercuries* are we told of by **Tully*? and of

VI.

5.

Voss. de
Idol. l. 1.

* *Cicero l.*
3. de Nat.
Deor.

Ddd

no

no less than five *Minervas*? Every angry, scornful, jealous Queen would fill up the Fables of *Juno*, who was equally claim'd by the *Argives* and *Samians*. What contests were there between the *Greeks* and *Egyptians*, concerning the Country of *Bacchus*, or *Liber Pater*, whose Story was made up of many patches of the Oriental Story, as will appear afterwards. The same may be said of *Hercules*. Now what a strange way was this to increase the number of Fables? when they had one whose memory was anciently preserved among them, they attributed the Actions of all such to him, who came near him in that which his Memory was most remarkable for: And in those things which they did retain of the Eastern Tradition, it was an usual thing to confound Persons, Places and Actions together. So the Story of *Enoch* and *Metbuselah* is joyned together by *Stephanus de Urbibus*, under the Name of *Annas*, who is there said to live above 300 years (which agrees with *Enoch* as the Name doth) and that at his death the World should be destroy'd by a Flood; which agrees with *Metbuselah*. So *Abraham* by *Orpheus* is called *Morophon*, which belongs to *Isaac* his Son; so the Actions of *Nimrod*, *Ninus* and *Cham*, are confounded together in their *Mythology*. By these several ways now we understand how the Original Tradition was by degrees corrupted and altered in the Heathen *Mythology*.

Steph. V.
Annas.

V. Scaliger.
Not. in
Frag. Græc.
Selden. de
Diis Syr.
Bochart.
Cana. l. 2.
c. 2.

Voss. de Idolat.
l. 1. c. 38.
Tacit. de moribus
German.

I come now to the footsteps of Scripture-history, which notwithstanding these corruptions, may be discern'd in the Heathen *Mythology*, which I shall methodically inquire after according to the series of Scripture-history. That the Names given to God in Scripture were preserv'd among the *Phœnicians*, appears sufficiently by the remainders of the *Phœnician Theology*; translated by *Philo Byblius* out of *Sanchoniathon*; wherein we read of the God *'Eloa*, which hath the same Letters with *יהוה*, besides which there we meet with *Eloah*, the same with *אלהים*, *The most High*, and *'Elo*, which is *The strong God*; *Beelsaman*, which is, *The God of Heaven*: and *Elohim*, the very Name of God us'd in the beginning of *Genesis* so often. Besides in those Fragments we have express mention of the *Chaos*, and the *Evening* following it, or *the Darkness on the face of the Deep*; the Creation of *Angels* under the *זרואים*, *אלהים* those *Beings* which contemplate the *Heavens*: and the Creation of *Mankind*, *אדם*, *The voice of the mouth of God*, which is by God's Word and Inspiration, when it is express'd that God said, *Let us make Man*, and that he *breathed into him the breath of life*. After we read of *אדם* and *אדמה*, which properly agree to *Adam*, who was made out of the *Earth*. *Vossius* conceives that the memory of *Adam* was preserv'd among the old *Germans*, of whom *Tacitus* speaks, *Celebrant antiquis carminibus Tuistum Deum terra editum, & filium Mannum, originem gentis, conditoremque*. Either by *Tuisto* *Adam* is understood, who was form'd of the *Earth*, and by *Mannus*, *Noah*: or by *Tuisto* God may be understood, and by *Mannus*, *Adam*; to which conjecture may be added further that the same Author reports that some of the *Germans* sacrificed to *Isis*, which *Vossius* likewise conceives to be a remainder of the *Hebrew Ischa*. And so among the *Egyptians* it is with like probability conceiv'd that *Adam* and *Ischa* were preserv'd

serv'd under *Osiris* and *Isis*, as they were historically taken. In *Cilicia*, the City *Adana* is thought to have some remainder of the Name of *Adam*; for the *Greeks* had no termination in *M*, therefore for *Adam* they pronounced it *Adan*, and that from *'Adanōs*, and so the City *Adana*: Now that *'Adanōs*, by *Stephanus de Urbibus*, is said to be the *Son of Heaven and Earth*. *Ἐν δὲ τῷ 'Αδανῷ γένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος πρῶτος.* *Stephan. V. Adana.* This *Adamus*, he tells us, was otherwise called *Κρόνος*, or *Saturn*, under whom the *Greeks* preserv'd the memory of *Adam*; for *Diodorus*, *Thallus*, *Cassius*, *Severus*, and *Cornelius Nepos*, do all (as *Tertullian* saith) confess *Saturn* to have been a Man; and according to their Fables, he must have been the first of Men. *Saturn* was the Son of *Heaven and Earth*, and so was *Adam*: he taught Men Husbandry; and was not *Adam* the first that tilled the ground? Besides, that power which *Saturn* had, and was depos'd from, doth fitly set out the Dominion Man had in the *Golden Age* of Innocency which he lost by his own folly. And *Adam's* hiding himself from the presence of the LORD, gave occasion to the Name of *Saturn*, from *Satar* to hide. We find something of *Cain* preserv'd in the *Phœnician* Antiquities, under the Name of *'Azeugōs*, or *'Azeugmōs*, the first Countryman or Husbandman, who with his Brother *'Azeug* built Houses, and the first foundation of a City is attributed to *Cain*: And on that account *Vossius* conjectures that the memory of *Cain's* Wife was preserv'd under *Vesta*, both because she was the Daughter of *Saturn*, i. e. of *Adam*, and that she is said *πρῶτον οἰκὸν καὶ γαμῶνα ἐβρῆν*, to find out first the way of building Houses. That *Tubal-Cain* gave first occasion to the Name and Worship of *Vulcan*, hath been very probably conceiv'd, both from the very great affinity of the Names, and that *Tubal-Cain* is expressly mention'd to be an *Instructor of every Artificer in brass and iron*; and as near relation as *Apollo* had to *Vulcan*, *Jubal* had to *Tubal-Cain*, who was the *Inventer of Music, or the Father of all such as handle the Harp and Organ*; which the *Greeks* attribute to *Apollo*. And if that be true which *Genebrard* and others ascribe to *Naamah*, the Sister of *Jubal* and *Tubal-Cain*, viz. that she was the *Inventer of Spinning and Weaving*, then may she come in for *Minerva*. Thus we see there were some, tho' but obscure footsteps preserv'd, even of that part of Scripture-history which preceded the Flood.

The memory of the Deluge it self we have already found to be preserv'd in the Heathen *Mythology*; we come therefore to *Noah* and his Posterity. Many parcels of *Noah's* memory was preserv'd in the scattered fragments of many Fables, under *Saturn*, *Janus*, *Prometheus*, and *Bacchus*. *Bochartus* insists on no fewer than 14 Parallels between *Noah* and the Heathen *Saturn*, which he saith are so plain, that there is no doubt but under *Saturn*, *Noah* was understood in the Heathen *Mythology*. *Saturn* was said to be the common Parent of Mankind, so was *Noah*; *Saturn* was a just King, *Noah* not only righteous himself, but a preacher of Righteousness; The *Golden Age* of *Saturn* was between *Noah* and the dispersion of Nations. In *Noah's* time all Mankind had but one Language, which the Heathens extend under *Saturn*, both to Men and Beasts: The Plantation of Vines attributed to *Saturn* by the Heathens, as to *Noah* by the Scriptures: The Law of *Saturn* men-

Stephan. V. Adana.

Tertull. Apolog. c. 10.

Vossius de Idol. l. 1. c. 17.

Gen. 4. 22.

4. 21.

VIII.

Bochart. Phal. l. c. 1.

tioned by the Poets, that none should see the nakedness of the Gods without punishment, seems to respect the Fact and Curse of *Cham*, in reference to *Noah*. *Saturn* and *Rhea*, and those with them are said to be born of *Thetis*, or the *Ocean*, which plainly alludes to *Noah* and his companies escaping the Flood; thence a Ship was the symbol of *Saturn*; and that *Saturn* devoured all his Children, seems to be nothing else but the Destruction of the old World by *Noah's* Flood. And not only under *Saturn*, but under *Prometheus* too, was *Noah's* memory preserved. *Diodorus* speaks of the great Flood under *Prometheus*; and *Prometheus* implies one that hath Forecast and Wisdom, such as *Noah* had, whereby he foretold the Flood, and was saved in it, when others were *Epimetheus's*, that had not Wit to prevent their own destruction.

Diod. l. i.

And no wonder if *Prometheus* were *Noah*, that the forming Mankind was attributed to him, when the World was peopled from him. *Herodotus* his saying that *Asia* was *Prometheus* his Wife, might relate to the Country *Noah* lived in, and our propagation from thence. Another part of *Noah's* memory was preserved under *Janus*; the Name of *Janus* is most probably derived from *Jan*, because of *Noah's* planting a Vine, and *Janus* was called *Consi-vius*, saith *Macrobius*, à *conserendo*, hoc est, à *propagine generis hu-mani, quæ Jano autore conseritur*; now to whom can this be so properly apply'd as to *Noah*, from whom Mankind was propagated? and *Janus* his being *bifrons* or looking *ἰσχυρὰ καὶ ὀπίσσω*, for-ward and backward, is not so fit an Emblem of any thing as of *Noah's* seeing those two Ages before and after the Flood. And it is further observable which *Plutarch* speaks of in his *Roman Questions*, that the ancient Coins had on one side the Image of *Janus* with his two Faces, on the other *ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρῶτου καὶ τοῦ ὀπίσθεν*, the fore or hinder part of the ship, by which the memory of the Ark of *Noah* seems to have been preserv'd. Thus we see what Analogy there is in the Story of *Janus* to that of *Noah*: not that I give credit to those fooleries which tell us of *Noah's* coming from *Palæstine* with his Son *Japhet* into *Italy*, and planting Colonies there, for which we are beholding to the spurious *Etruscan* Antiquities; but all that I assert is, that the Story of *Noah* might be preserv'd in the eldest Colonies, tho' disguised under other Names, as here in the case of *Janus*. And on the same account that the Name of *Janus* is attributed to *Noah*, some likewise believe him to have been the most ancient *Bacchus*, who was according to *Dio-dorus* *Εὐγενὴς ὁ ἀμπελὴν*, the first planter of Vines and instructor of Men in making Wines: and besides *Bacchus* his being twice born, seems only an adumbration of *Noah's* preservation after the Flood, which might be accounted a second Nativity, when the rest of the World was destroy'd; and withal *Philostratus* in the Life of *Apollonius*, relates that the ancient *Indian Bacchus* came thither out of *Assy-ria*, which yet more fully agrees with *Noah*. So that from these scattered Members of *Hippolytus*, these broken Fragments of Traditions, we may gather almost an intire History of all the pas-sages concerning *Noah*.

V. Mayer.
Philol. sacr.
p. 2. c. 5.

Philostr.
vit. Apoll.
c. 4.

IX.

As the Story of *Saturn* and *Noah* do much agree, so the three Sons of *Noah* and those of *Saturn*, *Jupiter*, *Neptune*, and *Pluto*, have their peculiar resemblances to each other. Of which *Vossius*

and

and *Bochartus* have largely spoken, and we have touched on already. Besides which this latter Author hath carry'd the Parallel lower, and finds *Canaan* the Son of *Cham*, the same with *Mercury* the Son of *Jupiter*; as it was the curse of *Canaan* to be a servant of servants, so *Mercury* is always described under servile employments; his Wings seem to be the Ships of the *Phœnicians* who were derived from *Canaan*, and his being the God of Trade, noting the great Merchandize of the *Phœnicians*, and *Mercury's* Thievery noting the Pyracies, or at least the subtilty and craft of the *Phœnicians*; he was the Father of *Eloquence* and *Astronomy*, as *Letters* and *Astronomy* came from the *Phœnicians* into *Greece*. The same Author parallels *Nimrod* and *Bacchus*, and *Magog* and *Prometheus* together. The Name of *Bacchus* is but a light variation of כר כוש, *Bar-chus*, as *Nimrod* was the Son of *Chus*, and *Bacchus* is called *Nebrodes* by the *Greeks*, which is the very Name of *Nimrod* among them, and *Bacchus* is called Ζωγγυδς, which excellently interprets *Nimrod's* being a mighty hunter. *Bacchus* his Expeditions into *India* were the attempts of *Nimrod* and the *Assyrian* Emperors. On which account *Vossius* makes *Nimrod* or *Belus* the most ancient *Mars*; for *Hestius Milesius* speaks of *Enyalius* which is *Mars*, his being in *Sennaar* of *Babylonia*. That the memory of *Magog* was preserved under *Prometheus*, these things make it probable, that *Magog* was the Son of *Japhet*, as *Prometheus* of *Iapetus*, and that the Posterity of *Magog* was placed about *Caucasus*, where *Prometheus* is feigned to lie: and the eating of *Prometheus* his Heart, is only an Interpretation of כגג, which apply'd to the Heart signifies to waste away, and be consum'd. Thus far *Bochartus*.

Vossius de Idol. l. 1. c. 18.
Bochart. Phaleg. l. 1. c. 1. cap. 2.

Vossius de Idol. l. 1. c. 16.

The *Phœnician* Antiquities seem to have preserved the memory of *Abraham's* sacrificing his Son *Isaac*, by that place which *Eusebius* produceth out of *Porphyrus's* Book concerning the *Jews*; where he relates, *How Saturn whom the Phœnicians call Israel, when he reigned in those parts and had an only son called Jeoud, of a Nymph called Anobret, being under some great calamity, did sacrifice that son of his, being clothed with a royal habit.* Here we have a Royal Person called *Israel*; and that *Abraham* should be accounted a King in those elder times, is nothing strange, considering his wealth, and what petty Royalties there were in those times. But *Grotius*, and from him *Vossius*, do not think that *Abraham* was here called *Israel*, but that the Transcriber of *Eusebius* meeting with י, supposed it to be a contraction of יעגל, and so writ at length: it must be acknowledg'd that י is used in the *Phœnician Theology* for *Saturn*, but yet the circumstances of the Story make the ordinary reading not improbable; neither is it strange, that *Abraham* should be called by the name of the People which he was the Progenitor of. That *Isaac* should be meant by his only Son called *Jeoud* is most likely; for when God bids *Abraham* go sacrifice him, he saith, *Take thy son, יחיד, thy only son*; *Jehid* is the same with the *Phœnician Jeoud*. That *Sara* is meant by *Anobret*, the original of the Name implies, which is as *Bochartus* derives it חן עוברת, *Annoberet*, that is, *ex gratia concipiens*, which the Apostle explains, *Through faith Sara her self receiv'd strength to conceive seed.* Now all the difference is, that which was only designed and intended by *Abra-*

V. Scaliger. ad Frag. Græc.

Grot. in Deut. c. 18. v. 10.
Vossius de Idol. l. 1. c. 18.

Gen. 22. 1.

Bochart. de Phœnic. col. l. 2. c. 2.
Heb. 11. 11.

ham, was believ'd by the *Phœnicians* as really done, that it might be as a precedent to them for their *Ἀφροδισία*, *sacrificing* of Men, a thing so much in use among the *Phœnicians*, and all the Colonies derived from them, as many Learned Men have at large shew'd. But besides this, there are particular testimonies concerning *Abraham*, his age, wisdom and knowledg, his coming out of *Chaldea*, and the Propagation of Knowledg from him among the *Chaldeans*, *Phœnicians*, and *Egyptians*, are extant out of *Berosus*, *Eupolemus*, and others in * *Josephus* and *Eusebius*, and from thence transcribed by many Learned Men, which on that account I forbear transcribing, as being common and obvious.

* *Joseph.*
Antiq. l. 1.
* 7.
Eus. Præp.
Evangel. l. 9.
c. 16.

X. Some have not improbably conjectured, that the memory of *Jacob's* long peregrination and service with his Uncle *Laban*, was preserved under the Story of *Apollo's* banishment and being a Shepherd under *Admetus*. For *Callimachus* reports that *Love* was the cause of *Apollo's* travails, as it was of *Jacob's*, and withal mentions a strange increase of Cattel under *Apollo's* care, answerable to what the Scripture reports concerning *Jacob*. But it is more certain, that the memory of *Jacob's* setting up the Stone he had rested on for a Pillar, and pouring Oyl upon it, and calling the place *Bethel*, was preserved under the Anointed Stones, which the *Phœnicians* from *Bethel* called *Βαυβλία*, as hath been frequently observ'd by Learned Men, from whence came the custom of Anointing stones among the Heathens, of which so very many have largely discoursed. Thence the Proverb of a superstitious Man, *πίδα λίθου ἀνέχθ' ἀσυνουρίῃ*, which *Arnobius* calls *lubricatum lapidem*, & *ex olivi unguine sordidatum*. It seems the anointing the stones with oyl, was then the symbol of the consecration of them. The Name *Βαυβλία* for such a stone occurs in *Hesychius*, the Greek Etymologists, *Damascius* in *Phocius*, and others. That the memory of *Joseph* in *Egypt* was preserved under the *Egyptian Apis*, hath been shew'd with a great deal of probability by the Learned *Vossius*, in his oft-cited piece of *Idolatry*, from the testimonies of *Julius Maternus*, *Rufinus*, and *Suidas*; and from these three Arguments. 1. The greatness of the Benefit which the *Egyptians* received by *Joseph*; which was of that nature that it could not easily be forgot, and that no symbol was so proper to set it out as the *Egyptian Apis*; because the famine was portended by lean Kine, and the plenty by fat; and *Minucius* at *Rome*, for relieving the People in a time of famine, had a Statue of a golden Bull erected to his memory. 2. The *Egyptians* were not backward to testify their respect to *Joseph*, as appears by *Pharaoh's* rewarding him; now it was the custom of the *Egyptians* to preserve the memories of their great Benefactors by some symbols to posterity; which were at first intended only for a Civil use, altho' they were after abus'd to Superstition and *Idolatry*. 3. From the Names of *Apis* and *Serapis*. *Apis* he conceives to be the sacred Name of *Joseph* among the *Egyptians*, and is as much as *Πατήρ*, *Father*; so *Joseph* himself saith, he was a *Father* to *Pharaoh*. And *Serapis*, as *Rufinus* and *Suidas* both tell us, had a *Bushe* upon his Head, and *Serapis* is probably derived from *Σορ*, *Sor*, which signifies a Bull, and *Apis*. So that by this means the Story of *Joseph* is attested by the *Egyptians* superstitions, of which they can give no account so likely as this is.

Callimach.
Hymn. in
Apoll.

Gen. 28.
18.

Scalig. not.
in Frag. Gr.
Bochart.
Can. l. 2.
c. 2.
Seld. de
Diis Syris.
V. Heins. in
Clem. Al.
Strom. 7.
Casaubon.
ad Theoph.
p. 295.
Herald. ad
Arnob. l. 1.
Colvium
ad Apul.
Florid.
Onzel. &
Elmen-
horst. ad
Minuc. de
Idolol. l. 1.
c. 29.

Gen. 45. 8.

Many

Many things concerning *Moses* are preserv'd in the Story of *Bacchus*; not that from thence we are to conclude that *Moses* was the *Bacchus* of the *Greeks*, as *Vossius* thinks, but they took several parts of the Eastern Traditions concerning him, which they might have from the *Phœnicians* who came with *Cadmus* into *Greece*, while the memory of *Moses* was yet fresh among the *Canaanites*. In the Story of *Bacchus*, as *Vossius* observes, it is expressly said, that he was born in *Egypt*, and that soon after his birth he was put in an Ark, and expos'd to the River, which Tradition was preserv'd among the *Brasiatæ* of *Laconica*: and *Bacchus* in *Orpheus* is called *Mimis*, and by *Plutarch* de *Iside & Osiride*, *Palæstinus*: and he is called *Βινούτιος*, which agrees to *Moses*, who, besides his own Mother, was adopted by *Pharaoh's* Daughter: *Bacchus* was likewise commended for his Beauty as *Moses* was, and was said to be educated in a Mount of *Arabia* called *Nysa*, which agrees with *Moses* his residence in *Arabia* forty years; so *Plutarch* mentions *Ουζαῖς Διορύγες*, the banishments of *Bacchus*; and *Nonnus* mentions *Bacchus* his flight into the Red-sea: who likewise mentions his Battles in *Arabia*, and with the neighboring Princes there. *Diodorus* saith, that *Bacchus* his Army had not only Men but Women in it; which is most true of the company which *Moses* led. *Orpheus* calls *Bacchus* *Θεομυθόγεν*, and attributes to him *Διωνυσιακή Θεομενία*, whereby we understand *Moses* his being a *Legislator*, and that he deliver'd the *Laws* in two Tables. *Moses* his fetching Water out of a Rock with his Rod, is preserv'd in the *Orgia* of *Bacchus*, in which *Euripides* relates that *Agave* and the rest of the *Bacchæ* celebrating the *Orgia*, one of them touched a Rock, and the Water came out: and in the same *Orgia* *Euripides* reports how they were wont to crown their Heads with Serpents, probably in memory of the cure of the fiery Serpents in the Wilderness. A Dog is made the companion of *Bacchus*; which is the signification of *Caleb*, who so faithful adhered to *Moses*. To these and some other circumstances insisted on by *Vossius*, *Bochartus* adds two more very considerable ones; which are, that *Nonnus* reports of *Bacchus* that he touched the two Rivers *Orontes* and *Hydaspes* with his *Thyrus*, or Rod, and that the Rivers dried, and he pass'd thro' them: and that his *Ivy-staff* being thrown upon the ground, crept up and down like a *Serpent*, and that the *Indians* were in darkness while the *Bacchæ* enjoy'd light; which circumstances consider'd will make every one that hath judgment say as *Bochartus* doth; *Ex mirabili illo consensu vel cæcis apparebit priscos fabularum architectos a scriptoribus sacris multa esse mutuatos*. From this wonderful agreement of *Heathen Mythology* with the Scriptures, it cannot but appear that one is a corruption of the other. That the memory of *Joshua* and *Sampson* was preserved under *Hercules Tyrius*, is made likewise very probable from several circumstances of the Stories. Others have deduced the many Rites of *Heathen Worship* from those us'd in the *Tabernacle* among the *Jews*. Several other might be insisted on, as the Parallel between *Og* and *Typho*, and between the old *Silenus* and *Balaam*, both noted for their skill in *Divination*, both taken by *Water*, Num. 22. 5. both noted for riding on an *Ass*: and that *Lucian* of the old *Silenus*; and that

XI.

Vossius de Idol. l. 1. c. 30.

Nonn. Dion. l. 20. Diod. l. 4.

Bochart. Canaan. l. 1. c. 18.

Vossius de Idol. l. 1. c. 26. p. 118. p. 169.

** Lucian. de Deor. Con. Pausan. Eliacum. 2. p. 203.*

which

which makes it more probable, is that of *Pausanias*, *Ἐν ᾧ τῇ Ἑβραίων χάρις Σίλλωος μνημονεύεται*, which some Learned Men have been much puzzled to find out the truth of; and this conjecture which I here propound, may pass at least for a probable account of it. But I shall no longer insist on these things, having, I suppose, done what is sufficient to our purpose, which is, to make it appear what footsteps there are of the truth of Scripture-history amidst all the corruptions of *Heathen Mythology*.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Excellency of the Scriptures.

- I. *Concerning matters of pure Divine Revelation in Scripture: the terms of Salvation only contain'd therein. The ground of the disesteem of the Scripture is tacite Unbelief.*
- II. *The Excellency of the Scriptures manifested as to the matters which GOD hath reveal'd therein.*
- IV. *The Excellency of the discoveries of GOD's Nature which are in Scripture.*
- V. *Of the Goodness and Love of GOD in CHRIST. The suitableness of those discoveries of GOD to our Natural Notions of a DEITY. The necessity of GOD's making known Himself to us in order to the regulating our Conceptions of Him.*
- VI. *The Scriptures give the fullest account of the state of Mens Souls, and the corruptions which are in them. The only way of pleasing GOD discover'd in Scriptures.*
- VII. *The Scriptures contain matters of greatest Mystery, and most universal satisfaction to Men's Minds.*
- VIII. *The Excellency of the manner wherein things are reveal'd in Scriptures, in regard of Clearness, Authority, Purity,*
- IX. *Uniformity, and Persuasiveness.*
- X. *the Excellency of the Scriptures as a Rule of life. The Nature of the Duties of Religion and the Reasonableness of them. The Greatness of the Encouragements to Religion contained in the Scriptures.*
- XI. *The great Excellency of the Scriptures, as containing in them the Covenant of Grace in order to Man's Salvation.*

- I. **H**AVING thus largely prov'd the truth of all those passages of sacred Scripture which concern the History of the first Ages of the World, by all those Arguments which a subject of that nature is capable of, the only thing left in order to our full proving the Divinity of the Scriptures, is, the consideration of those matters contain'd in it, which are in an especial manner said to be of Divine Revelation. For those historical passages, tho' we believe them as contain'd in the Scriptures, to have been divinely inspir'd

as

as well as others: yet they are such things as supposing no Divine Revelation, might have been known sufficiently to the World, had not Men been wanting to themselves as to the care and means of preserving them; but those matters which I now come to discourse of, are of a more sublime and transcendent nature, such as it had been impossible for the Minds of Men to reach, had they not been immediately discover'd by God himself. And those are the Terms and Conditions on which the Soul of Man may upon good grounds expect an eternal Happiness, which we assert the Book of Scriptures to be the only authentic and infallible records of. Men might by the improvements of Reason and the sagacity of their Minds discover much, not only of the lapsed condition of their Souls, and the necessity of a purgation of them, in order to their Felicity; but might in the general know what things are pleasing and acceptable to the Divine Nature, from those differences of Good and Evil which are unalterably fix'd in the things themselves: but which way to obtain any certainty of the Remission of Sins, to recover the Grace and Favor of God, to enjoy perfect Tranquillity and Peace of Conscience, to be able to please God in things agreeable to his Will, and by these to be assur'd of eternal Bliss, had been impossible for Men to have ever found, had not God himself been graciously pleas'd to reveal them to us. Men might still have bewildred themselves in following the *Ignes fatui* of their own imaginations, and hunting up and down the World for a path which leads to Heaven, but could have found none, unless God himself taking pity of the wandrings of Men had been pleas'd to hang out a Light from Heaven to direct them in their way thither, and by this *Pharos* of Divine Revelation to direct them so to steer their course, as to escape splitting themselves on the Rocks of open Impieties, or being swallow'd up in the Quick-sands of terrene delights. Neither doth he shew them only what Shelves and Rocks they must escape, but what particular course they must steer, what Star they must have in their Eye, what Compass they must observe, what Winds and Gales they must expect and pray for, if they would arrive at last at eternal Bliss. Eternal Bliss! What more could a God of infinite Goodness promise, or the Soul of Man wish for? A Reward to such who are so far from deserving, that they are still provoking; Glory to such who are more apt to be ashamed of their Duties, than of their Offences; but that it should not only be a Glorious Reward, but Eternal too, is that which tho' it infinitely transcend the Deserts of the Receivers, yet it highly discovers the infinite Goodness of the Giver. But when we not only know that there is so rich a Mine of inestimable Treasures, but if the Owner of it undertakes to shew us the way to it, and gives us certain and infallible directions how to come to the full possession of it; how much are we in love with Misery, and do we court our own ruin, if we neglect to hearken to his Directions, and observe his Commands!

This is that we are now undertaking to make good concerning the *Scriptures*, that these alone contain those sacred discoveries, by which the Souls of Men may come at last to enjoy a compleat and eternal Happiness. One would think there could be nothing more

Ecc

needless

II.

needless in the World than to bid Men regard their own welfare, and to seek to be happy; yet whoever casts his Eye into the World, will find no counsel so little hearkened to as this, nor any thing which is more generally look'd on as a matter trivial and impertinent. Which cannot arise but from one of these two grounds, that either they think it no great wisdom to let go their present hold as to the good things of this World, for that which they secretly question whether they shall ever live to see or no; or else that their Minds are in suspense, whether they be not sent on a *Guiana Voyage* to *Heaven*, whether the certainty of it be yet fully discover'd, or the instructions which are given be such as may infallibly conduct them thither. The first, tho' it hath the advantage of sense, fruition, delight, and further expectation; yet to a rational Person who seriously reflects on himself, and sums up what (after all his troubles and disquietments in the procuring, his cares in keeping, his disappointments in his expectations, his fears of losing what he doth enjoy, and that vexation of Spirit which attends all these) he hath gain'd of true contentment to his Mind, can never certainly believe that ever these things were intended for his Happiness. For is it possible that the Soul of Man should ever enjoy its full and compleat Happiness in this World, when nothing is able to make it happy, but what is most suitable to its Nature, able to fill up its large Capacity, and commensurate with its Duration? but in this Life the matter of Mens greatest delight is strangely unsuitable to the Nature of our rational Beings, the measure of them too short for our vast Desires to stretch themselves upon, the Proportion too scant and narrow to run parallel with Immortality. It must be then only a Supreme, Infinite and Eternal Being, which by the free communications of his Bounty and Goodness can fix and satiate the Soul's Desires, and by the constant flowings forth of his own uninterrupted streams of Favor will always keep up Desire, and yet always satisfy it: One whose Goodness can only be felt by some transient touches here, whose Love can be seen but as thro' a lattice, whose constant presence may be rather wish'd for than enjoy'd, who hath reserv'd the full sight and fruition of himself to that future state, when all these dark veils shall be done away, and the Soul shall be continually sunning her self under immediate beams of Light and Love. But how or in what way the Soul of Man in this degenerate condition should come to be partaker of so great a Happiness, by the enjoyment of that God our Natures are now at such a distance from, is the greatest and most important inquiry of Human Nature; and we continually see how successful and unsatisfactory the endeavors of those have been to themselves at last, who have sought for this Happiness in a way of their own finding out: The large volume of the Creation, wherein God hath describ'd so much of his Wisdom and Power, is yet too dark and obscure, too short and imperfect to set forth to us the way which leads to eternal Happiness. Unless then the same God who made Mens Souls at first, do shew them the way for their recovery; as they are in a degenerate, so they will be in a desperate condition: but the same Bounty and Goodness of God, which did at first display it self in giving

Being

Being to Mens Souls, hath in a higher manner enlarged the Discovery of it self, by making known the way whereby we may be taken into his Grace and Favor again.

Which it now concerns us particularly to discover, thereby to make it appear that this way is of that peculiar excellency, that we may have from thence the greatest evidence, it could come from no other Author but God himself, and doth tend to no other end but our eternal Happiness. Now that incomparable excellency which is in the sacred Scriptures, will fully appear, if we consider the Matters contain'd in them under this threefold capacity. 1. As *Matters of Divine Revelation.* 2. As *a Rule of Life.* 3. As containing *that Covenant of Grace which relates to Man's eternal Happiness.* III.

1. Consider the Scripture generally, as containing in it Matters of Divine Revelation, and therein the excellency of the Scriptures appears in two things. 1. *The Matters which are revealed.* 2. *The Manner wherein they are revealed.*

1. *The matters which are revealed* in Scripture, may be consider'd these three ways. 1. *As they are matters of the greatest weight and moment.* 2. *As matters of the greatest depth and mysteriousness.* 3. *As matters of the most universal satisfaction to the Minds of Men.*

1. *They are matters of the greatest moment and importance for Men to know.* The Wisdom of Men is most known by the weight of the things they speak; and therefore that wherein the Wisdom of God is discover'd, cannot contain any thing that is mean and trivial; they must be matters of the highest importance, which the supreme Ruler of the World vouchsafes to speak to Men concerning: And such we shall find the matters which God hath revealed in his Word to be, which either concern the rectifying our apprehensions of his Nature, or making known to Men their state and condition, or discovering the way whereby to avoid eternal Misery. Now which is there of these three, which supposing God to discover his Mind to the World, it doth not highly become him to speak to Men of?

1. What is there which doth more highly concern Men to know than God himself? or what more glorious and excellent object could he discover than himself to the World? There is nothing certainly which should more commend the Scriptures to us, than that thereby we may grow more acquainted with God; that we may know more of his Nature, and all his Perfections, and many of the great Reasons of his actings in the World. We may by them understand with safety what the eternal purposes of God were as to the way of Man's Recovery by the death of his Son; we may there see and understand the great Wisdom of God; not only in the contrivance of the World, and ordering of it, but in the gradual Revelations of himself to his People, by what steps he train'd up his Church till the *fulness of time was come*; what his Aim was in laying such a load of Ceremonies on his People of the *Jews*; by what steps and degrees he made way for the full revelation of his Will to the World by speaking in these last days by his Son, after he had spoke *at sundry times and in divers manners by the Prophets, &c. unto the Fathers.* In the Scriptures we read

Ecc 2

the

the most rich and admirable discoveries of Divine Goodness, and all the ways and methods he useth in alluring Sinners to himself; with what Majesty he commands, with what Condescension he intreats, with what importunity he wooes Mens Souls to be reconciled to him, with what Favor he embraceth, with what Tenderness he chastiseth, with what Bowels he pitieth those who have chosen him to be their God! With what Power he supporteth, with what Wisdom he directeth, with what Cordials he refresheth the Souls of such who are dejected under the sense of his displeasure, and yet their love is sincere towards him! With what profound humility, what holy boldness, what becoming distance, and yet what restless importunity do we therein find the Souls of God's People addressing themselves to him in Prayer! With what cheerfulness do they serve him, with what confidence do they trust him, with what resolution do they adhere to him in all streights and difficulties, with what patience do they submit to his Will in their greatest extremities! How fearful are they of sinning against God, how careful to please him, how regardless of suffering, when they must choose either that or sinning, how little apprehensive of Mens displeasure, while they enjoy the favor of God! Now all these things which are so fully and pathetically express'd in Scripture, do abundantly set forth to us the exuberancy and *Pleonasm* of God's Grace and Goodness towards his People, which makes them delight so much in him, and be so sensible of his displeasure. But above all other discoveries of God's Goodness, his sending his Son into the World to die for Sinners, is that which the Scripture sets forth with the greatest Life and Eloquence. By Eloquence, I mean not an artificial compofure of Words, but the gravity, weight, and persuasiveness of the matter contain'd in them. And what can tend more to melt our frozen Hearts into a current of thankful obedience to God, than the vigorous reflection of the beams of God's love thro' *Jesus Christ* upon us! Was there ever so great an expression of love heard of! nay, was it possible to be imagin'd, that that God who perfectly hates sin, should himself offer the pardon of it, and send his Son into the World to secure it to the Sinner, who doth so heartily repent of his sins, as to deny himself, and take up his Cross and follow *Christ*! Well might the Apostle say, *This is a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptation, that Jesus Christ came into the world to save sinners.* How dry and sapless are all the voluminous discourses of Philosophers, compar'd with this Sentence! How jejune and unsatisfactory are all the Discoveries they had of God and his Goodness, in comparison of what we have by the Gospel of *Christ*! Well might *Paul* then say, *That he determined to know nothing but Christ, and him crucified.* *Christ crucified* is the Library which triumphant Souls will be studying in to all eternity. This is the only Library which is the true *ταρσειον ψυχης*, that which cures the Soul of all its Maladies and Distempers: other Knowledge makes Mens Minds giddy and flatulent; this settles and composes them: other Knowledge is apt to swell Men into high Conceits and Opinions of themselves; this brings them to the truest view of themselves, and thereby to humility and sobriety: other Knowledge leaves Mens Hearts as it found them; this alters them and makes them

1 Tim. i.
15.

1 Cor. 2. 2.

them better. So transcendent an excellency is there in the knowledge of *Christ crucified* above the sublimest speculations in the World.

And is not this an inestimable benefit we enjoy by the Scripture, that therein we can read and converse with all these expressions of God's Love and Goodness, and that in his own Language? Shall we admire and praise what we meet with in *Heathen Philosophers*, which is generous and handsom; and shall we not adore the infinite fulness of the Scriptures, which run over with continued expressions of that and a higher nature? What folly is it to magnify those *Lean Kine*, the Notions of Philosophers, and condemn the Fat, the Plenty and Fulness of the Scriptures? If there be not far more valuable and excellent discoveries of the Divine Nature and Perfections; if there be not far more excellent Directions and Rules of Practice in the sacred Scriptures, than in the sublimest of all the Philosophers: then let us leave our *full ears*, and feed upon the *thin*. But certainly no sober and rational Spirit that puts any value upon the Knowledge of God, but on the same account that he doth praise the Discourses of any Philosophers concerning God, he cannot but set a value of a far higher nature on the Word of God. And as the goodness of God is thus discover'd in Scripture, so is his Justice and Holiness: we have therein recorded the most remarkable judgments of God upon contumacious Sinners, the severest denunciations of a judgment to come against all that live in sin, the exactest Precepts of Holiness in the World; and what can be desir'd more to discover the Holiness of God, than we find in Scripture concerning Him? If therefore acquaintance with the Nature, Perfections, Designs of so excellent a Being as God is, be a thing desirable to Human Nature, we have the greatest cause to admire the excellency, and adore the fulness of the Scriptures, which give us so large, rational, and compleat account of the Being and Attributes of God. And which tends yet more to commend the Scriptures to us, those things which the Scripture doth most fully discover concerning God, do not at all contradict those prime and common Notions which are in our Natures concerning him, but do exceedingly advance and improve them, and tend the most to regulate our Conceptions and Apprehensions of God, that we may not miscarry therein, as otherwise Men are apt to do. For it being natural to Men so far to love themselves, as to set the greatest value upon those excellencies which they think themselves most masters of: thence Men came to be exceedingly mistaken in their Apprehensions of a *Deity*, some attributing one thing as a Perfection, another a different thing, according to their humors and inclinations. Thus imperious self-willed Men are apt to cry up God's absolute Power and Dominion as his greatest Perfection; easy and soft-spirited Men his Patience and Goodness; severe and rigid Men his Justice and Severity: every one according to his humor and temper, making his God of his own complexion: and not only so, but in things remote enough from being Perfections at all; yet because they are such things as they prize and value, they suppose of necessity they must be in God, as is evident in the *Epicureans* *Atheists*, by which they excluded *Providence*, as hath been already observ'd. And

withal considering how very difficult it is for one who really believes that God is of a pure, just, and holy Nature, and that he hath grievously offended him by his sins, to believe that this God will pardon him upon true repentance. It is thence necessary that God should make known himself to the World, to prevent our mis-conceptions of his Nature, and to assure a suspicious, because guilty Creature, how ready he is to pardon iniquity, transgression, and sin, to such as unfeignedly repent of their follies, and return unto himself. Tho' the light of Nature may dictate much to us of the Benignity and Goodness of the Divine Nature, yet it is hard to conceive that that should discover further than God's general Goodness to such as please him: but no foundation can be gathered thence of his readiness to pardon offenders, which being an act of Grace, must alone be discovered by his Will. I cannot think the *Sun*, *Moon*, and *Stars*, are such itinerant Preachers, as to unfold unto us the whole Counsel and Will of God in reference to Man's acceptance with God upon repentance. It is not every *Star* in the Firmament can do that which the *Star* once did to the *Wise-men*, lead them unto *Christ*. The *Sun* in the *Heavens* is no *Parelius* to the *Sun of Righteousness*. The best *Astronomer*, will never find the *Day-star* from on high in the rest of his number. What *St. Austin* said of *Tully's Works*, is true of the whole Volume of the Creation, There are admirable things to be found in them: but the Name of *Christ* is not legible there. The work of *Redemption* is not engraven on the works of *Providence*; if it had, a particular Divine Revelation had been unnecessary, and the *Apostles* were sent on a needless errand, which the World had understood without their Preaching, viz. *That God was in Christ reconciling the World unto himself, not imputing to Men their trespasses, and hath committed to them the Ministry of Reconciliation*. How was the word of *Reconciliation* committed to them, if it were common to them with the whole frame of the World? and the *Apostle's Quære* elsewhere might have been easily answer'd, *How can Men hear without a Preacher?* For then they might have known the way of *Salvation*, without any special Messengers sent to deliver it unto them. I grant that *God's long-suffering* and *patience* is intended to lead Men to Repentance, and that some general collections might be made from *Providence* of the placability of God's Nature, and that *God never left himself without a witness of his Goodness* in the World, being *kind to the unthankful, and doing good, in giving rain and fruitful seasons*. But tho' these things might sufficiently discover to such who were apprehensive of the guilt of sin, that God did not act according to his greatest severity, and thereby did give Men encouragement to inquire after the true way of being reconcil'd to God; yet it amounts not to a firm Foundation for Faith, as to the remission of sin, which doth suppose God himself publishing an Act of Grace, and Indemnity to the World, wherein he assures the Pardon of sin to such as truly repent and unfeignedly believe his holy Gospel. Now is not this an inestimable advantage we enjoy by the Scriptures, that therein we understand what God himself hath revealed of his own Nature and Perfections, and of his readiness to pardon sin upon those gracious terms of *Faith* and *Repentance*, and

2Cor. 5. 18,
19.

Rom. 10.
14.

Act. 14. 14.
Luk. 6. 35.
36.

and that which necessarily follows from these two, hearty and sincere Obedience?

2. *The Scripture gives the most faithful representation of the state and condition of the Soul of Man.* VI. The World was almost lost in Disputes concerning the Nature, Condition, and Immortality of the Soul, before *Divine Revelation* was made known to Mankind by the *Gospel of Christ*; but *Life and Immortality* was brought to light by the *Gospel*, and the future state of the Soul of Man, not discover'd in an uncertain *Platonical* way, but with the greatest light and evidence from that God who hath the supreme disposal of Souls, and therefore best knows and understands them. The Scriptures plainly and fully reveal a Judgment to come, in which *God will judge the secrets of all Hearts*, when every one must give an account of himself unto God, and God will call Men to give an account of their stewardship here, of all the Receipts they have had from him, and the Expences they have been at, and the Improvements they have made of the Talents he put into their hands. So that the *Gospel of Christ* is the fullest Instrument of discovery of the certainty of the future state of the Soul, and the conditions which abide it, upon its being dislodg'd from the Body. But this is not all which the Scripture discovers as to the state of the Soul, for it is not only a Prospective-glass, reaching to its future state, but it is the most faithful Looking-glass, to discover all the spots and deformities of the Soul: And not only shews where they are, but whence they came, what their nature is, and whither they tend. The true Original of all that disorder and discomposure which is in the Soul of Man, is only fully and satisfactorily given us in the Word of God, as hath been already prov'd. The nature and working of this corruption in Man, had never been so clearly manifested, had not the Law and Will of God been discover'd to the World: that is the Glass whereby we see the secret workings of those Bees in our Hearts, the corruptions of our Natures; that sets forth the folly of our Imaginations, the unruliness of our Passions, the distempers of our Wills, and the abundant deceitfulness of our Hearts. And it is hard for the Elephantine sinner (one of the greatest magnitude) so to trouble these Waters, as not therein to discover the greatness of his own deformities. But that which tends most to awaken the drowsy, senseless Spirits of Men, the Scripture doth most fully describe the tendency of Corruption, that the wages of sin is death, and the issue of continuance in sin will be the everlasting misery of the Soul, in a perpetual separation from the presence of God, and undergoing the lashes and severities of Conscience to all eternity. What a great discovery is this of the faithfulness of God to the World, that he suffers not Men to undo themselves without letting them know of it before-hand, that they might avoid it! God seeks not to entrap Mens Souls, nor doth he rejoyce in the misery and ruin of his Creatures; but fully declares to them what the consequence and issue of their practices will be, assures them of a Judgment to come, declares his own future severity against contumacious Sinners, that they might not think themselves surpriz'd, and that if they had known there had been so great danger in sin, they would never have been such fools, as for the sake of it to run into eternal misery.

fery. Now God, to prevent this, with the greatest plainness and faithfulness hath shew'd Men the nature and danger of all their sins, and asks them before-hand what they will do in the end thereof; whether they are able to bear his Wrath, and wrestle with everlasting burnings? if not, he bids them bethink themselves of what they have done already, and repent, and amend their Lives, lest *iniquity prove their ruin, and destruction overtake them, and that without remedy.* Now if Men have cause to prize and value a faithful Monitor, one that tenders their good, and would prevent their ruin; we have cause exceedingly to prize and value the Scriptures, which give us the truest representation of the state and condition of our Souls.

3. *The Scripture discovers to us the only way of pleasing God, and enjoying his favor.* That clearly reveals the way (which Man might have sought for to all eternity without particular Revelation) whereby sins may be pardoned, and whatever we do may be acceptable unto God. It shews us that the ground of our acceptance with God, is thro' Christ, whom he hath made a propitiation for the sins of the World, and who alone is the true and living way, whereby we may draw near to God with a true heart, in full assurance of Faith, having our hearts sprinkled from an evil conscience. Thro' Christ we understand the terms on which God will shew Favor and Grace to the World, and by him we have ground of a *propitiation, access with freedom and boldness unto God.* On his account we may hope not only for Grace to subdue our sins, resist temptations, conquer the Devil and the World; but having fought *this good fight and finished our course, by patient continuance in well-doing, we may justly look for glory, honor, and immortality, and that crown of righteousness which is laid up for those who wait in faith, holiness, and humility, for the appearance of Christ from Heaven.* Now what things can there be of greater moment and importance for Men to know, or God to reveal, than the Nature of God, and our selves, the state and condition of our Souls, the only way to avoid eternal misery, and enjoy everlasting Bliss?

- VII. The Scriptures discover not only matters of importance, but of the greatest depth and mysteriousness. There are many *wonderful things in the Law of God*, things we may admire, but are never able to comprehend. Such are the eternal Purposes and Decrees of God, the Doctrin of the *Trinity*, the Incarnation of the Son of God, and the manner of the Operation of the Spirit of God on the Souls of Men, which are all things of great weight and moment for us to understand and believe that they are; and yet may be unsearchable to our Reason, as to the particular manner of them. What certain ground our Faith stands on as to these things hath been already shew'd, and therefore I forbear insisting on them.

Book II.
Ch. 8. Sect.
5, 6, 7.

3.

Orig. contr.
Cels. l. 3.
p. 135.

The Scripture comprehends matters of the most universal satisfaction to the Minds of Men; tho' many things do much exceed our Apprehensions, yet others are most suitable to the Dictates of our Nature. As Origen bid Celsus see, *Εἰ μὴ ὁ ὁ πῶς ἰσχυρὸς ὁ Θεὸς ἀποκρίσας ἀποκρίσας ἀποκρίσας, ποῦναι τὴν ἐκείνου ἀνθρώπου τὴν ἀρετὴν, Whether it was not the agreeableness of the Principles of Faith with the common Notions of Human Nature, which prevail'd most upon all candid*

candid and ingenuous auditors of them. And therefore as *Socrates* said of *Heraclitus* his Books, What he understood was excellent, and therefore he suppos'd that which he did not understand was so too: so ought we to say of the Scriptures; If those things which are within our capacity be so futable to our Natures and Reasons, those cannot contradict our Reason which yet are above them. There are many things which the Minds of Men were sufficiently assur'd that they were, yet were to seek for satisfaction concerning them, which they could never have had without Divine Revelation. As the Nature of true Happiness, wherein it lay, and how to be obtain'd, which the Philosophers were so puzl'd with, the Scripture gives us full satisfaction concerning it. True contentment under the troubles of Life, which the Scripture only acquaints us with the true grounds of; and all the prescriptions of Heathen *Moralists* fall as much short of, as the directions of an *Empyric* do of a wise and skilful *Physician*. *Avoiding the fears of Death*, which can alone be thro' a grounded Expectation of a state of Happiness which Death leads Men to, which cannot be had but thro' the right understanding of the Word of God. Thus we see the excellency of the matters themselves contain'd in this Revelation of the Mind of God to the World.

As the Matters themselves are of an excellent Nature, so is the manner wherein they are reveal'd in the Scriptures, and that,

VIII.

1. *In a clear and perspicuous manner*; not but there may be still some passages which are hard to be understood, as being either prophetic, or consisting of ambiguous Phrases, or containing matters above our comprehension; but all those things which concern the terms of Man's Salvation are deliver'd with the greatest evidence and perspicuity. Who cannot understand what these things mean, *What doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?* that *without Faith it is impossible to please God*; that *without Holiness none shall see the Lord*; that *unless we be born again, we can never enter into the Kingdom of Heaven*? These and such like things are so plain and clear, that it is nothing but Mens shutting their Eyes against the Light can keep them from understanding them: God intended these things as Directions to Men; and is not he able to speak intelligibly when he please? He that made the Tongue, shall he not speak so as to be understood without an infallible Interpreter? especially when it is his design to make known to Men the terms of their eternal Happiness. Will God judg Men at the great day for not believing those things which they could not understand? Strange! that ever Men should judg the Scriptures obscure in matters necessary, when the Scripture accounts it so great a judgment for Men not to understand them. *If our Gaspel be hid, it is hid to them that are lost; In whom the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, lest the light of the glorious Gospel of Christ should shine unto them.* Sure Lot's door was visible enough, if it were a judgment for the Men of *Sodom* not to see it; and the Scriptures then are plain and intelligible enough, if it be so great a judgment not to understand them.

2.

2 Cor. 4.

3. 4.

Fff

2. In

2. *In a powerful and authoritative manner*; as the things contain'd in Scripture do not so much beg acceptance as command; in that the expressions wherein our duty is concern'd are such as awe Mens Consciences, and pierce to their Hearts and to their secret thoughts; *All things are open and naked before this Word of God*; every secret of the Mind and thought of the heart lies open to its stroke and force; it is quick and powerful, sharper than a two-edged sword, piercing to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart. The Word is a Telescope to discover the great ~~Usuraries of the~~ World, the Truths of highest concernment to the Souls of Men; and it is such a Microscope as discovers to us the smallest Atom of our Thoughts, and discerns the most secret intent of the Heart. And, as far as this Light reacheth, it comes with Power and Authority, as it comes arm'd with the Majesty of that God who reveals it, whose Authority extends over the Soul and Conscience of Man in its most secret and hidden recesses.

Heb. 4. 12.
13.

3. *In a pure and unmix'd manner*; in all other Writings, howsoever, we see a great mixture of dross and gold together; here is nothing but pure gold, Diamonds without flaws, and without spots. The most current Coins of the World have their Allays of baser Metals, there is no such mixture in Divine Truths, as they all come from the same Author, so they all have the same purity. There is a *Urim* and *Thummim* upon the whole Scripture, Light and Perfection in every part of it. In the Philosophers we may meet, it may be, with some scattered fragments of good Metal, amidst abundance of dross and impure Oar; here we have whole wedges of Gold, the same vein of purity and holiness running thro' the whole Book of Scriptures. Hence it is call'd the *form of sound words*; here have been no hucksters to corrupt, and mix their own Inventions with Divine Truths.

2 Tim. 1.
13.

IX.

4. *In an uniform and agreeable manner*. This I grasp is sufficient of it self to prove the Scriptures to be Divine, because all Men do not contradict themselves in their Writings; but yet there are some peculiar circumstances to be consider'd in the agreeableness of the parts of Scripture to each other, which we not easily find in mere human Writings: 1. That this Doctrine was deliver'd by persons who lived in different Ages and Times from each other. Usually one Age corrects another's faults, and is tempted to pity the Ignorance of our Predecessors, when it may be said to posterity may think us as ignorant as we do them. But in the sacred Scripture we read not one Age condemning another; we find Light still increasing in the series of times in Scripture; but no reflection in any time upon the Ignorance, or Weakness of the precedent; the dimmest Light was sufficient for its Age, and was a step to further discovery. *Quintilian* gives it as the reason of the great uncertainty of Grammar Rules, *Quia non analogia dimissa: colorum loquendi dedit*; that which he wanted as to Grammar, was not to Divine Truths; they are deliver'd from Heaven, and therefore are always uniform and agreeable to each other.

Quint. l. i.
cap. 6.

2. *By persons of different interests in the World*. God has the choice of Men of all ranks to be Inditers of his Oracles, and

it appear it was no matter of State-policy or particular interest which was contain'd in his Word, which Persons of such different interests, could not have agreed in as they do. We have *Moses, David, Solomon*, Persons of Royal Rank and Quality; and can it be any mean thing, which these think it their glory to be Pen-ners of? We have *Isaiah, Daniel*, and other Persons of the highest Education and Accomplishments; and can it be any trivial thing which these imploy themselves in? We have *Amos*, and other Prophets in the Old Testament, and the Apostles in the New, of the meaner sort of Men in the World, yet all these joyn in consort together; when God tunes the Spirits, all agree in the same strain of Divine Truths, and give light and Harmony to each other.

3. *By persons in different places and conditions*; some in prosperity in their own Country, some under banishment and adversity, yet all agreeing in the same substance of Doctrine; of which no alteration we see was made either for the flattery of those in power, or for avoiding miseries and calamities. And under all the different dispensations before, under and after the Law, tho' the management of things was different, yet the Doctrine and Design was for Substance the same in all. All the different dispensations agree in the same common Principles of Religion; the same ground of acceptance with God, and obligation to duty was common to all, tho' the peculiar instances wherein God was serv'd might be different, according to the Ages of growth in the Church of God. So that this great uniformity consider'd in these circumstances, is an Argument that these things came originally from the same Spirit, tho' convey'd thro' different Instruments to the know-ledge of the World.

5. *In a persuasive and convincing manner*: and that these ways.
 1. *Bringing Divine Truths down to our capacity*, clothing Spiritual matter in familiar expressions and similitudes, that so they might have the easier admission into our Minds. 2. *Propounding things as our interest which are our duty*: thence God so frequently in Scripture, recommends our duties to us under all those motives which are wont to have the greatest force on the Minds of Men; and annexeth gracious Promises to our Performance of them; and those of the most weighty and concerning things. Of *Grace, Favor, Protection, Deliverance, Audience of Prayers, and Eternal Happiness*: and if these will not prevail with Men, what Motives will? 3. *Courting us to Obedience, when he might not only command us to obey, but punish presently for disobedience*. Hence are all those most pathetical and affectionate strains we read in Scripture. O Deut. 5.
that there was such a heart within them, that they would fear me 29.
and keep all my commandments always, that it might go well with
them, and with their children after them. Wo unto thee, O Jeru- Jer. 13. 27.
salem, wilt thou not be made clean? when shall it once be? Turn ye, Ezek. 33.
turn ye from your evil ways, for why will ye die, O house of Israel? 11.
How shall I give thee up, Ephraim? how shall I deliver thee, Is- Hof. 11. 8.
rael? how shall I make thee as Admah? how shall I set thee as Ze-
boim? mine heart is turned within me, my repentings are kindled
together. O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often would I have gathered Matth. 23.
thy 37.

thy children together, as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not. What Majesty, and yet what sweetness and condescension is there in these expressions? What obstinacy and rebellion is it in Men for them to stand out against God, when he thus comes down from his Throne of Majesty, and woos rebellious Sinners to return unto him that they may be pardoned? Such a matchless and unparallel'd strain of *Rhetoric* is there in the Scripture, far above the Art and Insinuations of the most admired *Orators*. Thus we see the peculiar excellency of the manner wherein the matters contain'd in Scripture are reveal'd to us: Thus we have consider'd the Excellency of the Scripture, as it is a Discovery of God's Mind to the World.

- x. The Scriptures may be considered as a *Rule of Life*, or as a *Law of God*, which is given for the Government of the Lives of Men, and therein the Excellency of it lies in the Nature of the Duties, and the Encouragements to the Practice of them.

1. In the Nature of the Duties requir'd, which are *most becoming God to require*, most reasonable for us to perform.

1. *Most becoming God to require*, as they are most suitable and agreeable to the Divine Nature, the imitation of which in our Actions, is the substance of our Religion. Imitation of him in his Goodness and Holiness, by our constant Endeavors of mortifying Sin, and growing in Grace and Piety. In his Grace and Mercy, by our kindness to all Men, forgiving the injuries Men do unto us, *doing good to our greatest enemies*. In his Justice and Equity, by *doing as we would be done by, and keeping a conscience void of offence towards God and towards Men*. The first takes in the Duties of the first, the other the Duties of the second Table. *All acts of piety towards God*, are a part of Justice; for, as Tully saith, *Quid aliud est pietas, nisi justitia adversus Deos?* and so *our loving God with our whole hearts, our intire and sincere obedience to his Will*, is a part of Natural Justice; for thereby we do but render unto God that which is his due from us as we are his Creatures. We see then the whole Duty of Man, *the fearing God and keeping his Commandments*, is as necessary a part of Justice, as the rendering to every Man his own is.

2. They are most reasonable for us to perform, in that, 1. *Religion* is not only a service of the Reasonable Faculties which are imploy'd the most in it, the commands of the Scripture reaching the heart most in it, and the service requir'd being a spiritual service, not lying in Meats and Drinks, or any outward Observations, but in a sanctify'd temper of Heart and Mind, which discovers it self in the course of a *Christian's* Life: but, 2. The Service it self of Religion is reasonable; the Commands of the *Gospel* are such as no Man's Reason which considers them can doubt of the excellency of them. All Natural Worship is founded on the Dictates of Nature, all instituted Worship on God's revealed Will; and it is one of the prime Dictates of Nature, that God must be universally obey'd. Besides, God requires nothing but what is apparently Man's interest to do; God prohibits nothing but what will destroy him if he doth it; so that the Commands of the Scriptures are very just and reasonable.

2. The

2. The Encouragements are more than proportionable to the difficulty of Obedience. God's Commands are in themselves easy, and most futable to our Natures. What more rational for a Creature than to obey his Maker? all the difficulty of Religion ariseth from the corruption of Nature. Now God to encourage Men to conquer the difficulties arising thence, hath propounded the strongest Motives and most prevailing Arguments to Obedience. Such are the considerations of God's Love and Goodness manifested to the World, by sending his Son into it, to die for Sinners, and to give them an example which they are to follow, and by his readiness thro' him to pardon the sins, and accept the Persons of such who *so receive him as to walk in him*; and by his Promises of Grace to assist them in the wrestling with the enemies of their Salvation. And to all these add that glorious and unconceivable reward which God hath promis'd to all those who sincerely obey him; and by these things we see how much the encouragements over-weigh the difficulties, and that none can make the least pretence that there is not motive sufficient to down-weigh the troubles which attend the exercise of Obedience to the will of God. Thus we see what a peculiar excellency there is in the Scriptures as a Rule of Life, above all the Precepts of mere *Moralists*; the foundation of Obedience being laid deeper in Man's Obligation to serve his Maker, the practice of Obedience being carry'd higher in those most holy Precepts which are in Scripture, the reward of Obedience being incomparably greater than what Men are able to conceive, much less to promise or bestow.

The Excellency of the Scriptures appears, as they contain in them a Covenant of Grace, or the Transactions between God and Man, in order to his eternal Happiness. The more memorable any Transactions are, the more valuable are any authentic Records of them. The Scriptures contain in them the *Magna Charta* of Heaven, an Act of Pardon with the Royal Assent of Heaven, a Proclamation of Good-will from God towards Men; and can we then set too great a value on that which contains all the remarkable passages between God and the Souls of Men, in order to their Felicity, from the beginning of the World? Can we think, since there is a God in the World of infinite Goodness, that he should suffer all Mankind to perish inevitably, without his propounding any means for escaping of eternal Misery? Is God so good to Men as to this present Life; and can we think if Man's Soul be immortal, as we have prov'd it is, that he should wholly neglect any offer of good to Men as to their eternal welfare? Or is it possible to imagine that Man should be happy in another World without God's promising it, and prescribing conditions in order to it? If so, then this Happiness is no free gift of God, unless he hath the bestowing and promising of it; and Man is no rational Agent, unless a reward suppose conditions to be perform'd in order to the obtaining it; or Man may be bound to conditions which were never requir'd him; or if they must be requir'd, then there must be a Revelation of God's Will, whereby he doth require them: And if so, then there are some Records extant of the Transactions between God and Man, in order to his eternal Happiness: For what reason can we have to imagine that such Re-

Fff 3

cords,

cords, if once extant, should not continue still, especially since the same Goodness of God is engag'd to preserve such Records, which at first did cause them to be indited? Supposing then such Records, extant somewhere in the World of these grand Transactions between God and Mens Souls, our business is brought to a Period; for what other Records are there in the World that can in the least vye with the Scriptures, as to the giving so just an account of all the Transactions between God and Men from the foundation of the World? Which gives us all the steps, methods and ways whereby God hath made known his Mind and Will to the World, in order to Man's eternal Salvation. It remains only then that we adore and magnify the Goodness of God in making known his Will to us, and that we set a value and esteem on the Scriptures, as on the only authentic Instruments of that *Grand Charter of Peace*, which God hath reveal'd in order to Man's Eternal Happiness.

F I N I S.

ORIGINES SACRAE:
OR A
RATIONAL ACCOUNT
Of the Grounds of NATURAL and REVEAL'D
RELIGION:
WHEREIN
The Foundations of Religion, and the Au-
thority of the SCRIPTURES are asserted and clear'd;
WITH
An Answer to the Modern Objections
OF
ATHEISTS and DEISTS.

In Five Books.

*By the Right Reverend Father in GOD EDWARD,
late Lord Bishop of WORCESTER.*

C A M B R I D G E,

Printed at the University-Press, for HENRY MORTLOCK,
at the Sign of the *Phoenix* in St. Paul's Church-yard. 1701.

Handwritten text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page. The text is mostly illegible due to fading and bleed-through, but some words like "The" and "and" are visible.

THE CONTENTS.

BOOK I. *Of the Grounds of Natural and Reveal'd Religion.*
II. *Of the Credibility of the Scriptures compar'd with other Accounts.*

III. *Of the Authority of the Writings of Moses, and the matters contain'd therein.*

IV. *Of the Authority of the Prophetical Writings, and other Books of the Old Testament.*

V. *Of the Authority of the Writings of the New Testament, and the matters therein contain'd.*

CONTENTS of BOOK I.

A General Discourse in vindication of the Principles of Natural and Reveal'd Religion; with an Answer to the Objections of Atheists and Deists.

CHAP. I.

The general Prejudices against Religion in our Age examin'd, and the old Atheistical Hypotheses consider'd p. 1

CHAP. II.

The Modern Atheistical Hypotheses examin'd, and the Unreasonableness of them shew'd 86

CHAP. III.

The reasonableness of Reveal'd Religion superadded to Natural; with an Answer to the most specious Arguments against Revelation.

CHAP. IV.

General Considerations about the Divine Revelation contain'd in the Holy Scriptures; as to Antiquity, Integrity, Consistence, and manner of Writing.

The CONTENTS.

CONTENTS of CHAP. I. BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

<i>The Atheistical Pretences of this Age consider'd and answer'd</i>	p. 1
<i>An Inquiry into the Atheistical Pretences of this Age</i>	2
<i>The first, That it is a Contrivance of Politicians</i>	Ibid.
<i>The falshood of that shew'd, from the first History of Religion in Egypt</i>	3
<i>In Phoenicia</i>	5
<i>In Greece</i>	8
<i>Diodorus Siculus's Account of the beginning of Religion examined</i>	15
<i>The absurdity of his Opinion about the Production of Animals, at large made out</i>	17
<i>The several Hypotheses of Democritus, and Anaximander, and Epicurus about the Production of Mankind shew'd to be very unreasonable</i>	25
<i>The opinion of the ancient Philosophers, about the World's being made by Chance or Providence, examin'd and compar'd; and the Foundations of Natural Religion asserted by the best of them</i>	38
<i>The second Pretense, That Religion is owing to Mens Ignorance and Superstitious Fear, examin'd</i>	65
<i>The third, That there are whole Nations without any sence of God or Religion, inquired into, and refuted by particular observations</i>	73

CHAP. II.

<i>The Modern Atheistical Hypotheses examin'd, and the Unreasonableness of them shew'd</i>	86
--	----

* * * * *

* * * * *

* * * * *

* * * * *

* * * * *

THE

ORIGINES SACRAE.

BOOK I.

DISCOURSE I.

CHAP. I.

*The General Prejudices against Religion in our Age examin'd;
and the old Atheistical Hypotheses consider'd.*

BEFORE I come to the particular Vindication of the *Truth* and *Authority* of the *Holy Scriptures*, which is my chief Design, it will be necessary to remove, if possible, the common and general Prejudices against Religion in this Age, as if it were only a cunning Artifice of some crafty Persons to support their own interest by deceiving the rest of Mankind. If this were the truth of the case, none ought to be blam'd for their Contempt of Religion; nor for their endeavors to set the Minds of Men free from the uneasiness and slavery of a superstitious and groundless Fear: For this must be all that is imply'd in Religion, if it were at first begun, and is still carry'd on by the Craft of some men, and the Folly of the rest. But such an imputation as this ought to be very well grounded; because it reflects on all Mankind (a very few excepted) and ought in common justice to be prov'd by the most clear and convincing Evidence; because no men have any reason to presume so far upon their own Wit and Capacity above all others, as to take it for granted, that the rest of Mankind are either *Fools* or *Knaves*. For this is the meaning of those who go about to persuade others, that Religion is nothing but an *Imposture*, that hath appear'd under several shapes and disguises; but still the *Machine* is the same, and the same Design carry'd on by the different Actors, according to the Humor and Inclination of several Ages.

I could be glad, that all this might justly be look'd on as a feign'd case, only for a better Introduction to the following Discourses; but none that live in our Age, and understand the too great prevalency of Scepticism and Infidelity in it, can apprehend it to be so. And therefore I shall lay down the true state of the present Case, with respect to Religion in general. It cannot be deny'd by the greatest Enemies to it, that there is still a general Belief of the truth of it among Mankind, however they differ in their particular Notions about it. For this cannot be look'd on as a new Thing, or an Invention of the present Age, since it is manifest by the undoubted History of former Times, that the same foundations of Religion have been generally receiv'd by Mankind, by

A

which

which I understand the Being of God and Providence, and the Rewards and Punishments of a future State; but yet not so, but that there have been in several Ages such as have gone about to unsettle Mens Minds about them, and to represent them as an invention of *Politicians* to keep the World in greater Awe. But they have not met with such success as they expected in their Discoveries; for they have been oppos'd by the wisest and most thoughtful Men in the several Ages they appear'd in, and the generality of Mankind continu'd in the same Belief which they had before. And yet they had then the same inclinations to Ease and Pleasure, as they now have, and would have been as willing to be rid of the terrible apprehensions of God and another World; they had the same value and esteem for themselves and their own interests, and hated all such as design'd to cheat them; they fell into warm Disputes and violent Heats about some particular Parts and Modes of Religion, which are apt to make them call all the rest into question: Yet under all these disadvantages, the Foundations of Religion have been preserv'd among them; and Mankind cannot be brought to look on them as *an Imposture*. But those who think so, are forc'd in great measure to conceal their thoughts, and to put on disguises to the World, that they may appear to be of another Mind than really they are.

Whence then comes it to pass, that those who are averse to the Practice of Religion, yet cannot be brought to shake off the Principles of it? That those who are otherwise so fond of their own ease and interest, should abhor those Atheistical Principles, which are said to be very much for the advantage of both? That those Nations which have had no communication with each other, and differ so much from one another in Languages, customs and modes of Religion, yet agree in the same common sense of God, and a future state?

It is a ridiculous thing for any to pretend to make our Religion to be *an Imposture*, unless they can first give a just and satisfactory account of these things.

All that I can meet with to that purpose, may be reduc'd to these three Heads; which contain the great *Atheistical* Pretences of this Age.

I. That the Notions of Religion were first started among rude and barbarous People by *Politicians*, to keep the People in better Awe; and that the *Priests* found it their interest to support them, because they were supported by them.

II. That there are some *Peculiar Qualities in Mankind*, which joyn'd with their *Ignorance and Fear*, tend to preserve that seed of Religion which is in Man, and no other living Creature.

III. That the consent of Mankind is not so great, as is pretended, there being several Nations now known by the late discoveries, which have no sense or notion of God, or a future state.

These are the things, which I shall now make it my business to inquire into; and thereby shew the vanity and folly of these general Prejudices against Religion.

I begin with the first, That Religion was first invented and carry'd on by *Politicians and Priests*; who aim'd only at keeping the World in better awe, and Themselves in a better condition. This hath

The *Egyptians* are said by *Lucian* to have been the first who set up *Religious Worship*: and *Herodotus* seems to be of the same opinion; *Plutarch* saith it was done by *Osiris*, and *Diodorus Siculus* saith it was directed by *Hermes*, who was a great *Politician*, and *Chief Counsellor* to *Osiris*. But all that *Diodorus* saith is, that he brought the *Honors and Services of the Gods into Order*; which supposes, that there was Religion among them before, but he methodiz'd it. And if we believe *Sanchoniathon*, who makes him first Counsellor to *Cronus* Father to *Misor* or *Osiris*, he began the *Symbolical Images of the Gods*, which caus'd such confusion in their *Worship* afterwards. *Diodorus* saith that *Osiris* built *Thebes* or *Diospolis*; where there was a Temple to the *Immortal God* that made the *World*, as appears by the Testimonies both of *Plutarch* and *Porphyry*. And the former observes, That the most ancient, and universal and most credible Tradition, both of *Law-givers* and others, *Philosophers*, as well as *Poets and Divines*, was, that the *World* was not made by chance, without a *Mind and Reason* to order and govern it. From whence it follows, That before such *Politicians* took upon them to order matters of Religion, there was a generally receiv'd Tradition of a *Divine Being*, which made and govern'd the *World*, and was the true foundation on which religious *Worship* was built. And the same *Plutarch* in that Discourse affirms it to be an *Impious and Atheistical opinion* to attribute the Name of *God* to insensible matter; and adds, that there is *One universal Reason* which governs the *World*. *Ammianus Marcellinus* saith, that the first beginnings of Religion were in *Egypt* long before they were in other parts. Here therefore we must search out for the first laying this design by *Politicians*; and here we find it fix'd upon *Hermes Trismegistus*, who by the accounts given of him, was a very great Man, and that in the beginning of the *Egyptian Monarchy*. *Philo Byblius* saith, he was call'd by the *Egyptians* *Thoth*, by the *Phœnicians* *Taautus*, by the *Greeks* *Hermes*; he flourish'd, he saith, with great reputation for wisdom among the *Phœnicians*; who it seems at that time, were under the government of *Cronus* Father to *Osiris* (or *Misor* as they call'd him from *Misraim*, the Son of *Ham*, who first peopled those Countries.) And so far there is nothing improbable in the Story. For the same Person being of an extraordinary Capacity, might be in favor both with *Cronus* in *Phœnicia*, and with *Osiris* afterwards in *Egypt*; but he goeth on, and saith, That *Taautus* was *the first who took the matters of religious *Worship*, out of the hands of unskilful Men, and brought them into due method and order. So that we find plainly there was

* Πρῶτος
καὶ τῶν
Θεοσέβων
ἐκ τῶν
χυδαίων ἀ-
πειρίας, οἱ
ἐπιστημονι-
κῶν ἐν-
πειρίαν δι-
αίξεν.

Religion among the People before, but this wise Politician thought he could manage it better, if he appointed the Rites of public worship, so as to be most serviceable to Government. And for that end he set up the worship of Princes after their Death (especially of *Osiris*, after his being cut in pieces by his Brother) and joyn'd their Names with those of the Stars, as visible Deities; and of some Animals, as so many living Images of their Gods. And herein, as far as we can find, lay the politic invention of *Hermes Trismegistus*; not in the first planting the principles of Religion, but in turning them that way, as he thought would serve best to the ends of Government; by raising a high veneration for deceas'd Monarchs; and deifying such things as they thought most useful to Mankind. This was indeed playing the *Politician* with Religion. But that there was a sense of Religion before among the People, not only appears by the former saying of *Philo Byblius*, but by another in his *Proëm to Sauchoniaton*: where he saith, *That the Phœnicians and Egyptians agreed (from whom other Nations took it up) to worship those as their chief Gods, which were most useful to Mankind; and to this purpose they turn'd the Temples already standing and erected Pillars & Statues to their Memories, and made Festivals to them.* From whence it appears that there were Rites of public worship among them before, but that *Hermes* caus'd them to be employ'd this way, joyning the worship of the Stars and their Kings together.

Kad eis to
Hermes Trismegistus
Hermes Trismegistus
Hermes Trismegistus
Hermes Trismegistus
Hermes Trismegistus

But there are two very different accounts concerning that Religion which was first settled by *Hermes* in *Egypt*. The one is of those who believe there are some remainders of the old *Egyptian* Doctrine in the *Trismegistic Books*, tho' with many additions and interpolations. And their opinion is, that under all the popular disguises and superstitious Ceremonies for amusing the common People, he did cover the true principles of Natural Religion, asserting the Being and Providence of *God*, and the Immortality of Souls. And for this, they produce not only diverse passages in those Books of *Hermes*, which were known in the *Egyptian* times, while their Priests were yet in being to have contradicted them if they had publish'd falsehoods under so great a Name; but from the testimonies of *Plutarch* and *Iamblichus*, which cannot be suspected: To which the opinions of *Pythagoras* and *Plato*, who sojourn'd so long among the *Egyptian* Priests to learn their Doctrine, may be added. But it is not pretended, that in those times, this was the common and profess'd Religion among the People; but that it was kept up as a *Secret*, not to be communicated, but only to such who were prepar'd for it. According to this opinion, the design of *Hermes* was not to establish any true Religion among the People, but to entertain them with Pomp and Sacrifices, and Ceremonies; and (as some in *Plutarch* and *Diodorus* think) to keep up a difference among them about the sacred Animals to secure them from an universal Conspiracy against the Monarchy. But if the true notions of *God* and Providence, and another World, were preserv'd among the Priests, especially at *Diospolis*, or the famous *Thebes*, where the chief of their residence was; then it appears, that these were not scatter'd among the common People, by *Priests* and *Politicians*; but were kept secret, as not

Plutarch.
de Isid. &
Osir. p. 380.
Diod. Sic.
l. 1.

so fit for their capacities, which would go no further than visible Deities, and a pompous worship. So that the True principles of Religion were not sow'd by them to serve their ends, but the Corruptions of it in order to the pleasing and entertaining the senses and devotions of the common People, who they knew were most affected with what was most agreeable to their superstitious fancies. And there was much more of *Policy* than *Religion*, in keeping the Best parts of it from the knowledg of the People: but the *Politicians* knew very well, those would not serve their turn so well as the fopperies of their Superstition.

But there is another opinion which depends most upon the credit of *Philo Byblus*, who liv'd about *Hadrian's* time. This Man being learned, had a Mind to make some noise in the World with the *Antiquities* of his own Country (for *Byblus* was a *Phœnician* Town.) He found the Jewish *Antiquities* asserted by *Josephus* and others, and the Egyptian by *Apion*; and now he thought was a fit time to vye with them both. To that end, he produces Nine Books of the *Phœnician Antiquities*, written, as he pretended, long since by *Sanchoniathon*, and translated by him into Greek; which he pretends to have found after a most diligent search into the *Phœnician Monuments*. And to make it appear how credible this account of *Sanchoniathon* was, he saith, He took it out of the Records of Cities, and the Monuments of Temples; which were kept up in the sacred *Ammonian Letters*. And this Man is very much commended by *Porphry* writing against the *Christians* for his *Antiquity* and *Veracity*. What ground there is for these pretenses may be examin'd afterwards; I am now only to consider the scheme of Religion, which is produc'd with so much pomp; and yet the Author of it, whoever he was, was neither Divine, Philosopher, nor Politician, for it is one of the rankest and most insipid pieces of Atheism that is to be found in Antiquity. And *Porphry* could not but detest it, unless he had produc'd it in spite to the *Christians*. For he doth on all occasions declare not only his belief of God and Providence, but that he was the Maker of the World; as *Holstenius* hath made it appear in his Life, cap. 9. and it is well known that he was a profess'd *Platonist*. But let us now see what an account we have from this *Phœnician Scheme*, about the making of the World. "At first there was a dark, confus'd, restless Chaos, which was agitated for a long time, and nothing came of it. At length, a mixture happened, and this was the first principle of making the Universe: but it was ignorant of its own making. From this Mixture came *Môt*, or a slimy kind of substance, out of which issued the Generation of all things. There were some Animals which had no Sense; out of which came those which had Understanding, and were called *Zophasemin*, i. e. Beholders of the Heavens, and were made in the figure of an Egg: and the *Môt* shined forth, and the Sun and Moon and great Stars appeared. But it seems those living Creatures were fast asleep, till they were awaked by dreadful Thunders, and then they began to bestir themselves. This is the short account of this matter, which depends not, we are told, on *Sanchoniathon's* Authority; but he took it out of the Records of *Taautus himself*. And so we have the Original of the World according to this ancient *Hermes*. And if

Euseb. Præp. Ev. l. 1. c. 9.

Euseb. l. 10. c. 9.

this were his true Doctrine, it is one of the most absurd and senseless pieces of Atheism, and tends directly to overthrow all Religion in the World. For can any thing do it more effectually, than to suppose, that there was nothing originally in the World but stupid Matter; which by its own motion, without a God to give and direct it, should produce the Heavens and Earth, and all living Creatures; and that Senseless creatures should beget those that had Understanding; and these not capable of acting, till they were thoroughly awaked by cracks of Thunder? Can we imagin this *Taautus* to have been any deep Philosopher or Politician; by setting down such extravagant and unreasonable suppositions as these? But let us see how it was possible for him to advance any thing like Religion upon these grounds: He must be a Politician indeed that could do it. The first Men, he saith, consecrated the fruits of the Earth, by which they liv'd, and worship'd them, and made oblations to them. This was a very notable beginning of Religion, according to this admirable Politician; for Mankind to worship what they devour'd. But *Cotta* in *Cicero* thought *No Man could be so mad to worship what he did eat*. But he saith, *That these notions of worship were sutable to their weakness and pusillanimity*. This doth not give any account how they came to have any notions of Divine worship at all. What was there in the Plants, which made them give such Reverence and Devotion to them? They saw how they grew out of the Earth, and had no power to help themselves, when they made use of them for food. And how was it possible then to give Divine worship to them? which must suppose Power at least in what is worship'd, or else it is a most ridiculous folly in Mankind to stoop to things so much below them. Now this original inclination to give Divine worship to something or other, is that which argues that there is that which some call a Natural Seed of Religion in Human Nature; and must come from some antecedent Cause, since there could be nothing in these objects of worship, which should move them to it; if it had been so, as *Sanchoniathon* represents it from the ancient Records of *Taautus*.

*Ecquem
tam amen-
tem esse
putas, ut
illud quo
vescatur
credat
Deum esse?*
*Cicero
de Nat.
Deor. l. 3,
c. 16.*

The two first Mortals, he saith, *were Eon and Protogonus; and their Children were Genus and Genea, who inhabited Phœnicia; and when they were scorched with the heat, they lift up their hands to the Sun, whom they believ'd to be the Lord of Heaven, and called him Beel-samen, the same, saith he, whom the Greeks call Zeus*. But how came they to imagin any Lord of Heaven, if they knew that the Sun was made out of senseless Matter, as well as themselves? It may be said, *That they being weak and ignorant, did not know it*. But how then came their posterity to know it, if the very first Race of Mankind were ignorant of it? By what means came *Taautus* to be so well inform'd? Revelation cannot be pretended, for that supposes what they deny; *viz.* a Supreme Being, above Matter, which hath Understanding, and gives it to Mankind. But here Mankind come to be understanding Creatures, by being born of Animals that had no Sense: which is a most unreasonable Supposition. They could not have it by original Tradition, for that fails in the Fountain-head, if the first pair of Mortals knew nothing of it. Then they must find it out by Reason:

and

and how was that possible, if there was no Maker of the World, that there should be a *Lord of Heaven*? It is a remarkable saying of *Aristotle* observ'd by *Cicero*, (who saw several of his pieces which we have not, after they were brought to *Rome* by *Sylla*, and put into order by *Andronicus Rhodius*) That if there were Men bred under ground, and had there all conveniencies of Life, without coming upon the surface of the Earth; but should only hear that there was a God and a Divine Power; and afterwards these Persons should come out of their Caves, and behold the Earth, Sea, and the Heavens; the greatness of the Clouds, the force of the Wind, the bulk, and beauty, and influence of the Sun, with the orderly motions and courses of the heavenly Bodies: they could not but think, not only that there was a Divine Power, but that these things were the effects of it. And why should there not have been the same thoughts in this first Race of Mankind, unless we can suppose that they had never heard of any such thing as God, or a Divine Power in the World? But then I ask, How they should come to think of worshiping this *Beelsamen* or Lord of the Heavens? for so he confesses they did, and *lift up their hands to the Sun*. What could the lifting up their hands signify to a senseless mass of Fire; which lately happened to be united together by chance in one body? If he had made Mankind wholly devoid of Religion, till they had been instructed in it by some crafty Politician, it had been much more agreeable to this *Hypothesis*; but to suppose them to pray to the Heavenly Bodies so early, and without any Instructor, must imply some natural apprehension of a Deity, altho' they were so much mistaken in the Object of Divine worship. But it is not reasonable to believe this should have been so early and so universal, but that they presum'd the Sun, Moon, and Stars to have been the visible Deities appointed to govern the visible World; and that the Supreme Mind was to be worship'd in a way suitable to his own Excellency, by acts of the Mind; which was the opinion of many Nations, and some of the greatest Philosophers.

Then he proceeds to relate, how after some of their posterity had found out some useful Inventions, as to the conveniencies of Life; after their death their Children erected Statues and Pillars to their Memories, and worship'd and kept Annual Festivals at them: and that after the death of *Uranus*, and *Cronus*, and *Dagon* and the rest, *Taautus* made Symbolical Images of them, being made King of *Egypt* by *Cronus*; and these things he saith, the *Cabiri*, by *Taautus* his own command, enter'd into Records; from whence we are to believe that *Sanhoniathon* took them, and *Philo Byblius* translated them out of the *Phœnician* Language. And *Eusebius* seems not to question the antiquity of them, but prefers this plain and simple Story far before the Inventions of Poets, or the Allegories of the Philosophers. If these things were recorded by the *Cabiri*, the sons of *Sydyc*, Brother to *Misor*, the Father of *Taautus*, they do not seem to have consulted the honor of *Taautus*; for they make him not barely to be chief Counsellor to *Cronus*, in the design against his father *Uranus*, but that he made use of Magical Arts against him, (but they do not tell us who invented them; nor upon what principles they could be founded, if there were nothing but Matter in the World) and besides this, he advis'd

Cronus,

*De Nat.
Deor. l. 2.
37.*

Cronus, having a suspicion of his brother, to bury him alive in the Earth. And one would think so great a Politician as *Hermes*, would never have commanded the *Cabiri* to have preserv'd these Storics of himself and his Ancestors.

However, this is the account given by *Philo Byblius*, out of *Sanchoiathon*, about the first planting Religion by *Hermes*, who was after, worshiped himself as a God by the *Egyptians*. And now let any one consider, whether this be a reasonable or tolerable account of the first sowing the seeds of Religion among Mankind. And yet this was the foundation of that sort of Religion which came out of *Phœnicia* and *Egypt* into *Greece*: For they pretend to give an account of *Uranus* and *Cronus*, or *Saturn*, and his Sons, and of *Minerva* at *Athens*, to whom *Sanchoiathon* saith, *Saturn* gave the dominion of it; but the *Greeks*, as *Philo Byblius* complains, confounded all with their Fables and Allegories: but this, he saith, is the true foundation which they rais'd their Mythology upon.

It is evident by what is said by *Herodotus*, *Diodorus Siculus* and others, that there were several Colonies that went out of *Egypt* into *Greece*, in the times of *Cecrops*, *Cadmus*, *Danaus*, and *Erethheus*; and it is very probable that they carry'd the *Egyptian* Superstitions along with them: but the Person who is pretended to have settled Religion among the *Greeks*, was *Orpheus*, who is said to have reduc'd them first from Barbarism, and then to have model'd Religion among them, and to have brought out of *Egypt* the Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul, and the Rewards and Punishments of a future state.

Plin. l. 4.

c. 11.

Diod. Sic.

l. 1. c. 4.

Euseb. Pr.

Evang. l. 2.

c. 1.

L. 10. c. 8.

De Nat.

Deor. l. 1.

This must therefore be more particularly inquired into. *Orpheus* is reported to have been a Man of Quality in his own Country of *Thrace*, his Father having a Command over a small Territory there, called *Sithonia*, saith *Pliny*, near the Mountain *Rhodope*, whence he had his Title *Rhodopeus Orpheus*. But *Diodorus Siculus* saith, That when he had accomplished himself at home, he went into *Egypt*; and from thence brought the greatest part of the *Egyptian* Mysteries into *Greece*, only changing the Names from *Osiris* and *Isis*, to *Bacchus* and *Ceres*; and so he did, as to the state of the good and bad after death. For, saith he, The *Elysian* fields for the good, and the torments of *Hades* for the bad, were both of *Egyptian* original. I do not question but the *Egyptian* superstition was in great measure the foundation of the *Greek*; but it is hard to determine any thing concerning *Orpheus*; since *Aristotle*, who was born in *Macedonia*, knew nothing of him, as *Cicero* informs us, and That the Verses under his Name were written by a *Pythagorean*. Which is not at all improbable. But not only *Diodorus* speaks positively about him, but *Strabo* and *Pausanias* seem not at all to question him; and *Diogenes Laertius* mentions an Epitaph upon him at *Dios* in *Macedonia*: But I lay no weight on the Verses under his Name; for *Suidas* mentions several ancient Poets of that Name; and it is allow'd on all hands, that there have been at least great Additions and Interpolations in the Verses that bear the Name of *Orpheus*. The *Argonautics*, *Suidas* saith, were written by one *Orpheus* of *Crotone*, one well acquainted with *Pisistratus*; others say, the true Author of the *Orphic Poems*, was *Onomacritus*, who liv'd about

about that time; and the *Descent into Hades* was written by one *Orpheus* of *Camarine*, saith *Suidas*. The most probable opinion is that of *Aristotle*, that his Sacred Poems were written by a *Pythagorean*; and therefore the *Platonists* *Syrianus* and *Proclus* might well boast of the agreement of the *Orphic* and *Pythagorean Doctrines*. It is no objection, that there is no such thing now to be found in *Aristotle*; for I think *Cicero* may be trusted, who saw more of *Aristotle* than we now have. But I confess if *Diodorus* were not deceiv'd by the Egyptian Priests, their mentioning him with *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, *Eudoxus*, and *Democritus*, who were certainly in *Egypt*, makes it very credible, that *Orpheus* had been there too, and carry'd many of the *Egyptian* superstitions with him: and he might the easier settle them in *Greece*, because as *Diodorus Siculus* observes, he had a particular interest in the Colony which *Cadmus* brought, and was much esteem'd by them; and *Cadmus* himself was originally of *Thebes* or *Diospolis*; altho' *Cadmus* himself might call it after his own Name; or at least the Castle, which long continued it, when the City was called *Thebes*.

But that *Orpheus* did not find those parts so barbarous, as to be destitute of all Religion before, will appear from the account *Diodorus Siculus* himself gives of him, viz. *That he was very well instructed in the Theology of his Country before he went into Egypt*. How could this be, if they were a wild and barbarous People, without any sense of God and Religion, till he return'd and planted it among them? It's true, he calls it a *Mythology*; and what else were the Egyptian Doctrines about *Osiris* and *Isis*, or about *Bacchus* and *Ceres*, as *Orpheus* chang'd them? But whether it were a *Mythology* or not, he calls it a *Theology*; such as was then known and thought to be true Doctrine, and I am apt to think, more decent and agreeable to their natural notions of Religion, than the Mysteries which *Orpheus* brought among them from the *Egyptians*. Some have observ'd, that the very Name of Religion among the *Greeks* was deriv'd from the *Thracians* (*Θρηάκια*) and such religion they had among them, before *Orpheus* was born, as *Diodorus* himself confesses. Whether *Zamolxis* had instructed them in Religion before the time of *Orpheus*, we cannot determin, unless his time had been better fix'd: The *Greeks*, who write *Pythagoras* his Life in favor to themselves, make *Zamolxis* his Servant; and that he went from them to instruct the *Getæ*, among whom he was honor'd as a God. But *Herodotus*, who extols them as the most valiant and just of the *Thracians*, after he hath told the Greek Story about *Zamolxis* being Servant to *Pythagoras*, he concludes, *That he thought him long before Pythagoras*. And he saith, that the *Thracians* had that opinion of his Doctrine, that they despis'd death; saying, they only went to *Zamolxis*. From whence it is plain, that the *Thracians* then believed the Immortality of the Soul: and *Pomponius Mela* saith, *That Belief continu'd among them to his time*. But whereas *Diodorus Siculus* affirms, that *Orpheus* brought all the *Mythology* about *Hades* and the state of the dead out of *Egypt*, and the customs of Burial there; For the Body was to be convey'd over the *Lake Acheron* by *Charon*; where on one side were pleasant fields; and not far off the Temples of *Phreaga* and *Cocytus*, and *Lethe*: I do not deny that *Orpheus* might add particular circumstances from what

Καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς
τῆς Θεολο-
γίας μυστη-
ριολογίας
μεταβαλὼν
ἐκ τῆς ἑλληνικῆς
εἰς Αἰγυπτί-
ακον. l. 4.
p. 232.

Herodot.
l. 9. c. 95.

Mela l. 2.
c. 2.

Diod. Sic.
l. 1. p. 58.
61.

Edda Mythol. c. 3.

he had observ'd in *Egypt*; but that the whole Tradition concerning a future state came from thence, is so far from being true, that the *Thracians*, the *Geta* and *Hyperborei* had the like Tradition among them; as appears by the Gothic *Edda's*, where we read of the Judgment of another World, and that the Good shall dwell with *Odin* in a happy state, and the Bad go to *Hellen* and *Thiffulheim*; and a large account is given of the manner of Judicature in the other World, from the Brass Tables of the *Hyperborei* in the Island of *Delos*, which are mention'd in the Dialogue *Axiarchus* in *Plato's* Works. And however it be not genuine, it is sufficient to our purpose, that all this Tradition came not out of *Egypt*. One would think by the Account given by *Diodorus*, that neither *Orpheus*, nor the *Egyptians*, believ'd any thing at all concerning a future state: but that only some Ceremonies were us'd about Burials, wherein the Lives of Men were inquir'd into, and Judgment pass'd upon them; which the Historian thinks more effectual for reforming Mankind, than the Greek or Poetical Fables. But that the *Egyptians* had a real Belief of another state, appears from *Diodorus* himself. For, if any Person were accus'd before the solemn Judicature, which sat upon him; if the matter were not prov'd, the Accuser was severely punish'd; if it were, the Body was depriv'd of Burial; if there were no Accusation, then the Person's virtues were remembred, his piety, justice, chastity, &c. and they concluded with a Prayer, that he might be admitted to the blessed Society of the Good; and the People applauded his Happiness in that respect. But *Porphyry*, who cannot be suspected of Forgery in this matter, gives a more particular Account of this Prayer; which he saith *Euphantus* translated out of the Egyptian Language; and the substance of it is this: They first take out the Bowels, and put them into a chest on purpose, and then lift it up towards Heaven; and the Person to whom it belongs, makes a Prayer in the name of the Deceased, to the Sun and all the Gods, which give life to Men, that they would receive him into the Society of the immortal Gods. For he had piously worship'd the Gods his Parents had taught him, as long as he liv'd; he had honor'd those from whom he came into the World; he had not kill'd, nor injur'd or defrauded any one, nor had committed any horrible wickedness; but if he had offended in eating and drinking, it was for the sake of that which was in that Chest; and so they took that, and threw it into the River, and intomb'd the rest of the Body. By this we see a distinction is to be made between the general sense of another Life, and some particular superstitions, such as those *Orpheus* carry'd into *Greece*; where they had a notion of another World before, as well as in *Egypt*. For it is not reasonable to presume that the *Greeks* should be worse in this respect, than the most barbarous Northern People. For, besides those already mention'd, † *Cæsar*, and *Strabo*, and *Ammianus Marcellinus* say, that the *Druids* asserted the Immortality of Souls; and neither *Orpheus*; nor any out of *Egypt* ever convers'd among them.

† Cæs. l. 6.
Strabo l. 4.
Ammian.
Marcellin.
l. 15.

* Nobilissimum autem eorum inventum fuit immortalitas Anima.
Canon.
Chron.
p. 217.

But some in our Age are so fond of the *Egyptians*, that they will by all means make the Immortality of Souls to be * a Noble Invention of theirs. What is the meaning of this Noble Invention?

tion? Is it that none ever thought of it before them; and all others deriv'd it from them? That appears already to be otherwise; and that very distant and remote Nations, who had no communication with these Noble Inventors held the same opinions; as might, if it were needful, be prov'd by undoubted Testimonies, both of the *East and West Indies*; where neither *Orpheus* nor the Egyptian Priests were ever heard of. And *Pausanias* long since observ'd, *That the Chaldeans and Indians held the same*; and before the Egyptians; for he makes them the first. But *Herodotus* saith, *That the Egyptians were the first who asserted the Immortality of Souls*. Not absolutely; but so as to pass from one Body to another, till at last it came into a human Body. And of this Noble Invention let the Egyptians have the due honor; and not those Greeks, who, as he saith, would deprive them of it. It is great pity they should lose it; since *Diodorus Siculus* saith, *The Soul of Osiris past into a Bull*; and that is the reason why they give so much honor to it. It cannot be deny'd, that some Greek Philosophers of great Reputation did assert the *Transmigration of Souls*; if their Doctrine be not misrepresented: but neither *Pythagoreans* nor *Platonists* did hold it universally; nor in such a manner as is commonly understood. For, they held no Transmigration of the Souls of Good Men, which were fit for happiness; but asserted that they went immediately to Heaven, or a state of Bliss; as may be prov'd by the testimonies of *Epicharmus*, *Empedocles*, *Plato*, and many others: but the difficulty lay about Impure Souls; the *Pythagoreans* utterly rejected the poetical Fables about the state of the dead; and therefore they were forc'd to think of some way of purifying them after death. They had no light to direct them, but their own Imagination; and they thought it best for the same Soul to come into another human Body, to try if it would behave it self better, that it might be happy: But for profligate and very wicked Persons, they told them of going into such Beasts, as were most remarkable for those vices they were most addicted to; as the cruel into Tigers and beasts of Prey; the voluptuous into Swine; the proud and vain into Birds; the idle and soft into Fishes. This is the Account given, saith *Bessarion*, by *Timæus* in his Book *de Mundo & Anima*. And when *Trapezuntius* charged *Plato* with asserting that *Brutes were informed by human Souls*; Cardinal *Bessarion*, a very learned Greek, utterly denies it; and saith, *That Plato doth not make the Soul of a Man to become the Soul of a Brute; but only that it is confined to it as a prison for a certain time, but it is not capable of acting there for want of proper Organs*. So that these Philosophers opinion was very different from the Egyptians. But whence came the most ancient Philosophers to hold the Immortality of Souls? Had they it from the Egyptians? *Plutarch* saith, *That Thales was the first*; not that held the Soul to be immortal; for so many did before him; but that maintained it as a Philosopher by Reason; that is, because it had the principle of Motion within it self, and so could not be supposed to forsake it self, or to cease moving by the death of the Body. * For, as *Cicero* observes, a Body is moved by impulse from another Body; but the Soul finds it hath this power wholly within and from it self; and therefore is immortal.

Pausan. in Mess.

Herodot. l. 2. c. 123.

Diod. Sic. l. p. 54.

Epicharm. apud Grot. Excerpt. p. 481. Clement. Alex. Str. 5. Poësis Philosoph. p. 28.

Bessar. cont. Calumn. l. 2. c. 7.

* *Θαλῆς ὁ πρῶτος τῶν φιλοσόφων τὴν ψυχὴν φέροντα δεικνύσκειν καὶ ἀποκρίσκειν.*
Plut. de Plac. Phil. l. 4. c. 2. Cicero Tusc. l. 1. 23.

But *Pythagoras* is said to have learnt this Doctrine in Egypt: He called the Soul a *self-moving Number*, saith *Plutarch* in the same place; i. e. as he well explains it, he puts *Number* after his mystical way for a *Mind*: and it seems very strange to me, that so great a Man as *Aristotle*, should think *Pythagoras* spake literally of *Numbers*; as tho' any Number could move it self. But *Plutarch* rightly interpreted him; and the latter *Pythagoreans* from *Moderatus Gaditanus* made no scruple of saying that *Pythagoras* expressed his sense about immaterial Beings by Numbers and Figures, as having nothing of Matter in them. And it is very probable, he learnt this way from the Symbols and Hieroglyphics of the Egyptians. But *Cicero* saith, That he had learnt the Immortality of the Soul from his Master *Pherecydes*; which he confirmed very much. And it is observable, that he first supposes a general consent of Mankind as to the Immortality of Souls, from a very ancient Tradition; and then proceeds to the Philosophers, who offered to give Reasons for asserting it, of which he gives an account. And if there were such a general consent from all Antiquity as he affirms, then this Doctrine could not originally come out of Egypt by *Orpheus* into Greece.

Porphyr. in vit. Pytha.
Plutarch. de Isid. & Osir. p. 354.
Cicero Tusc. l. 16.

Cap. 13.

Cap. 12.

Plato in Cratyl. p. 397.

Let us now consider the sense of Religion or Divine worship among the Greeks before *Orpheus* his time; whether they were such strangers to it, as they must be supposed, if he brought it first among them. *Plato* was a very competent witness as to the Old Greeks; and he affirms that the first Inhabitants of Greece seemed to him to have worship'd no other Gods, but the Sun, Moon, and Earth, and Stars, and the Heavens; as most barbarous Nations still do. So that here we have the same Religion in Greece, that was then common to the rest of the World; i. e. the worship of Visible Deities, and such as they apprehended to have the greatest influence upon their affairs. The heavenly Bodies did strike them with astonishment at their vastness, and beauty, and orderly motion, and the benefits they continually receiv'd from them; and these they were most ready to pay their Devotions to, as to those which appear'd most to them; but that which did not appear, was to them that were so much govern'd by Sense, as if it were not. As if we suppose a Prince travelling with his chariot in the Country, with the curtains drawn up on all sides, and a great Retinue about him; the People are much surpris'd with so great an Appearance, and flock about them to see to whom they must pay their Respects; and seeing no body in the Chariot, they turn their eyes to the Attendants, and especially to him that sits so high in the Coach-box and manages the Horses; and immediately give him that profound Reverence which was only due to the Prince himself, if he had appear'd. Much after this manner it was with the Barbarous People, both in Greece and other parts of the World: There was something so great, as to require Devotion from them; and they looked about them, and could see nothing which they thought could deserve it better than the Sun, Moon and Stars, which were placed very high, and were the great Movers which kept all things in their order, and made them so serviceable to them. But this is far from being an argument that they had no Religion; it being rather a sign they had too much, but knew not how to govern it. But this was a far more reasonable

sonable worship, than that which *Orpheus* or the *Old Poets* brought in among the *Greeks*; whose Stories and Ceremonies were so filthy and indecent, as were enough to have turned the stomachs of modest and virtuous Men from any kind of worship, which had the tincture of so much obscenity going along with it. And it is really to be wonder'd at, that the *Orphic Mysteries* and poetical *Fables* receiv'd among the *Greeks*, did not quite overthrow all Religion among them. For, as *Plutarch* well saith, *Absurd Notions of God have very bad consequences both ways; for some are plung'd into the depth of Superstition; and others to avoid that, run themselves into Atheism.* And if there had not been some very great reason in Nature, to have kept the notion of a *DEITY* in Mens minds; it is hardly conceivable, that under all the horrible superstitions of *Greece*, there should be any such thing as a sense of Religion left among them. But the evidence of that was so great, as made all Men of Understanding to put any tolerable sense upon those *vile superstitions*, which were so prevailing in *Greece*, after the *Egyptian fopperies* were brought in among them. The Rule they went by was this, That Religion must be preserv'd in the World, not to serve Politic Ends, but to satisfy the Reason and common Sense of Mankind; and that since such a way of Worship was so generally receiv'd, they were willing to put the best constructions upon it, and to make it some way or other serve to keep up the sense of a Divine Power in the management of the World. And of this we have a remarkable instance in *Plutarch*, with respect to the *Egyptian Mysteries*, in his Treatise of *Isis* and *Osiris*. He professes at first a great desire to find out the truth of these things that concern the knowledge of God, it being the greatest Blessing God can give, and Mankind can receive; and that without it Immortality is not Life, but Duration. And the end of all, he saith, is the knowledge of the first and principal and intellectual Being. But he can make nothing at all of the Matters of fact with relation to *Osiris* and *Isis*, which he looks on as very absurd; and so overthrows all the *Phœnician Scheme* of *Philo Byblius*, who lived much about the same time, under *Trajan*: but *Plutarch* saith, To understand those things of a Divine Being literally, is so absurd and impious, that they deserve to be spit at who offer them. And for those, who interpret these things of great Princes in former times, who had Divine Honor given them, this, he saith, is the way to overthrow the natural sense of a Divine Being, and so open the way to *Atheism*, by confounding Gods and Men together; as he saith, *Euhemerus Messenius* had done. And therefore he was fain to turn all into *Allegory*, to avoid the mischief of absurd and impious opinions concerning that Divine Power, which he owned to be in the World; and not only so, but he adds (as is already observed) that there was a very ancient Tradition in the World, among all sorts of Men; and which had obtained a firm and unshaken Belief in the World, not only in common talk, but in their greatest Mysteries, and that both among *Greeks* and *Barbarians*, that the Universe was not made by chance, or without reason, but that it was made and governed by it. From whence it follows, that there was such a

Plutarch. de Isid. & Osir.

Ω, πάλαι ἔστιν ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος. p. 352.

P. 358.

Διὸς παλαιὸς αὐτὸς ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἀστέροις. p. 369.

αὐτὸν δὲ πάλαι ἔστιν ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος. p. 369.

Tradition among the *old Greeks*, which did not lose its Authority, when those Myſteries were brought in; and that made the moſt intelligent Perſons to apply them that way. For it ſeems, by the account he gives of *Euhemerus Meſſenius*, that Atheiſtical Perſons took great advantages from theſe Stories of their Gods, to prove that there were none at all; but only that Great Men in former ages, that had found out ſome uſeful Inventions, were deify'd after their deaths. *Plutarch* makes that a fabulous ſtory, which he tells of his *Golden Inſcriptions in Panchæa*, to prove the truth of his aſſertion, *which none ever ſaw beſides himſelf*; and he affirms, That there were no ſuch Perſons as the *Panchæi*: but others have ſhew'd that there was ſuch a place as *Panchæa* about *Arabia Felix*. And *Diodorus Siculus* mentions it as a conſiderable Iſland in the *Arabian Sea*, and that the Inhabitants are called *Panchæi*; and that near the City *Panara*, there is a Temple to *Jupiter Triphyllus* which was in great veneration for its Antiquity and Magnificence, which he deſcribes at large; and upon the Mountain there, it is ſaid that *Uranus* of old inhabited; and the People were called *Triphyllii*, from three different Tribes which joyn'd there, and were afterwards driven out by *Ammon*. And to make the Story of *Euhemerus* more probable, he ſaith, The Inhabitants came firſt out of *Crete* in *Jupiter's* time. So that *Plutarch* was very much to ſeek, when he deny'd that there was any ſuch place as *Panchæa*, or ſuch a Perſon as *Jupiter Triphyllus*. And *Diodorus* further ſaith, There was in it a golden Pillar in the old Egyptian Letters, wherein there were Inſcriptions containing the Acts of *Uranus* and *Jupiter*, and of *Diana* and *Apollo* written by *Hermes*. Which is a very different account of this matter, from what *Plutarch* gives. Some are willing to excuſe *Euhemerus*, as tho' he intended nothing more, but to let the *Greeks* know, that they worſhip'd ſuch for Gods which had been Men; which was true enough. But this did not reach his deſign, according to *Plutarch*; which was to prove, *that there were no other Gods but theſe*: ſo *Plutarch* ranks him with *Diagoras Melius* and *Theodorus*, who ſaid *there were no Gods*. And the *Epicurean* in *Tully* ſaid, *that Euhemerus deſtroy'd all Religion*, which could not be true, if he had left any Divinity to be worſhip'd. *Sextus Empiricus* reckons him among the *Atheiſts*; and ſaith, *he was a conceited Man*; but he charges him only with ſaying, *That ſome Great Men in former Ages had been made Gods*. Which was ſo evident a thing, that one would think none could have been called an *Atheiſt* merely upon that account. But *Jupiter* of *Crete* had been advanc'd a long time to the higheſt Divine Honor; and conſequently thoſe who went about to diſprove his worſhip, were thought to deſtroy the worſhip which belongs to the Supreme God. But *Diodorus Siculus* in a Fragment of his ſixth Book preſerv'd by *Eusebius*, gives a very different account of him; and that from *Euhemerus* his own words, *viz.* That the Ancients had deliver'd to their poſterity two different Notions of Gods; one of thoſe that were Eternal and Immortal, as the Sun, Moon and Stars, and other parts of the Universe; but others were Terreſtrial Gods, that were ſo made, becauſe they were Benefactors to Mankind, as *Hercules*, *Bacchus*, and others. And as to *Euhemerus*, he ſaith *that he was a Favorite* of

Diod. Sicul.
l. 5. p. 220.

Plutarch.
de Placitis
Philos. l. 7.
Cicer. de
N. D. l. 1.
Sext. Emp.
ad Mathe.
p. 317.

Euseb. Pr.
Evang. l. 2.
c. 2.

of

of *Caſſander King of Macedonia*, by whose command he made a voyage into those parts; where he found the things before mention'd. But some learned Men are still of *Plutarch's* opinion, that *Euhemerus* his *Panchæa* is a mere figment of his; for which I do not see any reason sufficient; especially when the same Persons do allow *Sanchionathon's* Phœnician Antiquities; and methinks *Euhemerus* his Account of the Inscriptions on Pillars of the Acts of *Uranus* and *Cronus*, and *Jupiter* and *Ammon*; and the *Sacred Letters* by *Hermes*, comes so near to *Philo Byblius*, that one would think he had compar'd Notes with *Euhemerus* and *Diodorus Siculus*. But their design was different in this respect, that *Sanchoniathon* justify'd the making Men to be Gods; but *Euhemerus* went about to prove they were *not Gods*, because they had been Men. It is possible, that the common People might account him an Atheist for denying *Jupiter of Crete* to be God, or for saying, that his Sepulchre was to be found. But why should *Plutarch* charge him on this account, when he himself so much finds fault with those who made Men to be Gods? He endeavor'd, he saith, to avoid the extremes both of *Superstition* and *Atheism*; but he could but endeavor it, when he allow'd the practices of the *Greeks* and *Egyptians*, and only offer'd at some forced Interpretations of them; against the general sense of the Egyptian Mysteries.

*Bochart.
Phaleg. l. 2.
c. 8.*

But however it appears from him, that the *old Greeks* did preserve the ancient Tradition of the *World not being made by chance*, which is the foundation of all Religion. And *Plato*, when he enters upon the Discourse against *Atheism*, begins with two things, viz. *That the Sun, and Moon, and Stars, and the order of Seasons shew'd there was a GOD and Providence; and the consent of all Mankind, Greeks and Barbarians*. Now, how could *Plato* have said this of the *old Greeks*, if they had been without any Religion till *Orpheus* came out of *Egypt*? And we have an evident proof of the practice of Divine Worship among them, from the *Parian Chronicle*; where it is said, *That Deucalion after he had escaped the Flood went to Athens, and there offer'd a solemn sacrifice for his deliverance; and Pausanias saith, he there built a magnificent Temple*. Which are sufficient Evidences of the Religion of the *old Greeks*, even before they had the Name of *Hellens* from the Son of *Deucalion*. But I have not yet done with *Diodorus Siculus*, who lets fall several insinuations, as tho' he were of the Mind of *Euhemerus Messenius*; and that the old Religion, both in *Egypt* and elsewhere, was nothing but a *Politick Contrivance*. For in the beginning of his History, he pretends to give an Account of the beginning of all things. But it is such a one as plainly shews he was no friend to Religion; for he takes away the very foundation of it, by supposing the World to be produc'd without any Intellectual Cause. He saith at first there were two Opinions among the Philosophers and Historians: One was, that the World had been always just as it is; the other, that there was a beginning of Mankind, and of other things. But how? This he undertakes to explain after this manner. At first there was a Chaos, or a confus'd Mixture of Heaven and Earth and all together; then follow'd a Separation of Bodies from each other, and thence came the present Frame of the World. The lighter Bodies mov'd forward,

*Plato de
LL. l. 10.*

*Marmor.
Arundell.
Pausan. in
Atticis.*

ward, as the Air and Fire, by which Motion came the Sun, Moon and Stars. But the grosser and more heavy parts subsided together; the moister made the Sea, and the dry the Earth: which was very moist, but being quicken'd by the heat of the Sun, swell'd up in several Tumors with thin Skins containing the Materials of living Creatures; which having strength brake thro' those Skins; and thence came all sorts of Animals. But the heat of the Sun and the Winds hardening the surface of the Earth, no more of such swellings appear'd; and so the Animals are since continued by Propagation. But the Men which were thus born were very wild at first, but by degrees they came to understand one another, and to find out the conveniences of Living. This is the short Abstract of the Account he gives: which is just the *Epicurean Hypothesis* in other Terms; which was much in vogue in the time of *Diadorus Siculus*, (which, saith *Suidas*, was that of *Augustus*) especially after *Lucretius* his Poem was in such reputation: For, he saith, he very well understood the Latin Tongue, and had great helps to his History from *Rome*: and whosoever compares this with *Lucretius*, will scarce find any difference. And *Eusebius* observes, that he does not so much as once mention the Name of God in it, but leaves all to Chance, and a fortuitous concurrence; and as it is express'd in *Plutarch*, where the *Epicurean Opinion* is deliver'd much to the same purpose, the World is said to have come together at first by a motion of Atoms without Providence. Where there must be something defective in the beginning, to shew this to have been the *Epicurean Hypothesis*; for as it stands, it seems to be *Plutarch's* own opinion; which is directly contrary to what he had said before in the foregoing Chapter, where he blames *Anaximander*, for leaving out the Efficient Cause; for, saith he, Matter alone can do nothing without it. And the same he repeats against *Anaximenes*; and saith plainly, * That it is impossible that Matter alone should be the Cause of Things; as it is for Metals to form themselves into Pots and Cups without an Artist. So that *Plutarch* must be clear'd from that opinion, which he so justly opposes; and he commends *Anaxagoras* in a particular manner, for adding Mind as the Efficient Cause to Matter; which brought it out of confusion into that order that appears in the World. *Pliny* saith of *Diodorus*, *Apud Græcos desistit nugari*; but he only applies it to the Title of his Book; and it is not true of the Beginning of it: *Pliny* himself took the World to be an Eternal Being, which he calls *God*; and so was against *Diodorus* his Making of the World. But *Diodorus* quotes *Euripides* the Scholar of *Anaxagoras* for his Chaos: but that is not the point, whether there were such Confusion at first, but how the World came out of it. It's certain that *Anaxagoras* did not only hold a *Chaos* at first, but an *Eternal Mind*, which order'd the World, and brought things into that beauty and usefulness which they have. *Diogenes Laertius* saith, that *Anaxagoras* follow'd *Linus*, and he was before *Orpheus*: If it were only in that of the *Chaos*, there was nothing extraordinary in that; for all that supposed the World to be made, asserted it; but if it were of the Mind as the Efficient Cause, that is a considerable testimony of the antiquity of that Opinion among the old Greeks. And *Orpheus*,

Euseb. Pr. Evang. l. 1. c. 7.
Plutarch. de Placit. Phil. l. 1. c. 4.

* Ἀδύνατον
ᾧ ἀρχὴν
πάντων τῶν ὄντων
ἔξ ἑαυτοῦ
γενέσθαι
ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ
νοῦν αἰεὶ
ἔχειν ὡς
ἀρχὴν.
Plutar. de Plac. Phil. l. 1. c. 3.

Plin. N. H. l. 1. c. 1.
Lib. 2. c. 1.

Laert. in Proöm.

phens, as *Suidas* gives an account of his Doctrine, saith *That he held a Ckaos, and before that an Æther of GOD's making, which was the great Instrument in framing the World.*

But *Eusebius* charges the most part of the Greek Philosophers with being of *Diodorus* his mind in this Matter: but I hope to make it appear otherwise in the progress of this Discourse; being now only to consider this Assertion as we find it in him. And I cannot but take notice of the unfairness of it; for he represents it, as if there had been but two Opinions among the Philosophers, that of the *Eternity of the World*, and its being made by *Chance*; as if he had never heard of an *Eternal Mind* among them: which it is impossible so inquisitive and learned a Man should be ignorant of. But he offers no kind of proof of the truth of what he lays down; not so much as the Inscriptions of *Hermes*, or the Commentaries of *Taautus*, which *Sanchoniathon* and *Philo Byblius* pretended to. He gave no manner of Reason how the confus'd Matter was put into motion; or how the separation of the lighter and heavier Bodies was effected; How the heavenly Bodies came to have distinct *Vortices*, without interfering with each other; How the moister and heavier parts came to be divided, so as to make two such great Bodies, as the Earth and Sea to be so distinguish'd and parted from one another: which are considerable difficulties, and ought to have been clear'd. It may be said, *That he writes not like a Philosopher, but as an Historian, and only in general lays down the principles that had been receiv'd by Philosophers.* But this doth not vindicate him. For then he should have set down all their Opinions, which he doth not; but purposely avoids that which would have resolv'd these difficulties. For if an *Eternal Mind* be suppos'd to give and direct the motion of Matter, then we may easily conceive, not only whence Motion it self came; but whence Gravitation, or the tendency of Bodies towards their center; whence the several great Bodies of the Heavens came to have their distinct circumvolutions; and whence the Earth and Sea came to be so divided, and parted from one another.

But *Diodorus* was sensible that there would be great objections made against the production of *Animals out of the Earth*, without any other Cause than the heat of the Sun, and moisture and putrefaction of the slimy substance of the Earth. And therefore to answer them, the *Egyptians*, he saith, produce this Experiment among them, that about *Thebes*, when the Earth is moistened by the Nile, by the intense heat of the Sun falling upon it, an innumerable multitude of Mice do spring out; which being done after the Earth was so much hardened, and the first influences abated, much more might all kind of Animals come out of the Earth at first.

But in the first place, we have nothing but the testimony of these *Egyptians* for the original truth of this; who brought it as an Argument to justify their own Hypothesis. And from them other Writers have taken it, without examining the truth of it, as *Ovid*, *Mela*, *Pliny*, &c. *Ælian* goes farther (who liv'd in *Hadrian's* time) for he saith, in his way between *Naples* and *Puteoli*, he saw such imperfect Animals, half Mud, and half living Creatures; *Altera pars vivit, rudis est pars altera tellus*; as *Ovid* describes them.

C

But

*Euseb. de
Prep. Ev.
l. 1. c. 8.*

1.

*Ovid. Metamorph.
l. 15.
Plin. l. 9.
58.*

But this is very far from making any tolerable proof; for they might be perfect Animals, and only one part appear out of the mud or dirt, and the other be cover'd over with it. And this in all probability was the case in *Egypt*. For these were seen only in the *Mud*, after the *Nile* was return'd into its Channel, as *Mela* affirms, *Ubi sedavit diluvia & se sibi reddidit, per humentes campos quedam nondum perfecta animalia*, &c. Now this was a very ill time for any Persons to go farther than as to what appear'd to them at a distance: and because they saw but some parts, they concluded the rest to be nothing but slime. But this is a very slight and imperfect way of making *Experiments*. Did any of the *Egyptians* take and dissect any of these *Imperfect Animals*, and shew how it was possible in the formation of them, for one part of them to be nothing but mud, when the rest had all the proper Organs belonging to such Animals? If the internal and vital parts be first form'd (as no doubt they are) and the Blood passing thro' the Heart into the outward parts, be the great instrument of perfecting the *Organs* of sense and motion; how is it possible to conceive that where the inward parts are perfect in their kind; one main part of an Animal should have nothing like Organs, but merely be a mass of Dirt? And by what means could that afterwards be joyn'd with the other to make up one perfect Animal? It is agreed among the best Observers and most curious Inquirers into these things, that the Heart is the first of the solid parts, and the Blood of the Fluid; but whether it be by a dilatation of the *Punctum saliens*, or red beating speck, into several parts, whereof one is for the upper, and the other for the lower and remoter parts; or it be by extention of the several parts in little, as an *Embryo*, (as it is in Plants) or by a fermentation rais'd in the fluid matter by an active fluid convey'd into it, upon the conjunction of male and female; (which are the several *Hypotheses* of the most inquisitive Persons in this Philosophical Age) which way soever we take it, this *Egyptian Hypothesis* of *Imperfect Animals*, is repugnant to the most accurate Observations, which have been made about the Generations of Animals. And however such things might then pass among such who take all upon trust from the *Egyptians* or others who never examin'd them; yet it would be the only proof of *Imperfect Animals*, to find any in our Age to defend those crude and absurd Opinions. As tho' any thing were to be believ'd rather than the most reasonable things in the World, viz. God and Providence; which appear most conspicuously in the production of Animals. Insomuch that our sagacious Dr. * *Harvey* after all his diligent and exact Inquiries, confesses that the power and presence of the DEITY is no where more observable than in the Formation of Animals. And he could find no satisfaction in any *Hypotheses* of the greatest Naturalists, without taking in the immediate Power and Providence of God. And even Mr. *Hobbes* himself, who was as unwilling to call in the help of Providence, as another; yet is forc'd to give up the Cause in this matter; and freely confesses, † That if Men examin the several Machines in order to Generation and Nutrition, and think they were not order'd by an intelligent Being to

* Neq; sane uspiam alibi, quam in Animalis fabrica, Omnipotens Creator in operibus suis aut manifestius conspicitur, aut præsentius ejus Numen adest. *Exercitat.* 49. Quapropter rem recte pieq; (mea quidem sententia) reputaverit, qui rerum omnium Generationes, ab eodem illi æterno atq; omnipotente Numine deduxerit, à cuius nutu rerum ipsarum Universitas dependet. *Exercitat.* 50.

Quod ubique præsens, singulis rerum naturalium operibus non minus adfit, quam toti Universo, quod Numine suo five Providentia, arte ac mente Divina cuncta animalia procreet. *Ibid.*

† Qui si machinas omnes, tum Generationis tum Nutritionis satis perspexerint, nec tamen eas a mente aliqua conditas ordinatasque sua quasque officia viderint, ipsi profecto sine mente esse censendi sunt. *Hobb. de Homine* l. 1. c. 1. ad fin.

their

their several offices, must be said to be without Understanding themselves. And yet he sets down the words of *Diodorus Siculus* in the beginning of that Chapter; and thinks that is as far as Men can go by Philosophy, without Revelation. How can these things consist? For Men without Revelation may find out all the Machines in the Body; and therefore may be convinc'd that there was an Eternal Mind which gave a Being to these things; which is more than *Diodorus Siculus* or his Philosophers could find: For they affirm'd, That Animals were form'd by Chance, out of mud and putrefaction without any Mind; and therefore according to him they had none themselves. And some of our most experienc'd and skilful Anatomists, after all their debates about the several Mechanical Hypotheses concerning the Production of Animals, have concluded that *it is impossible that mere Matter and Motion, of whatsoever figure the particles of Matter be, should make up the Body of an Animal; but that we must have recourse to a most Wise and Omnipotent Agent, which alone is able to do it.

* Interea
raturum ma-
neat juxta
normam
optimæ
Philoso-
phiæ fieri

non posse, ut Particulæ five Corpuscula quomodocunque figurata solo motu fortuito in corpus humanam aut bellui-
mum sponte coalescant: Sed necessario ad hoc opus omnino sapientissimum potentissimumque Architectam re-
quiri, qui Animalium Machinas tam affabre & artificiose componat. Adeoque Deum solum formare cuncta ani-
malia, & fecunditatem ovis addere. *Exercit. Anatomica & Medica Peieri & Hardeci, p. 126.*

And those who plead most for the Motion of the particles of Matter in forming the Body, yet confess, That it is hardly possible to conceive how the kinds of Animals can be preserv'd, unless there be something beyond that, to regulate and determin that Motion; but what that is, they are not able to explain. Let now any Persons that have the use of Understanding, consider whether this *Egyptian Hypothesis* have the least credibility in it; since it is grounded on so little Authority.

*Etmulleri
Instit. Me-
dica, c. 23.*

But that is not all. For we shall prove it to be repugnant to the most certain accounts we have of the Nature, as well as the Production of Animals; both which are impossible to be conceiv'd to be the mere result of a fortuitous Motion of Matter, by the heat of the Sun upon the slime of the Earth. As will appear by considering the most necessary and vital parts of Animals themselves, and what relates to the several kinds and the preservation of them: For the *Egyptians* argued from their Mice to all other Animals. The most necessary and vital parts of Animals, are such as the course of the Blood and Respiration depend upon, without which it is impossible for them to live. The Course of the Blood supposes the Heart, as the great Machine in the Body; and the several Arteries are as so many vessels to convey the Blood into the several parts. But here is so much wisdom and contrivance in this, that unless the Heart had been fram'd in such a manner, and the Blood put into such a Motion as it is, the preservation of Life had been impossible. And Life it self is something beyond the mere Coalition of the particles of Matter: For if that were sufficient, then there must be Life in all parts of Matter united together; (but neither Stones nor Plants are Animals) and they become Animals by that which makes the difference between them and inanimated things; which are the constant course of the Blood, and the distribution of Nourishment to the several parts of the Body in order to their support; and when these are at an end, the Life

II.

Unde autem aliter calor hic perennis enascatur, haud facile dixerim, si quidem ad fermentationis operam recurrere inane auxilium est, quoniam ipsamet sine calore nihil egerrit. *Ent. Apologia, p. 204.*

Cicero de N. Deor. l. 2.

of an Animal is gone. Now in order to this course of the Blood, the Heart hath its peculiar and wonderful frame and motion; for therein is the chief seat of that which is called *the Flame of Life*; which is nothing else but that brisk and vigorous motion of the Blood, which actuates and enlivens the whole Body. But both the natural heat and motion of the Blood are unaccountable in the Mechanical way. To say the natural heat is caus'd by fermentation, can give no manner of satisfaction; for from whence comes this fermentation, but from heat? And so heat must be suppos'd in order to the producing heat; and there can be no end in such kind of Suppositions. And if the particles did of themselves give it, then it must be discern'd as much at first as afterwards; but the contrary is observ'd in Animals. For the Blood is more fixed at first, and its heat rises by degrees, as the parts are forming. If it be said, *There is a Spiritus Genitalis which causes all that heat and motion*; I ask, Whence that arises? Not from mere matter and motion. But it must be something of a higher nature, and from a superior cause. But if heat and mud can produce Animals, there is no need of any such *Spiritus Genitalis* in Nature, but all must arise from mere motion, and the continuation of Animals might as well have been without any distinction of sexes. But how came Matter of it self to form such a distinction, with parts futable to such a design? How come the Instincts of Nature in *Animals* to be so violent to such an end; when if there be nothing, but *Matter*, there can be no such end design'd? How come some *Animals* (as *Mules*) not capable of propagating their kind, when upon Anatomical searches no kind of defect hath been found in them, as some imagin'd? How come the *Species* of *Animals* to be so determin'd and limited, that in the revolution of so many Ages no new *Species* have appear'd, altho' they are so different in some Countries from others? How comes the number of some *Animals* so very much to exceed others? i. e. How come the *Beasts of prey* to fall so much short of the most tractable and *useful Animals* to Mankind, as *Sheep* and *Oxen*? And those are observ'd to be most fruitful, which afford the best Food for them. Can we suppose *the heat of the Sun and slime of the Earth* should regard so much the benefit of Mankind? How comes the difference of *Animals* as to the manner of their production? i. e. How come some to hatch their young ones within their own Bodies, and others to bring forth eggs, and so to bring them to maturity by incubation? And how comes this difference to have always continu'd without alteration? Whence comes that difference in Animals, that some do *Ruminare*, and others do not? Did mud quicken'd by the Sun design to supply the want of teeth for *Mastication* by those several ventricles, and the muscles belonging to them? How come some Animals to have their senses more exquisite than others, according to the nature of their food; as sight in some, and smelling in others? How come Birds and Fishes so very much to exceed Mankind in the frame of those nerves, which serve for smelling? Whence comes that wonderful sagacity in some Animals to pursue others merely from the scent left upon the ground at some distance of time, and to distinguish it from all others of the same kind? Whence comes that wonderful care and tender-

ness

ness of their young ones in the most cruel and fiercest Animals? If heat and mud could produce the Beasts themselves, yet what influence could they have upon their Brood? How comes the change of the passage between the lungs and the heart, when a young Animal is come into the open Air, from what it had in the Womb? What particles of matter close up the *Foramen Ovale*, and direct the passage of the Blood another way? What makes the milk to come into the proper vessels of the breeding Animal just at such a time, and to decay when there is no farther occasion for it? Whence came the wonderful contrivance of Birds in making their nests, and feeding and preserving their young? What particles of Matter dispos'd them to find out their proper food and physic? How come the seasons of bringing forth to be so settled, that there is a sufficient provision to support the young Animals when they come into the World, by the milk ready prepar'd for them, and such conveniences for the young to suck it? How come they to run so naturally to their dams without any director, and to avoid such as would destroy them? What had the particles of Matter to do in all this? If we go to *Insects*; How came the Silk-worms to hatch their eggs when the Mulberry-trees are ready for their food? The Bees to come forth in May, when there is most plenty of dew? The Wasps near Autumn, when the fruit is grown ripe to support them? How come the several *Insects* by that sagacity to find out the most proper places to lay their eggs in? It being observ'd of them, by those who have most curiously inquir'd about these matters, *That all the several sorts of Insects lay their eggs in places most safe and agreeable to them, where they are seldom lost or miscarry, and where they have a supply of nourishment for their young, so soon as they are hatched and need it.*

Neque alia
parte in-
genia avi-
um magis
admiranda
sunt. *Plin.*
N. H. l. 10.
c. 33.

Mr. Ray of
the *Creations*,
p. 115.

But there are some things yet further to be consider'd in the necessary vital parts of Animals, which shew that they could not be the result of a fortuitous motion of Matter. The main vitals of Animals are the same; and where there is any observable difference, these two things are remarkable: 1. That they are alike in the same kind. 2. That it is for the greater conveniency of those kinds. As the position of the heart is higher in Mankind, than in creatures that put their heads down to eat; because if the heart of Mankind were in the center of the Body, and not in the upper part, there could not be so easy a passage of the Blood from the heart to the head, which is so necessary for the support of life; but in those creatures which hold their heads downwards, altho' the passage may be longer in such which have long necks, yet no inconvenience comes by it, because of the easiness of the descent in holding down their heads. But how comes a fortuitous production of Animals to cause such an agreement in the several parts of living Creatures? That all have the same vitals, *Insects* excepted (in which the heart is the whole Body) none wanting the heart with its arteries carrying out the Blood, and the veins returning it; nor the lungs for respiration, nor the brain for sense and motion (to name no more;) How comes a blind motion of Matter to hit so exactly on all these, and to put them into such a convenient situation for the preservation of Life? How comes the heart to be endued with such strong fibres, unless it were intended not merely

Tota Cor
sunt. *Harv.*

to receive the Blood in its passage, but to disperse it again by its contraction of it self? How come the coats of the arteries about the heart to be so much stronger than in the outward parts, but that there is the greatest necessity of their being so, to receive the Blood in its first heat and quickest motion? How come the veins to be so dispers'd in all parts of the Body, but to receive the Blood in its return; and so to keep up the life and warmth of all parts? What motion of Matter could frame the *Valves* in the *Veins*, so as to give free passage of the Blood towards the heart, but oppose the passage of the Venal-blood the other way? (which gave the first occasion to the discovery of the Circulation of the Blood, as Mr. Boyle tells us from Dr. Harvey himself.) What is it which keeps the Blood in its constant course for so many years, as some Animals live to? And what makes the very different periods of their lives, when we can see no reason from their mechanical frame, why one should in an ordinary course survive another, for so great a compass of years? What is there in the texture and coalition of the parts of a Stag, to make it outlive an Ox or a Horse so many years; when Aristotle saith, *They seem to be less made for long life than other Animals, as far as he could judge by their bearing and growth*: but Pliny so long after him saith, *Vita Cervi in confesso longa est*; It was a thing taken for granted that they lived long. But I meddle not with any improbable Stories about it; for my argument depends not upon any thing but what all grant to be true, viz. That there is a great diversity in the Lives of Animals; of which I say no account can be given from mere Matter and Motion.

Boyle of
Final Causes,
p. 157.

Arist. Hist.
Anim. l. 6.
c. 29.
Plin. N. H.
l. 8. c. 32.

III. There is no probability of any kind of Animals arising from Putrefaction, which the Egyptians and Diodorus Siculus make their foundation. After the inundation of the Nile, a sudden heat of the Sun falling on the slime, causes a putrefaction, and from thence an innumerable company of Mice came. But Theophrastus, a very great Philosopher, in a Fragment preserv'd in Photius, saith, *That the great number of Mice is to be found in dry soils, and not in moist; for water is a great enemy to them, and they are certainly destroy'd by it.* How comes Theophrastus to differ so much herein from Diodorus Siculus and the Egyptians? Or must we suppose, that the water of Nile was quite of a different nature from all other waters to them? *Proventus eorum in siccitatibus*, saith Pliny; where he speaks of the great increase of them. How then came they to multiply in such moist places, where the Nile hath overflow'd? *Rain-water kills them*, saith Aristotle; how then comes the Nile to produce them? If it be said, that Aristotle speaks of great showers which drown them; it is easily answer'd, That at their going off upon these principles, they produce more, and so the greatest numbers would be after great Rains. But what Theophrastus saith before of small Frogs will hold of these Mice too, they do not come from the water, but that discovers them, and brings them out of the places where they were before. And Pliny's words are remarkable, when he speaks of this matter, *Detegente eo (Nilo) musculi reperiuntur*, &c. And so the late Editor confesses it was in the best MSS. So that the going off of the Nile, is that only which brings them to light. And before, Pliny saith, the Gyrini (the Name given

Diod. Sic.
l. 1. p. 8.

Phot. Bibl.
Cod. 278.

Plin. N. H.
l. 10. c. 65.

Arist. Hist.
Anim. l. 6.
c. 29.

Plin. N. H.
l. 9. c. 58.

Cap. 51.

given to these small Frogs) do come from other Frogs, and not from putrefaction; *Pariunt minimas carnes nigras, quas Gyrinos vocant, oculis tantum & cauda insignes; mox pedes figurantur, &c.* These are called Tadpoles, and seem imperfect at first, but by degrees do come to all their parts. But as to *Animals* arising from putrefaction, learned and inquisitive Persons of our Age have taken great pains to discover the truth of it in several Countries, but with no success. In *Italy, Franc.* Redi undertook the Discovery of this matter with incredible diligence, and great variety of Experiments; but after all, could not find that any putrified Flesh would produce *Animals*, much less putrified water or slime; but that lesser *Animals* hide themselves under dirt and slime, and therefore have been suspected to have come out of it; and if those who first broached this opinion had examined this matter more strictly, they would have found them only covered over, or at least some part of them with that earth which they thought had brought them forth. And for the little frogs, he saith, that they are so much of the colour of the earth, that they might easily be mistaken for parts of it; but upon opening of them, their stomachs and intestines are full of food and excrements. Which is a plain demonstration against their original from the earth; and he concludes it a thing impossible for any such creatures that are part mud and part animals, to be produced by the inundation of the Nile. There is a remarkable passage in *Olaus Wormius* concerning the *Norway* mice, which seem to come out of the Clouds; that as soon as they are fallen, they have found green herbs in their bowels; (and I do not think any grass grows in the Clouds:) But he thinks *Scaliger's* opinion not improbable, that they come from putrified water in the clouds; and he saith, The *Seamen* have found them fallen into their Vessels, and that the Clouds stink and hinder their breathing; but at last he thinks they may be only carried by some violent storms from the Mountains and Islands where they breed in great abundance. And *Etmullerus* a German Physician concludes all *Equivocal Generation* to be impossible. Some of our own most diligent Inquirers, after all their searches, declare that they can find no such thing as a *Spontaneous Generation of Animals*; and I remember I have formerly read a Discourse in MS. of Mr. Boyle's to that purpose. Our ingenious and learned Mr. Ray positively affirms, That there is no such thing in nature, as *Equivocal* or *Spontaneous Generation*, but that all *Animals* as well small as great, are generated by animal Parents of the same species with themselves. And because some were offended at it, he goes about to justify his Assertion, not only from Reason, but from the Authority of *Malpighius* as well as *Redi, Swammerdam*, and *Lewenhoek*, and many others, who have examin'd this matter carefully and circumspectly; and therefore their Authority sways more with him, than the concurrent suffrages of a thousand others; as he saith.

But there are somethings not yet sufficiently clear'd as to this matter, especially as to *Animals* breeding in human Bodies, of particular times, and in some diseases: but as to Plants and some Insects about them, in which *Redi* himself gives up the cause, *Malpighius* contradicts him, and so do *Swammerdam*, and others; particularly Mr. Hook saith, He observ'd little eggs in the protuberan-

Fr. Redi de
Gen. Insect.
p. 195, &c.

p. 208.

p. 209.

Museum
Wormian.
l. 3. c. 23.
p. 326.

Exercit.
192. 3.

Etmuller.
Instit. Med.
c. 23.

Lister in
Goedart.
de Insect.
p. 47.

Ray of the
Creation,
part. 2.
p. 71.

Microgna.
p. 189.

cies of plants, which became worms with legs, which eat through the womb which inclos'd them. And in all Galls, he saith, there be either holes where the worm hath eat out its passage; or a place where it had been. All which he attributes to the particular design of Providence, in taking care for the conveniencies of the meanest Animals. But there seems to be more difficulty in the *Apiarium marinum* mention'd by *Piso*; for it is hard to understand how these blue worms came to the bottom of the Sea, which coming up with a spongy sort of shrub growing upon the Rocks, and being expos'd to the heat, turn'd to little Animals like Bees. But this matter is not deliver'd distinctly enough to form any Argument upon; as Mr. *Hook* hath well observ'd. I see no difficulty in the *Ephemeron* or *Hemerobion*, as it is describ'd by the Authors at the end of *Goe-dart*, who give the best account of it; for it seems to be of the nature of other Insects; and the only difficulty is, why so much pains for so short a life? for it is produc'd by such changes as other Insects are. But it cannot be deny'd, that there have been among us two very learned Men, who have asserted a kind of Spontaneous Generation of Animals; I mean Dr. *Harvey* and his *Apo-logist*. For Dr. *Harvey*, *Redi* observes That altho' he asserts every Animal to come of an egg proper to its kind, yet he was of opinion that these eggs are not always contain'd in the bodies of Animals, but are dispers'd up and down by the Air, and after become Animals in an equivocal manner: but he saith, he hath not clear'd the grounds of his opinion; save only that it comes from the Omnipotent hand of God. So that Dr. *Harvey* held a true Spontaneous Generation from mere Matter and Motion to have been impossible; as appears by what is said of him before. And so his *Apologist* supposes a saline Spirit to be dispers'd in Nature, which meeting with proper matter and a moderate heat, may produce Insects, and such kind of Animals: but he was very far from thinking this could be done without a Power far above Matter and Motion; which at first order'd the World, and all things in it. But he thinks such Insects come nearer to the nature of Plants than Animals, and live chiefly by the heat of the Sun; and therefore in the winter, they are torpid and without motion, and are reviv'd at Spring when the heat increases.

IV. Supposing it to be granted that there were such an Æquivocal Generation of Mice and Frogs on the Bank of the *Nile*, how doth it from thence follow that Mankind had the same kind of

Original? It is a saying of *Pliny*, which hath been carry'd too far, *Quam Natura rerum nusquam magis quam in minimis tota sit*, where he compares Insects with the greater Animals; and seems to admire the workmanship of one far beyond the other: his words are, *Nusquam alibi spectatiore naturæ rerum Artificio*. And so he falls into admiration of the perfections of some Insects; as to the quickness of sense and motion; and of others as to their peculiar properties. I think *Aristotle* was very much in the right when he held, they were to be blam'd who despised the least things in Nature; for in all of them *there is something which deserves admiration*: And particularly in Insects, the contexture of their parts, the manner of their transformations, the difference of their kinds, the variety of their food, and their time of taking it, have something in them, which

Piso Hist.
Nat. Bras.
l. 4. c. 2.

Microgra.
c. 43.

Redi p. 19.

Ent. Apol.
c. 17. p. 379.

p. 245.

Plin. N. H.
l. 11. c. 1.

Arist. de
par. Anim.
l. 1. c. 1.

which cannot be accounted for by mere Matter and Motion: But yet, there is a great difference in the inward make of these Creatures from more perfect Animals. For *Redi* affirms, that *Steno* and he opening some Insects together, they could find no other inward parts, but one long channel thro' the whole Body, about which there were filaments in a confus'd series, which they thought might be instead of Veins and Arteries. When all their inward parts were taken out, and the Head taken off, they still lived and moved as other Insects do; and laid their eggs. By which we see what a vast difference there is between the principles of Life in Mankind from those in these admirable Insects. *Jul. Scaliger* extremely despises *Cardan's* way of reasoning; *Mus e putredine potest nasci, ergo & homo potest*: and saith, That the woman in *Esop's Fables*, who was asked by her husband how the child came without him, and she answered, Out of the snow; might have made a better answer from *Cardan's Philosophy*, viz. out of the mud. And it is wittily said by *Scaliger* of him in another place, They who stick in the dirt, while they lift up one foot to get out, set the other faster, and therefore it is best to keep out of it altogether. But *Cardan* seem'd to be so little concern'd to get out of it, that he asserts that every putrefaction produces some Animal or other; and that all Animals come out of it: which, saith *Scaliger*, is a wicked and profane speech. And yet *Andr. Cæsalpinus* undertakes to defend *Cardan*, chiefly from the Generation of Insects; without regarding the difference between them and more perfect Animals, if his supposition had been true. *Aristotle*, who had all possible advantages for writing his Books of Animals, by the bounty of *Philip* or *Alexander*, or both, coming to speak of such as had no Blood, (among which are all Insects) he saith, They have no Veins, nor Bladder, nor Respiration; but something that serves in stead of a Heart, without which they could have no Life; but they have the parts which serve for Nutrition: and therefore their Life differs little, according to *Pliny* himself, from that of Plants and Fruits; but he would have them *Spirare sine Visceribus*, breath without Lungs; and he grants they have neither them, nor Heart, nor Liver. And altho' there be some higher degree of Life in such Animals as *Diodorus Siculus* speaks of, yet those fall so far short of Mankind, that it is a wonder Men of sense could imagin the production of one could be an Argument for the other. For, if we go no farther than Nutrition, Mice and Frogs are easily provided for; but how should Mankind live that were produc'd out of slime and Mud? But nothing can be more absurd and ridiculous than the accounts given of the several ways of producing Mankind by a Spontaneous Generation, as will appear by a particular examination of them.

Franc. Redi hath reckon'd up the several Hypotheses to our hands: The first is, that of *Democritus*, That Mankind came into the world like worms, which by degrees grew up to the figure and shape of Men. I wish we had more of *Democritus* his own Writings left, that we might better judg what his true opinion was; but by what remains it doth not appear that herein he differ'd from *Epicurus*. It's certain he did, as to the first Principles of all things being made of Atoms; but whether he did, as to the immediate production of Animals is not so clear. For they did not imagin that Animals were form'd immediately by Atoms; which was too general and inde-

D

finite

Redi de Gen. Insect.
p. 218. Nil
hil intus,
nisi ad-
modum
pauca In-
testinum
impica-
tum. *Plin.*
l. 11. c. 4.
Arist. Hist. Anim. l. 4. c. 6.
Scaliger. Exercit.
193.

Exercit.
180. 2.

Exercit.
190. 193.
Andr. Cæsalpin. Qu. Peripat.
l. 5. c. 1.

De partib. Anim. l. 4. c. 5.

Redi de Gen. Insect.
p. 14.

finite a Principle; but that the Atoms first came together in one form, and then another, till they came to the perfection of Animals. And so 'tis said, that *Democritus* held Mankind to have appear'd first in the fashion of worms. *Petronius Arbiter* saith, that *Democritus* spent his days in making Experiments; *Ætatem inter Experimenta consumpsit*; and *Columella* particularly takes notice of his Experiments about Insects; and it is not improbable that from his Observations about their Transformations he might form his *Hypothesis* about Mankind. His original Notion was, as appears by *Plutarch*, That there were infinite Atoms dispers'd in a void space, which had no kind of Qualities inherent in them; but as they casually hit upon each other, they produc'd Water, and Fire, and Plants, and Men; which were nothing but a congeries of Atoms; which, saith *Plutarch*, he called *Ideas*. And it appears by another place in him, that *Democritus* only held Bulk and Figure in his Atoms; but *Epicurus* added Gravity; without which he found his Atoms could not move. And altho' *Epicurus* deriv'd the main of his Principles from *Democritus*; yet it is plain by *Plutarch*, that his followers set themselves to lessen the credit of *Democritus*, as one that overthrew the certainty of our Senses, and resolv'd all into Reason. To which purpose there are several passages, in *Sextus Empiricus*, of *Democritus* himself. Wherein he affirms, That the things we call Qualities, are only names impos'd upon Opinions (which he calls Law) and so bitter and sweet, and hot and cold, are only Fancies and no Realities; and that there is nothing real but what is not seen but only apprehended by the Mind, as Atoms and Vacuity; and in several other places, that there is no Certain Knowledge, but only Opinion by our Senses. And he quotes *Democritus* his own words to prove that the knowledge we have by our senses is dark and obscure; but that which is genuine depends only upon Reason. The *Epicureans*, who follow'd their Master, as to the certainty of Sense, could by no means brook this Doctrine of *Democritus*, who saw far beyond *Epicurus*, and knew what blunders he must fall into by the judgment of Sense, as about the bigness of the Sun; which he positively said, was no greater than appear'd to our senses, i. e. two foot over, saith *Cicero*, or a little more or less; which was so notorious a blunder, that *Democritus*, he saith, could not fall into, being skill'd in Geometry; but *Epicurus* not only despis'd it, but persuaded *Polyænus* it was false. And his late great Defender hath little to say for him, but that *Socrates* understood as little Geometry as he; but *Socrates* was far enough from asserting such stupid Paradoxes, and making Geometry nothing but a piece of Sophistry; as *Epicurus* did, and made a Mathematician think so too. Which shew'd his Authority sway'd more than his Reason. But the *Epicurean* in *Plutarch* rejects *Democritus* his Doctrine, for that which *Plutarch* saith, doth as well follow from that of *Epicurus*; for, if there be nothing but Atoms, then Qualities are only appearances, and when we judg by our senses, we cannot judg truly of things but of what they appear to us. But if nothing, saith he, can be produc'd out of nothing; and no Generation can be of that which already is; how can indivisible Atoms, which cannot be chang'd, produce Plants or Animals? Either therefore *Democritus* should not have asserted such immutable Prin-

Columel.
l. 11. ult.

Plutarch.
adv. Col.

De Placit.
Philos. l. 1.
c. 3.

Sext. Emp.
p. 163.

p. 164.

Cicero de
Fin. l. 1. c. 6.

Acad. Qu.
l. 4. c. 33.

Principles, or he should not have overlook'd the Consequence, *i. e.* that there can be no Generation. But *Epicurus* impudently holds the same Principles, and yet would deny the Consequence, and assert true Generation; just as he deny'd Providence, and yet asserted Piety; held Friendship to be only for Pleasure, and yet that a Man must undergo any hardship for his friends; made an infinite space, and yet placed an upper and lower Region in it. But he declares he can by no means understand, how Bodies indu'd with Qualities, should be produc'd by Atoms that have none. There can be no Generation without Heat; how comes there to be heat, when the Atoms themselves have no heat in them, nor become hot when they are joyn'd together? for if they are capable of heat, then they are not impassible, nor without Qualities. So that according to the general Principles of *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, there can be no such thing as a Generation of Animals.

But *Democritus* observ'd strange alterations in the Bodies of Insects from Worms to flying Animals; and why might not Mankind have come into the world after the same manner? If this were his opinion, it is one of the wildest and most extravagant opinions that could have enter'd into the head of such a Man, and would make one think that the People of *Abdera* were not out in their judgment of him; if those *Epistles* about him were genuine between *Hippocrates* and them.

There are wonderful alterations in the Bodies of *Insects*, as appear beyond all contradiction by the many Experiments of those, who have apply'd themselves for many years to observe them. But what then? Do not all these *Insects* come out of Eggs, which have been laid by other *Insects* before them? and therefore Mankind could not be *Worms* first, but there must have been Eggs before. And how should these Eggs be transform'd into the Worms? What force was there in Nature to make so strange a Transformation as is continually observ'd in them? And the very same Persons, who have observ'd their Transformations, have as well observ'd the incredible number of Eggs that are laid by them, and the great and sudden increase of them from those Eggs. Even in the *Ephemeron*, which was so great a rarity taken notice of by *Aristotle*, upon the River *Hypanon*, (but is so frequent upon some Rivers in *France* and the *Low Countries*, as is observ'd by *Scaliger*, *Auger*, *Clutius* and others) it is agreed, That they come out of such a Transformation, as other *Insects* do, with four wings and six feet; and are very careful where they lay their Eggs, to keep them from the water; in which they die, after they have spent their short life in flying in great numbers together, at Sun-setting; saith one from his own Observation: *Scaliger* saith, those he observ'd began to live at night, and dy'd by morning.

But there are some things which deserve a particular observation about *Insects*, which plainly shew that they were not form'd by a casual Coalition of Atoms, but by a wise Providence. As, that those that have wings have them stronger or weaker, more or less, according to their business and occasion for using them; those that have feet, have an equal number on both sides, altho' the numbers differ so much according to their kinds; those which have neither wings nor feet, have repositories made for them with

D 2

proper

Arist. Hist. Anim. l. 5. c. 19. Scaliger. Exercit. 194. 5. Aug. Clus. de Hemerobio. Joh. de Mey Append. ad Goedarts. Swammerdam Anasom. de Ephemeris apud Theophrastum. Sept.

proper food in the Leaves of Trees or Plants. Concerning which there are several things very observable. (1.) Their great niceness as to their food. *Goedart* who made it his business to observe them 40 years, (as *Aristomachus Solensis* did *Bees* for 58 years, faith *Pliny*) found it very difficult sometimes to find the proper food for them; for they would eat no other, and express'd their joy when they had it. *Dr. Lister* adds, *That Insects would rather die than eat any thing else, not from want of Organs, but from a natural accuracy of Taste.* And he ingeniously observes, that from hence may be found the best way of keeping Ships from worms, by finding out that sort of Wood which those worms will not touch. (2.) The different sorts of food in their different states. While they are mere *Eruca*, they eat a hard sort of food, as the Leaves of Plants; but when they come to have their wings and to fly abroad, they live only on Honey and liquid things: which is very different from such Animals as have Blood; for when they are *Embryo's* they live on liquids; but as they grow up they like harder food. (3.) That those which feed on Leaves of Plants growing, will not touch them when they are taken off or decaying: which *Goedart* faith, he observ'd both as to Garden-herbs and Grass. (4.) That those flying Insects which have very short feet, take their food out of Flowers by the help of their tongues as they fly. (5.) That those which are most afraid of Birds, eat only in the night, when they are most secure from them; which argued a wonderful care of their own safety. There are many other Observations to be made use of concerning the manner of their Transformations; the change made by them in the very Bodies of these Insects; and the different times of continuance under them; and the ways to secure themselves from injuries of the Weather in cold Seasons: but these are sufficient to my purpose, which was to shew that *Democritus* made a very ill choice of Worms, as the instance of a fortuitous Production. But if they had been so, it was a very extravagant fancy to think that Mankind should undergo such transformations as Worms do, before they come to their perfection. For these changes are evident to Sense to all that observe no more than Silk-worms; but Mankind continue in one uniform state from an Embryo, to a perfect Man; and while he is an Embryo hath one sort of nourishment from the Mother, which is wholly different from what all sorts of Worms do live upon; and the parts of Mankind are extremely remote from the shape, number and use of all sorts of Worms. In so much that *Democritus* might much better have fancy'd, that Mankind were at first a sort of Trees set with their Roots upwards: for the Head to Man is what the Root is to the Tree; and Trees come from an Embryo in the Seed, and are preserv'd in the Womb of the Earth, and are fed with a dew from above, and have passages like *Lymphaducts* in their several parts; only they happen to want the instruments of Sense and Motion, which are needless to them, since their food is brought home to them, and they grow up in the same uniform manner without Transformations, as Mankind do.

* *Plutarch.*
de *Placit.*
Philos. l. 5.
c. 19.

The next Hypothesis was that of *Anaximander*; and he makes them to be bred up as Embryo's in the Bowels of other Creatures. Of which * *Plutarch* gives the fullest account: In one place he only faith,

faith, *That the first Animals were produc'd in moisture, cover'd over with a certain Bark, like the rind of a Chestnut, faith Redi; and when it grew dry it crackt, and the Animals started out, but liv'd not long.* Was not this a hopeful Beginning in the early days of Philosophy? For *Anaximander* succeeded *Thales*, who was the first Philosopher of Greece; and a much wiser Man than his Scholar, as will afterwards appear. But we must now pursue *Anaximander*: and *Plutarch* in another place tells us, *That he was of opinion that Mankind were first bred in the Bellies of Fishes; and when they were strong enough to help themselves, they very fairly cast them upon dry ground and left them to shift for themselves.* Is not this a very good philosophical account of this matter? And he was in the right, when upon this ground he dissuaded Men from eating of Fish, lest they should be like *Cannibals*. It is a known saying, *That there is nothing so absurd, but it was said by one Philosopher or other.* I think *Anaximander* may put in for the first, who broach'd his own dreams and idle fancies under the name of Philosophy. And yet *Empedocles* in this matter, rather outwent him. For he faith, *Animals were not intire at first; but came into the world by pieces; and so arms and legs, and all other parts happening to joyn together, made up one perfect Animal.* *Hæc non sunt Philosophorum judicia, sed delirantium somnia,* may be much better apply'd here, than it is by the *Epicurean* in *Cicero* to their opinions of the Gods. But I rather think *Empedocles* his opinion is mis-represented; since the Author of the Book *De Mundo* (which is very ancient, if not *Aristotle's*) gives another account of him; and faith, *He deriv'd the forming of Animals from God; and his Verses, as they are in Simplicius, do not deny it; but only shew, that all things except God, came from different principles.*

Plutarch. Sympof. l. 8. c. 9.

Plutarch. de Placit. l. 5. c. 19.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 1.

But we are not deceiv'd in the third Hypothesis of *Epicurus* and his followers; which as *Redi* represents it is, *That Mankind and other Animals were inclos'd in certain Coats and Membranes in the womb of the Earth, which being broken in due time, they were all expos'd naked, without any sense of heat or cold, and sucked the Earth for nourishment; but the Earth grew too old for such births; and therefore was contented ever since to bring forth nothing but Insects.* This is so well known to be the *Epicurean Hypothesis* from *Lucretius*, *Censorinus*, &c. that there needs no farther proof of it. But whether it can be thought reasonable, is the thing now to be consider'd. And herein these two things are suppos'd: (1.) That there was a fit disposition of the Earth to produce them; and a capacity in it to form Wombs and Bags to preserve them till they were able to take nourishment; and that the Earth did afford a sort of Milk to support them. (2.) That the use of all the parts of human Bodies came only by chance, and were not form'd with any design. Both which are very unreasonable suppositions.

How can they make it appear that there ever was any such disposition of the Heavens and Earth to produce Animals more than there is still? When they were told that if the Earth could at first produce Animals, why not still? Their answer was, *The Seasons are changed, the Heavens were more benign, and the Earth more fruitful than they have been since.*

(1.)

*At novitas Mundi nec frigora dura ciebat,
Nec nimios æstus, nec magnis viribus auras;
Omnia enim pariter crescunt & robora sumunt.*

Lucret. l. 5.

Lactant.
l. 2. c. 12.

And *Lactantius* sets down their opinion more distinctly, *That certain motions of the Heavens are necessary to this production of Animals, as well as the freshness of the Earth; and that then there was no Winter nor Summer, but a perpetual Spring.* But how came such a *Proper Season* for this purpose at that time; and never since? *Animals, say they, can never since propagate themselves:* But what is this to the *Season*? Do the *Seasons* alter, as there is occasion? Then there is a Superior Mind to direct them. If there be a natural course of the Heavens, which caus'd the Earth to be then prolific; that must return and put a new vigor into the Earth, and make it young again. And this our modern Atheistical Philosophers in *Italy*, such as *Cardan*, *Pomponatius* and others, saw very well; and therefore asserted that upon certain *Conjunctions of the Heavens, the same effects would follow.* So *Berigardus*; who

Berigard.
Circul. 10.
p. 636.
para 5.

saith, that *Cardan* and *Pomponatius* laid much weight on this Story in *Diodorus Siculus* about *Animals produc'd by the Nile*; and he adds another very ridiculous, as he pretends out of *Camerarius*, of several parts of human Bodies, which are seen to appear every year rising out of the Earth about *Grand Cairo*: and he thinks they were like the *Egyptian Mice*, part Earth and part Animals. What will not such Men be inclin'd to believe rather than the truth! As when he adds, of the two *Green Boys* in *England*, which came out of a *Wolf's den* 500 years since; and the *Blew and Red Men* out of the *Mountains of Armenia*. Which are such incredible Fictions, that it is a wonder any one that pretends to Common sense could repeat them. But as to the *Egyptian Story* in *Camerarius*, it relates not at all to the first making of Bodies; but to the *Resurrection from the dead*. *Camerarius* neither pretends to have seen it himself, nor that his Friend did; but that his Friend

Camerar.
Opera sub-
cis. Cent. 1.
c. 73.

heard one that had been a great Traveller say, *That in a certain place not far from the Pyramids, at a certain time of the year, a great multitude met to see the Resurrection of the Dead, as they call'd it; and then he said some part of the Body seem'd to come out of the Earth, sometimes the Head, sometimes the Feet, and sometimes the greater part of the Body; which were afterwards hid under the Earth again.* And another Friend of his shew'd him an old *Itinerary* to the same purpose; and that the place was two Miles from the Nile, in an old Burying-place; and that it lasted three days, and then no more were seen that year. But he added, That they were not seen rising up or walking; and he saith, That he saw it not himself. But *Camerarius* himself censures it as a superstitious folly.

Martin. à
Baumgarten.
Peregrin.
l. 1. c. 18.

Martinus à Baumgarten saith, *That at Cairo it was believ'd in his time, that at a certain Mosque near the Nile, the Bodies of the dead do arise out of their Graves at the time of Prayers, and there stand, and disappear when they are over; which he calls a Diabolical Illusion.* But when our Ingenious Mr. *Sandys* was in *Egypt*, the story was chang'd; for then it was affirm'd, *That not far from the Nilus, upon Good-Friday, the Arms and Legs of a Numbers of Men did appear stretch'd forth of the Earth, to the astonishment*

Sandys's
Travels,
p. 99.

of

of the multitude. Which he not improbably conjectures to have been taken out of the Mummies not far off by the Watermen, (who gain very much by it) and plac'd conveniently in the Sand to be seen, as they thought would raise the greatest admiration. Since his time Monsr. Thevenot, who was upon the place faith, *That at Grand Cairo it is generally believ'd that on three days in Passion-week, some part of the dead Bodies lie out of the graves, and then return into the Earth. He had the curiosity to go and see, and there found some skulls and bones, which they say confidently came out of the Earth; but he looked on it as a contrivance of the Santons.* But if this prove any thing, it is not what Berigardus brings it for, that Mankind came first out of the Earth, but that there shall be a Resurrection of the Dead: for he faith, *It was in a place where many dead Bodies did lie buried; and not far from the Mummies; which was the most famous place for Burials in all Egypt: an account whereof is given by Bellonius, Peter della Valle, Buratine in Thevenot's Collection, Prince Radziwil and several others: Prince Radziwil observ'd, That there were vast numbers of skulls and bones scatter'd up and down, where the flesh had been taken off, and sold away for Mummy.* But besides these Mummies (as they are call'd) there was continu'd a place of solemn Burial near to Grand Cairo by the Turks; so that there were always Bodies ready that were not proper Mummies, to make this annual shew with, to deceive the simple. But Berigardus is aware of the difficulty of assigning the manner how Animals come out of the Earth; and therefore he thinks it sufficient to shew that the Earth can produce them one way or other, and afford them Nourishment when they are produc'd; this he thinks absolutely necessary, and he suspects that Lucretius his Folliculi will not do the business; because it is impossible for Children to subsist, if they did break the bags they were inclos'd in, which were fastened to the Earth: But if there were such a Milky Substance in the Earth for new born Children to suck, is that all that is necessary for their support, when they are so unable to help themselves? Of all things one would not expect to find Milk in the breasts of the Earth; and it must be some very happy Conjunction of the Planets to make the Earth to give suck. How much would those who are friends to Religion have been despis'd and laugh'd at, if they had made such absurd and ridiculous Hypotheses as these? If such a thing did arise from natural and necessary Causes, it must continue; and since we are certain it hath never been since, we have no reason to think it ever was. If it were by chance; what hinders the same effect, unless Chance were ty'd up to one certain time? and by what Laws can Chance be bounded? If it were by particular design at that time for the support of new born Animals, then there must be a Providence owned; and yet all this was invented on purpose to exclude Providence: which shews how weak and inconsistent this Hypothesis is.

We account it a wonderful work of Providence, that at the same time the Child is form'd in the womb of its Mother, there should be so ample and suitable provision made for its nourishment in the Mother's breasts against its coming into the World. Whether it be by turning the Blood into Milk, as was generally thought, or by a passage of the Chyle from the Ventricle thither, as some of late

think;

Thevenot
Voyage de
Levant,
part 2.
ch. 12.

Bellon. l. 2.
c. 47.
Pietr. della
Valle Vol.
1. Lett. 11.
§. 8.
Thevenot
Relat. part.
1. ad fin.
Peregrin.
Principis
Radziwil,
p. 187.

think; it cannot but be look'd on as a work of Design, to turn the nourishment another way on purpose to serve the necessities of the new born Child. But this is not all; but continual care and watchfulness of the Nurse is necessary to preserve it, otherways, as well as by feeding it. But these unadvis'd and fanciful makers of Mankind think they have done their business, if they can but imagin the Earth to afford some *Milky Substance*, to support the poor helpless Infants to a little suck from the Earth: why did they not as easily find out all other conveniencies for them? But there is so much absurdity in the whole Supposition, that *Berigardus* concludes, *That Mankind must come full grown out of the Earth, and able to shift for themselves; or else that some other Animals must come out before them to afford Milk for them, as the Wolf did to Romulus and Remus.* Such miserable shifts must those run into, who will not allow a wise Providence to have brought Mankind into the World.

11.

But how came Mankind, if they came into the World so by chance, to be so admirably provided in all parts of their Bodies of such instruments of sense and motion, that look as like a design as any thing can possibly do? The Bodies of Men are not like mere lumps of dirt and water put together, for there is not the least part about them, but is made up of such a *Wonderful Mechanism*, that there cannot be a discomposure in it without a disorder in the whole. But, suppose the fleshly and bony parts could be made by the mixing and tempering several particles of Matter together; yet what can be imagin'd as to the *Muscles* and *Nerves* and *Fibres*, which are so conveniently dispers'd over the Body? The Heart it self is found to be a very strong Muscle, consisting of abundance of Nerves, and all kind of Fibres complicated within each other, and a strong Tendon at the Basis of it; by virtue whereof it is able to contract it self, and so makes the Blood to pass into the Arteries, which convey it to all parts of the Body. Now let any one think with himself how it is possible for a mere Lump of Earth made in such a form as the Heart is, to have such a force and power to contract it self to such a degree as to send out so much Blood continually, and to receive it in again by the relaxation of it self. How comes this Motion to begin in such a piece of Clay made with a Basis and a Cone? How came the inward cavities to be form'd, and kept so distinct from each other? For, if there were any stop of the passage, Life is at an end. How comes such a Motion to continue so long and so uniform? Those who have most narrowly search'd into it, have found that no other account can be given of it, but that the Wise Creator that form'd the Heart, doth both give and continue its motion. And as to all the other Muscles of the Body, if we consider their number, their position, the contexture of their parts, and their continual usefulness; we can never imagin that all these things could be the result of Heat and Mud, or a casual conflux of the dull particles of Matter. Every Muscle hath its proper Fibres laid upon one another, and its opposite Tendons, with an inward cavity, and the Artery, Veins and Nerves belonging to it, and a Membrane to cover all; and all parts capable of motion have several Muscles peculiar to themselves, for distinct uses and different

sort

Lower de
Corde, p.
85.

fort of motions, as may be seen at large in all that treat of these matters. Who tell us generally that the Eyes have six, the Nose four pair, the Cheeks two pair, the Lips four Muscles, the nether Mandible five, the Ears six, the Tongue seven, &c. I need go no further: and altho' there be some difference in the way of numbring them, yet they all agree, there are so many as are impossible to be made out by heat and mud, or any force of the Sun or Earth. And what is it which makes all these Muscles so serviceable to Mankind, that upon the least command they move the parts they serve in what manner we direct them? The reason of *Muscular Motion* is a thing as much out of our reach as that of the *Heart*: Some talk of *Elastic Spirits*; others of *the weight of the Blood*; others of *a nervous liquor distending the carnous Fibres*; others of *a Succus nutritius from the Nerves meeting with the Animal Spirits, and fermenting together, which being thrust into the carnous Fibres, swells and dilates them so as to make them contract themselves*; from whence, they say, *Local Motion proceeds*. But all these are but mere conjectures, and hardly answer to the most common appearances of Muscular motion. And the Mechanism of our own Bodies, both as to Sense and Motion, baffles all the attempts of the most ingenious and subtle Philosophers; who may easier teach us the ways to talk about it, than to understand it. But there is one thing yet farther fit to be observ'd in this place concerning the Muscles; which is the different Figure of them, according to the use they serve for; as the Muscle called *Deltoides* on the Shoulder, the Circular Muscles, where their use is to open and shut; if such things do not argue contrivance and design, it is not easy to imagin what doth. What can those who follow *Diodorus Siculus* make of the whole *System of Nerves*, which are in the Body of Man? Did these come out of slime with *the heat of the Sun*? How came the different Rise of the *Nerves*, some within and others without the Brain? What reason is there in the bulk, and figure, and texture of that same Substance, that it comes to be so divided, so as part of it to continue within the Brain, and the other to be continued down to the lowest part of the Back, by several distinct *Vertebrae*? How came Matter of it self to form such a passage down from the Brain, and to secure it in such a manner; and to compact the several parts together, so firmly as if they were but one bone, and yet so flexibly as to serve best for motion? What made the *Perforation* for the *Spinal Marrow* to pass in the middle and on the sides, for the several *Nerves* to go from thence to the several parts of the Body? Whence came that *Ligament*, which joyns the *Vertebrae* of the Back together, and covers the other Membranes of the *Spina Dorfi*? There is a wonderful curiosity observed by our greatest *Anatomists*, in the order and placing of the *Nerves*, the *Arteries*, the *Veins* and the *hollow places* belonging to it: which they found by opening the *Verbetra* in *Embryos*, and taking out the spinal Marrow, and injecting liquors into the several vessels. And still the farther any have gone in these searches, the more reason they have seen to admire the wisdom of Providence: and so it hath been in other parts. *Aristotle* mentions a strange saying of *Empedocles*, *That the reason why the Back-bone appears as if it were made up of several pieces, was*

Willis de Cerebro, c. 29.

Arist. de Partib. Anim. l. 1. c. 1.

E

that

that it was at first broken, and then put together; and ever since it hath so continued. But how came the *Vertebræ* then to be so well fastened together, and to be so much more convenient for motion than an intire bone would have been? Besides in an *Embryo* that which is properly the *Spina*, doth not then appear, as being inconvenient for its posture in the womb; which shews both the intention of Nature, and the design of Providence. How came the *Vertebræ* to be in other Animals as well as Mankind? And even Aristotle himself was therein mistaken, for he affirms, *That a Lion hath no Vertebræ in his Neck-bone, but that it is all one continued bone*: But *Borrichius* in his Anatomy of one, declares that he found the several *Vertebræ* in the Neck plain and distinct. And the same learned Person observes, *That in a Crocodile, which he dissected, he found in four foot length of the Back sixty Vertebræ; which were of a spongy nature, fit to receive nourishment; and from the different formation of some parts of them, he concludes it most probable that they grow so much longer than other Animals*. But *Aristotle's* mistakes, about the *Lion's* having no *Vertebræ* in his Neck, had been discover'd by *Scaliger*, and confirm'd by several Dissections since: So that the *Vertebræ* are of the original design of Nature. But to proceed: What made the several passages out of the Skull, for the Nerves which serve for the several Senses of *Smelling, Seeing, Hearing and Tasting*? How come the several branches of the *Par Vagum* to be so dispers'd, and to make such knots with the *Intercostal Nerves*? These, and many more such Questions might be asked relating to the wonderful System of Nerves, but these are sufficient to my purpose, to shew that these wonderful contrivances for Sense and Motion, could not come from mere fortuitous and unthinking Causes. But let us look now upon the most obvious parts of the Body, which lie to the view of all Men, the *Eye, the Ear, the Mouth, and the Hand*; one would think it hardly possible for any Men pretending to Reason, to think these to be the result of Chance. Let us well consider the structure of the *Eye*, and we may well think *Lucretius* had no lucid interval when he wrote,

Arist. Hist. Anim. l. 4. c. 10.
Hermet. Sapient. indic. c. 10. p. 245. p. 272.

Exercit. 208.

*Illud in his rebus vitium vehementer & istam
Effugere errorem, vitareque præmeditator,
Lumina ne facias cæcæque tenebræ,
Prospicere ut possimus.*

Lucret. l. 4.

That we must have a great care to avoid the mistake of those that say, that *Eyes* were made for *Seeing*. For could any Man in his right Senses think the *Eye* could be form'd for any other use but to see with? But the use is after the thing is form'd. What then? May it not be design'd for such a use by him that form'd it? But that which is form'd for a particular use, must be later than that for whose use it is form'd, as a *Bed* for a Man to sleep on, a *Cup* to drink out of, *Armor* to defend himself; but a Man might sleep, and drink, and defend himself, before those things were found out. What is the meaning of all this? No one is so senseless to question, Whether Men be not before they find some conveniences for their particular uses;

uses; but the Question here is, Whether when a thing is so form'd as to serve only for such a use, it be not reasonable to conclude that it was made on purpose for that use? But saith *Lucretius*,

*Nil ideo quoniam natum est in corpore ut uti
Possemus, sed, quod natum est id precreat usum.*

Nothing is made in the Body that we might use it, but when it is made we find out the use of it. As tho' it had been possible for Mankind to have found such an use of the Eye, unless it had been purposely made for it. The act of Seeing is no doubt subsequent to the making of the Eye; for we cannot see without Eyes; but if we could make no other use of Eyes but to see with, is not this a plain evidence they were made for us to that end? This is not like a use we make of things which we alter the fashion of for our conveniencies. For, we do not make our own Eyes; they are very early form'd in the Body, and therefore were within the primary intention of Nature; and as soon as we come into the World, we do not deliberate whether we should use Eyes or not, for we presently see with them. And how can the Eye being made teach us the use of it, when we presently make use of our Eyes without any previous deliberation? We may hinder the use of them, if we please, by blinding our selves, but we cannot turn them to any other use. If *Lucretius* in the extravagancy of his imagination, might fancy the use was arbitrary, then Men might have heard with their Eyes, or have seen with their Ears, or have tasted with their Noses, or smelt with their Tongues: But this I suppose none can think that he meant. What was it then? that Men could not use them till they were made? We grant it. But doth it follow thence that they were not made designedly for such a use? How can we judge of that, but by examining the several parts? and if they were fitted for such a use and no other, we have reason to conclude they were so intended. Now what could the *Muscles*, and *Tunics*, and *several Humors* of the Eye be made for, but for Sight? How came that *Cavity* to be form'd in the Forehead in which the Eyes are plac'd? What motion of the particles of Matter made two such hollow places in the Skull? How came one not to be sufficient? How come the *Eye-lids* to be so plac'd? Could they be design'd for any other use? How come the *Glands* to be fix'd in the corners of the Eyes, and with the *Lymphatic Vessels* belonging to them? Could they have serv'd for other uses? How comes the *Optic Nerve* to be continued to the three *Tunics* of the Eyes? and that which partakes most of the substance of the Brain to be the chief organ of Sight, as fittest to transmit the images to the Brain? What was the *Chrystallin Humor* design'd for, but to receive the impressions of outward objects? How comes the *Optic Nerve* to be so inserted into the Eye, not directly behind, but on one side, but only for the more intire transmitting the images receiv'd by the Eye? Can now any one think that the Eye could be ever made for any other use, but for sight? And we do not therefore use it, because we find it ready prepar'd; but it was therefore so prepar'd, that we might use it to such a purpose.

E 2

And

And as to his general saying, *That nothing in the Body is made for use, but that the use follows the making of it*; let us apply it to other Animals, and it will appear ridiculous. What could any Man answer seriously to one that should say, that four-footed Animals had not Feet given them to go with; but that finding so many Feet, they did go with them? And so for the Wings of Birds, and the Fins of Fishes; and the particular shapes of some Animals for their particular use: As, the long Neck of the Swan, for going deeper in the water for his food; will any one say, that the Swan finding his Neck so long, us'd it for that purpose? Or that *Shell-fish* finding their hard Shells ready made as a defence against the *Rock*, crept into them for that end? Whereas all the Muscles they move by, are cover'd over with a hard bony substance; and so they are the necessary parts belonging to them. What can be said to the thick horny substance of an Eagle's Eye, which makes it bear the strongest beams of the Sun; was this only us'd for that purpose, but not intended by Nature? Whence came that outward covering of the Eye, not only in Eagles but in other greater Birds, which they can draw over it as they please, and is so strong a defence against light, that Anatomists tell us, by the help of it put to their open Eyes, they could look on the Sun without trouble, as *Borrichius* informs us? *Steno*, upon the observation of the wonderful Mechanism of the Eye both in Mankind, and Beasts, and Birds, saith, *That if a Man first understands Mechanics, and then curiously examines the fabric of Animals, he must either put off his Reason, or he must admire the wisdom and contrivance of Providence.* And he understood the frame of these things far beyond what either *Lucretius* or *Epicurus* did.

And so for the Ear; *that was made, saith Lucretius, long before any Sound was heard.*

*Multoque creatæ sunt prius Aures,
Quam sonus est auditus..*

No doubt of it. For how should we hear without Ears? But can any Man imagin they could be made for any other use but to hear with? How came they to be plac'd in the Head and not in any other part of the Body? Were there any form'd before with Ears in other parts, which did not do so well? In other cases they say, *Nature was put to try divers Experiments, because the imperfect Animals could not subsist*; but this cannot hold here: For Mankind might have lived without Ears in other places, but the Head is certainly the best for Sounds being receiv'd and transmitted to the Brain. How comes the outward part of the Ear to be so fram'd as it is, but for the better gathering and more distinct conveyance of the Sounds, as appears by the confus'd noise which those have who have lost that part? What made the inward passage so winding, and such an exquisite Membrane at the end of it, and a Cord behind it, but for the advantage of the Sound? How come the three cavities behind, the first with little bones of an extraordinary figure, whereof one triangular, the better to give passage to the Air; the second called *the Labyrinth*, and the third with *Spiral Windings* and an *Internal Air*, and all particularly serving the purpose of Hearing, by the Sound passing from one to another?

*Borrich.
Hermet.
Sup. p. 259.
A.B. Dan.
l. 2. Obs.
127.*

another? Whence came all these subtle and intricate passages, if our Bodies were made by chance? And yet, if any of them be not in their due order, our sense of Hearing is prejudiced; which shews that this contrivance was necessary in order to it. And which is again observable, the greater discoveries have been made in these matters, the more reason we have to admire the contrivance of them. As in this sense of Hearing, the latest discoveries about the small bones of the first cavity, call'd *the Hammer*, *the Anvil*, and *the Stirrup*, and another in the joyning the two last, acquaint us with more than what the Ancients knew; since there are two things remarkable about them. 1. *That they do move each other*; the Drum moves the Hammer, the Hammer the Anvil, that the Stirrup, which opens the passage into the second cavity. 2. *That these bones are as big in an Infant, as in grown Persons*. Now how comes this to pass in a way of *Mechanism*? How come these bones not to increase as the other parts of the Body do; since the most solid of them, *the Hammer* and *Anvil*, as well as the *Stirrup*, have manifest Pores in them to receive nourishment? But not only these, but the other small bones in the inner cavities, the *Semicircular passages* and the *Cochlea* only receive a greater *firmness* and *hardness* by Age. These things I can only mention, and refer the Reader to Mr. *Du Verney* and others, who have treated most exactly of them.

The frame of the Mouth as it is, is necessary for *Respiration*, and *Nourishment*, and *Speech*. For *Respiration*, the Mouth opened affords a passage to the Air, and there are inward vessels fitted to convey it to the Lungs; and without breathing it is impossible to live. But how came the two different passages for the *Air* and *Food*? How came the *Valve* to secure the passage to the Lungs from such things which may prejudice it, and pass the other way? As to *Nourishment*, the Mouth not only takes in the Food, but the Teeth are conveniently plac'd for the preparing it for its farther passage and alteration in the Stomach, in order to Nutrition; for which end there are vessels prepar'd with wonderful variety and contrivance. How come those *Channels* into those hard bones in the Mouth, which we call *Teeth*, by which an Artery, a Vein and a Nerve spread themselves in branches to each particular Tooth? How come the figures of them to vary according to their use, and to have stronger Roots where the work is harder? And because *Speech* is one of the peculiar excellencies of Mankind, there is an Instrument fram'd on purpose for it in the Mouth (which serves for *Tasting* likewise) and without this, all the communication of Mankind with each other by words had been lost. And I cannot see how mere Matter and Motion could help Mankind either to frame words, or to utter them to others without a *Tongue*; nor, how it could be fram'd by it.

The *Hand* is so provided with *Joynts*, *Muscles* and *Tendons*, for the great variety of necessary uses it serves Mankind for, that he that can think it could be so contriv'd by chance, doth thereby shew that some can think only by Chance without any Reason; and it is a vain thing to hope to convince them. I shall not need to insist on the curiosity of the contrivance of all the Muscles of the Hand, but it is impossible for any Man to give an account of the *Perfor-*

Riclan. A-
natom. l. 5.
c. 28.
Aristot. de
Part. A-
nim. l. 4.
c. 10.

ration of those Muscles, which serve for the use of some of the Fingers and Toes, from mere Matter and Motion; nor the Ligaments about the Tendons of those Muscles, for the greater easiness of their motion. *Aristotle* hath a Discourse about the great use of a Hand to Mankind; *Anaxagoras*, he saith, said that Man was the wisest Animal, because he alone had Hands; but, saith he, therefore Man had Hands, because he was the wisest: being best able to make use of such an excellent Instrument. For that is the wisdom of Nature to do as a wise Man would do, i. e. to give the best instruments to the best workman. Now, saith he, the Hand is the most useful Instrument to him that is capable of making a good use of it. And therefore he blames those that said, Man was the worst provided for of any Animals; for they have but one help afforded them by Nature, but the Hand is instead of all, for it can make use of all. And for that reason he shews how very convenient the make and fashion of the Hand is, and the division of it into five parts, on which he insists at large. So that *Aristotle* was fully satisfy'd that the production of Mankind was no casual or spontaneous thing, but the effect of Wisdom and Understanding.

These things I have here laid together at first, because this Hypothesis of *Diodorus Siculus* hath been thought by some in our Age to be *The natural sense of Mankind without Revelation*; whereas in truth it is the foundation of Irreligion, and the reproach of Mankind; but not the sense of the wisest part of them. And to make out this more effectually, I shall now proceed to consider and compare the sense of the most *Ancient Philosophers* on both sides, as to this point, whether the World was the effect of Chance, or of a wise Providence. For if the World were made by a wise and intelligent Being, it can never be suspected that Religion is an imposture, or a contrivance of Politicians; for then it will appear to be built upon the truest Reason. And I shall the more carefully inquire into the opinions of the eldest Philosophers; because they were neither *Priests* nor *Politicians*, having no interest to carry on by the practice of Religion. And some of them were born in a very good condition, and quitted their Estates, or neglected other business, the more freely to attend on their philosophical Inquiries. And therefore we have the more reason to search into their Opinions, so far as relates to these matters.

It cannot be deny'd that after Men began to be inquisitive into the philosophical Reasons of Things, there were some who set up for material Causes only, without an Efficient. And there were two different sorts of these, and the other Schemes may be well reduced to them.

The first was of those who were the immediate Successors of *Thales*. For I see no reason to put him in the head of them, if what *Cicero*, *Diogenes Laertius* and *Plutarch* report of him be true. For it is said in *Cicero*, That *Thales made God to be the Mind that form'd all things*. And to what purpose should *Velleius* say this, if this had not been then known to have been his opinion? For it had been better for his design to have made so great a Man as *Thales* was esteem'd, to have excluded God and Providence. *Diogenes Laertius* saith, That he not only made God an Eternal Being, but that the World was of his making. And he was no more partial

Cicer. de
Nat. Deor.
l. 1. 25.

tial in this case, than the *Epicurean* in *Tully*. It is observable, that when *Plutarch* blames *Anaximander* and *Anaximenes* for leaving out the *Efficient Cause*, he takes no notice of *Thales* on that account; which he ought to have done, as being the Head of that Sect of Philosophers called the *Ionic*; as himself acknowledges in that place. And *Stobæus* saith, That *Thales* own'd a Divine Power, which pass'd thro' and gave motion to the fluid Matter, out of which he suppos'd all things to be made. The great Objection against this, is, that several of the ancient Writers say, That *Anaxagoras* was the first Philosopher, who attributed the making of the World to an Infinite Mind; and that *Plutarch* himself, in the Life of *Pericles*, saith the same. But the true answer to this, is, that *Anaxagoras* was the first who own'd this in writing; whose words are produc'd by so many; but *Thales* wrote nothing about it that appear'd, and therefore his Scholars going another way, there might be some presumption against him. For, it is too evident that *Anaximander*, his Disciple, did never mention a God in the making of the World; but he mentions several Gods made out of the World, *Dii nativi*; a sort of *Phœnician* Gods, which rose out of Matter; and such as the Poets had possess'd the People with among the *Greeks*. I have already observ'd from *Plato*, That the old *Greeks* worship'd the Sun, Moon and Stars, &c. as other barbarous Nations did: Now herein lay the artifice of *Anaximander*, that he took care to assert the Popular Deities, and so avoided the imputation of *Atheism* among the People; who look'd no farther, than whether Men own'd the Religion in vogue: But whether there were an Infinite Mind superior to those Gods they worship'd, they look'd on as a Speculation too deep for them; and therefore they let those alone, who spake nothing against the Gods they solemnly worship'd. And this was the true reason of the different usage of *Anaximander* and *Anaxagoras*. The former asserted the Beginning of all things to have been from Infinite Matter, without an Efficient Cause; the latter said, this was impossible; but there must be an Eternal Mind to give motion to Matter, and to direct it. Now one would have thought that *Anaxagoras* should have been in favor with the People, who hated *Atheism*, and *Anaximander* punished: But on the contrary *Anaximander* kept up his Interest among the People where he liv'd, at *Miletus* in *Asia*, and at last carry'd a Colony along with him to *Apollonia*. The reason was, the People of *Miletus* had a wonderful veneration for the Sun and Moon, under the names of *Apollo* and *Diana*; and as long as *Anaximander* comply'd with them, as to these *Dii nativi*, they let him alone in his Philosophy. But *Anaxagoras* coming to *Athens*, and being there in favor with *Pericles*, a leading Man in the City, but oppos'd violently by a different Faction of *Thucydides Milesius*, who took all advantages they could against *Pericles* his Party: They finding that *Anaxagoras* had shew'd too much of his Philosophy, when he call'd the Sun a Mass of Fire; this set them all in a flame, and made such a disturbance about it, that *Anaxagoras* was accus'd of *Atheism*; and *Pericles* with all his Interest and Eloquence, could not save him from Banishment, in which he died, as appears by *Laertius* and *Ælian*. *Anaxagoras* was very clear as to the main point of *Atheism*, for he asserted an Eternal Mind

*Plutar. de
Plac. Phil.
l. 1. c. 3.
Stob. Eclog.
Phys. c. 11.*

*Ælian. l. 3.
c. 17.
Strab. l. 14.*

Mind which made the World; this *Anaximander* deny'd, but he asserted the Common Deities: and altho' the *Epicurean* in *Tully* argues well against *Anaximander's* Opinion, *Sed nos Deum nisi sempiternum intelligere qui possumus?* We can have no true Notion of God not eternal; yet such philosophical Reasons signified little; he allow'd the same worship which they practis'd, and this was enough to satisfy them.

I am not ignorant, that some have gone about to excuse *Anaximander*, as tho' he were so intent upon the Material Causes, that thro' *Incogitancy* only he left out the *Efficient*. A strange piece of *Incogitancy* in a Philosopher to leave out the main point. For the just fault which *Anaxagoras* found, was that he went about to make a World without an Eternal Mind before Matter; and he knew very well what the sense of *Anaximander*, and his Scholar *Anaximenes* were, by whom he was instructed. And why should *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Aristotle*, *Theophrastus*, &c. look on it as so extraordinary a thing in *Anaxagoras* to assert an Eternal Mind, as the first Cause, if his predecessors meant the same thing? But there is a passage in *Aristotle* which seems most to favor *Anaximander*; viz. *That he own'd an Infinite first Principle, which did contain and govern all things, and was Immortal and Incorruptible*. And this *Aug. Steuchus Eugubinus* in his learned Book *De perenni Philosophia*, insists much upon. (A Book written with so good a design, and bating some supposititious Authorities, so well manag'd, that the Elder *Scaliger*, as his Son tells us, commended it particularly to a great Friend of his, too inclinable to *Atheism* (as was too much the fashion then, as well as since, among some who would seem to have more wit than others) and it had so great success therein, that he utterly renounc'd all Principles tending that way.) The passage which he produces is certainly in *Aristotle*, and it seems so capable of a good meaning, that *Clemens Alexandrinus* joyn'd him with *Anaxagoras* in supposing an Infinite Being above the Elements; and it cannot be deny'd that the Author of the Book *de Mundo* (who, as I before observ'd, was very ancient, if not *Aristotle*) doth use the same Expression concerning God, *that he doth contain and govern all things*: but yet laying the passages in *Aristotle* together, there is too great reason to suspect that *Anaximander* did not assert an Eternal Mind, as *Anaxagoras* did. He is there giving an account of the different Notions Philosophers had concerning the first Principle; some asserted it to be Infinite, as *Anaxagoras* and *Democritus*; the former held things to be made out of one another, and that there was one first Principle of all, which he called Mind; the latter held no Generation of things out of another; but that one Common Matter or Body was the only Principle of all things; and that the parts differ'd only by bulk and figure. Thus far *Aristotle* is clear; then he goes on to shew, that the first Principle must be Ingenite and Incorruptible; and then it must contain and govern all things; as all do hold, who do not assert other Causes as Mind (as *Anaxagoras*) or Friendship (as *Empedocles*.) And this is the *τὸ θεῖον* the Divine Being, which is immortal and incorruptible, as was asserted by *Anaximander* and the most of those he calls *Physiologists*, i.e. who went no farther than the bare Nature of things. Now here it is plain, that he doth distinguish *Anaximander* and his

*De Perenni
Philos. l. 11.
5.*

*Jos. Scalig.
de vit. Ju-
lii Scaligeri
p. 50.*

*Clem. Alex-
andr. Pro-
trept. p.
43.*

*Nat. Aus.
l. 3. c. 4.*

his followers from *Anaxagoras*, who asserted an Eternal Mind: and he distinguishes his opinion both from that of *Democritus* and *Anaximander*. It may be said, that it is plain from hence, that *Anaximander* did assert a Divine Being; but at last it came to nothing but *Infinite Matter*: which was the Original and Mother-God to his *Dii geniti*, as he called them. In another place he speaks yet more plainly; viz. that those Philosophers before *Anaxagoras*, went no farther than Matter, and made all things to come out of it, and to be dissolv'd into it again; being it self one and immutable under all the variety of changes. He saith, They differ'd about the first Material Principle; *Thales*, and one *Hippon* called the Atheist (the first of that order that we read of) held it to be Water: but *Aristotle* bestows a very severe character upon him, viz. that he did not deserve to be mention'd for the meanness of his capacity. (It seems Wit and Atheism did not begin together.) *Anaximander* would go no farther than Infinite Matter in general; but *Anaximenes* was for Air; and so was *Diogenes Apolloniates*, who liv'd in the time of *Anaxagoras*; but it seems by *Demetrius Phalereus* his Apology for *Socrates* (now lost) that he fell into some danger at Athens: (possibly for being against the worship of Fire, as *Anaxagoras* was) But upon the whole matter, I do not see how *Anaximander* can be excus'd, altho' he left the Popular Gods, and bestow'd the name of Divinity upon his Infinite Matter.

Metaphys.
l. 1. c. 3.

Διὰ τὴν ἀ-
πλάνην αὐ-
τοῦ τῶν ἀθε-
ιστῶν.

But there was another Succession of Philosophers deriv'd from *Xenophanes*, who liv'd in Sicily, saith *Laertius*, and was contemporary with *Anaximander*: and he was neither a follower of *Thales* nor of *Pythagoras*; but from a Town near the Sea in Italy, whence his chief followers came, it was called the *Eleatic Sect*. He was a great enemy to the Poetical fictions about the Gods; as he had reason; for they strangely corrupted the minds of the People, and took away all inward Reverence towards the Deity. And altho' *Aristotle* speaks with some contempt of him; yet others have shew'd that he mis-understood him, and that he asserted One Infinite and Eternal Mind: and the same *Simplicius* saith of *Parmenides* and *Melissus*: But since the learned Author of the *Intellectual System of the Universe*, hath very well clear'd that matter, I intend not to transcribe him, but to refer my Reader to him; and proceed to those who changed the first Notions of the *Eleatic Sect*, and set up for the making a World without a Deity. And those were *Leucippus* and *Democritus*; and yet *Stobæus* saith, that *Leucippus* wrote a Book about Mind; wherein he hath this saying, That nothing is done in vain, but all things are done from Reason and Necessity. How these two things came to be so put together is hard for us now to conjecture, unless that Book of his had been preserv'd. *Plutarch* saith, That *Democritus* held that God was an Intellectual Fire, and the Soul of the World. But it appears by *Cicero*, that *Democritus* did not stick at making some very subtle Effluvia of his Atoms to be Gods, both those without us, and those within us, viz. those which make up our intellectual Faculties. It is very hard to say what his true Notion of Divinity was, unless we could have seen his Books about Mind and Providence, which *Laertius* saith that he wrote. But whatever he might write for the amusing the World, (as *Epicurus* did afterwards) if he made the origin of

Bessario c.
Calumnia.
Plat. lib. 2.
c. 10. 11.

Stob. Eclog.
Phys. c. 8.

Plutarch.
de Placit.
Philos. l. 1.
c. 7.
Cicer. de N.
Deor. l. 1.

all things to have been *without Mind or Providence*, no Titles of Books will be a sufficient Excuse for him.

And I confess it is all one to me, whether those who fram'd the *Atheistical Hypotheses* proceeded in the way of *Forms and Qualities*, or of *Atoms and Vacuity*; because I think the one way as impossible as the other. For as *Aristotle* hath well observed, the great difficulties as to the first Principles lay in two things; *The beginning of Motion, and the Order of the World*: and in both these the different *Hypotheses* of *Anaximander* and *Democritus*, were equally defective. But whether the World were made by the *Circumvolution of Infinite Matter, endued with contrary Qualities*; or by the motion of *Atoms, which had nothing but Bulk and Figure*, signifies nothing as to the main point. I do not deny but one *Hypothesis* may in some respects be more intelligible than the other, and tend more to explain the difference of Body and Mind: but there are still difficulties on both sides: some things may be taken for *Real Qualities*, which are not; and the many Experiments of this Age have fully prov'd it: but then there are other things, especially relating to *Animals*, which can never be explain'd in the Mechanical way, to the satisfaction of any reasonable Man.

Plutarch.
apud Euf.
Præp. Ev.
l. 1. 8.

But altho' *Anaximander* and *Democritus* started these two different *Hypotheses* about the Origin of the World; yet those who asserted an Eternal Mind to be the first Cause, had in common Reason very much the advantage of either; since it was impossible for them to give an account how the motion of Matter began, or how it fell into that order, and beauty and usefulness which we find in those parts which make up the visible World. All that we can learn of *Anaximander's Hypothesis* is, *That the Heavens and Infinite Worlds* (for why should they stop, when they could make Worlds so easily) *were produced by an Infinite circumvolution of all things; that these had in them very different Qualities from each other, some hot some cold, some dry some moist, &c. that these being in continual motion, a mixture of them happened, and according to the different mixtures of Qualities, the several sorts of things did arise.* This, as far as I can apprehend, was his scheme of the Production of things.

There is little difference between the two *Hypotheses* of *Anaximander* and *Democritus*, but only in the point of Mixture, which one attributes to Qualities, and the other to the Bulk and Figure of Atoms. They both assert the Production of things by the circumvolution of the parts of Matter; both held infinite Worlds; and that the things of this World came together of themselves, without any superior Cause.

But were not all the Philosophers of their Mind? No; so far from it, that the best and greatest of them utterly rejected this Doctrine, as unsatisfactory to human Reason. Of which we have an evident proof from *Aristotle*, who cannot be suspected of any partiality in this matter. In the beginning of his *Metaphysics* he gives an account of the Opinions of *Philosophers before him about the first Principles of things*. I know that he is hardly thought of by many for mis-representing the Opinions of those before him, and that he endeavor'd to lessen their reputation to advance his own; but I can see no manner of reason for it in this case. 'Tis possible

possible as to the *Pythagorean* and *Eleatic sect*, he might not represent their Opinions so fairly as they were capable of: but as to these *Physiologists*, as he calls them, he charges nothing upon them, but what they own'd; only he makes *Thales the Head of them*; for which I have offer'd Reasons to the contrary. But in general he saith, *That those who began first to philosophize, look'd upon Matter as the only Principle, out of which all things came, and to which they did return; the Substance remaining the same, and the Affections only chang'd. As Socrates is the same Man, altho' his inward habits were chang'd.* But what this Material principle was, they were not agreed. *Thales, the first of them, thought it to be Water; Anaximenes and Diogenes Air; Hippasus and Heraclitus Fire; Empedocles to them added Earth.* Hitherto, saith he, we find nothing but the Material Cause; but, saith he, when they had gone so far, the very Nature of things carried them farther in their Inquiries. For whatever change be made in Generation and Corruption, there must be some Cause why it so happened. For mere Matter doth not change it self. As Wood doth not make it self into a Bed, nor Brass into a Statue; but some Artificer doth it. *But the seeking this, is looking after another Principle, which he calls, the Principle of Motion. Which those who asserted from the beginning, ran themselves into difficulties, altho' they asserted Matter to be one; but those who went no farther than Matter, whether Water, or Fire, or Earth, were never able to clear the Production of things; and therefore were forc'd by Truth it self, (ὁ αὐτὸς πρὸς ἀλήθειαν) to seek for another Principle.* Where it is very considerable that *Aristotle* saith, That there were some from the beginning who asserted both Principles; and that those who asserted only a Material Principle, ran themselves into such difficulties which they could never see their way through; but were forc'd at last by the mere power of Truth to seek for another Principle. Which not only shews his own Opinion, but that others upon consideration, were fain to set up a new *Hypothesis* against these Materialists; not wholly new, as he shews, but new in opposition to them, who thought at first by pretending to skill in Philosophy, to have run down the ancient Opinion of Mankind, founded on such a Tradition of which none could trace the Original. Of which I have already produced the testimonies of *Plato* and *Plutarch*. But now the humor of philosophizing coming among the *Greeks*, the first setters up of this were very apt to contemn any thing that was built on Tradition; for that gave no Reason of things; which it was their business to do. In some things then unknown as to the natural causes of them, they wonderfully surpris'd the common sort, who thereupon admired them as Men that could do any thing. Being thus puffed up with a vain opinion of their own skill, they attempted to give an account of the very beginning of the World; and finding out what they thought the main Principle of which things were compos'd, they had no more to do, but to suppose them all reduced to a Mass or Chaos; and then they fancied that by the motion of these several parts of Matter, things would fall into that state, we now see them in the World. But as much as they pleas'd themselves with these Speculations, those who came after them, found them extremely defective, both in the beginning of this Mo-

Metaphys.
1. 9. 3.

Προβλεπόντων
δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν
τὸ πρῶτον
ἀδυνατούντων
αὐτοῖς καὶ
συνεπείναι
κατὰ τὴν φύσιν

tion, and the Order of it. For they found Matter to be a dull un-
active thing of it self; and that no Matter could form it self with-
out an Agent; and therefore they saw it necessary to add a Su-
preme Efficient Cause, which should both put the parts of Matter,
however qualified, into motion, and direct and regulate the course
of it. For otherwise it was impossible to conceive, that there should
be such distinct Systems or Bodies of Matter, as there are in the
World. For how come the several *Vortices* not to interfere with
each other? What made the Centers of them to be distinct from
one another; so as that the Matter within such circumference should
move about that alone? And without this it is impossible to con-
ceive there should be such Bodies as the Sun, Moon, and Stars are;
so great, and yet so distinct from each other. But what Cause then
was found so necessary to be superadded? *Aristotle* saith, That
the order and fitness of things, which he calls *εἰς ἑ καλῶς*, must pro-
ceed from an Intelligent Cause; for these things could never come
either from mere Material Causes, as Fire, Earth, &c. or only by
Chance. And therefore he saith, *Anaxagoras* wrote like a Man in
his senses, in comparison of those before him; which shews that he
look'd on the others Speculations as dreams and idle fancies. And
he will not allow *Anaxagoras* to have been the first that asserted
this; but he did it *φανερῶς*, openly and plainly, in opposition to such
as had set up another *Hypothesis*. For before him, he saith, *Her-
motinus Clazomenius* had said the same thing, as to a superior Cause.
And so no doubt had many others; but he mentions him as a Philo-
sopher of the same City from whence *Anaxagoras* came. But it seems
the reputation of *Thales* and his Scholars had obtain'd so much in
the Greek Colonies where they inhabited, that they buried the name
of others, altho' *Clazomenæ* were a City of *Ionia* too.

Τὸν ἄν-
θρωπον
ἀνδρῶν ἡγε-
μόνατον ὁ
Περικλῆς.
Plutarch.
in Pericle.

Ælian. l. 8.
c. 19.

Sext. Em-
pir. p. 153.
Plato in
Phædr.
Arist.
Metaph.
l. 4.
Plutarch.
in Pericle.

But that *Anaxagoras* was a Person of a just esteem, appears by
the great value which *Pericles* set upon him; who not only had
him for his Counsellor, but ventur'd his interest to preserve him:
and altho' he was over-rul'd by the contrary Faction, as to his Ban-
ishment; yet he took care of him in it. And as *Plutarch* saith,
he obtain'd the name of *Nobis*; he cannot tell, whether it was for
his Opinion, or the reputation of his Wisdom. And after he was
buried at *Lampsacus*, a City of *Asia Minor* near the *Hellepont*,
there were two Inscriptions on the Altar erected to his Memory,
which testify'd the very great Esteem of him in two words, the
one was *Nobis*, and the other *Ἀλφειον*. And what can be said greater
of a Philosopher, than that *Understanding* and *Truth* belong'd to
him? *Timon*, who was not very civil to the memories of most
Philosophers, gives him a high character in *Laertius*: who saith
likewise, *That he was born to a considerable Estate; but he had a
Mind above Riches*. And *Sextus Empiricus* saith, *he was the most
skilful in Natural Philosophy*; and he was blam'd both by *Socrates*
and *Aristotle*, for running too far into Natural Causes, as tho' he
made use of his Supreme Mind only to help him out, when nothing
else would. But therein he shew'd that it was not for want of
Understanding Natural Causes, that he asserted an *Eternal Mind*,
pure and unmix'd, which was the first Cause of things; but it was
his true skill in Philosophy, which brought him to it. For he
fix'd on the Principle of *Gravitation*, as the main foundation of

Union

Union and Composition; but the other *Hypotheses* of *Vortices*, or *Circumulations* without it, he look'd on as weak and insufficient. So vain is that saying of *Lucretius* and a modern Philosopher, that *Ignorance of Causes inclined Men to Religion*; especially as to the Heavenly Bodies: *Leviathan*
ch. 12.

*Præterea cæli rationes ordine certo,
Et varia annorum cernebant tempora verti,
Nec poterant quibus id fieret cognoscere causis;
Ergo perfugium sibi habebant omnia Divis
Tradere, & illorum nutu facere omnia flecti.*

Lucret. l. 5.

For the truest and exactest searcher into Natural Causes, we see, was the most firm and steady asserter of a GOD. *Lucretius* magnifies his Heroe, that neither the common Fame, nor the Thunder and Lightning had frighted him into any sense of Religion; but that he had gone beyond the Clouds by the strength of his Wit, and had settled all the bounds of Nature.

*Quem nec fama Deum, nec fulmina, nec minitanti
Murmure compressit cælum, &c.*

Which was all becoming the more than Poetic fury of *Lucretius* to say. But *Plutarch* in the Life of *Pericles* saith, That *Anaxagoras* explain'd to him the Natural Causes of those Meteors which are so apt to terrify Mankind; and thereby took away an ignorant Superstition; but instead of that he settled in his Mind *αἰσχυρὰν περὶ τὰ πάλαι ἀγνοούμενα, a firm Devotion accompany'd with good Hopes*. And is not this far beyond the utmost *Lucretius* attributes to his Hero? supposing he had such success, as he imagin'd; which we have only the Poet's word for.

*Quare Religio pedibus subjecta vicissim
Obteritur, nos exæquat victoria cælo.*

But we can find no such victory that he ever obtain'd over Religion, by his foolish and precarious *Hypothesis*, which the more learned pretenders to *Atheism* in our Age are ashamed of, because of its vanity and inconsistency; and therefore there is now less need of insisting upon it. But what reason had *Lucretius* to make such extravagant boasting of *Epicurus* his success against the Principles of Religion; when *Cicero* of the same age and time, and a friend to *Lucretius*, had so very mean an opinion of it, and hath expos'd it so much to contempt in more places than one? But possibly he may mean, *it had so at Athens*: nothing like it. For it was observ'd, that none were more forward to comply with the popular superstitions, none more reserv'd as to their real opinions about the Deity, than *Epicurus* and his followers. *Plut. adv.*
Color. What need all this mean compliance, this caution and reserve, if they were such Conquerers, as he represents them? They never oppos'd the common sentiments, as *Anaxagoras* did, and suffer'd for it; but instead of it, they industriously labor'd to persuade the People, that they were for *Piety and Veneration of the Gods*; and *Epicurus* wrote about

about it: whether in earnest or not, I dispute not; but he was in earnest concern'd for his own security. Are these the marks of a *Conqueror*? And yet in his time the *fear of the Arcopagus*, after the time of *Ephialtes* was in great measure removed. It is observed by *Josephus*, *That by the Laws of Athens, it was death without mercy, to speak against the established Religion*; and we find with what difficulty *Anaxagoras* escaped: But in *Epicurus* his time the Government was sunk, and the *Macedonian Empire* was continually growing upon them; and all People took greater liberty to speak their Minds, and without any such opposition as the Philosophers before him met with, when their Laws were observed more strictly; as when *Protagoras* and *Diagoras* were forced to abscond for fear of their lives; and *Aristotle* upon a suspicion of a profane *Hymn* to withdraw to *Chalcis*. But in the time of *Epicurus*, the state of the City was altered, and the Government was in the hands of *Alexander's* Successors; for *Epicurus* lived with his Scholars in *Athens*, when it was so closely besieged by *Demetrius*, as *Plutarch* informs us, who soon after had the possession of it delivered to him. Now in busy and disordered times, such as *Epicurus* might be far more secure than at another time; and yet even then he was afraid of giving any distast, as to his opinions about Religion; and still asserted his owning the *Anticipation of a Deity*, altho' not consistent with his own grounds of certainty. But where was the *victory the mean while over Religion*, which *Lucretius* boasts of? His Defenders say, *It was over the ill effects of Superstition*; but we find nothing like that effected by him. The World was not made one jot the better, but a great deal the worse for his Principles; for the very name of a Philosopher went a great way with Persons of bad inclinations: and they do not govern themselves by any Reason; but when they can bring an Authority of a Person of any reputation, they inquire no farther, but go on with greater confidence in their former practices; and then they charge *Ignorance* and *Superstition* on those that contradict them. I do not deny but some of the Defenders of *Epicurus* in our Age, have been Persons of Wit and Learning, and they have utterly disown'd his irreligious Principles: but yet the very undertaking to defend the Author of so much impiety, hath done unspeakable mischief to the Age we live in; and all the discoveries of Natural Philosophy can never make amends for it. We are now comparing the Notions of *Epicurus* and *Anaxagoras* as to Religion; and that method which *Plutarch* tells us *Anaxagoras* took, as to the freeing the Mind of *Pericles* from *Superstition*, was far better than that of *Epicurus*. For *Anaxagoras* satisfy'd him, that there were natural causes of Thunder and Lightning, but these were the effects of a Divine Providence, which order'd the affairs of Mankind for the best, as well as the Meteors in the Air; and therefore there was no reason why any wise and good Man should not entertain a comfortable Hope of Divine Protection: but in the way of *Epicurus* there is a bare account of Natural Causes, which whether true or false, can give no satisfaction to a thinking Man. For the utmost comes to this; Such and such Effects do naturally follow such Causes. And what then? *Then if such things happen, we cannot help it.* And what follows? Nothing more. And is this all the comfort of *Epicurus* his

Joseph. contr.
Apion.
l. 2.

Plut. vit.
Demetrii.

his Inquiry into Causes? To understand this better, I will put a Case, which lately happened in the place where I live at present, to a Man working in his Garden near a great River: while he was there busy, a violent shower of Rain fell of a sudden; and the Man thinking to divert it, the Rain beat down a great heap of earth above him, and carried it through his Garden, and took away the Man with its force into a precipice hard by, and with great violence hurried him down into the River, which made him stupid and senseless; but it pleas'd God he was taken up, and recover'd. Now let us consider what would tend most to the satisfaction of this Man's Mind, when he was in that deplorable state, if he had been then sensible of his case: What comfort would it have been to him to have been told, that as things were, the earth above him falling down, and there being such a precipice below him, there was no help for him, and he must be contented to suffer? But would it not be far greater satisfaction to be told, there were those above who saw him fall, and pitied his case, and would be sure to help him out, and give him what was necessary for his relief and remedy? Now this is the case of *Necessity* and *Providence*: the one gives only that heavy comfort, *Things must be so, and we cannot help it*; the other still keeps up reasonable hope, and the expectation of something better. So that no one can deny, that upon mere Principles of Natural Reason, this is the more desirable *Hypothesis*; and nothing but invincible arguments should remove Mankind from it: but neither *Democritus* nor *Epicurus* could offer any thing but a very precarious *Hypothesis* against it.

From *Anaxagoras* I now come to *Socrates* (for *Achælus* pursued his Principles at *Athens*, where *Socrates* was his Disciple.) He was a Person of great vogue at *Athens*, for the *Natural sharpness of his Wit*, and the *freedom he us'd in conversation with all sorts*, without regard to his own interest. And for this he appealed to his Judges, and to the whole City, that he was far from any design to enrich himself, as they all knew: he did not deny but that he had great presents offer'd him; but he took no more than to keep him from poverty, as in the cases of the King of *Macedonia* and *Alcibiades*: and none could blame him for being refractory to their Laws about Religion; for he declar'd that to be his Principle, *That God ought to be worship'd according to the Laws of the City where a Man liv'd*. And for this, *Xenophon* saith, he trusted to the *Pythian Oracle*; which was thought of good Authority among them: however some in our time have represented it as *so gross an imposture*, that is hardly credible any Men of common sense could be deceiv'd by it, much less the *Athenians*; who for all that we can perceive had as good an opinion of it, as the *Bœotians* themselves.

Plato in
Apol. Socr.

Xenoph.
Mem. l. 1.
c. 3.
Van Dalen
Dissert. de
Orac. Eshm.

This was a very hard point at that time among Men of better understanding, and who had a true sense of God and Providence, how they should behave themselves with respect to the Popular Superstitions. There was no difficulty, as to such as had no Religion at all; for their Principle was to keep fair and to secure themselves; and they look'd on such as *Protagoras* and *Diagoras*, as Persons who deserved be punished for their folly. But for Men who truly believ'd a wise God to govern the World, as *Socrates* and

and his two excellent Scholars *Plato* and *Xenophon* did, the case was very difficult: For, if they did not comply, they were sure to be prosecuted as guilty of impiety; if they did, this seem'd to justify all their Superstition.

The way which *Socrates* took was this: He avoided giving any offence as to the contempt of their public worship. Nay, *Xenophon* saith, he was so far from any impiety that way, that he was rather more remarkable for his diligence therein; and that no Man ever heard him say or do any thing that tended to the dishonor of Religion; so that from the whole course of his life, he might be

Propter ejus magnitudinem Ingenii. *De Orat.* l. 54. Qui quum omnium sapientissimus esset, sanctissimeque vixisset. *Ib.*

well concluded to be *Εὐσεβής*, a very devout Man. *Cicero* had a very particular esteem of *Socrates*, not only for the greatness of his Wit, but for his Wisdom and Goodness; and from him we learn what the grounds were which such Men went upon. They found the World horribly corrupted with Superstition, which was to be remov'd in the best way they could; but there was great danger, least under that pretense, all Religion should be destroy'd. And

Esse præstantem aliquam æternamque Naturam, & eam suspiciendam admirandamq; hominum generi, pulchritudo Mundi, ordoque rerum cœlestium cogit confiteri. *Cic. de Div. l. 2. c. 72.*

they saw an absolute necessity of keeping up that, since the Beauty and Order of the World, was sufficient to convince Mankind that there was an Excellent and Eternal Being, which was to be adored and worshiped by Mankind. This was their fundamental Principle; and they rather chose to comply with the follies of their Superstitions, than not keep the solemn worship of the Deity. And to satisfy themselves, they put such interpretations upon the public Rites, as made them serve to some part or other of natural worship, with respect to the benefits God bestows on the World, and thus, even the *Eleusmian* Mysteries were understood by them.

But how then came *Socrates* to be so severely prosecuted at Athens? 'Tis true, that his enemies charg'd him with Impiety and Atheism, as appears both by *Plato* and *Xenophon*. In *Plato's* *Apology* we find that *Melitus* downright accus'd him that he thought there were no Gods. *Socrates* being much surpriz'd at this charge, ask'd him what ground he had for it; and all the proof he offer'd was, that he was of *Anaxagoras's* opinion that the Sun and Moon were not Gods: which *Socrates* deny'd; and said his charge was inconsistent, for he both accus'd him of bringing in new Deities, and asserting that there were none at all. But in the conclusion of his *Apology*, he fully own'd a Divine Providence taking care of good Men living or dying; but whether of the two were better for a Man, he thought God alone knew.

But to shew more plainly what *Socrates* his judgment was as to the Production of the World: *Xenophon* gives this account of it. That

Ἐθαύμαζε δ' εἰ μὴ φανερόν αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ὅτι τοῦτο ἡ δύναμις ἐστὶν ἀνθρώποις εὐρεῖν. *Xenoph. Mem.* l. 1. c. 1.

* Ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν μίξις φερόμεναι ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ἡ ἑρμηνεία διέφερον ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλὰ εἰς κοινὸν οὐκ ὁμοίως ἀφαιρούμεν αὐτὸς ἀλλήλους. *Ibid.*

he look'd on it as a great piece of folly in Mankind to attempt it from Material Causes; and he wonder'd that they did not find out, that these things were above their reach. And he thinks those * *Philosophers* argued like mad Men; neither agreeing with one another, nor with the nature of things: for some said, that it consisted of One thing; others, of Infinite: some said, all things were in motion; others said, there was no motion at all: some said, that all things were generated and cor-

corrupted; and others, that nothing at all was. Plato in his *Phædo* let us know how he came to be unsatisfy'd even with *Anaxagoras* himself, altho' he mightily approv'd his fundamental Notion of all things being produc'd by an *Eternal Mind*. When he was a young Man, he saith, he was a great admirer of Natural Philosophy, and endeavored to find out the Causes of things; but at last he found they were too hard for him, and so fell into a kind of *Scepticism*: but he had heard of a Book of *Anaxagoras*, wherein he asserted, that *Mind* order'd all things; this pleas'd him well: but he expected that from hence he would have shew'd how that *Eternal Mind* did frame every thing for the best, *ad maiorem utilitatem*; but finding him to falter there, and to run to mere Natural Causes as others had done, he gave over his pursuit of Natural Philosophy, and applied himself to matters of Morality; as more certainly known, and of greater use to Mankind.

But as to Providence, *Xenophon* is very particular in it, That it extended to all things said or done, altho' in never so great silence; and that God was present in all places. To the same purpose *Diongenes Laertius* mentions a saying of *Thales*; Being asked, whether a man could do an unjust action without God's knowing it: No, saith he, not if he only thinks to do it. Which, saith *Valerius Maximus*, was intended to keep Mens Minds clean and pure, as well as their hands. But the Atheistical Club at *Athens* in *Socrates* his time, turn'd this another way. For they said, This was only a contrivance of some cunning man, to keep Mankind more in awe. And that this was their sense, appears by the Verses still preserv'd in *Sextus Empiricus*; and part in *Plutarch* and others; but by the former they are attributed to *Critias*, and by the latter to *Euripides*, both of *Socrates* his time. But there seems to be far greater probability as to the former, because such a saying was very agreeable to the Character of the Man. For *Critias* was one of the thirty Tyrants set up by *Lysander* at *Athens*; a Man of wit, and addicted to Poetry; as *Socrates* himself owns in *Plato's Charmides*, that he deriv'd it from *Solon*: He and *Alcibiades* had been both under *Socrates* his care, as *Xenophon* tells us, but they both forsook him, and changed their Manners upon it. *Critias* went into *Thessaly*, and there fell into lewd and debauched company; and from thence came to hate *Socrates*, whom he had admir'd before: and when he was one of the thirty Tyrants, he and *Charicles* shew'd a particular displeasure against him; for *Socrates* had spoken too freely against their Government. He was the head of the number, as appear'd by *Theramenes* drinking a Health to *Critias*, when he took off his Poison; and when *Thrasybulus* came to deliver *Athens*, upon his being kill'd, the whole Faction sunk. Nothing can be more agreeable to the Character of such a Man, than to make him look on all Religion as an imposture and contrivance of some crafty Politician. But nothing of it agrees with that of *Euripides*, who was Scholar to *Anaxagoras*, a friend to *Socrates*; and on all occasions wrote decently with respect to Piety and Virtue. But *Plutarch* saith, He wrote the Verses in the name of *Sisyphus* for fear of the *Areopagus*. It cannot be deny'd, that Author (whether *Plutarch* or not, for some question it) doth say so. But if *Plutarch* had said it on good ground, how came *Sextus* after him, so

G

posi-

Xenoph. l. 1. c. 1. ad fin. & c. 4. ad fin.

Valer. Max. l. 7. 2. §. 8.

Sext. Emp. p. 310. Poetis Phil. p. 75.

P. Petle. Miscell. l. 1. c. 1.

Plutarch.
de Placit.
Philos. l. 1.
c. 6.

positively to give them to *Critias*? And which is more to the purpose, the same Author had but a little before quoted a passage of *Euripides* very agreeable to a Scholar of *Anaxagoras*, *That the Heavens were Καλὸν ποίημα τέλει σοφῶ, The beautiful workmanship of a wise Architect*; and from thence we come to the Notion of God. How different is this from the sense of those Atheistical *Vogles*! But it is no easy matter to judge what the true sense of a Poet is, when it is his design to personate others. And so *Euripides* might introduce *Sisyphus* as speaking agreeable to his own Character, who is represented as *an ill man, and given to fraud*; and therefore it is no wonder such a Man should look on Religion as such a contrivance. For either *Sisyphus* or *Critias* might be well suppos'd to utter such things, but the question is, how far *Euripides* is to be charg'd with them; and whether he spoke his own sense under the name of *Sisyphus*, for fear of the *Areopagus*. This ought certainly to be prov'd some other way: and if not, it seems to be a very unjust imputation; especially since *Socrates* express'd such an esteem for *Euripides*; which he would never have done, if he had suspected that under the Person of *Sisyphus* he had overthrown the foundations of Religion.

Ælian. l. 2.
c. 13.

Xenoph.
Mem. l. 1.
c. 4.

But what the true sense of *Socrates* was, may be seen by his Discourse with *Aristodemus*, of which *Xenophon* hath preserv'd the remembrance. This *Aristodemus* was one of those that not only neglected Religion himself, but despis'd and laugh'd at those that regarded it. *Socrates* finding what sort of man he was, takes him to task after his dry manner. And are there no Persons, *Aristodemus*, said he, that you have any esteem of for being wiser than others? Yes, said he briskly and like a Man of Wit, *I admire Homer for an Epic Poem, Melanippides in Dithyrambics, Sophocles in Tragedy, Polycletus in the Art of making Statues, and Phidias in Painting*. The Man we see was a kind of *Virtuoso* in other things, but without any sense of God or Religion. Well! said *Socrates*, and would you not admire those more who make living and moving Statues, than such only as have neither sense nor motion? No doubt the former, *Aristodemus* reply'd, if they are made by Design, and not by Chance. Of that, said *Socrates*, we may best judge by the use they are intended for. For those things which are for a manifest use, are most agreeable to Design. As for instance, the Senses of Men are so plainly given them for particular uses, that we cannot reasonably think, but that he that made Mankind at first, gave them them for that purpose; as he particularly instances in the fabric of the Eye, and the care of Nature to preserve it, (which he calls a work of Providence) and so for the Ears, Nose and Mouth, which are so fram'd, as to be *συνεργαῖς πρὸς τὴν αἰσθησίν* done by a wise Design, and not by Chance. And I cannot, saith *Socrates*, look upon them otherwise than as the workmanship *τεχνικὴ διμυροῦ καὶ φιλοζήτου* of a wise contriver, and a lover of his own Workmanship. The same he shews in the propagation of Animals, and the love and care of their young, &c. but as to Mankind, he saith, there is *θεοειδὴς ἡ* a reach beyond other Animals, and they have not only a Body made out of Earth, but a Mind which we perceive within our selves. And can these great and wonderful things come to pass *ὃς ἀφ' αὐτοῦ ἡ* without Mind or Understanding?

ing? To which our *Virtuoso* had nothing to say, *but that he could not see the Artificer here, as he did in other cases.* Well! And do not you contrive and design things in your own Mind? And yet you can no more see that, than the wise contriver of these things. All that *Aristodemus* had to say, was that he did not disown or despise a Divine Being, but he thought it too great to regard his Service. Hold a little, said *Socrates*, for the greater he is, the more he ought to be honor'd by Mankind. Then he question'd, whether there were such a thing as Providence, with respect to human affairs. For that, *Socrates* again bad him look to the frame of Human Nature, and the several parts of Man's Body, and he could not but see a Providence in the contrivance of the several parts of the Body; but especially the Mind, which he hath inspir'd into Men. *τὴν ψυχὴν κατέβηκεν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ αἰθέρος*, Not blowing some subtle Air into Man, as some modern Philosophers would translate it; or giving a mere Vital motion. But *Socrates* was far from thinking an Incorporeal Substance within us to be a Contradiction; nor that it was any absurdity to take a Metaphor from Air, to express the infusion of an Immaterial Soul. And he shews the excellency of the human Soul above others, because it alone apprehends the being of GOD, who made and contriv'd the greatest best things; and alone is capable of doing him service. Besides, that it hath Prudence and Memory above all others. So that Mankind are as so many Gods among inferior Creatures. If a Man had the body of an Ox and the Mind of Man together, he could not do what he would; nor if Brutes had Hands and wanted Minds, could they do much with them. But you, said he to *Aristodemus*, have both, and can you think there is no care of Providence about you? Can you think, said he, that the Gods (as he speaks) should plant in Mens Minds an opinion that they are able both to reward and punish, if it were not so? And that Mankind should be always deceiv'd in this Matter, and not be sensible of it? Do not you see, saith *Socrates*, that the most ancient and wisest Cities, and Nations, and Ages, have always shew'd the greatest regard to Religion? This is a very remarkable testimony of *Socrates* concerning the sense of former Ages about the foundations of Religion; and that the Atheistical temper some were then fallen into, was a late Innovation, and in probability occasion'd by that smattering in Philosophy, which was crept in among the Greeks from the Principles of *Anaximander* and *Democritus*. But *Socrates* assures us the best and wisest Ages had a very different sense of these matters. And this *Xenophon* tells us he had from *Socrates* his own Mouth; and that he heard this Discourse between them.

And what now is to be said to such a Testimony as this, concerning the sense of Mankind about Religion? Have we any reason to mistrust such a Testimony as that of *Socrates*, who was so much valu'd for his integrity; and lost his life, because he could not flatter nor dissemble? For any one that will carefully examine the circumstances of his Trial will find, the true reason of his prosecution was, that he had disobligh'd so many sorts of People by his plain dealing. For, as he told his Judges, his way was when he heard any Man had a great opinion for his own wisdom and skill above other Men, to talk with him on purpose, to see whether

Platon.
Apolog.
Socr.

there were any sufficient ground for such an opinion: which was one of the most disobliging courses in the world; considering how fond Men are apt to be of themselves, and to think themselves wiser than others; at least in that which they most pretend to. By which means he disobliged the *Politicians*, who hate any Man that would pretend to find them out; the *Sophists*, whom on all occasions he expos'd; and in the most public manner: And the Men of Wit and the Poets were enrag'd against him, because he slighted their way, as tending only to entertain the fancy, and not to make Men wiser; and in their happiest strains, there was only a *Natural Enthusiasm*; and altho' they said many fine things, yet they were not one jot the wiser men. The Artificers he found had many pretty knacks, but because of their Skill in such little things, they presum'd wonderfully at *Athens* upon their Understandings, and would never bear long any Great Men among them, when things went by majority of Votes. As *Socrates* found, when sentence came to be pass'd; for altho' he had many good Friends, yet when it came to the numbring of Votes, he was cast by a great Majority. But as the People of *Athens* were so opinionated of themselves, that they could not bear any Man, whose reputation lessen'd theirs: So when they had done such things which made them ill spoken of abroad, then they were for redeeming their own honor; either by recalling them from Banishment, if living; or if dead, by punishing the instruments made use of in the prosecution. So it happened in the case of *Socrates*: when they found his death brought an *Odium* upon the City, one of his Accusers was put to death, another banished; and *Plutarch* saith, some of the rest were so weary of their lives, that they put an end to them by hanging themselves. And to shew their great esteem of him, they caus'd a Statue made by *Lysippus*, to be set up in a public place in the City, as a perpetual Monument of his wisdom, and their own folly. And his carriage at his death was with so much courage, and constancy, and evenness of Mind, that they were all satisfy'd as to his integrity and freedom from any ill design. What reason can there be then to suspect his Testimony in this point of Religion, when there was not the least constraint or byass upon him, and this attested by so unexceptionable a witness as *Xenophon*: A Person of great honor and judgment; and whose Writings are such, as could hardly be counterfeited by any since him, by reason of their unaffected sweetness; for which the ancient Critics so much admired him; even *Cicero*, as well as *Dionysius Halycarnassens*, and *Quintilian*.

From *Socrates* I go on to *Plato*, who in *Cicero's* opinion (and he was a very good judge) was *Princeps Ingenii & Doctrinae*, the Top of ancient Wit and Learning; and to the same purpose *Quintilian*, whom *Valla* esteem'd above all other Critics. But I need not go about to set up the Reputation of *Plato*. He was descended from *Solon* by his Mother, and by his Father from *Codrus*; he was nearly related to *Critias*, the first of the thirty Tyrants, and head of the Atheistical Club at *Athens*; and therefore it will be worth our while to find out his true sense and opinion about these matters. To which I shall confine my Discourse concerning him. And in his tenth Book of *Laws* he gives an account of three Opinions then in vogue among the looser sort of People at *Athens*.

Plutarch.
de Odio &
Invid.

Cicero de
Orat. l. 2.
Dionys.
Halycarn.
ad Pomp.
Quint. X.
Cicero ad
Quint. l. 1.

One was, that there was no GOD at all; the 2d, that tho' there was a GOD, yet there was no Providence; the 3d. that if both were allow'd, yet that GOD would accept of gifts and sacrifices, as a compensation for their faults.

As to the *Atheistical Hypothesis* it is observable, what character he gives of the Persons who were for it, *that they were the looser and more dissolute sort of Men among them; and especially in the heat of their youth. And that he never knew any Man who continued in it from his youth to his old age; and he calls it the plague of young Men.* The *Hypothesis*, as he lays it down, is much the same with *Anaximander's*, viz. *That Nature and Chance produced all things out of a strange Chaos, wherein were all sorts of Qualities, jumbled and confounded together, and at last by mixture came to that we call the World. But that Religion and the differences of just and unjust depended upon human Laws and Contrivances, for the better Government of Mankind.*

This is the substance of their *Hypothesis*, which *Plato* in a long Discourse sets himself to refute; by shewing that these things could not come together by mere Nature and Chance; but were according to *right Reason, the product of a Superior Mind.* And whatever they pretended, as to skill in Natural Causes, this opinion did proceed from *great Ignorance about them*, and that their Reasonings were both *Impious and Incoherent.* That their fundamental Mistake lay in supposing such Motion and Mixtures in Matters, before any Principle to begin or to direct it. For the first Motion must be from that which hath a power to move it self, as well as other things; and therefore there must be a Mind antecedent to matter in order to the Production of things. This is the force of his Reasoning. Then he shews how unreasonable it is to suppose a GOD without Providence; because it must argue either *Weakness or Neglect*; which were both inconsistent with the *Divine Perfections*: and so he proves was the last Opinion, and that it tended to overthrow the *practice of Virtue.*

In his *Epinomis* (which I see no reason to mistrust) he undertakes to prove *Religion to be the truest wisdom of Mankind*; the first Principle whereof is, *that there is an Eternal Mind before all Matter*; and then saith, *That there is no greater Virtue belonging to Mankind than Piety, or a due regard to the Divine Being.* So far was he from looking on Religion as an imposture, or trick put upon Mankind in order to their better Government. *Epinom. p. 989.*

But *Aristotle* may be more suspected for this, who wanted no Wit, but is generally thought to have been of no Religion; and he was by no means fond of *Plato's Notions*, especially those he took from the *Pythagoric School*: but yet I hope to shew, that in the main foundation of all, as to the Being of GOD, and the happiness of Mankind he agreed with him at last: I do not mean at his death, according to the story in *Cælius Rhodiginus*, that then he said, *Causa Causarum miserere mei*; and which *Suarez* quotes *Laertius* for; *Cæli. Rhod. l. 17. c. 34.* but there is nothing like it in him; and *Cælius* had it out of a trifling Book *De Pomo*; But I go upon the Principles deliver'd by him in his best consider'd Books. In his *Politics* indeed he recommends Religion to a Prince, *in order to his esteem among the People,* *Arist. Polit. l. 5. c. 11.* *that they may look on him as under the particular care of Providence.*

Now this *Aristotle* is charg'd to have utterly deny'd himself; and *Atticus* the *Platonist* in *Eusebius* makes him worse than *Epicurus*; because he put his Gods quite out of the World, which *Aristotle* did not; but, said he, he overthrew all Religion by denying Providence. And *Lactantius* is very sharp upon him, and makes him a contemner of God and Religion: but to do him right, he saith at other times, That he plac'd one Mind over the World; and that *Aristotle* and his followers were of the same mind with *Antisthenes*, that there was but One God in Nature, and many popular Gods. But was not *Aristotle* charg'd with *Impiety* at Athens, and forc'd on that account to withdraw to *Chalcis*, where he died; or as some say, was poisoned? So *Eumelus* and the anonymous Author of his Life, publish'd by *Menagius*. It cannot be deny'd that there was a prosecution against him by *Eurymedon* and *Demophilus*; but so there was against *Anaxagoras* and *Socrates*; but the pretence against *Aristotle*, was not for *Impiety* in his Doctrine, but for a profane Hymn which he was said to have made on his Friend *Hermias*; such as were wont to be made to *Apollo*. This *Athenaus* denies; and *Aristotle* sent an Apology for himself to Athens, but it was not receiv'd. The truth was, *Aristotle* found it was time for him to be gone; left, as he told his Friends, that City should offend twice against Philosophy: For, as he said in his Letter to *Antipater*, He found the City abounded with *Sycophants*; and he was fallen under *Alexander's* displeasure, on the account of *Calisthenes* his Kinsman; and in a Letter of his to *Antipater* he had said, he would be reveng'd on the *Sophister*; and he publicly affronted him by the great Present he sent to *Xenocrates*, and none to him: which was sufficient intimation to his Enemies, which he never wanted, saith *Aristocles*, because of the interest he had in Princes. And if *Pliny's* Story be true, (which *Plutarch* and *Appian* intimate too) as to *Antipater's* design, *Alexander* had cause for his displeasure. But *Aristocles* saith, That *Apellicon* (to whom his Books came) wrote so full a Vindication of him, that those who read that need no more. But they are his Principles which we inquire after, and not his Practices. *Alexander Aphrodisiensis*, who is thought to have understood *Aristotle's* Mind as well as any Commentator, owns that *Aristotle* without doubt asserted, that there was one Eternal Mind, which gave the first motion to Matter; and that thereby things were put into such an order, not by Chance, but from the first Mover, so as to produce the variety of species in the World, and to make them useful to each other, and for the good of the whole; and such an universal Providence, he saith, *Aristotle* did hold. So much then is confess'd by one who was thought his most judicious Interpreter. But let us see, whether *Aristotle* may not be reasonably presum'd to go beyond this: For (1.) he blam'd *Anaxagoras* for making no more use of his Eternal Mind, than merely to set things in order at first. Then it follows, that according to him, God must be more than a mere First Mover. (2.) He makes this famous conclusion of his *Metaphysics*, That things are best governed by one head; which signified nothing, if there be no Providence. *Clausulam hanc tam insignem amplector & laudo*, said one of his most bitter Enemies; and it cannot be denied, that he there compares the Government of the World, with that of an Army or Family, wherein are several Ranks

Euseb.
Præp. Ev.
l. 15. c. 5.
Lactant. de
Ira Dei,
c. 19.
De fals.
Rel. l. 5.
De Ira Dei
c. 11.
Bessario c.
Calumn.

Athen. l. 15.
Suid. in
Arist.

Ælian. 3.
36.

Euseb.
Præp. Ev.
l. 15. c. 2.

Plin. N. H.
l. 30. c. 16.

l. 2. c. 8.
Alexand.
Aphrodis.
in Arist.
Physic.

Met. 1. 4.

Metaphys.
l. 14. ult.
P. Rami
Schol. Me-
taphys. l. 12.
c. 10.

Ranks and Orders of Men for different purposes; which must suppose a particular inspection and care. (3.) He makes the complete Happiness of Mankind to be *Θείον*, a Divine thing; and must suppose Providence, as I shall now make it to appear. He affirms that a Man's complete happiness depends upon something Divine in him, in the exercise whereof his happiness consists. And therefore he advises those that study to be happy *Ἀνθρώπων ἕνεκα*, to draw themselves off from mortal things, and to live according to that which is the best thing in us, viz. our Minds. Which altho' they do not so appear in bulk, yet in reality are far greater and of more value than other things. By which he plainly owns such a Principle in Mankind as is capable of a greater happiness than the things of this World can give him; because his Mind is of a higher Nature than they. But then the Question arises, whether Mankind can make themselves happy by this Divine Principle within them? He grants in one place, *That if there be any gift from God, it is most reasonable it should be that which is best for them*; but he avoids the dispute there, because his business was to put men upon using their own endeavors to be happy: but in his last Book, where he speaks of this Divine happiness, he saith, *That he that acts according to his mind, and is dispos'd to do the best things, is the most likely to be beloved of God*: for, if there be any care above of human affairs, as there seems to be, it is most reasonable to suppose that the Gods love what is best and nearest to them; which is our Mind. But doth he not seem to speak very doubtfully in this matter? It is observ'd by his Commentator, that his manner of expression is such as he uses when there is no manner of doubt. But we must take Aristotle, as a Philosopher; and consider on what grounds he went. He had no Revelation to direct him, and so was to judge according to what he thought most reasonable; and this he declares he took to be so. And in his following words he saith, **That those who did most esteem and value their own minds, the Gods did regard as their friends, and such as did the best actions*. That word *Ἀνθρώπων* is very emphatical in this case; for it implies a Retribution of a Reward for doing good. So that here we have the complacency, which God takes in those that are good, and do good; and the reasonableness of expecting a recompense for it. Aristotle was no fool, but was especially admired by very great Men, particularly by Cicero, and Quintilian, and Pliny, for the greatness of his Wit and Subtilty: and such a Person would never have been guilty of so great impertinency to set down such Expressions as these, if he had not thought them fit to be believ'd; but he would have set some mark upon them, that they were the opinions of other men, and not his own. And in this case he had more particular reason to have done it. For any one that compares these expressions with those in Plato, 10 de Rep. would think that Aristotle had taken them from thence. For Plato there saith the same thing; *That a good man is Θειός, one in favor with God; and whosoever is so, shall receive the best things from him*. And we cannot suppose, that he that designs to be good, and minds the practice of virtue, will be neglected above, when he makes it

Eth. l. 1.

c. 10.

Eth. l. 10.

c. 7.

Eth. l. 1.

c. 10.

ὁ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπων ἐὼς
θεοποιῶν ἐδιδόκει μὲν αἰετῶν
καὶ θεοφιλέτατος ἔακεν εἶναι. Εἰ
γὰρ ἡ ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρώπων
καὶ τῶν θεῶν γίνεται, ὡς αὐτὸς
καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ εὐλογεῖν χαίρειν τι
αὐτὸς τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ συγγενεστῶν.
ἔστι δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ ὁ Νῆς. Eth. l. 10.
c. 9.

* Καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τοῦτο
ἐπὶ μῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρῶν
τι καλὸς προφύοντες.

Aristoteles vir summo ingenio,
scientiæ copia. Tus. l. 4. 10. A-
cad. l. 4. Singulari vir ingenio
Aristoteles, & pene Divino. De
Div. l. 25. Quint. X. l. Plin. N.
H. l. 8. 16, 18, 34.

it his business to be as like GOD as he can. And *Plato*, who was far from being uncertain as to Providence, makes use of the same kind of expression. *It is not probable that he should be neglected of one so like him.* And *Aristotle* in the foregoing Chapter saith, *The Gods are in a state of perpetual blifs, and Mankind are capable of happiness, as they come nearer to a resemblance of them.* Can any Expressions come nearer than these do? We find *Aristotle* on other occasions not very shy of expressing his dissent from *Plato*, even in these Books of Morals. How warmly doth he dispute against *Plato's* notion of *Ideas*? He saith, *there are three kinds of Men pretend to happiness; the sensual and voluptuous; which he saith, is the happiness of Slaves and Brutes: the busy and active Men place it in Honor; which is not in their power. But besides these, there are those who place it in Contemplation; which is most agreeable to the most perfect faculty we have: but then he saith, Some Friends of his had introduced Ideas to this purpose; however he was resolved to prefer truth before them.* Here we see he sticks not at contradicting *Plato*, as to his *Ideas*; but is so far from doing it in the present case, that he takes his very Expressions as his own; which he would never have done, if he had not thought them agreeable to Truth and Reason. He did not like *Plato's* *Ideas*, nor his *Poetical Fictions* about a future State; which made him more reserved in discoursing about it; but he was satisfy'd in these three things. 1. That the Mind of Man was capable of a real happiness distinct from the Body. 2. That this Happiness lies in a similitude to GOD, as the most perfect Being. 3. That it was reasonable to suppose GOD should make the best to be most happy.

Mag. Mor. 1. 5. In his *Great Morals*, he declares it *not to be Courage but Madness not to be afraid of the Gods.* And if there be no Providence, what reason can there be for Fear?

In the conclusion of his *Eudemian Morals*, he makes it *the best end of a man to contemplate GOD*, and said that it argues a very ill mind to hinder his worship and service, and the best temper of mind to be little affected with sensual inclinations; and this, saith he, is the great end of *Virtue and Goodness*.

These are not the Expressions of a Man that despis'd GOD and Providence; and we are as certain these were his, as we are, that we have any Books of his. For even *Fr. Patritius* himself makes very slight objections against them; and the Author of the Ancient *Paraphrase* upon his *Ethics ad Nicomachum* (suppos'd to be *Andronicus Rhodius*) is a far better evidence for them; who is said to have *paraphrased upon Aristotle's Writings*, and not upon any other Man's. And he puts this matter out of doubt; for he thus *paraphrases* his words, *If GOD doth take care of Mankind, as it seems to all and is true.* And not only *Plutarch* in the Life of *Sylla*, but *Porphry* in that of *Plotinus* say, that *Andronicus Rhodius* took great care in digesting and explaining *Aristotle's* Works.

Let us now compare these Sayings with the Objections taken out of him against Providence. *Alex. Aphrodisiensis* is of opinion that *Aristotle* meant no more by Providence, but an *Universal Care*

to preserve the species of things, and the Order of the World; but he doth not deny that so far it extends even to sublunary things. But if he did allow such an universal Providence as to the good of the World; I ask then, Whether God did know and intend this good and order that is in the World? If he did, then his great Argument against particular Providence is taken off; which was, *That it was below the Divine Perfections to take notice of such mean things.* For if it were not below it at first to appoint and order these things, then it cannot be below it to mind or regard them. And since they cannot deny such an *Universal Providence*, they cannot for this reason reject a Particular; for it is no more unbecoming God to regard the good of his Creatures, than it was at first to make them. But *Aristotle* utterly rejects their Opinion, that attributed the making of things, or the order that appears in them, to blind Necessity or Chance; and then God must have a Power and Will to make and order these things as they are, and with a design for the good of the whole. Then it follows, that a Providence that regards the good of the whole, is agreeable to the Divine Nature; and why not then a Particular Providence for the same end? If the same Power and Wisdom can manage the whole for that end, with regard to Particular Events, why should that be rejected, and the other allowed?

All that is pleaded from *Aristotle* is this, *That the knowledg and care of particular things is troublesom and uneasy; that the Eternal Being is happy in it self; and it's better not to see and know some things, than to see and know them.* But I urge from *Aristotle* himself, that he yields, that the Divine Happiness doth not lie in an *Unactive state*, or such a perpetual sleep, as they fancied of *Endymion*. And what can be more agreeable to Infinite Goodness, than such an Activity as employs it self in the care of his Creatures? *Metaphys. l. 14. 6.*

But saith *Aristotle*, *How can God understand any thing below himself? He is a perfect object, and fit for his own contemplation, and all other things are infinitely below him.* If any made the Divine happiness to consist in the knowledg of his Creatures, they were extremely mistaken; but I do not find that *Socrates* or *Plato*, who were hearty Assertors of Providence, say any thing like it: All that they say, is, That God being infinitely good and wise, takes care of the good of the whole, and especially of those that are good; and if he did not, it must be either from want of Power or Will, neither of which can be suppos'd in the Divine Nature. And if he wants neither of these, why is it not done? It cannot be said, *That Aristotle absolutely denied God's knowledg of all things*; for in one place he saith, *It is the Character of a bad man to suppose anything hidden from God*; and in another, *That we attribute to God the knowledg of all things.* *Metaphys. l. 13. c. 5.* But 'tis possible he might be to seek as to the manner of God's knowing all things, as who is not? But if he could not comprehend it, it doth not therefore follow, that he denied it. If God, saith he, *understands nothing, then he is like one that sleeps, which is not consistent with that veneration which we owe to God.* If he doth understand, and the principal object be without himself, then he is not the best Substance himself. But none ever thought, that if there were a God, the principal object of his Understanding could be without himself. *Rhet. ad Alex. c. 18.*

H

But

But what repugnancy is there for Infinite Knowledge to comprehend all things? And so if there be things without himself, he must know them, or his Knowledge cannot be infinite. Could *Aristotle* imagin that the World and the order of it were of his making and contriving; and yet he know nothing beyond himself? Are the several *species of things* of his ordering and appointing, and yet he not know them? This is impossible. But *Aristotle* saith, *That his Essence, as most perfect, is the most proper object of Divine Contemplation; and his Understanding is nothing but the understanding of himself: and so, as he expresses it, his Understanding is the understanding of his Understanding.* Wherein, as *Scaliger* saith, he did apprehend things *supra humanum captum*; and I am apt to think so too. But our business is not to unfold the Mystery of Divine Knowledge with respect to it self, but to consider whether it be repugnant to it to know other things? If so, saith *Aristotle*, there must be a change and motion, but the Divine Essence is always the same. As tho' an Infinite Mind could not comprehend all things without a change in it self, or such trouble as we find in our gradual perceptions of things, which arises from our weakness and imperfection. The Objection from *the meanness of things* is very inconsiderable. For, if they were fit to make up a part of the Order of the World, why are they below Divine Knowledge and Providence? If God thought fit to make them, why not to preserve them?

Scaliger.
Exercit.
365. n. 5.

Yes, say they, *as to the species he doth, but not as to all the little accidents about them.* The Schoolmen distinguish in Providence the *Ratio Ordinis* from the *Executio Ordinis*; the first they say, is wholly immediate, the other is by subordinate Causes, which we call the Course of Nature, which is no more than the common Order which God hath appointed in the World; which generally obtains, but yet so as that there must be a due subordination to the first Agent; if he sees cause for particular ends to order things otherwise. And I cannot see any kind of incongruity or repugnancy in such a Supposition, because it answers the same ends, which the original intention and design of Universal Providence doth. As that in the ordinary course of Nature, Fire burns, *i. e.* dissolves that contexture of Bodies which it meets with; and this it doth by virtue of that order of Causes and Effects, which is established by Universal Providence: but suppose that there be a stop put to this method by an extraordinary act for great and wise ends becoming the supreme Governor of the World, why should not this be as agreeable to the design of Providence, as the first appointment of things in the common order was? Why not as well to work miraculous cures at some times, as to leave things to the ordinary methods at other times? But we must still suppose the ends to be wise, and great, and good; for otherwise they do not reach the general design of Providence; and we mean no other particular Providence, but such as answers the same general ends which an Universal Providence is designed for.

Magn.
Morah. l. 2.
a. 4.

But, saith *Aristotle*, *If we suppose a particular Providence with respect to Mankind, then he must give to Men here according to their deserts; which cannot be, since bad men often meet with good fortune, and therefore God being Lord over these things would deal unjustly*

unjustly as a Judge, which is not becoming him to do. Here it cannot be deny'd that Aristotle doth exclude a *Judicial Disposal* of these things; for if it were such, his Argument must hold; but we distinguish between that and a *Providential management*, in order to the real good of Mankind. And I need no other than Aristotle's own Arguments in this case: for if a Man's real happiness lies in a *similitude of the mind to God*, how can that be inconsistent with Divine Justice to exercise good Men here in such a manner, as tends most to draw off their Minds from these transitory and decaying pleasures? And if these things cannot make a Man really happy without virtue, which is the great design of his *Morals* to prove; how is it inconsistent with his Justice to let bad Men meet with good fortune? For these things can be no demonstrations of the favor or displeasure of God, which himself grants relates most to the inward temper of Mens Minds. But the real difficulty in this case, is a supposition that there is no future state. I confess that Plato clears this matter easily and plainly; *A good man*, saith he, *if he be under poverty, diseases, or other difficulties here, will find these things end in good to him, living or dying; and he makes no question of such a one's happiness in another state.* But Aristotle is upon a great reserve, as to a future state; and altho' he asserts the possibility of it sufficiently, from what he saith of the Nature of the Mind of Man, as distinct from the principle of Life; yet I am afraid Plato's giving too much way to such *Poetical Fictions*, as that of *Herus Pamphilus*, made Aristotle more cautious as to what he said concerning it, unless he could go upon surer grounds. He grants, That the Mind is of a nature distinct from the Body, and separable from it; that it comes from without; that it is capable of pleasures more Divine than the Body can enjoy or apprehend: But when he had gone thus far, the mere light of Reason would carry him no farther; and therefore he rather forbore to say any thing, than affirm what he could not prove. As Socrates said in the case of Prayer, in the second *Alcibiades*; *They must stay till they were better inform'd.* Which is a mighty advantage in behalf of Divine Revelation. But of that afterwards.

Plato de Rep. l. 10.

Aristot. de Anim. l. 1. c. 5. l. 3. c. 5. De Part. Anim. l. 1. c. 1. De Gen. Anim. l. 2. c. 3. De Part. Anim. l. 4. c. 10.

Eth. l. 10. c. 7, 8, 9.

Thus far I have consider'd the Persons of greatest Reputation in Greece, and compar'd their Opinions and the grounds they went upon; and I shall proceed no farther there, because the following Sects were deriv'd from these, and they fell into quarrels and contentions with one another, which I have no occasion at present to consider. And therefore I shall now give an Account of another set of Philosophers, who settled in that part of Italy, which lay towards Sicily, and was called *Magna Græcia*; and this was called the *Pythagorean Sect*: which I shall inquire into, with respect to the present subject. *Pythagoras* was a Man of wonderful esteem for his wisdom, not only in those parts, but at Rome too. For *Pliny* and *Plutarch* tell us, That the Roman Senate erected a Statue to him, as to the wisest Man: but *Pliny* wonders that *Socrates* was not prefer'd before him. But the Romans had a particular veneration for *Pythagoras*; from the Tradition that *Numa* the wisest of their Kings was instructed by him. It's true that this is contradicted by *Cicero* and *Livy*, (two great Men) but *Plutarch* thinks, that they had no certain measure of times to direct them to judge by;

Plin. N. 15. l. 34. c. 6. Plutarch in Numa.

Test. l. 7. 16. IV. 1.

Plut. Num. as he shews from *Clodius his Index*. And there are other odd circumstances, as to *Numa*, which favor the correspondence; as his *Laws* about *Worship* and *Sacrifices*, mention'd by *Plutarch*; and especially the *Greek Books* found in his Tomb, distinct from those of the *Pontifical Rites*; for which *Pliny* produces unexceptionable Authorities. Even *Livy* himself, who thought it a mistake about *Pythagoras*, yet confesses *the Books contain'd the wisdom of the Greeks at that time*. If *Pythagoras* was contemporary with *Thales* (as we are told he took his advice about going into *Egypt*) what *Wisdom of the Greeks* was there before *Thales*? But *Varro's* testimony is plain as well as the rest, *that these Books contain'd the Greek Philosophy*. And what *Greek Philosophy* could come to *Numa*, but that of *Pythagoras*? And therefore *Ovid* makes no scruple of saying, *That Numa did consult him*. But if *Pythagoras* was in such esteem at *Rome*, how came these Books to be so solemnly burnt by order of the Senate, after they were discover'd? *Livy* saith, *because they tended to dissolve their Religion*: which *Lactantius* carries too far, when he saith, *That they tended to overthrow all Religion*. A most improbable story! That *Numa* should take such care that posterity should believe him to have been a notorious impostor. Do Men that deceive the World, write Books on purpose to let others see they have deceiv'd Mankind? No; they take all possible care to prevent any suspicion of that kind. But *Numa* could not think otherwise, but these Books would in time come to light? And it is a wonder that they were so long concealed; and so *Pliny* saith; for they lay there 535 years: *Plutarch* saith, *but about 400 years*, which others say is a great mistake. However, it was a long time before they were discover'd; by a great shower, saith *Plutarch*; by plowing, saith *Pliny* and others.

But still, why were these Books burnt? The true account I take to be this. *Numa's Religion* was very different from what then obtain'd among them. And *Q. Petilius* the *Prætor*, having got a sight of them, saith *Livy*, from his Kinsman *L. Petilius*, in whose Ground they were found, very officiously inform'd the Senate that they were Books of dangerous consequence to their Religion; and upon his Oath, they order'd the burning of them. Now *Numa*, as *Plutarch* saith, had expressly forbidden any Images in Divine worship, which he saith continued for 160 years among the *Romans*; and the reason he gives was, *that the first or supreme Being, according to Numa, was not sensible or visible, but was invisible, pure, and only to be apprehended by the Mind*; which, saith he, was very agreeable to the Doctrine of *Pythagoras*: and the Sacrifices he appointed were unbloody, of meal and wine, and other easy things. But these things were soon chang'd; for *Plutarch* saith that *Tullius Hostilius*, his immediate successor, chang'd the Devotion which *Numa* had set up into great Superstition; which daily increasing, it was no wonder that they should then order *Numa's Books* to be burnt, which upbraided them with their superstitious folly. But by this we see what *Pythagoras* his notion of God and his worship was. *Ovid* admires him for his skill in Divinity and Philosophy; for his giving an account of the beginning and nature of things.

Issue

—*Isque licet cœli regione remotos
Mente Deos adiit, & quæ natura negabat
Visibus humanis, oculis ea pectoris hausit.*

So that, if we may trust a Poet (and surely his Authority is as good as that of *Lucretius*) *Pythagoras* asserted the being of God, and the beginning of the World.

—*Magni primordia Mundi,
Et rerum causas, & quid natura docebat;
Quid Deus, unde Nives, quæ fulminis esset origo.*

There is a large description of God extant in *St. Cyril* against *Julian*, according to *Pythagoras*; wherein God is said to be intimately present in the World, the beginning of all things, the mind, and soul, and motion of the Universe. And so *Velleius* in *Cicero*, saith that according to *Pythagoras*, God was a Mind diffus'd thro' the World. Which is likewise express'd by *Virgil* in his known Verses, *Mens agitat molem, &c.* *Philoaus*, a noted Scholar of *Pythagoras*, (whose Books brought the *Pythagorean Learning* into esteem in Greece) gives this description of God, **That he is the eternal Governor and Ruler over all, being one and the same always, and different from all others.* Which we find in *Philo*, and have no reason to mistrust his Testimony; considering what the other *Pythagoreans* said concerning the Divine Nature. They made God to be one Eternal, perfect Being, and that the happiness of Mankind lay in a similitude to him; as appears by the *Pythagorean Fragments* in *Stobæus*, and elsewhere, which I need not repeat; but I shall only set down the passages of *Zaleucus* and *Charondas*, who were known *Pythagoreans* as appears by *Porphry*, *Iamblichus*, *Laertius*, &c. in the excellent Prefaces to their Laws. *Zaleucus* saith, *That in the first place all persons ought to own and acknowledge the Gods; which, saith he, is manifest by seeing the Heaven and the World, and the order that is therein; for these are not the work of Fortune, or of Mens hands; and they ought to be worship'd and honour'd as the Author of all good things to us. And to that end they ought to keep their Souls pure from evil; for God is not honour'd by bad men, nor by costly sacrifices, but by virtue, and the choice of good and just actions.* *Charondas* saith, *That men ought to begin their actions with piety. For God is the cause of all: and they must abstain from evil actions, for the sake of their respect to God. For God hath no regard to wicked persons.* These were Men of great and just esteem in their Cities, and their memory is preserv'd by all that speak of them with great veneration.

I might pursue this matter much farther; but if this be not sufficient to my purpose, more will be less regarded: for Mankind are better pleas'd with Choice, than a Heap; and I have only pitch'd upon Persons of great esteem in the World. Only *Pythagoras* did not go down well with some of the Greeks, because of his *Mystical* and *Symbolical* ways of Instruction; which the Greeks were by no means fond of; as appears by *Xenophon's* Epistle to *Æschines* (if it be genuine; and I see little reason to question it) for he up-

braids *Plato* with mixing the *Pythagoric Extravagancies* with the plain Doctrine of *Socrates*, which *Xenophon* kept strictly to. But as to *Pythagoras* himself, *Cicero* extols him for his wisdom and Quality; and he saith, *The Pythagoreans for a great while were accounted the only Learned men.* *Pliny* admires him for his sagacity; *Apuleius* for the greatness of his Wit; and the People of *Crotone* and *Metapontum*, as more than a Man. His greatest fault was that he was too wise; for he lock'd up his Secrets so close, that the greatest part of Mankind were not much the better for them; only the Cities of *Magna Græcia* were wonderfully re-form'd by his means (if the *Pythagoreans* may be believ'd) but at last the prevalent Faction of *Cylon* and his brutish Party at *Crotone* destroy'd many of the Disciples of *Pythagoras*, and dispersed the rest. And *Pythagoras* himself ended his days either by violence, or the discontent he had to find his good designs disappointed in such a manner. The reputation of his School was for some time kept up by *Archytas* and *Philolaus*; and some that escaped the common danger, as *Lysis* (who went to *Epaminondas* in Greece, and is suppos'd to have publish'd the *Golden Verses*) and several others are mention'd by *Porphry* and *Iamblichus*. But *Porphry* observes, That they only preserv'd some dark and obscure notions of the *Pythagoric Doctrine*, and made wonderful secrets of them; which he thinks did not contain the true Doctrine of *Pythagoras*; but only some sparks of it, which were far from being clear. And the decay of the *Pythagorean Doctrine*, he doth not only impute to the violence of the Faction rais'd against the *Pythagorean Society* in those Cities of *Italy* where they flourish'd; but to their Enigmatical way of expressing their minds by Numbers and Figures; and to the *Doric Dialect*, which was almost sacred among them; and after their Books were come into Greece, he saith, *Plato and others took out the best, and put it into smoother Language*, which made the rest be slighted. And he thinks some invented things on purpose in their names to expose them the more. So that it is no easy matter to judg now what was the genuine *Pythagorean Doctrine*, except what we find mix'd with *Plato*; who had the best opportunities of understanding their Doctrine by going among them himself, and afterwards getting the Books of *Philolaus* into his hands. And *Porphry* in the Life of *Photinus* doth particularly commend him, for joyning the Doctrines of *Pythagoras* and *Plato* together, beyond any that had gone before him. From whence it appears, that there was no difference between them, as to the first Cause and the Production of things.

But what shall we say to *Ocellus Lucanus*, who is mention'd as a Disciple of *Pythagoras* by *Iamblichus*; and *Archytas* in his Epistle to *Plato* mentions a Book of his of the Generation of things; which hath been often publish'd out of MSS. and doth plainly assert the *World's Eternity*, and being from it self; and so overthrows the *Pythagorean Doctrine* of God's being the Beginning of all?

In answer. That there is something genuine of *Ocellus* extant, I do not question. For *Stobæus* produces a Fragment out of his Book of Law, written in the *Doric Dialect*, according to their custom, and the precept of *Pythagoras*; wherein he doth positively

Tusc. 4. 1.
De Leg.
2. 9.
Tusc. I. 16.
Plin. N. H.
2. 21.
Apul. Flor.
Iamb. vit.
Pyth. c. 6.
10.

Stob. Eclog.
Phys. c. 16.
p. 32.

tively assert, *That God was the cause of the World* with, & with: but that is not all; for he saith, *The World consists of two parts, of that which governs, and is the principle of motion; and that which is called passive, and is governed; the first he saith, is Active and Divine, having Reason and Understanding; the other is made, unreasonable, and liable to changes.* How can this be reconciled to the Principles of the other Book? And yet *Vizzanius* who compared it with several MSS. and publish'd it, hath printed this Fragment at the end of the other. As to the *different Dialect*, he supposes it was first written in *Doric*, but after turn'd into the *Attic*: but of this he offers no proof; only he saith, *It was done as words are translated out of Portuguese into Castilian; or which answers more to the Doric, out of Scotch into English.* No one questions but such things have been done, and may be so again. But how doth it appear that the whole Book was so? For there are some Fragments of this very piece in *Stobæus* in the *Doric Dialect*, which is the conclusion of the first Chapter, and some parts of the second and third; which I suppose to have been genuine, and the groundwork of the rest; which some unknown Philosopher built more upon, and turn'd these Fragments into the *Attic Greek*, to make them all of a piece. The *Pythagoreans* did assert, that the World was incorruptible, as appears by the Fragments of *Philolaus* and others in *Stobæus*; but that which is asserted in this Piece is, *That the World was self-originated, which was contrary to their Doctrine, and of Ocellus Lucanus himself.* There can be no dispute about the Fragment of the Book of Law, where his opinion is plain and clear, *That God is the cause of all, and that the first Cause is a wise and intelligent Being*: let us now compare this with the Doctrine of this Book, wherein he asserts, * *That the World is the cause of perfection to other things, and therefore is perfect from it self.* *Vizzanius* would have it believ'd that this was the *Peripatetic Doctrine*: If he means that of *Aristotle*, I have already shew'd how false it is; since he so plainly derives the being and perfection of the World from God, and not from it self. But that which will give the greatest light into this matter is, that *Nogarola*, who publish'd *Ocellus* in *Italy* with Notes, observes, that *Critolaus* the *Peripatetic* in *Philo*, us'd the same Argument, *That the World must be eternal, because it is the cause of its own being, and of other things in it.* Now this *Critolaus* succeeded in the *Peripatetic School* at *Athens*, after the Doctrine of it about the beginning of things had been alter'd by *Strato Lampfacenus*, who, as *Cicero* tells us, attributed all to Nature, and nothing to God; supposing that Nature had all Causes within it self. And so *Plutarch* saith, that *Strato* the *Peripatetic* supposed Nature alone to give a being to all things from it self. Here we have found the very Principle of this Book, which goes under the name of *Ocellus Lucanus*, which is repugnant to what himself had expressly declar'd; but some one of these *Atheistic Peripatetics* at *Athens*, finding that *Ocellus Lucanus* had said something that might be turn'd to their purpose, takes what was ancient of *Ocellus*, and puts it out of the *Doric* into the *Attic Dialect*, and makes a short *System of the Universe*; which they thought would better pass in the World, under the name of ancient *Pythagorean*. And this seems to me the truest

Stob. Eclog.
Phys. c. 24.
p. 44.

* Οὐτως ἐν
ἐ τοῖς ἀλ-
λοις ἀΐον
γινώσκοντες
αὐτὸ πλείους,
αὐτὸ καὶ ἰ-
σχυροὶ αὐτο-
πλῆεις. Ocell.
Lucan. c. i.

Phil. Oper.
p. 946.

Acad. Qu.
l. 4. c. 38.
Cicer. de N.
D. l. 1.
Plut. adv.
Colos.

truest account of this matter. As for the Arguments themselves, such as they are, I shall consider them in a more proper place.

Thus I have gone thro' the Opinions of the eldest Philosophers of greatest esteem about God and Providence, and the production of the World. But before I proceed farther, it will be necessary to make some Reflections on the foregoing Discourse, which may be very serviceable to my following Designs.

1. That those Philosophers who asserted *the being of God and Providence*, were Persons of the greatest reputation for Wisdom and Knowledg, and did not hold these things merely from Tradition, but from the strongest evidence of Reason: which appear'd by this, that after the Atheistical Hypotheses of *Anaximander* and *Democritus* were started, they were not in the least mov'd by them; but saw an absolute necessity in point of Reason of holding a First Cause, which not only gave a beginning to the World, but continued to govern it. Even *Aristotle* owning an Universal Providence from such Reasons, as will hold much farther.

2. That these Philosophers who follow'd their Natural Reason, were very far from looking on *the Universe* as made up *only of Bodies*, or that *an Incorporeal Substance* imply'd a Contradiction. These were Persons who understood very well what a Contradiction meant; and if there had been any such Repugnancy in the notion of *Mind* or *Spirit* as distinct from Body, they would have found it out. But *Anaxagoras* asserted a *Superior Mind* antecedent to Matter or Body; so did *Socrates* and *Plato*, and *Aristotle* too; who expressly asserts God to be *an Essence without bulk and indivisible, or without any parts*; but this can never agree to a Body, altho' never so *fine and subtle*.

Metaphys.
l. 14. c. 7.

Nec vero Deus ipse qui intelligitur a nobis, alio modo intelligi potest, nisi mens soluta quædam & libera, segregata ab omni concretionem mortali, omnia sentiens & movens, ipsaq; prædicta motu sempiterno. *Tusc. l. 26.*

* *Cicero de Nat. Deor.*
l. 2.

† *Laert. vit. Zenon.*
‡ *Seneca Consil. ad Hel. c. 8.*

And *Cicero* tells us, That *they could have no other notion of God, but as a free Mind, remote from any composition, knowing and perceiving, and moving all things*. Even the *Stoics* who blunder'd most in this matter, yet yielded God to be *Numen præstantissimæ mentis*; as *Balbus* in * *Tully* calls him; and † *Zeno*

in *Laertius* describes God to be *an Immortal, Rational and most happy Being, incapable of evil, and taking care of the World*. ‡ *Seneca* saith, *The World was framed by God, or by Incorporeal Reason*. If at other times they seem to contradict this, we are not here concern'd to clear or vindicate them; because my Inquiry is confin'd to those who were elder, and not so given to Paradoxes and innovation in Terms, as the *Stoics* were.

3. That the true and complete happiness of Mankind lay in a similitude to God; herein *Socrates* and *Pythagoras*, and their Scholars agreed, as abundantly appears in the *Pythagorean Fragments*; and that the way to be like God, is to be *virtuous and good, and wise*; and that all other things, which Mankind are apt to value so much, fall infinitely short of this. And I have shew'd that *Aristotle* himself came to this at last, for which I have produc'd unquestionable Authorities from his Works.

4. That Religion and Piety are very great and commendable Virtues in Mankind. *Plato* said *the greatest*. *Pythagoras* gave very good Rules about Divine worship; that it should be perform'd *seriously and with great attention of Mind*; and not by the *By*, and by *Chance*. That *our Minds were most affected with Religion and Piety*

Plut. in Num.
Cicero de Leg. l. 2.

Piety in the due worship of God; that we should undertake nothing without prayer; wherein Socrates and Plato agree with him. And Aristotle look'd on it as Madness to despise God and Religion. Ant. Carm. 49.

That good Men are to bear the troubles of this World as well as they can, and to look for happiness in a future state. This appear'd by the carriage of *Socrates* at his death, and his Discourses then; and the Courage and Constancy of *Pythagoras* and his *Disciples*, when they were so miserably handled by their inveterate Enemies; setting fire in the House where they met, banishing some and famishing others, and dispersing the rest. 5.

That there was a common consent of Mankind, as to the Being God, and Immortality of Souls. Which appears not only by express testimonies of Philosophers, but by their appeals to the sense of former Ages and Distant Nations about them. 6.

That, notwithstanding that light of Reason, which they had, yet they found it so defective in many things, that they thought nothing more desirable than a clear Revelation about such things, which were of great importance to Mankind, but they found to be out of their reach to recover; as appear'd by the Confession of *Socrates*; and the Silence of *Aristotle* about a future state, when his Reason could only go to the possibility, and not to the undoubted certainty of it. For I have shew'd that *Aristotle* hath asserted so much concerning the Nature and Properties of the Soul, or rather the Mind of Man, that it cannot be destroy'd by death; but yet he was so far to seek concerning a future state after death, by reason of the Poetical fictions about it, that he rather chose to say nothing, than what might be thought fabulous or uncertain. 7.

And now, I hope, I have sufficiently clear'd the first thing which I undertook, which was to shew, That it was a most unreasonable prejudice against Religion; *that it was only a contrivance of Priests and Politicians for their own ends.*

I come now to consider in the next place, what account is given by such Men of that impression of Religion, which hath been upon the Minds of Men in all Ages. And the Cause must be as general as the Effect: since then we find this Effect of Religion in all kinds of Men, some universal and common Reason must be assign'd for it: which is the thing I am now to consider. And since no Person hath undertaken this Matter in such a manner, as Mr. *Hobbes* hath done, I shall particularly examin what he hath said concerning it. *Seeing there are no signs, nor fruit of Religion but in Man only, there is no cause to doubt, but that the seed of Religion is also only in Man; and consisteth in some peculiar quality, or at least in some eminent degree thereof not to be found in other living Creatures.* Leviathan ch. 12. 11.

But what is this *Peculiar Quality in Mankind*? For, therein the difficulty lies. How come Men of all sorts to be possess'd with it? Not merely the unthinking multitude, but Men of the deepest Sense and greatest Capacity, and who have taken the most pains to inquire into these matters.

And first, saith he, it is peculiar to the Nature of Man to be inquisitive into Causes of the Events they see, some more some less; but all Men so much as to be curious in the search of the Causes of their own good and evil Fortune. To be inquisitive into the
I Causes

Causes of Events is very proper for Rational Beings; but we do not mean such as relate merely to *their own good or evil Fortune*, which is no commendable curiosity; but into the nature and reason of things, which they see in the World; and this we say leads Men to a first Cause, which is God. This he mentions in the next words.

Secondly, upon the sight of any thing that hath a beginning to think also it had a Cause, to determin the same to begin when it did, rather than sooner or later.

And was not this a very reasonable thought? For *what hath a Beginning* must certainly *have a Cause* which produced it; which determined its being at that time. And if this be such a *Peculiar Quality in Mankind*, then there is something in Reason which carries them to the owning a God, which gave a Being to the World, and to the things in it.

Thirdly, Man observeth how one event hath been produced by another, and remembreth in them Antecedence and Consequence; and if he cannot find out the true Causes of things, he supposes Causes of them rather from his own fancy, or Authority of others whom he esteems.

But how come Mankind not to find out the true Causes of things? For this is here very sily suppos'd, without giving the least reason for it; and withal the things that Men search for the Causes of, are suppos'd to be *only* such as relate to *their good and evil Fortune*; (which are said to be *for the most part invisible*) but is it not possible for Men to inquire into the Causes of other things, which we plainly see? Do we not see our own Bodies, and those of other Animals, as well as the Heavens and Earth, and is it not as proper and reasonable for Mankind to inquire into the Causes of these, as well as into their *good and evil Fortune*? What strange stuff is this to suppose all Mankind only to run after *Born-tellers*; and never to concern themselves about the Causes of the visible World? Could any one that in the least pretended to *Philosophy*, ever think so meanly of the rest of Mankind? But these are the Causes which we search for; and we hope Natural Reason will conduct Men in this inquiry to their satisfaction; so that they need not to have recourse to *Fancy* or *Authority*.

But he goes on: *The two first make anxiety; i. e. a Man's Inquisitiveness into Causes in general, and thinking what about had a Beginning must have a Cause.* For being assur'd that there be Causes of all things, this fills him with solicitude for the time to come; and so his heart is gnaw'd on perpetually by fear of death, poverty or other Calamity; and hath no repose or pause of his anxiety but in sleep. What? Do Men think of nothing but what Calamities may befall them? And must they needs perpetually perplex themselves with the fear of future Evils? Those who were called *Philosophers* in former times, thought it possible for such who believed God and Providence, not to live under such perpetual anxiety. But what follows? *This perpetual fear always accompanying Mankind in the ignorance of Causes, as it were in the dark, and woods have for object something; and therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse, either of their good or evil Fortune, but some power or agent invisible. Thence the Poets said, that the Gods were first created by human Fear; which being spoken of the*

the many Gods of the Gentiles, is very true. But how come we from the *Qualities* of Human Nature to fall upon *the Gods of the Gentiles*? The Question was, What it is in Mankind which inclines them to believe a God? the Answer is, *That Fear made the Gods of the Gentiles.* What is that to *all Mankind*? Suppose there had been no such saying among the *Poets*, nor such *Gods among the Gentiles*, the Question still remains, whence comes Mankind to apprehend a *Deity*? Doth it all come from a vain superstitious Fear, such as Men have in the dark of they know not what; And because they see nothing, they imagin some *Invisible Power*? Is this the true ground of the Seed of Religion in Mens Minds? If so, then there is no ground in Reason to believe a God, but only an ignorant superstitious Fear.

Not so, saith Mr. *Hobbes.* *But the acknowledgment of one God, Eternal, Infinite and Omnipotent, may more easily be derived from the desire Men have to know the Causes of Natural Bodies, and their several virtues and operations, than from the fear of what was to befall them in time to come.* What is the meaning of this? *The acknowledgment of one God may be more easily derived, &c.* If he had meant sincerely, he would not have said, *That it may be more easily derived,* but that no tolerable account can be given of those things any other way. But we are to observe, That he makes *Ignorance and Fear* to be the general Seeds of Religion in Mankind: so that this *Acknowledgment of one God* doth not come from the *Seed of Religion*, but only from Mens being puzzled about a series of Causes. For, as he goes on, *he that from any Effect he sees come to pass, should reason to the next and immediate Cause thereof, and from thence to the Cause of that Cause, and plunge himself profoundly in the pursuit of Causes, shall at last come to this: (even as the Heathen Philosophers confess'd) one first Mover, that is a First and an Eternal Cause of all things, which is that which Men mean by the name of God.* This seems a plain confession that Reason must carry Men to the owning a *First and an Eternal Cause of all things.* And is not Reason a *Peculiar Quality in Mankind*? How then comes the *Seeds of Religion* not to be plac'd therein, but in *Ignorance and Fear*? And he after saith, *That the Natural Seed of Religion lies in these four things; Opinion of Ghosts, Ignorance of second Causes, Devotion towards what Men fear, and taking things casual for prognostics.* How comes the *Natural Reason* of Mankind to be left out? If by that Men may be convinc'd of a *First and Eternal Cause of things*, doth not that dispose Men to a fear and reverence towards a *Divine Majesty*? And is not that *Religion*? Then the best and truest Seed of Religion lies in that which most disposeth the Mind to fear God. What is the meaning then, that the *Seed of Religion* is plac'd by him in things without Reason? If Men by Reason are brought to own or acknowledge one God *Eternal, Infinite, Omnipotent*; doth not the same Reason oblige them to pay him that Reverence, and Fear, and Duty, which is owing to him? Therefore by this *Seed of Religion*, he really can mean nothing but an inclination to *Superstition.* And to this purpose he speaks in the conclusion of the foregoing Chapter. *And this Fear of things invisible, is the Natural Seed of that which every one in himself calleth Religion, and in them that fear or worship that power otherwise than they do, Superstition.* Here is

Leviathan,
ch. 6. p. 26.

a notable distinction found out between *Religion* and *Superstition*; the former is the good word a Man gives to himself; the other the Nickname he bestows on those who differ from him. But in general, *Religion* and *Superstition* are the same thing to him. Unless a difference be found out from the *allowance* of one, and not of the other. So he saith in another place: *Fear of power invisible feign'd by the Mind, or imagin'd from tales publicly allow'd, is Religion; not allow'd, Superstition.* So that what is feign'd and allow'd is *Religion*; and what is not allow'd is *Superstition*. So that the worship of the Heathen Gods, being from *Tales publicly allow'd*, was *Religion* and not *Superstition*; and the *Christian worship* under the Persecution, was *Superstition* and not *Religion*. No, saith Mr. Hobbes. *When the power imagin'd is such as we imagin, that is true Religion.* How can it be *true Religion*, if *Religion* be a *fear of a power imagin'd by the Mind, or from tales publicly allow'd*? For if this be *Religion* in general, *true Religion* must be a *true Fiction*, a real *Chimera*, an allow'd piece of Nonsense. *But when the power is such as we imagin it, then, saith he, it is true Religion.* But if it were a *power imagin'd to be such as the Law makes it*, is not that *true Religion*? And if it contradicts what is so establish'd, can this be according to Mr. Hobbes's *true Religion*? Then it follows, that the distinction doth not arise from the *Public Allowance* or *Disallowance*. For if it be possible for the Civil Power to *disallow* the worship of the true God, (as we know it hath too frequently happen'd) is such worship being disallow'd *true Religion*? If it be, then it is impossible the other should be true, that *Religion* is taken from the *Public Allowance*, and *Superstition* from the *Disallowance*. But they who put in some expressions only for a disguise and concealment, know well enough that they contradict themselves; and they know their friends will allow them in it, as long as the true meaning may be understood by them: and the safest way of instilling Atheism is by writing contradictions, i. e. by seeming at some times to own a God, but by the whole series of the Discourse to overthrow his Being; as a mere fancy of an invisible Power rais'd by a predominant fear. But hereby we see that *Fear* prevails so much on such Men, that they dare not speak consistently; which is very unbecoming *Philosophers*. As the gross *Hypocrisy* of *Vaninus* before his discovery, and the most servile *Flatteries* and *Importunities* of *Theophile* in France, did shew how much the power of *Fear* may sway in those who have no *Religion*, (which may be allow'd in them.) But how comes *Fear* to be made out to be the seed of *Religion* in Mankind? This a true Disciple to the *Leviathan*, in the Preface to his Book, hath undertaken to make out more fully than Mr. Hobbes had done; and therefore ought to be consider'd in this place. *When Men, saith he, are under any great distress, and see not the way out of it, their anxiety and fear makes them act like Men distracted, and ask any one's help, which at another time they would despise: so we find it as to Religion; when they are in great trouble, they run to their prayers; and when they are over, their devotion is soon cool'd; as he instances in Alexander, and might have done in many others.* But what is all this to the proof of the main Point? That Men are too prone to *Superstition*, especially under calamities, there is no question. But

Lescaoper
in *Cicer. de*
N. D. I p.
127.

Tract. The-
olog. Polit.

it is a most unreasonable supposition, that all *Religion* is nothing else but *Superstition*, which Men take up only when they are at their wits end. But if there be a God and Providence, as we find both the best *Philosophers* asserted, and the strongest Reason prove it; then whatever Mens condition be as to this World, there is the same ground in Reason for a due reverence and worship to be pay'd to him. But it is a very bad way of arguing against all Religion, because of some Mens extravagant *Superstition*. *Some Men have run mad with Superstition*. What follows? Therefore all Religion is madness? Where lies any color in the Argument? Some have been mad through an excess of Love; therefore all Love is Madness? No; but we must inquire into the proper objects and degrees of Love; whereof some are allowable, and some not. So here in the passion of Fear; there is a violent, foolish, ungovernable Fear; but may there not be a prudent, wise and reasonable Fear? It is madness and folly in great distresses to run to what cannot help us; but is it so to make our addresses to a Being infinitely wise and powerful, who alone can do it? Here lies the fundamental mistake of these Men, they would have it taken for granted, that there is no God nor Providence, and then they cry out upon the foolish Fear and *Superstition* of Mankind: but they cannot deny that if our foundations be true, Religion is a wise and reasonable thing in Mankind; as it is an owning our Creator by a solemn submission to him, and invocation of his help, and dependence upon his Providence. Let any Man in his wits (let his condition as to this World be what it will) deny that it is reasonable for him to be govern'd by one infinitely wiser and better than himself. If his condition be prosperous, he hath more reason to be thankful; if it be troublesome, he hath more reason to be patient, because God knows best both how to support him under it, and to deliver him out of it. But if there be no God nor Providence, he hath nothing but the miserable comfort of necessity. *But, did not the multitude of Gods in the Gentile World come from their ignorant and superstitious Fear, as Mr. Hobbes hath at large shew'd?* Truly he needed not to have taken so much pains to prove a thing which nobody denies. But what then? The Gentiles feign'd a great many Gods from their superstitious Fear, therefore there is no God but what is the effect of Fear. Is this good arguing? *But they fancied powers invisible which were only in their own imaginations.* Therefore there is no *Invisible power* but what depends upon Imagination. Can such Men pretend to Reason, who talk at this rate? *But those invisible powers they took to be Spirits, and that they were incorporeal, or immaterial, which are words of a contradictory signification.* This is news, and ought to have been prov'd in some measure, since the best *Philosophers* who understood contradictions never thought so, as I have shew'd already. *But those who by their meditation arrive to the acknowledgment of one Infinite, Omnipotent, Eternal God, chose rather to confess he is incomprehensible and above their Understanding, than to define his Nature by Spirit incorporeal, and then confess their definition to be unintelligible.* Do any that believe God to be an *Immaterial Substance*, confess this to be *unintelligible*? I rather believe that they think a *Material God* to be *unintelligible*; as being inconsistent with the

Divine Perfections. And altho' they acknowledg that what is *Infinite*, is so far incomprehensible; yet they may have clear and distinct conceptions of a *First and Eternal Cause*, which is endued with Infinite Perfections. And this is not only attributed to him as a *Title of Honor with a pious intention*: but from the true sense of their Minds, as to such Attributes which are proper to God.

Mr. Hobbes
consider'd,
&c. p. 30.

p. 32.

When Mr. *Hobbes* was charg'd with introducing *Atheism* by denying *Immaterial or Incorporeal Substances*, he undertook to defend himself; not only because we say *God is incomprehensible*, but because the notion of an *Incorporeal Substance* came from *Plato and Aristotle*, who mistook those thin inhabitants of the Brain they see in sleep for so many incorporeal Men; and yet allow them motion, which is proper only to things Corporeal. Before he seem'd only to say, That the ignorant superstitious People entertain'd this notion of *Spirits or invisible powers being only Creatures of the Brain like the images in sleep*: but now it seems *Plato and Aristotle* were no wiser, and that we receive it from them. But I have made it appear that the difference of Mind and Matter was before them; and that not by mere fancy, but by invincible Reason: because otherwise there could be no such thing as the Motion and Disposition of Matter in such a manner, as we see it in the World. And this was the ground which those Philosophers went upon; who were as little given to be impos'd upon by their dreams, as any before or since their time. And it is a strange confidence in any Man to think to bear down the general sense of the most Philosophical part of Mankind, with bare saying, that an *Immaterial Substance* implies a contradiction. But he offers to prove it, after an extraordinary manner; For, saith he, it is in English, *something that without a body stands under—* *Stands under what? Will you say, under Accidents?* Ridiculous! did *Plato or Aristotle* use the word *Substance*? And when it came to be us'd, the word signify'd the same with *Being*; and so the jest is quite lost. Such pitiful things as these must pass for Wit and Philosophy with some Men.

p. 33.

But to proceed with Mr. *Hobbes*; After he hath reckon'd up the many follies which the Gentiles fell into by their superstitious Fear, he concludes in this manner. *So easy are Men to be drawn to believe any thing from such as have got credit with them, and can with gentleness and dexterity take hold of their Ignorance and Fear.* Still we meet with nothing but the result of *Ignorance and Fear* in the *Gentile World*. We do not deny that Religion was exceedingly corrupted among them; but we affirm, that the true foundations of Religion were kept up among Men of Understanding; as fully appears by the Discourses of *Socrates, Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, Cicero, &c.* Why are their Reasons never so much as mention'd, and nothing thought worth insisting upon, but only the gross superstitions and follies of the People? This doth not look like fair dealing with Mankind; to represent only the meanest and most deform'd parts, and to conceal what any ways tended to the honor of them, and of Religion. *Cicero* dealt with Mankind in this matter in a much more ingenuous and candid manner. He doth not conceal the follies either of the *People* or of the *Philosophers* about their Gods; but then he sets down all the Arguments for God and Providence, and urges them with all his force.

Cicero de
Nat. Deor.

And

And in other places he owns the *general consent of Mankind*, as to the esteem and worship of a Divine Nature: which he is far from imputing to *Mens Ignorance and Fear*; but he saith, *it is the voice of Nature it self*. Nay he goes so far as to say, * *that there is nothing more evident to any one that looks up to the Heavens, than that there is a most excellent Mind, by which these things are govern'd*. † *And he questions, whether it be more evident that the Sun shines*. At what another rate doth that excellent Orator speak of *Human Nature*, with respect to Religion, than our modern pretenders to Philosophy? Nay ‡ *Sextus Empiricus* himself sets down the Arguments fairly which prove the Being of God: *viz. The Consent of Mankind; the Order of the World; the absurdities of Atheism, and the weakness of the Arguments for it*. Which he doth largely insist upon; and distinguishes between the *common errors of the people*, and the *Natural Arguments of Mankind*, with the consent of the wisest and sharpest Men among them; as *Pythagoras, Empodocles, the Ionic Philosophers* (from *Anaxagoras*) *Socrates, Plato, Aristotle*, and the *Stoics*. And, saith he, *if we inquired after an object of sight, we would rely most on those who saw best; or after a sound, on those of the quickest hearing: so in matters of speculation, the opinion of Philosophers ought most to be regarded*. Which he never answers when he sets down the Arguments on the other side; which are chiefly those of *Carneades* against the *Stoics*, who laid themselves open by some *Hypotheses* of their own.

But Mr. *Hobbes* tells us, *That the first Founders and Legislators of Common-wealths among the Gentiles took great care to keep the People in obedience and peace; and to that end pretended to Revelation for their Laws: and prescrib'd Ceremonies, and Supplications, and Sacrifices, &c. by which they were to believe the anger of the Gods might be appeas'd. And thus the Religion of the Gentiles was a part of their Policy*. Who goes about to deny this? or to justify the vain pretenses to Revelation among some of the ancient Legislators, besides *Numa Pompilius*, whom *Diodorus Siculus* takes care to preserve the memory of; as of *Mnenis*, as he calls him, the first Legislator in *Egypt*; who pretended to have his Laws from the God *Hermes*: but this seems to have been a mistake for *Menes*, whose Counsellor *Hermes* was: his others are, *Minos* of *Creet*, *Lycurgus* at *Sparta*, *Zathamustes* (as he calls him) among the *Arimaspi*, *Zamolxis* among the *Getae*; and among the rest he reckons *Moses*, who had his Laws from the God *Iao*. No question *Diodorus Siculus* believ'd all alike; but I hope to shew the mighty difference between *Moses* and the rest in the following Discourses. But here I am only to consider the force of the Argument. *These Gentile Legislators did pretend Revelation when they had it not, only with a design to deceive the People*. Doth it hence follow, that there is no such thing as *Religion*; but that it is only a Trick made use of by cunning Legislators to draw the People the better to Obedience? Now I think the Argument holds the other way. For, if the People were not before well persuaded of the truth of *Religion* in general, this Argument would have no force at all upon them. For, let us suppose a People altogether unacquainted with Religion, or uncertain of the truth of it, to be dealt with, by some cunning Legislator; and he comes

Cic. de Leg. I. 8.

Tusc. I. 13. 15.

* Quid enim potest esse tam apertum, tamque perspicuum, cum cœlum suspexit, cœlestiaque contemplati sumus, quam esse aliquod Numen præstantissimæ mentis quo hæc regantur.

De Nat. Deor. l. 2.

† Quod qui dubitet, haud sane intelligo, cur non idem Sol sit an nulus sit dubitare possit. Quid enim est hoc illo evidenti? Ibid.

‡ Sextus Empir. ad Mathem. p. 139.

Diod. Sic. l. 1. p. 59.

and tells them, he had brought them an excellent Body of Laws, which he had by Revelation from God; what would this signify to a People that were possess'd with Mr. *Hobbes's* Notion of *Invisible Powers* that were only *Fancies*, such as appear in a *Dream* or a *Glass*; would they be at all persuaded by such an Argument to obedience? No; but they would rather look on him as an Impostor, that went about to deceive them in the grossest manner; which would raise an invincible prejudice against them. But, saith Mr. *Hobbes*, *they had the Original seeds of Religion*, viz. *Ignorance and Fear*, and upon these such Legislators did work. But he can never make it out, that ever there was a People possess'd with such *Ignorance and Fear*, but they had a notion of a Deity among them before such Legislators appearing; and all the advantage they had, was from such an antecedent Belief of a God; then indeed it was no hard matter for such Legislators to impose upon them; but without it, the supposition is unreasonable. But Mr. *Hobbes* saith, *that Men in the dark are afraid of Invisible Powers*. As tho' there were no more to be said for the Being of God and Providence, than for stories of *Hob-goblins*; and this lies at the bottom of all his Discourse. Wherein he contradicts the common Sense and Reason of Mankind, who have agreed in the Notion and belief of a Deity, and that as I have shew'd from *Socrates* and *Xenophon*, as well as others in the *eldest and best Ages*, even of the *Gentile World*.

But Mr. *Hobbes* saith, where he speaks his Mind more freely, *that there is no Argument from Natural Reason doth prove that the World had its beginning from God*; and yet he saith, *there is no Argument to prove a Deity but from the Creation*. So that all proof of a God in point of Reason, must be destroy'd by him. This he knew was objected against him; and the Answer he gives is, *That there are no Arguments from Natural Reason, except the Creation, that have not made it more doubtful to many than it was before*: and therefore his opinion is, *that this matter is to be left to the Law to determin*. A very philosophical Answer! But why doth not the Argument from the Creation hold, when himself had said, *that from the series of Causes there must be one first Mover, i. e. a First and an Eternal Cause of all things*? But that came in by the by, to avoid odium in a Book for all Persons reading; but in his *Philosophical Discourses*, he doth not allow this Argument to hold. For what reason? *Because*, saith he, *it only proves, that a Man's Mind cannot go on in infinitum, but he must stop somewhere; and at last he grows weary, and knows not whether he should go on farther or not*. And is this all the force of the Argument from the Creation? What becomes now of the Argument from the *Mechanical Contrivance of the Human Body*, which he said, *was so clear a proof of a wise Maker, that he must be said to be without a Mind, that did not assert that it was made by one*? And this is in one of his *Philosophical Treatises*, published after the other; but in his *Vindication of himself*; he justifies the former passage; only he saith, *except the Creation*. So that he knew not well what to say in this matter, but only to keep himself out of danger, he was resolv'd to submit to the Law. But that is not our Point: and why did he not go about to take off the Argument from the *wise Contrivance of things*, which ought

Phys. c. 26.
n. 1.

Mr. Hobbes
consider'd.
p. 34.

to

to go along with the other? But he knew it was far easier to darken an Argument, wherein *Eternity* and *Infinity* is concern'd; and so from thence would infer that in the series of Causes Man-Mind are only puzzled and not convinced. But why, I pray, must a Man's Mind *give over in the search of Causes, as not knowing whether he may go on or not?* Can any thing be plainer in common reason, than that in the order of Causes a Man must go on till he arrive at a first Cause? What should make a Man to stop here, for he sees he must go on till he comes at a first? No; saith Mr. *Hobbes*, *A first Cause is infinite, and whatever is infinite is above our conception, and so we are lost.* But that is running from the order of Causes to the nature of the object, which is a thing of another consideration.

But he saith yet farther, *That the Argument from motion doth only prove an eternity of motion, and not an eternal first Mover;* because as nothing can be mov'd from it self, so whatsoever gives motion must be first mov'd. But all this depends upon the supposition that there is nothing in the Universe but Body; and if that be granted, his Argument holds: but if there be Mind distinct from Body, and can give motion to it, there is not so much as the color of reason in this Argument. And so much in answer to the Second Atheistical Pretense.

The Third *Atheistical Pretense* to be consider'd, is, *That there is no such common consent of Mankind, as to God and Providence, as was asserted by the Ancients, and is still by the defenders of Religion; for upon the late Discoveries whole Nations have been found without any sense of God or Religion.* This is a thing very fit to be inquir'd into, with more care than hath been yet us'd about it: for, altho' we do not ground the truth of Religion merely upon such a general consent; but upon those Arguments which the wiser part of Mankind hath insisted upon; of which I have given some account in the foregoing Discourse: yet such an universal consent doth manifestly shew that there is nothing repugnant to the common sense of Mankind in it; nothing that looks like a Trick or Imposture, which could never so universally prevail as this hath done; especially among the more sensible and civiliz'd part of Mankind.

But for our better understanding this Matter, it will be necessary to lay down some general Observations.

That we have reason to distinguish the more *Brutish* and *Savage* People, from the more *Tractable* and *Reasonable*; because it is possible for Mankind by an affected and universal neglect of all kind of Instruction, to degenerate almost to the nature of Brutes. But surely such are not fit to be brought in for the instances of what naturally belongs to Mankind: which we ought to judge of by a due measure, *i. e.* by such as neither want natural capacity, nor are profess'd Savages, nor have the improvements of the most civilized People. There are two sorts of brutish People in the World, whose sense in these matters is not much to be regarded. (1.) Such as have very little of common Humanity left among them; such as *Acosta* describes the *Uros*, who were such *dull and brutish People*, *that they did not think themselves Men*; and such are the *Caffres* or *Hottentots*, at the *Cape of Good hope*, who by the last Account we

Acosta of the Indies, l. 2. c. 6.

K

have

Voyage to
Surat, Am.
1689. p.
189.
De Laet
Descript.
Ind. Occid.
l. 5. c. 25.
De Orig.
Gent. Am.
p. 27.
Acosta of
the West-
Indies, l. 7.
ch. 3.
DuVal Ob-
servations
sur le Voy-
age de Pi-
rard, p. 132.

2.

Diarium
Schouten.
p. 47.
Descript.
Navig.
Jac. Le
Mair, 31
Maui.

Maff. Epist.
l. 4. Apr.
28. 1565.

Diod. Sic.
l. 1. p. 7.

have of them remain as *Bestial* and *Sordid* as ever; infomuch that the Author who was among them, saith, *That if there be any medium between Men and Beasts, they lay in the fairest claim to that species.* And such are the *Caigua* of *Paraguaria* (of whom afterwards.) (2.) Such as expresse open contempt and defiance of *Laws* as well as *Religion*, as the *Chichimeca* in the Northern part of *America*, who are said to have lived without any Government as well as *Religion*; (unless that they offer the first wild Beast they catch to the Sun) and so *Acosta* describes some other *Savages* among them; viz. without King, Law, God, or Reason: Those of *Brazil* are said to be without Faith, without Law, without a King; and the *Savages* of *Canada* are describ'd after the same manner. So that if any Argument can be drawn from such against Religion, it will as well hold against *Law* and *Civil Government*.

De Laet Ind. Occid. l. 2. c. 12.

We must not judg by light informations of mere Strangers, and Persons look'd on as Enemies; which is the case of the Inhabitants of the *Southern Islands*, which we have only from *Seamen* who landed upon them, and were suppos'd to come with an ill design; whose Accounts must be very imperfect and partial. But in *Le Mair's* Account we only read, *that they could observe no Offices of Religion among them*: And *Schouten* to the same purpose of the Inhabitants of *Horn Island* (as they call it) not far from *New Guinea*; but they seem'd, he saith, to live like the *Birds of the Air*, without any care, upon the fruits of the *Earth*. But no certainty can be grounded upon such Observations. Nor can we build any thing upon the Want of Religion in places not yet fully discover'd; as what is said by some of the People of *Tedso* or *Jesso*: For the first Account given of it was from the Jesuit *Fronius*, who liv'd long in *Japan*; and he describes it as a Country of *Savages*; and he saith, *that they have no other Religion but the worship of the Heavens*. And so *Diodorus Siculus* saith, *the sight of the Heavens, was that which brought Men first to Divine worship*; and he doth not attribute it to *Ignorance and Fear*, but to *Admiration*; and therefore fix'd on the *Sun and Moon* as their chief Gods; which was the most prevailing Idolatry in the world. But from hence we are not to infer that they believ'd no God above them; but they thought he that was above them was above their service: but their visible worship they thought ought to be pay'd to these visible Gods, as hath been already observ'd of the old *Greeks*; and *Diodorus Siculus* saith the same of the *Egyptians*. But as to these People of *Tedso* we find the first Account of them was, that they were a very *Savage People*, but had such kind of Religion as most ancient Idolaters had: since that time, there hath been no exact Account given of them; the best we have is from the *Dutch Caron*, who was Resident in *Japan*, saith only *that this People are brutish; and that the Japonese could never make a full discovery of the Country; which is parted from Japan by an Arm of the Sea, where it bounds on vast Mountains and Deserts; that the common passage is by ferrying over*. If this be true, there is a passage by Land beyond that Arm of the Sea, and so *Japan* is one Continent with it, which extends in probability to the Northern parts of *America*: For in the Account of the *Dutch Embassy* to *Japan*

Japan, A. D. 1641. we are told, That in the Treaty between the *Japoneſe Agent Syvoan* and the *Dutch*, he produc'd a Map of thoſe parts agreeable to what *Caron* had ſaid; and they obſerve that *Jefſo* was in it of a vaſt extent, and reach'd to North America, without any Streight of *Anian*. *Martinius* makes no doubt, that Japan was inhabited from *East Tartary*, as well as by a Colony from *China*; which he proves from their *Customs* and *Language*; but he thinks they came over the *Water*, or at leaſt over the *Ice*, for he ſaith, there are ſevere *Winters* there. But he ſaith withal, that the *Chineſe* do make *Jefſo* a part of *Tartary*, and that it is joyn'd with the Province of *Niuthan* and *Yupi*. *F. Couplet* agrees with *Martinius*, that Japan was peopled from *Tartary*; and he ſaith, they have a *Chronology* of their *Kings* for 660 years before *Chriſt*; and long before that the *Northern Tartars* took poſſeſſion of *Japan*. So that the People of *Yeſſo* and *Japan* are of the ſame Original. In the *Dutch Account* of *Yeſſo* printed by *Thevenot*, in the ſecond Part of his *Collections*, (which was taken from a Ship which went upon the Coaſts of that Country and People) we have a more favorable Deſcription both of the Country and People; only it is ſaid, that they do not love to take pains, have little Government or Religion; but they obſerv'd ſome Superſtitious Practices among them. And what exact Account could be expected from ſuch, who went not thither to acquaint themſelves either with the Country or their Religion, but to find a paſſage farther that way?

That it is no certain rule that the People have no Religion, becauſe Strangers cannot find any ſet times and places of worſhip among them. For this was a Principle among many Nations, that the *Supreme God* was to be worſhip'd only by acts of the Mind; and that external worſhip was only for leſſer Deities. And *Trigautius* (or rather *Riccus*, who lived a long time in *China*) gives this Account of the Religion of that ancient and famous Kingdom, That at firſt they own'd the *Supreme God*, Lord of Heaven; but afterwards they came to worſhip inferior Deities; and this, he ſaith, he took out of their moſt ancient *Annals* and *Books of Wiſdom*, which he ſaith, did not in reſpect to Religion and Morality, come ſhort of the beſt *Philophers* of *Greece*. He affirms, that the *Seſt* of the *Learned*, as he calls them, did ſtill worſhip one God, becauſe all inferior things are preſerved and governed by him; but that they gave an inferior worſhip to *Spirits* under him. They are ſilent about the beginning of things, as out of their knowledg; but there are ſome of no ſuch reputation, that talk their own vain Dreams, to which little regard is given. But *Martinius* hath given ſome account of theſe Notions among them; ſome would have all by chance, others held the eternity of the World. He ſaith, that their ancient Books ſpeak of the ſupreme Governor of Heaven and Earth; and altho' they have not a proper name for God, yet he confeſſes they have ſuch as expreſs his Authority and Government of the World. *Bartoli* ſaith, they are extremely miſtaken who charge this *Learned Seſt* with *Atheiſm*, becauſe they have no Temples, nor public ceremonies of worſhip for him; becauſe they apprehend that the ſupreme God is to be ſolemnly worſhip'd only by him that is ſupreme among them. And *Magaillans* who was well acquainted with the Court of *China*, and died there about 20 years ſince, gives this account of Divine worſhip,

*Ambaſſa-
de Memo-
rable, &c.
p. 27.*

*Martin.
Atlas Ex-
trem. Asia,
p. 170.*

*Martin.
Atlas p. 21*

*Couplet
Differ.
Proem. ad
Confuc.
Oper. p. 81.*

3.

*Trigaut. de
Chriſtian.
Exped. ap.
Sinas, c. 10.*

*Martin.
Hiſt. Sinic.
init.*

*Bartoli
Hiſt. Asia.
part. 3. l. 1.
p. 73.*

*Magaillans
Novel. Rel.
de la Chine
ch. 21.*

Couplet
Decl.
Proem. ad
Confuc.
p. 83:

Le Com-
pte part. 2.
lett. 2.

ship, that at Pekim there is a Temple, called the Temple of Heaven, wherein there is a very large Cupolo supported by 82 pillars, wherein the Emperor himself offers sacrifice on the day of the Winter Solstice, with great solemnity and humility; and another wherein he doth the same at the Summer Solstice: Before which, he saith, they observe a strict Fast for three days. He inquired of one of their learned Men, what they meant by this solemn worship of Heaven; whether it was directed to the material Heaven? He answer'd that they took Heaven not only for the visible Heaven, but for the Creator and Governor of all things; and that at the four seasons of the year their Emperor did offer sacrifice in Temples on purpose, not to the Creatures, but to the spiritual Heaven. F. Couplet saith, That by the ancient custom of China, the Emperor only sacrificed to the King of Heaven, as often as there was great occasion for it. And that if he were in a progress, he did it upon the Hills and Mountains. And by the last account we have from China, we find the same custom is kept up at Pekim by the present Emperors, since the conquest of China. Now it were very unreasonable to infer, that there is no Religion or Worship of the Supreme Being in China, because it is not commonly practis'd; since according to their Notion of Ceremonies, wherein they are the nicest People in the World, they think none ought to perform Worship to the Supreme in Heaven, but he who is their Supreme upon Earth.

4.

Another thing we are to observe in passing our judgment, whether Nations have any Religion among them, is to have a care of trusting too much to the Sayings of known and profess'd Enemies; but as much as may be we ought to take the Opinion of the most free and disinterests'd Persons, who have convers'd among them on the account of Religion. This I intend chiefly with respect to the Spaniards accounts of the West-Indies, when their design was to enslave the poor Indians; for then they made it their business to blacken them as much as possible, by representing them as a People without any sense of God or Religion, or any Virtues belonging to Human Nature. But the contrary appears from the first, the most impartial and the latest Accounts we have of them, from such as have been conversant among them, upon the account of Religion.

Columbi
Navigat.
c. 5.

Pet. Mart.
Dec. l. c. 1.

In the first Account we have of the Discoveries of the West-Indies, we find that when Columbus came to the Islands of Hispaniola and Cuba, he soon found that they worship'd the Sun and Moon, and the Heavens, but could not then discover what other Deities they worship'd: which Peter Martyr Anglerius understands both of the Natives and of the Caribbians, who were Savages and very troublesom to them. And he tells a remarkable Story of one of the Natives coming to Columbus at Cuba, being a Man of 80 years of age, and desir'd to discourse with him by an Interpreter. The substance of it was, That he understood that he with his ship had given a great disturbance to the Natives, and bad him to consider, that after death there were two passages for souls; the one dark and dreadful for those who were troublesom to Mankind, the other pleasant and delightful for those who promote the peace and welfare of People; and if he consider'd that every Man was to receive according to his actions after death, he would give over being so uneasy to them. Columbus took the Advice very well, and pretended that they only came

came to assist them against the *Savages* and *Cannibals*, and would hurt none of them; which the old Man was so pleas'd with, that as old as he was, he said he was ready to go with him in so good a design. Was there any thing that favor'd of *Barbarism* or *Irreligion* in this Discourse, or what would not become a good *Christian* to say? Besides, the same Author commends their way of living far beyond what the *Spaniards* brought among them (as appear'd by *Columbus* his own suffering for checking their enormities.) They enjoy'd the profits of the Earth in common without any division or property, having enough for every family; and none suffer'd but such as injur'd others; and without *Laws* and *Judges*, they did what was right. This was a great Character from one who was particularly intrusted in the Affairs and Council of the *Indies*, and had all the Accounts sent to him, out of which he fram'd his *Decades*. They thought, as he saith, that contentment lay in a little compass; and they had more than they knew what to do with. To the same purpose *Lerius* gives an account of a Conference he had with a *Brasilian* old Man about Trade. I pray, said he, why do your Countrymen take so much pains to come hither for our Wood? Have they not enough for fuel? Yes, said *Lerius*, but your *Brasil-wood* is of great advantage to them in Trade, by which they grow very rich. Very well, saith he, and when they are so rich do they not die as other Men do? And whither then go all these riches? To their Children or Relations. Then said the poor *Brasilian*, your Countrymen are a company of great fools (*insigniter fatui*.) For why should they undergo so much toil and danger by sea and land, to get that which they must part with when they die; and for the sake of those Children, who might live as contentedly without those riches? Do not you think that we love our Children as well as you, but we are contented that the same Earth which nourish'd us, will do as much for them? These barbarous *Brasilians*, saith *Lerius*, will rise up in judgment against too many Christians. To the same purpose, he saith, one of the Natives of *Peru* discours'd the *Spaniards* who took so much pains to get their Gold; and said, They were the froth of the sea, restless and uneasy; who might with far less trouble get a subsistence at home. These things I mention to shew, that these People were far enough from wanting Sense and Capacity when the *Spaniards* came among them; and seem'd to have a much truer notion of the happiness of human Life than they had.

But to shew how far they were from being without Religion at that time, we have an Account by *Benzo* (who liv'd a great while in the *West-Indies*, upon their first Discovery) of an Oracle among them, which foretold the *Spaniards* a considerable time before. For the *Cachiqui* and *Bobitii*, (*i. e.* their Great Men and Priests) told *Columbus*, That in the time of the Father of their present King, he and another King had a great Mind to understand what would happen after their time; and to that end resolv'd to apply themselves to their *Zemes* (the Gods they worship'd) in an extraordinary manner, by fasting 5 days together in a most sad and mournful condition. And then they receiv'd that Oracle; upon which they made a most doleful Song, which they repeated at certain times; but now they found things happen'd to them just as they were foretold. The same *Benzo* informs us, that after *Columbus* discover'd the Conti-

Ler. Hist.
Navig. in
Brasil.
c. 53.

Benzo Hist.
Novi Orbis
l. 1. c. 8.

Cap. 17.

nent, the Islands were soon left by the *Spaniards* in hopes of greater gains; and finding they could not manage the Nations as they desired, they sent Persons on purpose to make the worst representation possible of them, that they might have an *Edict* to condemn them to *perpetual slavery*. And therein they charge them with all manner of vices; but as to Religion, they only accuse them of *Idolatry*. But, if they had found any such thing as *Atheism* and *Irreligion* among them, they would have been sure not to have conceal'd that.

Descript.
Ind. Occid.
l. 1. c. 10.

Job. de Laet in his Description of the Isle of *Cuba*, saith, *That the Inhabitants there had no Temple, no Sacrifices, no Religion.* Which I could not but wonder at; the account being so different from that of the first Discoverers, who must certainly know best what Religion they had among them: but in probability he followed the later *Spaniards*, who give the worst accounts of them, to justify the most inhuman cruelties which were us'd against them.

Benzo l. 1.
c. 25.

For *Benzo* saith, *That of two millions of Natives in Hispaniola, there were left not above 150 in his time;* and the like desolation was made in *Cuba*, *Jamaica*, *Porto-Rico* and other places; and *de Laet* confesses *that they were all long since destroy'd.* But if we take the Account given of these People upon the first Discovery, we

Pet. Mart.
Dec. 1. c. 9.

shall find it was very different. For *Peter Martyr*, who was employed by the King of *Spain*, as himself tells us, to take the best intelligence he could meet with from the *Indies*, saith, *That at first they could find no other worship among them but that of the Sun, and Moon, and the Heavens; but upon further acquaintance with them, they found out a great deal more, which related to their Religion;* which he said, *he receiv'd from one who was employ'd by Columbus himself in instructing them. They had little Images, which they call'd Zemes; which they suppos'd to be inhabited by Spirits, which gave answers to them; but which is considerable, he saith, That they look'd on them only as a kind of Messengers between them and the Only Eternal, Omnipotent, Invisible God:* This was extant long before *De Laet* wrote his pompous Description of the *West-Indies*; was *Peter Martyr* unknown to him? So far from it, that he mentions and commends him for his diligence: How then comes he to differ so much from him in his Account of their Religion? And he there mentions the same Oracle which *Benzo* had done; and adds, *That the Natives understood it at first of the Caribbians or Cannibals; but at last found it too true of the Spaniards.*

Decad. 3.
c. 9.

In another place he gives an Account of *Hispaniola* from *Andreas Morales* his own Mouth, who was employ'd by the Governor to search out what he could find concerning the Island and the Natives. *And he found that they came from another Island, and built a House at the place of their landing, which they after consecrated and enriched, and revered to the time of the Spaniards coming: and he makes it to have been in as much esteem among them, as Jerusalem to the Christians, Mecca to the Mahometans, and Tyrena in the Grand Canaries; which he saith, was in such esteem among the Natives, that Persons would with singing leap off from that Holy Rock, in hopes their Souls should be made happy by it.* But altho' this were a great Argument of *superstitious folly* in them, yet it shews the falseness of that saying in the first Relation

lation of *Columbus* his Voyage, *That there was no such thing as Religion in the Canaries*: but those who pretend to give a more exact Account say, *That the Natives did believe one God, who punished the evil, and rewarded the good.*

Columbi Navigat. c. 2. Conquest de Canaries, par. II. p. 208.

The next we are to consider, are the *Savages* which disturbed the Natives, before the *Spaniards*; who were call'd the *Caribbians*, or the inhabitants of the *Caribbe Islands*: These were a wild sort of People, and a great terror to their Neighbors, whom they were wont to eat in triumph, after they had taken them; which was not the general practice of the *Indians*, but only of the most *Brutish* and *Savage* People among them, as the *Caribbians* and those of *Brasil*; but the other Natives both of the Islands and Continent abhorr'd it, as is found by the latest Discoveries. This appears by *Christ. d'Acunna*, who was employ'd *A. D. 1659.* to discover the People about the River of *Amazons*; and there he found a considerable People call'd *Agua* (the *Spaniards* call them *Omagua*) and they were represented to be *Eaters of the flesh of their Enemies*; but he saith that it was very false, and only a malicious calumny of the *Portuguese*; and there he saith, *It was a particular custom of the Caribbes, and not us'd by other Indians.* And *Dampier* saith, *That in all his Adventures among the Indians both East and West, he never met with any such People as eat Man's flesh, and that he knew some of the Cannibal stories to be false.* But on the other side, it cannot be deny'd that there had been such a barbarous practice not only among the *Caribbians*, but the *Savages* of *Brasil* and elsewhere; as appears by the particular Accounts of such as liv'd among them, and saw their manner of doing it; as in *Joh. Lerius*, *Pet. Carder*, *Ant. Knivet*; but especially in *Claud. d'Abbeville* his Relation of *Maragnan*, who is most particular in it; and he saith, that it arose from the hatred and revenge they express thereby to their greatest Enemies; and he adds, that their Stomachs cannot bear or digest it; but notwithstanding it had been continu'd among them, because their Enemies did so by them; but they confess'd it to be cruel and barbarous, but having been long us'd, they could not lay it aside, without a general consent. Some say, that the *Tapuia* eat the Bodies of their Friends; but those who have liv'd most among them, say nothing about it: which they would not have omitted; and they are most to be rely'd upon. The *Caribbe Islands* were discover'd by *Columbus* in his second Voyage: but the *Caribbians* would have no communication with them, flying into their Woods. *De Laet* saith only, *that they are a very brutish sort of People, of no shame or fidelity.* Not a word of their Religion; and it was not to be expected among them, who had very little regard to any thing but the satisfying their brutish passions of *Cruelty* and *Revenge*; which were the only things they were then remarkable for. Since that time, they have liv'd more quietly, being so much over-power'd by the Plantations upon the *Caribbe Islands*; by which means they have been brought to some kind of Humanity and Conversation. And there have been two understanding Persons conversant among them, who have given the best Account we have of them; and those are *Mons. Rochefort* and *F. Du Tertre*; who both agree, that they have some knowledge of One Supreme God in Heaven, who is of infinite Goodness,

Relation de la Riviere des Amazons, c. 52.

Dampier's Voyage, p. 485.

Ler. Hist. Navig. in Brasil, c. 15. Pilgrime, part. 4. p. 1188. 1217. Hist. de la Mission en l'Isle de Maragnan ch. 49. Bariz. Hist. Brasil. Pifo Hist. Brasil.

L. i. c. 17.

Rochefort Histoire de Caribb. l. 4. c. 13.

Du Tertre
Hist. Nat.
de Antilles
par. 7. §. 3.

ness, and hurts no body; but as *Du Tertre*, who liv'd longer among them, saith, they account the service of him a needless thing, being so far above them; but they are mightily afraid of the *Mabogas* or evil Spirits, which they think design to do them mischief: and to appease them they have their *Boyez*, who are a kind of Sorcerers among them. They both agree, that they believe the immortality of the Soul; and that the principal Soul, which is that in the Heart, goes to Heaven. And *Rocheport* from hence concludes the truth of *Cicero's* saying, *That the knowledge of a Divinity is planted in the Hearts of Men.*

Lact. Desc.
l. 2. c. 2.
12. 16.

L. 3. c. 18.

Les Voyages
du Sieur
de Cham-
plain, l. 3.
ch. 5.

Purchas
Tb. 4. l. 10.
ch. 5.

Acosta
Hist. of the
Indies, l. 5.
c. 2.

Jo. de Laet
de Origin.
Gent. A-
merican.
p. 187.
Le Grand
Voyage du
Pays de
Hurons,
c. 18.

But *De Laet* represents the Northern *Indians* to have been as much without Religion, as the Natives of *Cuba* and *Hispaniola*; and from no good grounds, altho' herein he did not rely upon the *Spanish* Reports. So he saith of the Natives of *New-found Land*, of *New-France*, of the *Souriquosii*, and other People of *Canada*, and the parts thereabouts, and of *Virginia*, &c. But I shall make it appear, that he took up with very slight Informations in this matter; which are contradicted by those who liv'd longer among them, and understood their Sense and Language better. 'Tis true, which I suppose gave occasion to the mistake, that the Savages had no set and constant ways of Devotion; but at certain Seasons of the year, or in time of War and Calamities they had; or however, to Persons that discoursed with them, they did by no means deny a God, but thought it was no great matter whether they serv'd him or not in such a manner; so that their chief fault lay in a gross neglect of Religion, and not in any settled Principles of Irreligion. So the *Sieur de Champlain* saith, He discours'd with the Savages of *Canada*, and found they wanted no Capacity; and he asked one of them, why they did not pray to God; he answer'd, that every one was left to pray as he thought fit in his own Mind. So, saith he, for want of a Law for Divine Worship, they liv'd like Brutes: and he imputes a great deal to their Savage way of living upon Hunting; whereas if the Land were cultivated, it might be much easier to reduce them to Civility and Religion. Mr. *Winslow* one of the first Planters in *New-England*, had some discourse with the *Indian Savages* about Religion, and God's being the Author of all our Blessings, which they agreed to, and said, *That they own'd God, and call'd him Kirtitan*: upon which I observe, that he ingenuously retracts the Accounts he had given before of the Natives; viz. *That they had no Religion or Knowledge of God*; for, saith he, *we find that they do own one supreme Being, who was creator of Heaven and Earth; but they likewise own'd many Divine Powers under him.* Therefore *Acosta*, speaking of the *Indian Savages*, saith, *It is no hard matter to persuade them of a supreme God, be they never so barbarous and brutish.*

But I must do that right to *Job. de Laet*, as to shew that after he had receiv'd better Information, he did speak more favorably of the Religion of the *Indians*: For in his Book against *Grotius*, ten years after the other, he hath an *Observation* on purpose to clear this matter. Father *Sagard* had publish'd an Account of his Voyage to the *Hurons*, a People of *New-France*, or *Canada*, near the Lake call'd *Mare dulce*, where he learnt their Language, and so was better able to judg of their Opinions; and he saith, Their
general

general Sense was, that there was one Creator, who made the World; and that in their Language he was call'd *Ataouacan*. Which is since confirm'd by the Account of the *French Missions* into those parts; especially of *Paulus Juvenæus*, who spent a Winter among them, to converse with them in their own Language. And when he preach'd to them about God, they all asked him, what he meant by it; he told them he meant such a Being who had infinite Power, and made Heaven and Earth: upon which they looked upon one another, and cried out *Ataouacan*. *Sagard* saith, *They believe the Immortality of the Soul*; and the later Accounts say, *That he was told that the Souriquosii did truly believe one God that created all things*. Which is very different from *de Laet's* former Account of them. But *de Laet* goes on, that he understood by *Davis* and *Baffin*, that the Natives of those parts where they had been, i. e. (about *Fretum Davis* and *Groen-land*) were Idolaters, and worship'd the Sun. *Davis* in the Account of his Voyage saith, *That they were a very tractable People, void of craft or double dealings, and easy to be brought to any Civility or good Order; but they judg'd them to be Idolaters and to worship the Sun*. This is quite another thing from being mere Savages, and having no Religion among them. Farther he owns *Hariot's* Account of the People of *Virginia*, that they believ'd many Gods of different degrees, but one supreme God who was from eternity. But he had publish'd to the World in his Description, that their only Religion was to worship every thing they were afraid of, as Fire, Water, Thunder, Guns, Horses, &c. and the Devil, whom they call'd *Okie*. *Hariot*, who conversed among them, saith no such thing; but he saith expressly, *That they own'd that God made the World, and that Souls are immortal, and that they shall receive in another World according to their actions in this*. What a different Account is this concerning the same People? And if *Lederer* may be believ'd, who went among the Indian Natives, not far from *Virginia*, he saith, *Okæ was the name of the Creator of all things among them; to him the high Priest alone offers sacrifice; but their ordinary Devotion is perform'd to lesser Deities, to whom they suppose sublunary affairs are committed*. *Denton*, who liv'd among the Indian Savages about *New-York*, saith, *That their solemn worship was not above once or twice a year; unless upon extraordinary occasions, as making War, &c.*

Hist. Canad.
da. l. 1. p. 78.

p. 87.

Hackluit,
To. 3.
p. 100.

Hariot of
Virginia,
25. 26.

Lederer's
Discovery,
p. 4.

Denton of
New York
p. 8.

I shall not need to pursue this matter any farther, since he owns the Religion that was practis'd not only in *Peru* and *Mexico*, but in other parts of the *West-Indies*. Only as to *Chili* he saith, *that we have no certainty, but only that they have solemn Oaths by one they call Enonamon*. But *Marcgravius* in the account he gives of *Chili*, saith at first, *That they know not God, nor his worship, &c.* but this must be understood of a clear and distinct knowledge of him; for he saith afterwards, *That they have some knowledge of a supreme Being, by whom all earthly things and human affairs are governed; whom they call Pillan*.

G. Marc-
gravius de
Régione
Chili, c. 3.

The only difficulty then remaining as to the *West-Indies*, is as to the People of *Paraguaria* and *Brasil*. For it is affirm'd, *That there are whole Nations there who know nothing of God, or Religion*. Which must be more strictly inquir'd into.

L

As

As to *Paraguaria*, it is said, that *Nicholas del Techo* in his *Letters from thence*, saith that the *Caigua*, (a People of that Country) had no name for God, or the Soul of Man; and no public worship, nor Idols. But the same *Nicholas del Techo* hath publish'd a full Relation of all the Proceedings in *Paraguaria* and thereabouts, on the account of Religion, and therein he hath acquainted the World with the several Nations that inhabit those parts between *Brasil* and *Peru*, &c. which were scarce heard of before. The *Diaigritæ*, (who rather belong to *Tucumania*, between *Paraguaria* and *Chili*) he saith, were worshipers of the Sun, after a particular manner; and they believ'd the immortality of Souls, and that the Souls of their great Men went into the greater Stars, and of ordinary People into the lesser. The *Guaicuræi* worshiped the Moon and Bootes. The *Guarani* were a very superstitious People, but they could not tell what God they worshiped; but they were mightily addicted to Sorcery. The *Calchaquini* worshiped the Sun, and Thunder, and Lightning. In the Plains between *Rio del Plata* and *Tucumania*, he saith, are a very large People, who have little regard to Religion; but they believe that after death, their Souls return to their Creator. In *Chili*, he saith, when one God the Creator was preach'd to them, one of their *Casiques* (or great Men) stood up and said, that they would not bear that the power of creating should belong to any but their God *Pillan*; and that he plac'd the Souls of their great Men after death about the Sun. After all these he mentions the *Caaigua*, as the smallest and most inconsiderable and brutish People among them: They were a most savage sort of Creatures, that could hardly speak so as to be understood; he saith, They were much more like to Apes than Men, and liv'd upon Mice, and Ants, and Vipers, &c. *utrique sexui*, saith he, *tenuissimus rationis usus est*: they are harder to be tamed than wild Beasts; and if they are put in chains, they starve themselves. And this is all the account he there gives of them, and saith not a word of their Religion; and it were very unreasonable to expect any from them. It is not improbable that others could not find a word for God or the Soul among them; for they were not able to speak sense, at least so as to be understood by Strangers.

Come we now to the People of *Brasil*, who are said to be without any notion of God. But those who have been best acquainted among them assure us, that they believe the immortality of Souls, and rewards and punishments after death. And from hence *Leorius* himself argues against the Atheistical Persons of his time; and that altho' they will not in words own God, yet he saith, they shew the inward conviction they have of him, especially when it thunders; which *de Laet* confesses they call *Tupá cunanga*, a noise made by the Supreme Excellence: for *Tupá* he saith signifies so much in their Language. And he adds, That they are very apprehensive of evil Spirits; that they do own a God of the Mountains, and of the Highways; and altho' they differ in their idolatry and superstition, yet he confesses it generally prevails among them, and the other innumerable People who live on both sides the vast River de la Plata. *Marcgravius*, a Learned Man, who liv'd in *Brasil*, and understood their Language so far as to write a Grammar of it, saith expressly, That they call God *Tupa* and *Tupana*; and

Hist. Prov.
Paraguar.
Auth. Ni-
colao del
Techo, Le-
odii 1673.

L. 2. c. 18.

L. 4. c. 16.

L. 5. c. 7.

Cap. 23.

L. 3. c. 12.

L. 2. c. 26.

L. 9. c. 24.

Hist. Navii.
in Brasil.
c. 16. p. 223,
224.

Lact. de
Orig. Gen.
Americ.
p. 193.

Marcgrav.
de Brasil.
Reg. c. 9.

and in the short Dictionary of *Emmanuel Moraes*, *Tupana* is rendered *Deus*. But the great Argument to *Lerius* was, *that they had no public exercise of Religion*; which was the common case of the *Savages* in all parts, who liv'd under no Laws; not that they believ'd no God, but they would not be at the trouble to serve him. *Ludolphus* saith of the *Gallani*, a savage People who had almost over-run *Abissinia*, that they had no public worship, but if any asked them about a Supreme God, they would answer, *Heaven*. So *Dellon* saith of the Inhabitants of *Madagascar*, *that they did not question a Supreme Being that governs all; but with a strange obstinacy denied that there was any necessity of praying to him*. *Francis Cauche*, who sojourned a long time among them, saith, *he could observe no public exercise of Religion among them; but they did not deny a God to be the Creator of all, and asserted the immortality of the Soul, but good and bad went to Heaven*. *Flacurt* liv'd five years among them, and he agrees in the same, as to no public exercise of Religion; but he saith, *They believe one God, of whom they speak with honor and respect*. *P. Gillet* in the Account of his Voyage to *Goyane* 1674, saith, *That the Nouragues, and Acoquas, and Galibis, all agree in owning one God in Heaven, but they give no worship to him*.

Joh. dos Santos saith of some of the *Caffres* (with whom he convers'd) *That they are the most brutish and barbarous People in the World; but they hold the immortality of the Soul, and have a confus'd knowledg that there is a Great God from a Natural Instinct; but they pray not to him*. But for those *Caffres* at the Cape, of good Hope, they may vye with any for *Brutishness*; but by the last Accounts given of them, by those who liv'd among them, and publish'd by *F. Tachard*, we find *that they do worship one God, altho' they have a confus'd knowledg of him; but they seem to have little regard to another Life, but sacrifice for rain and good Seasons*. By which it appears that the Account given of them in *Thevenot's Collections* is not true, viz. *That they have no knowledg of God*, altho' it were not much to be wonder'd at, since the same Author saith, *they are the most barbarous People in the World*. But that was a hasty Observation by Strangers, who could not understand one word they spake: For Sir *James Lancaster* said, *That in seven weeks time, the sharpest Wit among them could not learn one word of their Language; their Speech being uttered only in the Throat, like the Caaigua in Paraquaria*. And so **Pliny* mentions a People of *Africa*, who *made a noise without any articulate pronunciation*; who were surely the Ancestors of those *Hotentots*, concerning whom it is hard to affirm any thing, unless they have learnt lately to express themselves better. As it seems they have done by *Monf. de la Loubere's* Account of them; for he saith, *That they have some kind of worship at new and full Moons; and he thinks they own a good God, to whom they need not to pray; but that there is a bad one, to whom they pray not to hurt them*. And in the *Journal* of *Monf. de Chaumont*, we read, *That they have no great regard to Religion; but when they want rain, they pray to a certain Being, whom they know not, but that lives above; and offer milk, the best thing they have; and that the Dutch Secretary had seen them at this Sacrifice with Eyes lifted up to Heaven, and in a profound silence*.

Ludolph.
Hist. Æthi-
opix, l. 1.

Dellon Re-
lation d'un
Voyage, To.
1. c. 8.

Relation
du Voyage
de F. Cau-
che, p. 119.

Histoire de
l'Isle de
Madagas-
car, ch. 17.

Journal du
Voyage
dans la
Goyane,
p. 81.

Histoire de
l'Ethiopie
Orientale,
ch. 7.

Purchas
To. II. p.
1639.

Voyage de
Siam, l. 2.
p. 84.

Thevenot
Rec. p. 2.

Purchas
To. I. l. 3.
ch. 3. §. 1.

* Stridorq;
non vox;
adeo Ser-
monis

commer-
cio carent.
Plin. N. H.
l. 5. c. 8.

Des Roy-
aume de
Siam, To. 2.
p. 112.

Journal du
Voyage de
Siam, p. 786

Thus I have gone thro' all the Nations I have met with, who have been said to be *without any notion of God or Religion*; there remains only one Objection to be taken off, which relates to a Sect in the *East-Indies* which is said to be *Atheistical* in their *Principles*, having an *External Doctrine* for the People, and an *Internal*, which they keep from them.

Trigaut.
t. 1. c. 10.

To give the best Account I can of this matter; All the late Writers of *China* do agree, That besides the original Doctrine of the Country, there was brought in long since, (they generally say 65 years after Christ) a new Sect from *Indosthan*, which they call *Xekiao*. The Author is suppos'd to be one *Xekia*, or *Xaca* (as the *Japonefe* call him) who liv'd long before. *Matt. Riccius*, (or *Trigautius*) saith, *This Sect was at first receiv'd with great applause, because it set forth the Immortality of the Soul, and the Rewards and Punishments of another Life; but not eternal, because it introduc'd the Doctrine of Transmigration of Souls.* In order to the happiness after death, it requir'd *Particular Devotions to Idols*, which by that means spread over all *China* and *Japan*, as well as other parts of the *Indies*; and *Abstinence from flesh*, as well as *from murder, stealing, &c.* And *Austerities, Celibate, Retirement from the World, and great Liberalities to the Tapoins and Bonzes.* Wherein *Bertoli, Marini*, and the rest agree. But there was a secret under all this; viz. *That this was but an external Doctrine for the People, but the internal Doctrine was another thing, that the supreme Felicity lay in eternal Nothing; or as they rather called it, an Eternal Quiet, and that Souls are to pass from Body to Body, saith Martinus, till they are fit for it.* *F. Couplet*, who hath given the fullest Account of this matter, saith, *That when Xaca came to die, he sent for some of his choicest Disciples, and told them, that the Doctrine he had hitherto declared to them was only a shew, and not the truth; and that all things came out of nothing, and would end in nothing; as the late Author Le Comptre expresses it; and that is the Abyss where all our hopes must end.* But *Couplet* saith, *That his Disciples take great care, that this come not among the People; and only those, he saith, even among the Bonzes and others are admitted to it, who are thought capable of such a secret.* The *Eternal Doctrine* they look on, as he saith, as the *wooden Account* which is rais'd to support the other; but they are by all means for keeping that up among the People. But it is not clear what they understand by *Returning to Nothing*; for *Monf. De la Loubere* saith, *They do not understand proper Annihilation by it, but in a Mystical sense; and two things are imply'd by it, 1. That such Souls as arrive to it, are past all fears of returning to the Body: 2. That they live in perfect ease and quiet, without any kind of action.* And so *Couplet* explains it, by *Acting, Understanding, and desiring nothing*; so that this is the highest degree of *Quietism*; and so *Monf. Gervaise*, who was among those of *Siam*, and endeavor'd to understand their Doctrine, saith, *That Annihilation is to be mystically understood, and not in a Physical sense.* As appears by what *Couplet* saith, *That one of Xaca's posterity spent nine years with his face to the wall thinking of nothing, and so became perfect.* But from hence he sadly laments the spreading of *Atheism* among the *Chinese*, who were willing to understand it in the gross.

Martin.
Atlas, p. 7.
Couplet.
Proem.
Declar. ad
Confuc.
paragr. 4.
LeCompte
Memoires
Part. II.
Lett. 2.

Loubere
du Royau-
me de Si-
am, To. I.
c. 22.

Hist. Nat.
de Felis.
de Siam, Part.
3. c. p. 162.

And suppose it be so taken, what imaginable ground can it be for Men of sense, (as the *Chinese* would be thought above others) to take this for granted, because such an Impostor said it; concerning whom so many incredible things are said by them; that some have question'd whether there ever were such a Person or not: and *Loubere* seems to think this story a *Fiction of the Chinese*, for he can find nothing of him among the *Talapoins* of *Siam*, with whose Traditions he was very conversant. But what reason or demonstration did he offer? What ground could they have to believe one who had been an Impostor all his days, should speak truth at last?

But all this signifies nothing to the consent of Mankind. *For this was to be kept up as a secret*: and only to be communicated to such as were thought capable of it. If they thought this to be the truth, why was it not to be discover'd? Was it because the Pople were still to be kept up in the common persuasion about Religion? And was this for the sake of the *Bonzes*? of whom the wise People of *China* had a very mean opinion, as they all agree. Therefore it could not be for their sakes. *But the People might grow more unruly, if this were known*. If the *Bonzes* were so bad as they make them, they might rather think the People would be better without them; and the best service they could do, was to lay open the fraud and imposture of these Men, as those who preach'd *Christianity* in *China* and *Japan* after they understood their Languages, did very freely. And yet they did assert *God and Providence*, and the *Rewards and Punishments of another Life*, against all the Doctrines of *Xaca*, both as to the *External and Internal part*. *Matth. Riccius* having attain'd to good skill in the Language of *China*, publish'd an account of the *Christian Doctrine* at *Pekin*, *A. D.* 1603. wherein he asserted the Being of God, not only from Natural Reason, but from their own *most Ancient Books*; of which Couplet gives a large account, and how the Interpreters of latter times had perverted the Sense of them. We have in *Kircher* a *Summary of the Christian Faith*, as it was publish'd in *China*; and therein we find on what grounds they asserted the Being of God, against the *Atheistical sense* of *Xaca's* Doctrine, *That all things came out of nothing*: For, *if nothing were first, how came things into Being? therefore to bring them into Being, there must be a Creator before them; and this Creator is he whom we call God*. This was plain and true Reasoning, and impossible to be answer'd by the subtilest of those *Atheistical Wits* of *China*. For nothing can produce *Nothing*. So, that if *Xaca's* interior Doctrine were true, *That all things came out of Nothing*, it must necessary follow, that there must be *Nothing* before *any thing*; and what possible imagination can any Man of sense have, how any thing should by it self come out of *Nothing*? There is no repugnancy at all in conceiving that an Infinite Power should give a Being to that which had it not before; for altho' the difference between *not being* and *being* be so great, yet where we suppose a Power Infinite in the Cause, that may command the terms of that distance, by giving a Being to that which had it not before. To say that *Nothing can be produced out of nothing*, implies that nothing can of it self result out of nothing, where there is no superior Cause; but to say

Couplet
Declar.
Proœm.
Kircher
China illu-
strata, Pat.
2. c. 10.

that by no Cause whatsoever any thing can be put into Being which had it not before, is to take away all possibility of an Infinite Power, without any reason, when the very Being of things is an impregnable reason for it. For since we are certain things are, we must be certain that they came into Being; and that must be either out of nothing by themselves, which is impossible; or it must be from such a Power which can give Being where it was not, which must be infinite.

Thus far I have considered the General Prejudices against Religion, and the *Atheistical* Pretenses of this Age; and have shew'd how very little they signify to any Persons that will take the pains to examin them.

DISCOURSE II.

The Modern Atheistical Hypotheses examin'd, and the Unreasonableness of them shew'd.

I Now come to consider the *Atheistical Hypotheses* of this Age, which I shall rank under these two Heads:

1. Such as have a *Tendency* towards *Atheism*.
2. Such as are *plainly Atheistical*.

As to the former, I shall insist upon these two:

- (1.) Such as weaken the known and generally receiv'd Proofs of God and Providence.
- (2.) Such as attribute too much to the *Mechanical Powers of Matter* and *Motion*.

I begin with those who have gone about to weaken the known and generally received Arguments for God and Providence, which I have at large shew'd, were those taken from the manifest effects of Wisdom and Design in the parts of Animals, and in the frame of the World. I am far from intending to lay the *charge of Atheism* on any who have weakned some Arguments to prove a God, when they have industriously set themselves to do it from any other, altho' not so firm, nor so generally receiv'd. For I consider the fondness Men have for their own Inventions, and how apt therefore they are to slight other Arguments in comparison with them. And this I take to have been the case of a Modern Philosopher of great and deserved Reputation: For he designing to do something beyond other Men, thought he did nothing unless he produced Arguments which he thought had not been pursued by others. To this end he set aside the Argument from *Final Causes*, for two Reasons. 1. *Because in Physical Inquiries we ought to make use of none but the strongest Reasons.* 2. *Because all God's ends are unsearchable by us, being kept close in the Abyss of his infinite Wisdom.* But when he was smartly urged by his learned Adversary, That altho' upon another occasion he might set aside Final Causes, yet he ought not when the Honor of God as the Maker of the Soul is concerned; for by these means the Argument from the light of Nature, as to the Wisdom, Providence, Power and

Des Cartes
Medit. 4.
Princip.
Phil. Part.
1. p. 22.

Resp. ad 5.
Object.

and existence of God would be cast off; which he looks on as the chief Argument (which is taken from the parts of the visible World, the Heavens, Earth, Plants, Animals, and especially Mankind;) He had no other answer to make, *But that what was brought for a Final Cause, ought to be referred to the Efficient; i. e. that from those things we ought to know and honor God, as the Maker, but not to guess for what end he made them.* Which is a strange answer to be made by one of so much sagacity. For, as *Gassendus* well urges, how can we honor God for the excellent use of these things, and not know for what end they were made? Wherein lies the difference between *the Use* and *the End* in this case. For he that adores God for the Use, must do it for the End he designed those things for.

But, saith *Des Cartes*, *In Moral considerations, wherein it is a pious thing to make use of Conjectures, we may consider God's End; but not in Physical speculations, wherein we must only make use of the strongest Reasons.*

To which *Gassendus* very well answers, That if he takes away the Final Cause, he weakens the Argument for the Efficient: for that leads us to him. And it is not the bare sight of the visible World which makes us own God to be the Maker of it; because it is possible for Men to think that these things were so from Eternity, or came by Chance: but when we observe the Wisdom of God in the design and contrivance, then we come upon good grounds to own the Efficient Cause, and to adore him for the Workmanship of his hands. As, saith he, if a Man sees a passage for water, between Stones on each side with an Arch over, that doth not presently convince him that it is a *Bridge*; because pieces of Rocks might happen so, as to afford such a passage: but when he comes to consider the order in which they are framed and hold together, and the conveniency of Mankind for passing over, he cannot then but acknowledg there was a skilful Artificer who managed it, and that it could not be done by Chance.

To the other Argument, *That God's ends are unsearchable*, he answers, That it is not to be denied that God may have ends above our reach; but on the other side, there are ends which lie open to our view; as, saith he, particularly in the Body of Man, as the frame of the Mouth for respiration and nourishment, and all other passages so exactly fitted for those ends; and so the Bones, Muscles, Nerves, and other parts of the Body: but there are three especially which strike him with admiration. 1. The umbilical Vessels, the fitness of them for distribution of nourishment to the *Embryo*, and the alteration after the Child is born. 2. The Valves of the Heart, and the several Vessels for receiving and distributing the Blood. 3. The Perforation of the Tendons which serve to draw the Fingers into the hollow of the Hand. These were close and pressing Instances, of which *Gassendus* professeth, *that neither himself nor any of his acquaintance, who had made it their business to search into the Causes of things, were able to give any other Account of them, but from the Wisdom and Power of God.* And he challenges *Des Cartes* to shew him, *what Mechanical Cause could produce such Valves about the Heart; out of what matter, and in what manner they were made; how they came to have such a temper, consistence,*

Epist. Part.
2. ep. 98.

Regis Me-
taphys. l. 2.
Part. 1.
Nittich. in
Meditat.
Metaph. 4.
p. 97.

sistence, flexibility, bigness, figure, situation, &c. But I do not find that he ever undertook to give any answer to it; but by a Letter to *Mersennus*, it seems he was of opinion, *that he could give an account of the formation of the several parts of Animals in a Mechanical way, supposing God to have established those Laws of Mechanism, which he supposes in the same manner as he had explained the grains of Salt, and figures of Snow in his Meteors.* But however he might please himself in his opinion, he hath given the World no manner of satisfaction about it; infomuch that his posthumous piece to that purpose, is charged with great and fundamental Mistakes. However his Disciples run on upon the same ground, that *Final Causes are to be considered only in Morals*; and they must overthrow the Argument to prove a Deity, from the wisdom and contrivance in the works of Creation; which according to them are only occasion of our Meditation and Praise. But how can Men of sense satisfy themselves with this Answer? For can we give thanks to God for the use of our Senses, without knowing that God gave us Eyes to see with, with such admirable contrivance for that purpose; and so for all the variety of organs for our Hearing, unless we are satisfied that God did really give them for those ends? Otherwise all that we have to do, is to thank God for putting Matter into Motion, and for establishing those Laws of Mechanism from whence these Organs resulted. With what Devotion can we praise God for the Benefits we have from the Influences of Heaven and the Fruits of the Earth, if these things were not intended for our good; but it fell out by the Laws of Mechanism, that we have these advantages by them? So that all Natural Religion, according to this *Hypothesis*, comes to no more than an acknowledgment of God to be the Efficient Cause of the World, altho' we have no reason from his Works to conclude him to be so. *Yes, say they, from them as the effects of a First Cause, which put Matter into motion, we may; but not from the ends which God intended by them, which are above our capacity.* But this falls short of *Aristotle's Divinity*; for he asserted, that not only the first Motion was from God, but the order of the Universe; and that God did design the mutual Benefits which one part of it hath from others: but according to these Laws of Mechanism, God only put the Matter into motion with such Laws, and then every thing came into the order it is in, without any design of Providence. Which takes away all *life and spirit in Religion*, which depends upon God's managing the affairs of the World; and without that Men may own a *First mover*, and yet live as *without God in the World*. What reason can we imagin, why we ought to give God thanks for *fruitful Seasons*, or to pray to him in time of Drought and Scarcity, if he hath left all these things to the natural course, which he hath established in the World? But it is not denied by *Des Cartes*, *That God may reveal to us his own Ends, and then we are to believe them, and to serve him accordingly; but that without such Revelation, we cannot find them out.* Now this I say is contrary to the general sense of Mankind, where there hath been the most confused Notion of a God. For I have already observed, that even the *Caffres of Soldania* (or at the *Cape of good Hope*) do pray solemnly to God in their distresses for want of Rain; and the

the *Savages* of the Northern parts of *America* do the same at some Seasons of the year above others; so that if the consent of Mankind signify any thing as to the Being of GOD, it will do as much as to his Providential care of the World. And if such a confused Idea did carry along with it the Notion of his Providence, much more the clear and distinct *Idea* of him. For *Des Cartes* proves the Being of God from the *Idea* of him in our Minds; now what is there in that *Idea*, which doth not equally imply *Providence*, as well as his *Existence*? For, why should not a *Being absolutely perfect* as well regard the *Well-being* as the *Being* of his *Creatures*? *By the name* Medit. 3. of GOD in this *Idea*, he saith he understands a certain *Substance*, infinite, independent, most intelligent and most powerful; by which himself and all other things were created. But this is not all; for he acknowledges soon after and in other places, *that because there* Princip. P. I. n. 21. *is no necessary connexion between the several moments of Existence in a contingent Being, we most evidently know our dependence on this superior Being for our conservation*; which he therefore owns to be a continued Creation. From hence I infer, that *Des Cartes* his own *Idea* of God doth imply a particular Providence. For, if we depend upon him for every moment of our Subsistence, and Conservation differ only by an act of our Mind from Creation, as he affirms; then there is as immediate an act of Providence in our daily Subsistence, as in our first Being. But how is this consistent with leaving all to the Mechanical Laws of Motion? If it be said, *That this is only a general act of Providence in preserving things in that state he hath put them into*; I demand farther, Whether those very Laws of Motion, be not the Effect of a wise Providence? And whether we cannot from them infer, that these Laws were directed for very good ends? I do not think this can be denied. And if it cannot, then I am sure it certainly follows, that we may know some ends which God hath; whereas *Des Cartes* said, *That all God's ends are unknown to us, being kept secret in the Abyss of his infinite Wisdom*. But the ends of appointing the Laws of Motion may be known; and if these, why not as well the particular ends of those works of his which we find so useful to Mankind? Especially when his Providence is imply'd in that very *Idea* from whence he infers his Existence.

I can by no means suspect that *Des Cartes* designed to take away the force of other Arguments for a Deity, that he might secretly undermine the belief of a GOD, by introducing his Argument from the *Idea*, which he knew would not hold; (as some have suggested) for I am satisfy'd, that he thought this Argument beyond any other: For, in a Letter to a Friend, he saith, *He had* Ren. Des Cartes Ep. Part 2. Ep. 103. *found out such an Argument as gave him full satisfaction; and by which he more certainly knew that there was a God, than the truth of any Geometrical Proposition; but he doubted, whether he could make others understand it so well as he himself did.* To the same purpose he speaks in a Letter to *Mersennus*. And in another Letter to *Mersennus*, he saith, *That he thought himself bound in conscience to publish his Arguments to prove the Existence of God.* Ep. 104. Epist. P. II. Ep. 37. Which being written to his intimate Friends, shew sufficiently his own apprehension of the strength of them. But what opinion soever he had of it himself, they have not met with such a reception

M

among

Post Resp.
ad 2^{as} Ob-
ject. p. 85.

among thinking Men, as a Geometrical Demonstration would have done; altho' he hath endeavor'd to put them into that form. For, after all, they cannot conceive how an objective reality of an Idea in the Mind, can prove the real existence of that object out of the Mind. He grants, That it doth not hold in other Ideas; but that there is some thing so peculiar to this Idea that the Mind could not frame it, if it had not a real Existence: now here lies the main difficulty, what that is in this Idea, distinct from all others, which so exceeds the capacity of human Understanding, that we could not have such an Idea, unless the object were in being.

The force of his Argument, as himself hath put it in the Mathematical way, Prop. 2. lies here.

The objective reality in our Ideas must have some Cause in which it is either formally, or eminently: but we have such an Idea within us, which is not within us either of those ways; and therefore there must be some other Cause of it, which can be none but God; and therefore he is. Now here the difficulty returns, viz. to shew what necessary Connexion there is between the *Objective Reality* in the *Idea*, and the real Existence of the thing out of the *Idea*. For that he saith, by *Axiom 5. That this is the true Principle of Knowledge*; for, saith he, *we do not know that there is such a thing as the visible Heaven, barely because we see it; for that goes no farther than our sense: but our knowledg is an act of the Mind from the Idea, which arises from hence that the Objective Reality of the Idea in our Minds doth come from the thing it self as the true Cause; and the more of Objective Reality there is, by Axiom 6. in Substance than Accident, and in an Infinite Substance than a Finite, so much more doth it prove the Existence of the thing represented by the Idea.*

But the case still seems different between an Idea raised in our Minds from an object of Sense; and that which the Mind raises within it self about an infinite Substance. For, altho' it be impossible for the Mind to make an Objective Reality, which is infinite, by its own power; yet it doth not appear, but that it may frame an Idea within it self to which it sets no bounds, and so is infinite to it. And here lies the main ground of the Mistake: If our Idea were infinitely perfect as GOD himself is, no doubt it were wholly out of our power to make it; but then it would follow, that Idea with its Objective Reality must be GOD: if it be not GOD, it must be finite, and if it be finite, it is within the power of our Minds to frame it. For, altho' our conceptions of GOD be not *merely Negative*, yet whatsoever conceptions we have, they are not adequate; and if not, they are imperfect; and so come within the reach of our capacities.

Censur.
Philosoph.
Cartes. c. 4.
§. 3.

Réponse à
la Censure
de Mons.
Huet,
p. 192.
P. 198.

When the Learned Monf. Huet urged this Argument against *Des Cartes*, *That the Idea in us must be finite, because it wants something to make it perfect, being not adequate*: Monf. Regis, who undertook to defend *Des Cartes*, answers, *That if the Idea be taken formally as it is in us, so it is finite; but if we take it with its objective Reality, so it is infinite, and above our power: And as to its not being adequate, he saith, it doth not follow that it is finite objectively, but only formally; because it represents an infinite object, and it is sufficient to make it infinite because it represents as much as we can apprehend.* I grant, that if it reaches as far

as our capacity will go, it may be said to be infinite in regard of its object, altho' it be finite as to our manner of apprehending it; but still the main difficulty returns, *viz.* how a finite Idea in us can prove the Existence of an infinite Object. For the Question is not barely about our manner of conception of an infinite Being, which must be according to our capacities; but whether such a finite Idea, as we are capable of, can prove an infinite Being: for our Idea can represent to us an object to which we can set no bounds; but how doth it hence appear that it must be an infinite object really existing, and that such an Idea must proceed from an infinite Cause? Altho' these things be not so clear as were to be wish'd, yet we must not dissemble the force of this Argument so far as it goes, *viz.* That we cannot form an Idea of Nothing; and that we have no Ideas in our Minds, but what have a proper Cause for them; either from without us by *Sense*, or from within by the acts of our own Minds. As if a Man hath an *Idea* of a rare piece of workmanship, either he hath seen it, or else hath been told it, or was able to invent it. But here can be no evidence from Sense, and no Man can find within himself a power to frame such an object as God; therefore either he must have it from others, or else God himself hath imprinted it in our Minds. Now if the *Idea* of God had been alike in all, *viz.* of a Being infinitely wise, powerful and good, there might have been great reason to have believ'd it to have been planted in our Minds; but the general Idea of God among Mankind was too dark and confus'd to form any Argument from it; and it related chiefly to his power, and some kind of goodness; but not so as to exclude any other Beings from being honored as Gods. So that the force of it cannot be taken from the consent of Mankind in this Idea; but if it be only said, *That this is a true and just Idea of him*, and that there are other Arguments to prove it from his Works; so far it may and ought to be allow'd. But the *Metaphysical Subtlety* of this Argument, as it was managed by *Des Cartes*, was so great, that not merely Persons of common Capacities could not comprehend it; but he complains himself, *That the Mathematicians would not be convinced of the demonstrative force of it.* Upon which he makes a sharp Reflection, *That the Mathematics did rather hinder than further Men in Metaphysical Speculations.*

Des Cartes
Epist. To. 2.
Ep. 33.

But my business is not to lay open the weakness of these Arguments, but only to shew, that there is no cause to lay aside those which have been always used, and approved by the most sincere and intelligent Persons in all Ages. And this I shall make appear from his second Argument in his *Meditations*; but the first in his *Principles*, where he briefly lays it down after this manner. That among the several Ideas of our Minds, we find one of a Being infinitely perfect in Wisdom and power, which hath not a contingent, but a necessary existence; which being contained in the Idea, it follows that such a Being actually exists. *Des Cartes* in his 5th Meditation confesses, That at first appearance this looks like a piece of *Sophistry*; but he saith, that upon consideration, necessary Existence doth as much belong to an infinite perfect Being, as three Angles do to a Triangle. But he objects against his own Argument, that our thoughts put no necessity upon things; as if I conceive a

Princip.
Part. I.
n. 14.

M 2

Mountain

Mountain, I must likewise conceive a Valley, but it doth not follow that there is a Mountain existing: But, saith he, the difference is, that in this case there is no necessity of a Mountain's existing, but only that a Mountain and Valley cannot be separated; but in the other, it is not our Thought makes necessary existence to belong to God, but the nature of the thing makes that Thought necessary. For, saith he, I can frame no other Idea that hath necessary existence besides, nor can I make more than one God who hath it; which shews that it is no arbitrary or fictitious Idea. But *Gassendus* and others say, That all this is a *Paralogism*; because it supposes that which it should prove, *viz.* that God exists, which was the thing in question; and withal they say, It is a piece of *Sophistry* to argue from the Idea in the Mind to the existence of the thing out of the Mind. And this is the main thing which *Monf. Huet* insists upon; for he saith, *This Argument proves no more, than that a most perfect Being must necessarily exist in that way in which it doth exist; if it relates to the Idea, then it necessarily exists only in the Mind; if it relates to the thing, then it really exists out of the Mind; but the Argument doth not hold from one to the other.* To this *Monf. Regis* answers, That those things which are said only to exist in the Mind, have their foundation out of the Mind; as a Syren, from the Ideas of a Fish and a Woman joyn'd together: and so other *Chimæras* are form'd from joyning things in the Mind, which nature hath not joyn'd; for a Man cannot have an Idea of nothing. But in the Idea of a perfect Being he cannot distinguish that which is in the Mind, and that which is out of the Mind. And that here is no taking that for granted which ought to be proved; but it is only arguing from the nature of the thing; and not first supposing it to be, and thence proving that it is. For it is as much of the nature of a perfect Being to have necessary existence, as of the nature of a Triangle to have three Angles.

*Censur.
Philosoph.
Cartes. r. 4.
n. 8.*

*Réponse à
la Cens. ch.
4. p. 233.
&c.*

And thus the matter stands as to this Argument, so that whatsoever force there is in it, we plainly see that Persons of great Sagacity and Judgment, suspect that there is something in it of the nature of a *Paralogism*. And therefore there can be no reason why we should quit the former Arguments, which were plain and obvious to all capacities, for such a *Metaphysical Demonstration*, which those who are most versed in *Demonstrations* will not allow. Let the followers of *Des Cartes* magnify and defend this Argument as well as they can; but let them not despise and reject all others, which have had the approbation of all Ages, and the wisest Persons in them; and that upon such frivolous pretences, *that we cannot comprehend all the ends of Divine Wisdom.*

*Boyle of
Final Causes,
p. 36.*

But *Des Cartes* in an Epistle mention'd by Mr. *Boyle*, saith, *That it is a childish and absurd thing to affirm in Metaphysics, that God like a proud Man, had no other end in building the World but to be praised by Men; or in making the Sun, which is so much bigger than the Earth, but only to give light to Mankind, who take up so small a part of it.* Which is an Expression not at all becoming the reverence due to the great Creator of the World, from any one that doth acknowledg him truly to be so. For the objection, if it be any, lies against his making the World at all: since it may as well be said, to be like a proud Prince, only to shew the great-

greatness of his Power and Wisdom. But what is it which such Men would have? Can they imagin the World should be made without *any ends* at all? Is that becoming the wisdom of the Maker? Or would they not have these ends to be known? To what purpose are great and noble ends design'd, if they are not to be understood? And by whom can they be understood, but by rational and intelligent Beings? It is a great presumption in Mankind to pretend to know all the ends which the wise Creator had in the vast Fabric of the Universe; for some of the great parts of it are almost wholly unknown to us; I mean as to the fix'd Stars, every one of which of the first magnitude, is said to be above a hundred times in bigness beyond the Globe of the Earth; and yet how small do they appear to us? And in those other Celestial Bodies, which we can hardly discern without the help of Glasses of a late invention: and we are told by skilful *Astronomers*, that there are many Stars not visible, even with the help of Telescopes; and that they rather lessen than add to the greatness of the fix'd Stars. But if they had given us a fuller view of them, we cannot imagin, that God's great ends could depend upon such way of discovery: If all his design had been to be admir'd by Mankind for the greatness of his work, it would have been plac'd more within our reach, and the Earth we live upon would have born some bigger proportion to the Celestial Bodies, which is concluded to be but a Point in comparison of the Starry Heaven; and the very Orb of the Sun is thought to be no more in respect of the whole Firmament. So that the main parts of the Universe cannot be said to be made for our view. We grant therefore that the infinitely wise and powerful Creator hath great and glorious ends, which are above our reach; but how doth it follow from hence, that he hath no ends which we can judg of? For even in those things which we discern at so great a distance, we see enough to admire the infinite Majesty of him that made them; and consequently to adore, and fear him: And whatever other other ends he may have which we cannot see into, yet this is the best and most proper end for us with respect to him. Other ends might satisfy our curiosity more, but this tends most to promote our true happiness. As I have shew'd in the precedent Discourse that the wisest Philosophers, *Socrates, Plato, Aristotle*, and the *Pythagoreans* all agreed upon Principles of Natural Reason, that the true happiness of Mankind lay in being made like to God, not in an affectation of greatness and power, but in goodness and true wisdom; which lay in the knowledg of God, and a temper of Mind futable to our apprehensions of him. Now if those ends be attainable by such Discoveries, which God hath made of himself in the works of Creation, it is to little purpose for any to pretend that we cannot know the particular ends which he had in making such a number of vast Bodies of Light in the Heavens, nor why they are placed in such a manner, and at so great a distance from us; nor whether the space between be wholly void, or filled up with an *Ethereal Matter*; nor of what use those several Bodies of the Stars are with respect to themselves, or the rest of the Universe. Supposing that we are to seek as to these, and many other things relating to the visible Frame of the World, must we therefore cease to admire and praise the great God, the Maker of all, lest we

should seem to flatter him for his Greatness and Power? There is doubtless a just veneration due to an infinite Majesty, in what way soever he shews himself; but it is too mean a thing to imagin that these things were done by him only to be admir'd and prais'd by his own Creatures: But if such an Admiration tends to beget in them a greater and deeper sense of his Wisdom, power and Goodness; and that be the best and most effectual means to bring Mankind to a constant fear and love of him, and thereby to fit them for a future Happiness; can any Man of sense think this to be an end unbecoming the Creator of the World?

But these are said to be good Moral ends, but not proper for Physical Speculations. I answer, That those are truly the most Philosophical Contemplations, which lead us to the best and most noble ends of our Beings; for this was of old look'd on as the truest end of Philosophy, and the first occasion of it. For, it is agreed on all hands, that it had its name from Pythagoras: And it is very well observ'd by S. Augustin, that the Doctrine of the Soul's immortality gave the first occasion to the Greeks to apply themselves to Philosophy; and from hence Pythagoras began it: Who was instructed therein by his Masters Thales and Pherecydes; and after long Travels into several Countries for his own satisfaction, he at last fix'd at Crotone in Italy, and there took upon him to instruct others in the way to Immortality: but finding great reason to mistrust many who came to be his Scholars, he set up a very severe Discipline in his School (which prov'd his ruin at last) and would admit none but such as he had sufficiently tried. But when he was ask'd by one of the Great Men of those parts, *What it was he profess'd*, he said nothing but Philosophy, or a Love of Wisdom; which he made to consist in two things, *A search after Truth, and a pursuit of Virtue*. But by Truth he did not understand the Physical Causes of things, but Abstracted and Metaphysical Speculations; for his Notion was, that there was no certainty to be had from mere sensible things, which rather perplexed and confounded Mens Minds, which were apt to judge by the impressions of Sense; (and his opinion was that the Sense only transmitted the Objects, but it was the Mind which saw and heard, &c.) therefore to prevent false judgments, he thought it necessary to draw off their Minds from sensible Objects; to this end he be-thought himself of the way of reasoning by Figures and Numbers (as before observ'd) which were so soon and so grossly misunderstood. He had learnt, saith Porphyry, from the Eastern Magi, that God was Light and Truth; and therefore he look'd on a search after Truth as one way of assimilation to God. But the main thing was in the practice of Virtue; of which there is a short Abstract in the Golden Verses, and Hierocles declares in the beginning, *The design of them all was to bring Mankind to a likeness to the Divine Nature*. And in this, saith Eudorus in Stobæus, Socrates and Plato agreed with Pythagoras, That this was the chief end of Philosophy; but Plato added καὶ τὸ διδασκῆναι, as far as Mankind could attain to it. And so Alcinous expresses the sense of Plato: but he tells us, That Plato sometimes set it forth by being Wise, and Just, and Holy; sometimes by following God; because according to the ancient Saying God is the beginning and end of all things. This, saith Hierocles, is the end of the Pythagorean

Aug. ad
Voluf.
Ep. 3.

Stob. Eclog.
c. 3.

Alcin.
c. 27.

gorean Philosophy, to give wings to our Souls, that when death comes, we may leave a mortal Body behind us, and fly to the immortal Mansions above, and partake of a Divine Nature, as far as we are capable of it. And Simplicius in the beginning of his Commentaries on Aristotle saith, The end of Philosophy is to attain to our most perfect Happiness; and if a Man arriv'd to the top of Philosophy, he might be a God, and not a Man. These things I mention to shew, that Philosophy as it was understood by the Ancients was far from excluding Final Causes, or Moral Considerations of things; since its great end was to bring Men to a likeness to GOD.

*Simpli. in
Categor.*

This being then the true original end of *Philosophy*, to improve Mens Minds in order to their Happiness, how came the consideration of the great ends of God in the World, to be thought unbecoming Philosophical Speculations? The reason was, that the immortality of the Soul hath been excluded too. For, altho' according to the Doctrin of *Des Cartes* its distinction from the Body be asserted and proved, yet its immortality is pass'd over; under this pretense, *that God may fix its duration by his Will*; and therefore unless we know the Will of God in it, we can determine nothing in *Philosophy* about it. But the Ancient *Philosophers* made the immortality of the Soul the foundation of all their Inquiries, and therefore took in all such considerations as tended to improve, and refine, and purify the Minds of Men. For which end *Moral Considerations* are most proper. And therefore it cannot but seem strange to any thinking Man, to observe these to be so industriously set aside, on pretense *that we cannot find out the ends that God had in framing the World, and the several parts of it*: and yet at the same time they pretend to have found all the Mechanical Powers of Matter, which is much more difficult to comprehend. But of that afterwards: we now consider Final Causes. And have we not reason to conclude from the present Frame of the World with respect to Mankind, that the Maker of it intended to dispose things for their advantage? Let Men consider the Faculties of their Minds together with the Materials about them, and the Organs GOD hath given them to make use of them; and can they think otherwise, but that GOD hath abundantly made up to them, what other Creatures seem to exceed them in? Their Understanding, and Contrivance, and artificial Inventions go far beyond the natural strength and sagacity of Brutes, as to the comfortable way of subsistence. They can make the Brutes to be very servicable to them, as to Diet, Clothing, Journeying, Habitations, &c. They can find out ways to communicate their Thoughts to each other at a great distance, and entertain commerce in the remotest parts, by the help of their own Inventions as to Navigation. So that if one Country be not sufficiently furnished, they can bring home the products of others. And so, all the benefit of Trading (which in these later Ages is grown to so mighty a reputation above what it had in elder Ages) is owing to the happy Invention of the use of the *Magnet*. But set aside these modern Improvements, and consider Mankind as mere Natives of their several Countries, take all together, and the Inhabitants of the Earth have no cause to complain of Providence; which makes up what

is

is wanting in one thing by such advantages another way, that most Nations are fond of their own Countries, and would not change them. The ancient Geographers indeed mention People *who cursed the rising and setting Sun, because his heat was intolerable to them*; and the *Philosophers* thought they had great reason to conclude the *Torrid Zone* uninhabitable. But the experience of these latter times have found it quite otherwise, and that the places there were fully peopled, and their condition tolerable enough, and in some respects pleasant to them: as to the fruitfulness of Land, and numbers of Rivers and plenty of commodities. And as to Heat, that is very much qualify'd, by the constant breezes in the Day-time, and coolness of the Nights; and the particular situation of some places, at a very little distance have Winter and Summer; which shews that the Seasons do not merely depend upon the Sun, but upon the motion of the Air; for where that is stopt by the height of Mountains, there is Winter on one side, and Summer on the other; as *Is. Vossius* observes on the coast of *Malabar*; and about the Mountains of *Arabia*, *Congo* and *Bengala*, and other places: And *Ludolphus* confirms it concerning the Mountains of *Malabar*; insomuch, that he saith, *the King there may keep a perpetual Summer, only by crossing the Mountains*. Others have given a more particular account of it, and tell us, That the *Chersonese* between the Rivers of *Indus* and *Ganges*, is divided in the middle by a ridge of *High Hills*, which they call the *Gate*; on the one side is *Malabar*, and on the other *Coromandel*; and that it is Winter on one side from *April* to *September*, and Summer on the other; and that not above 20 Leagues distance in crossing the Mountains. And the same is said to be at *Cape Razalgate* in *Arabia*, and in *Jamaica*; which is imputed to the Mountains stopping the current of Vapors wherein the particles of them are driven together, and fall down into drops of Rain; and so the Seasons depend upon the *Monsons* or fix'd Winds in those parts; the Northeast blowing on one side from *November* to *April*, and the Southerly on the other from *April* to *November*. Sir *H. Middleton* speaks of so great cold on the Mountains of *Arabia*, that he could not have believ'd it, unless he had felt it himself; for he despis'd their information at *Mecca*, who knew the Country far better. But he thought he went according to *Reason*, as the Ancients did; but *Experience* hath plainly discover'd their mistakes. For Heat and Cold are found not to depend merely upon the nearness or distance of the Sun; for other things we find may not only qualify that heat, but produce cold where it was least expected. *Acosta* tells us that the old Philosophers went upon Principles of Common Reason, when they supposed the *Torrid Zone* was uninhabitable, but notwithstanding he found it so far from being so, that he thought it pleasant and agreeable, and saw it full of People; and he saith, that the Air is clearest when the Sun is farthest off, and fullest of Clouds and Rain when the Sun is nearest. As he saith at large from the experience himself had in those parts. Some parts of the *Torrid Zone* he observes to be Temperate, as in *Quito* and the Plains of *Peru*; some very cold, as at *Potosi*; some very hot, as in some parts of *Ethiopia*, *Brasil* and the *Moluccas*. The temperateness of it he imputes to the Rains, to the shortness of the

Herod. l. 1.
Mela l. 1.
c. 8.
Plin. l. 5.
c. 8.

Is. Voss. de
Nilo, c. 12.
Ludolph.
Comment.
ad Hist.
Æthiop.
p. 101.
Philosoph.
Transacti-
ons, n. 175.

Purchas
Pil. To. I. p.
255.

Acosta of
the Indies,
l. 2. c. 23.

c. 9.

c. 10.

the Days, the nearness to the Ocean, the height of Lands and Mountains, but especially to the Winds. For he saith, *The Providence of God hath so order'd it, that the fresh and cool Winds do qualify the excessive heat of the Sun.* But he observes, *that besides the Breezes from the Sea by day, there are Land-winds by night, which serve very much to temper the heat of the Air.* C. 13. L. 3. c. 8.

It look'd like an Objection against Providence, when Men concluded that by the nearness of the Sun within the Tropics, so great a part of the Earth as the *Torrid Zone* should be scorch'd by the Sun, as not to be capable of habitation by Mankind: but when the contrary is now found most certainly true, and such reasons are given for it, which Mankind could not have thought of, have we not ground to infer that Providence had certainly such an end as the good of Mankind, to order things so, as by several means to make those habitations not only tolerable, but in many places delightful? By this we see how vain those old Arguments against Providence were, which were grounded on this supposition, that so great a part of the Earth was useless to Mankind by the intolerable heat of the Sun. Yet how confidently doth *Lucretius* argue upon this supposition, as tho' he could demonstrate against Providence from Heaven and Earth?

*Hoc tamen ex ipsis cæli rationibus ausim
Confirmare, aliisque ex rebus reddere multis,
Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam
Naturam rerum, tanta stat prædita culpa.
Principio quantum cæli tegit impetus ingens,
Inde avidam partem montes, sylvæque ferarum
Possedere, tenent rupes, vastæque paludes,
Et mare, quod late terrarum distinet bras.
Inde duas porro prope partes fervidus ardor,
Assiduusque geli casus mortalibus aufert.*

Lucret. l. 5.

So much room taken up by the Heavens, so much by Mountains, Woods, Rocks, Marshes and Seas; and two parts of the Earth useless for Mankind by intolerable Heat and Cold; that he could never imagin this Earth was fram'd with design for the good of Mankind. And yet at the same time there were *Philosophers*, who thought the conveniencies for Mankind were so great in this World, that from thence they inferr'd that there was a Providence, which had a particular regard to the advantages which they enjoy; and this without any Revelation from God of those ends which he design'd. The *Stoics* knew, as well as *Epicurus*, the compass of the Heavens; the greatness of the Mountains, Woods, Rocks and Seas; and they believ'd as much that some parts of the Earth were not to be inhabited; and yet they concluded, that there was a design of Providence in all with respect to Mankind. For they took notice, not merely of the space which the Heavens took up, but of the great Beauty, and order, and usefulness of the *Celestial Bodies*; and particularly the convenient distance of the Sun to make the Earth fruitful and pleasant; and to distinguish Days and Nights for Works and Rest; and that the Mountains were large store-houses for Metals and Rivers, which could not otherwise be supply'd; and

N

that

that the Seas afforded plenty of Fish, and large conveniencies for Commerce, and the Woods were furnish'd with Timber to make Vessels out of, to pass over those Seas, and so preserve a correspondence among Mankind at the greatest distance for their mutual advantage; and if there were uncultivated parts of the Earth, that onle shew'd that God did not give these things to make Mankind lazy and idle, but to exercise those abilities both of Body and Mind, which he had given them.

But as to the two parts of the Earth being wholly unserviceable to Mankind, by reason of excessive heat or cold, that is found by experience of later Ages to have been a great mistake. But *Aristotle* is positive in it, *That the places near the Sun have no Waters nor Pastures; and that the remote Northern parts are not to be inhabited for the cold.* But both these Assertions are found to be false; however his Authority was follow'd. In so much, that *Pliny* saith, *Of five Zones two are useless by extremity of cold; and that there is nothing but a perpetual Mist, and a shining Frost; and that within the Tropics all is burnt up by the heat of the Sun, which is so intense, that, he saith, there is no passage from one Temperate Zone to the other.* This is a strange Account to us now, and given by a Man who had read all Authors then extant about these matters; and it is the stranger, because in the Chapter before he saith, *That Hanno passed from Cadiz to the end of Arabia, (which is much doubted) and that Eudoxus came to Cadiz from the Arabian Gulph; and that another went from Spain to Æthiopia on the account of Trade; and that some Indians trading abroad were cast by storms on the Northern Coasts, who were presented to the Proconsul of Gaul.* How could these thing be, and yet they such strangers to the *Torrid Zone*, thro' which they must pass? But he seem'd to take it for granted, *That those Regions were unpassable, and uninhabitable,* altho' himself mentions several Nations which liv'd within the *Torrid Zone*; as the *Negroes* on both sides the River *Niger*, the *Garamantes*, *Troglodytæ* (whom *Ludolphus* makes to be the same with the *Hotentots*) and several others. Now if all these Countries were burnt up, how come so many People to be then known to live here; and so they were from the time of *Herodotus*, who mentions them? But how different are the best Accounts we now have of these places from what the Ancients imagin'd? The Country of the *Negroes*, thro' which the *Niger* runs (which is suppos'd to be of the same Nature (if not *Original*) with the *Nile*, and overflows the Country of the *Negro's*, in the same manner and at the same time that the *Nile* doth *Egypt*) is according to a late Author, *A populous and fertile Country, who saith, that the Natives endure the heat with ease, and are healthful and vigorous.* Another, who spent some time in that Country, saith, *That the heat is more supportable by the cool Wind which blows; and that for 6 Months it is as pleasant as France.* *Andrew Battel*, who liv'd about 18 years in *Angola* and thereabouts, speaks enough of the *Populousness* of those parts; and *Lopez* who was at *Congo*, commends the *temperature of the Air* there. *Ludolphus* in his Account of *Ethiopia*, which he had chiefly from a Native, saith, *that it is as temperate as Portugal.* The same we have already produc'd from *Acosta* of *Peru*. Many more such Instances might be produc'd, but these are

suffi-

Arist. Meteor. l. 2. c. 5.

Plin. l. 2. c. 68.

L. 5. c. 8.

Herodot. l. 4. c. 183.

Plin. l. 5. 8. Solin. c. 43.

Voyage to Surat, p. 61.

p. 71. Relation de la Nigritie, 1689.

p. 85. Purchas II.

l. 7. c. 3. Id. c. 4.

Ludolph. Comment. l. 1. c. 5.

n. 36.

sufficient to shew what a wonderful Mistake the Ancients were under as to the *Torrid Zone*, and how very weak *Lucretius* his Argument against Providence from thence is. But the Argument for it is much stronger from these discoveries; because according to the ordinary effects of the heat of the Sun, they reason'd truly; but there is a concurrence of several other things which temper the Air, which they could not understand. It is true, there are some things that abate the heat which arises from the Sun's nearness; as the equality of nights to days, and the abundance of rains which fall at that time; of which the most probable account is, That altho' in our parts the distance of the Sun causes Cold and Rain, and the nearness Heat and Drought; yet it is quite otherwise there, for the Sun raises up the vapors more there by rarifying the Air, and that to a great height; which joyning together, and falling down with greater force, doth thereby produce a Wind as well as Water, both which cool and refresh the Air; and where the vapors do not produce Rain, yet they make a Dew, as in some parts of *Peru*, which falling on the ground makes it fruitful. But these things are not sufficient; for were all the Country in the *Torrid Zone* a flat, with those advantages, it would not be habitable; and therefore the height of the Mountains was necessary for this purpose. Which shews, that these are so far from being *Botches* or *Ruins*, that they are great instances of Divine Providence, if they can be made out to be serviceable to this purpose.

Scaliger saith, That those do *pie delirare*, who impute the Mountains to the fractures made in the Earth by the Flood; and that it is impossible that the Earth which fell in, should ever make a surface equal with the height of the Mountains: but he asserts them to be a work of Providence in the original frame of the World, and chiefly intended to be a receptacle for Water: and he observes that the highest Mountains are under the *Torrid Zone*; where they serve likewise for tempering the Air. For, *Acosta* gives that reason of the temper of the Air in the *West Indies*, that it is a high Country, having many Mountains, which afford a great refreshment to the neighboring Countries: and he observes, that the Sea-coast in *Peru* and *New Spain* is very hot, being low and flat; but it is otherwise in the higher parts. *Piso* a learned Physician, who liv'd in *Brasil*, and hath given a *Natural History* of that Country, imputes the healthfulness of the *Maritim Coasts* there, which he thinks compares with *Europe*, to two things; 1. The constant breeze from the Sea lying on the East of it, which he saith, very much defends them from the excessive heat of the Sun. 2. A ridge of Mountains between that and *Peru*, which keep off the noisom vapors of the *Moorish Grounds* on the other side of them. In the Night, he saith, the cold is so great (even in the *Torrid Zone*) that they are forc'd to keep fires to prevent the ill effects of it. *Nichol. de Techo*, who was in *Tucumania*, saith, That the part of it which is within the *Torrid Zone* is very cold, by reason of the Mountains there; which he saith, evidently confutes the Ancients opinion concerning it. *Andrew Battel* mentions the high Mountains about *Angola*, over which he march'd, and found the Air very cold. *Ludolphus* saith, The Providence of God is much to be admir'd in the Mountains of *Ethiopia*; for the height of their Mountains makes that Country habitable, and their Air more temperate; and affords them Rivers which the flat in the

Scaliger.
Exerc. 43.

Exerc. 42.

Acosta Hist.
of the *Indies*, l. 2.
c. 12.

Pison. Hist.
Nat. & Medic.
Brasilie,
l. 1. c. 1.

Hist. Paragu.
l. 1.
c. 19.

Purchas
To. II. l. 7.
c. 3 §. 3.
Ludolph.
Hist. Æthiop. l. 1.
c. 6.

c. 5. *Torrid Zone do want; unless they be such as come out of the mountainous part. And which seems very strange, he affirms from Tellez, That the heats in some parts of Ethiopia are more tolerable than in Portugal, which lies so many degrees more to the North.*

The force of what I have said comes to this. It was suppos'd to be an Argument against Providence, that so great a part of the Earth was useless to Mankind; which is so far from being true, that undoubted experience hath convinc'd the World, that they have been fully inhabited; and that to the comfortable subsistence of Mankind, there hath been concurrence of several things, which could not be the result of Chance, or of the Mechanical Laws of the motion of Matter: and therefore we ought to conclude these things to be ordered by Divine Providence, for the use and benefit of Mankind.

There is yet one thing to be observ'd, before I end this part of my Discourse; which is to shew the pernicious use that hath been made of *Des Cartes* his laying aside the consideration of *Final Causes*. For there was lately a Person too well known in the World, (and whom I intend to consider at large afterwards) who at first profess'd himself a strict follower of *Des Cartes* his *Notions* in his *Metaphysical Meditations*. But he made use of the Argument from the *Idea* to prove *the World to be God*: And *Des Cartes* cannot be excus'd from giving too great advantage to *Spinoza*, by supposing the *Idea of extended Matter to be infinite and necessary*; which overthrows the force of his own Argument from the *Idea*, for if it agrees to Matter, it cannot prove the being of a Substance distinct from Matter, and gave occasion to the other to think, that nothing but *Infinite Matter* was imply'd in this *Idea*: And to carry on his design the better, he kept close to *Des Cartes* in excluding the consideration of *Final Causes*. For in his *Mathematical Ethics*, (as he calls them) he hath an *Appendix* to his first Part, where he doth purposely set himself to overthrow all *Final Causes*, as *meer Fictions of Mens Brains*. But the comfort is, that they are no late *Fictions*, but the wisest Men in all Ages, as I have already shew'd, did assert them: And it is not a mere *Mathematical Appearance* will fright Men now out of the Principles of Reason. But let us examine what the grounds are, on which *Final Causes* are thus peremptorily condemned. He saith, *That they arise from the common prejudice of Mankind, who have so much fondness for themselves as to think that all things are done for their sakes: that God made all things for Man, and Mankind to serve him*. But this is no fair representation of the matter. We do not see any other end in the frame of the Universe, for the sake of the Inhabitants of the Earth; for we never give an account of the great ends which the Almighty order'd the vast and numerous Bodies of the fix'd Stars, who are so remote from us, but that which we say, is, that they are for the use of Mankind in such a station here upon Earth, that we may look about them; and when they do so, they may find so great and so wise a Being order all things, that they may not only the Wisdom but the Goodness of the Almighty appear. how doth this appear to be a mere *Fiction* of Mens Brains? there not such just causes for our admiration?

Des Cartes
Prin. Part.
II. n. 21.

B. D. Spinoza.
Opera
Posth. p. 36.

conveniences for human Life? Do not all Men see the wonderful contrivance and usefulness of the parts of their Bodies? And are there not great discoveries of the like wisdom in Plants and Animals, and the Earth and Sea? Are all these mere Phantasms and Fictions of Mens Brains? Why are not the mistakes about these things discover'd in a Mathematical manner? This might have signify'd something: But to go about to confute Mankind by telling them, *That Final Causes are mere fictions of their Brains*, is far from being a Geometrical way of Demonstration. Let us examine, however, the method he takes to make it out. (1) In the first place, he undertakes to shew how Mankind came to think so much of *Final Causes*; and then (2) how repugnant they are to the nature of things; (3) How Men came to take up the Notions of Good and Evil, and of Rewards and Punishments from this Opinion about *Final Causes*: all which I shall briefly consider. As to the first, He supposes *that all Men are born ignorant of Causes, and look after their own advantage, which they are conscious to themselves of*. And what follows? *First, that they suppose themselves free, because they know their own desires*. And why should they not as well as know that they think? For they have the like inward Perception as to both. *But they are ignorant of the Causes which determine their desires*. How doth it appear, that there are such Causes, which they are thus ignorant of? If any Man undertakes to assign Causes which Mankind are not at all sensible of, he ought not to take it for granted, that there are such Causes, but to prove it in such a manner, as to overballance the evidence of their inward Perceptions. For Mankind are conscious to themselves of no such Causes; if therefore any one will prove, that however, they are not free, certainly that Evidence ought to be clearer than the Argument from our own Perception to the contrary. I think I move my Eye freely to this or that object, and am fully satisfy'd from that inward Perception I have of the voluntary motion of the Muscles belonging to the Eye: now if any one goes about to tell me that I am deceiv'd herein, and that there were other Causes, which determin'd the motion of my Eye; is it not reason I should have Evidence greater than what I have from my own Sensation? But here we have no Causes at all assign'd: therefore we must go on. *Secondly, saith he, Mankind do all things for some end; viz. for their own profit; and therefore desire only to know Final Causes, and if they find these they are satisfy'd*. Is not this well said by a Man that pretends to *Demonstration*, and that in a *Geometrical manner*? Could no other *Ends* be thought of but *Profit*? I begin to be of *Des Cartes* his mind, *That Geometry spoils Mens Reasonings in other matters*. For, how was it possible for a Man of common sense to argue in such a manner; *Men aim at their own profit, therefore they desire only to know Final Causes*? What *Profit* was it which this Author aim'd at in making this Work of his? He had without doubt some end in it; for I hardly think he could take so much pains for no end at all. Was it a *Good* or a *Bad end*? (For Mankind are still apt to be inquisitive into *Final Causes*.) A *Good End*, no doubt his Friends will say. What was this *Good End*? was it *mere Profit*? No, certainly, they will say, his Mind was above it; *for he devoted him-*

De Intell.
Emend.
p. 357.

p. 361.

Ethic. P. I.
p. 34.

self wholly (as they they tell us in the Preface to his Works) *to Philosophy*; and *retired on purpose for the prosecution of his Studies*. It is then more than possible for a Man to aim at some other end, than mere *Profit*. And what was the End he propos'd in Philosophy? Still we inquire after *the End*, altho' *Profit* be set aside; and we cannot have a better account of it, than from himself. He tells us, *His Mind was set upon finding out the true Good of Mankind*. This was a noble End indeed, and fit for a Person that design'd to improve his Understanding. But was this *true Good* nothing but *Profit*? So far from it, that he saith, *He was soon satisfy'd, that what things Mankind generally pursued, were a hindrance to the End he aim'd at: and therefore he saw it necessary to give over the pursuit of Riches, Honors and sensual Pleasures; and to fix upon an eternal and infinite Good, which alone can give satisfaction to the Mind; and therefore ought to be pursued with all our might*. This one would think were spoken like a true Christian Philosopher; but his way is, to use our Expressions, and to couch his own meaning under very plausible Terms: but he speaks his Mind more afterwards, when he saith, *This chief Good of Man is to understand the union between the Mind and Nature*. What that is, will appear more afterwards; but here he saith, *That this is the End to which our studies and endeavors are to be directed*. Which is sufficient to my present purpose. For here it is confess'd, that they are only vulgar Minds that aim at *mere Profit* as their End; but that there is a higher, and more certain, and agreeable end for the Minds of Men to search after; and that their Happiness lies in the attaining of that End. Which being allow'd, if we suppose a wise and intelligent Being to have created Mankind, there is no incongruity at all in Man's making that infinite and eternal Good to be his chief End, nor in pursuing after it with all his endeavors; nor can there be any in supposing that this God should order things in this World with that design, that they should be serviceable to him here, as to his present subsistence, in order to his main End. For he allows his *Philosopher* to do many things with that design to serve his End; viz. *To speak as other Men do, whatever he thinks. To use sensual Pleasures, as they serve for Health. To get as much wealth, as will make his condition easy*. Thus far then we find that Mankind may propose ends to themselves; and that there are things which have a tendency to them; and that it is very becoming to them to use those means in order to their ends. Why then may not the wise Creator of the World appoint proper ends and means to Mankind, as to their conveniencies and future happiness? what repugnancy is there in this, more than in the former case? All that he can say is, *That Mankind finding something very useful to them, as Eyes for seeing, Teeth for eating, Herbs and Animals for nourishment, the Sun to give light, the Sea to breed Fish, &c. and because they are so useful to them, conclude that there was a Being above them, which prepar'd all these things for them*. And what absurdity is there in so doing? What *Geometrical Demonstration* is there, that these things all came together so of themselves without any intelligent Agent? All that he saith is, *That they considering them as means, could not believe that they made themselves; but because they were wont to provide things for their own use,*

use, they supposed or believed some free Agent which ordered all these things for them. And from hence they judging all by themselves, concluded that GOD ordered all these things for their use; to oblige Mankind to him, that they might honor and serve him; and so under a pretense of doing honor to GOD, they fell into Superstition; and were so bent upon Final Causes, till at last they made GOD no wiser than themselves. Is not all this *Demonstration*? They must think very meanly indeed of the Understandings of Men, that can think they will be satisfy'd with such Accounts as these. We find he grants *Eyes fitted for Sight, Teeth for Eating, &c.* And why I pray, may we not in reason conclude, that they were design'd for that use? He finds some things to cavil at, about *Unseasonable Weather, Earthquakes, Diseases, &c.* (which are consistent with the general Ends of Providence) but he hath nothing to say, as to his former Instances, why we should not believe *we had Eyes to see with, or Ears to hear with, or Teeth to eat with*: But if these things were given for those uses and no other, doth not this prove particular ends of Providence with respect to Mankind? What, *if Men do provide means for their ends*? Is it an Argument of *Folly*, or *Wisdom* so to do? If it be *Wisdom* to act for an end, and *Folly* to act for none, why may we not suppose an infinitely wise Being to act for ends agreeable to himself? Not for mean, foolish, sordid ends, but such as become the great Creator and wise Governor, and bountiful Benefactor to Mankind. And what is there unbecoming our *Idea* of God in these relations? Is it then unfit for a wise Creator and Governor, and Benefactor, to bestow on Mankind such things as tend to the use and good of his Creatures, or to take care of their welfare? So as to furnish us with such Organs of our Senses, such Faculties of our Minds, as may make use of the many conveniences which we have about us for our comfortable subsistence, and our cheerful service of so great and so good, and so liberal a Benefactor. Can this be call'd *Superstition*, to serve and adore him? Is this *making God like to our selves*, when we acknowledge the infinite distance between him and us, and serve him with devout reverence and godly fear? Far be it from us to think so meanly of him, as to attribute the least degree of our Passions and Weaknesses to him. We know he could not be GOD, if he were not infinitely above our Thoughts as well as our Services: but if he please to be so kind to us, to give us so many reasons to love and serve him, is it fit for his Creatures to despise his service, on pretense that he is above it? *Superstition* is a foolish thing, because it comes from mean apprehensions of GOD; but *true Religion* is a wise and agreeable thing, because it flows from a due sense of a Divine Majesty, and a tender regard to his honor. And whatever Men pretend as to *Philosophy* and *Demonstration*, there are none that really want sense and understanding so much, as those who despise *Religion*, under the name of *Superstition*. We cannot deny that there is too much of it in the World: but as GOD remains the same notwithstanding the follies of Mankind, so *Religion* is as just and reasonable a thing as ever, altho' *Superstition* hath brought so much dishonor upon it.

The

The next thing is to shew, *That Final Causes are repugnant to the Nature of things.* This is to the purpose indeed, if he can make it out. As to his Argument *from the necessity of all things*, that must be referr'd to its due time; because it is not prov'd but suppos'd: But here we are to consider how *Final Causes* do so lamentably pervert the order of Nature. *They make, saith he, the Cause to be the Effect, and the Effect to be the Cause; and that which was first in Nature to be the last; and make the most perfect Being to be the most imperfect.* These are sad consequences if they hold; the two former he passes over, as he had reason, and fixes on the last, *That they overthrow the Divine Perfection*; and he needs no more, if he can make this out. But how? *If God works for an end, then he must want that which he works for.* Is this the *Demonstrating Ethics in a Geometrical way*? A Father out of kindness to his Son designs to advance him in the World, and furnishes him with all necessary means to that end; doth this argue weakness and indigency, or only kindness and good-will to his Son? If there may be a design of doing good to others, with regard to their welfare, and many means us'd to that end, what want doth this argue? But rather it flows from *abundant Goodness*; and the more perfect any being is, the greater is the beneficence and readiness to do good to others: and one would think Men did not want Geometry to know this. But, saith he, *God did not do this for their sakes, but his own; his own glory is the end of all.* But if the *Glory of God* be most advanced by the good of his Creatures, how can these two be separated from each other? Men may make a distinction by Metaphysical Speculation: but if his glory be advanced by their good, there can be no real distinction between them; for both are carried on by the same thing.

After these faint Attempts, our *Geometrician* falls to *ignorance of Causes*, (of which I have said so much already) and from thence, he saith, *comes Mens admiration of the Fabric of Man's Body, because they know not the Causes of it.* And did our Philosopher know the *Mechanical Causes* of all the parts of it? What pity it is we had not seen them, instead of these loose and idle Discourses; for I can call them no other, when there is so much blustering talk about *Geometry*, and so very little appearance of true Reason. But saith he, very sensibly, *The World looks upon a Man as a very dangerous heretic, and impious Person, if he gives an Account of Natural Causes, and takes away their ignorance.* I see no such great danger from his *Knowledge*, whatever there be from his *Impiety*; for he hath shew'd much more cause for us to wonder at one, than at the other. But the *Impiety* of his *System* must be consider'd in its proper place.

The last thing he saith as to *Causes* is, *That Mankind being persuaded that all things were made for them; they set an esteem upon such things as they found most useful, and measur'd the value of things by their agreeableness to themselves. From hence came the difference of Good and Evil, Orderly and Confus'd, Hot and Cold, Beautiful and Deform'd; and because they imagin'd themselves free, thence came Praise and Dishonor, Fault and Merit. And what tended to Health or the Worship of God, they called Good, and the contrary Evil; what suted to their Imagination, they called Order, what did*

not, Confusion. *What was agreeable to their Senses they called Beautiful, Sweet, Pleasant, and the contrary to what was not; and attributed their Modes of Sensation to the things themselves: and Men judg of things by their different Imaginations; and from thence come such great differences among Mankind about Good and Evil, Order and Confusion; all which come from Mens following Imagination, and not Reason.* This is the substance of what he saith; which in short takes away all the real difference between Good and Evil; and makes *Good* to be a mere effect of Mens Imaginations, from respect to their own Conveniency, or what they call *the Honor of God*; and *Evil* what is repugnant to them. But how comes this to follow from *Final Causes*? Yes, saith he, *since all things are made for them, therefore Good and Evil are to be taken with respect to them.* This is a very weak foundation to build this Doctrin upon. For things are not therefore said to be *Morally Good*, because they are useful to Mankind; but that implies only a *Natural Fitness* for such purposes, which is quite another thing from Moral Goodness; and it is strange our Philosophers should not discern the difference. For, is there no measure of Good and Evil among Mankind with respect to one another? If the Good and evil of things did depend upon Final Causes, with respect to Mankind in general, then there could be no such thing in regard to each other; for these Final Causes do not reach to one individual more than another, for they respect the whole kind. But we say upon good grounds, that there are things which are good and evil between Man and Man. Yes, it may be said, *with respect to Society, and the common good of the whole.* If it be so, then it follows that it doth not depend upon mere Imagination, but that there is a true and just measure in things; for if human Society cannot be preserv'd without Justice, and keeping Faith and Obedience to Government, Conjugal Fidelity, &c. then there is a real tendency in these things to that end, and a repugnancy in the contrary; and if so, then their being good or evil doth not depend upon Mens Fancies or Humors, any more than the taking away fuel doth for lessening a fire, or the adding it doth to the increase of it. For Mens indulging their own Passions against Reason and a common interest; doth as much tend to a Civil combustion, as the other to a Natural; and Mens due government of themselves and actions doth as naturally tend to peace and tranquillity, as withdrawing fuel or casting water doth to quench the violence of fire. From whence it appears, that there are real ends as to Mankind, which are the measures of Good and Evil, with respect to Society. But besides this, Mankind cannot be suppos'd to subsist without the Relations of Parents and Children: and can any Man in his right Senses imagin that the Duties of these to each other depend only upon Fancy? Is there no natural regard due from Children to Parents, no natural affection and tenderness in Parents to Children? Is all this only the product of Imagination? So as to the difference of Sexes; Chastity, Modesty, and a decent regard to each other are things founded in Nature, and do not arise from Custom or Fancy. But in all these things, altho' there be a just regulation of them by Laws, yet the foundation of them is laid in the nature and respects of things to one another. As to our own Bodies,

O

Health

Health is not the only measure of Good and Evil; for it is so uncertain, that those excesses do little prejudice to some, which are mischievous to others: but there is a just proportion of things to be observ'd with respect to their use; and so *Intemperance* may be consistent with a healthful Body. As to the condition of others, who by reason of poverty or sickness stand in need of our help; it is a thing in it self good to afford them our assistance; and so *Liberality*, *Charity* and doing good, are so far from being good only from *Imagination*, that no Man can imagin them to be otherwise than good. But besides all these, there are duties which are owing to that infinite Being, from whom we derive all that we enjoy or hope for; and can it be any other than good for us to fear, and serve, and love, and honor him? He confesses Mankind allow *that to be good which respects the honor of God*; but he means *that it is because we suppose that he made all things for Men*. But altho' his Goodness and Providence be very great reasons for our serving him; yet if he had been less bountiful to Mankind, they had been bound to serve him as their Creator. And it is impossible to suppose that he should discharge his Creatures from so necessary a duty, and to make the contrary not to be a Fault. For, it would imply ingratitude and contempt of the best Being in the World not to be evil; and that he who is infinitely good, should require what is in it self evil. From all which it appears, that the nature of good and evil doth not depend upon the arbitrary Fancies and Opinions of Men; but upon the Nature of things, the Reason of Mankind, and the Respects they stand in to one another.

And it is a great confirmation of this, that our Philosopher himself makes it the same case as *to Good and Evil*, as it is with respect to *Order* and *Confusion*, and *Beauty* and *Deformity*, and *Harmony* and *Discord*. For altho' there may be a *Variety* of Fancies, as to some *Degrees* of these things; and that may please some which doth not others: yet in the main they all agree in a real difference between them; and none can have so little judgment, as to think that there is nothing but *Fancy* which puts a difference between a well digested Discourse, and a confus'd heap of Thoughts; or between an exact Beauty, and the Picture of Deformity; or the most ravishing Music, and the noise of a pair of Tongs. So that the extremes must be allow'd to be really different from one another, what difference soever there be in Persons Fancies, as to what lies between; and yet as to them, when the Idea of the thing it self is agreed upon, then the nearer any approach to it, the more it hath of the reality, and the farther off, it doth so much more depend upon *Fancy*.

But, saith he, *in our Objects of Sense we imagin the Qualities to be real things without us, whereas they are only the different impressions made upon our Senses, and so convey'd to our Imaginations*. And is this an Argument that there is no real difference between *Bitter and Sweet*, *Savory and Unsavory*, or *that all Sounds are alike*? Or that because some have fancied the Music of the Spheres, therefore there is no such thing as *Harmony*? But such kind of arguing deserves no farther consideration.

I now

I now come to the second *Hypothesis*, which tends towards *Atheism*, and that is of those who *attribute too much to the Mechanical Powers of matter and motion*. It cannot be denied by any ingenious Man, that in our Age a great improvement hath been made in *Natural and Experimental Philosophy*. But there is a great difference to be made between those who have proceeded in the way of *Experiments*, which do great service as they go, and such as have form'd *Mechanical Theories* of the System of the Universe; and have undertaken to give an Account how the World was fram'd, and what the immediate Causes are of those things which appear in the World. I do not go about to dispute, whether many things are not better resolv'd by the *New* than by the *Old Philosophy*; I am not concern'd in the Doctrines of *Antiperistasis*, *Fuga vacui*, *Occult Qualities*, *Intentional Species*, and such like: And I confess, that the *Particular Histories* and *Experiments* relating to things of Nature, as to the *Bodies of Animals*, the *Vegetation of Plants*, and *Particular Qualities*, tend much more to the true knowledge of Nature, than the mere nice and dry general Speculations about *Forms* and *Qualities*: which have been handled in such a manner, that they have been like some of *Aristotle's Books*, set forth, but not to be understood. If therefore several *Qualities* of Bodies be explain'd *mechanically*, i. e. by virtue of the known Affections of Matter, viz. *Size*, *Figure*, *Motion*, &c. and that new ones can be produc'd by changing the *Texture* or *Motion*, or some other *Mechanical Affection* of Matter; it is far from my design to oppose them, or any such Discourses, which tend only to give us more light into the *Occult Nature* (tho' not *Qualities*) of things. For to say, that Things proceed from *Occult Qualities*, is in other words to say, that they come from we know not what; and none can take that for a good Answer from one that pretends to give the reason of a thing.

But to proceed more distinctly, I make no difficulty of allowing these following Principles, as to the *Nature* and *Qualities* of Natural Bodies; which are most insisted upon by a late Excellent Philosopher, and a truly *Christian Virtuoso* among us. (1) That there is One Universal Matter of Bodies, that is, a Substance extended, divisible, and impenetrable. (2) That there is a diversity of Motion in several parts of Matter; so it be not said to be in Matter from it self as essential to it; for then it must always move, and there could be no Rest, and so no Composition. (3) That by virtue of this Motion, Matter is divided into greater and lesser parts, which have their Determination, Size and Figure. (4) That besides these, their Situation is to be consider'd; that is, their Posture and order, with respect to one another: and when the several parts joyn together to make up one Body, that is called the *Texture* of them. (5) That there is a different *Texture* both in our *Organs* of Sense, and in the *Objects* which make impressions upon them, with a different Motion, Figure and Size; from whence arise our different Sensations, and our Apprehensions of different sensible *Qualities* in things. (6) That by a Coalition of the smaller Particles of Matter into one Body, there are different Substances in the World of distinct Denominations; but by a change of *Texture* or *Motion*, or other Properties of Matter, that compound

Mr. Boyle
of the Origin
of
Forms and
Qualities.

Body may be put into a different state, which may be called its Alteration or Corruption; and if the change be so made as to offend our Senses, it is then called *Putrefaction*. (7) That there may be an incomprehensible variety in the Coalition and Texture of the minute Particles of Matter, which may be so different from each other, as to be thought to be endued with distinct Qualities. As the 24 Letters make up an inconceivable number of words by the different placing of them.

But when I have allow'd these, I can by no means agree, 1. That there are no other Qualities in Bodies, but what relate to our Senses. It's true we could not be sensible of Heat and Cold, but from the impressions made on our Senses: but supposing we were not sensible of the different agitation of Particles without us; it doth not at all follow, that there is not a real Alteration in the objects themselves, as that the Fire doth not burn, if we do not feel the heat of it; and why that disposition in Matter, which is apt to produce such a sense in us, may not be called an inherent Quality, is not so easy to apprehend. But if there be such a real difference in Bodies, as that one will make such an impression on our Senses, and another will not, we cannot in reason say that there is no Quality in things, but that it wholly depends on our Apprehension. It is granted, *That Snow hath a greater disposition to reflect light outwards, than a Coal or Soot, when the Sun shines upon all three.* Now why this disposition should be called a distinct Quality from what is in the other two, seems to me a Dispute of no consequence. So, if an Eccho be nothing but the cavity of a place, whereby it is dispos'd to reflect the sound back to the place from whence it came, altho' it must not be called the Quality of the place which makes the Eccho; yet it cannot be denied to be the peculiar Figure and Disposition of the parts which make it. So that, if Men will allow such inherent Dispositions in things to produce what we call *Qualities* in us, the difference will not be found worth the disputing. And I have wonder'd Persons of Judgment and skill in these matters lay so much weight upon it, as tho' the Quality must be said to be only in us, when it is confess'd to arise from a different Disposition in the parts without us.

Sydenham
de Hydropē
p. 160.

2. That there are no other Qualities in Bodies, but such as an account may be given of by the foregoing Principles: For I do not find it possible for any Person by virtue of these Principles to give an account either of the make or composition of the Bodies of Animals, or of the disposition and relation of the inward Parts, or of the instruments of Nature for preservation of the Individual or Species; or of the Diseases they are subject to, or of the proper methods of cure. And the more any Person searches into all the Mechanical attempts of this kind, the more unsatisfy'd he will find himself about them; and will see reason to conclude, as a Learned Physician hath done, *That we may know enough for our general direction what to do, but that the secret Causes are so hidden from us, as we have reason to admire the Supreme Artificer in what we know, and to adore him in what we do not.*

These things being premis'd, I come to the main point, which is, Whether Matter being put into motion, can in a Mechanical manner produce that frame of the Universe which we see, and the several

several things which are in the Heavens, and in this Globe of Earth and Sea.

To make this Matter as clear as we can, we must first consider the *General Principles*; and then proceed to the Account given of the several *Phænomena*, as they are commonly called.

I begin with the *General Principles*, which are these;

That the Matter of the Universe is one and the same extended Substance; and that all the properties we clearly perceive in it, are, that it is divisible and capable of motion in its parts. I. Princip. I. 11. n. 23.

That this matter is without bounds, and that the Idea of Extension is the same with that of Corporeal Substance. II. N. 21.

That it is capable of division into so many parts, as we cannot comprehend the utmost bounds of its divisibility. III. N. 34.

That God alone is the first and universal Cause of the motion of matter, which continues the same in the whole, altho' it vary in the several parts. IV. N. 36.

That there are certain Laws of motion, whereof these are the chief: V.

1. That every part continues in the state it was in, unless mov'd by an External Cause. N. 37.

2. That all motion of it self is in a right Line, but by other Bodies it becomes oblique, and all matter being in motion it becomes circular. N. 39.

3. That when two Bodies meet, the weaker loses not its motion, but changes its tendency, and the stronger loses so much as it gives to the weaker. N. 40.

4. That the parts of matter were at first divided into many parcels of an equal and indifferent size, and had among them all that motion which is now in the World. VI. Princip. 4. Pars. 3. n. 46.

That these Particles of matter could not at first be spherical, because then there must be a void space between them, but by force of motion and natural attrition they became so. VII. N. 48.

That those lesser Particles which came off from the Angles of the bigger, fill up all the empty spaces between them, and have a quicker motion. VIII. N. 49. &c.

That besides these, there are some Particles which are large and slower than the rest, being full of Angles, and so more apt to stick to one another, which by reason of their passage thro' the triangular spaces between the globular Particles become wreathed. IX. N. 88.

And these are the three Elements out of which he supposes all Bodies to be made; and accordingly the Ingenious Author hath framed a *System of the Universe* with great Art and appearance of Reason; but at sometimes he is content to let it pass as a bare *Hypothesis*, agreeing with the *Phænomena of the World*; but withal he saith, *That he makes use of no Principles but such as are most evident, and deduces nothing from them but by Mathematical Consequences.* And in an *Epistle to Mersennus*, to whom he opened his Mind more freely, he saith, *That he should think he knew nothing in Physics, if he could only tell how things might be, if he could not demonstrate that they could be no otherwise.* But to another Person he calls it his *Romance of the World*; which he confesses he was very well pleas'd with. Part. III. n. 44. N. 43, 44. Ep. 10. II. Ep. 37. Ep. 103.

But so have not others been, who have taken great pains both in *Philosophy* and *Mathematics*; and altho' they cannot deny this *Hypothesis* to be very consistent and well put together, yet they will by no means allow it to be a true and satisfactory account of the *Nature* and *Formation* of the World. But it is not my business to lay together the Objections of others against the *Cartesian Hypothesis*, but to shew the tendency of it to *Atheism* in these two Points.

1. In setting up a Notion of *Matter*, or *Corporeal Substance* independent upon the Power of *GOD*.

2. In undertaking to give an Account of the *Phænomena* of the *Universe* from the *Mechanical Laws* of motion without a particular *Providence*.

As to the former; His first Principle is, *That Matter is one and the same thro' the Universe; and is every where known by its essential property, which is Extension*: and therein he places the *Essence of a Corporeal Substance*; (as will presently appear.) If then the very *Essence* of *Matter* be independent upon *God's* Power, so that he can neither create nor annihilate it, what becomes of the *Creation* of the World according to this *Hypothesis*?

Princip.
Part. 2.
n. 23.

Du Hamel
de consensu
vet. & nov.
Philosoph.
l. 1. c. 9. n. 9.
P. Petiti
Dissert. de
Principiis
Cart. p. 18.
Huet. Conf.
Philosoph.
Cartes. c. 8.

n. 4.

Part. II.
n. 9.

Part. 3.
n. 46.

Part. II.
n. 64.

Some object against his *Notion* of *Matter*, and say, that he hath confounded *Mathematical* and *Physical Bodies* with one another. For, say they, the strength of his whole *Hypothesis* depends upon the supposition that *Matter is nothing but Extension, and therefore there can be no Vacuity, because all Space is extended, and therefore Matter is Infinite*, or as he calls it *Indefinite*; but so, as he positively saith, that the *Idea of Space is the same with that of Corporeal Substance, and that we can conceive nothing in it but Extension*. Which they say, is true, if we speak of *Mathematical Quantity*, but not of *Real and Physical*. But, saith *Des Cartes*, *Men may pretend to distinguish Corporeal Substance from Quantity; but they utter that in words, which they cannot comprehend in their Minds; for either they mean nothing by Substance, or attribute a confus'd notion of an Incorporeal Substance to a Corporeal; and leave the true Idea of Corporeal Substance to Extension*. But this is very far from clearing this matter. For himself lays it as a fundamental Principle, *That it is capable of Division into Parts, and was actually divided by God himself*. Now I desire to know what that was which was so divided? It must be *Something*; and that not an *Incorporeal*, but a *Corporeal Substance*: not pure *Extension*, but a *Body that was extended*; and of which the Substantial parts of the *Universe* are compos'd. Nay, his whole *Hypothesis* depends upon the actual *Division of Matter into Parts that are equal, or very near it*; without which his three Elements could not be made; which arise from the Motion and mutual attrition of those Particles; and yet he affirms in the Conclusion of the 2^d Part of his Principles, *That he owns no other Corporeal Matter, but such as Geometricians call Quantity, and is the thing which their Demonstrations are conversant about*. But is there no difference between *Geometrical* and *Physical Quantity*? It's true that in *Mathematical Quantity* there is nothing but *Extension*; but doth it therefore follow, that there is nothing more in a *Real and Physical Body*? How can we imagin that *GOD* should create mere *Extension* in the

the World; and that out of that all the Bodies in the Universe are fram'd? Nay, upon *Des Cartes* his *Principles* it is impossible that Matter should either be created or annihilated. For according to him, the *Idea of Matter and Extension are the same*; but he saith positively, that the *Idea of Extension and Space are the same*; therefore if *Space* can neither be created nor annihilated, neither can *Matter*. And it seem'd strange to me, that a Person so sagacious, should not lay these things better together; but his *Mathematical Notions* ran so much in his Mind, that his endeavor to accommodate them to the nature of things, was that which led him into such inextricable difficulties. It is well observ'd by *Monf. Du Hamel*, that the great mistakes in *Natural Philosophy* have risen from Mens applying their former *Notions* to it; thus, saith he, the common *Philosophers* confounded *Natural things* with *Metaphysical speculations*: on the other side, *Des Cartes* being a great *Mathematician*, endeavor'd to reduce *Nature* to *Geometry*, and so consider'd nothing in *Body* but *Extension*. *Extension*, saith he, which constitutes *Space*, is the same which constitutes *Bodies*; but we consider it more particularly in *Bodies*, and more generally in *Space*, which is not chang'd, as the other is. But is there then nothing to make a *Body*, but mere *Extension*? I mean not a *Mathematical*, but a real *Physical Body*. No, saith he, in the *Idea of a Body*, we may cast off other *Qualities*, as *Hardness*, *Color*, *Gravity*, *Heat* and *Cold*, and yet a *Body* remains; to which then nothing belongs but *Extension*, which is common to *Body* and *Space*. This is not so deep reasoning, as might have been expected from so great a Master of it. For altho' the particular *Qualities* may be cast off, yet the *Capacity* of them can no more than *Extension*; as is plain in *Figure* and *Size*, as well as *Hardness*, &c. any one particular *Figure* and *Size* may be abstracted from *Body*, but it is impossible to conceive a *Body*, but it must be capable of one or other. Besides, all this proves no more but that *Extension* is the *Inseparable Property of Body*. And what then? Must the whole *Essence* of a *Body* consist in one inseparable *Property*? But this is all the *Idea* we have of *Body*. Then I say, our *Ideas* of things are short and imperfect, and there is no forming *Worlds* upon such *Ideas*. And this was the fundamental mistake of *Des Cartes*. He lays this down as his ground of certainty; or that we cannot take falsehood for truth, if we only give assent to such things as we clearly and distinctly perceive. Then he goes on, that the things which fall under our perception, are either things and their *Properties*, or eternal *Truths*. Of things, the most general are *Substance*, *Duration*, *Order*, *Number* and such like, which extend to all kinds of things. And he saith, they may all be comprehended under those two: Of *Intellectual* or *Thinking Substances*; or of *Material*, i. e. of *Bodily* and *Extended Substances*. Thus far all is clear and distinct. Then, as to the *Notion of Substances*, he saith, By that we can understand nothing but a thing which so exists, as to need nothing else to support it. There is but one *Substance* in the *World* which needs no support, and that is *God*. All created *Substances* need his support; and the *Notion* of them is, that they are things which only stand in need of *God's* concurrence to support them. Hitherto we find nothing to stick at. But how come we to have an *Idea* of created *Substances*? Not from the bare *Existence*, for that doth not affect

De Con-
sensu vet.
& nov.
Philosoph.
l. i. c. 9. n. 8.

Part. 2.
n. 10.

N. 11.

Princip.
P. I. n. 43.

N. 48.

N. 51.

N. 52.

affect us: but it must be from some Properties, Attributes or Qualities; because Nothing can be attributed to Nothing. From whence we conclude from any Real Attribute, that there must be a thing or Substance to which it belongs. All this appears very well still; only we must take notice, that all Properties do assure us of a Real Substance under them: Which is very true, relating to Physical Bodies. But it is possible he may from hence aim at proving, That there must be a Corporeal Substance in Imaginary Space, because there is an Extension there, and nothing cannot be attributed to nothing; therefore there must be a Real Body there. But I think it may be truly answer'd, That the Extension is no more real than the Space is, and implies no more but a Capacity of having Bodies which it had not; that is, that God might create Bodies beyond this World; and if he did so, then there would be a real Extension; but as we conceive it, the Imaginary Space is no more but a Possibility for Bodies existing out of the compass of this Universe. And therefore I deny this to be any real Extension; and that it can be no Real Substance, because Des Cartes himself, but just before, owned that a created Substance was that which stood in need of God to support it. Now is it possible to imagin that Space needs a Divine Concourse? Therefore he must distinguish it from Substance: or else he must affirm it to be an uncreated Substance; which overthrows his distinction here between Created and Uncreated Substances. As to his Maxim, that nothing can have no properties, it certainly relates to Substance, and not to a mere Space; which by the common sense of Mankind must be distinguish'd from Bodily Substance; and there can be no greater prejudice to Philosophy, than to go against that. Now let us proceed. From every Attribute a Substance is known; but there is one chief Property which constitutes the Essence and Nature, to which the rest are referr'd. So, saith he, Extension makes the Nature of a Corporeal Substance, and Cogitation of a Thinking Substance. For every thing which we attribute to Body, supposes Extension, which is only the Mode of the thing extended; as all things attributed to our Minds, are different Modes of thinking. And thus we come to two clear and distinct Notions or Ideas; one of a Thinking Substance, and the other of a Corporeal; if we distinguish between the Attributes of Thinking and Extension. After this he saith, That Cogitation and Extension may be consider'd, as constituting the Natures of a Thinking and Corporeal Substance; and so their clear Ideas are, a Substance which thinks, and a Substance which is extended: but then these Properties, he saith, may be consider'd likewise only as Modes belonging to those Substances; and so they make a distinct Idea of themselves, not without the Substances, but as Modes belonging to them.

N. 53.

N. 54.

N. 63.

N. 64.

Part. 2.
N. 9.

Thus I have carefully laid down his own Notions about these matters. And now arises the main difficulty, viz. how upon these grounds the Idea of Space, and of Corporeal Substance should be the same? All that I can find is, that Extension is really Corporeal Nature, altho' it be call'd an Accident. But did not himself distinguish it as a Mode of Matter, and as a Substance extended? And was not this look'd on as such a Property of Matter, as Thinking is of a Mind? But can any Man say, that Thinking by it self is an Intellectual Substance; how then can Extension by it self be a Corporeal Substance? And yet, if it be not, as I can see no reason from

from his own grounds why it should be; then his Supposition of the *Infiniteness of Matter*, of the *Plenarty of the World*, and the *circular motion of his Particles of Matter*, on which his whole *Hypothesis* depends, comes to nothing. And what a strange foundation is *Des Cartes* his World built upon? I could hardly believe that so thinking a Man should not discern the Weakness of his own Grounds. But instead of that, it is plain that he laid great weight upon it: For when a learned Man of our own, and then a great admirer of him, objected to him, *that he extended the notion of Corporeal matter too far; but he thought it of no great consequence to the main of his Principles*; *Des Cartes* takes him up smartly for it, for he saith, *he look'd on it, as one of the chief and most certain Principles of his Philosophy*. And in the *Fragment* of his last Answer, which he liv'd not to finish, he persisted in his Opinion, *That the empty Space was a real Body, because nothing can have no properties*. But there is a difference between *Real Properties* and *Imaginary*; if there be any Bodies in that Space, there will be *Extension, Distance, &c.* but it is a very unconceivable thing that one of his judgment should so much contend to the last, *That there was a difference of parts in such a space, where there was nothing but space.* i.e. That there must be something, where there is nothing. And therefore *Bernier* observes, *That those who confound Space and Body, run themselves into strange absurdities by a Corporeal Substance to fill all possible space, or rather to be space it self; and that God cannot annihilate the least part of it.* And he concludes it to be *neither Substance nor Accident, but a mere Capacity*. And it was not an improbable Conjecture of that Learned Person who wrote to *Des Cartes* upon this Argument, that this Doctrine of his, as he explain'd it, laid the foundation of *Spinoza's* opinion of the *Infinite extent and power of matter*; but I cannot think that *Des Cartes* himself intended it so, however the other understood it. And it is great pity one of so clear a Capacity in other things, should so stiffly adhere to so unreasonable an Opinion. And yet we find his Disciples go on to defend him in this Matter. For when *Monf. Huet* had objected, *That Des Cartes had made Extension, which was an Accident, to be a Substance*; *Monf. Regis* answers, *That he confounded Extension which was of the essence of Body, with the Extension which belonged to Quantity; whereof the one is considered in it self, and the other with respect to Magnitude*. But let it be consider'd how he pleases, it is still but a Mode belonging to a Substance, and not the Substance it self. However, he refers us to his Book of *Physics* for the clearing of this Matter. And there we find indeed, that he distinguishes three sorts of Bodies, *Physical, Mechanical, and Mathematical*. *A Physical Body is one compos'd of many insensible parts in its due order and figure, from whence result the Physical properties.* *A Mechanical Body is one compos'd of gross and sensible parts, which by their figure and situation are proper for particular motions.* *A Mathematical Body is a Body consider'd with its proper extension under a regular figure, as a Cube or a Cylinder.* But this doth not shew that *Des Cartes* did not confound a *Mathematical* and *Physical Body*: For it is an easy thing to find out distinctions to avoid a difficulty; but then they ought to be

*Epist. Des
Cartes To.
I. Ep. 87.
Ep. 88.*

Ep. 93.

*Bernier A-
bregé de
Gassend.
To. I. p. 25.*

*H. Mori
Oper. Phil.
To. 2.
p. 242.*

*Censur.
Cartes. l. 5.
n. 1.
Regis Ré-
ponse à la
Censure,
ch. V. Art.
I. p. 255.*

*La Physiq.
Regis To.
I. p. 273.*

agreeable to the general sense of those Terms. But here a *Mathematical Body* is confin'd to *Regular Figures*; whereas the general notion of it is such a Body as *Des Cartes* himself means, when he calls it, *Geometrical Quantity*, such as is the object of *Mathematical Demonstrations*: i. e. of any kind of Figures abstract from Physical Bodies; and this, he saith, is that matter he treated of. And to such a Body Extension alone belongs, and to none else, either *Physical* or *Mechanical*.

Here then lies the difficulty as to *Des Cartes* his Principles: he considers Matter *Geometrically*, i. e. *Abstractedly*, with respect to bare *Extension*, and yet supposes the effects of *Physical Bodies*; such as *Division of parts of matter one from another*, and a *motion of those parts* in order to the composition of things. But *Mathematical Extension* is capable of no *Division* but in the Mind; for no Man imagines the Earth really divided by the *Parallels* and *Meridians*, &c. and the *Division of the parts of an empty space* is nothing but a *Mathematical Division*, which implies nothing really in that space, but a mere act of the Mind in conceiving the distance between the several parts of it.

Prim. Part.
II. n. 16.

N. 18.

Réponse
aux Reflex.
de M. Du
Hamel,
Part. 2.
ch. 4.

But *Des Cartes* proves it impossible *there should be a vacuum in Nature*, because the *extension of Space and Body are all one*. But may not *GOD* annihilate that Air which is between the sides of a Vessel, and would there not be a *Vacuum* between? No; he saith *It is impossible to conceive such a Cavity without Extension, or such an Extension without Matter*; and if the middle substance were annihilated, the sides must come together, because there would be nothing between. By which we see, that this Notion of the Identity of *Extension* and *Corporeal Substance* had sunk so deep into his Mind, that he makes *Annihilation* of the Substance of Matter impossible to Divine Power: for there can be no such Vacuity, but there must remain *Extension*, and consequently a *Corporeal Substance*. This hath been objected to the followers of *Des Cartes*, and lately by *Du Hamel*, in his Censure of *Regis* his *Cartesian Philosophy*; and it is worth the while to see what answer he makes to it. He saith, *That his objection about the Annihilation of the Air between the Heaven and Earth, can be of no force to prove a Vacuum; because if there be no space, they must touch one another; and if they do not, there must be space, and consequently a Corporeal Substance*. But saith *Du Hamel*, may not *GOD* by the same power by which he preserves the Bodies between Heaven and Earth, destroy them, and then there must be a Vacuum? He answers plainly, *That an Annihilation of the substance of matter is impossible, even to the power of God; because his Will is immutable*. He grants that *GOD* may destroy the Air, and all other Bodies as to their Form, or present Modification; but he cannot destroy their Matter, i. e. their *Extension*, which is a true substance, and substances are indefectible. Where we plainly see that the *Cartesians* assert the necessary Existence of Matter, and that it is not in the power of *GOD* to destroy it; and whatever they may talk of the Will of *GOD*, they deny any power to exercise it with respect to Matter.

But *Du Hamel* proceeds. How can those Bodies touch one another, when *GOD* can create another Body between? No, saith *Regis*, *That still supposes a space between; and if there be a space, there*

there must be a body, and so a vacuum is a repugnancy in it self. But this Space, saith *Du Hamel*, is nothing but imaginary, a fiction of the Mind, and there is no arguing from thence to the Nature of things. *Regis* replies, that their Ideas depend on the objective realities of things; and that the Idea of space or extension is one of their primitive Ideas; and that it represents substance, and all substance is incorruptible. Still we see the necessary existence of Matter is look'd on by them as a fundamental Principle, and depending on primitive Ideas.

Monf. *Bernier* puts the case of Air being annihilated between two walls; and he desires to know of the *Cartesians*, whether these two walls will come together or not? They say, *They must, if there be nothing between.* True, saith he, there is nothing Corporeal, or that touches our Senses, no Substance or Accidents, but there is a true distance remaining. Suppose a Chamber 20 foot long, 15 foot bread, and 10 foot high; and these dimensions to be measured, and one wall 20 foot distant from the other: it cannot be said that it is the Air that makes the distance between them; how then comes this distance to be quite lost, if the Air be destroy'd? They have no answer, he saith, but to say, It is an impossible Supposition; and they will rather deny God's Omnipotency in annihilating the Air, than let go their Opinion. Monf. *Regis* in his *Physic*s, takes notice of *Bernier's* Doubts, and in answer to them he resolves it at last into this, *That it is impossible there should be an Annihilation, so as to make a Vacuum; because Substances cannot cease: not from the Nature of things, but from the immutable Will of God.* And after all possible Objections, here they stick, and seem resolv'd to maintain, that *Extension* and *Matter* are the same.

Even Monf. *Robault* himself, altho' in some things he saw it necessary to leave *Des Cartes*, yet in this he persists, *That the Essence of Matter consists in Extension, and that Space and Matter are the same, and therefore a Vacuum is impossible.* And to the Objection about the walls of a Chamber standing, when the Air is annihilated, he avoids answering as to God's Omnipotency; but, he saith, according to our Understanding the walls must come together. And to that about the wall's distance not depending on the Air, he answers, *That the being of the walls do's not depend upon the Air within, but the state or disposition of them doth upon the Extension between them.* Which he supposes impossible to be taken away, and that the Substance of Matter hath a necessary Existence.

The substance of this Argument comes to this. *Des Cartes* makes all the matter of the World to be one and the same: but he asserts the Essence of Matter to be extension; and that Extension can neither be created nor annihilated: and therefore it is impossible upon his Principles, to make out the dependence of Matter upon an infinite Creator. If it be said, that *Des Cartes* expressly saith, *That it seemed manifest to him that there is no other General Cause which created matter with motion and rest but God;* And that in the Fragment of his last Answer to Dr. H. M. he saith, *That if matter were left to it self, it would not move, but that it was first moved by God:* I answer, That according to his Principles the Substance of Matter must be before, because there must be Space; and

Abregé To.
I. p. 13.

Reg. Phys.
Part. I.
ch. 3. n. 3.

Robault.
Tr. Phys.
l. 1. c. 7.
n. 9.
C. 8. 1. 2. 3.

Prin. P. 11.
n. 36.
Epist. To. I.
p. 93.

Space and Matter are the same. And I can see no possible way of clearing him, but by saying, that he held two sorts of *Matter*; one part is *Physical matter*, which God gave motion to at first when he created it, and out of which the World was fram'd; and the other *Mathematical*, which consists in mere *Extension*: but how to reconcile these two to his asserting *One and the same matter in the World*, is a thing above my Understanding.

II.

The next thing to be consider'd, is *Des Cartes* his undertaking to give an Account of the *Phænomena* of the *Universe* from the *Mechanical Laws of motion*, without a particular Providence. We are told by some, who have been very conversant with the Atheistical Persons of our Age, That *they despise the Epicurean Hypothesis of the World's being made by a fortuitous concurrence of Atoms, as a ridiculous thing; and think Moses his Account more probable than that*: (which is a great favor indeed.) So that it is to little purpose now to spend time in shewing how *precarious* and *unsatisfactory* the *Principles* of *Epicurus* were, who suppos'd motion in matter, without the least ground for it; but *Des Cartes* was a Man of too great sense and judgment to commit such blunders as *Epicurus* was guilty of (whom one of his sharpest Adversaries allows to have been of a great and searching Wit, well skilled in Geometry, to which he endeavor'd to reduce Natural Philosophy; (altho' he fail'd in his Attempt) That he had a faculty of expressing his mind clearly in few words above any either ancient or modern Writer.) Therefore it will be necessary to consider what *Des Cartes* yields, that we may not mistake or mis-represent his design.

Fr. Cuperi
Arcan.
Atheism.
l. 2. c. 3.

Huet. Conf.
Phil. Cart.
l. 8. n. 4.

1. He grants, that God did at first create Matter, which was capable of rest or motion.

2. That Matter left to it self would be without any motion; and therefore the first motion was from God.

3. That God by his ordinary Providence doth preserve as much motion in the World, as was given at first.

4. That we have no reason to suppose any other alteration in the ordinary course of things, according to the Laws of motion, than what we are certain of by Experience or Revelation.

And now the main point is, Whether matter being thus put into motion, can produce the *Phænomena* of the World, without any farther interposition of Providence, than only to preserve the motion of matter? For which we must consider, That he doth not give a satisfactory account, 1. of the *Nature* and *Laws of motion*; nor 2. of the *Phænomena of the Universe*.

(I.)

As to the former, I shall inquire into his *Notion of Motion*, and then of the *Laws* of it.

Princ.
Part. II.
n. 25.

(i) He asserts, That *Motion*, according to his Principles, is barely a *mode of Matter*, without any inward Principle of Motion. For *Motion*, he saith, is the change of the situation of Bodies, with respect to one another; or a *removing a Body from the vicinity of some Bodies to the neighborhood of others*; and he places it in such a *Translation* on purpose, that it may be understood to be only a *Mode of the Matter moved, as Figure is of a thing figured*. But it is not so easy to understand that *Motion*, which imports an Action, should be only a *Mode of the Matter moved*, as it is that *Figure* belongs only to the thing figured. For it is not possible for

for the Figure to be any where else, but in that Body which hath it; but it is possible to apprehend Motion to come either from an external Agent, or an internal Principle; and so it is not a mere mode of the thing moved. But when the whole weight is laid upon the Nature of *Motion* in this case, some greater evidence ought to have been given how motion being once given to Matter, as a Mode of it, must always continue, when the resistance of Bodies doth certainly weaken it so as to need a new force to repair it. For either all motion of matter must be by a violent impulse, without regard to the different force or magnitude of things; (which is to overthrow the due Laws of Motion) or else there must be a proportion in the force of the mover to the resistance of the Body moved: and if there be a regard to that proportion (or else the smallest Body might move the greatest) then there must be a resistance in that Body which is moved: But every resistance gives a check to the motion of that Body which moved it, and every check lessens the impulse; and so from a gradual resistance there must come a gradual decay, till at last all motion must cease; as it is in all Machines, whose motion depends upon external force. *Des Cartes* indeed saith, *That whatever motion is lost by one Body is communicated to the next, and so the first motion is still preserved.* But it is hardly possible to make it appear, that Motion is not so much weakened by resistance, but that it can preserve it self in a degree of motion proportionable to that which is not communicated to another. For the frequency of impulse lessens the power of reflection; and it appears in Light, and Sounds, and other things, that whatever is reflected grows weaker. So that resistance must gradually weaken motion. And in the *motion of projected Bodies*, *Des Cartes* himself grants, *That the motion continues till it be hinder'd by the resistance it meets with; and he saith, It is manifest that the motion is retarded by the Air, and other ambient fluids, and so it cannot continue long.* But is that an Argument that *Bodies do continue motion, till they be hinder'd, and that motion is only a mode of the Body mov'd*? Whatever Mode it is, it comes from the force of the immediate Agent, and not from the motion at first given to Matter; and here we see the resistance it meets with, soon gives a stop to it. Therefore it seems unconceivable that all the motion in the World, considering the continual resistance of Bodies, should be the same mode of Matter, which was at first given to it. And as to his definition of *Motion*, some have undertaken to demonstrate it to be false, by shewing how one Body may come nearer to another, without changing the situation of the parts next adjoining to it; and that there is no such reciprocal motion as he asserts, altho' there be a reciprocal change of situation, which is unavoidable. But *Monf. Robault* saith, *That motion is to be taken with respect to the next, and not to any remote Bodies.* However *Monf. Regis* thought fit to quit that definition of *Des Cartes* for another, which *Du Hamel* saith is not at all better; but he thought it necessary to take in the *Efficient Cause of motion*, which makes it not to be a mere mode of the matter moved. And but for the Authority of *Mathematicians* and *Philosophers*, it would be thought ridiculous for a thing not to be said to be moved, because it doth not change the situation as

Part. II.
n. 38.

H. Mori
Enchirid.
Metaphys.
Part. I. c. 7.

Robault.
Tr. Physic.
c. 10. n. 1.

Regis Ré-
ponse aux
Réflexions
Critique
de M. Du
Hamel,
ch. 7.

to the next Bodies about it; as that the Kernel of a Nut is not moved, because it is thrown with the Shell upon it; or that the Wine is not moved in a Ship at Sea, because it keeps within the Vessel. So, if the Earth be carry'd about with the force of the Vortex wherein it is, 'tis as certainly moved as a Pendulum is with the motion of the Ship, altho' it hath a proper motion of its own.

Des Cartes
Prin. Part.
II. n. 45,
&c.

Réponse,
&c. Part. 2.
ch. 11.

Prin. Part.
II n. 36.

Mr. Boyle
of the high
Veneration
of Man's
Intellect to-
wards God,
p. 41, 42.

Réponse
aux Refle-
xions, part.
2. c. 13.

Prin. Part.
II. n. 36.

But *Des Cartes* undertakes to give an account of the Proportion of the increase and lessening of motion, upon the meeting of two hard Bodies, and he lays down *seven Rules* to determin it; but it falls out very unhappily, *that six of them* are deny'd to be true, and that the first doth not answer the end it was brought for. This was a bold charge on so great a Mathematician; but all that *Regis* saith in answer to it is, *That he did not undertake to defend all Des Cartes his Rules of motion, because they did not appear to him exact enough.* But if the Particular Rules of motion be no better fix'd nor understood, how come they to be so certain, that the same quantity of motion is still preserv'd in the World? For that *Des Cartes* hath recourse to the immutable Will of God, which hath determin'd it. No doubt if God hath determin'd it, so it must be. But from whence comes *Des Cartes* to know this to be the immutable Will of God? What antecedent Reason is there to satisfy any Man's Mind, that God by his immutable Will must keep up the same proportion of motion in the World? Why may not God alter or suspend the Laws of motion, as to the parts of matter, in what way or manner he thinks good? What repugnancy is there to the Divine Nature in so doing? So that these Arguments *à priori*, (as they call them) have no kind of Evidence as to such matters, which may be or not be, as God pleases. Besides, what necessity was there that Motion must be only a Mode of Matter? And that Mode to be preserv'd by such Laws of Motion, which are so very uncertain? A very Skilful and Ingenious Philosopher of our own saith, *That this Rule, which he saith is the most useful of all Des Cartes's, is very metaphysical, and not very cogent to him. And he doth not see how it can be demonstrated; and he questions whether it be agreeable to Experience.* And he was a Person very favorable to *Des Cartes*, as far as he could; as appears on all occasions in his Writings; but here we see he gives up his Fundamental Rule. *Du Hamel* saith, *The Argument from God's Immutability is no force, because it holds not as to Extrinsecal Actions.* *Regis*, to defend this, runs into that Absurdity to make God a necessary Agent, because God's Will and his Essence are the same; which overthrows all Religion in the Consequence of it.

But *Des Cartes* himself excepts such mutations as are made in Matter, by evident Experience, or Divine Revelation. What is the meaning of this? Can that be an Immutable Will of God, which is contradicted by Evident Experience, and Divine Revelation? Or were these words only put in to avoid Censure? As the World was said to be Indefinite, lest he should be charg'd with making the World Infinite; and the Definition of Motion was altered, to avoid Galileo's fate: But there is no dissembling in this matter; if it be contradicted by Evident Experience, it can be no fix'd and Immutable Rule; if it can be alter'd in case of Miracles, the Argument from God's Immutability signifies nothing. For,

if

if it be no repugnancy to the Divine Nature to alter, or suspend the Laws of Motion, as he sees cause; then we can have no assurance as to GOD's Will any farther than himself hath declar'd it; and consequently they must prove that GOD hath manifested this to be his Will. But saith *Robault*, *It is unbecoming Philosophers on all occasions to run to Miracles and Divine Power.* Who puts them upon it? We may certainly allow an ordinary course of Providence, as to Causes and Effects, without asserting these Notions of *Des Cartes*; but this is a pleasant way of taking it for granted, that none but his Principles are fit for *Philosophers*. *Robault. Part. I. c. 10. n. 13.*

Come we now to examin his *catholic Laws of Motion*: and of all things, those ought to be very clear and certain, because so much depends upon them; and yet I am afraid we shall hardly find one of them to be so. (II.)

The first of them is, *That every thing remains in the same state it was in, unless it be changed by External Causes.* From whence he concludes, *That which is moved always continues to be moved; and that nothing tends to rest, which is contrary to the Laws of Nature, because Rest is contrary to Motion: and nothing tends to its contrary, for that would be to tend to its own destruction.* The main thing intended by this, is to assert the continuance of Motion in the parts of the Universe, upon their being once put into it; so that Rest is a state of violence to a Body once moved, because Rest and Motion are contrary to each other. But this is a very weak Foundation to build so much upon: For, we are not to consider Rest and Motion Abstractly, but Physically, together with the Bodies in which they are: And I think it will be very hard to persuade any Body endued with Sense and Motion, that after wearisome Motion, he doth aim at his own destruction by seeking for Rest. This is a sort of Reasoning would not be expected from *Philosophers*; that because Motion and rest are contrary Motions, therefore no Body in Motion can tend to Rest. *But every thing continues in the state it was in, till it be put out of it; therefore every thing in motion must continue to move.* This is not clearly express'd. For if it be meant, that every thing from it self continues in its original state, then it is not true. For Matter, he confesses, would rest, if GOD did not give motion to it; and so it must continue to rest, and there could be no Motion at all: If it be meant, that every thing continues in the state GOD put it into, unless he appointed several Causes to alter it, then it is true; but it doth not serve his purpose. For if GOD hath appointed both Motion and Rest for some Bodies, it can never be said that such tend to their own destruction, when they tend to that Rest which GOD and Nature appointed for them. If GOD hath appointed them for continual Motion, as the great Bodies of the Universe, then they must continue in it, not by virtue of any inherent Law of Motion, but by the immutable Will of GOD. *Des Cartes* saw it necessary for GOD to put Matter into motion, but he would have the framing of the Laws of this motion himself; whereas he had acted more respectfully towards his Maker, and more like a Philosopher, *i. e.* more consonantly to his own Principles, to have left GOD that made the World and gave motion to Matter, to have settled those Laws of Motion, which were agree-

II.
Princip. Part. II. n. 37.

agreeable to his Infinite Wisdom. For these Notions are unbecoming *Philosophers*, to make *Motion* a mere *Mode* of *Matter*; and this *Mode* to be supported by *Divine Concourse*; but so, that *Motion* and *Rest* being contraries, whatever is in *Motion* must continue in it; because *Motion* and *Rest* being contraries, nothing can tend to its own destruction.

Part. 2.
n. 39.
Part. 3.
n. 55.

N. 56.

Response,
Sec. part. 2.
ch. 10.

Response
max Reflex.
part. 2.
c. 9.

Besides, I know not how to reconcile this with another Law of Nature, as he calls it, *That all Bodies in a circular motion endeavor what in them lies to recede from the center of their motion*. Is not a Body put into a *Circular Motion* in a state belonging to it? How comes it then not to continue in that state, but to endeavor all it can to get out of it? And yet all the *Phænomena* of *Light* depends upon this Law: *That the round particles of the second Element endeavor to recede from their centres; not from any cogitation*, (no doubt of it) *but because they are so plac'd and incited to that Motion*. Is that possible, and yet *all Bodies continue in the state they are in*, when they endeavor what they can to get out of it? Are not these more contrary than *Motion* and *Rest*? I do not meddle with *External Hindrances*, but the *Natural Endeavors* of Bodies. But it may be said, *That Des Cartes intends his Rule only of Primary and Simple Motions, and not of Circular, which are violent and unnatural*. So indeed his words seem to run at first, that this Rule relates to *simple and undivided Bodies*; but then I say, it is of no use, as to the present *Phænomena*; and he speaks of *the Laws of such Motion as we may observe in Bodies*: which words signify nothing, unless his Law reaches to the Bodies now in being; and I see no reason for him to suppose *Circular Motion* to be any more repugnant to the Nature of *Matter*, than any other. *Regis* to avoid this, saith, *That Circular Motion is not Unnatural, but Accidental; and the state of the Body is to be taken from what it would be, if External Causes were removed; i. e. in a right Line*. But he doth not attend to the Consequences of this; for then the *Circular Motion* of the Heavens must be *Accidental*, and not under the care of Providence, or the immutable Will of God. For God's Will, he saith, is *that every Body be preserved in its own state*; now, saith he, *the state of a Body in motion is in a right line, and the endeavor of Nature is to keep to that*. Then say I, whatever *Motion* is against the state wherein Nature designs it, must be not only *Accidental* but *Violent*, because it is against the course of Nature. And if it be violent, it cannot be suppos'd to be under God's immutable Will; but if it be not *Violent*, then a Body in circular motion must endeavor to preserve it self in that state, and not to recede from it, as *Des Cartes* supposes.

Monf. *Du Hamel* objects against this Law, that *Permanent Beings* do indeed endeavor to preserve themselves in the state they are in; but it doth not hold in *Beings* that are successive; because the former are in their full state at first, but it is otherwise in successive. But saith *Regis*, *This doth not hinder them from not doing any thing to their destruction*. So that it is a plain case, no Body in *Motion* can tend to *Rest*, because *Motion* and *Rest* are contrary; and this is a Fundamental Law of Nature, for this weighty Reason.

The second Law is, *That all Motion, according to Nature, is in a right line, and that oblique and circular motion arises from the motion*

tion

tion and interposition of other Bodies; and whatever Body is moved circularly, hath a perpetual tendency to recede from the center of the circle it describes.

Now if this Rule had that evidence which is necessary to make it a fundamental Law of Motion, it must be proved either from the Nature of Matter and Motion, or from the immutable Will of God: The latter is not pretended to be proved, but only *from the immutability and simplicity of the operation whereby God doth preserve motion in matter; which only regards that very moment, without regard to what was before.* But how from hence it follows that Motion, which extends to more moments, should be determined one way rather than another, I cannot apprehend. For if the Motion be in a right line, it must be in more moments than one, as well as in a circle; and if it prove any thing, it is *that God preserves motion only in a point: but Des Cartes owns That it cannot be conceived in an instant, altho' in a right line.* How then comes Motion in a Right Line to come from God's Immutability, and not in a Circle? *Because it is determined in every instant towards a right line.* This ought to have been made more evident, than from the instance of the Sling: For the falling down of the Stone to the Earth, is certainly from another cause; viz. from the Principle of Gravitation, and not from the Inclination of matter to move in a right line. Neither can it be said to come from the Nature of Matter, or Motion: For a Circular Motion, hath as much the Nature and Definition of Motion, according to Des Cartes, as the other: and Matter is of it self indifferent, which way it moves; and some have thought Circular Motion more perfect, because they observ'd the motion of the Heavens to be so. But if it arises from the impediments of other Bodies, they must shew, that Matter was first put into motion in a streight line; and if God put all the parts of Matter at first into motion in a right line, how came the impediments to make it circular? For God preserves motion as he gave it; he first gave it in right lines, and his Will is immutable, therefore it must always so continue; and so Circular Motion will be impossible.

But let us suppose Circular Motion, how comes it to be so evident as to be made a Law of Nature, *That a Body in that motion always endeavors to recede from the center?* How is this consistent with the Principle of Gravitation and Attraction, which depends upon Mathematical Demonstrations? Can it be in the Nature of Bodies to tend to the center, and to recede from it at the same time? And it is a very improbable thing, that Gravity should be nothing else, but some Particles being not so quick in their motion from the center as others are, these being left in the lurch, and press'd by the motion of the other, do sink under them; and so come nearer to the center, which is all that Des Cartes means by Gravity. But of this afterwards.

The last Fundamental Law of Motion is, *That when a Body meets another, if it hath not a greater power to proceed in a right line than the other hath to hinder it, then it turns aside, but loseth not its motion; if it hath a greater force than the other, then it communicates its motion to the other, and loseth it self as much as*

Q

it gives. The reason given of this is, *Because it is the immutable Will of God, that the same quantity of motion shall be always preserved*: Of which I have spoken already. And as to the whole matter of these Laws of Motion, Mr. Boyle saith, *That they have been receiv'd by Learned Men, rather upon the Authority of so famous a Mathematician, than upon any convictive evidence which accompanies the Rules themselves.*

Mr. Boyle
of Venera-
tion, &c.
p. 41.

The next thing we are to do is, to see whether from these *Laws of Motion*, he gives a satisfactory Account of the making of the Universe.

And here we must consider the *Elements* out of which he supposeth it made, and the account of the things made out of them.

Princip.
Part. 3.
n. 48.

As to the *Elements*, this, in short, is his account of them. *The Particles of matter into which it was first divided, could not at first be round, because then there must be a vacuum between them; but they must by succession of time become round, because they had various circular motions (altho' the Natural Motion be in a Right Line, and God's immutable Will be that every thing should be preserved in its Natural state.) But that force which put them into these Notions, was great enough to wear off their Angles, and so they become round. Which being join'd together must leave some intervals, which were filled up by the filings off from the Angles; which were very small and of a figure fit to fill up all interstices, and were carried about with a very quick motion. So that here we have two Elements, one of the round Particles, and another of the subtile Æthereal matter, which came by the attrition of the first Particles. But besides these, there are others more gross and unapt for motion by their figure; and which make the third Element, and out of these, all the Bodies of the visible World are compos'd; the Sun and fixed Stars out of the first; the Heavens out of the second; and the Earth, with Comets and Planets out of the last.*

N. 49.

N. 52.

The main thing which makes this *Hypothesis* unsatisfactory to me is, that it is as precarious and groundless as the *Epicurean*, and they differ only as to the beginning of Motion; which the *Epicureans* suppose to belong to Matter, and *Des Cartes* saith, it comes from an infinite Agent distinct from it; because he supposes that it would not move of it self, unless it were put into motion. Which being set aside, there is no more of the Wisdom or Providence of God to be found in His making of the World than the others, nor any more evidence as to the Production of his Elements. For he first supposes, that there can be no *Vacuum* in Nature, which he proves only from his Mathematical Notion of Body consisting only in Extension; and from hence he undertakes to give an Account, not of God's creating the matter of the World at once, nor of his Production of things within six days; but how in process of time Particles of matter being divided would come to make up his several Elements. And for this, he makes use of several Suppositions without any ground of reason, but it must be so and no otherwise, which was the thing which he undertook to *Mersennus* to do. For what reason doth he give, that matter must be divided at first, in order to the production of the Elements? When there can be no *Division*, but there must be Inter-

Intervals between the Parts; and if all Matter be *One and the same*, and the Space of the Intervals be necessarily fill'd up with *Extended Matter*; what division of Parts could there be? And how can that Extension be divided into solid Bodies? *Des Cartes* grants, *That by Reason we cannot find out how big the parts of Matter were at first, how quick their motion, nor what kind of Circles they described.* Then it is impossible to find out by Reason how the world was made. For, if God, as he confesses, *might use innumerable ways of doing it, and we cannot tell which he pitched upon*; what a vain thing is it in any Man to undertake to give an Account how the World came to be form'd? And therefore *Robault* with great Judgment, pretends not to give an Account how Matter was form'd by God at the first Creation; but only to shew a possibility how it might be fram'd, so as to solve the Appearances of the World. But neither he nor *Des Cartes* can reconcile this primitive division of Matter into parts, with their original notion of Matter, which is nothing but *Extension*. But if Matter be so divided, as *Des Cartes* supposes, may we not reasonably conclude, that there were three such Elements as he speaks of? The Question is not, Whether there be not a Distinction of the Particles of Matter answerable to these three Elements, viz. a more subtle and Ethereal Substance, as in Fire; a less subtle and globular, as in Air; a grosser, as in Earth; which are most made according to these Principles, out of such different Particles: but the point is, Whether these Elements can be produc'd in such a manner by the mere Motion of Matter? And *Des Cartes* will by no means allow them to be made round, for fear of his *Vacuum*, which would spoil all, but *that by length of time they would become round; nay they must become round; Eas non potuisse successu temporis non fieri rotundas*, are his words. Now here lies the difficulty, to shew how these must become round by his own Laws of Motion, i. e. by a motion in a right line; for he saith, *It is done by various circular motions.* But how comes the Original Matter of it self to deviate from the fundamental Law of Motion? That is, from whence came these Circular motions, without which the Elements could not be form'd? And if the first Particles were so solid, as is suppos'd, how came the Angles to be worn off? For when two solid Bodies meet, according to his own Laws of Motion, the one communicates motion to the other, and loses of its own; which implies nothing but a mutual contact and rebounding upon the collision; but this doth by no means shew how these Bodies come to wear off each others Angles. And therefore this is only a product of fancy, but very necessary to his purpose. But let us suppose that by frequent collisions some alterations would be made in the figure of these Bodies; what a long time must it be before they become spherical? Too long to be consistent with such a thing as *Creation*; which at the same time is pretended to be believ'd. But the only agreeable Supposition to this is, The existence of matter from eternity, which having we know not how many Ages since been put into motion, then by a casual concurrence (for it was not by the Laws of Motion) these Particles jostling one against another, at last rubb'd off the uneven Particles, so as to make them round. But

Q 2

what

Part. 3.
n. 46.Traët.
Physic. c.
21. n. 6.

N. 42.

Enchirid.
Metaphys.
c. 16.
Huet Cens.
Philosoph.
Cartes. c. 6.
Regis Re-
ponse ch. 6.
Art. 2.

what quantity was there of such Particles in proportion to what was left? For it may easily be too great and so the first Element be too powerful for the second, as some have undertaken to demonstrate that it must be, upon *Des Cartes* his own grounds. And the Answer given is insufficient; because the Proportion of the first Element will still be too great, notwithstanding all the uses found out for it; and therefore *Robault* more wisely avoided these attempts of forming the World out of the first *Chaos* of confus'd matter, which he found could give no satisfaction.

Let us now in the last place come to the Account he gives of the *Phænomena of the Universe* according to these Principles. And because it would be too large a task to run thro' all, I shall confine my self to these following: (1) The formation of the Sun and Stars. (2) The motion of the Air. (3) The placing of the Earth. (4) The Mechanism of Animals.

I.
Princip.
Part. 3.
N. 54.

N. 88.

As to the formation of the Sun and Stars: which *Des Cartes* saith was in this manner; *That the matter of the first Element increas'd by the attrition of the particles of the second, and there being greater quantity of it than was necessary to fill up the interstices between the round particles of the second Element, the remainder went to the centers of the several Vortices.* But here arises a difficulty, which takes away any appearance of satisfaction in this matter; which is, That *Des Cartes* owns that in this matter of the first Element there are some parcels which are less divided and slower moved, having many Angles, and therefore unfit for motion. Now why should not these take up the Center of the Vortex, and not those which have a quicker Motion, and endeavor to recede from it? For we must observe, that *Des Cartes* supposes that these bigger fragments are mix'd with the lesser, and that they transfer their motion to them: according to the Laws of Nature (which serve his turn as he pleases) greater Bodies do easier transfer their motion to lesser, than receive motion from them. So that here we have these bigger fragments of the first Element mix'd with the lesser, and communicating their motion to them. Now, who could expect any other than that these should have fix'd in the centre of the Vortex? But if this be suppos'd, his whole Hypothesis is lost; for then the Sun and Stars must be Opaque, and not Luminous Bodies. But *Des Cartes* hath found out a notable Invention to send them far enough from the centre; which is, *That they move in the way between the Poles, towards the middle of the Heaven in a right line, and there are gathered into little masses, some from the North, and others from the South.* But when they are in the Body of the Sun or a Star, then they make those spots which hinder their Light, and are thrown off like a thick scum from heated Liquors. But when he assigns the reason of Gravity, he saith, *It comes from hence, that those particles which have a quicker motion press down those which are not so fit for it, and by that means they get nearer to the center.* How comes it then to be so much otherwise in these parts of the third Element; how come they not to be press'd down in the same Vortex towards the center? Especially when himself there saith, *That the particles of the first Element have more power to depress the earthy particles*

N. 89.

N. 91.
N. 94.

Princip.
Part. 4.
N. 23.

N. 25.

ticles than of the second, because they have more agitation; and here he speaks of the motion within the *Vortex*: So that according to his Principles, the matter of the third Element ought to subside and be near the center, being least apt for motion. But this would overthrow his whole Theory about the Sun and Stars; and about Light, and the spots of the Sun, and of Magnetic Particles, &c. so that these Particles of the third Element must be dispos'd of as he thinks fit, lest they put all out of order. And it is strange he should parallel the Scum made by the fermenting of Liquors, with the natural Motion of the Matter of his Elements. And if this Principle were true, that the Matter of the third Element might get above, and leave the thinner and more subtle Matter nearest the center, I do not see how the Earth could be habitable; for then we could breath nothing but thin and ethereal Air, which we could not bear. As appears by the famous instance of *Acosta*, who speaks by his own sad experience, as well as of others, that he was in great danger of his Life, by going over one of the highest Mountains of *Peru*. From whence it is observ'd, that the most subtle Air is too thin for Respiration. But how comes it to pass, according to these Principles, that the heavier part of the Air is most towards the center, and the lighter ascends highest? For Air, according to *Des Cartes*, is a Congeries of the Particles of the third Element very thin and dis-join'd; and yet we find this come nearer the center according to its Gravity; and the lighter Air goes higher, and hath very different effects on Mens Bodies, tho' the motion of it be not strong nor violent. For *Acosta* saith, That Air which is so fatal to passengers on those Mountains of *Peru* (which are so high, that he saith, the *Alps* and *Pyrenées* were but as ordinary Houses to lofty Towers) is so still, that it is but as a small Breath, neither strong nor violent; and yet it pierces so that it often kills Men without feeling, and makes their Hands and Toes drop off; as he affirms from his own knowledg.

From whence it appears to be a mere fetch in *Des Cartes* to keep these Particles of his third Element from being nearer to the center, altho' they are more weighty and indispos'd to motion than others are.

But his whole Hypothesis is overturn'd concerning the Celestial Bodies, if there be a Principle of Gravitation in Matter; which makes a Natural tendency towards the Center, according to the Quantity and Distance of it. The opinion of *Des Cartes* his great skill in Geometry, hath gone much farther towards persuading the World of the truth of his Theory, than any evidences that appear'd in his Principles themselves: For Men who are not deeply skill'd in those matters, are very apt to be sway'd by the Authority of those that are. But as it falls out in this case, we have this Theory of Gravitation fully demonstrated by a very Learned and Judicious Mathematician of our own, to whom I refer the Reader, who hath given a Mathematical Account of the Celestial Bodies; not only of the Sun and Stars, but of Comets, and the Moon, from the Principle of Gravitation; not inherent and essential to Mat-

Acosta of the Indies, l. 3. c. 9. Boyle's Experiments of Air, p. 182.

Princip. Part. 4. N. 45.

Newton Philosoph. Natural. Principia Mathem.

ter, but by a force given and directed by Divine Power and Wisdom. Which being granted, we have no reason to be displeas'd with the clearest Account can be given, in a Mathematical manner, of the chief *Phænomena* of the Universe. And the same Person saith, *He hath many Reasons to suspect that the rest may depend upon some secret Powers, by which the Particles of matter do either cohere or fly from each other; for want of the knowledge whereof, Philosophers have hitherto blunder'd in Natural Philosophy.* But we proceed in *Des Cartes* his Account of his *Cælestial Vortices*.

FINIS.

J

ADDITIONAL B.

F

Forrestal
ANNEX
1986

